Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
HEIRS OF ALIWALAS and CA On rebuttal, Victoria adduced evidence that there is no record of the
(1988, CORTES, J.) Homestead patent in the name of Dr. Aliwalas is because the prewar
records of the Bureau of Lands pertaining to public land applications
FACTS: were burned during the war.
October 12, 1933 - Lot No. 3563 (subject land) of the Arayat Cadastre TC: Victoria as true owner, cancel all certs in Tengcos names,
was originally part of the public domain. Tengcos must vacate and pays rents 5k/year since 1974 until turn over
Dr. Jose Aliwalas applied with the Bureau of Lands for a homestead Heirs of Tengco appealed to CA CA affirmed TC, MR was
patent covering this lot. denied Hence this case.
o 1936 Application granted. Homestead Patent No. 38588 was issued in
his name. ISSUES:
o 1937 The homestead patent was duly registered and OCT No. 159 WON TC and CA had jurisdiction?
was issued. WON the claim of the heirs of Victoria will hold true and prosper
From that time on, Dr. Aliwalas declared the subject lot for tax before a proper forum; (Tengcos were claiming the Aliwalas title is
purposes and paid the corresponding land taxes thereon. As owner, Dr. defective)
Aliwalas, thru his overseer and caretaker Espiridion Manaul, had this WON the heirs of Victoria, assuming for the sake of argument, that
parcel fenced and vegetables were planted in some portions. Other they have proprietary rights on and to the land in question, have not
portions were dedicated to cattle raising until WWII. long lost such rights by laches and/or prescription.
After the war, tenants of Dr. Aliwalas planted crops on the subject
ON JURISDICTION
land. Manaul was still caretaker and delivered to Dr. Aliwalas the
Well-settled rule in jurisprudence: an OCT issued on the strength of a
owners share in the harvests.
homestead patent partakes of the nature of a certificate of title issued
1962 Dr. Aliwalas died management over the subject parcel in a judicial proceeding, as long as the land disposed of is really part of
passed to his son Jose Jr. the disposable land of the public domain, and becomes indefeasible
o Subsequently, the heirs partitioned Dr. Aliwalas estate the subject land and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of
was distributed to Victoria Vda. De Aliwalas (the widow) Partition the promulgation of the order of the Director of Lands for the issuance
was approved by RD of Pampanga OCT in Victorias name (Nov of the patent. A homestead patent, once registered under the Land
1966). Also has TD and paid real estate taxes thereon. Registration Act, becomes as indefeasible as a Torrens title.
October 31, 1973 - Ponciano Tengco representing the Heirs of
Gregorio Tengco filed an application with the Bureau of Lands. ON NON-EXHAUSTION
Among other things, he alleged that the subject parcel of land had been Already been rejected in earlier decisions. The Director of Lands
occupied and cultivated originally and continuously by has the power to review homestead patents only so long as the land
Gregorio. APPROVED + issued Free Patent No. 557692 on remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his
February 5, 1974. exclusive control; but once the patent is registered and a certificate of
o The Free Patent was issued upon the assumption that the lot still formed title is issued, the land ceases to be a part of public domain and
part of the public domain and on the findings of the Public Land becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither
Inspector Romeo Buenaventura who conducted an investigation and control nor jurisdiction.
reported that the land was possessed and occupied by the Tengcos who
had planted different kinds of trees on the land aside from rice and
corn.
ON DEFECTIVE TITLE lands which might even include private lands found within said
TENGCOS: (a) Dr. Jose Aliwalas was not qualified to be a areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law also violate the rights of
homesteader being a rich landed person; and (b) The Aliwalas Family private landowners.
has never been in actual or physical possession of the property, unlike ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
the Tengcos who have been in continuous and open possession of the
property since 1918. (EVIDENCE: Report prepared by Librado B. HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After
Luna, hearing officer of the Bureau of Lands, attesting to such facts.) deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated
again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority
o SC citing the CA: Aliwalas title to the property having become
vote, Cruzs petition was dismissed and the constitutionality of the
incontrovertible, CANNOT be collaterally attacked. If indeed there IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
had been any fraud or misrepresentation the proper remedy is an action public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.
for reversion instituted by the OSG.
ON LACHES AND PRESCRIPTION 38. G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
TENGCOS: The Aliwalas Family has never actually possessed the vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT andESTELITA PADILLA,
property unlike the Tengcos (same as their 2nd reason as to why the respondents.NARVASA, J.:pFACTS: Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P.
