1.

RURAL BANK OF ANDA INC V ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LINGAYEN

DAGUPAN

FACTS:

The lot in dispute, Cadastral Lot 736 (Lot 736), is located in the Poblacion of
Binmaley, Pangasinan. Lot 736 has a total area of about 1,300 square meters and is
part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot 737 and Lot 739 also form part of Lot 3. Cadastral Lot
737 is known as Imeldas Park, while on Lot 739 is a waiting shed for commuters.
Lot 3 is bounded on the north by Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A and on the south by the
national road. In front of Lot 736 is the building of Mary Help of Christians Seminary
(seminary) which is on Lot 1.

Lot 1 of Plan II-5201-A, which adjoins Lot 3 on the north, is titled in the name of
respondent Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lingayen (respondent) under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 6375 (TCT 6375). An annotation on TCT 6375 states that the
ownership of Lot 3 is being claimed by both respondent and the Municipality of
Binmaley

In 1958, the Rector of the seminary ordered the construction of the fence
separating Lot 736 from the national road to prevent the caretelas from parking
because the smell of horse manure was already bothering the priests living in the
seminary. The concrete fence enclosing Lot 736 has openings in the east, west, and
center and has no gate. People can pass through Lot 736 at any time of the day

In December 1997, Fr. Arenos, the director of the seminary, discovered that a
sawali fence was being constructed enclosing a portion of Lot 736. In January 1998,
the Municipal Mayor of Binmaley, Rolando Domalanta (Mayor Domalanta), came to
the seminary to discuss the situation. Mayor Domalanta and Fr. Arenos agreed that
the construction of the building for the Rural Bank of Anda should be stopped.

On 24 March 1998, respondent requested Mayor Domalanta to remove the

sawali fence and restore the concrete fence. On20 May 1998, Mayor Domalanta
informed respondent that the construction of the building of the Rural Bank of
Anda would resume but that he was willing to discuss with respondent to resolve
the problem concerning Lot 736.

On 1 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for Abatement of Illegal

Constructions, Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan. On 24 August 1998, the trial court
ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

Page 1
Whether Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley are
valid.

HELD:

The petition has no merit. Both respondent and the Municipality of Binmaley admit
that they do not have title over Lot 736. The Assistant Chief of the Aggregate Survey
Section of the Land Management Services in Region I testified that no document of
ownership for Lot 736 was ever presented to their office. Both respondent and the
Municipality of Binmaley failed to prove their right over Lot 736. Since Lot 736 has
never been acquired by anyone through purchase or grant or any other mode of
acquisition, Lot 736 remains part of the public domain and is owned by the state

RATIO:

This is in accordance with the Regalian doctrine which holds that the state
owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Thus, under Article XII, Section 2 of
the Constitution: All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state.

Municipal corporations cannot appropriate to themselves public or government

lands without prior grant from the government. Since Lot 736 is owned by the state,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Binmaley exceeded its authority in passing Resolution
Nos. 104 and 105. Thus, Resolution Nos. 104 and 105 are void and consequently, the
contract of lease between the Municipality of Binmaley and the Rural Bank of Anda
over a portion of Lot 736 is also void.

2. CRUZ VS DENR GR NO 135385

FACTS:
Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other
natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources.
Cruz et al content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within
said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law violate the rights of private
landowners.

Page 2
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD:
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7
vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no
majority vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include natural resources somehow against the regalian
doctrine.

RATIO:
Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of
"ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the rights of private
landowners.3
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and
jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these
provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.4
These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition
of ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate
ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a
particular area is an ancestral domain and upon notification to the following
officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of
Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and Commissioner of the
National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials over said area
terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of
indigenous peoples shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims of
ownership, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and that any
doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
indigenous peoples;
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to
resolve disputes involving indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the indigenous peoples.

3. REPUBLIC VS. CA AND NAGUIT

FACTS:

Page 3
 Corazon Naguit filed a petition for registration of title which seeks judicial
confirmation of her imperfect title over a parcel of land in Nabas, Aklan. It was
alleged that Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly
and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even
the government until she filed her application for registration. The MCTC rendered a
decision confirming the title in the name of Naguit upon failure of Rustico Angeles to
appear during trial after filing his formal opposition to the petition.

