Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322 (1988)(modified by Rule 119 Sec.

3 (e)
FACTS:
During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the Crime of Homicide. Respondent
Judge issued an order stating that the accused admits in open court that he killed the deceased but
that he acted in self-defense hence the defense counsel should first prove evidence in self-defense
and then prosecution to present its evidence to disprove the same.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration contending that the Court action was violative of Section 3,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which establishes the sequence in the presentation of evidence by
the parties in criminal cases, first by the prosecution and then by the defense, and not vice versa.
Additionally, petitioner claimed that the procedure adopted by respondent Judge is prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused in the sense that the same would give rise to the presumption that
the prosecution had already established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt when
what is only on record is the accuseds admission that he had killed the victim in self defense.

ISSUE: WON the judges order requiring the defense to present first after the accused entered a
plea of guilty was violative of the latters right to be presumed innocent?
HELD: YES. Enshrined in our Constitution as a protection to accused persons in criminal cases is
the requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law. That requirement simply requires that the procedure established by law shall be
followed. 4Section 3 of Rule 119 lays down the order of trial when an accused entered a plea of not
guilty- the prosecution first and then defense.
The procedure outlined safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. That right is founded on the principle of justice and is
intended not to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human agencies can, the conviction of an
innocent person. 6 Indeed, the form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest; 7 the orderly
course of procedure requires that the prosecution shall go forward and present all of its proof in the
first instance.
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil.404 (1910), relied upon by the prosecution and
the trial Court, the defense had produced its proofs before the prosecution presented its case, and it
was held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. There is one radical difference,
however, since in that case, no objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure
followed in the presentation of proof. In this case, the change in order of trial made by
respondent Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense.
G.R. No. L-66497-98 July 10, 1986

VIRGILIO V. SACAY, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

FERIA, J.:p

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Sandiganbayan. Although petitioner
did not join the People of the Philippines as party respondent, it is necessarily impleaded as such.
Petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) separate crimes of homicide in the
dispositive portion of the decision which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 5003, accused PAT. VIRGILIO SACAY Y

VALDEZ is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

With the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public position and
absent any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, said accused is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the heirs
of the deceased PATERNO N. LERMA:

P15,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the said deceased;

P1,650.00 as actual damages;

P24,600.00 a compensatory damages representing the lost earning capacity of

the same deceased; and

P5,000.00 as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 5004, accused Pat. Virgilio Sacay Y Valdez is also found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of a separate crime of Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

With the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his public
position, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer another indeterminate penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum, to pay to the heirs of
the deceased, ANTONIO N. TAPACE:

P15,000.00 as indemnity for the death of said victim;

P3,683.40 as actual damages;

 P34,800.00 as compensatory damages, representing the lost earning capacity of
the said deceased for a period of 29 years; and

P5,000.00 as moral damages.

Subject .22 caliber paltik revolver marked Exhibit "II" together with the three (3) live
ammunitions and one (1) used cartridge contained in an envelope marked Exhibit
"12" and four (4) test shells are hereby confiscated in favor of the government. Let
the same be brought to the Firearm Section of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, Metro Manila, for disposition in accordance with law. 1

Arraigned on February 24, 1982 in both cases, the accused entered a plea of Not Guilty after which,
upon motion of the prosecution and without objection from the accused, joint trial was held. 2

Petitioner Virgilio V. Sacay was a Patrolman in the Western Police District, Masinop Street, Tondo,
Manila. he was on duty on April 12, 1979, the date of the riot incident in Don Bosco Compound in
Tondo, Manila, he admitted having shot with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver Antonio
Tepace and Paterno N. Lerma who were among the rioters, but invoked self-defense and fulfillment
of duty to justify his act of shooting said deceased.

As correctly stated by, respondent Court: "Having admitted the two gun-shot killings charged, the
accused assumed the burden of showing legal justification therefore. He has to substantiate the
justifying circumstance invoked, He 's called upon to spell out and describe, convincing how, he
acted in complete self-defense and/or due fulfillment of official duty, as claimed by him; otherwise,
he must suffer all the consequences of his malefaction. And he has to rely on the qualitative and
quantitative strength of his own evidence; not on the weakness of the prosecution; for even it were
weak it could not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killings. 3

The first witness for the prosecution in the killing of the deceased was Veneranda Lagrimas. As
summarized by the Sandiganbayan, her testimony was as follows:

She narrated that as she was outside the church near Marcos Road, some twenty
(20) meters from the NHA and NHCC Compound, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of April 15, 1979, Patrolman Virgilio Sacay shot Antonio Tepace inside the
Don Bosco Compound near said Church. Many people, including Boy Rodrigo, were,
then playing basketball inside the Don Bosco compound, she recalled. 4

Her testimony was, however, cut short when the defense admitted the killings in question and the
prosecution asked that the reverse procedure be adopted as in the other cases in that court. Justice
Rallos commented that it would be improper for the Court to provide or suggest the procedure to
follow. Thereafter, the prosecutor opted to submit the case on the basis of the admission of the
accused, but without prejudice to presenting the medical certificates on rebuttal. Witness Lagrimas
was discharged. 5 To prove civil liability, Leonida Nubio Tepace, mother of Antonio N. Tepace, and
Francisca Lerma Y. Naldo; mother of Paterno N. Lerma, were placed on the witness stand. 6

With the admission thus made by the defense, the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses and
its documentary evidence consisting of Exhibit "A", death certificate of Paterno N. Lerma; Exhibit "B";
death certificate of Antonio N. Tepace; Exhibit "C", post mortem findings on the body of Antonio N.
Tepace and Exhibit "D", post mortem findings on the body of Paterno N. Lerma, the prosecution
closed its evidence in chief. 7

For the defense, the following testimonies were also summarized by the trial court, as follows:
Testimony of Juanito Yang, member of WPD and assigned with the Homicide Investigation Section:

He prepared on April 16, 1979, the report marked Exhibit "1" and took down the
statement of Alfredo Madrigo (Exhibit "2"), of Robert Catangjas (Exhibit "3") and of
Leonila Galit (Exhibit "4"). A s stated in the report Exhibit " I ", he received from Pfc.
Cabildo in the afternoon of April 15, 1979 the 10-inch long knife (Exhibit "5") together
with a firearm which he submitted for ballistic examination per receipt (Exhibit "7").
According to Pfc. Cabildo, the aforesaid knife and firearm were confiscated by
Patrolman Virgilio Sacay during a gang war inside the Don Bosco compound in
Tondo, Manila. In connection with the shooting of Antonio N. Tepace and Paterno N.
Lerma, he invited Pat. Virgilio Sacay for investigation but the latter refused to give
any written statement. The accused opted, instead to submit the affidavit (Exhibit "6")
rather than to be interrogated.

As the investigator designated to look into the case, he went to and saw at the Tondo
General Hospital the cadavers of Paterno Lerma and Antonio Tepace bearing tatoo
marks of BCJ as indicated in the third paragraph (Exhibit "I-A") of Exhibit "I". Starting
the investigation of the incident at bar in the afternoon of April 15, 1979, he prepared
his report (Exhibit "1") the following day. It was 1:00 to 2:00 a.m. of April 16, 1979
that the accused presented the already finished affidavit (Exhibit "6"). He interviewed
not only Madrigo and Catangjas but also Pat. Rodolfo Amado, the one who
dispatched Sacay to verify a reported rioting at the scene of the incident in question.
Pat. Amado sent only Sacay because it was just for the purpose of verifying the
veracity, of said report. 8

Testimony of Bonifacio Abao, Jr. Y Rom, security guard of Don Bosco Youth Center.

Bonifacio Abao, Jr. Y Rom, security guard of Don Bosco Youth Center whose tour
of duty on April 15, 1979 was from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., Identified his "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" of May 8, 1981, marked Exhibit "8" and reaffirmed its contents. He
narrated that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 15th he phoned Police
Station I about a brewing confrontation between the warring Sigue Sigue-Sputnik and
Batang City Jail Gangs which were outside the Don Bosco compound, with the latter
positioning themselves at Marcos Road and the former along Carlos P. Garcia
Street, Tondo, Manila. Respondent to his call for police intervention Patroman Sacay
arrived in civilian clothes. Sacay was the lone policeman to show up at the place
where the rioters were already shouting and throwing stones and darts at each other.
The first thing Sacay did was to fire two warning shots and Identify himself as a
peace officer by shouting " I am a policeman." Then, he ordered the fight to stop but,
instead five of the rioters one of whom holding a revolver and a bladed weapon, ran
towards and unsuccessfully tried twice to stab Sacay who shot and felled the said
aggressor. At the precise moment when the said aggressor named "Fernando" was
thrusting a bladed instrument towards Sacay, and the latter fired at the former, the
two were just 3 & 1/2 feet apart. After hearing two more gun rapports, two men fell
but did not see any particular person being hit by Sacay's tirades. Others docked and
ultimately surrendered, this witness who claims to have been twenty meters from the
protagonists, recounted.

Cross-examination elicited from witness that after firing the last shot, Sacay stood up
and ordered the trouble makers to stop even as some of them were running. He did
not notice Sacay leaving the crime scene because when people were coming, he
was preoccupied closing the gate of the Don Bosco compound. He did not also see
 what ride was used by Sacay who was alone. He could not tell if Sacay fired
immediately but he did observe that Sacay fired only after the aggressor's second
thrust towards Sacay. He heard a shot and saw Sacay shooting the fellow. There
were four shots, all in all witness said. 9

Testimony of Ramon Pintado y Baguio, Ballistician or Firearm Identification Technician, WPD

Evidence Laboratory:

Ramon Pintado y Baguio, ballistician or firearm Identification, technician of WPD's

Evidence Laboratory, also mounted the witness stand for the defense to state that on
April 20, 1979, Cpl. Yang requested ballistic examination of a .38 caliber revolver
with Serial Number SN-243277 used by Pat. Virgilio Sacay on April 15, 1979 in
repelling aggression coming from Antonio Tepace and Paterno Lerma. Subject
firearm was accompanied with the "Reference Slip" marked Exhibit "9". Then, on
April 24, or four days later, Yang was back to ask ballistic examination also of a .22
caliber Magnum revolver having serial No. SN-2424 (Exhibit "11") with three (3)
rounds of live ammo and one (1) fired cartridge contained in the envelope marked
Exhibit "12". The subsequent request was embodied in the "Reference Slip" marked
Exhibit "10". Placed in another envelope marked Exhibit "13 " are two (2) test shells
and two (2) test bullets utilized for the examination of subject .22 caliber revolver, the
result of which ballistic test is shown in the findings and conclusions (Exhibit "14-B")
in the Laboratory Report No. 5790.

As thus requested, he conducted on May 7, 1979 the desired ballistic examination for
the purpose of determining whether the .22 caliber discharged cartridge with the
initial "JY" was fired from the said .22 caliber paltik revolver bearing Serial Number
2424. The spent cartridge was found inside the chamber of subject firearm but no
spent bullet from the same gun was submitted to him for examination, this witness
revealed. 10

Testimony of Virgilio Sacay y Valdez, accused member of the Western Police District:

On April 15, 1979, he was a station reserve from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. In the
afternoon, he was instructed by the Actg. Desk Officer, Patrolman Amado Adolfo, to
verify a phoned report regarding a riot at the Don Bosco premises in Barangay
Magsaysay Tondo, Manila. Right away, he boarded a passenger jeepney. He was
alone and in plain clothes. Upon arrival at the reported scene of trouble, shooting of
darts between members of the Sigue Sigue-Sputnik gang and Batang City Jail gang
was taking place. He knew the identity of the warring groups because he grew up in
the area. At the right side facing north were members of the Sigue Sigue-Sputnik
gang. On the left side of the Don Bosco compound were those belonging to the
Batang City Jail gang. He entered the compound via the left gate (the right gate was
closed) and met Virginia Nacar who told him that the throwing of stones and darts by
about twenty (20) people had been going on for quite a time. Among the people
involved were Paterno Lerma, Antonio Tepace, Alfredo Mondrigo and Roberto
Catangjas. Closing in on the protagonists, he identified himself as a policeman and
fired two warning shots.

After the warning shots were fired, members of the Sigue Sigue-Sputnik gang
dispersed They ran towards the right gate of the Don Bosco compound. But
members of the Batang City Jail Gang ran to the place-where he was and one of
them, Paterno Lerma who was only an arm's length away, lunged an 8-inch knife at
 him. Luckily, he was able to evade the thrust by moving backward. In so stepping to
the rear, however, a big stone blocked his leg, causing him to sit on the buttocks and
while in such position Lerma approached at the left and as he (accused) stood up,
Lerma tried once more to stab him with the same weapon; and so he fired his service
gun at Lerma who was mortally hit.

Denying the imputation that he shot Paterno Lerma when the latter was kneeling
down, the accused went on to narrate that after Lerma was fatally wounded, Antonio
Tepace, Lerma's gangmate, shot him (accused) with a .22 caliber magnum revolver
from a distance of two meters but missed him so that to protect his life, he fired back
at Tepace who thereafter slumped on the ground.

To reinforceable theory of self-defense and fulfillment of duty, the accused also

declared that the .22 caliber magnum revolver (Exhibit "11") with three (3) live ammo
and one spent shell (Exhibit "12") was picked up from the ground near the hands of
the deceased Antonio Tepace and the knife (Exhibit "5") was taken near the hands of
Paterno Lerma inside the Don Bosco compound that afternoon of April 15, 1979.
Investigated later by P/Cpl. Johnny Yang of WPD's Homicide Section. on the same
day of the unfortunate happening, he gave the affidavit (Exhibit "G") to said police
investigator. To the Tanodbayan, he turned in the counter-affidavit (Exhibit "18")
including the annexes marked Exhibits "18-A" to "18-D" pertaining to the derogatory
police and court records of the deceased Paterno Lerma and Antonio Tepace who
were full of tatoo marks of the Batang City Jail Gang.

Such in a nutshell was the tale of the accused before the court. 11

Testimony of Eusebio Arguelles y Magpantay, police chemist of Manila's finest

He testified that Patrolman Rodolfo Buenaventura who is now retired, was under his
administrative supervision. Upon the request of P/Cpl. Yang, Buenaventura
subjected to paraffin test the body of the late Antonio Tepace about 7:30 in the
afternoon of April 16, 1979 at the Capitol Memorial Chapel Although he did not
actually see the written request of P/Cpl. Yang therefore, Buenaventura informed him
of the paraffin test thus made whereby the latter took a paraffin cast from the dorsal
side of the right and left hands of Antonio Tepace. Thereafter, he conducted thereon
a diphenylamine test which gave positive reaction to the presence of nitrates or
nitrites, a finding mentioned in that portion marked Exhibit "16-1" of the laboratory
report marked Exhibit "16".

The witness pointed to Exhibits "17" and "17-A" as the patterns of the right and left
hands of Antonio Tepace y Nubia.

On cross-examination, he opined that the presence of nitrates on the dorsal side of the right hand of
Antonio Tepace could have been caused by gun powder residues. Because of the possibility of
contamination upon touching any object, the palm of subject cadaver was not examined anymore,
he justified. Told that the deceased Antonio Tepace died a day before the paraffin examination was
made, he did not discount the possibility that during the 24-hour period following the death of
Antonio Tepace, the dead man's hand could have been used by someone to fire a gun thereby
rendering the dorsal side of such hand positive of nitrates. 12

Testimony of Veneranda P. Lagrimas, on rebuttal for the Prosecution:

 Veneranda P. Lagrimas testified that at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April
15, 1979, she was in the church near Don Bosco compound in Tondo to fulful her
Sunday obligation. While outside the said church, she saw Patrolman Sacay, the
accused herein, alighting from a passenger jeepney. There was no clash between
the Sigue Sigue Sputnik gang and the Batang City Jail gang, she said. According to
her, upon the arrival of the accused at the place of the incident complained of, he did
not say "magsitigil kayo, pulls ako, si Sacay ako" but said "magsilapit kayo" and
commanded the three persons, including Antonio Tepace, to "raise your hands,
kneel, he flat on your stomach" which order the three obeyed. The accused fired no
seaming shot; he aimed his gun at the people. Paterno Lerma was unarmed, had no
knife and never lunged any knife at the accused who shot Lerma even as Lerma was
running away with face looking backward at the accused, witness recalled.

As regards the deceased, Antonio Tepace, she categorically revealed that the latter
was equally unarmed. He never fired, had no gun to fire and was actually lying flat on
his stomach with hands stretched forward when fatally shot by the accused, she
recounted. Shown Exhibit "F", she acknowledged the same to be the sworn
statement she executed in connection with the shooting incident at bar. She affirmed
the truth of its contents.

On cross-examination, she went on to state that she had known the late Antonio
Tepace even prior to April 15, 1979 because he used to buy viand in her house. But
she never saw Paterno Lerma alive. He was already dead when she saw his lifeless
body. As to why she failed to present herself for police investigation not long after the
tragic happening under inquiry, she pointed out that it was her impression that no
complaint would even be filed in relation thereto. It was only when the mother of
Antonio Tepace was crying over lack of witnesses to testify against the feared
accused that she became aware of the intention of the bereaved family to sue. So,
three days later, she was accompanied to the police station by the sorrowful mother
of Antonio Tepace and, then and there, she executed her affidavit (Exhibit "F").

More on the environmental facts surrounding the shooting litigated upon, she further
divulged that there were a lot of churchgoers and no basketball game was being
played at the time because a Sunday afternoon mass was about to begin. 13

Testimony of Dr. Luis Larion y Craig, medicolegal officer of the Western Police District, sur-rebuttal
witness for the defense:

Sometime in April, 1979, he performed post-mortem examination and autopsy on the

cadaver of the deceased, Antonio Tepace, and in the course thereof, recovered a
bullet embedded in the head of said victim who sustained two gunshot wounds, one
of which was just a "grazing gunshot wound." The bullet was without a point of exit,
he ventilated.

Judging from the trajectory of the bullet, he ruled out the infliction of such a wound on a victim lying
face down. The kind of wound sustained by Antonio Tepace could be possible if the assailant was in
front and the head of the victim was raised upward by about a foot, making it almost perpendicular to
the ground, the doctor theorized. 14

The Sandiganbayan, giving credence to the lone testimony of the prosecution witness and finding
the version of the defense too incredible and repugnant to human experience, convicted the accused
as charged. 15
Hence this petition, with the following assignment of errors:

(a) There has been an error by the Court in giving weight and evidentiary worth to
conjectures and beliefs in finding the accused guilty of the offenses charged against
him; the decision is not based on the evidence adduced;

(b) There has been an error by the Court in utterly ignoring and disregarding all the
evidence adduced by the accused;

(c) There has been an error by the Court in giving too much weight and reliance on
the testimony of Veneranda Lagrimas, the lone witness for the prosecution whose
testimony is never free from serious legal defects; and

(d) There has been a serious error in the trial of these cases in the sense that the
Order of Trial provided for in Section 3, Rule 119 of the New Rules of Court had
never been observed, thus depriving this accused of the right to due process of
law. 16

The accused begs, in the interest of justice and fair play, that all the evidences presented be fairly
and justly evaluated through this sought-for judicial review by this Honorable Court. 17

The first three errors assigned question the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court while the
fourth raises the denial of procedural due process to the accused.

In his comment, the Solicitor General maintains that petitioner's contentions raise the question of
sufficiency of evidence upon which his conviction is predicated and necessarily a question of fact.
However, because of the sufficiency of evidence against the accused, said question of fact cannot
be transformed into one of law under the exceptions as have been noted by this Court by which a
question of fact may be passed upon even under a petition for certiorari.

Accordingly, the Solicitor General supports the view of respondent Court that the version of
petitioner as to how he shot the two victims to death is unworthy of credence, so that the plea of self-
defense is not established by clear and convincing evidence. He adds that there was no denial-of
due process to the accused as there was no reverse order of trial followed, but on the contrary the
order of trial as provided in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court was religiously observed. 18

The main issue in this petition is whether or not petitioner has convincingly established that he acted
in self-defense and/or in fulfillment of duty. Relative thereto, petitioner also claims that he has been
deprived of procedural due process.

We shall deal first with the procedural issue.

At the initial hearing, the testimony of Veneranda Lagrimas was interrupted when the accused,
through his counsel, admitted that he shot the deceased Tepace and Lerma, but invoked self-
defense and fulfillment of duty. The prosecution then moved that the reverse procedure be adopted
in view of the admission that the accused shot the deceased. No objection was interposed by the
accused or his counsel. After presenting Mrs. Leonida N. Tepace and Mrs. Francisco Lerma Y.
Naldo to prove damages and the death and medical certificates of the deceased, the prosecution
rested.
Petitioner claims that the order of trial provided in Section 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court was not
followed and in support of his claim quotes the ruling of this Court in the case of Alejandro vs.
Pepito, as follows:

It behooved respondent Judge to have followed the sequence of trial set forth. That
procedure observes in the words of Chief Justice Fernando, the 'Mandate of reason
and the guarantee of fairness with which due process is Identified.' The procedure
outlined safeguards and protects the fundamental right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. That right is founded on the principle
of justice and is intended not to protect the guilty but to prevent as far as human
agencies can, the conviction of an innocent person. Indeed, the form of a trial is also
a matter of public order and interest; the orderly course of procedure requires that
the prosecution shall go forward and present all of its proof in the first instance. 19

However, this ruling is not applicable in the case at bar inasmuch as the accused did not object to
the procedure followed. In the above-cited case of Alejandro vs. Pepito, this Court also stated:

It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 (1910), relied upon by the
prosecution and the trial Court, the defense had produced its proofs before the
prosecution presented its case, and it was held that no substantial rights of the
accused were prejudiced. There is one radical difference, however, since in that
case, no objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure followed in the
presentation of proof. In this case, the change in order of trial made by respondent
Judge was promptly and timely objected to by the defense. 20

It should be noted that this procedure is now expressly sanctioned in Section 3(e), Rule 119 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:

However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified
accordingly.

We shall now deal with the main issue-the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence of self-defense and/or
fulfillment of duty.

After petitioner had presented his evidence, the prosecution presented its sole rebuttal witness,
Veneranda Lagrimas, who disputed the testimony of petitioner. At the close of her direct examination
she was asked to confirm the truth of the contents of her sworn statement, Exhibit "F", which she did,
after which the following took place:

PJ PAMARAN

Cross examination?

ATTY. SANCHEZ

If Your Honor please, I think this is the only witness for the
prosecution. In order to give the accused, Your Honor, the prepared
cross-examination.... I am not or I was not able to read all the
stenographic notes neither all the affidavit, may I be given an
opportunity....
 PJ PAMARAN

Denied. You cross examination her based on that, Proceed. 21

Atty. Demetrio Sanchez, an attorney of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, who had been
appointed counsel de oficio for petitioner upon the withdrawal of counsel de parte, Atty. Santiago
Inoferio, on the ground of a permanent ailment, should have been given a little time to prepare for
cross-examination. Moreover, in the case of People vs. Estenzo, this Court frowned upon the
procedure proposed by counsel for the defense of submitting the affidavits of his witnesses subject
to cross-examination by the prosecution, and stated:

There is an additional advantage to be obtained in requiring that the direct testimony

of the witness be given orally in court. Rules governing the examination of witnesses
are intended to protect the rights of litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the
business of the courts. Under the rules, only questions directed to the eliciting of
testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent
to prove, the issue of the case, may be propounded to the witness. A witness may
testify only on those facts which he knows of his own knowledge. Thus, on direct
examination, leading questions are not allowed, except on preliminary matters, or
when there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answer from the witness who is
ignorant, a child of tender years, or feeble-minded, or a deaf-mute. (Section 5, Rule
132, of the Rules of Court.) It is obvious that such purpose may be subverted, and
the orderly dispatch of the business of the courts thwarted, if trial judges are allowed,
as in the case at bar, to adopt any procedure in the presentation of evidence other
than what is specifically authorized by the Rules of Court. 22

Similarly, Veneranda Lagrimas should have been examined directly on the statements in her
affidavit.

Respondent Sandiganbayan gave credence to the testimony of Veneranda Lagrimas and found "the
version of the defense too incredible and repugnant to human experience to induce faith and
reliance.

