Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Aquinas on Inner Space

Author(s): F. F. Centore
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Dec., 1974), pp. 351-363
Published by: Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40230512
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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume IV, Number 2, December 1974

Aquinas on Inner Space

F. F.CENTORE, University of Waterloo

A Cluster of Problems

Can one deny the intelligibility of "extramental nonbeing" in pure

ontology while affirming its intelligibility in physics? When one sweeps the
heavens clean of matter does one also necessarily affirm the existence of
absolute nonbeing in those "clean" spaces? Does talking about space necessarily
mean talking about nonbeing? How could there possibly be "space" which is not
absolute nothingness? How, if at all, can statements about space be reconciled
with such self-contradictory statements as "What is not, is"?
The purpose of this brief paper is not to argue, within the context of the
physical sciences, about whether or not there exist voids or absolutely empty
spaces in the universe. Neither is it to discuss the existence or nonexistence of
the aether.1 And although I shall be using texts taken from several famous
historical figures, my purpose is not primarily historical. The cluster of
problems, after all, is still very much a contemporary one. It still lies in the
borderline area between the philosophy of being and the philosophy of nature
and science. In order to further the resolution of these problems, I shall seek to
show how Aquinas would view them, for he thought as profoundly about them
as any of the great metaphysicians. The clarification of his view will require us to
attempt a reconciliation between certain passages which seem to affirm what
other passages seem to deny about spaces or voids within the confines of the
universe taken as a whole.

1 Some modern authors have made a strong case for the existence of the aether. See,
for instance, V. Samuel and H. Dingle, A Threefold Cord: Philosophy, Science,
Religion (London, 1961), Appendix I, pp. 265-269, where Dingle quotes famous
modern scientists such as Einstein, Dirac, and Whittaker in support of the aether.
According to Dingle, radio and television stations do not go "on the air" but "on
the aether."

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F. F. Centore

Thinking About Nonbeing

Parmenides is widely held to be the father of metaphysics because he was

the first philosopher we know of to discuss the meaning of being in a generalized
fashion. In his poem The Way of Truth he explains how he came to know that
the path of "What is Not" cannot be trodden by human thinkers. That which
can be thought can be, but that which is a pure nothing cannot even be thought.
Possible things can be thought about and things not actually present can be
thought about but something which is totally not there cannot be a something in
any sense in any way at any time and cannot be thought about at all.2
How then could "What is Not" ever get into a poem? Parmenides does not
say. If he can make no sense at all out of "What is not, is," how could he ever
venture to express himself in the first place? Aquinas, for one, thought that it
was possible to have an idea of "What is Not." However, such a notion must
always depend upon a previously held positive notion of something that is. When
discussing whether or not it is proper to speak aboUt God the Father as
unbegotten he uses "unbegotten" as a relative term indicating a negation of
"begotten." This is true of all negations. All negations are reducible to the genus
of affirmation as, for instance, not man is in the genus of substance and not
white is in the genus of quality.3 Nonbeing, therefore, may have a certain logical
kind of existence as a concept which is totally dependent upon the mind of the
knower responsible for creating the idea. Parmenides was right in so far as he
claimed that in itself nonbeing has nothing that could render it intelligible. But,
he was not right when he claimed that nonbeing was absolutely unthinkable.
For, in so far as the intellect renders it knowable relative to being it can be
known.4

Aristotle and the Void

But what does this tell us about the existence of nonbeing as an

extramental reality? Is nonbeing purely an ens rationis as are the mental
creations of the logician? Aquinas, following one course of reasoning, would
seem to agree with Aristotle that such is indeed the case.
Aristotle's case against the reality of an extramental void was based upon a
combination of physical observation and reasoning. His main argument centres

2 See K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford, England, 1962),

pp. 41-44. See also F. E. Peters, Greek Philosophical Terms (New York University
Press, 1967), p. 101: Kenon.
3 See 5. T.y 1,33,4, ad 3.
4 See S. T., 1,16, 3, ad 2.

