1 Valdes vs. RTC
132529 February 2 2001
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were
married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration
of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to
choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in
the decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in unions
without marriage. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime
should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property
relations of the parties are governed by the
rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts.
A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered
as having contributed thereto jointly if said
partys efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.
2 carino v carino
G.R. No.
[Article 147 Family Code-Property Regime of
Union Without Marriage; Article 148 - Rules on
Co-ownership regarding polygamous/bigamous
marriages, adulterous or concubinage
relationships; Article 40 - Judicial Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage]
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao in
1969 without marriage license. They had two
children. He then married Susan Yee on
November 10 1992, with whom he had no
children in their almost 10 year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.
He passed away on November 23 1992. The two
Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the
claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Nicdao collected
a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of
P21,000.
Yee filed an instant case for collection of half
the money acquired by Nicdao, collectively
denominated as "death benefits." Yee
admitted that her marriage with the SPO4 took
place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity,
the marriage between Nicdao and the SPO4.
She however claimed that she became aware of
the previous marriage at the funeral of the
deceased.
In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee.
Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yee can claim half the amount
acquired by Nicdao.
RULING:
No. SC held that the marriage between Yee and
Cario falls under the Article 148 of the Family
Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous
or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the
SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the
deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only
entitled to the properties acquired with the
deceased through their actual joint contribution.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong
to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not
owned in common by Yee and the deceased,
but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has
no right whatsoever to claim the same. By
intestate succession, the said death benefits
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs.
And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of
them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage
between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due
to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao
can claim the death benefits by the deceased
even if she did not contribute thereto. Article
147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling Nicdao to share one-half of the
benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in
the first marriage, she can claim one-half of the
disputed death benefits and the other half to
the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate
succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise
null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of
the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under
Article 40, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she
has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the
second marriage would be void. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is
necessary
3 Metrobank v Pascual
CASE DIGEST: Metrobank v. Pascual
FACTS:
Florencia Nevalga and Nicholson Pascual were
married in 1985. During the union, they
acquired a lot with a three door apartment
standing thereon. Their marriage were annulled
in 1994 and they went on their separate ways
without liquidating their properties.
In 1997, Florencia mortgaged the aforesaid
property as a security for the loan she obtained
with spouses Oliveros. Petitioner foreclosed the
mortgage, had the property auctioned and
acquired it as the successful bidder. Nicholson
filed an action to annul the mortgage alleging
that the subject property is still a conjugal
property and it was executed without his
consent
RTC ruled that mortgage is invalid. The said lot
is a conjugal property, the same having been
acquired during the existence of the marriage of
Nicholson and Florencia. (Art 116 NCC)
Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive
conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal,
the RTC concluded that the disputed property
may not be validly encumbered by Florencia
without Nicholsons consent.CA affirmed the
decision
ISSUES:
A. WON the subject property is a conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the Family Code.
B. WON the declaration of nullity of marriage
between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and
Florencia Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the
regime of community of property of the
spouses.
RULING:
A.) The property relations of the former spouses
are governed by the Civil Code Art 106 (Being
contrated prior to effectivity of the Family Code)
which provides that all property of the marriage
is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless
it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. This article does not
require proof that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear. (Note:
The petitioner failed to overcome the
presumption in this case)
B.) While the declared nullity of marriage severe
marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties
acquired before such declaration continues to
subsist as conjugal properties until and after the
liquidation and partition of the partnership. In
this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship
between the former spouses. Thus, applying the
provision to the present case, the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. Accordingly,
the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the
remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is
null and void, Nicholson not having consented
to the mortgage of his undivided half.
(In the trial, it was found that the alleged waiver
presented by Florencia bore Nicholson's forged
signature.)
4 Ravina v. Villa
Meron sa scribd
5 Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Dailo
FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr
were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot
situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida.
The subject property was declared for tax
assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the
exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo,
authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from
petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and
lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA,
Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As
security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the
same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on
the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the
execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo,
took place without the knowledge and consent
of respondent.[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding.
As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of
petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse
of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the
ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of
Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In
one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already
employed a certain Brion to clean its premises
and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire
within the premises.