It is well settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court)
are conclusive on the parties and on this Court, 23 unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellees; 24 (7) the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of facts are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; 25 (10) the
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by evidence on record. 26

The same exceptions apply to the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan. As this Court stated in the
case of Cesar vs. Sandiganbayan "Considering further that no less than three senior members of
this Court, Justices Teehankee, Makasiar and Fernandez dissented from the Court's opinion in
Nuez (111 SCRA 433) partly because of the absence of an intermediate appeal from
Sandiganbayan, this Court has been most consistent in carefully examining all petitions seeking the
review of the special court's decisions to ascertain that the fundamental right to be presumed
innocent is not disregarded. This task has added a heavy burden to the workload of this Court but it
is a task which is steadfastly
discharged. 27

Since the testimony of Veneranda Lagrimas is the only evidence of the prosecution to rebut the
evidence of petitioner, it becomes necessary to scrutinize the same carefully.

Moreover, this witness volunteered to testify only about five (5) months after the incident when she
executed her affidavit on September 14, 1979. Asked why it took her so long a time to go to the
police headquarters, she replied: "Because I thought the relatives of Antonio Tepace would not file a
complaint. 28

In the case of People vs. Mula Cruz, it was held that the long delay of forty-two (42) days after the
incident by a witness, an Army man, in reporting a crime to the authorities, not caused by threat,
intimidation or coercion, rendered the evidence for the prosecution insufficient to establish
appellant's guilty connection to the requisite moral certainty. 29

The fact that there was a riot going on at the Don Bosco Youth Center in Tondo and that petitioner
was dispatched to proceed to the place and investigate the incident was clearly established by the
testimonies of Corporal Juanito Yang and the Security Guard, Bonifacio Abao. 30 And yet,
Lagrimas denied that there was a clash between the two gangs in the Don Bosco compound. 31

On May 31, 1982, Lagrimas testified that before the shooting there were many people who were
playing basketball, 32 but on June 13, 1983, she stated that no basketball game was going on that
afternoon and that the people were to enter the church to attend mass. 33

More significant is the fact that according to Lagrimas, Antonio Tepace was lying flat on his stomach
with his hands stretched forward when he was shot. 34 This is contradicted by the expert testimony
of Dr. Luis Larion, medicolegal officer of the Western Police District, who testified on sur-rebuttal as
follows:

ATTY. SANCHEZ

Q But having examined the deceased, could you tell this Honorable
Court what was the relative position of the deceased when he was
shot at?

A The relative position of the deceased in relation with the assailant

when he was shot was that, if they were both on standing position,
the assailant could have been in a higher elevation . . . . in relation
with the victim. That is assuming that both were standing, that the
assailant could have been in a higher elevation, if they are both
facing each other.

ATTY. SANCHEZ

Q Now Doctor, a prosecution witness, Veneranda Lagrimas Pepito,

when she testified before this Honorable tribunal in rebuttal evidence,
stated in answer to a question of the prosecutor that the deceased
Tepace was lying flat on his stomach with his hands stretched
forward. My question, sir, is, considering the entry of the bullet wound
 that you found, is it possible that the deceased was in this position
when he was shot at?

FISCAL VIERNES

I object, the question is misleading because the witness Lagrimas

stated in her testimony that the deceased was lying down flat on his
back but his head was rifted. It was looking up.

ATTY. SANCHEZ

Yes, but in the stenographic notes it shows that it was not so stated,
Your Honor.

FISCAL VIERNES

The deceased lifted his head.

PJ PAMARAN

What does your note say?

ATTY. SANCHEZ

The stenographic notes says that Tepace was lying flat on his
stomach with his hands outstretched forward.

PJ PAMARAN

Answer.

WITNESS

A With that position, it is not possible. 35

On the other hand, the testimony of petitioner was corroborated by the testimony of Bonifacio
Abao, the security guard of Don Bosco Youth Center.

Ramon Pintado, Ballistic expert of the Western Police District, testified that the .22 caliber empty
shell (Exhibit "12") had been discharged or fired from the .22 caliber paltik Magnum revolver (Exhibit
"11") which had been submitted to him for examination by Corporal Yang. 36 This was the revolver
which petitioner testified had been fired at him by Antonio Tepace.

Eusebio Arguelles, Police Chemist, testified that the right hand, dorsal side, of Tepace was positive
for the presence of nitrates or nitrites, a strong indication that the deceased had recently fired a
gun. 37

Of course, one cannot discount the possibility that the knife (Exhibit "5") which petitioner testified
was used by Paterno Lerma in attacking him, and the gun (Exhibit "11") were planted evidence. Nor
can one easily dispel the nagging suspicion that the deceased were "salvaged". But possibilities and
suspicions are not evidence. That respondent Court harbored such suspicions may be gleaned from
the following statements in its decision, to wit:

... What is more, the accused also admitted that his place of abode is only a
barangay away from the residence of Lerma and Tepace for the past ten (10) years
he had known and used to see them. The existence of ill-feeling or grudge between
the deceased and the accused is not, therefore, improbable; and the actuations of
the accused at the crime scene that afternoon of April 15, 1979 could have been far
from being impersonal. He could have been laboring under some prejudice or bad
impression against some people in that area where he spent many years of
childhood. 38

This conclusion is not supported by the evidence as shown by the following:

ATTY. INOFERIO:

q Now Mr. Witness, you have known previously this Tepace and
Lerma, is that correct?

a Yes, sir.

q For how long have you known them?

a About 10 years ago, sir.

PJ PAMARAN:

q Those two belong to one gang?

a Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PURISIMA:

q What gang?

a Batang City Jail, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MOLINA:

q Would you say that they also knew you for the same period of
time'.;

a Yes, Your Honor.

q And they know you to be a member of the Western Police District?

a Yes, Your Honor.

 q And during that ten-years period that you knew each other until
April 15, 1979, had there been any untoward incident between you
and these two?

a So far, none, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MOLINA:

q There had been no ill-feelings between you and these two

deceased persons?

a None, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PURISIMA:

q You are neighbors?

a One barangay away, Your Honor. 39

JUSTICE MOLINA:

q By the way, what is your educational attainment?

a I am a graduate of Criminology, Your Honor.

Respondent Court also had to resort to speculation when it attempted to reconcile the testimony of
Lagrimas with the expert testimony of Dr. Luis Larion, as follows:

... The late Antonio N. Tepace lay flat on his stomach as ordered by the accused but
while listening and talking to the accused who was in front of him, he could have
raised his head such that when he was fatally shot his (victim's) head was almost
perpendicular to the ground. 40

Prejudice against petitioner is shown by the following incident when petitioner presented Police
Chemist Eusebio Arguelles as one of his witnesses.

AJ PURISIMA:

Q But you are not testifying in your own capacity. You were hired to
testify here by the defense.

A I was subpoenaed, Your Honor.

Q You were sent here by your Chief?

A I am the Chief of the Section.

Q What about your Chief of Police? You are testifying against the
prosecution now, is it not?
 A Not exactly, sir. I win be testifying on my findings based on the
incident. 41

Well established is the rule that every circumstance favorable to the accused should be duly taken
into account, The evidence against him must survive the test of reason. The strongest suspicion
must not be allowed to sway judgment. In brief, We are not morally certain of the guilt of petitioner,

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is reversed and the petitioner is acquitted, with
costs de officio.

G.R. No. 190321 April 25, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
SAMMY UMIPANG y ABDUL, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

SERENO, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal from the 21 May 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 affirming
the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Cases No.
14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG.2 The RTC Decision convicted Sammy Umipang y Abdul
(Umipang) for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. 9165),
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Facts

The pertinent facts, as determined by the CA, are quoted as follows:

Acting on a tip from a confidential informant that a person named Sam was selling drugs along
Cagayan de Oro Street in Maharlika Village, Taguig City, a buy-bust team from the [Station Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAID-SOTF)] of the Taguig City Police was
dispatched on April 1, 2006 at around 6:00 in the evening. [Police Officer (PO) 2] Gasid was
assigned to act as poseur buyer and he was given a P 500.00 marked money. The operation was
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

Upon arrival at the area, PO2 Gasid and the confidential informant sauntered the length of the street
while the other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. The confidential informant
saw the man called Sam standing near a store. The confidential informant and PO2 Gasid then
approached Sam. Straight off, the confidential informant said "Sam, pa-iskor kami." Sam replied
"Magkano ang iiskorin nyo?" The confidential informant said "Five hundred pesos." Sam took out
three (3) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance with various price tags500, 300, and
100. After making a choice, PO2 Gasid handed the marked P 500.00 to Sam who received the
same.

Upon receipt by Sam of the marked money, PO2 Gasid took off his cap as the pre-arranged signal
that the sale had been consummated. Sensing danger, Sam attempted to flee but PO2 Gasid
immediately grabbed and arrested Sam. In a few seconds, the rest of the buy-bust team [comprised
of their team leader, Police Senior Inspector (PS/INSP.) Obong, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1
Mendiola, PO3 Hajan, PO3 Maglana, PO3 Salem, and PO1 Ragos] joined them. PO1 Ragos
handcuffed Sam. Five (5) more plastic sachets containing the same white crystalline substance were
recovered from Sam. PO2 Gasid marked the items with the initials "SAU" [which stood for Sammy A.
Umipang, the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-appellant]. Sam was forthwith
brought to the police station where he was booked, investigated and identified as accused-appellant
Sammy Umipang y Abdul. PO2 Gasid then brought the confiscated items to the crime laboratory for
testing. The specimens all tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, popularly known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug.

On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his brother Nash Rudin
Umipang. According to them:

In the evening of April 1, 2006, while they were sleeping, accused-appellant and his family were
awakened by loud knocking on the door. The persons outside shouted "Mga pulis kami. Buksan mo
ang pinto kung hindi gigibain namin ito." Accused-appellant obliged and opened the door. Five (5)
policemen barged into his house and pointed a gun at him. Against his will and amid the screams of
his wife, accused-appellant was brought to a waiting vehicle and brought to the police headquarters.
At the Taguig Police station, PO2 Gasid tried to extort from him P 100,000.00 for his release. He
denied the charges and that the alleged evidence were all "planted" by the police.3

Consequently, the following charges were brought against Umipang:

That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by
law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell deliver and give away to poseur buyer
PO2 Ruchyl Gasid, one heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.05 gram of white
crystalline substance, which substance was found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride also known as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of P 500.00,
in violation of the above-cited law.

That on or about the 1st day of April 2006, in the City of Taguig, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having been authorized by
law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and have in his custody and
control five (5) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets, each containing 0.05 gram, 0.05 gram, 0.05
gram, 0.04 gram and 0.04 gram with a total weight of 0.23 gram of white crystalline substance,
which substances were found positive to the tests for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride also known
as "shabu" a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.

RTC Ruling

In its 24 July 2007 Joint Decision, the Pasig City RTC found accused-appellant guilty of violating
Section 5 (Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals) and Section 11
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of R.A. 9165. The RTC gave more weight to the
testimonies of the arresting officers on how they conducted the buy-bust operation than to accused-
appellants claim of frame-up by the police. Thus, for violating Section 5 (Criminal Case No. 14935-
D-TG), Umipang was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 500,000. For
violating Section 11 (Criminal Case No. 14936-D-TG), he was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fourteen (14) years one
(1) day as maximum and to pay a fine of P 300,000.

CA Ruling

In its 21 May 2009 Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the 24 July 2007 Joint Decision of the RTC.
According to the appellate court, the elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal
possession and sale of dangerous drugs were present and established. Thus, it no longer disturbed
the RTCs assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, the CA found
that there was no showing of improper motive on the part of the police officers. With the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties, it ruled against the denials of accused-appellant,
and his defense of frame-up.

We have consistently declared that a review of the factual findings of the lower courts is not a
function that is normally undertaken in appeals before this Court. However, after a careful scrutiny of
the CA Decision, we find it proper to reevaluate the factual issues surrounding the present case,
especially since it is not clear from the Decision whether the proper implementation of the strict
procedural safeguards laid down in R.A. 9165 was established.

Issue

Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses were sufficient to convict accused-appellant of the alleged sale and possession of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, which are violations under Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of
R.A. 9165.

Discussion

Accused-appellant argues4 that since there were two versions presented during trial one, that of
the prosecution; and the other, that of the accused the latter version must be adopted, because the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties should not take precedence over the
presumption of innocence of the accused. He also contends that a surveillance of just 30 minutes
was insufficient to establish that Umipang was engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. Lastly, accused-
appellant claims that the fact of possession of the confiscated plastic sachets was not clearly
established, and that the evidence allegedly confiscated from him was merely planted.5 Alluding to
the testimony of PO1 Ragos, he points out that the former did not see him holding the drugs, and
that the sachet was shown only to PO1 Ragos by PO2 Gasid.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays for the affirmation of the RTC
Joint Decision in all respects, as it was decided in accord with law and evidence.6 The OSG
argues7 that the necessary elements to convict a person under Sections 5 and 11 were proven
beyond reasonable doubt. It then contends that, absent independent proof and substantiated
evidence to the contrary, accused-appellants bare-faced denial should be deemed merely as a self-
serving statement that does not hold merit. Finally, the OSG asserts that, where there is no evidence
of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against accused-appellant,
the testimony must be given full faith and credence.

Substantive law requires strict observance of the procedural safeguards outlined in R.A. 9165
At the outset, we take note that the present case stemmed from a buy-bust operation conducted by
the SAID-SOTF. We thus recall our pronouncement in People v. Garcia:

A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to
be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in
secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the
framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool
for extortion. In People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that "by the very nature of anti-narcotics
operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the
ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of
unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility
of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." Accordingly,
specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down in the law (R.A.
No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these
procedures have been followed in proving the elements of the defined offense.8 (Emphasis supplied
and citations omitted.)

Section 21 of R.A. 9165 delineates the mandatory procedural safeguards9 that are applicable in
cases of buy-bust operations:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official whoshall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under
oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after
the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does
not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination
report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to
be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certificationshall be
issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-
four (24) hours;

(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct
an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant
 sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including
the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall
within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or burning of the same,
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the
guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be
borne by the offender: Provided, That those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the
Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes: Provided, further, That a
representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of
the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the
PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the
representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally
observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission
of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after
due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before
the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall
appoint a member of the public attorney's office to represent the former; x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Congress introduced another complementing safeguard through Section 86 of R.A. 9165, which
requires the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Philippine National Police (PNP), and Bureau of
Customs (BOC) to maintain close coordination with PDEA in matters of illegal drug-related
operations:

Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all
other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the
investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a
violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or
any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the
NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
related matters. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the 2002 Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 (IRR) set the following procedure
for maintaining close coordination:

SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the
PDEA and Transitory Provisions. x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies The PDEA shall be the lead
agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies
shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA: Provided, that the said
agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA prior to anti-drug
operations; Provided, further, that, in any case, said agencies shallinform the PDEA of their anti-drug
operations within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of the actual custody of the suspects or
seizure of said drugs and substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport equipment used in
illegal activities involving such drugs and/or substances, and shall regularly update the PDEA on the
status of the cases involving the said anti-drug operations; Provided, furthermore, that raids,
seizures, and other anti-drug operations conducted by the PNP, the NBI, and other law enforcement
agencies prior to the approval of this IRR shall be valid and authorized; Provided, finally, that nothing
in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance
with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Given the nature of buy-bust operations and the resulting preventive procedural safeguards crafted
in R.A. 9165, courts must tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who
conducted the operations. Although we have ruled in the past that mere procedural lapses in the
conduct of a buy-bust operation are not ipso facto fatal to the prosecutions cause, so long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved,10 courts must still
thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from
those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the
law. Consequently, Section 21(a) of the IRR provides for a saving clause in the procedures outlined
under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, which serves as a guide in ascertaining those procedural aspects
that may be relaxed under justifiable grounds, viz:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. x x x:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photographshall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
(Emphasis supplied.)

We have reiterated that "this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the
procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds" after which, "the
prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been
preserved."11 To repeat, noncompliance with the required procedure will not necessarily result in the
acquittal of the accused if: (1) the noncompliance is on justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.12

Accordingly, despite the presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of law
enforcers,13 we stress that the step-by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, which cannot be simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. The
provisions were crafted by Congress as safety precautions to address potential police abuses,
especially considering that the penalty imposed may be life imprisonment. In People v.
Coreche,14 we explained thus:

The concern with narrowing the window of opportunity for tampering with evidence found legislative
expression in Section 21 (1) of RA 9165 on the inventory of seized dangerous drugs and
paraphernalia by putting in place a three-tiered requirement on the time, witnesses, and proof of
inventory by imposing on the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs the
duty to "immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof". (Emphasis supplied.)

Consequently, in a line of cases,15 we have lain emphasis on the importance of complying with the
prescribed procedure. Stringent compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be
construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the accused.16 Otherwise, "the
procedure set out in the law will be mere lip service."17

Material irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operations

In the recent case of People v. Relato, we reiterated the following:

In a prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride prohibited under

Republic Act No. 9165, the State not only carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the
offense of, but also bears the obligation to prove the corpus delicti, failing in which the State will not
discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled that
the State does not establish the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the
prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance
raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as evidence in court.
Any gap renders the case for the State less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, Relato deserves exculpation, especially as we recall that
his defense of frame-up became plausible in the face of the weakness of the Prosecutions evidence
of guilt.18(Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)

The conduct of the buy-bust operations was peppered with defects, which raises doubts on the
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items from accused-appellant.

First, there were material inconsistencies in the marking of the seized items. According to his
testimony, PO2 Gasid used the initials of the complete name, including the middle initial, of accused-
appellant in order to mark the confiscated sachets. The marking was done immediately after
Umipang was handcuffed. However, a careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Gasid would reveal
that his prior knowledge of the complete initials of accused-appellant, standing for the latters full
name, was not clearly established. Thus, doubt arises as to when the plastic sachets were actually
marked, as shown by PO2 Gasids testimony:

A [PO2 Gasid]: We conducted a buy-bust operation on April 1, 2006.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Against whom did you conduct this buy-bust operation?

A: Against alias Sam, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What prompted you to conduct this operation against this alias Sam?

A: We received information from our confidential informant that one alias Sam is selling shabu at
Cagayan De Oro Street, Maharlika Village, Taguig.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Aside from this information that you received from your informant, was there
anything more that your informant told you about the real identity of this alias Sam?

A: Nothing more, sir, he gave us only his alias, sir.19

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after you have taken the item and paid alias Sam and then you executed
the pre-arranged signal that you have already purchased from him, what happened then?

A: After I made the pre-arranged signal, mabilis po yung mata ni alias Sam, para ho bang balisa,
siguro napansin nya na hindi lang kami dalawa (2), aakma syang tatakbo, sinunggaban ko na po
sya.

PROSEC. SANTOS: So, you held Sam already during that time?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened after that?

A: I introduced myself as police officer and at that time I arrested him.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What about your companions who serves [sic] as your immediate back up,
what happened to them when you were already hold and arrested [sic] this alias Sam?

A: I noticed my companions approaching us.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: And what did your colleague Ragos do when he arrived at your place?

A: When he arrived at the place, after arresting alias Sam, he was the one who handcuffed him.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything more that was done in that place of occurrence during that
time, Officer?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us please?

A: After arresting alias Sam, I frisk [sic] him for the remaining items he showed me and the buy-bust
money I gave him.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: Was there anything that you and your team did in the items that you
confiscated from the possession of the accused during that time and the shabu that you bought from
him?

A: I marked the items I confiscated at the place of incident.

PROSEC. SANTOS: How did you marked [sic] the item that you bought from this alias Sam?

A: SAU, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: And what does that stand for? That SAU?

A: Stands for the initials of alias Sam.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Is that the only thing that you placed on the plastic sachet containing the shabu
that you bought from this alias Sam during that time?

A: I marked the shabu I bought as SAU-1.

PROSEC. SANTOS: How about the other five (5) plastic sachets containing the suspected shabu,
what happened to that?

A: I marked them as SAU-2, SAU-3, SAU-4, SAU-5 and SAU-6.20

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, after you have marked and inventoried the items that you bought and
confiscated from this alias Sam during that time, what else happened?

A: After the inventory of the evidences, I turn [sic] them over to the investigator.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Where did you turn these items to your investigator?

A: At the office, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?

A: PO1 Alexander Saez, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: When you turn these items to your investigator, where were you?

A: At the office, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened to these items that you turn it over [sic] to your investigator?

A: He made a request for laboratory examination of the items confiscated.21

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: Now, Officer, this Sam when you have already arrested him, were you able to
know his real name?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What was his real name?

A: Sammy Umipang, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Is he present here in Court?

A: Yes, sir.22

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you arrived at the place, by the way, where was your target area, Mr.
Witness?

A: Cagayan De Oro Street, Barangay Maharlika, Taguig City.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: When you were there, you did not buy [sic] anybody to buy shabu from the
accused?

A: No, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not conduct any test buy?

A: No, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Nor did you make any inquiry with Cagayan De Oro Street regarding the
accused?

A: Not anymore, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: At that moment, you dont have any idea regarding the identity of the accused
and also whether he was engaged in illegal activity?

A: Regarding the identity, he was described by the informant.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was only the informant who knows the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also your other members, they did not know the accused?

A: Yes, sir.23 (Emphasis supplied.)

A clearer picture of what transpired during the buy-bust operation, from the marking of the
confiscated items to the arrest of accused-appellant, is provided by the testimony of PO1 Ragos:
PROSEC. SANTOS: And what is the effect to you of the act of Gasid taking off his cap?

A: That is the sign that he already bought the shabu.

PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid acting that way, being the back up of him during that
time, what did you do?

A: I run [sic] towards them.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Were you able to go near him when you run [sic] towards him?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened?

A: I saw him holding Sam.

PROSEC. SANTOS: When you saw Gasid already holding Sam, what did you do?

A: I handcuffed Sam.

PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened?

A: The items confiscated by Gasid were marked with his initials.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Did you see Gasid marking those things that he took from this Sam during that
time?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: What marked [sic] did he put on these plastic sachets?

A: SAU, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Do you know what SAU connotes?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Tell us?

A: Sammy Abdul Umipang.

PROSEC. SANTOS: After that, what happened?

A: He was apprising [sic] of his constitutional rights.

PROSEC. SANTOS: After this person was apprised of his rights, was there anything more that was
done?
A: We went back to the office.

PROSEC. SANTOS: All the members of the team went back to the office?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: And together with this alias Sam?

A: Yes, sir.

PROSEC. SANTOS: What happened in your office?

A: We turn [sic] over the evidence to the investigator.

PROSEC. SANTOS: Who was your investigator during that time?

A: PO1 Saez.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: So, after the team has turn [sic] over the evidences to your investigator in the
person of Officer Saez, was there anything more that transpired in relation to this event, this
incident?

A: We prepared an affidavit of arrest.24

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information regarding the accused was relayed to you by your
immediate superior?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And this information was the first information regarding the accused, is that
correct?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: What was told you was that your target person was alias Sam?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No photographs of alias Sam was shown to you?

A: None, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no derogatory records of this alias Sam in your office?

A: None, sir.
ATTY. HERNANDEZ: You have no warrant of arrest?

A: None, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: This alias Sam was not included in your watch list?

A: No, sir.25

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, the markings were placed on the plastic sachets?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: After that Mr. Witness, you brought the accused together with the items to
your office?

PROSEC. SANTOS: Already answered, Your Honor. We are just repeating the same pattern, Your
Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you investigated the accused?

A: No more, it was PO1 Saez who investigated the accused.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: So, you did not ask the full name of the accused?

A: It was PO1 Saez who investigated him, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: It was PO1 Saez who got his full name and on you [sic] part, that was the first
time that you were able to learned [sic] the full name of the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Because you knew him only as alias Sam?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: How about Officer Gasid, it was also the first time that he learned the full
name of the accused?

A: Maybe not, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you mentioned that it was Officer Saez who delivered the items
to the crime lab?