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 Aquinas on Inner Space

around the conditions necessary for projectile motion. What keeps an arrow in
motion after it has left the bow? According to Plato, the originally moved object
moves the medium in front of itself thus giving it the power to be a mover also.
Ipso facto, whatever is moved is a potential mover. The medium in turn
transmits its motive power to the opposite end of the object. The missile is then
pushed again. This process gradually diminishes in strength thus allowing the
projectile to fall back to earth.5
Aristotle rejected his teacher's view because according to it the mover and
moved were not in act simultaneously. Since there is a time interval between the
motivation of the front medium and the action on the rear of the projectile
Plato's theory fails.6 According to Aristotle's view the medium itself must
somehow be made a mover in its own right. That is to say, the medium's power
to move is something over and above the power to move which it has by virtue
of its actual local motion. The projectile is moved and the medium is also moved
by the projector which is directly exerting its influence on the two by being a
moving mover. Once separated from the projector, though, the missile can
acquire its motion neither from the projector nor from the turbulence in the
medium because both would depend upon the continuous action of the
projector which has now ceased its activity. Since everything moved violently
requires a mover simultaneously in act, the only other possibility that Aristotle
could see was that the medium, once agitated by the projector and missile, must
possess a power to move over and above both its own actual local motion and
the motion of the projectile.7 How then can anything move in a vacuum?
Natural motions, such as each element moving to its proper place in the universe,
might continue, but how could forced motions come about without a moving
cause?
If the moved must be in constant touch with a mover, as soon as the
mover is removed the object will immediately stop. Moreover, it will remain
stationary until acted upon. Also, a projectile's coming to rest (provided it is not
an element in its natural place) is due to the effects of meeting resistance from
other things and of the lessening power of the propelling power of the medium.
In a void, however, none of these effects could take place. Consequently there
would be no reason either for a body's moving or ceasing to move. Without a
medium, a body at rest would remain at rest, just as it would in a medium, until
acted upon and a body once set in motion, if it ever were possible for it to move
in a void at all, would continue to move forever.8

5 See Timaeus, 57e-58c.

6 See Physics, VIII, 10, 266b29-267a2.
7 SeeDeCae/o, III, 2, 301b26-31 ; Physics, VIII, 10, 267a3-13.
8 See Physics, IV, 8, 215a19-22. This has been called Aristotle's theory of inertia. Cf.
J. A. McWilliams, Physics and Philosophy (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 17: "The
doctrine of all these four is identical, and the very wording is so nearly so, that not

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F. F. Centore

But would it ever be possible for a body to move at all in a space of

absolute nonbeing? Aristotle observes that between any two movements there is
always some ratio but that there can be no ratio of void to plenum. The number
four, for instance, is known to exceed unity by three. But there can be no such
relationship when one deals with nothingness. It makes no sense to say, for
example, that four equals four plus zero. This is the same as saying that four is
four which is not to state a ratio at all.9
Similarly, there can be no ratio between a medium and a void.
Consequently, neither can there be a ratio between the movement of a projectile
through a medium and its movement through a void. Such a movement would
have to be beyond any ratio, which is no ratio at all. This conclusion is
supported by Aristotle's treatment of ratios of motion for a body traversing a
medium. In a very general way he had made certain observations which told him
that (1)the distance traversed by a body having a certain weight is inversely
proportional to the resistance of the medium (S^C1/R), (2) that the time it
takes to cross the medium is directly proportional to the resistance (TCR), and
(3) that the time required to cross is inversely proportional to the force or
weight of the object (TC|/w).By combining these observations the physicist
can deduce the general statement that the uniform velocity of a body through a
medium is directly proportional to the weight of the body divided by the
resistance offered by the medium (V0CW/R).10 Imagine, now, the body trying
to move through a space of zero resistance. What kind of ratio would one get
when dividing by nothing? The answer is no ratio at all. The body's velocity
would have to be infinite. But the infinite is unthinkable. It is the same as no
time at all. Furthermore, even those bodies most likely to move with the greatest
speeds, the heavenly bodies, are observed to move with finite speeds.
Consequently the existence of areas of absolute nonbeing in the world, as was
taught by the atomists, made neither logical nor physical sense.

