Rule 120: Judgement Memaid

Case Facts Issue Ruling

SECTION 1. Rosario Tan filed a case for recovery of ownership of a parcel
Judgment; of land against respondents Ramirez, et. al. Rosario alleges
Definition and Form. that her great-grandfather, Catalino, acquired said property
under a Tax Declaration in 1915. The respondents trace their
1. Tan v. Ramirez, ownership of said land through a compromise agreement and
G.R. No. deed of absolute sale from Gavino who has been cultivating
158929. August the said property. Gavino is the husband of one of the
3, 2010 daughters of Catalino.
MCTC RULING :the subject property was the conjugal
property of Gavino and Gliceria; Glicerias death in 1952
dissolved the conjugal partnership and entitled Gavino to a
one-half portion as his conjugal share, while Glicerias one-
half share should be equally divided among Gavino and
Glicerias brothers and sisters or their children. It held that
Roberto was entitled to only 3/4, as this was Gavinos entire
share, while the petitioner was entitled to 1/4 of the subject
property.
RTC (affirmed mctc)rendered a 2 page decision declaring
plaintiff and respondents to be co- owners of said land, 1/4 to
pet and 3/4 to resp. RTC however did not substantiate its
legal and factual bases of its decision
CA set aside MCTC and RTC ruling and declared Roberto to
be the sole owner of the disputed land. It found that
Compromise Agreement executed by Belacho gave Robertos
possession of the subject property the characters of
possession in good faith and with just title.
WON CA erred in its decision 1. YES.
Compromise agreement not a valid basis of possession in good faith and just
WON RTC rendered the title. In the present case, to avoid any conflict with Belacho, Roberto and
correct judgment in relation Nicomedesa paid P1,800.00 in consideration of Belachos desistance from
to sec 1 rule 120 further pursuing her claim over two (2) parcels of land, including the subject
property. Thus, no right can arise from the compromise agreement because
the parties executed the same only to buy peace and to write finis to the
controversy; it did not create or transmit ownership rights over the subject
property. In executing the compromise agreement, the parties, in effect,
merely reverted to their situation before Civil Case No. B-565 was filed.
Contract of sale cannot support claim of good faith and just title. .
In the present case, no dispute exists that Roberto, without Nicomedesas
knowledge or participation, bought the subject property on September 16,
1977 or during the pendency of Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto, therefore,
had actual knowledge that Belachos claim to ownership of the subject
property, as Gavinos purported heir, was disputed because he (Roberto) and
Nicomedesa were the defendants in Civil Case No. B-565. Roberto even
admitted that he bought the subject property from Belacho to avoid any
trouble.[35] He, thus, cannot claim that he acted in good faith under the belief
that there was no defect or dispute in the title of the vendor, Belacho.
Not being a possessor in good faith and with just title, the ten-year period
required for ordinary acquisitive prescription cannot apply in Robertos favor.
Even the thirty-year period under extraordinary acquisitive prescription has
not been met because of the respondents claim to have been in possession,
in the concept of owner, of the subject property for only twenty-four years,
from the time the subject property was tax declared in 1974 to the time of the
filing of the complaint in 1998.