A: No sir, it was Gasid.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: But you were not with him when he delivered the specimen to the crime
laboratory?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: No further question, Your Honor.

PROSEC. SANTOS: No re-direct, Your Honor. x x x26 (Emphasis supplied.)

The circumstances surrounding the marking of the seized items are suspect. From their testimonies
during the trial, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos both admitted that they only knew their target by the
name "Sam." They both testified that, after accused-appellant was handcuffed, frisked, and read his
rights, they immediately brought him to the police precinct. They then said that it was a certain PO1
Saez who investigated him. In fact, in their joint affidavit, PO2 Gasid and PO1 Ragos stated thus:

Na dinala namin siya [accused] sa aming opisina para sa pagsisiyasat at pagtatanong tungkol sa
detalye ng kaniyang pagkatao at sa layuning masampahan ng kaukulang reklamo sa paglabag ng
Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165.27 (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidence on record does not establish that PO2 Gasid had prior knowledge of the complete name of
accused-appellant, including the middle initial, which enabled the former to mark the seized items
with the latters complete initials. This suspicious, material inconsistency in the marking of the items
raises questions as to how PO2 Gasid came to know about the initials of Umipang prior to the
latters statements at the police precinct, thereby creating a cloud of doubt on the issues of where
the marking really took place and whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were preserved. All that was established was that it was PO1 Saez who asked accused-appellant
about the latters personal circumstances, including his true identity, and that the questioning
happened when accused-appellant was already at the police station. We thus reiterate:

Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because
succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting", or contamination of evidence.

Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the
authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the
corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties,
the doctrinal fallback of every drug-related prosecution. Thus, in People v. Laxa and People v.
Casimiro, we held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the
accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt. These
rulings are refinements of our holdings in People v. Mapa and People v. Dismuke that doubts on the
authenticity of the drug specimen occasioned by the prosecutions failure to prove that the evidence
submitted for chemical analysis is the same as the one seized from the accused suffice to warrant
acquittal on reasonable doubt.28 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted.)

It is true that the failure of the arresting officers to mark the seized items at the place of arrest does
not by itself impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items inadmissible
in evidence.29 We have already clarified that the marking upon "immediate" confiscation of the
prohibited items contemplates even that which was done at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team.30 We will analyze this possible seed of doubt that has been planted by the
unexplained marking of the shabu with the complete initials of Umipang, together with the other
alleged irregularities.

Second, the SAID-SOTF failed to show genuine and sufficient effort to seek the third-party
representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. Under the law, the inventory and
photographing of seized items must be conducted in the presence of a representative from the
media, from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and from any elected public official. The testimony of
PO2 Gasid, as quoted below, is enlightening:

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Mr. Witness, you also made the certificate of inventory, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And since this is a drug operation, you are required by law to make a
certificate of inventory?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And that inventory, you are required by law that there should be a signature of
any representative from the media, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also representative from the Department of Justice, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And also elected official, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Im showing to you Mr. Witness your certificate of inventory, do you confirm
that there are no signatures placed by any member of the media, representative from the
Department of Justice and any elected official?

A: Yes, sir, there is none, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: And there appears to be an initial of RS above the type written name Sammy
Umipang, who wrote this initial RS?

A: That stands for refuse [sic] to sign, sir.

ATTY. HERNANDEZ: Who refuse [sic] to sign?

A: Sammy Umipang, sir.31

xxx xxx xxx

PROSEC. SANTOS: Why was the certificate of inventory not witnesses [sic] and signed by any
members of the media, the DOJ and elected officials, Officer?

A: That time there is no available representative, sir.

COURT: How did you exert effort to locate available representative of those officers or persons in
the certificate of inventory?

A: The investigator contacted representative from the media, Your Honor.

COURT: What barangay this incident happened?

A: Barangay Maharlika, Your Honor.

COURT: Did you talk to the barangay captain?

A: No, Your Honor.

COURT: What about the barangay councilman?

A: No, Your Honor.32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, the absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the marking of the
seized items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. However, we
take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay
chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they contacted other
elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police officers tried to get in touch
with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce any justifiable reason for failing to do
so especially considering that it had sufficient time from the moment it received information about
the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest.

Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police
officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. A sheer
statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether
serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be
regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the prosecution who has the positive duty to
establish that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,33 or that there was a justifiable ground for failing to do so.34

Third, the SAID-SOTF failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the
seized items pursuant to Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165. As pointed out by the defense during trial,35 the
Certificate of Inventory did not contain any signature, including that of PO2 Gasid the arresting
officer who prepared the certificate36 thus making the certificate defective. Also, the prosecution
neither submitted any photograph of the seized items nor offered any reason for failing to do so. We
reiterate that these requirements are specifically outlined in and required to be implemented by
Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.37

Minor deviations from the procedures under R.A. 9165 would not automatically exonerate an
accused from the crimes of which he or she was convicted.38 This is especially true when the lapses
in procedure were "recognized and explained in terms of [] justifiable grounds."39 There must also be
a showing "that the police officers intended to comply with the procedure but were thwarted by some
justifiable consideration/reason."40 However, when there is gross disregard of the procedural
safeguards prescribed in the substantive law (R.A. 9165), serious uncertainty is generated about the
identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.41 This uncertainty cannot be
remedied by simply invoking the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, for a
gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the procedural safeguards effectively produces an
irregularity in the performance of official duties.42 As a result, the prosecution is deemed to have
failed to fully establish the elements of the crimes charged, creating reasonable doubt on the
criminal liability of the accused.43
1wphi 1

For the arresting officers failure to adduce justifiable grounds, we are led to conclude from the
totality of the procedural lapses committed in this case that the arresting officers deliberately
disregarded the legal safeguards under R.A. 9165. These lapses effectively produced serious
doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti, especially in the face of allegations of frame-
up. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, we must resolve the doubt in favor of accused-appellant, "as
every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable
doubt."44

As a final note, we reiterate our past rulings calling upon the authorities "to exert greater efforts in
combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for
the greater benefit of our society."45 The need to employ a more stringent approach to scrutinizing
the evidence of the prosecution especially when the pieces of evidence were derived from a buy-
bust operation "redounds to the benefit of the criminal justice system by protecting civil liberties
and at the same time instilling rigorous discipline on prosecutors."46

WHEREFORE, the appealed 21 May 2009 CA Decision affirming the 24 July 2007 RTC Joint
Decision is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Sammy Umipang y Abdul is hereby ACQUITTED of the
charges in Criminal Cases No. 14935-D-TG and No. 14936-D-TG on the ground of reasonable
doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE accused-appellant from custody, unless he is detained for some other lawful
cause.

G.R. No. 199403 June 13, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
GOMER S. CLIMACO, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against appellant Gomer S. Climaco (Climaco) for violation
of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
for illegal possession (Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL) and illegal sale (Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL)
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in its Decision dated 20 January
2009 (RTC Decision), found Climaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, and sentenced him to
imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months with a fine of P 300,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL.1 In Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL, the RTC found Climaco guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and
sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, the Special Fifteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals (CA), in its Decision dated 29 March 2011 (CA Decision), affirmed
the RTC Decision.2 Climaco appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal in accordance with
Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.3

Prosecutions Version

The prosecutions version of events is summarized in the RTC Decision:4

The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses in the persons of PO1 Alaindelon M. Ignacio, who gave
his testimony on 5 January 2005, 8 February 2006 and 2 August 2006; and Forensic Chemist Donna
Villa Huelgas, whose testimony was dispensed with on 5 January 2005 upon defenses admission of
the existence of the following: 1) Written Request for Laboratory Examination as Exhibit "A"; 2) The
Chemistry Report No. D-1102-04 as Exhibit "B"; 3) 1 white envelope as Exhibit "C"; 4) the
existence of two (2) plastic sachets with markings "GSC-1" as Exhibit "C-1"; and 5) another one with
markings "GSC-2" as Exhibit "C-2".

PO1 Ignacio testified that he is a member of the Philippine National Police since 15 October 1999
and was assigned at Intelligence Division, San Pedro Municipal Police Station. As member of the
Intelligence Division, he was tasked to conduct surveillance operation and apprehend persons
engaged in illegal drug activity. On 7 September 2004, he was on 24-hour duty at PAC base located
at United Bayanihan, San Pedro, Laguna. At around 6:00 in the evening of the same day, PO1
Ignacio, SPO3 Samson, SPO4 Balverde, some members of the Laguna Special Operation Team,
Members of the Provincial Intelligence and Investigation Division conducted a briefing regarding a
drug operation against a certain Gomer Climaco, No. 5 in the drug watch list in San Pedro, Laguna.
During the briefing, PO1 Ignacio was tasked to act as the poseur-buyer and SPO4 Almeda as the
overall team leader. The buy-bust money was prepared, which consist of P500.00 bill and some
boodle money. The team was also armed with a Warrant of Arrest for illegal drugs issued by Judge
Pao. After the briefing, the team proceeded to the target area. When they arrived, PO1 Ignacio saw
the suspect standing in front of his house. The other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. Since PO1 Ignacio already knew the suspect, PO1 Ignacio just told Gomer that he
would buy shabu. Gomer entered his house and took something. When he came out, Gomer
showed to PO1 Ignacio the shabu. PO1 Ignacio scratched his head to signal the team that item was
shown to him and he would execute the buying of the shabu. After Gomer asked for the money and
PO1 Ignacio gave it to him, SPO3 Samson and the rest of the team immediately moved in to effect
the arrest of the suspect. Since he was caught in the act, Gomer did not resist anymore. The team
likewise showed Gomer his warrant of arrest. PO1 Ignacio saw SPO3 Samson frisk and ask Gomer
to empty his pockets. SPO3 Samson was able to recover another plastic sachet, which was inserted
between Gomers fingers. The plastic sachet, which was the product of the buy-bust, and the one
recovered from Gomer were turned over to SPO4 Teofilo Royena, who turned them over to the
Office of the Special Operation Group located at Brgy. Tubigan, Bian, Laguna. The plastic sachet
product of the buy-bust was marked TR-B, which means Teofilo Royena and the letter "B" means
"Bust." While the plastic sachet recovered from Gomer was marked TR-R, which means Teofilo
Royena and the letter "R" means "Recovered". PO1 Ignacio identified the accused Gomer Climaco
in open court. He likewise identified his sworn statement. During the cross-examination, PO1 Ignacio
admitted that he learned of the warrant of arrest on 7 September 2004 only. It was SPO4 Valverde
who instructed PO Ignacio to conduct surveillance operation against Gomer, who was engaged in
rampant selling of shabu.5

Aside from the testimony of PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio (Ignacio), the following documentary exhibits
were offered for the prosecution: (1) Exhibit "A" Letter dated 7 September 2004; (2) Exhibit "B"
Chemistry Report No. D-1102-04; (3) Exhibit "C" One-half white envelope; (4) Exhibit "C-1"
Plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings "GSC-1"; (5) Exhibit "C-2" Plastic
sachet with white crystalline susbtance with markings "GSC-2"; and (6) Exhibit "D" Pinanumpaang
Salaysay of PO1 Ignacio.6

Defenses Version

Appellant Climaco, on the other hand, presented three witnesses and denied the prosecutions
allegations of sale and possession of shabu. The defenses version of the events, as narrated in the
RTC Decision, is as follows:

The defense presented three (3) witnesses in the persons of the accused himself, Gomer S.
Climaco, who testified on 13 May 2008, Michael M. Basihan, who gave his testimony on 7 October
2008, and Cristina Gamboa Climaco, who gave her testimony on 25 November 2008.

Gomer S. Climaco testified that prior to 7 September 2004, he did not know SPO2 Wilfredo Samson
and PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio. On 7 September 2004, Gomer, together with his wife and five (5)
children, were inside their house. When Gomer was feeding the chicken in front of his yard, four (4)
unidentified armed men suddenly arrived and frisked him. When nothing was found in his
possession, the men handcuffed and brought him to the police station. At the police station, the men
filed a case against him. Gomer denied having sold and delivered shabu to a police poseur-buyer
and that he was in possesion of shabu. During the cross-examination, Gomer said that while he was
being frisked by the men, Gomer asked the men what was his violation. The men replied that
somebody bought shabu from him. Gomer told the men that he did nothing wrong, but the men
continued to handcuff him. Gomer was not aware that he was included in the list of top 20 illegal
drug pushers. Gomer did not know of any ill motive on the part of the police officer why he would be
charged with so grave an offense. He did not file any case against the police officer who arrested
him.

Michael M. Basihan testified that Gomer Climaco was his neighbor in Bagong Silang. On 7
September 2004, Michael went to Gomers manukan to gather guava fruits. When he arrived there,
Gomer was tending to his cocks. While he was gathering guava fruits, Michael saw four (4)
unidentified armed men suddenly barge into the premises and arrest Gomer. After he was
handcuffed, Gomer was made to board a vehicle where he was brought to Jaka Subdivision.
Michael could not remember whether it was morning or evening when Gomer was arrested by
unidentified armed men because the incident happened a long time ago.

Cristina Gamboa Climaco testified that she is the wife of Gomer Climaco. She did not know SPO2
Wilfredo Samson and PO1 Alaindelon Ignacio. On 7 September 2004, she was inside their house
taking care of her child. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of the same day, Gomer arrived in their
house, who just came from Barangay Cuyab. After taking a bath, Gomer went outside of their house.
While in front of their house, Gomer called the person taking care of his chickens. Gomer and that
person went to the back of the house. Meanwhile, Cristina went inside the house. Although she was
inside of the house, Cristina could see Gomer and the person through the window. At around 4:00 in
the afternoon, Cristina saw four (4) unidentified armed men approach and ask something from
Gomer. After a few minutes, Gomer left the back of the house, while the men were left standing
there. Cristina went out the house and saw her husband go toward the direction of St. Reymond. At
around 6:00 in the evening, Cirstina went down from their house to ask Michael if he saw Gomer.
Michael told Cristina that he saw Gomer loaded into a van by several men. During the cross-
examination, Cristina said that she did not know of any reason why SPO2 Samson and PO1 Ignacio
would arrest her husband.7

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC declared Climaco guilty of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL, the Court finds the accused, Gomer S. Climaco,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P 500,000.00.

In Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL, the Court finds the accused, Gomer S. Climaco, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 11 of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay a fine of three
hundred thousand pesos (P 300,000.00).

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the plastic sachets subject matter of these cases, for said agencys appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED.8

The RTC found that the elements for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu were
sufficiently established by the prosecution.9 The RTC held that Climacos defense of frame-up is
viewed with disfavor as it can be easily concocted.10 The RTC gave full faith and credit to the
testimony of PO1 Ignacio, and declared the police officers who participated in the buy-bust operation
were properly performing their duties because they were not inspired by any improper motive.11

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the conviction of Climaco. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the judgment dated January 20, 2009 of the RTC in
Criminal Case Nos. 4911-SPL and 4912-SPL finding appellant Gomer S. Climaco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is AFFIRMED.12

The CA declared that all the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs were proven.13 The CA found that based on the testimony of PO1 Ignacio, it was
established that the chain of custody over the seized drugs was unbroken from the arresting officers
to SPO4 Royena, and then to the forensic chemist for examination.14
 The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession ofshabu, a dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Ruling of this Court

We resolve to acquit Climaco for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

PO1 Ignacio, in his testimony, claimed that the dangerous drugs seized from Climaco were marked
by SPO4 Teofilo Royena as "TR-B" and "TR-R."15 However, the Chemistry Report submitted to the
trial court shows that the dangerous drugs examined and confirmed to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu by the forensic chemist were marked as "GSC1" and "GSC2."16 Since what
was seized ("TR-B" and "TR-R") by PO1 Ignacio from Climaco at the time of the buy-bust operation
was different from the dangerous drugs submitted ("GSC1" and "GSC2") to the forensic chemist for
review and evaluation, the chain of custody over the dangerous drugs was broken and the integrity
of the evidence submitted to the trial court was not preserved, casting doubt on the guilt of Climaco.

Constitutional Presumption of Innocence; Weight of Evidence

The Constitution guarantees the accuseds presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Section
14(2) of the Bill of Rights (Article III) provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court likewise states that, in a criminal case, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, which produces absolute
certainty. Only moral certainly is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

"Chain of Custody" Over the Confiscated Items

The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment.17 Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the "actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged."18The corpus delicti in cases involving
dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous drug itself.

On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.19

In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the chain of custody over the
dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti. In People v. Alcuizar,20 the Court held:

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus
delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from
the illegal drugs unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily
open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any
doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show
that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-
appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,21 which implements the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines "chain of custody" as follows:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In Malillin v. People,22 the Court explained the importance of the chain of custody:

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the
mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not dictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the
exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance was later analyzed as heroin was handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts
of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession was excluded from the prosecution evidence,
the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have
been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the posession of the
police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state
as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the
chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other cases by accident or otherwise in which similar evidence was seized or in
which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.

In this case, PO1 Ignacio, in his testimony, claimed that the substances seized from Climaco during
the buy-bust operation were marked as "TR-R" and "TR-B":

Q: When SPO4 Almeida handed over the items to SPO4 Teofilo Royena, what if any did SPO4
Royena do with the items?

A: He placed markings on it, maam.

Q: Where were you when he placed the markings?

A: I was present, maam.

Q: Do you know what markings was made?

A: He placed his initials TR which means Teofilo Royena and the letter B which means bust, maam.

Q: Im showing to you a plastic sachet with the markings TR-B, please go over this and tell if this is
the same item which you confiscated from the accused?

A: Yes, maam. This is the same.

PROS. CASANO: Your Honor, the brown envelope which contains the plastic sachet has already
been marked as Exhibit "C", the plastic sachet as Exhibit "C-1" and the markings TR-B as Exhibit "C-
2" (Continuing).

xxxx

Q: Tell us the markings that was placed?

A: Its TR-R, the R means recovered, maam.

Q: How sure are you that the items marked by SPO4 Teofilo Royena TR-R was the same item taken
by SPO3 Samson from the accused?

A: Because there was a difference between the two plastic sachets, the items recovered by SPO3
Samson was a little bit bigger, maam.

Q: Im showing to you a bigger plastic sachet with the markings TR- R, are you referring to this?

A: Yes, maam.23

Based on the testimony of PO1 Ignacio, the substances retrieved from Climaco and submitted to the
court were contained in two (2) plastic sachets with the markings "TR-R" and "TR-B." However,
according to the Chemistry Report executed by Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas on 8
September 2004, the plastic sachets submitted for examination carried the markings "GSC-1" and
"GSC-2," different from the plastic sachets marked "TR-R" and "TR-B" containing the drugs retrieved
from Climaco:

CHEMISTRY REPORT NUMBER: D-1102-04

xxxx

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

A One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, with markings "GSC1", containing 0.35
gram of white crystalline substance and placed in a staple-sealed transparent plastic bag.
(Allegedly bought by the Police Poseur-Buyer)

B One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, with markings "GSC2", containing 0.14
gram of white crystalline substance and placed in a staple-sealed transparent plastic bag.
(Allegedly found from the posession of Glomer Climaco)24

In addition, in the Index of Exhibits submitted by the Officer-in-Charge of the RTC, Exhibit "C-1" was
described as a "plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings GSC-1" while Exhibit
"C-2" was described as a "plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with markings GSC-
2,"25 contrary to the testimony of PO1 Ignacio and the declaration of Prosecutor Casano that the
specimens submitted to the court carried the markings "TR-B" and "TR-R."

Likewise, in the handwritten Minutes dated 5 January 2005, Exhibit "C-1" was identified as a plastic
sachet with white crystalline substance with marking "GSC-1," and Exhibit "C-2" was identified as a
plastic sachet with white crystalline substance with marking "GSC-2."26

Clearly, what was submitted to the trial court were plastic sachets bearing the markings "GSC-1" and
"GSC-2," instead of the plastic sachets bearing the markings "TR-R" and "TR-B" that contained the
substances recovered from Climaco. This fact is evident from the RTC Decision, recognizing
Exhibits "C-1" and "C-2" to bear the markings "GSC-1" and "GSC-2," while acknowledging the
testimony of PO1 Ignacio that the plastic sachets containing the substances recovered from Climaco
bore the markings "TR-R" and "TR-B":

The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses in the persons of x x x Forensic Chemist Donna Villa
Huelgas, whose testimony was dispensed with on 5 January 2005 upon defenses admission of the
existence of the following: 1) Written Request for Laboratory Examination as Exhibit "A"; 2) The
Chemistry Report No. D-1102-04 as Exhibit "B"; 3) 1 white envelope as Exhibit "C"; 4) the
existence of two (2) plastic sachets with markings "GSC-1" as Exhibit "C-1"; and 5) another
one with markings "GSC-2" as Exhibit "C-2".

xxxx

The plastic sachet product of the buy-bust was marked TR-B, which means Teofilo Royena and the
letter "B" means "Bust." While the plastic sachet recovered from Gomer was marked TR-R, which
means Teofilo Royena and the letter "R" means "Recovered".27 (Emphasis supplied)

The prosecution did not explain why the markings of the plastic sachets containing the alleged
drugs, which were submitted to be "TR-B" and "TR-R," became "GSC-1" and "GSC-2" in the
Chemistry Report, Index of Exhibits and Minutes of the Hearing. In their decisions, the RTC and CA
were silent on the change of the markings. In fact, since the markings are different, the presumption
is that the substance in the plastic sachets marked as "TR-B" and "TR-R" is different from the
substance in the plastic sachets marked as "GSC-1" and "GSC-2." There is no moral certainty that
the substance taken from appellant is the same dangerous drug submitted to the laboratory and the
trial court.
1w phi1

As held in Malillin v. People,28 to establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases
involving dangerous drugs, it is important that the substance illegally possessed in the first place be
the same substance offered in court as exhibit. This chain of custody requirement ensures that
unnecessary doubts are removed concerning the identity of the evidence. When the identity of the
dangerous drug recovered from the accused is not the same dangerous drug presented to the
forensic chemist for review and examination, nor the same dangerous drug presented to the court,
the identity of the dangerous drug is not preserved due to the broken chain of custody. With this, an
element in the criminal cases for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the corpus
delicti, is not proven, and the accused must then be acquitted based on reasonable doubt. For this
reason, Climaco must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due to the broken chain of
custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from him.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 29 March 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03860 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San
Pedro, Laguna in Criminal Case Nos. 4911-SPL and 4912-SPL dated 20 January 2009.
We ACQUIT appellant Gomer S. Climaco based on reasonable doubt and we ORDER his
immediate release from detention, unless he is detained for any other lawful cause.

G.R. No. 188328 August 25, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JOSELITO NASARA y DAHAY, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.
Joselito "Jojo" Nasara (appellant) was convicted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 103 for violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, (R.A. No. 9165) or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The accusatory portion of the Information against appellant, together with "another person," reads:

That on or about the 16th day of March 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with another person whose thru (sic) name, identity and whereabouts
has not as yet ascertained and mutually helping each other not being authorized by law to sell,
dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, wilfully (sic), and
unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero
point zero three (0.03) grams of white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1 (underscoring supplied)

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is culled:

In the morning of March 16, 2004, a confidential informant reported at Police Station 6, Batasan
Hills, Quezon City the selling of illegal drugs along San Miguel Street, Payatas, Quezon City.

On the instruction of P/Supt. Raymond Esquivel, SPO2 Rodelio Dionco, PO2 Rolando Lopez (PO2
Lopez), SPO4 Constancio Pitaga and SPO4 Reynaldo Angeles conducted a buy-bust operation in
the area. SPO2 Dionco, who was designated as poseur-buyer, was given two 100 peso bills and
instructed to scratch his head to signal the consummation of the sale.

Upon arriving at San Miguel Street at 10:30 A.M., also on March 16, 2004, SPO2 Dionco and the
informant approached appellant who was standing, together with a certain Kune, outside a small
store. The informant thereupon introduced to Kune and appellant SPO2 Dionco as a prospective
buyer. As appellant asked how much was being bought, SPO2 Dionco handed the two bills to
appellant who, together with Kune, went inside a house adjacent to the store. When the two
returned, Kune handed a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances to SPO2
Dionco who, after examining it, scratched his head.