only St. Thomas but Descartes and Newton would appear to have copied their
statements directly from Aristotle."
9 See Physics, IV, 8,21 5b1 9-21 6a1 9.
10 See De Caelo, IV, 6, 313b18-23. T/SOCR/W=S/TO W/R=VCW/R. Although
Galileo seems to have interpreted the Aristotelians as thinking in terms of only
falling bodies, Aquinas did not do so. See his Commentary on Aristotle's Physics
(trans. R. J. Blackwell, R. J. Spath, and W. E. Thirlkel [Yale University Press,
1963]), IV, 12, 529, p. 235. Neither was Aristotle thinking only in terms of
terminal velocities. See I. E. Drabkin, "Notes on the Laws of Motion in Aristotle,"
American Journal of Philology, LIX (1938), 78. On the dates of Aquinas's works
used in this paper see V. J. Bourke, Introduction to the Works of St. Thomas
Aquinas (New York, 1948).

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 Aquinas on Inner Space

Aquinas and the Void

According to Thomas Aquinas there are no areas of nonbeing in the world.

If there are any spaces within the world not obviously filled with visible bodies,
they are indeed filled. in some not so obvious way. There are various clear-cut
indications of this in his writings. When discussing whether or not God is
contained in a genus, for example, Aquinas makes it clear that such is not the
case. The only genus God could even remotely be considered to be in would be
that of being. "But the Philosopher has shown that being cannot be a genus, for
every genus has differences from outside the generic essence. But no difference
can exist which is not also a being, for nonbeing cannot be a difference."1 1 If
anything in the universe, especially change, is to be explained at all it must be in
terms of "What Is" and not in terms of "What is Not." Explanations must take
place within being. To this extent Parmenides was certainly correct. Nonbeing
cannot be called upon to explain anything. One cannot even think it without a
previously acquired positive basis of something that is.
It is even highly doubtful whether Aquinas would allow for a void area in
outer space, that is, beyond the last sphere of the universe. Referring to
Aquinas's commentary on the De Cae/o, for instance, E. Grant thinks that he
would not allow for it. Since a void, by definition, is a place where no kind of
body or matter actually exists even though it could possibly be there, it makes
no sense to talk about an empty world outside of our full world. If anything did
exist beyond the outer sphere of the world it would needs be a type of thing to
which the categories of time and place could not apply. Into this type of thing
one could fit only God and spiritual creatures.1 2
Everything would seem to go along smoothly and consistently until one
runs across several other passages in the authentic works of St. Thomas which
seem to cause a little trouble. To Aristotle's way of thinking everything moved
must be in direct contact with a mover. Since every body in the world is in a
place and every place has a body of some kind occupying it, there is no place in
the world where motion cannot happen. Such movements are ordered and
determined as given in Aristotle's laws for the proportionality of movements
through a medium. On the basis of his assumptions about these proportions the
Philosopher concluded that there was no real vacuum in nature. In other words,
everywhere there is resistance because everywhere there is some sort of medium.
Aquinas was well aware of Aristotle's thinking and commented at length
upon his reasonings on the subject of the void. However, in his commentary on
the Physics (1267), immediately after his explanation of Aristotle's views on the

1 1 Sum ma Theologiae, I, 3, 5.
12 See E. Grant, "Medieval and Seventeenth-Century Conceptions of an Infinite Void
Space Beyond the Cosmos," /sis, LX (1969), 41.