Cheesman weremarried on December 4, 1970 but have
Aliwalas title is defective)
beenseparated since February 15, 1981. On June 4, 1974, a Deed
o UNTENABLE Title acquired through a homestead patent registered of Sale and Transfer ofPossessory Rights was executed by Armando
under the Land Registration Act is imprescriptible. Thus, prescription Altaresconveying a parcel of unregistered land and the housein favor of
cannot operate against the registered owner. Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age,Filipino citizen, married to
Citing CA: The Aliwalas Family have NOT slept on their rights. SC Thomas Cheesman, andresiding at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta.
Rita,Olongapo City . Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed,
cited the facts (having a caretaker, tenants, planting on the land, paying didnot object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Thereafter, tax
tax, partition) which they found showed that the Aliwas Family had declarations for the property purchasedwere issued in the name only of
indeed occupied, possessed and exercised rights of ownership over the Criselda Cheesmanand Criselda assumed exclusive management
subject land prior to the filing of the instant suit. andadministration of said property, leasing it totenants. This
happened without any protest fromThomas. Criselda sold the
37. 347 SCRA 128 (400 Phil 904) Civil Law Land Titles and property to Estelita M. Padilla,without the knowledge or consent of
Cheesman. Thedeed described Criselda as being of legal
Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine
age,married to an American citizen... Subsequently, Thomas filed a suit
Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the in the CFI againstCriselda and Estelita Padilla, praying for
validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples theannulment of the sale on the ground that thetransaction had
Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an been executed without his knowledgeand consent. During the Pre-trial,
the sale was declared void abinitio and the the delivery of the
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the property to Thomas asadministrator of the conjugal partnership property
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources wasordered. However, the judgment was set aside on a petition forrelief
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, filed by the Estrellita, grounded on "fraud,mistake and/or
Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates excusable negligence" which hadseriously impaired her right to
the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which present her caseadequately. Estelita Padilla filed a
may include natural resources. supplementalpleading as her own answer to the complaint and amotion
for summary judgment. The Trial Court found that o The evidence on
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all- record satisfactorily overcame thedisputable presumption that all
encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral property of themarriage belongs to the conjugal partnership andthat
the immovable in question was in truthCriseldas paraphernal containing thetestimony of witnesses. The rule of conclusiveness of the
property;o The legal presumption in Article 160 could not applybecause the factual findings orconclusions of the CA is subject to certain
husband-plaintiff is an American citizenand therefore disqualified under exceptions.However, none of which is present in the case at bar. Both the
the Constitution toacquire and own real properties; ando The exercise Trial Court and the IAC reached the sameconclusions on the 3 factual
by Criselda of exclusive acts ofdominion with the knowledge of her matters, after assessmentof the evidence and determination of the
husband hadled Estelita to believe that the properties were theexclusive probative value thereof and these determinations will not
properties of Criselda and on the faith ofsuch a belief she bought the bedisturbed.o The facts on record adequately proved fraud,mistake
properties from her andfor value and therefore, Thomas was estopped or excusable negligence by which EstelitaPadilla's rights had been
toimpugn the transfer. Thomas appealed the judgment, as well as the substantially impaired; thatthe funds used by Criselda Cheesman was
actof the Trial Court of granting Estelitas petition forrelief and its moneyshe had earned and saved prior to her marriage toThomas
resolution of matters not subject ofsaid petition. IAC affirmed the Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla didbelieve in good faith that
Summary Judgmentand found no reversible error. Thomas Criselda Cheesman wasthe sole owner of the property in question. An
Cheesmanappealed to the Supreme Court. order of a CFI granting a petition for reliefunder Rule 38 is
interlocutory and is NOTappealable. The failure of the party who
ISSUE: Whether or not Thomas correctly availed of theremedy of appeal to opposedthe petition to appeal from said order, or
SC? NO hisparticipation in the proceedings subsequently had,cannot be
construed as a waiver of his objectionto the petition for relief so as
[COMMENTO: Were familiar with the Persons relatedissue The to preclude hisraising the same question on appeal from
foreigner husband has no capacity orpersonality to question the sale thejudgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat
of the property becauseit would be an indirect controversion of the his objections to thepetition for relief, or perform any act
constitutionalprohibition. Aliens are prohibited from acquiring lands ofthe thereafter inorder to preserve his right to question the
public domain. sameeventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for thispurpose
that he has made of record "the actionwhich he desires the court
]RULING: An order of the CFI granting a petition forrelief to take or his objection tothe action of the court and his grounds therefor."