As the back-up police officers were closing in, SPO2 Dionco introduced himself as a police officer to
appellant andKune who shoved him and both ran away. The rest of the team gave a chase and
caught appellant but not Kune.

The police officers recovered the money from the right pocket of appellants short pants. On
inspection of the house, SPO2 Dionco found on top of a television set two plastic sachets containing
substances similar to those inside the sachet handed to him by Kune. These two sachets were
marked by PO2 Lopez with his initials "RL".2

The buy-bust team thereafter brought appellant to the police station, together with the seized items
which were turned over to the Desk Officer. A memorandum3 was then prepared by P/Insp. Abelardo
Aquino, addressed to the Chief of the Central Police District, Physical Science Division, requesting
for the conduct of laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the presence of
dangerous drugs and their weight, which memorandum was delivered by PO2 Lopez and received at
7:00 p.m. of March 16, 2004 by "Nard" Jabonillo.
Upon receipt of the sachets, Engr. Leonard Jabonillo, Forensic Analyst of the Central Police District
Crime Laboratory Office, conducted a laboratory examination thereof and recorded his findings in
Chemistry Report No. D-292-2004 that each of the three heat-sealed plastic sachets contained 0.03
grams and was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.4

Appellant, denying the accusation, claimed that he was framed-up. His version goes: On March 16,
2004, while he was resting inside the house of one Nelson Balawis in San Miguel, he heard
some kalabugan which prompted him to go outside where he saw three armed men, one of whom
pointed a gun at him. When he asked why, the man shouted to his companions "Damputin yan!,"
and he was in fact apprehended and brought to a waiting vehicle.

Inside the vehicle were two men who were also accosted and who informed him that the police
officers acquired from them 2.5 grams of shabu, P11,000.00 in cash, and a cellular phone.

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted appellant, disposing as follows:5

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused JOSELITO "JOJO"

MASARA (sic) Y DAHAY, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 of RA 9165 (for
drug pushing) as charged and he is hereby sentenced to a jail term of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00.

The shabu involved in this case in three (3) small plastic sachets of 0.03 gram each are ordered
transmitted to PDEA thru DDB for proper care and disposition as per RA 9165.

SO ORDERED.6 (emphasis in the original)

Ruling out appellants defense of frame-up, the trial court observed, quoted verbatim:

Jojo testified that he saw two arrested persons inside the FX van where he was also boarded and
who told him that the police got from them 2.5 grams of shabu, P11,000.00 cash and a cellphone. If
this were so, then those policemen already have (sic) enough sequestered merchandise to bother
going after Jojo who, based on his claim, had just gotten out of his

room, jobless as a construction crewman for three months, penniless, and who must have clearly
appeared to those three (3) armed men mentioned by the defense as a person, from whom they
could get nothing. So why bother with him if after all Jojo was not the subject of their going to that
place. x x x7 (underscoring supplied)

As stated earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellants conviction, hence, the present petition.

In the main, appellant claims that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No.
9165, hence, it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized items.

It bears noting that the Information is for selling "0.03 gram" of shabu, and that the two heat-sealed
plastic sachets each also containing the same 0.03 gram of shabu allegedly confiscated from the
house were presented to corroborate the prosecutions evidence.

Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The issue, in the event of non-compliance with above-quoted provision of R.A. No. 9165, does not
pertain to admissibility of evidence, but to weight-evidentiary merit or probative value thereof.8

People v. Dela Cruz9 enlightens:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

In the present case, the records do not show that the procedural requirements of Section 21 with
respect to the custody and disposition of confiscated drugs were followed. No physical inventory and
photographs were taken. On that score alone, the case for the prosecution fails, absent a plausible
explanation to justify failure to comply with the requirements.
1wphi1

Parenthetically, there is even no showing that coordination with PDEA prior to and after the conduct
of the buy-bust operation was made, in violation of Section 86 (a), Implementing Rules and
Regulations to R.A. 9165.10

Given the purpose of conducting a laboratory examination of the suspicious items seized to
determine if indeed they contain, in this case, shabu, a more strict standard is imposed by law to
ascertain that they are the sameitems seized or are not substituted or adulterated. Said standard
has not been observed in the present case.

The chain of custody was, however, broken after SPO2 Dionco failed to mark the first sachet which
is the subject of the sale and the subject of the Information. Why said sachet, together with the two
others, was delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory after more than eight hours from initial custody of
the apprehending officers was not even explained.

The police officers-members of the buy-bust team cannot bank on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of their duties. The presumption has been destroyed upon their unjustified failure to
conform to the procedural requirements mentioned above.11
The prosecution having failed to discharge its onus of proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
appellant, his exoneration is in order.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the appellate court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Joselito "Jojo" Nasara y Dahay, is ACQUITED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections who is ORDERED
to release appellant, unless he is being lawfully held for another offense, and to inform this Court of
action taken within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

G.R. No. 178544 February 23, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MANUEL PALOMA y ESPINOSA Appellant.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need in cases of illegal sale of prohibited drugs for the prosecution to prove
the details of the transaction through someone who saw the sale take place.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor charged the accused Manuel Paloma (Paloma) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-03-116898 with violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

At the trial, PO2 Bernard Amigo testified that at about 1:00 p.m. on April 23, 2003 the Batasan Police
Station got a tip from an informant that accused Paloma was selling illegal drugs at Pacomara Street
in Commonwealth, Quezon City. The station chief directed PO2 Amigo and PO1 Arnold Pealosa to
conduct a buy-bust operation involving Paloma. The police officers went to Pacomara Street with the
informant and brought with them aP100.00 bill marked with the initials "AP."

When the buy-bust team arrived at Pacomara Street at around 3:15 p.m., they saw Paloma standing
beside a man and a woman. PO1 Pealosa and the informant approached them; PO2 Amigo, the
witness, stood as back-up some 15 meters away. From where he stood, he saw PO1 Pealosa
talking to Paloma. Momentarily, PO1 Pealosa waved his hand, signifying that he had made the
purchase. On seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO2 Amigo approached and arrested Paloma; PO1
Pealosa for his part arrested Palomas companions, later on identified as Noriel Bamba (Bamba)
and Angie Grotel (Grotel). PO2 Amigo recovered from Palomas pants pocket a plastic sachet with a
white crystalline substance and the marked P100.00 bill.
After the police officers informed Paloma, Bamba, and Grotel of their rights during custodial
investigation, they brought them to the police station and turned them over to the desk officer. The
arresting officers also turned over the three sachets of suspected shabu that they seized. According
to PO2 Amigo, two of these sachets were those that PO1 Pealosa bought from Paloma. The police
eventually let Bamba and Grotel go for the reason that the police officers found no illegal drugs in
their possession.

In his defense, Paloma denied that such a buy-bust operation took place. He claimed that at the time
of the alleged buy-bust, he was with his 80-year-old mother at their house on Pacomara Street,
taking a nap. Suddenly, five armed men in civilian clothes barged into the house and woke him up.
Two of them held him by the arms while the others searched the house. Although the men found
nothing, they handcuffed him and brought him to the police station.

On June 10, 2005 the RTC found Paloma guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Q-03-
116898 of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00.

On February 13, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. HC CR 01289 affirmed the RTCs
ruling in toto.

The Issue Presented

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding that the prosecution succeeded
in proving beyond reasonable doubt that Paloma sold prohibited drugs to PO1 Pealosa.

The Ruling of the Court

To prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, the prosecution is
required to prove (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller as well as the object and consideration
of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment given for the same. Further, the
prosecution must present in court evidence of corpus delicti.1

Here, the proof of the sale of illegal drugs is wanting.

One. Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria,2 the prosecution must clearly and
adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial contact between the poseur-
buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, and,
finally, the accuseds delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be the informant
alone or the police officer. This proof is essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not
unlawfully induced to commit the offense.3

Here, PO2 Amigos testimony miserably failed to establish the required details of the supposed
illegal drug sale. He testified on direct examination:

Q: When you, [P]olice [O]fficer Pealosa and the confidential informant arrived at around
3:15 at Pacomara Street, what happened there?

A: Upon arrival of that said place Pacomara Street we saw Paloma and one female
companion talking with each other.4

xxxx
Q: Now when Police Officer Pealosa and the asset approached Paloma where were you at
that time?

A: I was in a hiding place, in a viewing distance.

Q: Can you see them talking with each other from where you were stationed?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: You said earlier Mr. Witness that there were other person[s] other than Paloma, female
and male when Police Officer Pealosa and the confidential informant approached him,
where were these two persons?

A: They were beside each other.

Q: What were they doing, these two persons at that time when they approached by your
companion?

A: They were just standing.

Q: When these Pealosa and confidential informant approached the subject, what
happened next? What transpired next at that time?

A: While they were talking Pealosa made the pre-arrange[d] signal.

Q: What was that signal that Pealosa did?

A: By waving his hand.

Q: Meaning to say?

A: The buy-bust has already consummated.

Q: When Pealosa made that signal what did you do if any?

A: We rushed up to the area where they were standing.

Q: When you arrived in that area what happened there?

A: I grabbed Paloma and made the search.5 (Emphasis supplied)

All that PO2 Amigo could say was that PO1 Pealosa and the informant approached
Paloma, talked to him, and then PO1 Pealosa made the pre-arranged signal that the sale
had been consummated. Since he was standing at a great distance during the purported
buy-bust, PO2 Amigo could not provide the details of the offer to buy the drug and the
acceptance of that offer. Indeed, he did not see Paloma take money from PO1 Pealosa nor
Pealosa take delivery of the prohibited substance from Paloma.

The cross-examination of PO2 Amigo does not help. He testified:

 Q: As a back up Mr. Witness you will agree with me that you cannot hear what was the
conversation between the informant, Mr. Pealosa and Mr. Paloma?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: So you merely acted upon their gesture?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: So Mr. Witness when you rushed-in to the place where the buy-bust operation was being
conducted, you just rushed-in not because you were called upon, but because of the gesture
that the same was consummated?

A: Yes maam only the pre-arranged signal.6 (Emphasis supplied)

While law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption is disputable by contrary proof and cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the
accused to be presumed innocent.7 The totality of the evidence presented in this case does not
support Palomas conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, since the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense.8

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. HC CR 01289 dated February 13, 2007 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 103, in Criminal Case Q-03-116898, and ACQUITS the accused-appellant
Manuel Paloma y Espinosa of the crime of which he is charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The Court orders his immediate RELEASE from custody unless he is being held for some other
lawful cause.1avvphi1

G.R. No. 192188 April 11, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANDREW ROBLE, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the July 14, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-
H.C. No. 00746, which affirmed the May 2, 2007 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. DNO-2989 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25 in Danao City. The RTC found accused-appellant Andrew
Roble (Roble) guilty of violating Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts

The charge against Roble stemmed from the following Information:

That on or about March 12, 2003 at 6:30 oclock in the evening more or less, in Looc, Danao City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in a buy-
bust operation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver two (2) plastic
packets containing "shabu" powder/granule a regulated drug with a total weight of zero point zero six
(0.06) gram to a poseur-buyer for a total consideration of Three Hundred (P300) pesos without any
corresponding license or prescription from the proper authorities as provided by law; and the
aforesaid packets of "shabu" was turned over by the poseur-buyer to the police as evidence.

Contrary to law.4

On April 9, 2003, the City Prosecutor Dalmacio D. Suralta (City Prosecutor Suralta) issued a
Resolution5authorizing the filing of the foregoing information against Roble. Accordingly, a warrant of
arrest was issued on April 21, 20036 and Roble was arrested on June 17, 2003. On the same date,
Roble, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation7 of the case. In the said motion, Roble
intimated that when the case was filed against him, he was in the province of Leyte and, thus, was
not able to refute the allegations against him. In an Order dated June 20, 2003, the RTC granted the
motion.8

After reinvestigation, City Prosecutor Suralta, however, did not find any reason to withdraw the said
information9and it was given due course by the RTC.10 As a result, Roble filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Reinvestigation Report before the Office of the City Prosecutor, which was
subsequently denied on January 19, 2004.11

On February 4, 2004, Roble was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.12

During the trial, the prosecution presented witnesses Police Officer 2 Castor Laurel (PO2 Laurel)
and Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza (Medical Technologist Mendoza). On the other
hand, the defense presented accused Roble as its sole witness.

The Prosecutions Version of Facts

On March 12, 2003, at around 5:30 p.m., PO3 Matias Casas (PO3 Casas) received information
through a telephone call regarding the illegal drug activities of a certain "Jojo" Roble in Looc, Danao
City.13 Coordination was then made with the Special Operations Group (SOG) and a buy-bust team
was formed composed of PO3 Casas, PO2 Laurel, the SOG and the mayor of Danao City, Mayor
Ramonito Durano (Mayor Durano).14 A briefing was conducted where several pieces of marked 100-
peso bills were handed to the poseur-buyer, Abner Banzon Cuizon (Cuizon), by PO3 Casas.15

At 6:30 p.m., the team proceeded to the reported area. PO3 Casas, PO2 Laurel and Cuizon were
aboard a tricycle while the rest of the team were with Mayor Durano.16 The tricycle was parked on
the side of a road where Cuizon alighted and walked to a nearby store, leaving PO3 Casas and PO2
Laurel inside the tricycle. At this time, the tricycle was parked seven (7) meters away from the said
store while the group of Mayor Durano was about thirty (30) meters away.17

PO2 Laurel saw Cuizon approach a person and hand him money in exchange for plastic sachets.
Upon seeing Cuizon scratch his head, which was the pre-arranged signal, the policemen
approached to arrest "Jojo" but he was able to flee from the scene.18 PO3 Casas and PO2 Laurel
signaled the rest of the team for assistance but all of them could not locate "Jojo."

Meanwhile, Cuizon gave the sachets to PO3 Casas when they approached to arrest "Jojo." PO3
Casas, in turn, gave them to the investigator, Senior Police Officer 3 Edgar Awe (SPO3 Awe).
Thereafter, a request for laboratory examination was made and submitted to the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City.19 After examination,
Medical Technologist Mendoza issued Chemistry Report No. D-459-2003, which stated that the two
(2) plastic sachets contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.20

Version of the Defense

In contrast, Roble interposes the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that from March 11, 2003
to June 14, 2003, he was in Babatngon, Leyte working, to avoid a frame-up by his enemy.21

Specifically, on March 12, 2003 at around 2:00 p.m., he went to his cousin, Danilo Roble, to ask him
to accompany him to Wantai Piggery, owned by Nicomedes Alde (Alde), where he would apply as a
worker on the recommendation of his uncle, Atty. Santiago Maravilles (Atty. Maravilles).22 Alde told
him to come back and bring his bio-data with picture and that he would start working on March 17,
2003.23 He worked there until May 31, 2003 and was not able to return home until June 14,
2003. 24 In support of his claim, he presented a Barangay Certification issued by the Barangay
Captain, affidavits of Alde and Danilo Roble, vouchers sighed by Alde, and the endorsement letter of
Atty. Maravilles.

Roble further testified that the poseur-buyer, Cuizon, is his enemy in Danao City. Robles girlfriend,
Leny Tiango (Tiango), informed him that Cuizon would frame him in a buy-bust operation because
Tiango is also the girlfriend of Cuizon.25

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC found Roble guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of its Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the prosecution to have sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 5, Art. 11, of R.A. 9165 and, therefore,
sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay the fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00). The two (2) packets of "shabu" which are the evidence in this
case shall be forfeited in favor of the government, and turn over to PDEA for disposition and
destruction.

SO ORDERED.26

On appeal to the CA, Roble argued that the testimony of PO2 Laurel was replete with
inconsistencies.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On July 14, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower court based on the time-honored
doctrine that the assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies
deserves great respect. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated May 2, 2007 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, in Danao City is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.27

Roble timely filed a notice of appeal of the decision of the CA. On October 13, 2010, he filed his
supplemental brief with this Court.

The Issues

Accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

I.

The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.28

II.

Both the [RTC] and the [CA] erred in relying upon the weakness of the defense of the
accused, instead of the strength of the evidence of the prosecution against him, to come up
with Decisions finding him guilty as charged.29

III.

Corollarily, the [CA] erred in finding that the basic elements for the sale of illegal drugs are
present in this case.30

IV.

The [CA] erred in finding that the inconsistency in the markings appearing in the letter
request and chemistry report are not material enough to cast doubt that the substance
subjected for examination was indeed shabu.31

V.

The [CA] erred in finding that the assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the
witnesses and their testimonies deserves great respect and remaining unconvinced that the
lower court overlooked any important fact or misapprehended any relevant information,
which if properly weighed and considered, would negate or erode its assessment.32

Our Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Accused-appellant argues that the trial and appellate courts erred in relying on the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. He points out several inconsistencies in the testimony of PO2 Laurel raising
doubts as to its credibility. Further, he argues that the buy-bust operation was irregularly conducted
resulting in a broken chain in the custody of the drugs.
We agree with accused-appellant.

It is hornbook doctrine that the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great weight and is generally not disturbed upon appeal. However, such
rule does not apply when the trial court has overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied any fact of
weight or substance.33 In the instant case, circumstances are present that, when properly
appreciated, would warrant the acquittal of accused-appellant.

In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove the
following elements: "(1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor."34 Similarly, it is essential that the transaction
or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of
corpus delicti.35 Corpus delicti means the "actual commission by someone of the particular crime
charged."36

In the instant case, the prosecution has failed to prove all the elements of the crime with moral
certainty.

A careful perusal of the testimony of PO2 Laurel readily reveals that there is serious doubt as to the
identity of the seller. In his testimony, PO2 Laurel stated that when the transaction took place at 6:30
p.m., he was inside a parked tricycle located seven (7) meters away from where the transaction took
place. Significantly the transaction occurred behind a store and not along the road. Add to this the
fact that it happened at dusk, making it harder to see. Considering all these, it is, therefore, highly
improbable that PO2 Laurel actually saw accused-appellant. In fact, he testified that the poseur-
buyer approached a "certain person" and that he only assumed it was accused-appellant to whom
the poseur-buyer was talking, viz:

Q It is therefore safe to say that there is a distance of ten (10) to 15 meters between you and the
person approached by the poseur buyer?

A Around seven (7) meters, mam.

Q At the time of the approach of your poseur buyer, he was just standing there outside of the road?

A Not at the side of the road, but behind the store.

Q This store was beside at the National Highway?

A Yes, mam.

Q At that time, there was still some day light?

A Yes, mam.

Q Nevertheless, the day light that was available at that time was not so bright anymore?

A No mam, but there was an electrical light in that area.

Q You were inside the cab of the tricycle, is that correct?

A Yes, mam.
Q PO3 Casas was also inside the cab together with you?

A Yes, mam.

Q Who was on the side that was nearest the road?

A PO3 Casas.

Q When you saw that poseur buyer approached the subject and it was not so bright anymore, you
could only see that your poseur buyer approached a man?

A Yes, mam, the poseur buyer approached a certain person.

Q You assumed this man that the poseur buyer approached to be the subject Jojo Roble also known
as Andrew Roble?

A Yes, mam, he was the one.

Q You stated that you had arranged with the poseur buyer to execute a pre-arranged signal by
scratching of his head upon the completion of the transaction, is that right?

A Yes, mam.

Q And, it was the execution by this poseur buyer of that pre-arranged signal that prompted you and
Police Officer Casas to rush towards the place where the poseur buyer and the subject were
standing?

A Yes, mam.37 (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, PO2 Laurels testimony cannot establish with moral certainty the identity of the seller. It
baffles this Court why the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer as he would be the best
person to identify the identity of the seller. No justifiable reason was submitted as to why Cuizons
testimony could not be presented.

Even more doubtful is the identity and integrity of the dangerous drug itself. In prosecutions for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs, "[t]he existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for
conviction x x x."38 Thus, it must be established that the substance bought during the buy-bust
operation is the same substance offered in court. The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.39

In Malillin v. People,40 the Court explained the importance of the chain of custody, to wit:

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the
mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe
the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time
of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination
and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tamperingwithout regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise notdictates
the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the
exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham vs. State positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two police
officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts
of the exhibit at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence,
the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have
been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the
continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police
officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to
the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the
chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of
substances from other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in
which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a
standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.

After a thorough review of the records of the instant case, this Court has serious doubts as to the
identity of the drug in question. While a buy-bust operation is legal and has been proved to be an
effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards
must be undertaken. It is the duty of the Courts to ascertain if the operation was subject to any police
abuse.41
In his Supplemental Brief, accused-appellant aptly points out certain points in the evidence of the
prosecution that cast uncertainty on the identity of the drug in question.

At the outset, it must be pointed out that there is confusion as to when the plastic sachet in question
was turned over by the poseur-buyer to PO3 Casas. During PO2 Laurels direct examination, he
testified that the plastic sachet was handed over by the poseur-buyer to PO3 Casas when they
arrived at the police station.42 But, on cross-examination, his story changed. He testified that the
poseur-buyer handed the plastic sachet when his team tried to approach him after he gave the pre-
arranged signal, viz:

Q It was already there at the Police Station that your poseur buyer handed the packet of shabu
which he allegedly bought from the subject to your investigator?

A There at the buy bust area, the poseur buyer delivered to Casas the plastic packet of shabu he
bought from the subject.

Q He gave that plastic sachet of shabu to Casas after you chased the accused, correct?

A No, mam, upon approaching the poseur buyer, he handed to Casas the plastic packet of shabu,
then we ran after the subject and, likewise, PO3 Casas followed us.43

After receiving the plastic sachet, PO3 Casas then gave it to the investigator, SPO3 Awe. From
here, the trail becomes vague once again. The testimony of PO2 Laurel up to this point talks about a
single plastic sachet, but the Request for Laboratory Examination44 (Request) identifies not one (1)
but two (2) plastic sachets. This contradictory fact was not explained in his testimony. Further, one
Police Superintendent Agustin G. Lloveras, Jr. (P/Supt. Lloveras) signed the Request. P/Supt.
Lloveras was never mentioned in PO2 Laurels testimony. It is unclear as to who he is and as to how
he was able to obtain the plastic sachets. Similarly, it is uncertain as to how the plastic sachets were
transferred to P/Supt. Lloveras from SPO3 Awe. Again, PO2 Laurels testimony is bereft of any
details as to the chain of custody of the drugs at these critical points.

Furthermore, the Request also mentions that the plastic sachets were marked "ARJ 1-2." Yet again,
PO2 Laurels testimony is lacking as to who marked the plastic sachets and when it was done.

Moreover, the testimony of Medical Technologist Mendoza reveals certain anomalies in the handling
of the plastic sachets as well. In his testimony, a certain PO3 Enriquez delivered the plastic sachets.
The trail from P/Supt. Lloveras to PO3 Enriquez was also not explained by the prosecution. Further,
the sachets were delivered to Medical Technologist Mendoza in an unsealed packet, viz:

Q Mr. Witness, when you received the specimens for examination, you received them attached to
accompanying letter-request and already in bigger plastic packet. Is that correct?

A Yes, Maam.

Q Now, this bigger plastic packet was not sealed.

A No, Maam.

Q Only the two (2) smaller plastic packets inside them. Is that correct?

A No, Maam.45
Obviously, the way the packets were delivered could make them easily susceptible to replacement
or substitution. Medical Technologist Mendoza even attested that he had no knowledge as to who
marked the plastic sachets since they arrived in his office already marked.

Clearly, the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove that the plastic sachets of
shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant are the very same objects tested by the crime
laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody of the drugs is patently broken.

Similarly, the prosecution failed to follow the requisites found in Sec. 21 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, which outlines the post-procedure in taking custody of seized
drugs, viz:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and
have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items x x x. 1avv phil

Even though non-compliance with Sec. 21 of the IRR is excusable, such cannot be relied upon when
there is lack of any acceptable justification for failure to do so. In People v. Lorenzo,46 citing People
v. Sanchez,47 the Court explained that "this saving clause applies only where the prosecution
recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds."