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F. F. Centore

proportionality of movements, he makes it clear that he personally does not

agree with Aristotle because of the many difficulties surrounding Aristotle's
position.13
Aquinas gives three main objections. They all, however, centre around the
role played by resistance in determining a body's velocity.14 He even attempts
to allow Aristotle to save face by claiming that the Greek's emphasis upon media
was merely an effort to reduce to absurdity the position of the atomists and
that, in fact, Aristotle most likely knew better himself. Nevertheless, the views
of Aristotle as passed down in history are wrong. And the arguments used by
Averroes, his all too loyal commentator, to defend Aristotle are worthless.
In opposition to Aristotle, what Aquinas wants to say is that every
motion, even supposing it to be in a void, will have a determinate speed because
the speed depends mainly upon the proportion of the power of the mover to
that which is moved rather than upon the resistance to be overcome. Resistance
has the effect of slowing down the motion but this does not mean that where
there is no external resistance the movement of the body in a, finite time
becomes an impossibility.
Aquinas has two reasons for thinking this, one based upon experience and
the other one upon logic. With respect to the first, "the motion of the celestial
bodies is impeded by nothing, nevertheless, they have a determined speed in
respect to a determined time." With respect to the latter, since the space
traversed by the body would still have successive parts even if empty, the time
needed to cross it would not be zero but would also have an order of before and
after. That is, there would be a finite time lapse. In the end, then, the "natural"
speed of the moving body, which it would retain regardless of how thin the
resistance, is the prime consideration. Consequently it is possible to imagine a
proportion between a body moving in a void and a body moving in a medium.
Aquinas here does not distinguish between bodies as "loose" in space or as em-
bedded in crystalline spheres, presumably because the effects would be the same.

13 See the translation of his Commentary already cited: IV, 12, 534, p. 238. Some
think that Aquinas was led to his own view by several predecessors such as
Philoponus, Avempace, and Avicenna. See E. A. Moody, "Avempace and Galileo,"
Journal of the H&ory of Ideas, XII (Apri'l 1951), Part I, 163-193; (June 1951),
Part II, 375-422. Others can find little or no continuity. Cf. S. Sambursky, The
Physical World of Later Antiquity (New York, 1962), pp. 174-175: "One is
tempted to speculate on how the course of the history of ideas would have been
changed had the doctrine of Philoponus been accepted by the Church instead of the
Aristotelian conceptions. Had for instance Thomas Aquinas chosen Philoponus'
ideas and incorporated them in the scientific foundations of Christian philosophy,
the birth pangs of the Copernican and Galilean revolution would perhaps have been
less severe and scientific progress possibly accelerated."
14 See Commentary, IV, 12, 534-538, pp. 238-241. Aquinas does not put to Aristotle
the question about how the same medium which causes projectile motion can also
be responsible for stopping it.

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 Aquinas on Inner Space

Furthermore, even If one were to look at just the relative velocities of

bodies moving parallel to one another Aristotle's formulations will not hold up.
Aristotle wanted to maintain that in a void all bodies regardless of shape, size, or
weight must move at the same rate if they moved at all and if the speed was not
instantaneous- zero. Aristotle thought this ridiculous. Aquinas disagreed. "For
the argument seems to suppose that there is no difference in the speed of
motions except the difference of the division of the media. But in the celestial
bodies there are diverse speeds for which there is no plenum as a resisting
medium which must be divided by the motion of the celestial bodies."15 In the
case of the celestial bodies, as he had said earlier, the only source of their
resistance to being moved that he can imagine is their nature as quantified
substances that change place. Since relative velocities are not a function of
adding together continuous quantities but are rather cases of different intensive
quantities (as when one thing is more white than another), the speed of a body is
an accidental form bestowed upon the body by the mover. Aquinas cannot see
how the thinness of the resisting medium would have anything to do with the
lessening or strengthening of this bestowed form. What Aquinas is doing here is
stating a kind of impetus theory of projectile motion. This, however, is largely
irrelevant to something else he is saying and which is of first importance with
respect to the point of this paper.1 6
We have seen Aquinas state in at least two places in his commentary on the
Physics that at least in the case of celestial bodies there is no obstacle, no
impediment, no resistance, and presumably no medium to be overcome. This
sounds very much like saying that the heavenly spheres inhabit a void or area of
nonbeing. Can similar implications be found elsewhere?
When discussing the creation of the world he drops another disquieting
statement. How can there be a separate, empty space set over against the being
of God and existing independently of Him? Averroes, Aquinas points out, might
argue that there must have been such a space if God created the world in time

15 /bid., 539, pp. 241-242.