under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is notappealable. The prayer in a petition for relief from judgmentunder Rule 38
is not necessarily the same prayer inthe petitioner's complaint, answer
QUESTION OF FACT vs. QUESTION OF LAW: Theconclusions made by the or other basicpleading. Once a petition for relief is granted and
trial court were derived fromevidence adduced by the parties, the facts set thejudgment subject thereof set aside, and furtherproceedings
out inthe pleadings or otherwise appearing on recordareconclusions or are thereafter had, the Court in itsjudgment on the merits may
findings of fact. As distinguishedfrom a QUESTION OF LAWwhich properly grant the reliefsought in the petitioner's basic pleadings,
exists "when thedoubt or difference arises as to what the law is on acertain althoughdifferent from that stated in his petition for relief.WHEREFORE,
state of facts" "there is a QUESTION OFFACT when the doubt or the appealed decision is AFFIRMED,with costs against petitioner.
difference arises as to thetruth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or when
the"query necessarily invites calibration of the wholeevidence 39. G.R. No. 149615 | 2006-08-29
considering mainly the credibility ofwitnesses, existence and
relevancy of specificsurrounding circumstances, their relation; to FACTS: Elena Muller and Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
eachother and to the whole and the probabilities of Germany. The couple resided in Germany ata a house owned by
thesituation." The RULE is that only questions of law, distinctly Helmut's parents. In 1992, they moved to Philippines. Helmut sold the
setforth, may be raised in a petition for the review house he inherited from his parents to purchase a parcel of land in
oncertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appealspresented to Antipolo, Rizal. The lot costs P528,000 and the construction of the house
the Supreme Court. The appellate jurisdiction of the SC is costs P2.3M. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and
limited toreviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive thefactual expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that
findings of the lower court upon its ownassessment of the
he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of
evidence. CA was created precisely to take away from the SCthe work of
the said prohibition. Due to incompatibilities and Helmut's alleged
examining the evidence, and confine itstask to the determination of
womanazing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
questions which do not callfor the reading and study of transcripts
separated. Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties before the
RTC. In its ruling, although the Family Code provides that properties FACTS:
acquired by gratuitous title are excluded from the conjugal property, Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong,
Helmut cannot recover the Antipolo property. This is because his covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion
acquisition of the property is in violation of Sec. 7, Art. XII of the fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although
Constitution. The constitution provides for the prohibition for an alien to the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the
acquire lands in the Philippines. Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that Helmut agreement.
be reimbursed of the cost of acquisition of the land and the cost of the On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option
construction of the house. to buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a
monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed
ISSUE: Whether or not the Helmut can be reimbursed of the cost of on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of
Antipolo property? the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month.
The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a
RULING: No. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust petition for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner's It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn
marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October
hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in 28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the abandoned.
party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. Invoking the principle that to respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil
a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise of a later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and heart. Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a
frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he ISSUE:
who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has HELD:
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but
the controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien
prohibition. the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine
citizenship.
40. PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. LUI SHE But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to
G.R. No. L-17587. September 12, 1967 buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or
Ponente: J. Castro otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership
DOCTRINE: whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy
Even if the contract appears to be valid, if the provisions is the land but also of the right to dispose of it rights the sum total of
against a constitutional prohibition, the same should be considered null which make up ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional
and void. ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
44. registration of a land, located at Sto. Tomas, Batangas and with an area
REGISTER OF DEEDS vs UNG SIU SI TEMPLEGR. No. L-6776 May of 56.4007 hectares.
21,1955FACTS: To support its application, it submitted two certificates, issued by
A Filipino citizen executed a deed of donation in favor of the Ung Siu Si CENRO and FMS-DENR
Temple, an unregistered religiousorganization that operated through and both certifying that the land applied for was alienable and disposable.
three trustees all of Chinese nationality. The Register of Deeds refused The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
torecord the deed of donation executed in due form arguing that the opposed the
Consitution provides that acquisition of landis limited to Filipino citizens, application on the ground that T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the
or to corporations or associations at least 60% of which is owned by land was alienable
suchcitizens. and disposable.
ISSUE: Issue/s:
Whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a Whether or not the applicant proved that, the land is alienable and
religious organization whose founder,trustees and administrator are disposable.