In the instant case, no justifiable grounds were put forth by the prosecution for the procedural lapses.
In his testimony, PO2 Laurel clearly stated that no inventory was made after he and his team
obtained custody of the drugs. This is a patent violation of the aforementioned section. Citing
Zarraga v. People,48 the Court, in People v. Lorenzo, held that "the lack of inventory on the seized
drugs create[s] reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti."49

Parenthetically, no coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency was made, in violation
of Sec. 86(a) of the IRR of RA 9165.50

Summing up all these circumstances, it behooves this Court not to blindingly accept the flagrantly
wanting evidence of the prosecution. Undoubtedly, the prosecution failed to meet the required
quantum of evidence sufficient to support a conviction, in which case, the constitutional presumption
of innocence prevails. As we have held, "When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance,
acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right."51
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CEB CR-H.C. No. 00746 affirming
the RTCs judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Andrew Roble is
hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately
released from custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.

G.R. No. 191061 February 9, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROSELLE SANTIAGO y PABALINAS, Appellant.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor of Makati charged the accused Roselle Santiago y Pabalinas
alias Tisay (Roselle) with violation of Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) 91651 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City in Criminal Case 05-792. Roselle was also charged with violation of
Section 15 of the same law in Criminal Case 05-1101.2

Initially, Roselle pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case 05-1101 (violation of Section 15) but she later
changed her plea to guilty3 and was so found by the court. The latter, however, deferred her
sentencing until the termination of the case for violation of Section 5.

The parties stipulated at the pre-trial (1) that PO3 Leo Gabang investigated the case; (2) that,
although the latter prepared the investigation report, he had no personal knowledge of what
happened; (3) that the police made a request, through P/Supt. Marietto Mendoza, for laboratory
examination; (4) that P/Insp. Richard Allan Mangalip, a forensic chemist of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, examined the submitted specimen, not knowing from whom the
same was taken; (5) that the PNP Crime Laboratory Office issued Physical Science Report D-090-
05S; and (6) that the forensic chemist was qualified. With these stipulations, the prosecution
dispensed with Mangalips testimony.4

PO1 Voltaire Esguerra (Esguerra) testified that on April 4, 2005, they received information that
Roselle was selling illegal drugs at her house at Pipit Extension, Barangay Rizal, Makati City.
Esguerra conducted a test buy and received from her one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
that presumably contained shabu. When he returned to his office, Esguerra marked the sachet with
"@ Tisay" then sent it to the laboratory for testing.5 Before receiving the results of the test buy, an
asset told the police that Roselle was going to leave her house, prompting Esguerras team to
conduct a buy-bust operation.

Esguerra met Roselle again and told her that it was he who bought shabu from her earlier that day.
She thus let him enter the front yard of her house where he told her that he wanted to buy another
pack for P300.00. Roselle took his marked money and entered the house. While waiting and looking
in, Esguerra spotted two women6 inside using shabu with the asset by their side, apparently waiting
for his turn. Subsequently, Roselle returned with one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
presumably containing shabu. Upon receipt of the sachet, Esguerra signaled his team. They
arrested Roselle and appraised her of her rights. Esguerra immediately marked the sachet with
"RPS".

After returning to the station, he turned over Roselle and the seized sachet to the
investigator. When the contents of the first and second sachets (with "@ Tisay" and "RPS"
1aw phil

markings) were examined, these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu).

A confirmatory test also found Roselle positive for the use of shabu.

For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She claims that the case was a
product of a mistaken identity, as she was not known as Tisay in the area but Roselle. She narrated
how she was forcibly taken from her house and into custody.

In its decision dated June 11, 2008, the RTC found Roselle guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. 9165, and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. The RTC
also sentenced her to undergo rehabilitation for not less than six months at a government drug
rehabilitation center subject to the provisions of R.A. 9165 for her violation of Section 15, Article II of
R.A. 9165.

Roselle appealed from both judgments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03451 but
the latter court affirmed the two convictions. She looks for her acquittal from this Court.

The Issues Presented to the Court

The issues presented to the Court are (1) whether or not the police conducted a valid arrest in
Roselles case; and (2) whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs finding that the
prosecution evidence established her guilt of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

The Courts Ruling

One. Roselle claims that the police did not make a valid arrest in her case since they arrested her
without proper warrant and did not apprise her of the rights of a person taken into custody as the
Constitution and R.A. 7438 provide.7 But Roselle raised this issue only during appeal, not before she
was arraigned. For this reason, she should be deemed to have waived any question as to the
legality of her arrest.8

Two. Although the prosecution established through Esguerra the acts constituting the
crime9 charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5), it failed to provide proper identity of the
allegedly prohibited substance that the police seized from Roselle.

Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed sachet of white substance from Roselle and marked
the sachet with "RPS" right in her presence. He claimed that he then immediately submitted the
specimen to the police crime laboratory for examination. But the request for laboratory exam reveals
that it was not Esguerra who delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory.10 It appears that
Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn forwarded it to a certain PO2 Santos. No
testimony covers the movement of the specimen among these other persons. Consequently, the
prosecution was unable to establish the chain of custody of the seized item and its preservation from
possible tampering.
Since the seized substance was heat-sealed in plastic sachet and properly marked by the officer
who seized the same, it would have also been sufficient, despite intervening changes in its custody
and possession, if the prosecution had presented the forensic chemist to attest to the fact a) that the
sachet of substance was handed to him for examination in the same condition that Esguerra last
held it: still heat-sealed, marked, and not tampered with; b) that he (the chemist) opened the sachet
and examined its content; c) that he afterwards resealed the sachet and what is left of its content
and placed his own marking on the cover; and d) that the specimen remained in the same condition
when it is being presented in court. In this way, the court would have been assured of the integrity of
the specimen as presented before it. If the finding of the chemist is challenged, there may be
opportunity for the court to require a retest so long as sufficient remnants of the same are left.

What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the whereabouts of the seized specimen after the
crime laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of custody should be
established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and eventually marked until the same is
presented during trial.11

Taking into account the above reasons, the Court finds it difficult to sustain the conviction of Roselle
for violation of Section 5. The presumption of her innocence of the charge must prevail.

As for the other offense, her and " to account the whereabouts of both specimens (those marked
with @f those identified as members of the buy bust team. laboviolation of Section 15 (Use of Illegal
Drugs), it is curious that the CA still entertained her appeal from it despite the fact that she pleaded
guilty to the charge and did not ask the trial court to allow her to change her plea. At any rate, since
she had been under detention at the Correctional Institute for Women since 2005 and presumably
deprived of the use of illegal substance during her entire stay there, she should be deemed to have
served the mandatory rehabilitation period that the RTC imposed on her.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
alleged violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03451 dated October 30, 2009 and ACQUITS the accused Roselle
Santiago y Pabalinas of the charge against her for that crime.

G.R. No. 174774 August 31, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias "Botong," and RAYMUNDO G. REYES, alias "Mac-
Mac," Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01733, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated September 23, 2003 of Branch 214 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. MC-00-2375-D. The Court
of Appeals found accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes (Reyes)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 21 of Article IV, in relation to Section 16 of
Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and
imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The following antecedent facts are culled from the records:

On February 17, 2000, accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal
possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug commonly known as shabu. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City,
in its Resolution dated March 3, 2000, found probable cause to indict accused-appellants, together
with Emmanuel de Claro, for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, and resolved to continue the
preliminary investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned. The criminal information against
accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, filed with the RTC, reads:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor accuses ROLANDO DELOS REYES y SANTOS @
BOTONG, RAYMUNDO REYES y GUINZON @ MAC-MAC and EMMANUEL DE CLARO y
ENRIQUEZ @ COCOY of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 21 ART. IV IN REL. TO SEC. 16 ART.
III OF R.A. 6425 AS AMENDED, committed in the manner herein narrated as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of February, 2000, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any regulated drug, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, commit to sell, deliver, distribute and/or transport a carton of ten (10) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with the following grams, to wit: 99.2,
94.9, 99.6, 93.5, 98.3, 99.5, 99.6, 99.5, 98.4 and 98.4 grams or a total of 980.9 grams, which
substance when submitted for drug examination, were found positive to the test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a regulated drug, without the
corresponding license and prescription.3

On March 7, 2000, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom,
insisting on their innocence, moved for a reinvestigation of their case before the RTC, which said
trial court granted in an Order4 dated March 15, 2000.

After the reinvestigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated April 3, 2000,
recommending that the RTC proceed with the indictment of accused-appellant Reyes and
Emmanuel de Claro, and dismiss the charges against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and
Lantion-Tom. The Office of the City Prosecutor considered the different versions of events presented
by the parties during the preliminary investigation and reinvestigation (except accused-appellant
Reyes who did not participate in the proceedings), which it summarized as follows:

In their Joint Affidavit of Arrest, the arresting officers, members of the Intelligence and Investigation
of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO) claims
that on 17 February 2000 a confidential informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to
commence at the vicinity of the parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City; that they
were dispatched to verify the reports and conduct police operations; that about 2:00 p.m. after
meeting with the confidential agent, they strategically positioned themselves at the vicinity parking
area of said hotel; that about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a
white Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. "Botong," on board a
red Toyota Corolla, arrived with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside
Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes calling
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro through his cellular phone; that accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes and [Emmanuel] de Claro then proceeded to the latters parked Mazda car
where respondent Lantion-Tom was waiting; from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag
was taken, which accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to accused/respondent
[Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a
plastic bag to accused/respondent Reyes; that the arresting officers accosted the
accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers admitted having in their possession
illegal drugs; that the recovered items containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic
bags of white crystalline substance with a total weight of 980.9 grams turned positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

In his "Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay," accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes claims that on 17

February 2000, he went to Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City, together with a neighbor, one
Marlon David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was to pay his indebtedness; that while looking for a
parking space, several men with firearms suddenly appeared, with one shouting, "buksan mo ang
pintuan ng sasakyan at kung hindi babasagin ko ito"; that he and Marlon David were forced out of
their vehicle with one of the armed men bringing out a plastic shopping bag of Shoe Mart, asking
where the said bag allegedly containing "shabu" came from; that accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes answered "hindi ko alam," that he and Marlon David were blindfolded when forcibly
taken to the groups vehicle and continuously asked who the source of the shabu was, with
respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes replying, "hindi ko alam at wala akong kinalaman diyan;"
that Marlon David was separated from accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes and later
released on 18 February 2000; that when accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes blindfold was
removed, he found himself at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

xxxx

To confirm respondent/accused [Rolando] delos Reyes claim, that he was arrested in Brgy.
Manggahan, Pasig City, and not in the vicinity of Whistletop Bar and Restaurant in Mandaluyong
City, respondent/accused [Emmanuel] de Claros spouse submitted a certified true xerox copy of
barangay blotter of Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City, reflecting the entry on 19 February 2000
made by Mrs. Delos Reyes, on the incident reported to by Marlon David thus:

"BLOTTER"

"Dumulog po rito sa himpilan ng Punong Barangay si Gng. Virginia Delos Reyes, upang ipagbigay
alam ang pagkawala ng kanyang asawa na si Mr. Rolando delos Reyes, nuong petsa 17 ng Pebrero
taong dalawang libo (2000) na ayon sa batang pamangkin na si Marlon David, ay hinuli ng mga hindi
kilalang lalaki sa Buenas Market, Manggahan, Pasig City nais niyang alamin kung ang nasabing
insidente ay coordinated dito sa himpilan o tanggapan ng Barangay."

(Sgd) Virginia delos Reyes

Nagpapahayag"

The blotter was apparently made after Marlon David informed Mrs. [Virginia] Delos Reyes of the
incident upon his release on 18 February 2000. Another witness, one Joel Navarro, claims having
seen the actual incident confirming the events as narrated to by accused/respondent [Rolando]
delos Reyes and Marlon David.

Accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro and his common law wife, respondent Lantion-Tom,
submitted their separate Counter-Affidavits jointly denying the charges and claiming that they were
at the Whistlestop Bar and Restaurant to talk to respondent Lantion-Toms accountant Ms. Daisy
Milan regarding the Mayors Permit, Business Location Clearance issued by the Office of the
Barangay Captain, insurance documents, BIR Certificate of Registration of her business; that they
were with accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claros brother, Roberto and a friend, James, with the
two remaining outside the restaurant; that respondent Lantion-Tom went to accompany Ms. Milan,
while accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro was left inside; that after Ms. Milan left, respondent
Lantion-Tom was suddenly surrounded by men who introduced themselves as police officers and
were arresting them for being the source of "shabu" in a drug deal; that all of them,
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro, Roberto and James were likewise arrested and
continuously questioned on their complicity in the drug deal; that they were taken to Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila and subjected to further investigation; that Roberto and James were
released the following day. Both respondents maintain that the allegations of the arresting officers as
to the circumstances on the alleged "drug deal" leading to their arrest are unfounded and purely
fabricated.

During the preliminary investigation proceedings on 21 March 2000, the arresting officers manifested
that they are going to submit reply-affidavit on 29 March 2000. However, no such reply-affidavit was
submitted.5

The Office of the City Prosecutor pointed out that the arresting police officers failed to refute
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in Cainta,
Rizal, as corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective sworn
statements (Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated March 14, 2000. The Office of the City Prosecutor also
observed that Lantion-Tom was "merely in the company of the other respondents without performing
any overt act showing her to be part of the illicit transaction" and her drug test revealed negative
results. On the other hand, it considered the conflicting claims of Emmanuel de Claro (i.e., that he
was illegally arrested and that the drug deal was a mere fabrication) and the arresting officers (i.e.,
that Emmanuel de Claro was the seller/pusher in the drug deal and the shabu was seized from his
vehicle) would be best ventilated during the trial on the merits.

In accordance with the foregoing resolution, the prosecution filed with the RTC a motion with leave
of court to admit amended information.

In its Order6 dated April 4, 2000, the RTC denied the prosecutions motion. Contrary to the finding of
the Office of the City Prosecutor, the RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not only against
accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes as
well.

Accused-appellants were arraigned on May 23, 2000,7 while Emmanuel de Claro was arraigned on
July 12, 2000.8 All three pleaded not guilty. After the pre-trial conference, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 3 Virgilio
Santiago,9 Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Eraldo Lectura,10 PO3 Angel Yumul,11 and SPO1
Benjamin David,12 members of the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) who apprehended and/or investigated the
case against accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom; and P/Insp. Benjamin
Cruto, Jr.13 (Cruto), the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

PO3 Santiago was one of the police officers who arrested Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom on
February 17. 2000. He testified that at around 10:30 a.m., their operation chief, Major Arnold Aguilar,
received information from a confidential informant regarding an illegal drug deal that would take
place between Botong and Mac-Mac at the parking lot of Shangri-La Plaza in Madaluyong City.
Botong and Mac-Mac were identified during the investigation as accused-appellants Rolando delos
Reyes and Reyes, respectively.

As narrated by PO3 Santiago, a team to bust the illegal drug deal was organized by Major Aguilar,
composed of PO3 Santiago himself, SPO1 Lectura, and PO3 Yumul, along with PO3 Elmer Corbe,
PO3 Marcelo Arcancia, Jr., PO3 Randy Fuentes, PO3 Dennis Padpad, and PO3 Edwin dela Cruz. At
around 1:00 p.m. of the same day, the police team was dispatched, using four vehicles, to the
location of the drug deal and upon arrival, they waited for the confidential informant to arrive. When
the confidential informant arrived at around 3:30 p.m., he told the police team that the drug deal
would possibly take place between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., and that the suspects would utilize a
red Toyota Corolla with plate number TRP-868 and a white Toyota Corolla with plate number ULF-
706. The police team then positioned their cars strategically in such a way that they could see the
vehicles coming from St. Francis Street and EDSA.

PO3 Santiago further recounted that at around 10:00 p.m., the suspected vehicles arrived, both
stopping along the driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. The drivers of the vehicles alighted and talked to
each other. The confidential informant recognized the driver of the white Toyota car as Mac-Mac and
the driver of the red Toyota car as Botong. After a few minutes, Botong made a call on his cellular
phone and then proceeded inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac behind. Inside the
restaurant, Botong talked to another person, who was identified during the investigation as
Emmanuel de Claro alias Cocoy. PO3 Santiago was about three to five meters away. Thereafter,
Botong and Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a car parked right outside. The person
at the back seat of the car, later on identified as Lantion-Tom, handed to Cocoy a white plastic bag
containing a box. Cocoy gave the bag to Botong, who, in turn, handed the same bag to Mac-Mac. In
the meantime, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant.

PO3 Santiago related that their team leader "sensed" that the drug deal had already been
consummated, so the police team immediately effected the arrest of the suspected drug dealers.
PO3 Santiago and PO3 Yumul arrested Cocoy and Lantion-Tom, while SPO1 Lectura and the
remaining police team members arrested Botong and Mac-Mac. The plastic bag containing the box
was seized from Mac-Mac. The arrested suspects were brought to the police office for investigation.
The plastic bag, the box, and the 10 heat-sealed sachets of white crystalline substance inside the
box, were marked for identification and physical examination at the police office.

According to PO3 Santiago, the physical examination of the contents of each of the 10 heat-sealed
sachets yielded positive test results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. PO3 Santiago
then signed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 together with the other arresting
police officers, namely, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, PO3 Fuentes, and PO3 Nelson
Gene Javier.

On cross-examination, PO3 Santiago admitted that he did not actually see what was inside the
plastic bag and that he did not even see Botong hand over such plastic bag to Mac-Mac. From PO3
Santiagos position, he could not conclude that the suspects were committing an illegal drug deal as
he had no prior knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag, and that he and the other arresting
officers just relied on the information relayed by the confidential informant. Also, the police team did
not recover any money from the arrested suspects. The confidential informant merely informed the
police the following morning that the money for the illegal drugs was already deposited in the bank.
The police, however, failed to make further queries from the confidential informant about the bank.

SPO1 Lectura related that their office received a telephone call from a confidential informant about
an illegal drug deal involving Cocoy, Botong, and Mac-Mac in the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City on February 17, 2000. SPO1 Lectura was designated as the leader of the team
that will bust said illegal drug deal. After the briefing, SPO1 Lecturas team proceeded to the subject
location.

The confidential informant arrived and met SPO1 Lecturas team at around 3:30 p.m. SPO1 Lectura
conducted a short briefing then positioned his team strategically within the vicinity. The confidential
informant told the police team that the drug deal would take place between 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.
At around 10:00 p.m., the confidential informant identified the suspected drug dealers Botong and
Mac-Mac, who were arriving in two cars. After conversing for a moment with Mac-Mac, Botong went
inside Whistle Stop Restaurant to talk to Cocoy. Botong and Cocoy then went outside the restaurant
and approached another car. Cocoy took a white plastic bag from the car, which he handed to
Botong. Thereafter, Cocoy went back inside the restaurant, while "[Botong] proceeded to his car
near [Mac-Mac]." SPO1 Lectura was positioned at the other lane of the road, approximately 10 to 15
meters away from the suspects. At that moment, SPO1 Lectura "sensed" that the drug deal had
been consummated, so he decided to already arrest the suspects. SPO1 Lectura arrested Mac-Mac,
from whom he seized the white plastic bag. PO3 Yumul and PO3 Padpad arrested Botong; and PO3
Santiago apprehended Cocoy. The police team brought the arrested suspects to the police office for
investigation.

SPO1 Lectura submitted to SPO1 David the white plastic bag containing a box with 10 heat-sealed
plastic sachets inside. In front of SPO1 Lectura, SPO1 David marked the said articles with his
initials. After physical and chemical examinations revealed that the contents of the sachets were
shabu, SPO1 Lectura signed the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.

During cross-examination, SPO1 Lectura initially denied that Marlon David was with Botong when
the latter was arrested, but he later admitted that the police also arrested Marlon David. Marlon
David was brought to Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, together with the other arrested suspects, for
"verification," and was released the following day. SPO1 Lectura also admitted that during the
preliminary investigation, he and PO3 Corbe, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Javier, answered that it was
PO3 Santiago who seized the shabu from Mac-Mac; but SPO1 Lectura explained that what the
investigating prosecutor actually asked during preliminary investigation was who saw where the
shabu came from and that he signed the minutes of the preliminary investigation without reading the
same. SPO1 Lectura maintained that it was he who recovered the shabu from Mac-Mac. Lastly,
SPO1 Lectura acknowledged that his team heavily relied on the information given by the confidential
informant in identifying the suspects in the illegal drug deal, who were eventually arrested.

PO3 Yumul substantially narrated the same version of events as that of PO3 Santiago and SPO1
Lectura. On February 17, 2000, he was assigned at the Intelligence Investigation Division of the
RMG based in Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig. He was with SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago,
PO3 Fuentes, PO3 Padpad, and several other police officers at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in
Mandaluyong City, conducting surveillance operation regarding the tipped-off illegal drug deal. He
was with SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Padpad in the car parked in front of Shangri-La Plaza, while PO3
Fuentes, PO3 Dela Cruz, and their confidential informant were in another car also parked along the
driveway of Shangri-La Plaza. PO3 Santiago, PO3 Arcancia, and PO3 Corbe were in the car
stationed in front of Whistle Stop Restaurant. PO3 Yumul could not recall where the other members
of the team were located.

At around 10:00 p.m., the suspects Botong and Mac-Mac arrived in separate cars, stopping in front
of Shangri-La Plaza. Botong and Mac-Mac alighted from their cars and talked to each other. At that
time, PO3 Yumul was about five meters away from the two suspects. Moments later, Botong called
someone on his cellular phone, and then went inside Whistle Stop Restaurant, leaving Mac-Mac
behind. PO3 Yumul followed Botong inside the restaurant and saw the latter talking to Cocoy. PO3
Yumul though did not hear the conversation between Botong and Cocoy. Afterwards, Botong and
Cocoy went out of the restaurant and approached a parked car. From his position about three
meters away, PO3 Yumul saw the passenger at the back seat of the car, Lantion-Tom, opening the
window and handing over "a white plastic bag with carton inside" to Cocoy, who, in turn, gave the
plastic bag to Botong. Cocoy then returned inside the restaurant and "[Botong] went back to [Mac-
Mac]." PO3 Yumul followed Cocoy inside the restaurant. A few minutes later, PO3 Santiago also
went inside the restaurant informing PO3 Yumul that they would be arresting Cocoy, and that Botong
and Mac-Mac were already arrested outside the restaurant. PO3 Santiago, assisted by PO3 Yumul,
approached Cocoy and arrested him. The police team proceeded to the police office with all the
arrested suspects for further investigation. PO3 Yumul, however, failed to join the other arresting
officers in signing the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000.

SPO1 David was an investigator at the Intelligence and Investigation Section of the RMG at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, assigned to the instant case following the arrests of accused-
appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom. He also referred the case for inquest to the Office
of the City Prosecutor.

SPO1 David testified that on February 17, 2000, he received from SPO1 Lectura a plastic bag
containing a box with 10 heat-sealed sachets of suspected shabu inside. SPO1 Lectura told SPO1
David that the articles were seized from the suspected drug dealers. SPO1 David marked his initials
"BSD" on the confiscated articles, then prepared a request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination of the specimens. SPO1 David disclosed that he prepared the Affidavit of Arrest of the
arresting officers.

The last witness for the prosecution was P/Insp. Cruto of the PNP Crime Laboratory. P/Insp. Cruto
was the forensic chemist who conducted the physical, chemical, and confirmatory examinations of
the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets submitted by the RMG-NCRPO on February 18,
2000.