The Solicitor General, representing the Republic of the Philippines, filed a

motion for reconsideration on the grounds that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since the subject land was declared as
alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property

Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and
disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.

RULING:

Section 14 (1) merely requires that the property sought to be registered as

already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
file

Page 4
 There are three requirements for registration of title, (1) that the subject
property is alienable and disposable; (2) that the applicants and their predecessor-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession and occupation,
and; (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945.

There must be a positive act of the government through a statute or

proclamation stating the intention of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative
over the property, thus, declaring the land as alienable and disposable. However, if
there has been none, it is presumed that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property and the possession of the land no matter how long would not
ripen into ownership through acquisitive prescription.

To follow the Solicitor Generals argument in the construction of Section 14

(1) would render the paragraph 1 of the said provision inoperative for it would
mean that all lands of public domain which were not declared as alienable and
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no
matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. In effect, it precludes
the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to reclassify lands as
alienable and disposable.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted
with coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but
confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no
impediment to the application of Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by
her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945.

Page 5
4. MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

FACTS:
On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition
his inscription as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then
municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other
documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the
US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo
lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use
and occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his
possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The
government is still the absolute owner of the land (regalian doctrine). Further,
Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the
presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used
for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and
since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the
petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he
proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted
that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and
obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute
owner. Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not
always, public land.

Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce

title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as
a valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is
enough. For uncultivated, 30.

Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such

proceedings against him or his father ever was made.

Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

There must be a presumption against the government when a private

individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that the

Page 6
 lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.

5. Ching v. CA

FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the
Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of
money against the PBMCI. Trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to attach all the properties of said
Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans. Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of
Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment allegeing inter alia
that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her and
her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver
that the source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the
controlling factor when invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks
under Art. !21 and that such presumption subsists even if the property is registered
only in the name of one of the spouses, in this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching.
According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not contracted in the
pursuit of the petitioner-husbands profession or business.44

ISSUE:
WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the
loans guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching

HELD: No.

RATIO:
The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the
petitioner-husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate
business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of
the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the
petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money.

The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for
the said account of PBMCI.
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she
may legally bind the partnership.

Page 7
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of
the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husbands act of executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and
in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and
the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from
the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.

6. CASTILLO VS ESCUTIN

FACTS:

Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla (Raquel), married

to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her search for properties to satisfy the
judgment in her favor, petitioner discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw
(Urbana), and sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land
consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City,
Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.

Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to
secure an Order dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the application of Summit
Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of several agricultural landholdings,
including Lot 13713 owned by Perla K. Mortilla, et al. and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 00449, to residential, commercial, and recreational uses. She was
also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a Certification[if stating
that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-
owners Raquel, Urbana, and Perla; and a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No.
00554-A itself. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued a
Certificationattesting that Lot 13713 in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and
Perla, was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial or patent, or subject
to the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or patent under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and
the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002. Sometime in
May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot
13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She

Page 8
immediately went to the Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice
President, Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any
document to prove ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened
her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful and
influential for petitioner to tangle with.

ISSUE:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION 00942 OF
PETITIONER IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 109 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION ACT

RULING:

From the very beginning, petitioner was unable to identify correctly the positions
held by respondents Mistas and Linatoc at the Office of the City Assessor. How then
could she even assert that a particular action was within or without their
jurisdiction to perform? While it may be true that petitioner should have at least
been notified that her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was being cancelled, she was not
able to establish that such would be the responsibility of respondents Mistas or
Linatoc. Moreover, petitioner did not present statutory, regulatory, or procedural
basis for her insistence that respondents should have done or not done a particular
act. A perfect example was her assertion that respondents Mistas and Linatoc should
have annotated her interest on Tax Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of
Catigbac. However, she failed to cite any law or rule which authorizes or recognizes
the annotation of an adverse interest on a tax declaration. Finally, absent any
reliable evidence, petitioners charge that respondents conspired with one another
and with corporate officers of Summit Realty is nothing more than speculation,
surmise, or conjecture. Just because the acts of respondents were consistently
favorable to Summit Realty does not mean that there was a concerted effort to cause
petitioner prejudice. Respondents actions were only consistent with the recognition
of the title of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered
under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of title.

7. RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC, vs. THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAAQUE

CITY,

Page 9
FACTS:

Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to change its name

from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was
approved by SEC. As a consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the
amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties owned by them,
all of which were under the old name. For this purpose, petitioner instituted a
petition for amendment of titles with the RTC Paraaque City.

The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City,

apparently because the titles sought to be amended, all state that they were issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in
the body of the petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in
Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject titles are in the custody
of the Register of Deeds of Paraaque Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry of Deeds of
Paraaque City, and alleged that its lands are located in Paraaque City.

In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the petition motu
proprio on the ground of improper venue, it appearing therein that the respondent
is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City.
Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the petition, the lower court also
denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared from the original petition that
the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Paraaque
court. Since it had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the
motion to admit amended petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of
improper venue.

HELD:

Venue of real actions

This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, where this Court held that it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of
petitioners complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is

Page
10
plain error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction
and venue.

Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically governed by Rule 4 of

the Revised Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an
action is conferred only by law.[16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver
upon a court which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as fixed by statute may be
changed by the consent of the parties, and an objection on improper venue may be
waived by the failure of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an
event, the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never
be left to the consent or agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the
parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial.

Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is certainly not the
appropriate course of action at this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant
fails to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be permitted to belatedly
challenge the wrong venue, which is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly
erroneous for the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by
dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without
first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course.

Amendments as a matter of right

A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time before a
responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10)
days after it is served.

Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of justice, in order

that every case may so far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in order to
speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.
The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment proposed by
petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the actual merits of the case to be
speedily determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious
and inexpensive manner.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid

multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are
presented, their rights determined and the case decided on the merits without

Page
11
unnecessary delay. This liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit,
especially in this case where the amendment to the complaint was made before the
trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and
to prepare for trial.

8. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y ESTEBAN,

represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR, ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO,
petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), AURELIO
OCAMPO, DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, V
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON, VICENTE
PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN
PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,

FACTS
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject of
controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro
y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the ownership of, against third
persons and the Government itself, a total land area of approximately 173,000
hectares or 214,047 quiniones,[ on the basis of a Spanish title, entitled Titulo de
Propriedad Numero 4136 dated April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San
Pedro heirs, appears to cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal,
Laguna and Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City,
Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands extending
from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the land area between
Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the south
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes cropped up and
land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in tedious litigation in various trial
courts, in the appellate court and in the Supreme Court, in connection therewith. G.R
No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaintfor recovery of
possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. This
was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
104, Quezon City in its decision dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portionof which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the complaint against the
defendants Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa dela Cruz and ordering
plaintiff to pay each of the herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as and for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or reconveyance
with damages and with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on August 15,
1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-judicial administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo,
MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz, Gaudencio R. Soliven,

Page
12
Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D.
Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay, Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic
Investment & Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose
F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San Pedro
discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure from the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the subject estate, particularly Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 1386, 8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412,
353054, 372592, 149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original
Certificate of Title No. 614 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and
264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that the
aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and possession of
certain portions of the subject estate in their names through deceit, fraud, bad faith
and misrepresentation; (3) that Original Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had
been cancelled by and through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988
in relation to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation to Central
Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971, September 12, 1972 and June 10,
1980; and (4) that the issue of the existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo
Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been
resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25, 1978 by the
defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag, Bulacan pertaining to a case
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-B.
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants, namely,
Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz, Dominador Buhain and
Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the complaint against
Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and against Manuel Chung and
Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of action considering that the registered owner
of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and
Development Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu.
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and
Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint based
on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz are already the
registered owners of the parcels of land covered by Torrens titles which cannot be
defeated by the alleged Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the
subject estate; and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled
In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all lands which have already been
legally and validly titled under the Torrens system by private persons shall be
excluded from the coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.

Page
13
ISSUE: Whether the claim of 173hectares land is valid

HELD: NO. (1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null and void and,
therefore, no rights could be derived therefrom;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 are excluded from the
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
(3) The petition for letters of administration, docketed as Special Proceedings No.
312-B, should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting for and in behalf of the estate of
the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to exercise any act of
possession or ownership or to otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or any
portion of the estate covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby
ordered to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of them are in possession
thereof.

