G.R. No. 137887. February 28, 2000.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DAMIAN ERMITAO DE GUZMAN et. al.

FACTS: Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and
private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the
merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit:

(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the application for registration of the parcels of
land mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for lack of factual and legal bases;

(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the petition for registration and thus places under
the operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Law,
the land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing an area of 308,638 square meters, as
supported by its technical descriptions now forming parts of the records of these cases, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the names of petitioners subject to the claims of oppositors under an
instrument entitled Waiver of Rights with Conformity the terms and conditions of which are hereby
ordered by this Court to be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be issued to the
petitioners pursuant to the judgment of this Court.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition for registration of
private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved.

ISSUE: Whether the occupation of the land prescribed to ownership

HELD: We find merit in the instant Petition. It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were
released as agricultural land only in 1965 while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed
by private respondents only in 1991. Thus, the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from
1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only 26 years, 4 years short of the required 30
year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940.

In finding that private respondents possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of
Appeals reasoned out that

(W)hile it is true that the land became alienable and disposable only in December, 1965, however,
records indicate that as early as 1928, Pedro Ermitao, appellees predecessor-in-interest, was already
in possession of the property, cultivating it and planting various crops thereon. It follows that appellees
possession as of the time of the filing of the petition in 1991 when tacked to Pedro Ermitaos
possession is 63 years or more than the required 30 years period of possession. The land, which is
agricultural, has been converted to private property.

We disagree.

Land Titles; Prescription; Natural Resources; Forest Lands; Possession of a public land while still
inalienable forest land, or before it was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
could not ripen into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year
open and continuous possession in concept of owner.The Court of Appeals consideration of the
period of possession prior to the time the subject land was released as agricultural is in direct
contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, to witThe Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the private respondents had not qualified for a grant under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act because their possession of the land while it was still inalienable forest land, or before it
was declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen
into private ownership, and should be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and
continuous possession in concept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords
with our ruling in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that: Unless
and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Land classified as forest land may form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain only by a release in an official proclamation to that effect.So, too, is the
Court of Appeals reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals misplaced.
There, while the period of possession of the applicants predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own
possession to comply with the required thirty year period possession requirement, the land involved
therein was not forest land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the
property subject of private respondents application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such
date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands
were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. In summary, therefore, prior to its
declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the
counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court
of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless
and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.

G.R. No. 179987. April 29, 2009.*

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Land Registration Act; Public Lands Act; Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration
Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws
commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.Notwithstanding the
passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land
Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or
that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
Same; Same; Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by
the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-
existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.It is clear that Section
48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land
Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for
the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.

Civil Law; Prescription; Under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.It is clear under the Civil Code that where
lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription
are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands.

Same; Land Registration Act; Prescription; Alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the
State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the
period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been
converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law.

Land Registration Act; Prescription; Public Land Act; If a public land is declared patrimonial by law or
proclamation, can the period of possession prior to such conversion be reckoned in counting the period
of prescription? No.The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes
patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for
registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code,
there is no way that possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion
property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration. Are
we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2)
is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

FACTS: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a
parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.

The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose
Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan
himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property
was originally belonging to a 22-hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino
had four sonsBenedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather.
Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco
sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.

On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan for his application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known
as Property Registration Law, the lands described.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision8 reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that date
could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of
Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic
v. Herbieto.
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic
v. Naguit, which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the
discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial
Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place
since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit,
petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of
the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect
title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.

ISSUES: 1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct
interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted,
should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio
due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,14 promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same observation
that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG
remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,15 Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic16 and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation,17 as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.18

With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land
into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would
not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into
private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our
2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.19

The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes
that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to
patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet
to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the
30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that
the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the
time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.

Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.

II.

First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the
provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.

A.

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to
time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a)
agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational,
charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.

May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through
judicial legalization. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
 performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was amended by
P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The OSG
submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered. This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands
of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands.

Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The
Court in Naguit explained:

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to
vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26,
1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
xxx

It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of
property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of
such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other
is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted.
That is not the case.

The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act].The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx

Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree].Who may apply.The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

xxx

It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by
the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-
existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that
it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily
established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with
the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title.

Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which
provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the
Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree
recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete
title.

There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act
limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently
reads thus:

Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to
extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided,
That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares:
Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with
Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter,
but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter
at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.

Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be
availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant
and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June
1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945
cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning
of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a
bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or
phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain
which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before
June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.

Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:

[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length
of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit.
The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the
provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable and
disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.

Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals27 since in the
latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in
Republic v. Ceniza,28 which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza
should have failed. Not so.

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.

In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo
M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were found to be
within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-
I555 dated December 9, 1980. This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject
of private respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:

[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on
the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots
in question are forestal land....

Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period
required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in
favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of
their application.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule,
we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner
did not show that this is one of them.29

Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell, sanction the
registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35)
years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the application for
registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or disposable, while
in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a
difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.

III.

We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:

SECTION 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.

The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then
recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further
discussion, thus:

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such
conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2),
and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus,
even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to
register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have based
their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their
claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the
nuances of the provision.

A.

The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for application
for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal
foundation for the application. It reads:

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character, they
are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are
not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution itself
proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.

There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property through
prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10) years, or
through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith, as well as just title.

When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, it
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the
only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether
Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State,
which a private person has acquired through prescription.

The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirty-year
period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge.
For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.

The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the
concept of an owner for at least thirty years.

The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)37

This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June
1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977
could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.

The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are
two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse
possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.

Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable
after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription under
the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference between how
the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year
possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any
qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue
as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to
assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,38 similar to our earlier finding with respect
to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.

Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original
registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply for
original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription
under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire
regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section
14(1).

B.

Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws.
Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code,
in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section
14(1).

The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification what
consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.

It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State,
cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.39 Lands of the
public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion and
thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the
public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable
lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It
is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law.

It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and
disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands
owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used
only by the Government.

Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution
and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the
province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No.
7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses,
etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain
military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and
Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)40
which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.41 The President is authorized to sell
portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.42 Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the
military lands subject thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws
and regulations governing sales of government properties.43

From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.44 Such purpose can be tied to either public service or the
development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property
of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It
is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands become
private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.

C.

Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted law
or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such
public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.

The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession before the
public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive
period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of
prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls
wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during
the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet the
requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.

Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the
aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2)
is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.

In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the
former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-
year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil
Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded on
extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to
Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous
statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration Decree. The
legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts
subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed
under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).

IV.

One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land registration
procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for
acquiring ownership over property.

The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private persons
through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things which are
within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of the State or any of
its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code.
The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith
and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10) years. There is
nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through
ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same
time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith
involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,45
provisions that more or less speak for themselves.