2. YES

RTC Decision did not conform to the requirements of the Constitution

and of the Rules of Court
The RTC decision did not distinctly and clearly set forth, nor
substantiate, the factual and legal bases for its affirmance of the MCTC
decision. It contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor
reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions. Judges must
inform the parties to a case of the legal basis for their decision so that
if a party appeals, it can point out to the appellate court the points of
law to which it disagrees. Judge Apostol should have known the
exacting standard imposed on courts by the Constitution and should
not have sacrificed the constitutional standard for brevitys sake. Had
he thoroughly read the body of the MCTC decision, he would have
clearly noted that the proportion of 1:3, stated in the penultimate
paragraph of the decision, meant that the petitioner was entitled to one-
fourth, while the respondents were entitled to three-fourths, of the
subject property.
SECTION 2. There is no solid statement of facts.
Contents of the
Judgment This is from the State Witness chain of circumstances
1. Bacolod v.
People, G.R. N Ruben Gonzales heard the loud voices of the petitioner and
206236. July 15, his sister coming from the Cogtas house that the Bacolod
2013 family had been renting, with the petitioner demanding
money from his sister Daisy Mae Bacolod but the latter not
acceding to the demand; he was then only about 15 arms
lengths away from the Cogtas house. Not soon after,
Gonzales heard a commotion inside the Cogtas house, and
then immediately saw Daisy Mae and three other persons
running out of the house asking for help. Gonzales himself
going towards the house to see what was happening, saw
the petitioner in the kitchen waving a flaming blanket that he
had lit from the burner stove. The petitioner then came out of
the house, daring anyone to arrest him. Gonzales turned off
the burner stove in the kitchen, even as he saw the ceiling of
the kitchen already in flames; and the fire immediately spread
to the other parts of the house, and which eventually burned
down the house completely. Gonzales account about the
commotion inside the house was corroborated by Alexander
Cernal, a barangay tanod who happened to be on board his
tricycle at the same subdivision where the Cogtas house was
located.
RTC: Guilty but did not include the imposed penalty upon the
accused and the civil liability or damages caused.
CA: affirmed the RTC in full, hence the court also failed to
include the imposed penalty and the civil liability
WON CA erred in giving
credence to the prosecutions
circumstantial evidence in lieu
of direct evidence available.
NO.
The lack or absence of direct evidence does not necessarily mean that the
guilt of the accused cannot be proved by evidence other than direct
evidence. Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, because circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can
supplant the absence of direct evidence. The crime charged may also be
proved by circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or
presumptive evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as that
which goes to prove a fact or series of facts other than the facts in
issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in
issue.
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which requires for circumstantial
evidence to warrant the conviction of an accused that;
1. there are more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the circumstances arose are duly established
in court; and,
3. the circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to the
fair conclusion of the culpability of the accused for the crime for
which he is convicted
Ostensibly, the court rules make no distinction between direct evidence of a
fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may
be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct, for in either case, the trier of fact must
be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
RELATED TO SECTION 2 RULE 120
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their
express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court to have
the judgment, if it was of conviction, state:
1. the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission:
2. the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact;
3. the penalty imposed upon the accused;
4. the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived. Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the
Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the
Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on December 9, 2011
by the Court of Appeals, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that:
1. the indeterminate sentence for GILFREDO BACOLOD a.k.a.
GILARDO BACOLOD is corrected from 10 years of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 16 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum;
2. GILFREDO BACOLOD a.k.a. GILARDO BACOLOD is ORDERED
to pay the amount of P500,000.00 as temperate damages to
SPOUSES CEFERINO AND GEMMA COGTAS, plus interest of
6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision, plus the
costs of suit.
 2. Garces v. Respondent was acquitted of murder by the RTC.
Hernandez, Jr., G.R. No.
180761. August Physical evidence: primarily a gun, empty bullet shells
9, 2010 recovered near the body of Rustico. The gun recovered was
never established to have belonged to any of the private
respondents.
Testimonial evidence: We find no reason to disagree with the
finding of public respondent giving no credence to the
testimonies of witnesses testified that they saw accused at
11.am. traversing the barangay road while carrying the dead
body of Rustico with Simplicio, Sr. and Rosita walking with
them. Indeed, as observed by public respondent, if such fact
actually happened, there should have been many witnesses
who could have testified to this event. Besides, settled is the
rule that to be credible, testimonial evidence should not only
come from the mouth of a credible witness but should also be
credible. In this case, the said testimonies are inconsistent
with human nature. It is unbelievable that private respondents
would kill Rustico and then expose themselves to prosecution
by parading the evidence of their crime in public and in broad
daylight.
Pertinent portions of the judgment of acquittal:
In the case at bar, there is clearly no moral certainty that
can be arrived at by the Court in convicting the accused.
Physical and testimonial evidence presented by the
Prosecution have failed to elicit in the mind of the Court the
conclusion that the herein accused should and must be held
criminally liable for the heinous death of Rustico Garces. As a
matter of fact, the physical evidence in his case instead of
strengthening only weakened its case.
...These actuations of the accused eloquently speak of their
innocence in the face of unreliable evidence presented by
the Prosecution.
After the promulgation of judgment, Atty. Florentino H.
Garces entered his appearance as counsel for the father of
the victim, Roman Garces (petitioner), and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the trial court's decision respecting
respondent's civil liability.
RTC dismissed the motion on the ground that Counsel
appears to have no legal personality to file the motion. The
records do not show that he was Counsel of record for the
Private Prosecution and neither was the motion signed by the
[Provincial] Prosecutor. That rhe matter should be properly
prosecuted in an appropriate separate civil action and not in
the same criminal case which gave rise to such right.
Petitioner appealed. CA denied. Ratio : In the present case,
there is no dispute that the judgment of the trial court
acquitting private respondents is already final. What
petitioner is assailing is the failure of public respondent to
rule on the civil liability of private respondents. However,
Whether CA committed grave
and reversible error when it
denied the petition for certiorari
considering that there is more
than a preponderance of
evidence on record supporting
the claims of petitioner garces
against the private
respondents to award civil
liability.
presented by the Prosecution have failed to elicit in the mind of the Court
respondents might arise did not exist.
NO. In his Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court, petitioner
admitted that he did not waive the civil action or reserve the right to institute it
separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Petitioners remedy then was, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, to
appeal within the reglementary period the trial courts decision, which was
silent on the civil aspect of the case.
Rule 120, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment.
(b) In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist.
Under the immediately-quoted rule, a trial court, in case of acquittal of an
accused, is to state whether the prosecution absolutely failed to prove his
guilt or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and in either
case, it shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. From the earlier-quoted portion of the decision of
the trial court, however, particularly the following portions:
In the case at bar, there is clearly no moral certainty that can be arrived
at by the Court in convicting the accused. Physical and testimonial evidence
the conclusion that the herein accused should and must be held
criminally liable for the heinous death of Rustico Garces. As a matter of
fact, the physical evidence in his case instead of strengthening only