P/Insp. Cruto conducted the physical examination by weighing the contents of each sachet,
revealing that two sachets weighed 99.6 grams each; two sachets, 99.5 grams each; one sachet,
99.2 grams; two sachets, 98.4 grams each; one sachet, 98.3 grams; one sachet, 94.9 grams; and
one sachet, 93.5 grams. P/Insp. Cruto then took a representative sample from each plastic sachet
and proceeded with his chemical and confirmatory examinations. The contents of the 10 heat-sealed
plastic sachets all tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
P/Insp. Cruto recorded the result of the examinations in his Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-
2000.14

The prosecution submitted the following object and documentary evidence: the Joint Affidavit of
Arrest15 dated February 18, 2000 signed by SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, PO3 Corbe, PO3
Arcancia, PO3 Dela Cruz and PO3 Javier; the Sketch prepared in open court by SPO1 Lectura;16 the
10 heat-sealed plastic sachets recovered from the possession of accused-appellants;17 the PNP-
RMG Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets;18 the
PNP Crime Laboratory Physical Sciences Report No. D-097-2000 dated February 18, 2000 which
revealed that the contents of the 10 heat-sealed plastic sachets positively tested for
methamphetamine hydrochloride;19 and the Letter (Referral of the case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor)20dated February 18, 2000. The RTC admitted all the aforementioned evidence for the
prosecution in its Order21dated March 1, 2001.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Marlon David,22 accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes,23 Emmanuel de Claro,24 Roberto de Claro,25 and Mary Jane Lantion-
Tom.26 Accused-appellant Reyes did not testify.
Marlon David was 17 years old and a fourth year high school student of Rizal High School in Pasig
City. He recalled that on February 17, 2000, at about 1:00 p.m., he accompanied accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes, whom he referred to as Kuya Botong, to the Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal,
to collect some money.

While accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David were inside their car at the parking
area of said market, another car suddenly arrived, from which an armed male passenger alighted
and approached them. Four other armed men followed and poked their guns at accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men, in civilian attire, were carrying an SM
plastic shopping bag and questioned accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes if he knew the owner
of said plastic bag. Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied any knowledge about the plastic
bag. Marlon David was also asked and he answered that he knew nothing about the plastic bag.

Thereafter, the armed men, who later introduced themselves as police officers, pulled accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes from the driver seat of the latters car, transferred him and Marlon
David to the back seat of said car, and blindfolded both of them. Two of the armed men sat in the
front seats of the car, while one of them sat at the back, beside accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes and Marlon David. The armed men drove the car around (paikot-ikot). The armed men then
separated accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes from Marlon David. They ordered Marlon David
to alight from the car and transfer to another vehicle. While in the other car, the armed men boxed
and mauled Marlon David to force him to admit to be the source of the plastic bag. Each question
was accompanied with one punch. Marlon David remained blindfolded until they arrived at the police
camp in Bicutan, Taguig, where he again saw accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes. Marlon
David was released the following morning, leaving accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes behind
at the police camp. Marlon David went home and told Virginia delos Reyes, the wife of accused-
appellant Rolando delos Reyes, about the incident.

Marlon David, during his cross examination, denied knowing any person with the name Mac-Mac.
Marlon David additionally relayed that he was told by accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes that
the latter was likewise mauled by the armed men.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes or Botong gave a similar account of the incident that took
place at 1:00 p.m. on February 17, 2000, while he and Marlon David were at the Buenas Market in
Cainta, Rizal. Their car was surrounded by four armed men. The armed men poked their guns at him
and Marlon David, shouting at them to open the car doors. He lowered the car window and the
armed men opened the car door. The armed men forced him and Marlon David to get down from the
front seats of the car and to transfer to the back seat, blindfolded them, and asked them who were
the owners of the SM plastic bag. After they left Buenas Market, he noticed that they were just
driving around. The car stopped only when Marlon David was taken out and transferred to another
car. It was already late in the evening when the car finally stopped. He then realized, after his
blindfold had been removed, that he was at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes denied the accusation of the police that he was selling or
delivering shabu to anyone. He asserted that he was not arrested at Whistle Stop restaurant in
Mandaluyong City, rather, he was illegally arrested at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal. Accused-
appellant Reyes or Mac-Mac was his friend who owed him money. He and accused-appellant Reyes
agreed to meet at Buenas Market for the settlement of the latters loan, but the meeting did not take
place because the armed men arrived. He further claimed that he only met Emmanuel de Claro at
Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig. He never knew Emmanuel de Claro before that time, and he
found out the latters name only when they were already detained at the Mandaluyong City Jail.
Emmanuel de Claro or Cocoy testified that on February 17, 2000 at around 10:00 a.m., he was at
the Department of Trade and Industry in Buendia, Makati City, with his common-law wife Mary Jane
Lantion-Tom to follow up their application for business permit. At around 1:00 p.m., they had lunch at
Glorietta. Emmanuel de Claro was no longer feeling well so he and Lantion-Tom passed by the
house of his brother Roberto de Claro to request the latter to drive for them. James, Roberto de
Claros friend, also went with them.

The vehicle driven by Emmanuel de Claro was a rented car because his own car was in the auto
shop. Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom, Roberto de Claro, and James first went to Las Pias City to
check on Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop. From there, they proceeded to Libertad in
Pasay City and ate dinner at the Duty Free Philippines. Afterwards, the group made their way to
Mandaluyong City where Lantion-Tom had a scheduled appointment with Daisy Milan (Milan), her
accountant. Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom met Milan at Whistle Stop Restaurant located at
Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. Milan and Lantion-Tom discussed matters pertaining to the
business permit. Emmanuel de Claro stepped outside the restaurant for a moment to smoke a
cigarette, then, returned inside to wait for the meeting between Lantion-Tom and Milan to finish.
After their meeting, Lantion-Tom walked Milan outside the restaurant, while Emmanuel de Claro
waited for Lantion-Tom inside.

Three male persons suddenly approached Emmanuel de Claro and introduced themselves as police
officers. They warned Emmanuel de Claro not to make a scene and just go with them peacefully.
Emmanuel de Claro obeyed. He was brought outside the restaurant and was forced to get into a
waiting car. For about three hours inside the car, he was punched, handcuffed, blindfolded, and told
to bow down his head. He was likewise being forced to admit something about the shabu, but he
denied knowing anything about it. He heard from the radio inside the car that the police officers were
waiting for another car. After three hours of traveling, the car finally stopped and when his blindfold
was removed, he learned that they were already at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig.

Emmanuel de Claro was placed in one room where he stayed for almost an hour, until he was called
into another room where he met his co-accused for the first time. He later saw Lantion-Tom at the
office of one of the police officers. They were interrogated by the police and being forced to admit
that the drugs being shown to them belonged to them. They asked for a lawyer but their plea was
ignored. The police told Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom that somebody should be held
responsible for the shabu so they were made to choose whether both of them or only one of them
would be charged. Emmanuel de Claro was compelled to choose the latter option.

Roberto de Claro corroborated Emmanuel de Claros testimony. On February 17, 2000, Roberto de
Claro was at home playing video games when his brother Emmanuel de Claro and the latters wife,
Lantion-Tom, arrived and requested him to drive their car because Emmanuel was not feeling well.
James, Roberto de Claros friend, rode with them. They first went to Las Pias City to check on
Emmanuel de Claros car at the auto shop, then they proceeded to Libertad, Pasay City, where they
had dinner at Duty Free Philippines. They next drove to Whistle Stop Restaurant at Shangri-La
Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet "Ms. Milan." Only Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tom went
inside the restaurant. Roberto de Claro and James stayed in the car.

Two hours later, Roberto de Claro saw Lantion-Tom and "Ms. Milan" walking towards them. As the
two women were approaching, armed men suddenly appeared, surrounded their car, and pointed
guns at them. Roberto de Claro got terrified. It was as if an armed robbery ("hold-up") was taking
place. The armed men knocked at the car window. Out of fear, Roberto de Claro opened the
window, then the door of the car. Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom were made to sit at the
back seat of the car. Two of the armed men sat on the front seats of the car, while one sat at the
back with Roberto de Claro, James, and Lantion-Tom. The armed men introduced themselves as
police officers.

Inside the car, the police officers mauled (siniko, sinuntok sa ulo) Roberto de Claro, James, and
Lantion-Tom, all the while ordering them to keep their heads bowed down. The police officers drove
the car for two hours, stopping at a gas station for about five minutes. At this moment, Roberto de
Claro was able to raise his head but was immediately told to bow down his head again. Roberto de
Claro also heard from the police officers radio that they were still waiting for somebody. They
travelled again for quite a long time and stopped in a dark place. The police officers took Roberto de
Claros wallet containing P7,000.00 cash. Early in the following morning, they arrived at the police
station where Roberto de Claro saw his brother Emmanuel de Claro once more. They stayed in one
room until Roberto de Claro and James were released by the police the next day.

When Lantion-Tom was called to testify, the prosecution and the defense agreed to consider her
Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000 and Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000 as her
direct examination.

On cross-examination, Lantion-Tom confirmed that she was among those arrested on February 17,
2000 at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City for her alleged involvement in an illegal
drug deal. At the time of the arrest, she was with Emmanuel de Claro, Roberto de Claro, and James.
She was also brought to Camp Bagong Diwa in Taguig where she was interrogated without a
lawyer. She was shown a box containing shabu which she had never seen before. Lantion-Tom
insisted that she was in Mandaluyong City to meet her accountant, Milan, regarding her application
for a business permit. Lantion-Tom pointed out that the charge against her was eventually
dismissed.

The documentary evidence for the defense consisted of Emmanuel de Claros Counter Affidavit
dated March 23, 2000,27 Lantion-Toms Counter Affidavit dated March 23, 2000,28 Emmanuel de
Claro and Lantion-Toms Supplemental Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,29 Roberto de Claros Witness
Affidavit dated March 29, 2000,30Marlon Davids Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14,
2000,31 Virginia delos Reyes Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,32 Navarros Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,33 accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes Sinumpaang Kontra
Salaysay dated March 14, 2000,34 and a Barangay Blotter dated February 19, 2000 by Virginia delos
Reyes.35 The RTC admitted all these documentary evidence for the defense in its Order36dated
September 13, 2002.

In its Decision dated September 23, 2003, the RTC found accused-appellants and Emmanuel de
Claro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and decreed:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having successfully proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for unlawfully possessing/selling, delivering, transporting and distributing
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a regulated drug, without lawful
authority in violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Article III in relation to Section 21 of Article IV of R.A.
No. 6425, as amended, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 each and the costs of suit.

Further, all the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) taken and seized from the accused during
the aforesaid operation are forfeited and confiscated in favor of the government shall be turned over
to the PDEA pursuant to law for proper disposal without delay.37
Emmanuel de Claro filed his notice of appeal38 on October 23, 2003. Accused-appellants Roberto
delos Reyes and Reyes each filed his notice of appeal39 on October 29, 2003 and December 30,
2003, respectively.

Emmanuel de Claro, however, subsequently moved to withdraw his notice of appeal,40 instead, filing
before the RTC an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Re-Open Proceedings Pursuant [to]
Section 24, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court41 on October 30, 2003, and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration42 on November 3, 2003. Emmanuel de Claro asked the RTC to review its judgment
of conviction based on the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACCUSED

DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP IS A MERE ALIBI AND HAS THUS ERRED IN ADOPTING THE
THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION THAT ALL THE THREE (3) ACCUSED WERE PICKED-
UP AT THE VICINITY OF EDSA SHANGRI-LA PLAZA HOTEL.

II. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS LAWFUL SINCE THE ACCUSED WERE CAUGHT IN
FLAGRANTE DELICTO.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY AMONG THE THREE (3) ACCUSED IN THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME OF UNLAWFUL SALE, DELIVERY AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE
PROHIBITED DRUG.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION ON
THE BASIS MAINLY OF A DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF LACK OF IMPROPER
MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.

V. THAT THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO CONSIDER

THE FACT THAT ACCUSED EMMANUEL DE CLARO WAS NOT AFFORDED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.43

Emmanuel de Claro principally contended that the accusation that he was engaging in an illegal drug
deal, levied against him by prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul
was suspicious, if not incredible. Emmanuel de Claro pointed out that although these police officers
testified that Lantion-Tom, from the car, handed to him the plastic bag containing the box with
sachets of shabu, the prosecution still dropped the criminal charges against Lantion-Tom.
Emmanuel de Claro also strongly argued that the prosecution failed to contradict his well-supported
alibi that he, his wife, and his brother went to Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City to meet his
wifes accountant, so they could attend to several documents pertaining to a business permit.
Emmanuel de Claro further insisted that the RTC should have highly regarded accused-appellant
Rolando delos Reyes testimony which directly contradicted the police officers statements.

In its Order44 dated November 11, 2003, the RTC granted Emmanuel de Claros motion to withdraw
his notice of appeal and required the prosecution to comment to his motions for reconsideration.

The prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition45 on December 19, 2003, objecting to Emmanuel de
Claros motions for reconsideration and maintaining that its police-witnesses categorical, consistent,
and straight-forward testimonies were sufficient to convict Emmanuel de Claro.
In a complete turnabout from its previous findings and conclusion, the RTC, in its Order46 dated
January 12, 2004, acquitted Emmanuel de Claro of the crime charged. The RTC explicitly admitted
that it erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura,
PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul, and in entirely rejecting the alibi of the defense. Thus, the RTC
disposed:

WHEREFORE, the motion of accused-movant Emmanuel De Claro is hereby GRANTED and a new
one entered, ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. Consequently, his immediate release from
detention is hereby ordered unless he is detained for other cause or causes.47

Nevertheless, in view of the pending notices of appeal of accused-appellants, the RTC forwarded
the complete records of the case to us on March 29, 2004, and we gave due course to the said
appeals in our Resolution48dated June 21, 2004.

Accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes filed his Appellants Brief49 on September 15, 2004, while
accused-appellant Reyes filed his Appellants Brief50 on November 26, 2004. Pursuant to our
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,51 we transferred the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action and disposition.52 Accordingly, the plaintiff-appellee, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed before the appellate court its Consolidated Brief53 on January 21, 2005.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained the conviction of accused-
appellants, and merely modified the penalty imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua. According to the appellate court, the police officers testimonies deserve credence than
accused-appellants defenses of denial and alibi, there being no evidence to rebut the presumption
that the police officers regularly performed their official duties.

The case was then elevated to us for final review. In our Resolution54 dated January 31, 2007, we
required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs. Plaintiff-appellee and accused-appellants
Rolando delos Reyes and Reyes filed their manifestations55 on March 14, 2007, April 10, 2007, and
April 13, 2007, respectively, opting to stand by the briefs they had already filed before the Court of
Appeals.

In his Appellants Brief, accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes assigned the following errors of the
RTC:

I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE THE CONTRADICTORY

TESTIMONY AS TO THE PLACE OF THE ARREST IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING [THE] TESTIMONIES OF PO3 VIRGILIO
SANTIAGO CREDIBLE.

III. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE PROSECUTIONS

EVIDENCE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY CATEGORIZE[D] AS WEAK WHEN THE COURT
A QUO GRANTED BAIL TO THE ACCUSED.56

Accused-appellant Reyes cited these errors in his Appellants Brief:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES AS UNLAWFUL.
 II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS VALID,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION
OF R.A. 6425.57

Accused-appellants essentially assert that the charge of illegal drug deal lodged against them by the
police is a complete fabrication and frame-up. Accused-appellants called attention to the material
inconsistencies in the prosecutions evidence. PO3 Santiago testified during direct examination that
accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes handed the "plastic bag with box inside" to accused-
appellant Reyes, but he admitted during cross-examination that he did not see such transfer. The
prosecution was unable to present any evidence to prove the source of the plastic bag containing
the box with sachets of shabu, and the money paid as consideration for the illegal drugs. The
prosecution likewise failed to rebut accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes straightforward,
coherent, and truthful narration, corroborated by Marlon David, that he was illegally arrested at
Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, and not at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.

Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecutions version of the arrests of the
suspects and seizure of the shabu shows that the same were effected in violation of accused-
appellants fundamental rights. The arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the
exceptional circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. The suspects, including accused-
appellants, were arrested without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant and not
because of any apparent criminal activity. A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless
arrest or search and seizure incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from accused-
appellants is inadmissible in evidence.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-appellants, maintaining

that:

I. THE POSITIVE AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES

HAVE ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS VALID SINCE IT

FALLS SQUARELY UNDER RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF THE REVISED RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

III. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION MORE THAN SUFFICE TO

CONVICT APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

IV. CONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.

V. MERE DENIAL AND "HULIDAP," WITHOUT MORE, CANNOT EXCULPATE

APPELLANTS FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY.

VI. THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY

UNDER SECTION 3(M) OF RULE 131 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT HAD NOT
BEEN OVERCOME BY DEFENSE EVIDENCE.

VII. CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF

WITNESSES COMMANDS GREAT RESPECT AND CONSIDERATION.58

Plaintiff-appellee avers that the inconsistencies in the police officers statements, as pointed out by
accused-appellants, are trivial and do not affect the weight of their testimonies; while accused-
appellants defenses of denial and frame-up could be easily concocted and, thus, should be looked
upon with disfavor. Moreover, there is no need for proof of consideration for the illegal drug deal,
since consideration is not an element of the crime charged.

Plaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a crime or
in flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act of distributing, without
legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, on the night of
February 17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City. In addition, in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, the warrantless arrests executed by the police officers
enjoy the presumption that "official duty has been regularly performed."

We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

At the outset, we observe that the prosecutors and the RTC both displayed uncertainty as to the
facts surrounding accused-appellants arrest on the night of February 17, 2000.

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, after preliminary investigation and
reinvestigation, recommended that the RTC drop accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes and
Lantion-Tom from the criminal charge. The RTC only partially adopted the recommendations of the
Office of the City Prosecutor: dropping the criminal charge against Lantion-Tom, but still finding
probable cause against accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes.59

Even after trial, the RTC wavered in its findings and conclusion. In its Decision60 dated September
23, 2003, the RTC initially convicted accused-appellants and Emmanuel de Claro, but acting on
Emmanuel de Claros motions for reconsideration, said trial court, in its Order61 dated January 12,
2004, totally reversed itself and acquitted Emmanuel de Claro. This time, the RTC gave more weight
to the evidence presented by the defense.

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de
Claro by the RTC. Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the
crime charged. Despite the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of Appeals speciously
ratiocinated in its assailed decision that "when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial
courts assessment is entitled to great weight."62

Guided by the settled rule that "where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one
consistent with accused's innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fail[ed] to
meet the test of moral certainty,"63 we find that the findings and conclusion of the RTC in its
subsequent Order64 dated January 12, 2004 (in which it acquitted Emmanuel de Claro) is more in
keeping with the evidence on record in this case. It bears to stress that the very same evidence were
presented against Emmanuel de Claro and accused-appellants; if the evidence is insufficient to
convict the former, then it is also insufficient to convict the latter.

Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul are
unreliable and suspiciously fabricated. In its Order dated January 12, 2004, the RTC correctly
observed that:

Viewed vis--vis the peculiar factual milieu of this case, not to say the insistence by the accused-
movant [Emmanuel de Claro] that a reevaluation or reassessment of the evidence by the
prosecution be considered, this court has decided to revisit the evidence put forward by the
prosecution through the crucible of a severe testing by taking a more than casual consideration of
every circumstance of the case.

It is noted that the testimony given by the witnesses for the prosecution and that of the defense are
diametrically opposed to each other. While this court had already made its conclusion that the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO3 Santiago, SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Yumul are given full
faith and credit and reject the frame-up and alibi story of the accused-movant [Emmanuel de Claro],
nonetheless, upon reassessment of the same it appears that the court erred.

In sum, the conveniently dovetailing accounts of the prosecution eyewitnesses, all of them police
officers, with regard to the material facts of how the crime was allegedly committed engenders doubt
as to their credibility. Firstly, the court noted that these police officers gave identical testimonies of
the events that happened from the moment they arrived at 2 oclock in the afternoon until the arrest
of the accused at 10:30 oclock in the evening at the EDSA Shangri-La premises. This uniform
account given by these witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances
testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought-out and prefabricated story. Because of the
close camaraderie of these witnesses who belong to the same police force it is not difficult for them
to make the same story. Furthermore, their testimonies are so general which shows only too clearly
that they testified uniformly only as to material facts but have not given the particulars and the details
having relation with the principal facts. While they testified that they were at Shangri-La from 2 in the
afternoon to 10 in the evening, they were not able to tell the court how their group positioned
strategically at the premises without being noticed by their target. They could not also gave (sic) an
explanation how their confidential informant was able to obtain information regarding the drug deal
that was supposed to take place on that date involving several personalities. Except for their bare
allegation that they have that information regarding the drug deal they were not able to present any
proof of such report, say, entry in their logbook of such confidential report and a spot report. Even
their operation is not recorded as no documentary evidence was presented. Worth remembering in
this regard is People v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, where it is said that: . . . "[i]t often happens with
fabricated stories that minute particulars have not been thought of." It has also been said that "an
honest witness, who has sufficient memory to state one fact, and that fact a material one, cannot be
safely relied upon as such weakness of memory not only leaves the case incomplete, but throws
doubt upon the accuracy of the statements made. Such a witness may be honest, but his testimony
is not reliable."65 (Emphasis supplied.)

There are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn statements following
accused-appellants arrest and their testimonies before the RTC. The police officers attested in their
Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 that "upon sensing suspicious transactions being
undertaken thereat, team leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted the suspects and
introduced themselves as Police Officers and after that, subject persons deliberately admitted that
they have in their possession illegal drugs and thereafter showed the same to the herein
undersigned arresting officers thus they were placed under arrest."66 Yet, during trial before the RTC,
the police officers uniformly testified that they brought accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and
Lantion-Tom to the police office after arresting the four suspects in flagrante delicto, without mention
at all of the suspects purported admission.

We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement even
when, according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first person to deliver the shabu.
This seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of February 17, 2000.

In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their

defenses, which the prosecution failed to rebut. Specifically, accused-appellant Rolando delos
Reyes testified that he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market, Cainta, Rizal, not at
Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City; and that he and Marlon David were coerced to incriminate
themselves for possession of shabu. His claims were corroborated by Marlon Davids testimony and
Navarros Sinumpaang Salaysay dated March 14, 2000. Also, Emmanuel de Claro, Lantion-Tom,
and Roberto de Claro consistently testified that they were at Shangri-La Plaza to meet Milan,
Lantion-Toms accountant, regarding documents for a business permit (photocopies of the said
documents were presented during trial); and that they were illegally arrested without warrant and
forced to admit criminal liability for possession of shabu. These pieces of evidence are
overwhelmingly adequate to overthrow the presumption of regularity in the performance by the
arresting police officers of their official duties and raise reasonable doubt in accused-appellants
favor.

Furthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that took place on the night
of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify the in flagrante
delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental to their
arrests, resulting in the seizure of the shabu in accused-appellants possession.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Complementary to the above provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined in Section 3, paragraph 2
of Article III of the Constitution, which solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus:

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)

The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations.67

The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the
process cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a
peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).68

In People v. Molina,69 we cited several cases involving in flagrante delicto arrests preceding the
search and seizure that were held illegal, to wit:

In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting
officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to,
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable
cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.

As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so.
What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier
of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."

Likewise, in People v. Mengote, the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting from side to side . . .
[while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the
Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense
had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the
arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada, the Court ruled that no probable cause
is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.

Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his
eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them."' In
declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the
lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed.

It went on to state that

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation which
leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already
6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner
and were not creating any commotion or trouble . . .

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed with a
deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered"
"inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and
petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu.

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.70 (Emphases supplied.)

Similar to the above-cited cases in Molina, there is a dearth of evidence in this case to justify the in
flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants and search of their persons incidental to the arrests.

A close examination of the testimonies of SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul reveal that
they simply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal drug deal
was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.
Without any other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass from one to
another a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was already able to conclude
that the box contained shabu and "sensed" that an illegal drug deal took place.

SPO1 Lectura testified on direct examination as follows:

Q: What was the information gathered by your informant?

A: That there will be a drug deal between 6 to 11 in the evening, sir.

Q: You were there as early as 2:00 p.m.?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do after briefing?

A: We positioned ourselves strategically, we waited for the arrival of the subject, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you are already positioned in your respective area at the vicinity of Shangri-La Plaza, what
happened next, if any?

A: At around 10:00 p.m. two (2) cars arrived and they were identified by the informant that they were
the personalities involved.

xxxx

Q: When this two (2) cars arrive what happened next?

A: They talked for a while after few minutes Botong entered, sir.

xxxx

Q: Do you know this Botong prior this incident?