On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just
title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but
the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:

Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have
actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured by
prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.46

The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary
acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that the State,
as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the completion of the
required period of possession.47 It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary
acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other
mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.

Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the
period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be
counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become
patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period
has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into
private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.

It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode
of confirmation of ownership.48

Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained
under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following
P.D. No. 1073).

The Land Registration Act49 was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired
through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such
registration.50 Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the
Civil Code as of now.

V.

We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.51

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.

B.

We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

VI.

A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For,
every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.

The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to
long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called Third World
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on
the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive due to
limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said properties.52 Judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means to
regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that
system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.

There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential lands on
which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of
the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and their
communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according them
legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a
new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in
legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could be
accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public dominion
property into patrimonial.

Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are
put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and
Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

No. L-73002. December 29, 1986.*

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD &
VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.

Land Registration; A juridical confirmation proceeding should at most be limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time as it is not so much one to confer
title as it is to recognize a title already vested.Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical
inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by
statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself that the
possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to
overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a
title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land,
but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required
period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cario, "x x x (T)here are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
Same; Constitutional Law; The 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights. Thus where land was
acquired in 1962 when corporations were allowed to acquire lands not beyond 1,024 hectares, the same
may be registered in 1982 although under 1973 Constitution corporations cannot acquire lands of the
public domain.Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed
in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right
to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the
vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain
cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

Same; Same; Same.The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in
its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As
it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the
1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest
by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.

Same; Same; The ruling in MERALCO vs. CASTROBARTOLOME (114 SCRA 799), that public land ceases to
be so only upon issuance of a certificate of title, is hereby reconsidered and abandoned. Correct rule is
that in Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil 424.The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds,
that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is
converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private
property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title,
there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in
the dissent in Meralco.

Same; Same; Same; A corporation that acquired private land in 1962 may have it registered in 1982
despite the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution which cannot be given retroactive effect as to impair
vested rights.There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in
their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a
liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in
Meralco.

Same; Same; Same; Same.While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively
recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past
cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief
Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the
petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect
title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its
Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential, limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in
that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

FACTS:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration
in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (The Public Land Act). as amended; and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:

"1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly
organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real
properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its
secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-1');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood
& Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29,1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the
Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on
October 29,1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have
possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession
of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and
public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom
the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from
time immemorial;
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No.
3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or
their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million
(P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its
ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18,1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for
the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to
reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the
land bought by the Company from the lnfiels for the townsite of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon,
Isabela (Exh. 'N-1'), during their special session on November 22. 1979."

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have
been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the
latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations
or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of
Acme.

Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

"SEC. 48, The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof."
The Petition for Review does not disputeindeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Courtthe fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48
of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against
private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered
in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al,1 where
a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than
60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from
the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On
December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

"x x x, the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and
the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

x x x x.

"Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the
one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the
other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject
to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification.
The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under
section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs.
Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644)."

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Cario in
19092 thru Susi in 19253 down to Herico in 1980,4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land f or the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period
ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes
private property. That said dissent expressed what is the betterand, indeed, the correct, view
becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein.

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Cario, involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:

"It is true that the language of articles 4 and 55 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession for
the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration
proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an application under the
foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion
that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon
to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law. x x x."

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:

"x x x. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land
under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her
favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of
the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant
may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47
of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right.6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, like Lacaste vs. Director of Lands,7 Mesina vs.
Vda. de Sonza,8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan,9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:11

"x x x. Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than
30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-ininterest, title over the land has vested on
petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable
under the Public Land Act as by free patent. x x x.

x x x x

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied
with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent "

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself13 that the possessor(s) "x x x shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title x x x." No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to
ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Cario, "x x x (T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is acceptedas it must bethat the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the
1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the
vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain
cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

"We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application
of Bian Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at
the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not
exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the
doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

* * *

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights
by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by
a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power' (16 C.J.S.
1177-78).

* * *

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of
the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer
open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect
of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the
land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs.
CA, 123 Phil. 919). "15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in
said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have
had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would
deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco
must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in
the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.

Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already
private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a
registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning
private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and,
again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

"6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land
Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title
would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a
technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as
the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled
with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with
the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership
by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be
necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here
and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as
amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural
persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by
conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and
granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged."

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas
the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it
breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which
has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting
that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad
Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential,
limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially
obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
G.R. No. 134308. December 14, 2000.*

SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO

MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO and GENEROSO MENGUITO, petitioners, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Land Registration; Public Land Act (CA No. 141); Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141 provides
for the registration of imperfect titles to lands of the public domain; The applicants for registration of
imperfect titles are duty-bound to prove that (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable, and
(2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945.Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA)
No. 141, as amended, provides for the registration of imperfect titles to lands of the public domain in
this wise: x x x Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1073 clarified paragraph b of the said provision by
specifically declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence,
as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal requirements: (1)
the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June
12, 1945.

Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.For the original
registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
ownership and be registered as a title. To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

Same; Same; Same; Surveyors; A notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer in the Survey Plan that the
survey was inside alienable and disposable land does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of landa mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public
domain.In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit E
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a
positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared
alienable.

Same; Same; General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are
unavailing and cannot suffice.Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate
taxes since 1974. Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land
for several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943.
However, they did not present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim.
General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and
cannot suffice.
Same; Same; Social Justice; Much as the Supreme Court wants to conform to the States policy of
encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and
remain true to the ideal of social justice, its hands are tied by the laws stringent safeguards against
registering imperfect titles.Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were
contrary to each other, we waded into the records, but found no reason to modify the assailed CA
Decision. Much as we want to conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the
distribution of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social
justice, our hands are tied by the laws stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In this
case, we agree with the CA that petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with
the legal requirements for registration of imperfect titles.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Unless a piece of public land is shown to have been classified as alienable and disposable, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Even assuming that such land has been classified as alienable, title
thereto can be registered only upon presentation of incontrovertible proof of adverse, notorious and
open possession in the concept of owner for a period of thirty years.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the September 30, 1997
decision1 and the June 23, 1998 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 39638. The
decretal portion of said Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
appellees application for registration is hereby DISMISSED.3

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 157),4 which was reversed by the
appellate court, granted petitioners application for registration in this wise:5

WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is
affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants to the land
described in their application under plan Swo-13-000227 and its technical descriptions, situated in the
Barrio of Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and containing an aggregate area of 2,112
square meters; and individual and separate certificates of titles to the lots comprising the said land are
hereby ordered registered in the names of the applicants, as follows:

1. For lots 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, and 6045-D in the name of Susana Menguito, of legal age, widow,
Filipino citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pater[o]s, Metro Manila;

2. For Lot 6045-Ein the name of Renato Menguito, of legal age, married to Irene Toledo, Filipino
citizen, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit, St, Pateros, Metro Manila;

3. For Lot 6045-Fin the name of Bersamin Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

4. For Lot 6045-Gin the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;
5. For Lot 6045-Hin the name of Helen Marta Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single, with
residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

6. For Lot 6046-1in the name of Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida
Carag, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila;

7. For Lot 6045-Jin the name of Emelita Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano
Manalili, with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila; and

8. For Lot 6045-Kin the name of Generoso Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Luciano
Manalili; and Froilan Menguito, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Zenaida Carag, all with residence
and postal address at T. Sulit St., Pateros, Metro Manila.