16 See ibid., 536, pp. 239-240. See also De Potentia Dei, 3, 1 1, ad 5. The question of
whether or not Aquinas was consciously substituting the formula VC(W-R) for
Aristotle's V^W/R is still open. Moody seems to think he did while Sambursky
seems to think otherwise. Further, there seems to be no connection at all between
Aquinas's treatment of the formulation and the later treatment accorded it by
Thomas Bradwardine (1290-1349) who introduced the equivalent of logarithms into
the formula in order to have V equal zero when W equalled R. See his Tractatus de
Proportionibus (trans, and ed. H. L. Crosby [University of Wisconsin Press, 1955] ).
Also, as M. Clagett, referring to Thomas's de caelo et mundo expositio, points out,
the impressed motion cannot be a substantial form because this would change the
very nature of the thing moved. See his The Science of Mechanics in the Middle
Ages (University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 516-517. Yet Thomistic impetus
theory should not be overlooked as some have done. Cf. E. Grant, Physical Science
in the Middle Ages (New York, 1971 ), p. 50.

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F. F. Centore

out of nothing. But since a vacuum independent of God is impossible, God could
not have created the world in time. The world, therefore, must be eternal. So
argued Averroes.
Aquinas answers by saying that a vacuum is not only that in which there is
nothing. It is also a space capable of holding a body, but one in which there is in
fact no material entity. He then continues: "But we hold that there was no place
or space [spat/urn] before the world was."17 Apparently, there can be no
vacuum unless such is created by God as an area devoid of body. Now that the
world has been created there is certainly place in the universe. Is the comment
about space to be read in a parallel fashion? Before the world was made there
was no space. But is it the case that now, after the world has been made, there is
space, say, in the heavens?
When one moves to the end of the Summa Theologiae one finds a
modification of Thomas's approach but no essential change from his later
commentary on the Physics. The Supplement to Part III was taken largely from
Aquinas's commentary (1256) on Book Four of Peter the Lombard's Sentences
and compiled after his death. This would place its contents at least a decade
before the commentary on the Physics. It is interesting, though, that his views
on space and nonbeing did not change; he merely made more clear his view that
talk about "lack of resistance" must be construed as talk about "lack of any
medium."
Will the movements of human bodies after death and resurrection be
instantaneous? Aristotle had said that any movement in a vacuum needs be
instantaneous. Now, the effect of an immaterial soul or glorified body moving
through a material medium would be the same as the effect of an earthly
material body moving through a void. Consequently, one could reason, since the
latter must be instantaneous so must the former.
Aquinas supplies an unusually long answer to this objection. First of all,
one could deny that Aristotle is correct in his proportional way of reasoning
against a vacuum such that bodies could still move with a finite speed in a void.
"For every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or slow, through the
mover overcoming the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of
the medium; as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their
movement and yet do not move instantaneously."1 8
In the second place, one could go along with Averroes and try to save
Aristotle's doctrine by reinterpreting it in such a way that, although his basic
approach (VDW/R) would still hold, things would be arranged so that R could
never go to zero. This could be done by regarding the body to be moved or a

17 S.T., 1,46, 1,ad4.

18 S.T., Supp., 84, 3, ad 2. As is clear from other passages, the celestial bodies are
composed of a fifth essence or element but are not in such an element. See S.T., I,
10, 5; 70, 3.

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 Aquinas on Inner Space

body in motion as having in itself a continuous resistance to movement.

Accordingly, then, in the case of the celestial spheres, where "there is no
resistance except on the part of the body itself," the body could still be
imagined to move with a finite velocity even in a void. Perhaps this could be
applied to the movements of a resurrected body. That is, perhaps the body itself
will offer a resistance to the mover from the very fact it has to change place, just
as in the case of the heavenly spheres. What one finds in the Supplement is a
much more congenial attitude towards Averroes than one finds in the
commentary on the Physics. However, even though Aquinas later came to regard
many of Averroes's views as worthless, he still continued to maintain that there
was no impediment hindering the movements of the celestial bodies.