A: No, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that he is Botong?

A: Through our informant, sir.

Q: When Botong went to the Whistle Stop, what happened next?

A: According to my other companion he talked to another person then after that they went out, sir.

xxxx

Q: How long did Botong stay in Whistle Stop Restaurant?

A: One (1) minute, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you say they who is the companion?

A: Cocoy, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next after they went out to the car?

A: They went to another car and Cocoy got something from his car and handed to Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: Did you see that something that was taken inside that car?

A: White plastic bag, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Cocoy went inside the Whistle Stop, sir.

Q: With the bag?

A: No, it was left with Botong, sir.

Q: What happened next after that?

A: Botong proceeded to his car near Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: What happened next after that?

A: We already sensed that drug deal has transpired, sir. We accosted him.

xxxx

Q: What did you do?

A: I arrested Mac-Mac, sir.

xxxx

Q: Who of your companion apprehended Botong or Rolando delos Reyes?

A: Botong was arrested by Yumul and Padpad, sir.

Q: How about De Claro?

A: Arrested by Santiago, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what did you do after apprehending these people?

A: We brought them to our office for investigation, sir.71 (Emphases supplied.)

PO3 Santiagos testimony also did not offer much justification for the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellants and search of their persons:

Q: When these two (2) persons went out of the restaurant and went to the place where blue Mazda
car was parked, what happened next?

A: The person inside the Mazda car, from the backseat, handed a white plastic bag with a box inside
to Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy], sir. Then, Emmanuel de Claro [Cocoy] gave it to Rolando Delos
Reyes [Botong], sir.

Q: You mentioned about somebody handling box to De Claro [Cocoy] from inside that Mazda car?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was this somebody handling that box?

A: It was Mary Jane Lantion, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you see De Claro [Cocoy] handling the box to Botong, what happened after that?
A: Botong proceeded to the place of Mac-Mac and Emmanuel De Claro [Cocoy] returned back inside
the said restaurant, sir.

Q: Where was Mac-Mac then at that time?

A: Near their car, sir. He was waiting for Botong.

Q: After that what happened next?

A: When Botong returned to Mac-Mac, he gave white plastic bag with box inside to Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: Our team leader, sensing that the drug deal have been consummated, we apprehended them, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that there was a drug deal at that particular place and time?

A: Because of the information given to us by the informant, sir.

Q: Are you aware of the contents of that box at that time?

A: No, sir.

Q: How did you come to know that there was a consummation of a drug deal?

A: Because of the information given to us by the informant that there will be a drug-deal, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what did you do?

A: We brought them to our office for proper investigation, sir.

Q: At your office, what else did you do?

A: We confiscated the evidence, marked them and a request for laboratory examination was made
and other pertaining papers regarding the arrest of the accused.

Q: You mentioned about the confiscated evidence. What is that confiscated evidence that you are
saying?

A: Ten (10) pieces of white plastic transparent plastic bag with white crystalline substance suspected
to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, sir.

Q: How were these evidences confiscated by your group?

A: They were confiscated from Mac-Mac, sir.

Q: In what condition were they at that time that they were confiscated from Mac-Mac?
A: They were placed inside the box, sir.72 (Emphases supplied.)

PO3 Yumuls narration of events was not any different from those of SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago:

Q: When did you meet the confidential informant?

A: At the vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza, sir.

Q: And what was the information that was relayed to you by the confidential informant?

A: The identities of the persons, sir.

Q: What did he particularly tells you in that particular time you meet the confidential informant at the
vicinity of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza?

A: That there will be a drug-deal and the people involved will arrived together with their car, sir.

xxxx

Q: And what happened after the confidential informant relayed to you the information?

A: After we were brief by the confidential informant, we strategically positioned ourselves in the place
where the drug-deal will occur, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do after positioning yourselves in that place of EDSA Shangri-La Plaza and
Whistle Stop restaurant, what happened next after that?

A: At around 10:00, one car arrived, a white Toyota corolla . . .

Q: 10:00 what? In the morning or in the evening?

A: In the evening, sir, of February 17, 2000, sir.

Q: And you stated that two vehicles arrived?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what happened when this vehicle arrived?

A: The red Toyota corolla follows, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what happened? What did you do, if any?

A: Our confidential informant told us that, that is our subject, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next, if any, were they alighted from the car?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then, what happened next, if any?

A: They talked after they alighted from their car, sir.

Q: When you say "nag-usap sila" to whom are you referring?

A: To Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: What happened next after you see them talking to each other?

A: When they talk Mac-Mac called through cellphone, sir.

Q: By the way, did you hear the conversation of this two?

A: No, sir.

xxxx

Q: How about the one calling over the cellphone, did you hear also what was the subject of their
conversation?

A: No, sir.

Q: So what happened next after seeing them having a conversation with each other?

A: Botong immediately walked and proceeding to the Whistle Stop, sir.

xxxx

Q: Then what happened when Botong went to Whistle Stop?

A: He talked to somebody inside, sir.

xxxx

Q: And did you hear what was the subject of their conversation?
A: No, sir.

Q: Then what happened next when Botong talked to somebody inside the Whistle Stop?

A: The companion stood up and they went outside and both of them went to the side of Whistle Stop
in front of the blue car, sir.

xxxx

Q: What did you do then?

A: Somebody opened the window in back of the blue car, sir.

Q: And then what happened next, if any?

A: A white plastic bag was handed to him with carton inside, sir.

xxxx

Q: And who received that item or article from the car?

A: Cocoy, sir.

xxxx

Q: Were you able to know the person inside that car and who handed to Cocoy the white plastic
bag?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who was that person?

A: Mary Jane Lantion, sir.

xxxx

Q: And when this white plastic bag with carton placed inside handed to Cocoy, what did you do?

A: It was first handed by Cocoy to Botong, the plastic bag and then they walked in different direction,
Cocoy went back inside the Whistle Stop and then Botong went back to Mac-Mac, sir.

xxxx

Q: And then what happened next after that?

A: I followed Cocoy inside the Whistle Stop, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do then?

A: I observed him inside but after a few minutes PO3 Virgilio Santiago went inside and told me that
we will going to get them, sir.

Q: Why are you going to get them?

A: Because the two were already arrested outside the Whistle Stop, Mac-Mac and Botong, sir.

xxxx

Q: So what did you do when PO3 Santiago told you that?

A: PO3 Santiago approached Cocoy and I am just assisting him, PO3 Santiago to avoid commotion,
sir.

Q: Then what did you do next after that?

A: We were able to get Cocoy and we went outside, sir.

Q: And then what did you do, if any?

A: After arresting them we boarded to the car and we went to the office, sir.73 (Emphases supplied.)

Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and
searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de
Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or
carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando
delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These circumstances, however, hardly
constitute overt acts "indicative of a felonious enterprise." SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3
Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their
confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what
was inside that box. There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the
box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew
that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu.
The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have
reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants,
Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom "has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit" a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.

Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the integrity of the
shabu purportedly seized from accused-appellants.

In People v. Sy Chua,74 we questioned whether the shabu seized from the accused was the same
one presented at the trial because of the failure of the police to mark the drugs at the place where it
was taken, to wit:

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were
the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test
where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of
Angeles City. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v.
Casimiro, we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since
they were not marked at the place where they were seized, thus:
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not
conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt
as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick
of marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime
laboratory.75 (Emphases supplied.) 1avv phi1

In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the RTC
that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation. SPO1 Lectura and PO3
Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained as shabu the contents of the box inside the white
plastic bag, immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before
proceeding to the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-examination76 that he
saw the shabu for the first time at the police office. At any rate, all three police officers recounted that
the shabu was marked by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.

Without valid justification for the in flagrante delicto arrests of accused-appellants, the search of
accused-appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of the shabu from
accused-appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seized shabu is
excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree. Without the corpus delicti for the crime charged,
then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.

As we aptly held in People v. Sy Chua77 :

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more
cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither
can the presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In
People v. Nubla, we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for
affirming accused-appellant's conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that a
mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, . . . [it] cannot be regarded as
binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

xxxx

The government's drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not
undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so
carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the
constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good
intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.78

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
01733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and
Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED
forthwith released from custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
G.R. No. 179344 August 3, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGARDO FERMIN Y GREGORIO AND JOB MADAYAG, JR., Y BALDERAS, Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

For our review is the Decision1 of the Special Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01852 dated 31 May 2007, convicting the herein accused-appellants Edgardo Fermin y
Gregorio and Job Madayag, Jr. y Balderas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103 in Criminal
Case No. Q-03-119028, finding accused-appellants Edgardo Fermin y Gregorio and Job Madayag,
Jr. y Balderas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article 5 [Section 5], Article II of R.A.
9165, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 500, 000) each is AFFIRMED in toto.

The facts as presented by the prosecution follow:

At around 9 a.m. of 9 July 2003, a police informant went to La Loma Police Station in Quezon City
and reported that two (2) male persons are engaged in illegal sale of drugs at No. 93 Iba St., Brgy.
San Isidro, Quezon City. The two were eventually identified as the herein accused Job B. Madayag,
Jr. (Madayag, Jr.) alias "Rolan" and Edgardo G. Fermin (Fermin) alias "Jon-Jon." Acting upon the
report, Station Chief Police Senior Inspector Oliver M. Villanueva (Senior Inspector Villanueva)
created a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of the police members of
the station namely, PO1 Roderick Valencia (PO1 Valencia), PO1 Albert Mabutol (PO1 Mabutol),
PO2 Ronald Pascua (PO2 Pascua), PO2 Edsel Ibasco (PO2 Ibasco) and one identified only as PO
De Guzman. In their briefing, Senior Inspector Villanueva gave each member of the team their
respective assignments; PO2 Ibasco will act as the poseur-buyer with the rest of the team
completing the cast. Senior Inspector Villanueva gave PO2 Ibasco one (1) One Hundred Peso Bill
for use as marked money. PO2 Ibasco, in turn, put his initial "EI" on the bill.2

At around 11 a.m. of the same day, the buy-bust team, together with Senior Inspector Villanueva
and the confidential informant, went to the target area of operation at No. 93 Iba St., Brgy. San Isidro
in Quezon City on board a Tamaraw FX. PO2 Ibasco and the confidential informant proceeded to
the area where they saw the subject, Madayag, Jr., in front of the house. The rest of the team
positioned themselves, more or less ten to fifteen meters away from the location of PO2 Ibasco, the
informant and Madayag, Jr. The informant then introduced PO2 Ibasco to Madayag, Jr. as a drug-
dependent who wanted to buy drugs. When Madayag, Jr. asked for payment, PO2 Ibasco paid in the
one-hundred-peso marked money. Madayag, Jr. then called another person from inside the house.
The man, later identified as the co-accused Fermin, came out and gave three (3) plastic sachets to
Madayag, Jr. Madayag, Jr. turned again to PO2 Ibasco and showed him the three (3) plastic sachets
at his palm and told the poseur-buyer, "Dahil kasama ka na namin, mamili ka dito sa tatlo para
makasigurado kang di ka talo, sisiguraduhin kong babalik ka."3 PO2 Ibasco then took one plastic
sachet from Madayag Jr.s palm and examined its content. Being convinced that the content was
positive for shabu, PO2 Ibasco made the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head in order to alert
the other members of the buy-bust team. The members then immediately rushed to the location and
introduced themselves as police officers.

PO2 Ibasco testified in his Direct Examination4 that PO2 Pascua got hold of Fermin while PO1
Valencia got hold of Madayag, Jr. He added that PO2 Pascua was able to recover the buy-bust
money and plastic sachet from Fermin while PO1 Valencia recovered a bente nueve knife from
Madayag, Jr. PO2 Ibasco added that the plastic sachet which was the subject of illegal sale
remained in his possession which he marked "EI-JM," while the rest were in the custody of PO2
Pascua. The buy-bust team returned to the police station with the two (2) accused and all the [pieces
of] of evidence were turned over to the desk officer, and the desk officer turned them over to the
police investigator.5

PO2 Pascua affirmed in open court that he arrested and bodily frisked Fermin and was able to
recover one plastic sachet and one (1) .38 Paltik Revolver.6 However, he contradicted the previous
statement of PO2 Ibasco that PO1 Valencia was the one who got hold of Madayag, Jr. He testified
that it was PO2 Ibasco who arrested Madayag, Jr. and recovered from the latter the buy-bust
money.7 He contradicted himself when, on the earlier part of his testimony he said that all the pieces
of evidence including the plastic sachet which was the subject of sale were in his possession until
they were turned over to the investigator,8 he later testified that PO2 Ibasco recovered one plastic
sachet from Madayag, Jr.9

Nonetheless, the two police officers were one in testifying that a Joint Affidavit about the conducted
operation was executed by them at the police station.10

PO2 Ibasco identified the one (1) hundred peso bill with serial number ZT-427430 bearing his initial
"EI" as the marked money used in the buy-bust operation.11 PO2 Pascua, on the other hand,
admitted that he put his initial "RP-EF" in all the plastic sachets he recovered12 and in the .38 paltik
revolver.13

The confiscated sachets of shabu were turned over to the Police Crime Laboratory at Central Police
District in Quezon City for examination.14 Police Forensic Chemist Officer Bernardino Banac, Jr.
executed Chemistry Report No. D-605-03 finding the submitted specimen positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.15

The factual version presented by the defense is:

Madayag, Jr. testified that before 12 noon of 9 July 2003, while he was buying some cigarettes from
a nearby store, he noticed that around eight (8) armed male persons wearing civilian clothes, who
turned out to be police officers, were in front of his house located at No. 93 Iba St., Brgy. San Isidro,
Quezon City. He approached them to ask what they were looking for. However, instead of
answering, two of the police officers, one identified as PO1 Valencia, drew their firearms and poked
them at Madayag, Jr.s head.16 One of them then pulled the accused inside the house. He was then
made to lie down on the cement floor of the veranda. The police officers entered the house and
when they came out after around ten minutes, the other accused Fermin, who was then sleeping
inside one of the bedrooms of the same house, and his mother were brought to the
veranda.17 Fermin was also forced to lie down by the police officers.18 PO1 Valencia recovered a
cigarette lighter from Madayag, Jr., which the police described as, "eto ang gamit mo sa
shabu."19 The police then took the two accused and Fermins mother to the police station where they
were detained.20
Fermin, the other accused, said his mother was later released because she paid the police officers
the amount ofP11,000.00.21 He added that they remained in detention because they could not
produce the additional demanded amount of P14,000.00.22

Fermin corroborated the testimony of Madayag, Jr. in court. He said that at around 11:00 a.m. of 9
July 2003, while he was sleeping, together with his nieces, at one of the rooms of the house at No.
93 Iba St., Brgy. San Isidro, Quezon City, police officers entered the room and grabbed him on his
nape and arrested his mother.23Then they were brought to the veranda of the house where he saw
Madayag, Jr. lying facedown on the floor.24He was ordered to lie down by Valencia. He denied that a
gun was taken from him or that he was called by Madayag, Jr.25 He further denied having given three
(3) plastic sachets to Madayag, Jr. or that he was frisked by the police for plastic sachets and
money.26

Eventually, an Information was filed against Fermin alias "Jon-Jon" and Madayag, Jr. alias "Rolan"
dated 14 July 2003 which reads:

That on or about 9th day of July 2003, in Quezon city, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, not being authorized by law to sell,
deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as a broker in the said transaction, zero point eleven
(0.11) gram of white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.27

Upon arraignment, both the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

On 19 December 2005, the trial court found both the accused guilty of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby finds accused Job Madayag, Jr. y Balderas
and accused Edgardo Fermin y Gregorio GUILTY as conspirator of the crime of drug pushing and
each is hereby sentenced to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000 each.

Upon appeal before the Court of Appeals, the accused in its Appellees Brief assigned the following
errors:28

1. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING

THAT A BUY-BUST OPERATION WAS CONDUCTED AGAINST APPELLANT AT ABOUT
11:30 OCLOCK IN THE MORNING OF JULY 9, 2003 IN FRONT OF HOUSE NO. 93 IBA
ST., BRGY. SAN ISIDRO LABRADOR, QUEZON CITY.

2. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING

APPELLANTS GUILTY AS CONSPIRATORS OF THE CRIME OF DRUG PUSHING AND
SENTENCING EACH TO SUFFER LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE OF
500,000.00 EACH.

3. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO

ACQUIT APPELLANTS OF THE CHARGE ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals agreed with the judgment of the trial court that the two accused
were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him.29
The appellate court found that the testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO2 Pascua were straightforward
and candid as against the claim of alibi or frame-up and extortion of the two accused. Further, the
appellate court found no motive on the part of the police officers to frame up both of the accused.
Finally, it ruled against the alleged lack of "verisimilitude" of the prosecutions version because the
improbabilities, inconsistencies contradictions and self-contradictions did not pertain to the actual
buy-bust itself but only to peripheral matters.

The Courts Ruling

The defenses main argument is whether or not there was really a buy-bust operation on 9 July
2003. While we are not in total agreement with all the submissions of the defense, this Court is
reversing the ruling of the lower courts and now acquits the two accused of the crime charged.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that
the transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as
evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.30 The presence of these elements is
sufficient to support the trial courts finding of appellants guilt.31 What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or
regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked
money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the
accused.32 The presentation in court of the corpus delicti the body or substance of the crime
establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.33

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a
hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial
judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the case.34

Cognate to this, while the entrenched rule is that the assessment of witnesses and their testimonies
is a matter best undertaken by the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor,
conduct or attitude of the witnesses, the findings of the lower court on this point will be reversed on
appeal, if it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case.35

This Court believes that on application of the rule to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
the exception to the high value of the trial courts findings surfaces. We find irreconcilable conflicts in
the recollections about the principal factum probandum which is the buy-bust itself. The varying
versions about the pre-operation, the illegal sale itself and the immediately preceding actions put
doubts about what really transpired on 9 July 2003. 1avv phi1

PO2 Ibasco, in his testimony of 15 June 2004, stated that after the transaction, PO2 Pascua
arrested Fermin and recovered the buy-bust money and the two plastic sachets; while PO1 Valencia
was the one who arrested Madayag, Jr. and recovered from him a bente nueve knife.

Fiscal Araula: After giving the pre-arranged signal, what happened?

Ibasco: My companions rushed towards us and approached us sir.

Q: Now you said your companions approached the both accused at that time?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Who approached Fermin?

A: It was Ronald Pascua sir.

Q: How about Job Madayag?

A: It was Valencia sir.

Q: After your companion Pascua and Valencia arrested them, what happened next?

A: After the arrest, Pascua was able to get the buy-bust money and the plastic sachet sir.

Q: From whom?

A: Fermin sir.

Q: How about from Madayag, was there anything recovered from him?

A: Knife bente nueve sir.

Q: How about the plastic sachet that you able to buy from him, where was it?

A: At that time I was holding it sir.

Q: You said Pascua arrested Fermin, he was able to recover the buy-bust money and plastic
sachets and from Madayag, Valencia recovered the bente nueve?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What bente nueve?

A: Balisong sir.36

However, PO2 Pascua in his 19 April 2004 testimony stated that it was PO2 Ibasco who arrested
Madayag, Jr. and recovered the buy-bust money while he, on the other hand, arrested Fermin and
recovered the .38 paltik revolver and two plastic sachets.

Fiscal Araula: When Ibasco made the pre-arranged signal what happened Mr. Witness?

Pascua: When we saw Ibasco made the pre-arranged signal we rushed towards him.

Q: Were you able to approach them at that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What happened when you rushed to the transaction?

A: We introduced ourselves as police officer and I got hold of Fermin, sir.

Q: How about Madayag, where was he when you got hold of Fermin?

A: Ibasco got hold of him, sir.

Q: When you got hold of accused Fermin, what happened?

A: After it bodily frisked.

Q: You frisked Fermin at that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the result?

A: We recovered one plastic sachet.

Q: From whom?

A: Fermin and one (1) .38 paltik Revolver, sir.

Q: How about Madayag, where was he when you frisked Fermin and got hold the two plastic sachets
and got one (1) .38 paltik?

A: I saw that the buy-bust money was recovered.

Q: Who recovered that buy-bust money?

A: Ibasco, sir.

Q: After you frisked Fermin and got two plastic sachets and paltik revolver and Police Officer Ibasco
recovered the buy-bust money which was held in possession of Madayag, what happened after
that?

A: We proceeded to the vehicle.37

There is another material contradiction. The testimony of PO2 Ibasco dated 7 December 2004
corroborated by PO2 Pascua in his 5 October 2004 testimony was that coordination was made with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). However, as per Certification of PDEA dated 26
July 2003,38 none was made. This was affirmed by Police Inspector Avelino Ecaldre39 when he
testified that no coordination was made by the La Loma Police Station with the PDEA.40 This was
viewed by the trial court as an administrative matter and not an element of a valid entrapment.
Nonetheless, the difference in the prosecution testimonies is evident. And, evident too is the attempt
to project regularity in the buy-bust operation by the disputed testimony on coordination. These are
what matter.

Finally, PO2 Ibasco testified that the sachet which is the subject of the illegal sale remained in his
possession and was subsequently marked as EI-JM.41 However, PO2 Pascua, contradicted this
statement when he testified on 19 April 2004 that the sachet was in his possession. This
contradiction will be underscored in the discussion on the chain of custody of the corpus delicti.
The clear inconsistencies on important points cannot be disregarded where the issue is ones liberty.
The contradictory statements of the main prosecution witnesses need not even be appreciated
together with the defense position. The proof of the supposed buy-bust operation rests exclusively
on the prosecution.42

We now examine the chain of custody of the corpus delicti of this case. Section 21, paragraph 1,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 provides for the custody and disposition of the confiscated illegal
drugs, to wit:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof;

Further, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, provides:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items x x x.

Strict compliance with the prescribed procedures is required because of the unique characteristic of
illegal drugs, rendering them indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering,
alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Hence, we have the rules on the measures
to be observed during and after the seizure, during the custody and transfer of the drugs for
examination, and at all times up to their presentation in court.43

While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 excuses
non-compliance with the afore-quoted procedure, the same holds true only for as long as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. Here, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with the procedural requirements cannot be
excused since there was a break in the chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It
should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is established by showing its chain of
custody.44
The following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.45

As provided by the implementing rules and jurisprudence, strict compliance of the requisites under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 can be disregarded as long as the evidentiary value and
integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved; and its preservation can be well established if the
chain of custody of illegal drug was unbroken. The break is clear in this case.

It must be noted that the police officer who had the initial custody and control of the illegal drug was
not clearly identified. In the preceding discussion on the inconsistency in the statements of PO2
Ibasco and PO2 Pascua, it was pointed out that PO2 Ibasco admitted that he was in possession of
the confiscated drug, but this was contradicted by PO2 Pascua who testified that he was the one
who was in possession of the illegal drug which was the subject of sale when it was brought to the
police station.

Fiscal Araula: After both accused were arrested and recovered buy-bust money and two plastic
sachet[s], in which you recovered from the accused, what happened next?

PO2 Ibasco: We turned over all the evidence to the desk officer and the desk officer turned it to the
police investigator for proper investigation sir.
1avvphi 1

xxxx

Fiscal Araula: All the recovered evidence that we recovered from the accused, can you tell to this
Honorable Court what are these?

PO2 Ibasco: The plastic sachet that I bought, paltik, two sachets, one bente nueve and the buy-bust
money sir.

Fiscal Araula: Who was in possession of the evidence when your group went to the police station?

PO2 Ibasco: I was the one holding the plastic sachet what I was able to buy, my companion was
holding on the items that they recovered, sir.46

In his direct examination, PO2 Pascua testified differently:

Fiscal Araula: Now, who was in possession of that two plastic sachets and the paltik revolver taken
from Fermin at that time when you proceeded to La Loma Police Station?

PO2 Pascua: I was in possession of that, together with the paltik, sir.

Fiscal Araula: How about the P100.00 bill and the plastic sachet which was the subject of sell [sale],
who was in possession?

PO2 Pascua: All of them were in my possession, sir.47

Additionally, no photograph was taken of the substance immediately after its supposed seizure.
Atty. Madayag: When the alleged shabu was confiscated, was there any photographs taken?