Upon the finality of this Decision, let an Order be issued to the Commissioner of Land Registration
Authority for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificates of title in
favor of the applicants pursuant to Section 39 of PD No. 1529.

SO ORDERED.

The Facts

The antecedents of the case are adequately summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

On November 10, 1987, in the Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila an Application for
Registration of Title was filed by the following successors-in-interest of the deceased spouses Cirilo
Menguito and Juana Manalo-Menguito, namely: SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-MANALILI,
HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO
and GENEROSO MENGUITO. Docketed in the said court as LRC Case No. N-10938, the application reads:

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION

OF TITLE

The above-named applicants hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property Registration Decree No. 1529 and to
have their title thereto registered and confirmed,

AND DECLARE:

1. That the applicants are the owners in fee simple of eleven (11) parcels of land situated in the Barrio of
Ususan, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, and are bounded and described as shown on plan Swo-
13-000227 (lot Nos. 6045-A, 6045-B, 6045-C, 6045-D, 6045-E, 6045-F, 6045-G, 6045-H, 6045-1, 6045-J
and 6045-K) and corresponding technical descriptions, x x x;

2. That said parcels of land are assessed for taxation for the current year at P5,910.00 as per Tax
Declaration No. B-11-01351 of the land record of Taguig, Metro Manila;

3. That to the best of applicants knowledge and belief, there is no mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind whatsoever affecting the said land nor any other persons having any estate or interest therein,
legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or expectancy;
4. That the applicants acquired the said parcels of land by inheritance;

5. That said parcels of land are occupied by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in actual, open, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession, in the concept of owners, of said parcels
of land for more than thirty years;

6. That the names in full and addresses as far known to the undersigned, of the owners of all adjoining
properties are as follows:

7. That the applicants full name, age, citizenship, residence, and postal address, are as follows:

SUSAN MENGUITO, widow; EMELITA M. MANALILI, married to Luciano Manalili; HELEN MARTA M.
LUNA, married to Benjamin Luna, Jr.; RENATO MENGUITO, married to Irene Toledo; BERSAMIN
MENGUITO, married to Elvira Salvacion; FROILAN MENGUITO, married to Zenaida Carag; and GENEROSO
MENGUITO, single; all of legal age, Filipinos, and with residence and postal address at T. Sulit St.,
Pateros, Metro Manila.

8. That should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable in the instant case, the applicants
hereby apply for the benefit of Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended;

9. That the following documents attached hereto and made part hereof:

(a)

Tracing cloth plan of Swo-13-000227

(b)

Two (2) print copies of said plan Swo-13-000227

(c)

Three (3) copies each of the Technical Description of:

Lot 6045-A

Lot 6045-B

Lot 6045-C

Lot 6045-D

Lot 6045-E

Lot 6045-F

Lot 6045-G

Lot 6045-H

Lot 6045-I

Lot 6045-J

Lot 6045-K
(d)

Three (3) copies of Engineers Certificate

(e)

Four (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. B-011-01351

xxx xxx xxx

(Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 1-5).

Acting on the foregoing application, the lower court issued a Notice of Initial Hearing addressed to:
the Solicitor General, the Director of the Land Management Bureau, the Secretary of the Department of
Public Works and Highways, the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Director of the
Bureau of Forest Development, and the owners of the adjacent properties as mentioned in the
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++application, informing them that the application is
scheduled for initial hearing on April 25, 1989. The addressees were then ordered to present such
claims as you may have to said lands or any portion thereof, and to submit evidence in support of such
claims and unless you appear at said court at the time and place aforesaid, your default will be recorded
and the title to the lands will be adjudicated and determined in accordance with law and the evidence
before the Court, and thereafter, you will forever be barred from contesting said application or any
decree entered thereon (Exhibit A).

Said notice of initial hearing was published in the April 5, 1989 issue of Abante, a daily tabloid (Exhs. C,
C-1 C-1-A).

Earlier, or on March 30, 1989, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed its
Opposition to the application for registration contending:

1. That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto
(Sec. 48 [b], CA. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073).

2. That the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the lands
applied for or his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. Said muniments of title do not appear to be
genuine and indicate the pretended possession of applicant to be of recent vintage.

3. That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be
availed of by the applicant who has failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the
period of six (6) months from February 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree No. 892. From the
records, it appears that the instant application was filed on July 31, 1990.

4. That the parcel applied is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines not
subject to private appropriation (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 5-6).
The Solicitor General therefore prayed for the denial of the application for registration and for the
declaration of the properties subject thereof as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines.

At the scheduled initial hearing of the case on April 25, 1989, a certain Jose Tangco, Jr. appeared and
registered a verbal opposition to the application. On motion of counsel for the applicants, the court
issued an Order of General Default against the whole world, except as against the oppositors Republic of
the Philippines and Jose Tangco, Jr., who was directed to file his written opposition but never did.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On June 13, 1990, the applicants filed their Formal Offer of Evidence submitting therewith the
following documentary exhibits: (1) Plan Swo-13-000227 (Exh. T); (2) technical descriptions of Lot Nos.
6045-A to 6045-J, inclusive (Exhs. F to F-10 inclusive); (3) Engineers Certificate (Exh. G); (4) Extra-
judicial Settlement and Partition executed by the applicants dated December 12, 1985 (Exh. H); (5)
description of the land and the apportionment thereof among the applicants (Exhs. H-F and H-2
respectively); (6) Tax Declarations (Exhs. I, J, K, V M, W and O); (7) Tax Receipts (Exhs. O, O-1,
P, P-I, Q and R); (8) Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1969 executed by Cirilo Menguito in
favor of Pedro Menguito (Exh. S); and (9) Deed of Partition dated November 7, 1990 executed by the
applicants (Exh. T).

On September 12, 1990, the oppositor Republic filed its Manifestation and Opposition to applicants
formal offer of evidence. The said manifestation reads:

It interposes no objection to the admission of Exhibits A, B, C D, relative to jurisdictional

requirements. It has no objection to Exhibits E, F, F-1 to F-10 relating to the plan and the technical
description of the lots being applied for and Exhibit G which is the Engineers certificate.