Chinese citizens should be registered or not.
Ruling:
RULING:Sec. 5, Art. 13 of the Constitution provides that save in cases of No.
hereditary succession, no privateagricultural land shall be transferred or It is the burden of the applicant to prove that the land subject to
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associationsqualified to registration is
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The Constitution does alienable and disposable and for such the applicant must prove that the
not make anyexception in favor of religious associations DENR Secretary had
.The fact that appellant has no capital stock does not exempt it from the approved the land classification and released the land of the public
Constitutional inhibition, since itsmember are of foreign nationality. The domain as alienable and
purpose of the 60% requirement is to ensure that corporations or disposable.
associations allowed to acquire agricultural lands or to exploit natural In the present case, T.A.N. Properties did not provide the needed
resources shall be controlled byFilipinos; and proof. For the
the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, documents provided by the company, the Court cited DENR
controllingmembership should be composed of Filipino citizens. Administrative Order No. 20
As to the complaint that the disqualification under Art. 13 of the (DAO No. 20) and DAO No. 38; DAO No. 20 proves that FMS-DENR has
Constitution violated the freedom of religion,the Court was not convinced no authority to issue
that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment of certificates, classifying lands to be alienable and disposable; and DAO
religious profession or worship. No. 38 provides that
CENRO can issue certificates of land classification for lands having a
45. maximum area of 50
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties Inc. (555 SCRA 477) hectares. The land applied for in the case has an area of 56.4007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, hectares, thus CENRO has
vs. no jurisdiction over it. It is clear from the aforementioned DAOs
T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent. that the documents
G.R. No. 154953; June 26, 2008 submitted by T.A.N. Properties did not prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. originally filed The petition represented by its Luis Olan, testified that his father Lucio Olan originally owned the land.
Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr. They had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the land in
the concept of owner until his father sold the land in 1946 to Anatalio
Aranda. The children of Anatalio then took over in tilling the land, planting
OSG filed its opposition on grounds that the land applied for is part of the it with rice and corn and adding a few coconut trees. He does not have any
public domain and the applicant has not acquired a registrable title. copy of the document of sale because his mother gave it to Anatalio.
ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application citing the reasons: RTC granted the application and ordering the issuance of a decree of
1. registration in favor of petitioner.
"On April 4, 1979, the heirs of Ignacio Arrobang, through counsel in a letter- Evidently, the filing of the application and the verification and investigation
complaint requested the Director of Lands, Manila, for an investigation of the allegedly conducted by Recio were precipitate and beyond the pale of the
District Land Officer for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore Public Land Act. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, investigation and
land in favor of [respondent]. The Chief, Legal Division, Land Management verification should have been done only after the filing of the application.
Bureau, Manila, recommended to the Director of Lands the appropriate civil Hence, it would have been highly anomalous for Recio to conduct his own
proceeding for the cancellation of Free Patent Title and the corresponding investigation and verification on December 27, 1998, a day before Felipe
Original Certificate of Title in the name of [respondent]. Alejaga Sr. filed the Application for Free Patent. It must also be noted that
while the Alejagas insist that an investigation was conducted, they do not
In the meantime, [respondent] obtained a NACIDA loan from the defendant dispute the fact that it preceded the filing of the application.
Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB) executed in Cebu
City in the amount of P100,000.00 on August 18, 1981. The loan was Second, the claim of the Alejagas that an actual investigation was conducted
secured by a real estate mortgage in favor of defendant PNB. is not sustained by the Verification & Investigation Report itself, which bears
no signature. Their reliance on the presumption of regularity in the
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an performance of official duty is thus misplaced. Since Recios signature does
action for Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against not appear on the December 27, 1978 Report, there can be no presumption
[respondent], the PNB of Roxas City and defendant Register of Deeds of that an investigation and verification of the parcel of land was actually
Roxas City covering Free Patent Application. conducted.
ISSUE I: Whether or not there was fraud in procuring the patent. Based on the foregoing badges of fraud, we sustain petitioners contention
that the free patent granted to Felipe Alejaga Sr. is void. Such fraud is a
HELD II: Yes. A preponderance of evidence showed manifest fraud in ground for impugning the validity of the Certificate of Title. The invalidity of
procuring the patent. the patent is sufficient basis for nullifying the Certificate of Title issued in
consequence thereof, since the latter is merely evidence of the
First, the issuance of the free patent was not made in accordance with the former. Verily, we must uphold petitioners claim that the issuance of the
procedure laid down by Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Alejagas patent and title was tainted with fraud.