Claiming that she had no knowledge of the
mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent
instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a Civil
Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages
against petitioner. In the latters Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered
a Decision declaring the said documents null
and void and further ordered the defendant is
ordered to reconvey the property subject of this
complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff
the sum representing the value of the car which
was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and
exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts
Decision, but deleted the award for damages
and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this
petition
ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE
LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS
TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE
FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY
THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME
HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in
part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership property shall belong
to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this
Court declared that the absence of the consent
of one renders the entire sale null and void,
including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the husband who contracted the
sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were
married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between
respondent and her late husband. With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in
the Family Code was made applicable to
conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested
rights have already been acquired under the
Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to
the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino even in a suppletory manner.
The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a
special type of partnership, where the husband
and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate
properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance.
Unlike the absolute community of property
wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a
suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership
shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with
what is expressly determined in the chapter (on
conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses
in their marriage settlements. Thus, the
property relations of respondent and her late
husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of
the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules
on partnership under the Civil Code. In case of
conflict, the former prevails because the Civil
Code provisions on partnership apply only when
the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of
his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which
formed part of their conjugal partnership. By
express provision of Article 124 of the Family
Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes
the disposition or encumbrance in the same
manner that the rule on co-ownership under
Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the
law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the
appellate court are correct in declaring the
nullity of the real estate mortgage on the
subject property for lack of respondents
consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code,
[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . .
(1) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been
benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership
respond for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show
the utmost concern for the solidarity and
well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party
litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino to finance the construction of
housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing
adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot
be held liable for the payment of the principal
obligation.
NOTES:
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case
reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property
was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the
trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of
the loan redounded to the benefit of the family.
Even on appeal, petitioner never claimed that
the family benefited from the proceeds of the
loan. When a party adopts a certain theory in
the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal, for to permit him
to do so would not only be unfair to the other
party but it would also be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice and due process. A
party may change his legal theory on appeal
only when the factual bases thereof would not
require presentation of any further evidence by
the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new
theory.
6 Siochi v. Gozon
Marital Consent, Essential to Sale of Conjugal
Property Even If Separated De Facto (Siochi v.
Gozon Case Digest)
G.R. No. 169900 March 18, 2010
MARIO SIOCHI, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO GOZON,
et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 169977
INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY, INC., Petitioner,
vs. MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, et al.,
Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FIRST ISSUE:
In this case, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines once again had the occasion to
mention that sale of the property forming part
of the conjugal partnership without the consent
of the other spouse is void. This is true even if
the spouses were separated in fact and Alfredo
was the sole administrator of the property at
the time of sale.
The sale is void absent such consent or
authority. The absence of the consent of one of
the spouse renders the entire sale void,
including the portion of the conjugal property
pertaining to the spouse who contracted the
sale. Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the
property, that other spouses written consent to
the sale is still required by law for its validity.
The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and
Mario was without the written consent of Elvira.
Thus, the Agreement is entirely void. As regards
Marios contention that the Agreement is a
continuing offer which may be perfected by
Elviras acceptance before the offer is
withdrawn, the fact that the property was
subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred
and then sold to IDRI clearly indicates that the
offer was already withdrawn.
SECOND ISSUE:
It was ruled by the CA that the one-half
undivided share of Alfredo in the property was
already forfeited in favor of their daughter
based on the ruling of the RTC that the
offending spouse in an action for legal
separation is deprived of his share in the net
profits of the conjugal properties.
The Supreme Court found the ruling of the CA
to be in error.
Under Article 63 of the Family Code, the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership
shall be dissolved and liquidated but the
offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the net profits earned by the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the
provisions of article 43(2).
Article 43 of the Family Code likewise provides
that, the termination of the subsequent
marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall produce the following:
xxx
(2) the absolute community of property or the
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall
be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse
contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the community
property or conjugal partnership property shall
be forfeited in favor of the common children or,
if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse.
Therefore, among the effects of the decree of
legal separation is that the conjugal partnership
is dissolved and liquidated and the offending
spouse would have no right to any share of the
net profits earned by the conjugal partnership.