It objects to Exhibits H, H-1 to H-2 the extrajudicial settlement and partition dated December 12,
1985 for being self serving. It objects to Exhibits I, J, K, L, M and N for being incompetent and
insufficient proof of possession of the lot in question by applicants or their predecessors-in interest. In
fact the said tax declarations do not date back to at least June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibits 0, T, Q,
and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since June 12, 1945. It objects
to Exhibits 0 T Q, and R, the same being incompetent and insufficient to prove possession since
June 12, 1945. It objects to Exhibit S as being self-serving being a mere photocopy of the alleged
Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated May 7, 1989 executed by Cirilo Menguito the same cannot be accepted
in evidence, applicants not having first laid the basis for the presentation of secondary evidence. It
objects to the first page of Exhibit T, being self-serving and a mere photocopy. Furthermore, page 2 of
said exhibit, where the supposed acknowledgment of the instrument appears, refers to different parcels
of land other than those being applied for.

WHEREFORE, considering that the applicants have failed to prove their title to the lands applied for, it is
respectfully prayed that the application for registration be denied and that the land applied for be
declared as part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

Considering the above, oppositor respectfully manifests that there is no need for it to submit evidence
in support of its opposition. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 11-13).

On May 15, 1991, the lower court rendered its decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the order of general default against the whole world heretofore entered in this case is
affirmed, and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the registerable title of the applicants x x x

On June 11, 1991, the oppositor Republic, through the Solicitor General, moved for a reconsideration of
the aforequoted decision, to which a written opposition was interposed by the applicants.

On July 8, 1991, the lower court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals agreed with respondent that the lower court had failed to consider the legal
requirements for registration of imperfect titles; namely: (1) the land is alienable and disposable; and (2)
the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since June 12, 1945. It was not convinced that the land in
question had been classified as alienable or disposable and that petitioners or their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of it since June 12, 1945.

Hence, this Petition.7

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit a single issue for our consideration:

Whether or not the court a quo erred in reversing the findings of facts of the trial court.8

In fine, the Court will resolve whether the CA erred in rejecting petitioners application for the
registration of their respective titles.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Sole Issue:

Registration of Petitioners Titles

Section 48 of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,9 as amended, provides for the registration of imperfect
titles to lands of the public domain in this wise:

SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest thereon, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) those who by themselves or through their predecessor in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.

Presidential Decree (PD) No. 107310 clarified paragraph b of the said provision by specifically
declaring that it applied only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.11

Hence, as observed by the appellate court, petitioners were duty-bound to prove two legal
requirements: (1) the land applied for was alienable and disposable; and (2) the applicants and their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since June 12, 1945.

The records show that petitioners failed to establish these two requisites.

Classification of the Land

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on
January 3, 1968, appearing on Exhibit E (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State, x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.12 Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.13 To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant.14 Absent such evidence, the land sought to
be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit E indicating that
the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive
government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no
authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyors assertion,
petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been declared alienable.

Period of Possession

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners have been able to prove that the land is alienable, their
Petition for confirmation of their imperfect titles and registration thereof under the law will still be
denied. The reason is that they have failed to establish possession of the lots in questionopenly,
continuously, exclusively and adverselyin the concept of owner for at least 30 years, since June 12,
1945.
Petitioners do not claim that they are the original possessors of the lots in question, which had allegedly
belonged to Cirilo Menguito before he donated it to his son Pedro. When Pedro died in 1978, these lots
allegedly passed down to petitioners.

Although petitioners can trace their possession of the land from as far back as 1968 only, they would
tack it to that of their predecessors, who had supposedly been in possession thereof even before the
Second World War. There is not enough convincing proof, however, to support such claim.

Petitioners presented evidence that they had been paying real estate taxes since 1974.15 Their
predecessors-in-interest, they claimed, have also been paying taxes on the land for several years before
them, and Cirilo Menguito had declared the land for tax purposes in 1943.16 However, they did not
present any documents or any other satisfactory proof to substantiate this claim. General statements,
which are mere conclusions of law and not proofs of possession, are unavailing and cannot suffice.17

Cirilos six children were not presented as witnesses by petitioners during the hearing of their
application for registration of the lots in question. In fact, of the six children, only Pilar Menguito was
personally informed of petitioners application. Still, she was not presented as a witness.

There can be no question that Cirilos children were the best witnesses, because they could have
substantiated petitioners claim that indeed the lots in question had been donated to Pedro Menguito.
Moreover, they may even have in their possession documents that can adequately support their
supposed claim. Instead, petitioners presented only Raymunda Bautista, the alleged tenant of Cirilo
Menguito, who had tilled the land before petitioners built their houses thereon. Neither Cirilos children
nor the documents that they might have had in their possession were presented.

Furthermore, serious doubts are cast on petitioners claim that their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and occupation of the land. Because they are of
recent vintage, the tax declarations (Exhs. I to N), tax receipts (Exhs. O, O-1, P, and P-1) and
the Municipal Treasurers certifications of tax payments (Exhs. Q and R) presented in evidence are
incompetent and insufficient to prove petitioners and their predecessors-in-interests possession of the
lots in question.

Because the factual findings of the trial and the appellate courts were contrary to each other, we waded
into the records, 18 but found no reason to modify the assailed CA Decision. Much as we want to
conform to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution of alienable public lands to
spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice, our hands are tied by the laws
stringent safeguards against registering imperfect titles. In this case, we agree with the CA that
petitioners have not presented sufficient proof of their compliance with the legal requirements for
registration of imperfect titles.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. Menguito vs. Republic, 348 SCRA 128, G.R.
No. 134308 December 14, 2000
G.R. No. 186961. February 20, 2012.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EAST SILVERLANE REALTY DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, respondent.

Civil Law; Property; Land Registration; Public Land Act; Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title; Under
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes is by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.The PLA governs the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. Under Section 11 thereof, one of the modes of disposing
public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. On
the other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified possessor of an alienable and disposable
public land. Thus: SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit: (a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain
under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not
received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said
lands continuously since the filing of their applications. (b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in
sub-section (b) hereof. Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January 25,
1977, deleted subsection (a) and amended subsection (b) as follows: SECTION 4. The provisions of
Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense
that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant thru
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

Same; Same; Same; Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529); Persons Who May Apply for
Registration of Title to Land.P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws
relative to the registration of property. Section 14 thereof partially provides: Section 14. Who may
apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws. (3) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing
laws. (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Same; Same; Same; Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates the properties belonging to the public
dominion, outside thereof are patrimonial property, hence, susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Property is either part of the public domain or privately owned. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
following properties are of public dominion: (a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of
similar character; (b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth. All other properties of the State,
which is not of the character mentioned in Article 420 is patrimonial property, hence, susceptible to
acquisitive prescription.

Same; Same; Same; Without express declaration that the property is no longer intended for public
service or development of national wealth, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.In Heirs of Malabanan,
this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the
periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into private property
or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no
longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and thus, may
not be acquired by prescription.