RATIO: The Title embraces land `located in the Provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon,
and Quezon City. Second. The title was signed only by the provincial officials of
Bulacan, and inscribed only in the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation,
indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-embedded principle that private
ownership of land must be proved not only through the genuineness of title but also
with a clear identity of the land claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa
Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v. Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen,
13 Phil. 202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil 51, 54-56; Lasam v. Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371.
This Court ruled in a case involving a Spanish title acquired by purchase that the
land must be concretely measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass (cuerpos
ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362, 373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree
of August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for classifying lands strongly
suggests that the land applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been mentioned in the title. In Piadecos
Rejoinder to Opposition dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case 3035-M, it specified
that area covered by its Titulo de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-24796, p.
36). In its Opposition of May 13, 1964 in the same case, it described the land as
containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is which? This but accentuates the
nebulous identity of Piadecos land. Piadecos ownership thereof then equally suffers
from vagueness, fatal at least in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the original owner
appearing on the title, acquired his rights over the property by prescription under
Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p. 184) the
basic decree that authorized adjustment of lands. By this decree, applications for
adjustment -- showing the location, boundaries and area of land applied for -- were

Page
14
to be filed with the Direccion General de Administracion Civil, which then ordered
the classification and survey of the land with the assistance of the interested party
or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the period for filing applications for
adjustment at one year from the date of publication of the decree in the Gaceta de
Manila on September 10, 1880, extended for another year by the Royal Order of July
15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought adjustment within the time prescribed, as he
should have, then, seriously to be considered here are the Royal Orders of
November 25, 1880 and of October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to 1,000
hectares of arid lands, 500 hectares of land with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable
lands (See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154; Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98
Phil. 935, 941. Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889 limited the area
that may be acquired by purchase to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%.
Ponce, op. cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition, it should be stated again that
Piadecos Titulo is held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of land.

9. ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, vs. HERMINIGILDO* TAYAG and

JUAN HERNANDEZ,

On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter
alia, that:
--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, [herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in
his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner
Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at
public auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes,
penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80,
representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974. Elias Imperial
never authorized a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for
and on his behalf;
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent]
Tayag for P4,400.00 without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to
[petitioners], and without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;
--A final bill of sale was later issued in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo
Tayag. The assessed value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair
market value of the same is more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew
these;
--The bid price of P4,400 is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience,
thus, the sale for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including

Page
15
penalties is null and void ab initio;
--[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they
bought the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public,
continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo
Tayag has never been in possession of the said property;
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered to pay to the [respondents] the sum
of P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but
said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo.
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of
not less than P20,000.00; attorneys fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of
P2,000.00 for every appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00
to prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with
[C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the
allegations in the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative
defenses, among others:
--(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue
of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16,
1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the
Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a buyer in good faith in
a regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.
--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners] claim because the
[petitioners] pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of
Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become] final
and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;
--The public auction sale complied with the requirements of Presidential Decree No.
464 hence, the same is lawful and valid:
--[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the
[petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with
the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at
least P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and,
expenses of litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he
denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that no irregularity or
illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the
delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant
herein were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the
provisions of the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464
otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be
imputed against him. He also claimed, by way of affirmative defenses, that:
--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:

Page
16
--[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus, the
case cannot prosper;
--Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because
of] the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including
defendant herein.

ISSUE: The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the
auction sale of the subject property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency
when there was no compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 46 of
P.D. 464 that such notice of delinquency of the payment of the property tax should
be published.

HELD: NO. DENIED

RATIO: As correctly pointed out by respondents, equitable considerations will not

find application, if the statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the
requisites and standards by which the matters at bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are
innocent purchasers of the subject property, it is a well-settled principle that
between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in ones favor has a
preferred right over the other whose title has not been registered, even if the latter
is in actual possession of the subject property.
Likewise, we cannot help but point out the fact that petitioners brought this
misfortune upon themselves. They neither registered the Deed of Sale after its
execution nor moved for the consolidation of ownership of title to the property in
their name. Worse, they failed to pay the real property taxes due. Although they had
been in possession of the property since 1981, they did not take the necessary steps
to protect and legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners suit is now barred by laches. The law helps the vigilant, but not
those who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily,
time runs against the slothful and the contemners of their own rights.