Public Land Act. Under Section 91 thereof, an investigation should be
conducted for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out ISSUE II: Indefeasibility of Title
in the application are true.
Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title issued,
Further, after the filing of the application, the law requires sufficient notice to the land covered by them ceases to be part of the public domain and
the municipality and the barrio where the land is located, in order to give becomes private property. Further, the Torrens Title issued pursuant to the
adverse claimants the opportunity to present their claims. Note that this patent becomes indefeasible a year after the issuance of the latter. However,
notice and the verification and investigation of the parcel of land are to be this indefeasibility of a title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and
conducted after an application for free patent has been filed with the Bureau misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
of Lands. under the Torrens System does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the
registrants already existing one. Verily, registration under the Torrens
In this case, however, Felipe Alejaga Sr.s Application for Free Patent was System is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
dated and filed on December 28, 1978. On the other hand, the Investigation
& Verification Report prepared by Land Inspector Elfren L. Recio of the Therefore, under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the State --
District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands of Roxas City was dated even after the lapse of one year -- may still bring an action for the reversion
December 27, 1978. In that Report, he stated that he had conducted the to the public domain of land that has been fraudulently granted to private
individuals. Further, this indefeasibility cannot be a bar to an investigation by condition. Hence, the property must necessarily revert to the public domain,
the State as to how the title has been acquired, if the purpose of the pursuant to Section 124 of the Public Land Act.
investigation is to determine whether fraud has in fact been committed in
securing the title. 56.
In the case before us, the indefeasibility of a certificate of title cannot be Director of Lands vs. Rivas
invoked by the Alejagas, whose forebear obtained the title by means of (G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986)
fraud. Public policy demands that those who have done so should not be
By: Tangonan, Julius
allowed to benefit from their misdeed. Thus, prescription and laches will not
bar actions filed by the State to recover its own property acquired through
fraud by private individuals. This is settled law. Doctrine:
1. Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the
ISSUE III: Prohibition Against Alienation or Encumbrance 1935 Constitution and Secs. 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing
Assuming arguendo that the Alejagas title was validly issued, there is
another basis for the cancellation of the grant and the reversion of the land to lands (inalienable).
the public domain. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 proscribes the
encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead 2. Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of
within five years from its grant. The prohibition against any alienation or
private ownership.
encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of every
application.
Facts:
Further, corporations are expressly forbidden by law to have any right or title 1. On 14 Mar 1973, the CFI granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory
to, or interest in, lands that are granted under free or homestead patents; or information title for tract of land specifically classified as grazing land called
any improvements thereon. They are forbidden from enjoying such right, title Nottab. Lope Guzman and Pacifico Vijandre now seek to have the same
or interest, if they have not secured the consent of the grantee and the registered.
approval of the secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources; and if such lands are to be devoted to purposes other than 2. Conflicting evidence were presented by petitioner Pacifico Vijandre and
education, charity, or easement of way.
oppositor Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corp (Cavaco). Previously, the TC and CA
adjudicated the land to Cavaco, though it was 1,222 ha and exceeded the 1000
In the case at bar, the Free Patent was approved and issued on March 14,
1979. Corresponding Original Certificate of Title was issued on the same ha limit under law.
date. On August 18, 1981, or two (2) years after the grant of the free patent,
Felipe Alejaga Sr. obtained from Respondent PNB a loan. Despite the 3. The formers evidence depicted that that after Bunugans death, the same was
statement on the title certificate itself that the land granted under the free sold by the heirs of Bunugans attorney to Manuel Guzman. Then Guzmans
patent shall be inalienable for five (5) years from the grant, a real estate administratrix, with the courts approval, sold it to Luis Guzman Reyes. It
mortgage was nonetheless constituted on the land passed next to Luis widow, Dolores, who sold the northern portion to
Saturnino, and the southern portion to Rafael. The northern portion was then
Thus, the mortgage executed by Respondent Felipe Alejaga Sr. falls sold to spouses Estrada. Finally, the spouses and Rafael sold their portions to
squarely within the term encumbrance proscribed by Section 118 of the Cavaco.