weakened its case.
x x x These actuations of the accused eloquently speak of their innocence
in the face of unreliable evidence presented by the Prosecution.
The Court finds that the acts or omissions from which the civil liability of
 while an appeal appears to have been open and available,
petitioner, without any justifiable reason, did not resort to this
remedy. This is a fatal procedural lapse.
SECTION 3. Lindo was charged with rape committed against an 11-year
Judgment for old neighbor (AAA).
Two or More Offenses)
by then and there carrying said [AAA], a minor, 11 years old,
1. People v. Lindo, and bringing her to a vacant lot, trying to insert his penis into
G.R. No. her vagina but said accused was not able to do so, thereafter
189818. August inserting his penis into her anus..
9, 2010
AAA attended a pabasa at a neighbor's place, during which
she fell asleep under a platform that served as a stage. While
AAA was sleeping, Lindo took her away to a place near a
creek where clothes are placed to dry. It was there that AAA
woke up, as Lindo removed her short pants and underwear,
and also undressed himself. He tried inserting his penis
into her vagina (STRIKE 1), whereupon his penis made
contact with her sex organ but there was no complete
penetration. Not achieving full penile penetration, he then
made her bend over, and inserted his penis into her anus
(STRIKE 2), causing her to cry out in pain. Lindo then sensed
the arrival of a friend of AAA, so he discontinued his act, and
told AAA to put on her clothes and go home.
Accused defense : alibi. That during the crime happened he
was working as a painter from 8:00pm-5:0am.
RTC found Lindo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Statutory Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Lindo appealed to the CA assailing AAAs credibility. CA
affirmed RT conviction.
Whether or not the lower court
erred in convicting the accused
only of one count of rape.
(N.B. not the one indicated in
the case but what is pertinent
to the Rule).
YES.Both the RTC and the CA, however, erred in finding only one count of
rape in the present case. It is settled that in a criminal case, an appeal throws
the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate
court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from,
whether they are made the subject of the assignment of errors or not.From
the information filed, it is clear that accused-appellant was charged with two
offenses, rape under par. 1 and 2. Accused-appellant was charged with
having carnal knowledge of AAA, who was under twelve years of age at the
time, under par. 1(d) of Art. 266-A, and he was also charged with committing
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person under the second paragraph of Art. 266-A. Two instances of
rape were indeed proved at the trial.
Two offenses were charged, a violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states, A complaint or
information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a
single punishment for various offenses.
Section 3, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: When
two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the
accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the appellant of
as many as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each
offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each offense.
As accused-appellant failed to file a motion to quash the Information he can
be convicted of two counts of rape.
Other matters:
At the outset, it must be noted that the RTC and the CA made reference to
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime of rape is no longer to be
found under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code, or crimes against
chastity. As per Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the
crime of rape has been reclassified as a crime against persons.The crime of
rape is now defined under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, with the
penalties for rape laid out in Art. 266-B. As the incident happened on April 3,
2001, it is no longer covered by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, but Art.
266-A.
SECTION 4. Ricalde, a 31 year old man, was a distant relative of XXXs
Judgment in mother. XXX, a 10 year old boy, was the textmate of Ricalde.
Case of Variance Between One time, XXX requested his mother to invite Ricalde for
Allegation and Proof dinner. After which, XXXs mother offered Ricalde to sleep in
1. Ricalde v. the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor. By 2AM,
People, G.R. No. XXX felt that something was inserted in his anus and
211002. January discovered it to be Ricalde. XXXs mother, armed with a
21, 2015. knife, told Ricalde to leave.
Provincial Prosecutor of Bian, Laguna charged Ricalde with
rape with sexual assault. (Instrument or object rape; gender-
free rape; homosexual rape)
During trial, the first witness, XXX categorically identified
Ricalde to be the one who inserted something into his anus.
XXX felt that Ricalde inserted his penis into his anus as XXX
was able to touch Ricaldes penis while the perpetrator was
playing with the minors penis. However, XXX also testified
that he was able to push Ricalde away. The second witness
of the prosecution, the medico-legal officer, also stated that
although there was a negative finding of any abrasion or
trauma in the anus of XXX, still, the possibility of penetration
cannot be discounted because of the sphincters flexibility.
Ricalde denied the charge against him. He argued that the
testimonies of XXX were inconsistent (1), that there was no
presence of spermatozoa in the anus (2), and that the
variance doctrine should be applied (3).
RTC convicted him. CA affirmed.
Bernabe Pareja was charged with two counts of rape and
2. People v. Pareja, G.R. one attempted rape. Pareja is the stepfather of a 13 year old
No. 202122. girl, AAA.
January 15, 2014.
In the first incident of rape on December 2003, Pareja
mashed the breasts of AAA and inserted his penis into her
anus while the victim was asleep.
In the second incident of rape on February 2004, Pareja
sucked again the breasts of AAA and then proceeded to
insert his finger into her vagina while caressing the sleeping
victim. In both rape incidents, AAAs mother was away.
In the last incident which was of attempted rape, Pareja
WON the variance doctrine NO. SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
shall apply. proof.When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or
of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
In People v. Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654
was charged with qualified rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of
acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b)
of Republic Act No. 761091 since "there was no penetration, or even an
attempt to insert [the accuseds] penis into [the victims] vagina.
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and
what was proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victims dignity. The degree
of penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity.
However, the SC modified the penalties imposed upon Ricalde in
accordance to the Child Abuse Law or RA 7610.
The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) "for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period." This penalty is higher than the
imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was
established by his birth certificate, and this was admitted by the defense. His
age of 10 years old was alleged in the Information. The higher penalty under
Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v. Chingh, applies in this
case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law
(Republic Act No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to
provide greater protection for children. Rape is rape. Rape of a child is
clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.
SC affirmed CA and convicted Ricalde with rape with sexual assault.
WON the variance doctrine YES. As to the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness, the variance doctrine
shall apply. shall apply.
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003,
inserted his penis into her anus. While she may not have been certain about
the details of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had
anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the
occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this
account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003
incident is rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found
guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial.
This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between
 crawled towards AAA while she was asleep and attempted to
lift her skirt when were it not for the shocking discovery of
AAAs mother who just arrived, the victim would have been
raped again.
The Information for two counts of rape and one attempted
rape was filed:
December 2003: Rape through carnal knowledge.
February 2004: Rape with sexual assault.
the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the
second, and viceversa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual
assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge,
would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Results of the medico-legal examination confirmed that AAA
was indeed raped. Pareja argued that the house they were
living in were too congested and surrounded by other houses
so the possibility of rape is untenable and that the victim was
just blaming him to be the reason for the separation of AAAs
parents.
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.