Same; Same; Same; The possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect title over an
alienable and disposable public land must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious in
character.It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an
imperfect title over an alienable and disposable public land must be open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious in character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba, 427 SCRA 611 (2004), this Court
explained that the intent behind the use of possession in conjunction with occupation is to
emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession. The law speaks of
possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention
of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation
because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an
applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his
own property. (citations omitted)

Same; Same; Same; Possession; Acquisitive Prescription; Possession for purposes of prescription must
be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.On the other hand, Section 14 (2)
is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus, requiring a reference to the
relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118 thereof, possession for
purposes of prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. In
Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, 532 SCRA 391 (2007), this Court expounded on the
nature of possession required for purposes of prescription: It is concerned with lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of
an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that
it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who
asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of
acquisitive prescription. (citations omitted)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the
basis of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and
convincing evidence.The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner, by
which the respondent describes its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of
law. The burden of proof is on the respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that
the alleged possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration required by law. It
is therefore inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the
allegations of the respondent. A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis
of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of
the oppositors.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.

Jaime Y. Sindiong for respondent.

REYES, J.:

This Court is urged to review and set aside the July 31, 2008 Decision1 and February 20, 2009
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143. In its July 31, 2008 Decision, the CA
affirmed the August 27, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 of Cagayan De Oro
City. The dispositive portion thereof states:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated August 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.3

In its February 20, 2009 Resolution, the CA denied the petitioners August 29, 2008 Motion for
Reconsideration.4

The Factual Antecedents

The respondent filed with the RTC an application for land registration, covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre, situated in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental and with an area of
9,794 square meters. The respondent purchased the portion of the subject property consisting of
4,708 square meters (Area A) from Francisca Oco pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
27, 1990 and the remaining portion consisting of 5,086 square meters (Area B) from Rosario U. Tan Lim,
Nemesia Tan and Mariano U. Tan pursuant to a Deed of Partial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale
dated April 11, 1991. It was claimed that the respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945.

After hearing the same on the merits, the RTC issued on August 27, 2004 a Decision, granting the
respondents petition for registration of the land in question, thus:

ACCORDINGLY, finding the application meritorious, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence
on the matter, particularly the provisions of P.D. 1529, judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant
application. The Land Registration Authority is hereby ordered to issue a decree in the name of the
applicant East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation covering the parcel of land, Lot 9039, Cad 237,
having an area of 9,794 square meters covered by the two (2) tax declarations subject of this petition.
Based on the decree, the Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental is hereby directed to
issue an original certificate of title in the name of the applicant covering the land subject matter of this
application.5

On appeal by the petitioner, the CA affirmed the RTCs August 27, 2004 Decision. In its July 31, 2008
Decision,6 the CA found no merit in the petitioners appeal, holding that:

It is a settled rule that an application for land registration must conform to three requisites: (1) the land
is alienable public land; (2) the applicants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof must be since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and (3) it is a bona fide claim of ownership.

In the case at bench, petitioner-appellee has met all the requirements. Anent the first requirement, both
the report and certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
shows that the subject land was within the alienable and disposable zone classified under BF Project
[N]o. 8 Blk. I, L.C. Map [N]o. 585 and was released and certified as such on December 31, 1925.

Indubitably, both the DENR certification and report constitute a positive government act, an
administrative action, validly classifying the land in question. It is a settled rule that the classification or
re-classification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is now a prerogative
of the Executive Department of the government. Accordingly, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence. As it is, the said certification remains uncontested
and even oppositor-appellant Republic itself did not present any evidence to refute the contents of the
said certification. Thus, the alienable and disposable character of the subject land certified as such as
early as December 31, 1925 has been clearly established by the evidence of the petitioner-appellee.

Anent the second and third requirements, the applicant is required to prove his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

xxxx

In the case at bench, ESRDC tacked its possession and occupation over the subject land to that of its
predecessors-in-interest. Copies of the tax declarations and real property historical ownership
pertaining thereto were presented in court. A perusal of the records shows that in 1948, a portion of the
subject land was declared under the name of Agapito Claudel. Subsequently, in 1957 until 1991 the
same was declared under the name of Francisca Oco. Thereafter, the same was declared under the
name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise issued by the Provincial Assessor of Misamis Oriental that
previous tax declarations pertaining to the said portion under the name of Agapita Claudel could no
longer be located as the files were deemed lost or destroyed before World War II.

On the other hand, the remaining portion of the said land was previously declared in 1948 under the
name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho. Subsequently, in 1969 until 1990, the same was declared under the name
of Jacinto Tan. Thereafter, the same was declared under the name of ESRDC. A certification was likewise
issued by the Provincial Assessor that the files of previous tax declarations under the name of Jacinto
Tan Lay Cho were deemed lost or destroyed again before World War II.

In 1991 or upon ESRDCs acquisition of the subject property, the latter took possession thereto. Albeit it
has presently leased the said land to Asia Brewery, Inc., where the latter built its brewery plant,
nonetheless, ESRDC has its branch office located at the plant compound of Asia Brewery, Inc.

Corollarily, oppositor-appellants contentions that the court a quo erred in considering the tax
declarations as evidence of ESRDCs possession of the subject land as the latters predecessors-in-
interest declared the same sporadically, is untenable.

It is a settled rule that albeit tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

Finally, it bears stressing that the pieces of evidence submitted by petitioner-appellee are
incontrovertible. Not one, not even oppositor-appellant Republic, presented any countervailing
evidence to contradict the claims of the petitioners that they are in possession of the subject property
and their possession of the same is open, continuous and exclusive in the concept of an owner for over
30 years.

Verily, from 1948 when the subject land was declared for taxation purposes until ESRDC filed an
application for land registration in 1995, ESRDC have been in possession over the subject land in the
concept of an owner tacking its possession to that its predecessors-in-interest for forty seven (47) years
already. Thus, ESRDC was able to prove sufficiently that it has been in possession of the subject property
for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
in the concept of an owner.7 (citations omitted)

The petitioner assails the foregoing, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that its predecessors-in-
interest possessed the subject property in the manner and for the length of time required under Section
48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act (PLA), and Section 14 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529).
According to the petitioner, the respondent did not present a credible and competent witness to testify
on the specific acts of ownership performed by its predecessors-in-interest on the subject property. The
respondents sole witness, Vicente Oco, can hardly be considered a credible and competent witness as
he is the respondents liaison officer and he is not related in any way to the respondents predecessors-
in-interest. That coconut trees were planted on the subject property only shows casual or occasional
cultivation and does not qualify as possession under a claim of ownership.

Issue

This Court is confronted with the sole issue of whether the respondent has proven itself entitled to the
benefits of the PLA and P.D. No. 1529 on confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

Our Ruling

This Court resolves to GRANT the petition.

Preliminarily, with respect to the infirmity suffered by this petition from the standpoint of Rule 45, this
Court agrees with the respondent that the issue of whether the respondent had presented sufficient
proof of the required possession un-

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7 Rollo, pp. 48-54.

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

der a bona fide claim of ownership raises a question of fact, considering that it invites an evaluation of
the evidentiary record.8 However, that a petition for review should be confined to questions of law and
that this Court is not a trier of facts and bound by the factual findings of the CA are not without
exceptions. Among these exceptions, which obtain in this case, are: (a) when the judgment of the CA is
based on a misapprehension of facts or (b) when its findings are not sustained by the evidence on
record.