It is only the share in the net profits which is
forfeited in favor of their daughter. Article
102(4) of the Family Code provides that [f]or
purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Article 43, No. (2)
and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market
value at the time of its dissolution. Clearly,
what is forfeited in favor of their daughter is not
his share in the conjugal partnership property
but merely in the net profits of the conjugal
partnership property.
7 Flores v. Lindo
648 SCRA 772 Civil Law Family Code
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment, and
Disposition of Conjugal Property
Mortgage of Real Property Mutually Exclusive
Remedies
In October 1995, Edna Lindo obtained a loan
amounting to P400k from Arturo Flores. To
secure the loan, Edna executed a deed of real
estate mortgage on a property which is
however part of the conjugal property (it was
both in her name and her husbands name
Enrico Lindo). Only Edna signed the deed. But in
November 1995, Enrico executed a special
power of attorney authorizing Edna to
mortgage the property.
Edna was not able to pay the loan despite
repeated demands from Flores. Flores then filed
an action to foreclose the mortgage.
The trial court (RTC Manila, Branch 33) ruled
that the action for foreclosure cannot prosper
because it appears that there was no valid
mortgage between Edna and Flores. Edna
mortgaged the property without the consent of
her husband and the special power of attorney
executed by Enrico a month after the execution
of the deed did not cure the defect. The trial
court however ruled that Flores can instead file
a personal action (collection suit) against Edna.
Eventually, Flores filed a suit for collection of
sum of money against Edna and Enrico (raffled
to RTC Manila, Branch 42). The Lindo spouses
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res
judicata. The trial court denied the motion. The
spouses then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals.
The CA ruled in favor of the spouses. It ruled
that when Flores filed an action for the
foreclosure of the mortgage, he had abandoned
the remedy of filing a personal action to collect
the indebtedness. These remedies are mutually
exclusive.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is
correct.
HELD: No. It is true that as a rule, a
mortgagee-creditor has a single cause of action
against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover
the debt; and that he has the option of either
filing a personal action for collection of sum of
money or instituting a real action to foreclose
on the mortgage security. These remedies are
indeed mutually exclusive. However, in this case,
the Supreme Court made a pro hac vice decision
(applicable only to this case and as an exception
to the rule) which allows Flores to recover via a
personal action despite his prior filing of a real
action to recover the indebtedness. This
procedural rule cannot be outweighed by the
rule on unjust enrichment. Here, Edna admitted
her liability of indebtedness.
Further, the ruling of the Manila RTC Branch 33
is erroneous when it ruled that the mortgage
between Edna and Flores is invalid. It is true
that a disposition (or in this case a mortgage,
which is an act of strict dominion) of a conjugal
property by one spouse without the consent of
the other spouse is VOID. However, under the
second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family
Code:
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority
of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of
the consenting spouse and the third person, and
may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus it is clear, the mortgage was void at the
outset but it was ratified when a month later,
Enrico executed a special power of attorney
authorizing Edna to mortgage the subject
property. (So I guess this is an exception to the
rule that no void act can be ratified.
8 Marcos v. Marcos
FACTS: Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson
Marcos in 1982 and they had five children.
Alleging that the husband failed to provide
material support to the family and have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the
marriage on the ground that Wilson Marcos has
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the
marriage null and void under Article 36 which
was however reversed by the Court of Appeals
ISSUES: 1. Whether personal medical or
psychological examination of the respondent by
a physician is a requirement for a declaration of
psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the totality of evidence
presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
HELD: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for
declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidencepresented.
There is no requirement, however that the
respondent should be examined by a physician
or a psychologist as a conditionsince qua non
for such declaration.Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may
haveresorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
on hispart. There is absolutely no showing that
his defects were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they
areincurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent
can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for aperiod
of more than six years. It was during this period
that he became intermittently drunk, failed to
give material and moral support,and even left
the family home.Thus, his alleged psychological
illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equallyimportant,
there is no evidence showing that his condition
is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully
employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this Court
cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage
for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychologicalincapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability;
and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined inMolina.