RTC convicted Pareja with acts of lasciviousness (February Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of
2004) and rape (December 2003) but acquitted him from lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
attempted rape for failure of prosecution to present AAAs circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by
mother as witness. CA affirmed. prisin correccional.

For Clarificatory Purposes:
Q: Why did RTC convicted Pareja with acts of lasciviousness
when in the Information he was charged with rape with
sexual assault (February 2004)?
A: RTC did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond
reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its
charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against
Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 041556CFM, or the February
2004 incident, the RTC considered AAAs confusion as to
whether or not she was actually penetrated by Pareja,
and eventually resolved the matter in Parejas favor. Thus,
because of the material omissions and inconsistencies,
Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004
incident. Nonetheless, Parejas acts of placing himself on top
of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts
of lasciviousness, which is included in the crime of rape.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.
Clearly, the abovementioned elements are present in the December 2003
incident, and were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the
crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can
be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his
constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.
SC affirmed CA but held Pareja guilty with two counts of acts of
lasciviousness.

SECTION 5. When Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio was charged with violation of
an Offense Includes or is Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
Included in Another. (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). As the chairperson of A.
1. Asistio v. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Coop
People, G.R. No. entering into a contract with Coca-cola Products in her own
20046 capacity when in truth and in fact the said contract should
5. April 20, 2015 accrue to the coop.
Arraigned: Not Guilty
By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement between the
school and the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the
school principal, directed petitioner to submit her financial
reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead, petitioner
claimed that the principal had no business and authority to
require her to produce financial statements, and that the said
WON the CA erred in reversing
the RTC ruling.
WON the CA erred in
remanding the case back to
the to the RTC ignored the rule
that dismissal of the charge on
demurrer to evidence amounts
to an acquittal and the
dismissal is not appealable.
NO.
Since Asisitio is a committee member and officer she is liable.
SEC 124. Penal Provisions of RA 6938:
A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions of
Section 47 shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than five (5)
years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the courts discretion.
The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may
correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would
render the statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or
impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent
on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated.
To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute and
give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give a statute
a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid
 reports had been posted on the school bulletin board. The
principal then created an audit committee to look on the said
issue and it was proven that such transaction really exist.
Despite requests for her to return to the coop the amounts
she had allegedly misappropriated petitioner failed and
refused to do so. Thus the Coop issued a Board Resolution
authorizing the filing of criminal charges against petitioner.
Asistio moved to dismiss case by way of demurrer to
evidence with prior leave of court, on the ground the RTC
Manila has no jurisdiction, as the crime(Violation of RA 6938)
charged does not carry with it sanction for which she can be
held liable(because violation of [Sec.] 46 of R.A. 6938 would
be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6)
months nor more than one (1) year ).
RTC: Dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The coop/teachers filed an MR denied by the RTC. Grounds:
a. Nowhere in said in R.A. 6938 does it provide for
penal sanctions/liability for violation of acts or
omission prescribed therein. If ever, the liability is
only for damages and for double the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the
cooperative(this section of the law was said to be a
clerical error)
b. before this case was filed in Court,
conciliation/mediation process for the amicable
settlement of the dispute was not availed of by the
private complainants
c. No prior availment and exhaustion of administrative
remedies
CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and
remanded the case records to the RTC for further
proceedings.
Hence this petition.
SECTION 6. Sps. Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa. On
Promulgation of March 30, 2011, the date scheduled for promulgation of
Judgment. judgment, their counsel moved to defer the promulgation on
1. Salvador v. the ground that Horacio Salvador was suffering from
Chua, G.R. No. hypertension. Unconvinced, the RTC proceeded with the
212865. July promulgation and found the Sps. Salvador guilty of estafa.
15, 2015
Horacio filed a Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal on
April 13, 2011, and attached a medical certificate supposedly
issued by a Dr. Paulo David, which certified that Horacio
submitted himself to a medical consultation on March 30 and
was found to be suffering from hypertension.
The RTC initially denied the Motion for Leave to file Notice of
Appeal on the ground of non-compliance with Sec. 6, Rule
Whether Salvador lost his right
to appeal his conviction
injustice or absurdity.
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in
Section 124(3) of RA 6938 on the liability of directors, officers and committee
members, has been recognized and duly corrected when the legislature
enacted RA 9520, entitled An Act Amending the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008.
NO.
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right
against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that
the dismissal having been granted upon petitioners instance, double
jeopardy did not attach.
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and
dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the
case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioners guilt or
innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being
the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as
an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
RELATED TO RULE 120 SECTION 5
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of
the crimes of falsification of private document under Article 172(2) of the
RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the
Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said
to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third
requisite for double jeopardy to attach a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements
different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as
what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the
latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special law
enacting it.
It is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as
many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one
incident
YES.
As the rule expressly indicates, the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction may be done in absentia. The accused in such case is allowed a
period of 15 days from notice of the judgment to him or his counsel within
which to appeal; otherwise, the decision becomes final.
The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction loses the remedies available under the Rules of Court against the
judgment, specifically:
(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or for reconsideration (Rule
121), and
(b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122)
However, the Rules of Court permits him to regain his standing in court in
 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Salvador moved for reconsideration. The RTC granted on
October 26, 2011..
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration against
the Oct. 26 order, attaching an affidavit executed by Dr.
Paolo David, which affirmed that he had not examined
Salvador and that he never issued a medical certificate in
Salvadors favor. In fact, his name was misspelled in the
medical certificate.
The petitioner opposed, and submitted another medical
certificate issued by Dr. Santos-Enriquez, an OB-
Gynecologist.
Thereafter, a special civil action for certiorari was filed in the
CA by Chua to nullify the Oct. 26 order (which gave due
course to Salvadors notice of appeal).
The CA granted the petition and nullified the Oct. 26 order.
2. Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan Jaylo, Valenzona. Habalo, and Castro were police officers
(First), G.R. Nos. 183152- placed on special detail with the NBI. In June 1990, the US
54. January 21, 2015 DEA approached the NBI with information on a sale of a
considerable amount of heroin in the Philippines. Jaylo was
assigned to head the team that would conduct a buy-bust
operation, with the aid of US DEA undercover agent
Needham. Needham posed as a member of an international
drug syndicate and conducted negotiations for the purchase
of 10 kilograms of heroin from Arrastia, Calanog, and de
Guzman. The exchange was to be conducted in the evening
at the parking lot of Magallanes Commercial Center.
Needham arrived in a taxi with Arrastia and Manila, who was
an undercover NBI agent posing as Needhams bodyguard.
remedies from the judgment of conviction.
David. Yet this did not establish a justifiable cause, as Dr. Paolo David,
Whether Section 6 takes away
the right to file a motion for
reconsideration
reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the
order to avail himself of these remedies within 15 days from the date of
promulgation of the judgment conditioned upon:
(a) his surrender; and
(b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail himself of the
remedies, stating therein the reason for his absence
Should the trial court find that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he
should be allowed to avail himself of the remedies within 15 days from notice
of the order finding his absence justified and allowing him the available
Based on the records, the promulgation of the judgment was on March 30,
2011; hence, the petitioner had only until April 14, 2011 within which to meet
the mandatory requirements under Section 6.
In the attempt to regain his right to avail himself of the remedies under the
Rules of Court, the petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File a Notice of
Appeal, and attached the medical certificate issued by Dr. Paulo Miguel
directly impugned the credibility of this certificate. The petitioner later
submitted another medicate certificate, which, aside from being belatedly
issued, went unsupported and unauthenticated by the testimony of the
alleged issuing physician, who turned out to be an OB-Gynecologist. The CA
justly discredited the certificates.
Even assuming that he suffered hypertension, which could have validly
excused his absence, the petitioner did not fulfill the other requirement
of Section 6: to surrender himself to the trial court. The term surrender
used in the rule visibly necessitated his physical and voluntary submission to
the jurisdiction of the court to suffer any consequences of the verdict against
him.
In its assailed decision, therefore, the CA unavoidably declared the petitioner
to have lost his standing in court because of his non-compliance with Section
6. His failure to fulfill the requirements rendered the conviction final and
immutable.
He ought to be reminded that the right to appeal, being neither a natural
right nor a part of due process, is a merely statutory privilege that should
be exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law
establishing the right; otherwise, it is lost.
NO.
Jaylo et. al. argue that their right to file a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal has a statutory origin, as provided under Section 7 of P.D. 1606,
to wit:
Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions.
Xxx A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may
be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the
final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be
decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.
