Leiden University

MPA Economics and Governance

Regulation and Governance

Course instructor: Dr. Maarja Beerkens

Student: Elizabeth Pellini

Case 3 - Animal Welfare

Q1 - Why is there a failure to enforce EU law on animal transport?

Q2 - Could we have lowered the risks of failure?

According to FVO, despite the good architecture for achieving the enforcement many Member
States failed to enforce EU law on animal transport. The occurrences of non-compliance
described in the FVO report might be understood as a consequence of three reasons
categorized by the PUMA regulatory reform work for OECD Members countries, as following:

1. Lack of regulatory knowledge or comprehension by the target group

FVO reported about Competent Authority insucient knowledge in assessing the feasibility and
adequacy of the journey logs documented (e.g. Spain, Romania). In Lithuania, none of the
veterinary sta at the slaughterhouse had received training regarding the Regulation 1/2005
and they were not aware of the breach due to the transport of unfit animals. In Spain, there
were also checklists for the inspection and approval of means of transport based on repealed
legislation.

This recurrent problem might indicate that the requirements were too complex to know ,
understand and keep updated, and consequently, to comply with regulation.

2. Willingness of the target group to comply with the rules

The decision taken by the transporters in order to not comply with regulation has demonstrated
their resistance which might indicate that compliance is too costly. Voluntary compliance is this
case is very low because it also has an impact on the transporters profit, e.g. the number of
journeys might be reduced due to the longer rest period.

Hence, the number of regulatory breaches seemed to indicate that the transporters were
calculating the utility of rule breaking (Lodge 2008: 76), weighing the costs and benefits whilst
deciding to follow or not the regulation. The deterrence failure had significant contribution to
the fact that the fines were not high enough to compensate the profit from the crime. As FVO
reported, the penalties were to low to be dissuasive and bring about corrective actions, e.g. in
France, the fine imposed for the transport of two unfit animals to a slaughterhouse was only
135.

In addition, there was also a failure to monitor compromising the enforcement activities. Even
in the cases when CAs discovered infringements, frequently they were been reported to the
other relevante CAs as required by the regulation to prevent the recurrence of similar
breaches(e.g. Belgium, Malta). Or in the case of corrective actions that were requested but had
no proper follow up to make sure they were put in place (e.g. Hungary). That means even if
there were high fines they would not lead to adjustments in behavior if not accompanied by
credible detection threat.

3. Ability of the target group to comply with the rules

Apparently the architecture for achieving the enforcement is not as good as assumed by the
FVO. Huge obstacle to achieve the desired outcomes through the means required when related
to Member States lack of eective power to impose penalties on transporters from other
Member States. Absence of legal power to collect fines on the spot and the diculty to to
sanction foreign transporters (e.g. Hungary) lead to an interesting reflection whether the
regulation went through a prior consultation with the target group to identify lack of regulatory
clarity or consider the limits of authority of regulatory agencies, for example, in the case of
cross jurisdiction.

However, thinking about measures that could be taken to lower the risks of failure, the first one
should start with communication with the targeted group to explain the rules, clarify the rights
and duties and hear from them, whether there is any unexpected impact that could stop the
policy to take eect.

The following measure should consider the use of policy instruments such as fines (but
eective, proportionate and dissuasive) to influence the transporters behavior for example, and
also supported by enforcement activities as suggested by the enforcement pyramid (Lodge
2008: 82) - advice and warnings; administrative sanctions; criminal sanctions, and;
incarceration and revocation.

Last but not least important, adequate implementation to make the policy workable in practice.
For example, were the CAs suciently trained, with knowledge of exactly how to check the
journey logs, to assess the capacity of vehicles ventilation systems, to proceed in case
penalties on transporters from other jurisdiction? As highlighted on PUMAs work on regulatory
reform (OECD report 2000: 12), governments have to ensure that necessary information is
provided to the target group and other technical facilities or mechanisms are taken.