This Courts review of the records of this case reveals that the evidence submitted by the respondent fell
short of proving that it has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of
the PLA. The respondent cannot register the subject property in its name on the basis of either Section
14 (1) or Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It was not established by the required quantum of evidence
that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property for the prescribed statutory period.
The PLA governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. Under Section 11
thereof, one of the modes of disposing public lands suitable for agricultural purposes is by confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete titles.9 On the other hand, Section 48 provides the grant to the qualified
possessor of an alienable and disposable public land. Thus:

_______________

8 Republic of the Philippines v. Manna Properties, Inc., 490 Phil. 654, 665; 450 SCRA 247, 258 (2005).

9 Sec. 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization;

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

412

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for the
purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal
decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but
have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such
applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of
the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of
the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of
ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.

Presidential Decree No. 1073 (P.D. No. 1073), which was issued on January 25, 1977, deleted subsection
(a) and amended subsection (b) as follows:

SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain which have been in open, continuous,

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant thru himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

Notably, the first PLA, or Act No. 926, required a possession and occupation for a period of ten (10)
years prior to the effectivity of Act No. 2096 on July 26, 1904 or on July 26, 1894. This was adopted in
the PLA until it was amended by Republic Act No. 1942 on June 22, 1957, which provided for a period of
thirty (30) years. It was only with the enactment of P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977 that it was
required that possession and occupation should commence on June 12, 1945.

P.D. No. 1529, which was enacted on June 11, 1978, codified all the laws relative to the registration of
property. Section 14 thereof partially provides:

Section 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession
or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) are clearly different. Section 14 (1) covers alienable and disposable
land while Section 14 (2) covers private property. As this Court categorically stated in Heirs of
Malabanan v. Republic of the Philip-

414

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

pines,10 the distinction between the two provisions lies with the inapplicability of prescription to
alienable and disposable lands. Specifically:

At the same time, Section 14 (2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under the Civil
Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14 (1).11

roperty is either part of the public domain or privately owned.12 Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
following properties are of public dominion:

(a) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;

(b) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

All other properties of the State, which is not of the character mentioned in Article 420 is patrimonial
property,13 hence, susceptible to acquisitive prescription.14

In Heirs of Malabanan, this Court ruled that possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable
public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not automatically convert said property into
private property or release it from the public domain. There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service or development of national wealth. Without such
express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
State, and thus, may not be acquired by prescription.

_______________

10 G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.

11 Id., at p. 201.

12 Article 419, Civil Code.

13 Article 421, Civil Code.

14 Supra note 10, at p. 202.

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It
is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial property
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property
belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth. (emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in
the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President
is duly authorized by law.15

In other words, for one to invoke the provisions of Section 14 (2) and set up acquisitive prescription
against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established.
Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot
be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period.

_______________

15 Id., at p. 203.

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the subject property on or prior to June
12, 1945 or had completed the prescriptive period of thirty (30) years, the respondent submitted the
following tax declarations:

a) Tax Declaration in the name of Agapita Claudel for the year 1948;

b) Tax Declarations in the name of Francisca Oco for the years 1957, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980,
1987, 1989 and 1991;

c) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994;

d) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho for the years 1948 and 1952;

e) Tax Declarations in the name of Jacinto Tan for the years 1969, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990;
and

f) Tax Declarations in the respondents name for the years 1991, 1992 and 1994.

Pursuant to Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration, there were nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10)
banana trees planted on Area A. The coconut trees were supposedly four years old, hence, the
reasonable presumption that she had been in possession even before June 12, 1945.16

The respondent also offered the following testimony of Vicente Oco:

Q Mr. Witness, If you know about what period your predecessor has started to possess this land
subject matter of this application?

A Per my personal knowledge, it was before the second world war but the Municipality of El Salvador
was created on June 15, 1948 by virtue of RA 268 and its started to officially function only on August 2,
1948[.]

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16 Rollo, p. 102.

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

Q From whom did you acquire this information?

A From the seller and the adjoining lot owners.17

To prove that its predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject property, the
respondent claimed that per Francisca Ocos Tax Declarations, the following improvements were
introduced in Area A: nineteen (19) coconut and ten (10) banana trees in Area A in 1957 and 1963;
thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1969 and 1973; thirty-three (33) coconut trees, one (1) mango tree
and three (3) seguidillas vines in 1974; thirty-three (33) coconut trees in 1980; eighty-seven (87) coconut
trees in 1987; and fifteen (15) coconut trees in 1989. Per Jacinto Tans Tax Declarations, there were fifty-
seven (57) coconut trees in Area B in 1973, 1974, 1980, 1989 and 1990.18

A reading of the CAs July 31, 2008 Decision shows that it affirmed the grant of the respondents
application given its supposed compliance with Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. It ruled that based on
the evidence submitted, the respondent is not qualified to register the subject property in its name
under Section 14 (1) as the possession and occupation of its predecessors-in-interest commenced after
June 12, 1945. Nonetheless, as the CA ruled, the respondent acquired title to the subject property by
prescription as its predecessors-in-interest had possessed the subject property for more than thirty (30)
years. Citing Buenaventura v. Republic of the Philippines,19 the CA held that even if possession
commenced after June 12, 1945, registration is still possible under Section 14 (2) and possession in the
concept of an owner effectively converts an alienable and disposable public land into private property.

This Court, however, disagrees on the conclusion arrived at by the CA. On the premise that the
application for registra-

_______________

17 Id., at pp. 102-103.

18 Id., at pp. 99-101.

19 G.R. No. 166865, March 2, 2007, 517 SCRA 271.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

tion, which was filed in 1995, is based on Section 14 (2), it was not proven that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject property in the manner prescribed by law
and for the period necessary before acquisitive prescription may apply.

While the subject land was supposedly declared alienable and disposable on December 31, 1925 per the
April 18, 1997 Certification and July 1, 1997 Report of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO),20 the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) converted the same from
agricultural to industrial only on October 16, 1990.21 Also, it was only in 2000 that the Municipality of El
Salvador passed a Zoning Ordinance, including the subject property in the industrial zone.22 Therefore,
it was only in 1990 that the subject property had been declared patrimonial and it is only then that the
prescriptive period began to run. The respondent cannot benefit from the alleged possession of its
predecessors-in-interest because prior to the withdrawal of the subject property from the public
domain, it may not be acquired by prescription.