Their argument lacks merit. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for
The taxi was driven by Noriega, another undercover NBI
operative. He was met by Calanog, Manguera, who alighted
from a blue Volkswagen Beetle, and de Guzman, who
alighted from a brown Saab..
Needham approached the blue Beetle and examined the
heroin. After confirmation, he walked back towards the taxi
while executing the prearranged signal of taking out his
handkerchief and blowing his nose.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION:
Jaylo et. al. rushed in with at least 15 other operatives and
surrounded de Guzman, Calanog and Manguera. When the
car with Needham was safely on its way, Jaylo et. al. shot de
Guzman, Calanog and Manguera. They waited for the victims
to bleed out before loading them into the vehicles under the
ruse of bringing them to a hospital.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE:
While Jaylo et. al. were in the process of arresting de
Guzman, Calanog and Manguera, they were distracted by a
speeding car and a burst of gunfire. This allowed de Guzman
et. al. to reach for their firearms and attempt to shoot at the
NBI operatives. In retaliation, Jaylo et. al. fired back, and shot
de Guzman et. al. Afterwards, they brought them to a
hospital.
THE ELMA COMMITTEE
President Aquino issued an admin order creating the Elma
Committee to conduct an investigation. The Elma Committee
recommended the prosecution of Jaylo, Calanog, Valenzona
and Habalo for the killing of de Guzman, Calanog and
Manguera.
SANDIGANBAYAN
The Sandiganbayan found Jaylo et. al. guilty of homicide.
Considering the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy
and the attendance of any of the alleged qualifying
circumstances, as well as the failure of the defense to prove
the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful
exercise of a right or office, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the
crime committed was homicide.
During the promulgation of this judgment on April 17, 2007,
none of the accused appeared despite notice. The decision
was promulgated in absentia and judgment was entered.
On April 30, 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
On November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution taking no action on the motion and ordering the
implementation of the warrants of arrest for the convicted
accused.
The court ruled that the 15-day period from the promulgation
of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the accused
filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with
and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for
reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules
of Court.50
It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim
states that [a] petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may
be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order
or judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, we
enunciated that the term may denotes a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. Those granted this opportunity may choose to
exercise it or not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached
thereto.
Petitioners insist that the right to file a motion for reconsideration under
Section 7 of P.D. 1606 is a guarantee, and no amount of Rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court can operate to diminish or modify this substantive
right. Aptly citing Fabian v. Desierto, the Sandiganbayan was correct in
rejecting the argument of petitioners in this wise:
Fabian v. Desierto lays down the test for determining whether a rule
prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges or modifies any substantive right, to wit:
whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly determining remedy and redress for a disregard or
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
Applying the Fabian v. Desierto test, it appears indubitable that Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court clearly applies to the Sandiganbayan.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the
right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is
the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the
scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits
their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in
pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. This provision
protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases
delay arising from the simple expediency of non-appearance of the accused
on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
It is incumbent upon the accused to show justifiable cause for their
absence at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides
the remedy by which the accused who were absent during the promulgation
may reverse the forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the
judgment of conviction. In order to regain their standing in court, the accused
 giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the
promulgation. Under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court, Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost the remedies
available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayans
judgment of conviction, including the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.
SECTION 7. This is the case of a neophyte who died by hazing. The
Modification of accused are students of the Ateneo de Manila School of Law
Judgment. and members of the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity.
1. Villareal v.
People, G.R. The initiation rites are scheduled to last for 3 days. After the
Nos. second day of beatings and physical and psychological
15125 torment, while the neophytes are already resting, 2 alumni,
8 etc., December Dizon and Villareal demanded that the rites be reopened.
1, 2014. Head of initiation, Victorino initiarlly refused but upon
insistence of the two, he reopened it. The neophytes were
again subjected to additional rounds of paddling.
After the last session, Lenny could no longer walk. When
they were sleeping, the neophytes were suddenly roused by
Lennys shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially,
Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though,
that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped
him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his
condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital.
Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.
35 were charged with homicide.
RTC:
26 guilty of homicide
CA:
19 acquitted
4 guilty of slight physical injuries (Tecson, et. al)
2 guilty of homicide (Dizon and Villareal)
SC:
Whether the completion by
Tecson et al. of the terms and
conditions of their probation
discharged them from their
criminal liability, and closed
and terminated the cases
against them
probation.
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a
However, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120
does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have
must do as follows:
1) surrender and
2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the remedies, stating the
reasons for their absence, within 15 days from the date of the
promulgation of judgment.
In Villena v. People, we stated that the term surrender contemplates
the act by the convicted accused of physically and voluntarily
submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court to suffer the
consequences of the judgment against them. Upon surrender, the
accused must request permission of the court to avail of the
remedies by making clear the reasons for their failure to attend the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show that
their reason for being absent at the promulgation of judgment was
justifiable. If the court finds that the reasons proffered justify their non-
appearance during the promulgation of judgment, it shall allow them to
avail of the remedies.60 Thus, unless they surrender and prove their
justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, their absence is
presumed to be unjustified.
NO. Normally, the petition of the People would result into a double jeopardy
for Tecson, et. al. because they have already completed their probation. BUT
SURPRISE: this is one of the exceptions where the state assails the very
jurisdiction of of the court that issues the criminal judgment.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal
judgment once the accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may,
upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final
or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
Only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case,
especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment
therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict
against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.
The government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove
the criminal defendants culpability. Unfairness and prejudice would
necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendants guilt while
process where the governments power and resources are once again
employed against the defendants individual means.
already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not
absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails
 5 guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide (Dizon, Tecson and 3 others)
This is actually a consolidation of 4 cases but for
purposes of CrimPro, only the case of Tecson, et. al. is
relevant.
After the CA decision rendering them guilty of SPI (lowered
from homicide in the RTC decision), they immediately applied
for probation.
In their MOTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION OR
RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE SC, Tecson et al. argue
that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
had already granted their respective Applications for
Probation on 11 October 2002 and, upon their completion of
the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from
probation and declared the criminal case against them
terminated on various dates in April 2003.
Rule 121: New Trial or Reconsideration
Case Facts
SECTION 1. New MOTION to reopen case for reception of further evidence.
Trial or Reconsideration.
1. Tadeja v. During the celebration of the annual fiesta of Barangay
People, G.R. Talabaan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, two witnesses
No. 145336
saw Ruben Bernardo being hacked to death by the brothers
February 20,
Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand (petitioners), and
2013.
petitioners first cousin Plaridelall surnamed Tadeja.
Issue
Whether petitioners motion to
reopen the case can be granted
petitioners motions for reconsideration of this Courts Decision and
the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.
INAPPLICABILITY: Section 7 of Rule 120 is inapplicable and irrelevant
where the courts jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition.
(Petition for Certiorari)
The orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court.
The OSG questions the entire proceedings involving the probation
applications of Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130.
Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance of
the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the
criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered
the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the
Caloocan City RTC. Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they
filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130,
and not with Branch 121.
Second, the records of the case were still with the CA when Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 granted the probation applications. A perusal of the
case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over
the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed
their respective applications while a motion for reconsideration was still
pending before the CA and the records were still with that court.
Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for
Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET
ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto.
Without prejudice to their reapplying for probation.
In short, GABA :P
Ruling
No
Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate
that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts should
attain finality at some definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be
no end to litigation. This is the reason why SC have consistently denied
subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case.
 An Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed
against Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel.
RTC convicted Reynante, Ferdinand, Plaridel, Ricardo and
Ricky guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may
only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with
the consent of the accused (a)t any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final.

Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the other accused
(petitioners herein) appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
DENIED
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. DENIED
In this case, petitioners judgment of conviction already became final and
executory on 26 July 2007the date on which the Decision of this Court
denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA was recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to
the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained.

Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for

Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the CA Decision and Resolution.

This Court issued a Decision dated 21 July 2006 affirming

the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, alleging that the SC

had failed to reconcile the testimonies of witnesses Elena
and Jacinta on the one hand and Regina on the other. On 23
October 2006 SC denied the motion with finality.

In a letter dated 7 August 2007 addressed to then Chief

Justice Reynato S. Puno, Ferdinand prayed for the
reopening of the case on the basis of the confession of
Plaridel.

OSG was not posing any objection to the reopening of the

case.

SC denied petitioners motion to reopen the case for

reception of further evidence in the trial court.

2. Custodio v. MOTION TO REOPEN CASE WITH LEAVE OF COURT
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
96027-28. March 8, 200 Petitioners were members of the military who acted as
Senator Aquinos security detail upon his arrival in Manila
from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were
charged, together with several other members of the military,
before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino
who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the
aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International Airport.
Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando
Galman who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac.
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting all the
accused, which include the petitioners. However, the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by
SC to be a sham trial. The Court thus nullified said
Whether petitioners motion to
reopen the case can be granted
This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on
the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the
evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted.
These standards, also known as the Berry rule, trace their origin to the
1851 case of Berry vs. State of Georgia where the Supreme Court of
Georgia held: Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered
evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the following points
there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz.; that it is
incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has
come to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the
 proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and
ordered a re-trial of the cases.
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.
Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found
the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder
.
The judgment became final after SC denied petitioners
petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure
to show reversible error in the questioned decision, as well
as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners, assisted by the Public Attorneys Office, now
want to present the findings of the forensic group to this
Court and ask the Court to allow the reopening of the cases
and the holding of a third trial to determine the
circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno
Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.
Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of
the physical evidence in the double murder case constitutes
newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a
new trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
Motion to reopen the case was denied.
SECTION 2. A shooting incident occurred on February 26, 1980 in Sitio
Grounds for a Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite
New Trial. team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated
1. Payumo v. National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of
Sandiganbayan, civilians instantly killing Amante Payumo and wounding
G.R. Nos. Edgar Payumo, and others.
151911 &
154537, July 25, SB. Information for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and
2011. Attempted Murder was filed against Domiciano Cabigao, and
other private respondents. During the trial, the accused
interposed the defenses of lawful performance of duty, self-
defense, mistake of fact, and alibi. They insisted that the
incident was a result of a military operation, and not an
ambush as claimed by the prosecution.
After four (4) years of trial, the Sandiganbayan (Second)
convicted the accused as co-principals.
Cabigao filed their Motion for New Trial anchored on the
following grounds: (1) Error of law or irregularities have been
committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantive rights
of the accused; and (2) the accused were denied procedural
due process of law.
Cabigao also appealed to SC (Petition 1). In view of the
appeal, the SB denied accuseds Motion for New Trial on the
ground that it no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
SC. Cabigao filed another petition (Petition 2), claiming that
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a
Whether SB (Special 5) erred in
setting aside the SB (5)
decision.
change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised
want of due diligence that it did not come sooner. 3d. That it is so
material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were
granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative onlyviz.; speaking to facts, in
relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of
the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And
6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to
impeach the character or credit of a witness.
discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due
diligence. The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered.
The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly
discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for
them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence
during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that
the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence
proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of
said evidence.
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented
by the defense during the trial of the double murder case.
Yes. The judgment of conviction penned by Justice Legaspi must be
declared valid. Apparently, it was not necessary that he be a member of the
Fifth Division at the time the decision was promulgated since he remained
an incumbent justice of the Sandiganbayan (BP 129). What is important is
that the ponente in a collegiate court remains a member of said court at the
time his ponencia is promulgated because, at any time before that, he has
the privilege of changing his opinion or making some last minute changes
therein for the consideration and approval of his colleagues.
Granting arguendo that the First Division erred in admitting the testimonies
of the Payumos given during the first trial, which proceedings were nullified
by this Court in Petition 1, the same would still not justify a new trial. It must
be emphasized that an erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the
trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the decision if there
are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected
evidence, if it had been admitted, would not have changed the decision.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching;
and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it.
 the Sandiganbayan committed GAD when it denied the
motion for new trial. The Petition 1 was denied for lack of
merit.
Re Petition 2, SC granted and set aside the Decision of the
SB and ordered the remanding the case for a new trial. SC
clarified that the conduct of a new trial should not be limited
to the mere presentation of newly discovered evidence but
should be full and complete, taking into account the other
serious allegations touching on due process.
SB (Fifth). After new trial, SB (5) convicted the accused of
the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder.
The matter of presentation of evidence for the defense is not for the trial
court to decide. Considering that the defense counsels have control over
the conduct of the defense, the determination of which evidence to present
rests upon them.
The Court notes that the defense presented a substantial number of
witnesses and exhibits during trial de novo to belie the accusation against
the accused and to prove the defenses they interposed. It has been held
that the mistakes of the attorney as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy, materiality or immateriality of a certain evidence, the
proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new
trial.