Aquinas and the Leibniz-Clarke Debate

The question concerning the existence of voids within the universe was
debated long after Aquinas's death. In more modern times a major source of
discussion has been Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica
(1687). The mathematics of this work generally commanded the highest respect.
But it could still be asked: what kind of physical interpretation was to be put
upon certain parts of his work? Did, for instance, his physics demand the real
existence of nonbeing in the world? R. S. Westfall maintains that although
Newton began his intellectual career by not seriously questioning the existence
of some kind of aether filling the universe, he gradually came to abandon it.
"The thrust of my argument on Newton," he states, "holds that he started with
aethereal mechanisms- the commonplace orthodoxy of the day-and that he
ultimately dispensed with them and replaced them by forces."19 No one is quite
sure exactly how or when this happened. Newton's views on the aether are
admittedly tentative and vacillating. It seems clear, though, that at no time did
he seriously- maintain the Cartesian doctrine on the aether. Newton was an
atomist who did not wish to fill every niche in the universe by some subtle
matter. However, his atoms were so highly differentiated in type and so
numerous that the effect of his doctrine, at least before his old age, was
practically the same. Newton's final position on the aether and space appears to
have been that, even though the atoms in our solar system are compacted
together, there are still empty spaces among them and that as one moves farther
away from our sun the atoms thin out more and more so that "it is evident that
the celestial spaces are void of resistance."20 Consequently, there is no medium
or matter filling the heavens.

19 Force in Newton's Physics (London, 1971 ), p. 409, note 115.

20 Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Cajori ed.; Berkeley, 1946),
Book III, L. IV, cor. Ill, p. 497. See A. Koyre, From the Closed World to the
Infinite Universe (New York, 1957), Chap. VII.

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F. F. Centore

But what did Newton mean by "space," "void," "vacuum," etc.? Was this
the nonbeing of Parmenides and the ancient atomists? Newton himself does not
provide a clear answer in his own words.21 To find out what he meant we have
to go to his philosophical surrogate Samuel Clarke (1675-1729), an Anglican
divine noted for his scientific interests.22 Ever since its publication various
aspects of Newton's Principia had come under attack for one or more of its
supposed philosophical implications. Bishop Berkeley thought that it would lead
to pure materialism, while Leibniz thought that it would lead the world back to
occult qualities. These reactions led Newton, under the advice of Roger Cotes,
the editor of the second edition (1713) of the Principia, to add a General
Scholium to the second edition in order to help clear up certain
misunderstandings about what he really believed. Far from being atheistic his
natural philosophy was the most theistic he could imagine. If anything were
likely to push out God it would be Descartes's infinite extension, or Cartesian
matter. Newton's world, in contrast, left ample room for the influence of God.
In Cotes's preface and in the Scholium itself, Newton's critics, especially the
Continental Cartesians and Leibniz, were severely criticized.
After what seems like a long delay, Leibniz sent back to England in
November of 1715 a brief reply by way of Caroline, Princess of Wales. She in
turn passed on parts of the letter to Clarke, thus setting off a series of letters
running to a total of ten between the two men. Clarke's reply to Leibniz's fifth
letter was sent in October of 1716. Leibniz died in November of the same year.
Leibniz's original letter expressed a concern for what Newtonian science
was doing to English religion. When Newton talked about space as the sensorium
of God was he not materializing God? And when he talked about God
intervening in nature from time to time to see to it that the natural laws
continued to work well was he not degrading God to being an inferior
watchmaker? By the fourth and fifth sets of letters Clarke and Leibniz had