PO2 Pascua: No sir.

Atty. Madayag: That is in violation of Section 21 of [R.A. No.] 9165. So there was no inventory and
photographs?

PO2 Pascua: There was an inventory.

Atty. Madayag: On the night of the incident?

PO2 Pascua: All the evidences were turned over to Villanueva.

xxxx

Atty. Madayag: Where was the inventory made?

PO2 Pascua: At the office.

Atty. Madayag: At the office there was no photographing?

PO2 Pascua: None, sir.48

The fundamentals of a criminal prosecution were, indeed, disregarded. In considering a criminal

case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charged laid unless the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt.49 The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. To repeat, the prosecution must rest on
its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet
the required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own
behalf. In which case, the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted.50

The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the two accused. The rule that
high respect must be accorded the lower courts in their findings of facts cannot be misused to
diminish the required evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused as
guaranteed by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01852 in affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 December 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 103 of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-03-119028 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Edgardo Fermin y Gregorio and Job Madayag, Jr.
y Balderas are hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention unless their
continued confinement is warranted from some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185717 June 8, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GARRY DE LA CRUZ y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated June 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02727, which affirmed in toto the February 8, 2007 Decision2 in Criminal Case No. Q-
03-117814 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused
Garry de la Cruz y dela Cruz (Garry) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

In an Information3 filed on June 3, 2003, accused was indicted for the crime allegedly committed as
follows:

That on or about the 29th of May, 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and
there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment on July 28, 2003, accused pleaded "not guilty" to the above charge.4 Trial5 on the
merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

After conducting surveillance for a week, the Station Drug Enforcement Unit in La Loma, Quezon
City planned a buy-bust operation against a certain Garry who was in the Barangay Watch List. The
operation was coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

On May 29, 2003, at around 9:00 a.m., the stations Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Police Inspector Oliver
Villanueva (P/Insp. Villanueva), gave a briefing on the buy-bust operation. Police Officer 2 Edcel
Ibasco (PO2 Ibasco) was designated as poseur-buyer, while PO1 Roderick Valencia (PO1
Valencia), PO1 Alfredo Mabutol, and PO2 Ronald Pascual were assigned as back-up operatives.
Their informant attended the briefing.

Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to Biak-na-Bato corner Mauban Streets, Quezon City and
arrived there at around 9:30 a.m. The informant introduced PO2 Ibasco to the accused, who was
standing in front of a shanty, as wanting to buy shabu. The accused asked for PhP 100, and when
PO2 Ibasco paid the amount, the former handed over to him a white crystalline substance in a
plastic sachet. Upon PO2 Ibascos prearranged signal, the other members of the buy-bust team
approached them. The accused, sensing what was happening, ran towards the shanty but was
caught by PO1 Valencia at the alley. PO1 Valencia introduced himself as a police officer and frisked
the accused, in the process recovering the buy-bust money.

The buy-bust team then brought the accused to the station. The accused was turned over to the
desk officer on duty, along with the substance in the sachet bought from him and the recovered buy-
bust money. After inquest, the Information was filed on June 3, 2003. Accused was then committed
to the Quezon City Jail.6

Consequently, the substance inside the sachet believed to be shabu was sent to and examined by a
Philippine National Police forensic chemist, Engr. Leonard Jabonillo (Engr. Jabonillo). The laboratory
result confirmed that the substance was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Only PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified for the prosecution during the trial. The testimony of
Engr. Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense.

Version of the Defense

The accused denied selling shabu to PO2 Ibasco. In short, the accused used the defense of denial
and alleged a frame-up by the arresting officers.

The accused testified that he was arrested on May 29, 2003 at around 9:00 a.m. inside his house at
Barangay Manresa, Quezon City while he was alone drinking coffee. While two neighbors were
talking in front of his house, a Tamaraw FX arrived. Five armed men alighted from it, whereupon his
neighbors ran away and were chased by them. The armed men then returned, saying, "Nakatakas,
nakatakbo." (They had escaped and ran.) One of the armed men saw the accused and entered his
house. It was PO2 Ibasco, who frisked him and got PhP 60 from his pocket. PO1 Valencia also
entered his house and came out with a shoe box, then said, "Sige, isakay nyo na." (Take him in the
car.) He asked the armed men what his violation was but was told to merely explain at the precinct.

In the police precinct, he was investigated and subsequently detained. They showed him a plastic
sachet which they allegedly recovered from him. Then a man approached him and demanded PhP
30,000 for his release, but he said he did not have the money. Thereafter, he was presented for
inquest.

A witness, Rodolfo Buencamino (Buencamino), narrated that in the morning of May 29, 2003, he
called the police precinct to have a certain "Taba," an alleged drug pusher in their area, arrested.
PO2 Ibasco and other police officers responded immediately. When the police officers arrived,
Buencamino pointed to "Taba," who, however, was able to evade arrest. Thereafter, he was
surprised to see the accused inside the vehicle of the policemen. But he did not know why and
where the accused was arrested since he did not witness the actual arrest.

Another witness, Marbelita Collado Lepiten (Lepiten), testified that she was at the terrace of her
house on 135 Manba St., Manresa, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, when she noticed the
accused talking to a certain "Taba," a resident of the area. When a maroon Tamaraw FX stopped in
front of the house of accused, "Taba" ran away and was pursued by two men who alighted from the
vehicle. The two men returned without "Taba," who evidently escaped, and entered the house of the
accused. She did not know what happened inside the house but she eventually saw the men push
the accused outside into their vehicle.

The Ruling of the RTC

On February 8, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused GARRY DELA CRUZ guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and hereby sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS.

SO ORDERED.

In convicting the accused, the RTC relied on and gave credence to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Citing People v. Jubail,7 which enumerated the elements
required to be established by the prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the trial court
found that the prosecution had established the elements of the crime.

The RTC pointed out that Buencamino may, indeed, have called the police to arrest a certain "Taba,"
an alleged pusher in the area, but he was not present when the accused was arrested. The trial
court likewise did not accord evidentiary weight to the testimony of Lepiten, who testified that she
saw the accused talking to "Taba" and that when the police officers entered the house of the
accused, she was unaware of what transpired inside. Thus, the RTC concluded that her testimony
did not provide clear and convincing justification to cast doubt on the candid and straightforward
testimonies of the police officers.

Applying the presumption of the performance of official function, the lack of showing any ill motive on
the part of the police officers to testify against the accused, and the principle that the bare denial of
an accused is inherently weak, the RTC convicted the accused.

Consequently, with his conviction, the accused started to serve his sentence8 and was subsequently
committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City.

Aggrieved, accused appealed9 his conviction before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

On June 30, 2008, the appellate court rendered the appealed decision, wholly affirming the findings
of the RTC and the conviction of appellant. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision supra is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

The CA upheld the findings of the trial court that the essential elements required for the conviction of
an accused for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 were present in the instant case. The appellate
court brushed aside the irregularities raised by accused-appellant by putting premium credence on
the testimonies of the arresting police officers, who positively identified accused-appellant in open
court. One with the trial court, the CA found no improper motive on the part of the police officers
who, it said, were regularly performing their official duties. Besides, relying on People v.
Barlaan,10 the CA held that the irregularities raised that there was no coordination with the PDEA and
that no inventory was made and no photograph taken of the seized drug, if true, did not invalidate
the legitimate buy-bust operation conducted. Moreover, the CA found that the corpus delicti, i.e., the
confiscated shabu and the PhP 100 bill, were presented as evidence of the commission of the
offense.

The CA also ruled that accused-appellants mere denial, as corroborated by Buencamino and
Lepiten, deserved scant consideration vis--vis the positive identification by the arresting officers
who arrested him in flagrante delicto. Anent the questioned chain of custody, the CA found it
unbroken and duly proven by the prosecution.

The Issues

Hence, We have this appeal.

Only accused-appellant, however, filed his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief),11 while the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of the Philippines, submitted neither a
Manifestation nor a Motion. Consequently, on July 27, 2009, the Court dispensed with the OSGs
submission of a supplemental brief.12 Since no new issues are raised nor supervening events
transpired, We scrutinize the Brief for the Accused-Appellant13 and the Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee,14 filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727, in resolving the instant appeal.

Thus, accused-appellant raises the same assignment of errors, in that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF DENIAL.15

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

Accused-appellant argues that, first, the prosecution has not proved his commission of the crime
charged for the following irregularities: (1) the arresting officers did not coordinate with the PDEA, as
required under Sec. 86 of RA 9165; (2) no physical inventory was conducted and photograph taken
of the alleged seized drug in the presence of public officials, as required by Sec. 21 of RA 9165; and
(3) the chain of custody was not duly proved by the prosecution. And second, his denial is worthy of
credence upon corroboration by the credible witnesses presented by the defense.

After a careful and thorough review of the records, We are convinced that accused-appellant should
be acquitted, for the prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt his commission of
violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165.

A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and
the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the
violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the
crime."16 However, where there really was no buy-bust operation conducted, it cannot be denied that
the elements for illegal sale of prohibited drugs cannot be duly proved despite the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty and the seeming straightforward testimony in court by
the arresting police officers. After all, the indictment for illegal sale of prohibited drugs will not have a
leg to stand on.

This is the situation in the instant case.

The courts a quo uniformly based their findings and affirmance of accused-appellants guilt on: (1)
the straightforward testimony of the arresting police officers; (2) their positive identification of
accused-appellant; (3) no ill motive was shown for their testimony against accused-appellant; (4) the
self-serving defense of denial by accused-appellant; (5) the seeming irregularities in the conduct of
the buy-bust operation and the arrest of accused-appellant not invalidating the operation; and (6) the
testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten not showing that the buy-bust operation was not conducted.

Although the trial courts findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied in a case under appeal,17 as here.

For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the
identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled
with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.18

In People v. Doria,19 the Court laid down the "objective test" in determining the credibility of
prosecution witnesses regarding the conduct of buy-bust operations. It is the duty of the prosecution
to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation"from the initial contact between the
poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration
until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of sale."20 We said that
"[t]he manner by which the initial contact was made, x x x the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug x x x must be the subject of
strict scrutiny by the courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit
an offense."21

No Surveillance Conducted

The testimony of PO2 Ibasco on direct examination did not mention an alleged surveillance
conducted by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia prior to the alleged buy-bust operation, the
corresponding intelligence report, and the written communiqu with the PDEA. The defense in cross-
examination put to task both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia concerning these matters, as attested to
in the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension22 executed by the two police officers on May 30, 2003. PO2
Ibasco testified that his unit, specifically PO1 Valencia and himself, conducted surveillance on
accused-appellant for a week prior to the buy-bust operation on May 29, 2003 which, according to
him, turned out positive, i.e., accused-appellant was, indeed, selling shabu.

PO2 Ibasco on cross-examination testified, thus:

ATTY. LOYOLA:

Being an operative, you are of course, trained in intelligence work?

PO2 IBASCO:
Yes, sir.

Q: You said you conducted surveillance but you cannot show any proof that there is an intelligence
report, you have no proof?

A: Yes, sir. There is, we were dispatched.

Q: Where is your proof now?

A: Its in our office.

Q: Your dispatch order for the surveillance do you have any?

A: I dont have it now sir but its in the office.

Q: You said that you conducted surveillance for one week, did I hear you right?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: So, you are saying you did not actually see him selling drugs at that time during the surveillance?

A: We saw him, sir.

xxxx

Q: None. You did not even coordinate this operation with the PDEA?

A: We coordinated it, sir.

Q: What is your proof that you indeed coordinated?

A: Its in the office, sir.

ATTY. LOYOLA:

May I make a reservation for continuance of the cross-examination considering that there are
documents that the witness has to present.

COURT:

What documents?

ATTY. LOYOLA:

The proof your Honor that there was indeed a coordination and the intelligence report.

COURT:
Will you be able to produce those documents?

A: Yes, sir. "Titingnan ko po."

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

Titingnan?

COURT:

You are not sure? You dont have any copy of those documents?

A: You Honor, what we have in the office is the dispatch.23

PO1 Valencia, likewise, on cross-examination testified:

ATTY. LOYOLA:

Mr. Witness, tell me during the orientation, you will agree with me that there was no coordination
made to the PDEA regarding this intended buy bust operation?

PO1 VALENCIA:

We have coordinated at the PDEA.

Q: You say that but you have no proof to show us that there was coordination?

A: We have, sir.

Q: What is your proof?

A: We have files in our office for coordination.

Q: Are you sure about that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, based on the information, you already planned to conduct a buy bust operation
against the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: But you will agree with me that there was no surveillance against the accused?

A: We have conducted a surveillance one week before the operation and we conducted surveillance
"Pinakawalan namin ang informant."

Q: What do you mean "pinakawalan ang informant"?

A: So that we have a spy inside to verify whether Garry was really selling shabu.
xxxx

Q: In fact you dont have any information report?

A: We have, sir. Its in the office. Its with Insp. Villanueva.

Q: And because you claim that you have submitted an information and report, of course, you should
have come up with an intelligence report.

A: Yes, sir. Its also in the office of Insp. Villanueva.

xxxx

Q: And the alleged recovered item, the plastic sachet which contained white crystalline substance
was brought by whom to the PNP Crime Laboratory?

A: I cannot remember who brought it sir because it was a long time ago.24

These documentsspecifically the dispatch order, the intelligence report of the alleged surveillance,
and the written communiqu from the PDEA for the conduct of the surveillance and buy-bust
operationwere not, however, presented in court. Evidently, these documents are non-existent,
tending to show that there really was no surveillance and, consequently, no intelligence report about
the surveillance or the averred written communiqu from PDEA attesting to coordination with said
agency. Worse, the prosecution never bothered to explain why it could not present these
documents. Thus, there is no basis to say that accused-appellant allegedly sold shabu a week
before he was arrested.

Even putting this lapse aside, the other irregularities raised by accused-appellant in the backdrop of
the uncontroverted testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten tend to show that there was really no
buy-bust operation conducted resulting in the valid arrest of accused-appellant.

Generally, non-compliance with Secs. 21 and 86 of RA 9165 does not mean that no buy-bust
operation against appellant ever took place.25 The prosecutions failure to submit in evidence the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to Sec. 21, Art. II
of RA 9165 will not discharge the accused from the crime. Non-compliance with said section is not
fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.26

No Buy-Bust Operation

But where there are other pieces of evidence putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation,
these irregularities take on more significance which are, well nigh, fatal to the prosecution.

Putting in doubt the conduct of the buy-bust operation are the uncontroverted testimonies of
Buencamino and Lepiten, which gave credence to accused-appellants denial and frame-up theory.
The Court is not unaware that, in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting
evidence to extract information from or even to harass civilians.27 This Court has been issuing
cautionary warnings to trial courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drug cases, lest an innocent
person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.28
The defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official
duties.29 Nonetheless, such a defense may be given credence when there is sufficient evidence or
proof making it to be very plausible or true. We are of the view that accused-appellants defenses of
denial and frame-up are credible given the circumstances of the case. Indeed, jurisprudence has
established that the defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecutions evidence is
such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt,30 as in the instant case. At the very least,
there is reasonable doubt that there was a buy-bust operation conducted and that accused-appellant
sold the seized shabu. After all, a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense.31

Notably, Buencamino voluntarily testified to the effect that he called the police asking them to
apprehend a certain "Taba," a notorious drug pusher in their area. PO2 Ibasco and company
responded to his call and Buencamino helped identify and direct the policemen but "Taba"
unfortunately escaped. Thus, Buencamino testified:

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

Mr. Witness, who asked you to testify today?

BUENCAMINO:

I volunteered myself to testify.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell us how, when and where the accused was arrested?

A: I was the one who called-up the precinct to arrest a certain Taba and not Garry. Taba was the
target of the operation.

Q: When was that?

A: May 29, 2003.

Q: Why did you call the police station?

A: Ibasco talked to me to arrest Taba.

Q: Why are they going to arrest Taba?

A: Because he is a pusher in the area.

Q: Why do you know Ibasco?

A: Because he was a previous resident of Barangay Manresa.

Q: You said you called police officer [sic] what was the topic. Mr. Witness?
A: That Taba is already there and he already showed up and they immediately responded to arrest
Taba.

Q: So, Ibasco immediately responded to your call?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When they arrived in your place what happened else, if any?

A: I pointed to Taba so they could arrest him.

Q: Where they able to arrest Taba?

A: No, sir. He was able to escape.

Q: Whey they were not able to arrest alias Taba what happened, next Mr. Witness? What happened
to Garry Dela Cruz?

A: I was surprised because I saw Garry Dela Cruz already inside the vehicle and I dont know why
Garry was inside the vehicle.32

Buencaminos assertion of knowing PO2 Ibasco was likewise not rebutted. Moreover, the
presentation of the police logbook on calls received in the morning of May 29, 2003 would indeed
show if Buencamino or someone else made a call to the precinct about a certain "Taba," but then,
again, the prosecution did not bother to rebut the testimony of Buencamino. Verily, this time the
presumption "that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced"33 applies. In fact, the
prosecution did not even assail Buencaminos credibility as a witness but merely made the point in
the cross-examination that he had no actual knowledge of the arrest of accused-appellant. Thus,
Buencamino was cross-examined:

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

You were not with Garry at the time he was arrested?

BUENCAMINO:

No, sir.

Q: You dont know where he was arrested at that time?

A: I dont know where Garry was, sir.

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

That will be all, your Honor.34

More telling is the testimony of Lepiten which, uncontroverted, shows that there was no buy-bust
operation. Her testimony corroborates the testimony of Buencamino that police enforcers indeed
responded to Buencaminos phone call but were not able to apprehend "Taba." This destroys the
buy-bust operation angle testified to by PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia. Since the buy-bust operation
allegedly happened not inside the house of accused-appellant but in an open area in front of a
shanty, such cannot be sustained in light of what Lepiten witnessed: The policemen chased but were
not able to arrest "Taba"; thereafter, the policemen went inside the house of accused-appellant,
emerging later with him who was led to the vehicle of the policemen. Thus, Lepiten testified:

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

Mrs. Witness, where were you on May 29, 2003, if you could still remember?

COURT:

What time?

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

At around 9:00 in the morning.

LEPITEN:

I was at the terrace of the house we are renting while sipping coffee.

Q: Where is that house located?

A: No. 135 Mauban Street, Barangay Manresa, Quezon City.

COURT:

Where is this, Novaliches?

A: No, your Honor, near San Francisco Del Monte.

xxxx

ATTY. BARTOLOME:

While drinking coffee, what transpired next, Mrs. Witness or was there any unusual thing that
happened?

A: Yes, sir. While I was sitting on the terrace in front of the house we are renting is the house of
Garry. Garry was talking to a certain Taba whom I know.

xxxx

Q: While you saw them talking to each other, what happened next?

A: Suddenly a maroon FX stopped.

Q: Where?

A: In front of the house of Garry.

Q: When this maroon FX stopped, what happened next, if any?

A: Taba ran, sir.

Q: What happened next, if any?

A: Two (2) men in blue pants and white shirt alighted from the maroon FX and ran after Taba.

Q: Were they able to arrest Taba, Ms. Witness?

A: No, sir. They were not able to catch him.

Q: When they failed to arrest Taba, what did these two (2) men do, if any?

A: They returned in front of the house and Garry and I saw them entered the house of Garry.

xxxx

Q: What did they do, if any?

A: I dont know what they did inside because I could not see them, sir. Then I saw them went down
and pushed Garry towards the FX.

xxxx

Q: After that what else happened, if any?

A: I just saw that they boarded Garry inside the FX.

xxxx

COURT:

Any cross?

PROSECUTOR ANTERO:

No cross, your Honor.35

Thus, taking into consideration the defense of denial by accused-appellant, in light of the foregoing
testimonies of Buencamino and Lepiten, the Court cannot conclude that there was a buy-bust
operation conducted by the arresting police officers as they attested to and testified on. The
prosecutions story is like a sieve full of holes.

Non-Compliance with the Rule on Chain of Custody

Moreover, the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the requisite chain of custody of the seized
specimen. "Chain of custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.36 The CA found an unbroken chain
of custody of the purportedly confiscated shabu specimen. However, the records belie such
conclusion.

The testimonies of PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia, as well as their Joint Affidavit of Apprehension,
were bereft of any assertion on how the seized shabu in a heat-sealed sachet was duly passed from
PO2 Ibasco, the chosen poseur-buyer, who allegedly received it from accused-appellant, to forensic
chemist Engr. Jabonillo, who conducted the forensic examination. While the testimony of Engr.
Jabonillo was dispensed with upon stipulation by the defense, as duly embodied in the RCT Order
dated March 16, 2004, it is likewise bereft of any assertion substantially proving the custodial
safeguards on the identity and integrity of the shabu allegedly received from accused-appellant. The
stipulation merely asserts:

x x x that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; that his office received a
request for laboratory examination marked as Exhibit "A"; that together with said request is a brown
envelope marked as Exhibit "B"; which contained a plastic sachet marked as Exhibit "B-1"; that he
conducted a requested laboratory examination and, in connection therewith, he submitted a
Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C". The findings thereon showing the specimen positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit "C-1", and the signature of the said police
officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2". He likewise issued a Certification marked as Exhibits "D" and
"D-1", and thereafter, turned over the specimen to the evidence custodian and retrieved the same for
[sic] purposed proceeding scheduled today.37

While both PO2 Ibasco and PO1 Valencia testified on the identity of the plastic sachet duly marked
with the initials "EIGC," there was no sufficient proof of compliance with the chain of custody. The
records merely show that, after the arrest of accused-appellant, the specimen was allegedly turned
over to the desk officer on duty, whose identity was not revealed. Then it was the stations OIC,
P/Insp. Villanueva, who requested the forensic examination of the specimen. In gist, from the alleged
receipt of the plastic sachet containing 0.02 gram of shabu by PO2 Ibasco from the alleged buy-bust
operation, the chain of custody of the specimen has not been substantially shown. The Court cannot
make an inference that PO2 Ibasco passed the specimen to an unnamed desk officer on duty until it
made its way to the laboratory examination. There are no details on who kept custody of the
specimen, who brought it to the Crime Laboratory, and who received and kept custody of it until
Engr. Jabonillo conducted the forensic examination. The stipulated facts merely made an allusion
that the specimen custodian of the Crime Laboratory had possession of the specimen and released
it for the proceedings before the trial court.

It is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.38 This, the prosecution failed to do.
The prosecution must offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain
of custody.39

As the Court aptly put in People v. Cantalejo:

x x x the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the custody of the seized drugs raises
doubt as to its origins.

x x x failure to observe the proper procedure also negates the operation of the presumption of
regularity accorded to police officers. As a general rule, the testimony of police officers who
apprehended the accused is usually accorded full faith and credit because of the presumption that
they have performed their duties regularly. However, when the performance of their duties is tainted
with irregularities, such presumption is effectively destroyed.
While the law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and
it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.40
1avvphi1

In sum, considering the multifarious irregularities and non-compliance with the chain of custody, We
cannot but acquit accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt. The law demands that only
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.41 In all criminal prosecutions,
without regard to the nature of the defense which the accused may raise, the burden of proof
remains at all times upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.42 As the Court often reiterated, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.43

In fine, We repeat what the Court fittingly held in People v. Ong, a case similarly involving a buy-bust
operation, thus:

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. While appellants defense engenders suspicion that he probably
perpetrated the crime charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the evidence establishes a
strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. 1avv phi 1

In the case at bar, the basis of acquittal is reasonable doubt, the evidence for the prosecution not
being sufficient to sustain and prove the guilt of appellants with moral certainty. By reasonable doubt
is not meant that which of possibility may arise but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and an inability, after such an investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the
certainty of guilt. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the appellants
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defense. Suffice it to say, a slightest
doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.44

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accused-appellant Garry De La Cruz y Dela Cruz is
herebyACQUITTED of the crime charged on basis of reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the CA
Decision dated June 30, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02727 is SET ASIDE. The Director of the
Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of accused-appellant, unless he is
being lawfully held for another cause.