On the premise that the application of the respondent is predicated on Section 14 (1), the same would
likewise not prosper. As shown by the tax declarations of the respondents predecessors-in-interest, the
earliest that the respondent can trace back the possession of its predecessors-in-interest is in 1948. That
there were four-year old coconut trees in Area A as stated in Agapita Claudels 1948 Tax Declaration
cannot be considered a well-nigh controvertible evidence that she was in possession prior to June 12,
1945 without any evidence that she planted and cultivated them. In the case of Jacinto Tan Lay Cho, the
earliest tax declaration in his name is dated 1948 and there is no evidence that he occupied and
possessed

_______________

20 Rollo, p. 142.

21 Id., at pp. 84, 133.

22 Id., at pp. 89-90, 138-140.

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

Area B on or prior to June 12, 1945. Furthermore, the testimony of the respondents lone witness that
the respondents predecessors-in-interest were already in possession of the subject property as of June
12, 1945 lacks probative value for being hearsay.

It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required to acquire an imperfect
title over an alienable and disposable public land must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious in
character. In Republic of the Philippines v. Alconaba,23 this Court explained that the intent behind the
use of possession in conjunction with occupation is to emphasize the need for actual and not just
constructive or fictional possession.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together
with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the
fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a
land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally
exercise over his own property.24 (citations omitted)

On the other hand, Section 14 (2) is silent as to the required nature of possession and occupation, thus,
requiring a reference to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code on prescription. And under Article 1118
thereof, possession for purposes of prescription must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful
and uninterrupted. In Heirs of Marcelina

_______________
23 471 Phil. 607; 427 SCRA 611 (2004).

24 Id., at p. 620; pp. 619-620.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon,25 this Court expounded on the nature of possession required for purposes
of prescription:

It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that
the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or
the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the
presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.26 (citations omitted)

This Court is not satisfied with the evidence presented by the respondent to prove compliance with the
possession required either under Section 14 (1) or Section 14 (2).

First, the twelve (12) Tax Declarations covering Area A and the eleven (11) Tax Declarations covering
Area B for a claimed possession of more than forty-six (46) years (1948-1994) do not qualify as
competent evidence of actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled in Wee v. Republic of the
Philippines:27

It bears stressing that petitioner presented only five tax declarations (for the years 1957, 1961, 1967,
1980 and 1985) for a claimed possession and occupation of more than 45 years (1945-1993). This type
of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence, tax
declarations do not conclusively estab-

_______________

25 G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.

26 Id., at p. 404.

27 G.R. No. 177384, December 8, 2009, 608 SCRA 72.

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

lish either possession or declarants right to registration of title.28 (emphasis supplied and citation
omitted)

The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner, by which the respondent
describes its possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest is a conclusion of law. The burden of
proof is on the respondent to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged
possession of its predecessors-in-interest was of the nature and duration required by law.29 It is
therefore inconsequential if the petitioner failed to present evidence that would controvert the
allegations of the respondent. A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis
of possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence, i.e., he must prove his title and should not rely on the absence or weakness of the evidence of
the oppositors.30

The respondents claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax declarations alone. In
Cequea v. Bolante,31 this Court ruled that it is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof
of actual possession of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership.32 In the
absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not
prove ownership.33

Second, that the nineteen (19) coconut trees supposedly found on Area A were four years old at the
time Agapita Claudel filed a Tax Declaration in 1948 will not suffice as

_______________

28 Id., at p. 83.

29 See The Director, Lands Mgt. Bureau v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 761, 772; 324 SCRA 757, 767
(2000).

30 Arbias v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173808, September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 582, 597.

31 386 Phil. 419; 330 SCRA 216 (2000).

32 Id., at p. 430.

33 Id., at p. 431; p. 228.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

evidence that her possession commenced prior to June 12, 1945, in the absence of evidence that she
planted and cultivated them. Alternatively, assuming that Agapita Claudel planted and maintained these
trees, such can only be considered casual cultivation considering the size of Area A. On the other
hand, that Jacinto Tan Lay Cho possessed Area B in the concept of an owner on or prior to June 12, 1945
cannot be assumed from his 1948 Tax Declaration.

Third, that plants were on the subject property without any evidence that it was the respondents
predecessors-in-interest who planted them and that actual cultivation or harvesting was made does not
constitute well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of actual possession and occupation. As this Court ruled
in Wee:

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an unspecified number of coffee
plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them, when they were planted, whether cultivation or
harvesting was made or what other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, is not sufficient
to demonstrate petitioners right to the registration of title in her favor.34

Fourth, Vicente Ocos testimony deserves scant consideration and will not supplement the inherent
inadequacy of the tax declarations. Apart from being self-serving, it is undoubtedly hearsay. Vicente Oco
lacks personal knowledge as to when the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent started to occupy
the subject property and admitted that his testimony was based on what he allegedly gathered from the
respondents predecessors-in-interest and the owners of adjoining lot. Moreover, Vicente Oco did not
testify as to what specific acts of dominion or ownership were performed by the respondents
predecessors-in-interest and if indeed they did. He merely made a general claim that they came into
possession before World War II, which is a mere conclusion of law and

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34 Supra note 27, at p. 84.

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Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

not factual proof of possession, and therefore unavailing and cannot suffice.35 Evidence of this nature
should have been received with suspicion, if not dismissed as tenuous and unreliable.

Finally, that the respondents application was filed after only four years from the time the subject
property may be considered patrimonial by reason of the DARs October 26, 1990 Order shows lack of
possession whether for ordinary or extraordinary prescriptive period. The principle enunciated in Heirs
of Malabanan cited above was reiterated and applied in Republic of the Philippines v. Rizalvo:36

On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The July 31, 2008 Decision and
February 20, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00143 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the respondents application for registration of title over Lot 9039 of Cagayan Cadastre is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Villarama, Jr.,** Perez and Sereno, JJ., concur.

_______________

35 Supra note 29, at p. 770; p. 765.

36 G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516.

37 Id.

424

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. Republic vs. East Silverlane Realty
Development Corporation, 666 SCRA 401, G.R. No. 186961 February 20, 2012

No. L-61647. October 12, 1984.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C.
TANCINCO, respondents.

Appeals; Exceptions to binding effect of lower court factual findings.The rule that the findings of fact
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus
in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the
power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.

Property; Land Registration; Requisites for land accretion to take place for benefit of riparian owner.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by
this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Same; Same; For accretion or alluvion to form part of registered land of riparian owner, the gradual
alluvial deposits must be due to the effects of the rivers current. Deposits made by human intervention
are excluded.The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river
is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence
whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of
the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the

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* FIRST DIVISION.

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of
land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of
the private respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their
father noticed the four hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents
claim that at this point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent
to testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.

Same; Same; Evidence; In the case at bar there is evidence that alleged alluvial deposits were man-
made.However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed an increase in the area of the
original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the accretion was
sudden. However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and
not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial
deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the rivers but as a result of the
transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not
even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the rivers current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is
under two meters of water. The private respondents own evidence shows that the water in the
fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one meter deep on
the side of the pilapil facing the river.

Same; Same; A riparian owner cannot register accretions to his land arising from special works or man-
made dikes constructed for reclamation purposes.The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner
the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he
suffers because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other
evils produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates
are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which
may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of
Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about accretion. When the private respondents
transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to
protect their property from the destructive force of the waters of the river.