21 Cf. Koyre, op. cit., p. 209: In his Opticks, "Newton does not tell us outright- any
more than he does in the Principia- what these various 'Powers' [by which bodies
act across space] are. Just as in the Principia, he leaves that question open, though,
as we know, he holds them to be non-mechanical, immaterial and even 'spiritual'
energy extraneous to matter."
22 Cf. ibid., p. 301, note 3: "I am, thus, morally certain that Clarke communicated to
Newton both Leibniz's letters and his own replies to them. ... As a matter of fact,
the Princess of Wales informed Leibniz . . . that he was right in his supposition that
these letters were not written without the aflvice of Newton. Strange as it may
seem, the importance of Clarke's papers as representing literally the metaphysical
views of Newton has never been recognized, with the result that their study was
completely neglected by the historians both of Newton and of Leibniz." See also his
Newtonian Studies (Harvard University Press, 1965), Appendix D, pp. 164-169. The
Princess had been a friend to Leibniz in her younger days and was now living in
England as the wife of the future George II.

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 Aquinas on Inner Space

moved into the problem of the void in earnest. Leibniz denied that any such
thing was possible, while Clarke defended its reasonableness. It turned out that
Clarke, because of Leibniz's death, had the las,t word. It is doubtful that it would
have satisfied Leibniz but it could have very well satisfied Aquinas. The problem
is to find out if one can make any sense out of "What is not, is." One way of
looking at this is to ask whether when one is speaking about empty space one is
also speaking about nonbeing. Clarke, in some notes he added to the printed
edition (1717) of his fifth reply of the correspondence, sought to resolve the
issue by making some distinctions:
All the conceptions (I think) that ever have been or can be framed concerning
space, are these which follow. That it is either absolutely nothing, or a mere idea, or
only a relation of one thing to another, or that it is a body, or some other substance,
or else a property of a substance.
That it is not absolutely nothing, is most evident. For of nothing there is no
quantity, no dimensions, no properties. This principle is the first foundation of all
science whatsoever; expressing the only difference between what does, and what does
not, exist. 23

This statement deserves some clarification. Space is not nonbeing because space
has quantified dimensions and properties. First and foremost there is the
property of universal gravitational action, that great all-pervasive power which
binds together the universe according to divine plan. In addition, there are
various other forces highly important to the operation of the world, such as
magnetic pushes and pulls, cohesive forces, and electrical phenomena. Absolute
nonbeing, on the other hand, has no reality at all of any kind. Consequently, the
space of Newtonian physics, which offers no resistance to celestial bodies, is not
equivalent to the nonbeing of Parmenides and the ancient atomists.24

23 The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester University

Press, 1956), p. 120. Clarke's own view is that infinite space is an attribute or
property of God just as eternal duration is a property of God. Newton would prefer
to call it a necessary effect of God. Leibniz, however, using the Scholastic
terminology of the time, could see no difference. To say that the ability to laugh,
for instance, is a property of man is the same as saying that it is a necessary effect of
man's rational nature. (See ibid., p. xxix.)
24 Professor Alexander would seem to be mistaken when he states that in Einstein's
General Theory of Relativity, in contradistinction to Newton's space and time,
"space-time is given some sort of reality. For part, if not all, of what is meant by
calling a thing real is that one can ascribe properties to it." (Ibid., p. Iv.) Cf. the
remarks of Sir A. Eddington, one of Einstein's chief disciples: "We must rid our
minds of the idea that the word space in science has anything to do with
void. ... In any case the physicist does not conceive of space as void. Where it is
empty of all else there is still the aether. Those who for some reason dislike the
word aether, scatter mathematical symbols freely through the vacuum, and I
presume that they must conceive some kind of characteristic background for these
symbols. I do not think any one proposes to build even so relative and elusive a