9 Dedel v. CA separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various
Art 46 compared with PI circumstances being themselves, depending on
the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia
of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is
not one of those contemplated in law. Until
In 1966, David and Sharon married each other.
further statutory or jurisprudential parameters
Theyve had four children since then. David then
are set or established, SI cannot be appreciated
found out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife
in favor of the dissolution of marriage.
and as a mother because during the marriage
Sharon had extra-marital affairs with various
other guys particularly with one Mustafa
Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with whom she had 2 10 Buenaventura v. CA
children. She even married Ibrahim. David
averred that Sharon is psychologically
incapacitated and David submitted the findings Meron sa scribd
of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan
declared that Sharon was suffering from 11 Yu v. Yu
Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her
blatant display of infidelity; that she committed
several indiscretions and had no capacity for
Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for declaration
remorse, even bringing with her the two
of nullity of marriage and dissolution of the
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
absolute community of property before the
petitioner. Such immaturity and
Pasig Regional Trial Court. The petition contains
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
a prayer for the award of sole custody of his
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of
daughter Bianca, subject to the final resolution
her family are indications of Anti-Social
by the Court of Appeals (CA) on his Petition for
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
incapacity to perform the essential obligations
of marriage.

The CA dismissed the petition for

writ of habeas corpus for becoming moot and
ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.
academic. Caroline Tanchay-Yu, on the other
hand, filed before the RTC Pasay a petition for
habeas corpus, with a prayer for the award of
HELD: PI is not proven in court in this case. The the sole custody to her of Bianca.
evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
which make one be incapable of performing the
Both the Pasig RTC and the
essential marital obligations. Sharons sexual
Pasay RTC asserted their jurisdiction over the
infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it
case.
constitute the other forms of psychoses which if
existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual ISSUE:
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable
pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug Whether or not the question of custody over
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or Bianca should be litigated before the RTC Pasay
homosexuality should occur only during the or before the RTC Pasig
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal
 provide, the custody issue in a declaration of
nullity case is deemed pleaded.
HELD:

Since this immediately-quoted provision directs

Judgment on the issue of custody in the nullity
the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for
of marriage case before the Pasig RTC,
declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the
regardless of which party would prevail, would
custody of common children, by mere motion of
constitute res judicata on the habeas corpus
either party, it could only mean that the filing of
case before the Pasay RTC since the former has
a new action is not necessary for the court to
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
consider the issue of custody of a minor.
matter.

The only explicit exception to the earlier-quoted

There is identity in the causes of action in Pasig
second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code
and Pasay because there is identity in the facts
is when such matters had been adjudicated in
and evidence essential to the resolution of the
previous judicial proceedings, which is not the
identical issue raised in both actions whether
case here.
it would serve the best interest of Bianca to be
in the custody of Eric rather than Caroline or
vice versa.
The elements of litis pendentia having been
established, the more appropriate action
criterion guides this Court in deciding which of
Since the ground invoked in the petition for
the two pending actions to abate.
declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Pasig RTC is Carolines alleged psychological
incapacity to perform her essential marital
The petition filed by Eric for the declaration of
obligations as provided in Article 36 of the
nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the
Family Code, the evidence to support this cause
more appropriate action to determine the issue
of action necessarily involves evidence of
of who between the parties should have
Carolines fitness to take custody of Bianca.
custody over Bianca in view of the express
Thus, the elements of litis pendentia, to wit: a)
provision of the second paragraph of Article 50
identity of parties, or at least such as
of the Family Code. This must be so in line with
representing the same interest in both actions;
the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.
b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and c) the identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment that may be rendered in 12 Navarro v. Navarro (actual case)
the pending case would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other, are present. NARCISO S. NAVARRO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

By Erics filing of the case for declaration of CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO, Respondent.

nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he
automatically submitted the issue of the
custody of Bianca as an incident thereof. After DECISION
the appellate court subsequently dismissed the
habeas corpus case, there was no need for Eric
to replead his prayer for custody for, as
QUISUMBING, J.:
above-quoted provisions of the Family Code
For review is the Decision1 dated January 8,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65677, reversing the Regional Trial Courts
declaration of nullity of the marriage of
petitioner and respondent. Likewise assailed is
the Court of Appeals Resolution dated February
4, 2004 denying reconsideration.