516

516

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Public Lands; Beds of rivers are non-registerable portions of the public domain.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified
as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. They are not open to registration under the Land Registration Act. The
adjudication of the lands in question as private property in the names of the private respondents is null
and void.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Martin B. Laurea for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fifth
Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-131892 are accretion to the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and ordered their registration in the names of the
private respondents.

Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be Maria) Tancinco
Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers.

On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent
to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows:

Lot 1-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along
line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W.,
along lines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina Santiago;
on the E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877). x x
x containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE
METERS. x x x

Lot 2-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)

A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the E., along line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on
the S., along line 2-3, by Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; and
on the N., along line 4-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877). x x x containing an area
of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE METERS. x x x

Lot 3-Psu-131892

(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio of Ubihan, Municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco
(Lot 1, Psu-111877); and along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by
Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892; and along line 5-6 by
property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and on the NW., along line 6-1, by property of
Joaquina Santiago, x x x containing an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985)
SQUARE METERS. x x x

On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands
filed a written opposition to the application for registration.

On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for registration
with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of the Commissioner
appointed by the Court.

518

518

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded only with
respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.

On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the finding that the
lands in question are accretions to the private respondents fishponds covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are accretions to the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the
owner of said property. The Court, therefore, orders the registration of Lots 1 & 2 situated in the barrio
of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more particularly described in plan
Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying technical descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin
Tancinco, married to Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614 U.S.A.;
Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina
Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati, Rizal;
and Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St., Dasmarias Village,
Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.

On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.

On August 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the
lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan nang walang
bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court
admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734)
we held that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings of fact of said courts when
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on

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Republic vs. Court of Appeals

speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee.

There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents fishponds.

The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New Civil Code
because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply transferred their dikes further
down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is
manmade and artificial and not the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters
of the river.

On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acua to the effect
that:

xxx xxx xxx

x x x when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry almost at the level of
the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2)
arms length the land was still dry up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was
established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was transferred to the new
Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the new lots were then converted into fishpond, and
water in this fishpond was two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the fishpond x x x.

The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of accretion without
human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the accretion was complete.

We agree with the petitioner.

Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:

520
520

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.

The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by
this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land
where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.

The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable.
This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that
the addition to the said property was made gradually through the effects of the current of the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is
preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of
the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to be
their overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four hectare accretion to
the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time, accretion had
already taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible
increase to their land in the years before 1939. However, the witness testified that in that year, she
observed an increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was
telling the truth, the accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits
were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect of the current of the
rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land
sought to be registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the rivers current on
the fishpond adjoining it. It is under two meters of water. The private respondents own evidence shows

521

VOL. 132, OCTOBER 12, 1984

521

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

that the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only
one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river
is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of the location of his land. If estates
bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the destructive force of the
waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds
of easements, it is proper that the risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner
does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed to
bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the river bed, the
dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force
of the waters of the river.

We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private respondents
lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such alleged alluvial deposits,
deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question were not included in the survey of their
adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of
Meycauayan conducted between the years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for
taxation purposes only in 1972 or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The only valid
conclusion therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after the
private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in 1951. What
private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the Meycauayan river
by reclamation.

The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the private
respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are therefore classified
as property of the public domain under Article 420

522

522

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

paragraph 1 and Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as private
property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes of their fishponds to their original
location and return the disputed property to the river to which it belongs.

SO ORDERED. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 514, No. L-61647 October 12, 1984

No. L-17652. June 30, 1962.

IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN
CALALUNG, respondents.
Property; Accretion; Alluvial deposits on registered land; Increment not automatically registered.An
accretion does not automatically become registered land, just because the lot which receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens title.

525

VOL. 5, JUNE 30, 1962

525

Grande vs. Court of Appeals

Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is
another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil
Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land
Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and,
thereafter, protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of
third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws, wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.

Gonzales & Fernandez for respondents.

BARRERA,.J.:

This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the
latter without petitioners' consent.

The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land,
with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly
Tumauini), province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited
it from her parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown
by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1,
Plan PSU-83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern
boundary was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years
thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the
Cagayan River, so
526

526

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Grande vs. Court of Appeals

much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original
site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to
the registered area (Exh. C-1).

On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging
in their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents
entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February
18, 1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous,
open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises
and deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.-00 as damages and costs.
Said decision, in part, reads:

"It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of
Titie No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendants' witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony
portion, in 1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his
witness, Vicente C. Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do
not only contradict

527

VOL. 5, JUNE 30, 1962

527

Grande vs. Court of Appeals

the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that
the accretion with an area of 4 hectares, more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only
declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. '2')
when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec.
No. 257 (Exh. '2') cancelled Tax Dec. No. 28226 (Exh. '1'), because Exh. '2' says that 'tax under this
declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation
purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it
is a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art.
366, Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo,that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since
1948, or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of
the owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9
Phil. 408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the
reparian owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not
require the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).

'This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January
25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have
acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496; and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person."

Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:

"That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in
the early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore,
unless some superior title has super-

528

528

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Grande vs. Court of Appeals

vened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in accordance with the rule of
natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which provides that 'to the owner
of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.' The defendants, however, contend that they have acquired
ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The Court a quo,has
resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in question
pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the accretion,
consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that 'no title to
registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession'; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action
was instituted.

"As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion
to registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the
land as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of
their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to
all the rights conferred by the Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on
accession; and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the additional area by another person
through prescription. This Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19249-R, July 17, 1959.

"We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of
time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land
in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit
1). This tax declara-

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VOL. 5, JUNE 30, 1962

529

Grande vs. Court of Appeals

tion was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality wherein it is
located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by two
witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants.
Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
"We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of
the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land
was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or
paid the taxes hereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is
conceded by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included,
containing an area of some 458 square meters.

"The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possessionfrom 1933 to 1958is
not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the
plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiffs had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay
the fees of the surveyor Domingo Parian, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment
of the surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it
was not necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which
was legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up
to their rights only when they

530

530

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Grande vs. Court of Appeals

received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had already supervened in favor
of the defendants."

It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.

The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in
question through prescription.

There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto
registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. lmprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed
under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
The fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was
formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was
registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is
not entitled or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the
Torrens system. Consequently, it was sub-

531

VOL. 5, JUNE 30, 1962

531

Valderrama Lumber Mfrs. Co., Inc. vs. Administrator

ject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. The next issue is, did respondents acquire said
alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a question which requires determination of
facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such possession. The Court of Appeals, after
analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in possession of the alluvial lot since
1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of ownership up to the filing of the
action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by the Court of Appeals after an
examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to them and can not be reviewed
by us.

The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the
Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code
were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
accordance with law.

The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
So ordered. Grande vs. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524, No. L-17652 June 30, 1962

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc
FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property originally belonged to a 22
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four
sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena,
had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino.
After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved
the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the
land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification
occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.