10. Legarda vs Saleeby,

Facts: A stone wall stands between the adjoining lot of Legarda and Saleeby. The
said wall and the strip of land where it stands is registered in the Torrens system
under the name of Legarda in 1906. Six years after the decree of registration is
released in favor of Legarda, Saleeby applied for registration of his lot under the
Torrens system in 1912, and the decree issued in favor of the latter included the
stone wall and the strip of land where it stands.
Issue: Who should be the owner of a land and its improvement which has been

Page
17
registered under the name of two persons?
Held: For the issue involved, The Land Registration Act (Act 496) affords no remedy.
However, it can be construed that where two certificates purports to include the
same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold title and will
prevail.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, is to quiet title to land; to put
a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were
noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto. That being the purpose of the law, once a title is registered the owner may
rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
The law guarantees the title of the registered owner once it has entered into the
Torrens system.
Ratio: One ruling exposes all persons purchasing or dealing in registered lands to
unknown, unspecified and uncertain dangers, to guard against which all such
persons will be put to additional cost, annoyance and labor on every occasion when
any transaction is had with regard to such lands; while the other ruling tends to
eliminate consequences so directly adverse to the purpose and object for which the
land registration law was enacted, and imposes no burden upon any holder of a
certificate of registered lands other than that of defending his title on those rare,
definite and specific occasions wherein he has actual notice that his title is being
challenged in a Court of Land Registration, a proceeding in which the cost and
expense is reduced to the minimum by the conclusive character of his certificate of
title in support of his claim of ownership. Furthermore, judgment against the
innocent purchaser and in favor of the holder of the earlier certificate in a case such
as that under consideration must inevitably tend to increase the danger of double or
overlapping registrations by encouraging holders of registered titles, negligently or
fraudulently and conclusively, to permit default judgments to be entered against
them adjudicating title to all or a part of their registered lands in favor of other
applicants, despite actual notice of the pendency of judicial proceedings had for that
purpose, and this, without adding in any appreciable degree to the security of thir
titles, and merely to save them the very slight trouble or inconvenience incident to
an entry of appearance in the court in which their own titles were secured, and
inviting attention to the fact that their right, title and ownership in the lands in
questions has already been conclusively adjudicated.

11. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration

before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang
Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful

Page
18
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his
great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo
and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties
inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It
was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated
11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated
that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the
RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law
for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and
disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any
time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established
that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of
land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore
susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its

use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?

Page
19
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves
or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the
length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition
of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled
to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.

Page
20
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or
petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented
in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is
no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil
Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL

CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.

On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus,
applied with the Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a
33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron, Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The
property applied for was a portion of what was then known as Lot 522 of the Davao
Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer,
accepted sealed bids for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for
P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr. Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per
hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction sale for the reason
that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for
non-service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant
Eugenio de Jesus was the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by
Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00 representing 10% of the price of the
land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of
Award, the dispositive portion of which reads: +.wph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in connection
with the Sales Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law and existing
regulations, the land covered thereby is herebyawarded to the said applicant,
Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for the whole tract.

Page
21
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de
Jesus filed his Sales Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan
Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was approved and the land awarded to
Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and 1176-B-1-B
with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales
Application of Eugenio de Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales
Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army
for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended so as to exclude
therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus
amended, it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was Identified
as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85
withdrawing Lot No. 1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for
military purposes, under the administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th
installment for 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was
amended. This payment did not include the military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as
the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application at the time the
payment was made. Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P.
Dans ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales
Application for "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the
barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. On the same date, then Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent to Eugenio de
Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of
Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centa.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title
over a full 12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956
reserving the area for medical center site purposes.

HELD: YES

RATIO: Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp
site" was executed between Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation
would anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus held no dominical rights over the
site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year, proclamation No. 85
of President Quezon already withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved
it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the
subject of the donation was not the land itself but "the possessory and special
proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus over it. We disagree. It is true that the
gratiuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or right. But the term "right"
must be understood in a "propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus

Page
22
disponendi. This is because, in true donations, there results a consequent
impoverishment of the donor or diminution of his assets. Eugenio de Jesus cannot
be said to be possessed of that "proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in
1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at that time this 12.8081-hectare
lot had already been severed from the mass of disposable public lands by
Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's
assets as a consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed. In fact, even if We
were to assume in gratia argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the
Sales Award, still the same may not be the subject of donation.

13. Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim
areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred
to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and
Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all
future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA.
It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register
of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the
mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended
joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now

Page
23
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

14. REPUBLIC vs. DOLDOL

FACTS:

Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Opol,

Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an application for saltwork purposes for the said
area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same. Sometime in 1965, the
Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed a resolution reserving a certain lot as a
school site. This lot unfortunately included the lot of Doldol. Sometime in 1970, the
Opol High School filed a complaint for accion possessoria with the RTC, the court
ruled on schools power. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of teh court ruling
that Doldol was entitledto the portion he occupied, he having possessed the same
for 32 years (1959-1991).

ISSUE: Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?

Page
24
HELD: No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the
land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation of
law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
title/certificate of tile being issued.

The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and
disposable in accordance with the District Foresters Certification. Doldol thus
meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the

disputed land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than
June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law, Doldol
cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a right
superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol
National School.

The privilege occupying public lands with a view of pre-empting confers no

contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for
public use, prior to divesting by the government of title thereof stands eventhough
this may defeat the imperfect right of settler. Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired (Solicitor
General)

In sum, Opol National Schoolhas the better right of possession over the land
in dispute.

15. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARMENCITA M.

ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO; MAURICIO B.
MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented by CONCEPCION M.
LAZARO, respondents.

Page
25
On 14 November 1996, the respondents filed before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna, an
application for registration of title over five parcels of land, each with an area of
5,220 square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their
application, they stated, among other things, that they are the sole heirs of Spouses
Melencio E. Melendez, Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original owners of Lot 2111
of CAD-455, with an area of 2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in possession of
the said property since 1949, more or less. After the death of their mother and
father on 19 February 1967 and 5 May 1976, respectively, they partitioned the
property among themselves and subdivided it into five lots, namely, Lots 2111-A,
2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. Since then they have been in actual possession
of the property in the concept of owners and in a public and peaceful manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the
respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to the
property or have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land in question since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of
title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts, presented by the respondents do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide right to registration of
the land under Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as The
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073; (c) the claim of
ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., and Carmencita M.
Alconaba testified to establish their claim over the subject lots. Mauricio claimed
that he and his co-respondents acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents
Lot 2111 of Cad-455, which is an agricultural land. Their parents had been in
possession of the said land since 1949 and had been religiously paying the taxes due
thereon. When their parents died, he and his siblings immediately took possession
of said property in the concept of an owner, paid taxes, and continued to plant rice
thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his co-heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
with Partition over the said lot and subdivided it into five lots.
For her part, Carmencita testified that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had been in the
possession of their parents since 1940 and that after the death of their parents she
and her siblings immediately took possession of it and religiously paid the taxes
thereon. The land is being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant. She admitted that
no improvements have been introduced by their family on the lot. On cross
examination, she admitted that plans to sell the property were at han.
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the respondents have
sufficiently established their familys actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious
possession of the subject property for more than fifty-seven years, commencing
from the possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that such
possession was in an adverse and public manner. Likewise, it found that the land in
question is alienable and disposable and is not within any reservation or forest
zone. Thus, it confirmed the title of the respondents over the said lots; directed the
Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch, to cause the registration of said

Page
26
parcels of land in the name of the respondents upon payment of fees; and ordered
the issuance of a Decree of Registration once the decision becomes final and
executory.
Upon appeal by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in (a) giving
weight to the self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the lots in question in the concept of an owner for at least
thirty years; and (b) holding that respondents tax declaration is sufficient proof that
they and their parents have been in possession of the property for at least thirty
years, despite the fact that the said tax declaration was only for the year 1994 and
the property tax receipts presented by the respondents were all of recent dates, i.e.,
1990, 1991,1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Finally, the OSG states that even granting
for the sake of argument that the respondents have been in possession of the
property since 1940, their adverse possession should be reckoned only from 28
September 1981 when the property was declared to be within alienable and
disposable zone.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the
self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of
the lots in question in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years

HELD: YES. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the
following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural
lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.

RATIO: The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.

Page
27