In Civil Case No. 94-70727, filed by petitioner
Narciso Navarro, Jr. with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 37, he sought the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
respondent.
As culled from the records, the facts of the case
are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent were college
sweethearts. At the time they got married, both
in civil and church ceremonies, they were
awaiting their first child. Since petitioner was
still a medical student, while respondent was a
student of pharmacy, they lived with
petitioners parents, on whom they were
financially dependent. Eventually, their union
bore four children.
Petitioner alleged that respondent constantly
complained that he didnt have time for her;
and that she constantly quarreled with him
even before marriage when he could not give
her the things she wanted. He added that she
was not supportive of his career. Even marriage
counseling did not work. Petitioner stated that
when they quarreled, she refused to have sex
with him and even told him to look for other
women. He filed the petition for nullification of
their marriage when he found out their eldest
daughter had been made pregnant by a man
whom respondent hired to follow him.
Abdona T. de Castro, a marriage counselor duly
accredited by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, testified that when
petitioner saw her on April 6, 1994, he was
distraught, harassed, and unhappy. She
concluded from meetings with the petitioner
that the marriage was dysfunctional, destructive,
and reconciliation was out of the question since
he claims he would go insane if he were to go
back to his wife. Relying on the view of another
expert, one Dr. Gerardo Velasco, witness de
Castro opined that professionals are per se
incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage because they spend a
lot of time in the pursuit of their profession and
have very little time to spend with their family.
She concluded that respondent was also
psychologically incapacitated to perform the
marital obligations because she knew, from the
start, that her husband was going to be a doctor,
yet she did not give him the support and
understanding that was expected of a doctors
wife.
Lilia Tayco, the housemaid of petitioners
parents also testified that petitioner and
respondent were always quarreling because
respondent was always jealous of petitioners
classmates.
A psychologist, Dr. Natividad Dayan, who
conducted a psychiatric test on petitioner,
testified that tests showed that petitioner was a
perfectionist, short-tempered, critical,
argumentative and irritable when people do not
meet his expectations. He married Cynthia only
after he got her pregnant. He had depressions
and tended to escapism when beset with
problems. He was vocal about his marital
problems. He believed that the lack of
communication, absence of quality time,
inadequacy in problem-solving, and many
problems caused the failure of the marriage.
For her part, respondent refused to submit to
the psychiatric examination asked by the
petitioner, but said she would do so only when
her defense requires it. She averred that she
had no marital problems, not until petitioner
had an illicit affair with a certain Dr. Lucila
Posadas. Petitioner denied the affair.
Respondent narrated that early 1984, she
caught petitioner and Lucila inside the Harana
Motel in Sta. Mesa where a confrontation
ensued. After the incident, petitioner seldom
went home until he permanently left his family
sometime in 1986. Respondent claimed
petitioner and Lucila continued to see each
other and had gone abroad together several
times. She explained that she uttered she would
not make love with her husband and dared him
to look for other women only out of frustration
and anger upon discovery of the affair. She
admitted hiring someone to spy on petitioner,
but added that she still loved her husband.
Cynthias friend since high school, Miraflor
Respicio testified that Cynthia was a good,
stable, and mature person; that she was a loving
and caring mother who gave up her career to
take care of her children; and that petitioner
and respondent were happy during the early
days of the marriage.
On August 21, 1998, the trial court held that
petitioner and respondent were both
psychologically incapacitated to perform their
marital obligations. The dispositive portion of
the courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the marriage between the parties
is (sic) dated June 2, 1973 is hereby declared
null and void with the following effects:
1. The Plaintiff is hereby directed to support his
children with the Defendant in the amount of
forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) a month,
which sum shall be payable on or before the 5th
day of each month, effective September, 1998;
2. The parties are hereby disqualified from
inheriting from each other by way of testate or
intestate succession;
3. Either of the parties may revoke the
designation of the other as beneficiary in a life
insurance policy;
4. The parties children are hereby declared
legitimate, and the custody of the parties minor
children is hereby awarded to the Defendant
with the Plaintiff exercising his right to visit
them at least once a week;
5. The properties in the name of the parties
consisting of a house and lot located at 15
Bronze Street, Filinvest, Quezon City are hereby
deemed as their advance legitime to their
children.