Public Land Act. A mortgage constitutes a legal limitation on the estate, and
the foreclosure of the mortgage would necessarily result in the auction of the
property. 4. While the latters evidence detailed that Bunugans sole heir, Manuela
Banugan, sold to Pablo Guzman only the portion in excess of the 1000 ha. After
To comply with the condition for the grant of the free patent, within five years Pablo died, the Nottab was inherited by his son Lope Guzman Rivas. Later, Lope
from its issuance, Felipe Alejaga Sr. should not have encumbered the parcel sold the same to Ignacio Pascio, who then sold it to his son Fernando.
land granted to him. The mortgage he made over the land violated that
5. On one hand, the SolGen contents that the CA erred in not declaring that the Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his
land was part of a forest reserve and that Banugans Spanish titles werent civil rights, or does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or
authentic.
does not have the character or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case
6. On the other hand, the lawyer of Pascua argued that the said land was already is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the
private land in Banugans hands and the latters titles were valid and authentic real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action. The
term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue,
Issue: W/N the application of registration of the said land by Lope and Vijandre
such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality
should be dismissed as the same is inalienable public land.
or any other general disqualifications of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the
plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a ground
Ratio: YES
for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue; whereas
Held:
the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that
The registration case herein should be dismissed since the disputed land is part of
the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
the forest reserve under PD 159. Its intended for wood production watershed soil
protection and other forest uses. The same fact is proven by the way that Lope and
Pascua treated the same as pasture land or grazing land. Even under the presented
tax declarations the land was described as for pasture exclusively. Facts: This case is about the complaint for the declaration of nullity of
Original Certificate of Title No. 670 and all other titles emanating therefrom.
Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the The subject property is a vast tract of lands where the petitioners alleged
1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
that they occupied and possessed such parcels. The whole property covered
Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands
by OCT No. 670 was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1024 in favor of Isabel
(inalienable). Thus, lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the
Manahan Santiago the mother of herein respondent. Petitioners filed with
object of private ownership.
the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of nullity of
respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and
57. NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, spurious and also Petitioners came by information that respondent was
EUSEBIA V. TABLADA, CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. planning to evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners
COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. had actually received notices to vacate.
NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES, SALVADOR I. DE LA
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary
TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD
Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses. Respondent claimed that the
LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS,
petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the
Petitioners. vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO
Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005 authentic on its face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles
derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive against
the petitioners and the whole world. Furthermore, He pointed out that any
action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with
Principle laid down by SC:
regard to OCT No. 670, which was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years Held: No. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff,
prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners. in an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the real property which is the subject
During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that
witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject
laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez Property so as to justify their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or
of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled to quiet title.
illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that
it was the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, that should file Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their
for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other action was one for removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at
hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
documents he had so far submitted to the trial court. petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-
in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause
RTC dismissed the case ruling that plaintiffs were not the
of action.
lawful owners of the land subject of this case, for they did not comply with
PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to bring before this Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Court the instant complaint. Defendants title especially so with the mother Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal
title OCT 670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly
years ago, the same not having been questioned by any party. Only now dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the
that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are on the case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the
offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their issue of prescription of the action.
case, unwittingly sealed their fate.
65. 236 SCRA 336 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Land Registration 102858. July 28, 1997]
Spanish titles
Isabel, Consuelo, and Serapia were sisters who filed a petition to register 6 parcels of
land under their name. The land has an area of 10,481 sq m. The same was inherited
15AUG
by them from their parents who acquired the same from Spanish grant. The sisters
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.
showed possessory information. The lower court ruled in their favor but only awarded FACTS:
4 parcels of land. Parcel no. 1 and 2 were not yet decided upon as there was a Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648
separate case involving one Constancio dela Pena Tan. The heirs appealed to have square meters of land under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land
lots 1 & 2 be included.
registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
for want of jurisdiction, in compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have rights over lots 1 & 2. circulation. The case was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals which, set
aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in
the name of Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not deprive the
HELD: No. The Supreme Court noted that they do not even have rights over the other
trial court of its authority to grant the application. The Director of Lands
parcels of land (but no need to disturb ruling as it was not appealed for by the Director
of Lands). The original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to the
evidence by the heirs. Such omission is fatal to their application as the submission of Supreme Court.
the original tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. While
ISSUE: since 1918 and obtained a homestead patent for it. He introduced some
improvements on the land such as fencing the area with barbwires, planting mango
Whether or not the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper publication of
trees and palays and pasturing carabaos. He was able to secure a title in favor of his
the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory. children petitioner included for the big parcel of land he cultivates and improves and
when he died in 1941 the petitioner continued to possess the land in question not
HELD: embraced in the Transfer of Cert. of Title issued to them in the concept of an owner.