Unrelenting, Cabigao filed an Omnibus Motion to Set Aside

Judgment and for New Trial contending that errors of law or
irregularities had been committed during and after trial which
were prejudicial to their substantive and constitutional rights.
Later, the accused filed their Supplemental Omnibus Motion
to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial, and thereafter their
Supplemental Omnibus Motion to Re-open Case and to Set
for Oral Arguments.

SB (Special 5): Ordered to set aside SB (5) decision since

Justice Legaspi (ponente) could not have been validly
promulgated and could not have acquired binding effect
since Justice Legaspi had transferred to the Second Division
and, hence, he ceased to be a member of the SB (5) before
the Decision was promulgated. The testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Edgar, which had been tainted with
the irregularity of rigodon de juezes pursuant to the ruling
of the Court in the case Petition 2 were erroneously admitted
during the trial de novo and, as such, had to be stricken out
and taken anew. A second new trial would enable it to allow
the accused to adduce pertinent evidence including the
records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), AFP.

SC: Payumo, et al. filed the present Petition (3).

On 17 August 1985, Elmyra Trading Corporation (Elmyra),
2. Dinglasan, Jr. v. CA, represented by its President, Dinglasan, and Antrom, Inc.
G.R. No. 145420. (Antrom), also represented by its President, Antonio Garcia,
September 19, 2006. Jr., entered into a memorandum of Agreement whereby the
parties agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodation
in favor of Elmyra to finance its prawn business. The latter, in
turn, will issue checks to guarantee the payment of its
obligations. Upon presentment for payment with the drawee
bank, however, the said check was dishonored for
insufficiency of funds.
Information charging Dinglasan with Violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed before the RTC of Makati.
RTC convicted Dinglasan. MR was denied.
CA: Upon appeal, CA dismissed, and affirmed in toto the
decision of RTC.
Whether a new trial or
reopening of the case based on
newly discovered evidence
should be allowed.
No. Section 14. Motion for New Trial.At any time after the appeal from the
lower court has been perfected and before the judgment of the Court of
Appeals convicting the accused becomes final, the latter may move for a
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence material to his
defense. The motion shall conform to the provisions of section 4 Rule 121.
Explicit from the rule that a Motion for New Trial should be filed before the
judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused becomes final.
The requisites for newly discovered evidence under Section 2, Rule 121 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such
weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. These
standards, also known as the Berry Rule, trace their origin to the 1851
case of Berry v. State of Georgiawhere the Supreme Court of Georgia
held: Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence,
 SC: Petition for review was filed, attributing GAD to CA. In its
decision, SC denied the petition for failure to show that a
reversible error had been committed by the CA. MR was
filed, but was also denied.
Undaunted, Dinglasan filed a Second Motion for
Reconsideration but the same was merely noted without
action by this Court in view of the En Banc Resolution dated
7 April 1987 that no motion for leave to file a second motion
for reconsideration of a judgment or a final resolution by the
same party shall be entertained. The decision of SC
became final and executory.
RTC: Issued a warrant for the arrest of Dinglasan and a writ
of execution for the enforcement of his civil liability and, at
the same time, enjoining him from leaving the country.
Dinglasan filed the instant Petition for New Trial and, in the
alternative, for the Reopening of the Case16 based on newly
discovered evidence. He urges this Court to uphold
substantial justice, emphasizing that the newly discovered
evidence he seeks to introduce in this case is so material
and of such weight that, if, admitted would probably change
the judgment, hence, suspension of procedural rules is
warranted.
SECTION 4. Form Simon Flores was charged with Homicide.
of Motion and Notice to the
Prosecutor. He allegedly went into the house of Jesus Avenido, at
1. Flores v. nighttime, gathered with family and friends celebrating the
People, G.R. eve of fiesta, and continuously shot Jesus using an M-16
No. 181354. Rifle.
February 27,
2013. Flores interposed self-defense to avoid criminal liability. He
claimed that he, together with other CAFGU and CSU
members were tasked by the Mayor of Alaminos, Laguna to
conduct a ronda that night in Brgy San Roque. They
observed that Jesus and his guests, while having drinking
spree, were still having shooting practice for the following
day. Flores, being a relative and Brgy Chairman, was the
one who approached and politely requested Jesus to cease
firing their guns and save their shots for next day. However,
this was met with hostility by Jesus and the guests.
Jesus attacked him with his magnum pistol. Twice hit by
bullets and bleeding, Flores, with his life and limb at great
peril, instinctively swung and triggered the baby armalite.
Fearing for more untoward incidents, he withdrew and ran
through to the Mayors house to report the incident.
SANDIGANBAYAN:
Found Flores guilty of the offense charged and rejecting his
claim to prove self-defense. According to the
Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to doubt the
testimonies of the said witnesses who appeared to have no
ill motive to falsely testify against Flores.
are not favored by the Courts.
Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of
authority, viz.; that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court:
1. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial.
2. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come
sooner.
3. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new
trial were granted.
4. That it is not cumulative onlyviz.; speaking to facts, in relation to which
there was evidence on the trial.
5. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its
absence accounted for.
6. A new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to
impeach the character or credit of a witness.
Procedural Issue: Section 4, Rule 121 states: SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the
prosecutor. The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in
Whether Sandiganbayans writing and shall state the grounds on which it is based. X x x. Notice of the
outright denial of the MR on a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.
mere technicality amounts to a
violation of Floress right to due As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of
process. Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with Sec. 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must
be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which the
court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse
party. The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must
specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.
In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a
notice of hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no legal
effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the
Sandiganbayan.
Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review
the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. He avers that the ponente as
well as the other members of the First Division who rendered the assailed
decision, were not able to observe the witnesses or their manner of
testifying as they were not present during the trial. He, thus, argues that
there was palpable misapprehension of the facts that led to wrong
conclusions of law resulting in his unfounded conviction.
His contention is likewise devoid of merit.
It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by
the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had earlier