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F. F. Centore

The obvious question now, of course, is whether or not the statements

made by Aquinas concerning the celestial regions can fit into a similar
interpretation. If they can, one need no longer worry about whether or not
Aquinas was affirming in physics what he was denying in his philosophy of
being. On the assumption that a lack of a medium does not turn the remaining
area into nonbeing the various parts of Aquinas's doctrine on the subject may be
reconciled.
It turns out that this is indeed the case. As J. A. McWilliams has pointed
out some years ago, without developing the point, the heavenly bodies, even
though proceeding without impediment, are nevertheless "doing work" and
consequently are exercising an influence throughout the universe.25 In the same
commentary on the Physics where it is stated that the celestial bodies meet with
no resistance it is also held that the celestial bodies, "which do not share in
matter with inferior bodies, act upon inferior bodies in such a way that they are
not acted upon by them, and they touch and are not touched."26 In the same
work he also hints, in at least two places, that it is wrong to follow some of the
ancient materialists who thought that because there was no sensible body in a
certain place therefore there was nothing at all in that place. To be a being does
not necessarily mean to be a body.27
What Aquinas says in his Commentary is even more obvious when he is
speaking more clearly in his own name. Within the context of the question
concerning whether or not the celestial bodies are living beings he has occasion
to answer the objection that since the cause is nobler than the effect, and since
the heavenly bodies cause life (especially in the form of spontaneous
generations), the heavenly bodies (sun, moon, stars, planets) must be even more
alive than the plants and animals they cause life in. Aquinas answers that the
celestial bodies, since they are moved movers, have the function of being
instruments and do not act on their own but by virtue of the angel that moves
them. It is in this way that their heat, light, and other influences reach the earth
where life is caused.28 Aquinas makes basically the same points elsewhere.29
These very special orbs which inhabit the vast empty regions of the
heavens are not merely useless bodies doing nothing more than changing place.

thing as force out of entire nothingness." The Nature of the Physical World
(University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 137. Newton's disciples did in fact say the
same sort of thing.
25 See J. A. McWilliams, op. at., p. 18.
26 Commentary, 111,4, 301, p. 143.
27 See ibid., IV, 9, 497, p. 224; 10, 509, pp. 227-228. It should also be remembered
that for Aquinas to be did not mean to have properties. Properties also are and
consequently to view being in such terms would be quite circular.
28 S.T., 1,70, 3, ad 3.
29 See On Spiritual Creatures, 6, ad 1 2; De Potentia Dei, 3, 1 1 , ad 1 4; 6, 6, ad 1 0.

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 Aquinas on Inner Space

They have a very important function to perform, namely, to guide the activities
taking place in the sublunar area of the universe. They are tools which among
other things act through space to bring new life out of the old, dead, and
decaying creatures of the world. From our modern vantage point such views may
sound archaic and strange.30 However, if one troubles to look beneath the
surface one discovers that they are quite modern. The celestial bodies have a
function, they do something, and in order to do it they must fill the universe
with their influence. In other words, empty space is not really Greek atomist
void. It is not a nonbeing. In it and through it there is something going on.

Conclusion

It is possible, then, to have empty spaces without having to affirm that

"What is not, is." Moreover, Aquinas seems to have been cognizant of exactly
such a possibility. This would mark a major departure from Aristotle's physics
comparable to his major departure from Aristotle's philosophy of being. For
Aristotle, the form, and ultimately the Self-Thinking Form, was the highest act
he could imagine in the world of Being. For Aquinas, however, the act of
existing was an act even above the form of a substance.
In his physics, although also taking its start from the ancients, Aquinas
again made a break with the past by showing himself able to imagine a situation
in which, although all matter is extended, it is not necessary that everything,
extended be filled with matter. Like Aristotle before him Aquinas did not feel
competent in astronomy. The actual operations of the heavens was something he
could safely leave up to others to answer.31 However, regardless of what theory
was considered, whether the Ptolemaic, that of Eudoxus, or some other, the
problem of the emptiness of the celestial regions had to be faced. How is this
possible without attempting to affirm "What is not, is"? It is possible because,
where there is an all-pervasive and continuous influence of some kind operating
throughout the areas within the universe that are vacant of any medium, there is
also some kind of being. In this way Aquinas would have sided with Newton and
Clarke against Descartes and Leibniz.

November 1972

30 Modern scientists, of course, recognize the great influences of the sun and moon
upon the earth. Except for gravity, space deformation due to matter, and one or
two other influences, however, most of the influences of stars and planets have been
relegated to astrology. The part about angels propelling the luminous orbs has been
called worse things.
31 SeeS. T., 1,32,1, ad 2.

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