YES. Petition was granted.
The petitioner had the land surveyed from a private surveyor only to find out that
there is already a survey plan of the said land in the name of the respondents and
RATIO: that a title was already issued to them. Petitioner now contends that being an
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requires adjacent owner of the land in question they were not notified of the survey. The
publication of the notice of initial hearing. It should be noted further that land Surveyors Certificate reveals that notice was given to the following: Jose Cruz, Diego
registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires Francisco (petitioners father), and Santol Creek. It is noted that both Jose Cruz and
Diego Francisco were already dead from the date of the notice and Santol Creek is
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state, not a person or entity. It was established that the petitioner and her brother and
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is sisters who are the actual occupants of the adjacent land of the land in question were
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process must not notified of the survey. Petitioner did not read the publication in the Official Gazette
strictly be complied with. and the former mayor of Teresa who is the owner of the property across the Santol
Creek testified that Diego Francisco was in possession of the land throughout his
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
lifetime and after his death his heirs and not the respondents. By virtue of this
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and continuous, adverse, and open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47)
again, this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of this parcel of land.
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus,
the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
Respondent contends that the petitioners claim for ownership of the land in question
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal is insufficient in form and substance failing to explain under what color of title she
requisites shall have been duly complied with. acquires ownership of the land in question, citing that an essential requisite for a valid
petition for reopening and review of a decree should be made by a person who is
68. Fausta Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35787, April 11, 1980 (97 deprived of the land or interest. "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 of Act
SCRA 22) 496 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show
fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is
Facts: not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act.
The mere claim of ownership of petitioner lacks this requisite to merit in granting of
This is a petition for review filed by the petitioner on the decision rendered by the CA their petition. They claim that Toribio Santos, the respondents father owns the land
reversing the CFI judgment in favor of her on a land registration case and orders the and Alejandro Santos inherited it from him and occupied the land in 1920 and has
issuance of the Original Cert. of Title to the respondents Alejandro Santos and been in possession thereof for more than 30 years.
Ramona Francisco instead. Petitioner alleges that she is the absolute owner of the
land in dispute covered with an Original Cert. of title of the Register of Deeds; that
she is in continuous, adverse, open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the
land since time immemorial; respondents have never been in possession of the land Issue:
as they claim and that they obtained their Decree of Registration of said land by
fraud. Apparently, Diego Francisco, the petitioners father occupied the land in dispute 1. Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332
2. Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question. land registration of the respondents. Respondents filed with the MTC a
single application for registration of two parcels of land. They claimed to
be owners in fee simple of the subject lots, which they purchased from
their parents on June 25, 1976. The petitioner filed an opposition to the
Ruling:
respondent s application for registration of the subject lots arguing
that : (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse
possession of the subject lots required by law; (2) Respondents title
were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the subject lots and (3) The subject
It appears that Jose Cruz and Diego Francisco are both dead when the alleged notice lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were
was served and that Santol Creek could not appear for the hearing because it is not a not subject to private appropriation. ISSUES: 1. WON MTC has
person. The court finds it absurd that the respondent claims that they complied with jurisdiction over the case at bar. 2. WON the subject lots are part of the
the requisite of serving notice to interested parties on the land in question. It is clear public domain and thus cannot be subject to private appropriation. HELD:
that the petitioner and her brothers and sisters who are the actual occupants of the 1. No. Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, the Court finds that the
adjacent lots were not notified of the registration proceeding applied for by the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed and hear the application for
petitioner. It is clear that no notice was sent to the actual owner and possessor of the registration filed by the respondents. 2. Yes. Respondents failed to
land in question allowing the respondents to successfully register the land in their comply with the required period of possession of the subject lots for the
name. It was also established that respondents did not state the true adjoining juridical confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete file.
owners of the North, East and West of the land in question. On the North side it is no Respondents application filed with the MTC did not state the
longer Diego Francisco who is the owner of the lot but it is the petitioner by virtue of statutory basis for their title to the subject lots. They only alleged therein
transfer of the homestead patent of their father to them as his heirs. On the East, it is that they obtained title to the subject lots by purchase from their parents.