Flores filed for MR. Prosecution filed Motion to Expunge
(ME). The Sandiganbayan denied the MR for being a mere
scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of hearing,
making its assailed judgment final and executory.
Flores then filed petition for review on certiorari to the SC.
SECTION 6. Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara were convicted of the
Effects of crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and were sentenced to
Granting a New Trial or death by the RTC of Marikina City.
Reconsideration.
1. People v.
Licayan, G.R. The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court. It became
No. 203961. final and executory on and a Writ of Execution was issued on
July 29, 2015 ordering the accused to be executed. Weeks before Licayan
and Lara were scheduled to be executed, two of their co-
accused in the original Information were arrested Pedro
Mabansag and Rogelio Delos Reyes.
The PAO filed with the Supreme Court an Urgent Motion to
Reopen the Case with Leave of Court. The Court issued a
Resolution ordering the temporary suspension of the
execution of Licayan and Lara for a period of 30 calendar
days.
The Supreme Court granted the Urgent Motion to Re-
open the Case with Leave of Court and remanded the
case to the lower court for further reception of evidence.
During their arraignment, Mabansag and Delos Reyes
pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged in the Infromations
under which their co-accused were previously indicted.
Mabansay dies while detained at the Marikina City Jail.
RTC: rendered its decision finding Licayan, Lara, and Delos
Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and
sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua.
1) Whether the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable
fear should be considered in
favor of Delos Reyes. NO
(2) Whether Licayan and Lara
should be acquitted based on
purportedly newly discovered
evidence? NO
presided at the trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion
in the factual findings reached by him.
Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in
divisions of three Justices each, is a collegial body which arrives at its
decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of view and ideas, and the
concurrence of the required majority vote.
In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was
misapprehension or misinterpretation of the material facts nor was the
defense able to adduce evidence to establish that the factual findings were
arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court sustains the
Sandiganbayans conclusion that Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling
his body with bullets even after he was already lying helpless on the
ground.
(Re: Issue on Self-Defense, SC is not a trier of facts but of law. Flores failed
to discharge his burden to prove.)
PETITION DENIED.
1) NO. Accused-appellant Delos Reyes did not refute the
testimony of private complainant Co that he (Delos Reyes) was one of
the abductors. Instead he admitted going to the house of Pedro Mabansag,
Tata Placio and Jojo (two of the co-accused who were not apprehended)
poked a gun at him and threatened him that they would kill him if he reports
the matter to the police. He admitted that he saw 2 persons inside the
house near the kitchen.
After he left the safe house, Delos Reyes admitted that he no longer felt
being threatened but still he did not report what he witnessed to the police
authorities. The Court affirmed the findings of the RTC, adding that the
testimony of DelosReyes was self-serving and could not stand on its
own to prove the elements of the exempting circumstances relied
upon. The Court held that a person invoking the exempting
circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the
commission of a punishable act, and must therefore prove the exempting
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. The Court finds it hard to
believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap victims would be
held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a
mastermind of a kidnapping syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting
cock selling activities in the regular meeting place, would invite a recent
affiliate to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did
not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.
2.) NO. The pro hac vice resolution of the Supreme Court on January 15,
2004 allows the Court an unusual task to revisit its own final and
executor decision. It should be stressed that a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence may only be granted by the court on
motion of the accused or motu proprio with the consent of the
accused at any timebefore a judgment of conviction becomes final.

The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals
CA: Affirmed in toto the lower courts decision on July 4,
2012.
Accused-appellant Delos Reyes reiterates his defense of
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear as to why he
did not report the crime to the police because he was being
threatened by his other co-accused. Moreover, other
accused-appellants Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their
conviction on the basis of newly discovered evidence
presented during their retrial.
Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes cannot be
considered newly discovered in that the affiants are the movants co-
accused who were already identified as such during the trial.
To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly
granted the effects of Rule 121, Section 6 (b) of the Rules of Court. In
general, the new evidence adduced in the second trial consists in
(1) allegations that the identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and
Manaysay was unreliable;
(2) testimonies and affidavits of the recently apprehended Mabansag and
Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that Licayas and Lara were not involved
in the crime; and
(3) testimonies purporting to establish Lara was a t work in Antipolo during
the kidnapping incident.
The second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the opportunity
to present new evidence that were not available during the first trial.
However, the focus of their defense was to show that the identification
made by the victims was unreliable.
The Court held that discrepancies in testimonies concerning minor details
and not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair
their credibility. Instead of weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies
tend to strengthen their credibility, because they discount the probability
of their being rehearsed. The new evidence alluded to by the Supreme
Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new trial was supposed
to be the testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and
Delos Reyes, who both denied that Licayan and Lara participated in
the crime.
The statements of Mabansag and Delos Reyes would have been given
more weight had they personally admitted their own involvement in the
crime.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not
enoughto prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime
was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission.
The new evidence presented by Licayan and Lara not only fialed to prove
that either of them was in another place during their alleged participation in
the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but likewise failed to discredit the
positive identification made by both Co and Manaysay.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
disposition of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina was AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS by the SC.