no longer Jose Cruz who owns the land but it was already by a different person after Respondent Jeremias in his testimony claimed that his parents had been
his death. On the West, it is no longer Eugenio Francisco who is the owner but it is in possession of the lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. Yet,
Paula Francisco, petitioners sister who is in actual possession of the land. according to DENR-CENRO Certification, the subject lots are within
alienable and disposable. The subject lots are thus clearly part of the
public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of June 25,
1963. Under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, any period of possession
The court find that the respondents have the motive of concealing their application for prior to the date when the subject lots were classified as alienable and
registration from the real owners of these said lands by not sending them the actual disposable is inconsequential and should be executed from the
notice of their application for registration to prevent them from filing their opposition. computation of the period of possession, such possession can never
The court cited the failure of the surveyors of the respondent to comply with the ripen into ownership and unless they had been classified as alienable
requirement of finding out the actual occupants and boundary owners of the said and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
land. The court held that the registration of land cannot serve as a protecting mantle thereto. Hence, respondents application for registration of the
to cover and shelter bad faith. Thus it reverses the decision of the CA and affirmed subject lots mush have complied with the substantial requirements under
the decision of the lower court without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements
complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title under the Property Registration Decree. Wherefore, the petition is
in favor of petitioner. granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
ISSUE:
78. REPUBLIC v. CA and BERNABE
WON THE LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD LEGALLY BE TH
G.R. No. L-40402 March 16, 1987; Paras, J.: E SUBJECT OF AJUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SEC. 48
(b) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 141 AS AMENDEDBY R.A. 1942.
FACTS:
HELD:
Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision
rendered before the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as
Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated from theforest amended, applies exclusively topublic lands. Forest lands or areas covered
zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an Agricultural with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of forest lands, howeverlong
Land for disposition underthe Public Land Act.On April 26, 1967, cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the
Respondents filed in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case exclusive jurisdiction of theBureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the TorrensSystem.Thus, real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It is the evidence of
even if the reopening of the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by which means he can
respondents havenot qualified for a grant under Section 48 (b) of CA 141. maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and
They can only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos. and 20days of possession and enjoyment of the property. Rodriguez should have registered the land before
occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots August 16, 1976.
involved had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the BOF
as an agricultural land for disposition under thePublic Land Act. As such, 80.
respondents and their predecessors in interest could not have possessed the
lots forthe required period of 30 years as disposable agricultural land. LABURADA vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
79. 507 SCRA 283 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Spanish Titles [G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998]
Inadmissible as Evidence
FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which wasapproved by the
In 1994, Victoria Rodriguez inherited a parcel of land from his father. She leased trial court. Upon motion of petitioners, the trial courtissued an order requiring
the land to Pedro Santiago and Armando Mateo for a period of 50 years. Subic the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) also claimed ownership of the same parcel refused. Hence, petitioners filed an actionfor mandamus. The LRA revealed that
of land. SBMA alleged that they only let the Santiagos into the land as part of the based on records, Lot 3-A which sought to beregistered by Sps. Laburada is part
employment benefits given to Santiagos wife, as she was formerly employed by of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595has already been issued. Upon the other
SBMA. But when her employment ended in 1998, SBMA is now ousting them. hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 iscovered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
Rodriguez et al filed a petition against SBMA. Rodriguez presented a Spanish issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as a
title of land to show proof of her ownership. RTC dismissed the petition for lack transfer from TCTNo. 6595. The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding
of cause of action. The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No. 892, decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the
which required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy
their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land andpurpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the
Registration Act, within six months from effectivity of the decree, or until 16 same.
August 1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as
ISSUE:
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens
System. Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue adecree of
registration if it has evidence that the subject land may alreadybe included in
an existing Torrens certificate of title?
ISSUE: Whether or not Spanish Titles are admissible as evidence of ownership.
HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction toorder the
HELD: No. Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, cannot be considered a registration of land already decreed in the name of another inan earlier land
right in esse. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable registration case. A second decree for the same landwould be null and
evidence of land ownership. And, without legal or equitable title to the subject void, since the principle behind original registration is toregister a parcel of
property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo, and Pedro R. Santiago land only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land whichpetitioners are seeking to
lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the same. Title to register has already been registered in 1904and 1905, the issuance of a decree
of registration to petitioners will runcounter to said principle. The issuance of a
decree of registration is partof the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act whichmay be compelled through mandamus. It is not legally
proper to requirethe LRA to issue a decree
of registration.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case isRE
MANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA, on the otherhand, is
ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining withfinality
whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No.6595,
within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, theland
registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue
thedecree of registration, according to the facts and the law as hereindiscussed.