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals. She averred that the trial court erred
when it annulled their marriage instead of
decreeing their legal separation, with the ruling
that petitioner was the guilty spouse.
In a Decision dated January 8, 2003, the Court
of Appeals held that the constant arguments,
bickerings and conflicts between the spouses
did not constitute psychological incapacity. It
ruled that petitioner failed to show that any
psychological incapacity in either of the two
parties existed at the time of the celebration of
marriage. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court and declared that the
marriage still subsists.
Petitioner now comes before us raising the
following as issues:
(1) Are the decision and resolution of the
Honorable Court of Appeals proper subject for
review by the Honorable Court under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure?
(2) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of
Appeals that the lower court (RTC) erred in
finding the parties (petitioner and respondent)
both psychologically incapacitated under Article
36 of The Family Code correct or not?

(3) Is the conclusion of the Honorable Court of
Appeals that the evidence failed to show that
the parties (petitioner and respondent) were
completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of marriage correct or not? and
(4) Which is more in accord with existing law
and settled jurisprudence, the decision of the
Court of Appeals or the decision of the trial
court?3
Simply stated, the issue before us is whether
the marriage is void on the ground of the
parties psychological incapacity.
Petitioner contends that the decision of the trial
court was well-founded, based on the evidence
indicating that the marriage was beyond
reconciliation, and allowing the marriage to
subsist would only prolong the spouses agony.
Respondent counters that petitioner failed to
prove psychological incapacity, and that their
psychological incapacities existed as early as the
time of the celebration of their marriage.
We shall now resolve the issue.1a\^/phi1.net
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In addition, as early as 1995, in Santos v. Court
of Appeals,4 we categorically said that
psychological incapacity required by Art. 36
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
These include the obligations to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.5
We likewise have repeatedly reminded that the
intention of the law is to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.6 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,7 the
Court gave the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 which are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity...
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision...
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing
at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable...
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage...
(6) The essential marital obligations must be
those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts...
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition...8
In the present case, the spouses frequent
squabbles and respondents refusal to sleep
with petitioner and be supportive to him do not
constitute psychological incapacity. The records
show that petitioner and respondent were living
in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them four children.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just
a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations,9 it is
essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness10 existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage.
It will be noted that respondent did not undergo
psychological tests. Witness de Castros
diagnosis was based solely on petitioners
avowals and not on personal knowledge of the
spouses relationship. Hence, de Castros
diagnosis is based on hearsay and has no
probative value.11
Further, de Castros statement that
professionals are per se incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage
because their profession allows them little time
for family life is highly debatable.
Lastly, petitioner failed to show that grave and
incurable incapacity, on the part of both
spouses, existed at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Their bickerings and arguments
even before their marriage and respondents
scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show
their immaturity, and immaturity does not
constitute psychological incapacity.12 Thus so
far, both petitioner and respondent have not
shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor, an adverse integral element in their
personality structure that effectively
incapacitates them from accepting and
complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision dated January 8, 2003 and
the Resolution dated February 4, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 65677 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
13 Bier v. Bier
Parang meron din sa scribd
14 Sales v. Sales
meron sa scribd
15 Cabreza v. Cabreza
16 Camacho-Reyes v. Camacho
Nabasa na natin ito dati
17 Bacay v. Bacay
DOCTRINE:
The phrase psychological incapacity is not
meant to comprehend all possible cases of
psychoses.
FACTS:
Noel and Maribel were schoolmates turned
sweethearts. Noel considered Maribel as the
snobbish and hard-to-get type. Maribel was also
snobbish around his family. Noel tried to break
up with Maribel. However, Maribel refused.
Noel and Maribel still continued to see each
other only on a friendly basis. They failed to
keep their meetings friendly as they had several
romantic moments together. Noel took these
episodes of sexual contact casually since
Maribel never demanded anything from him.
After a while, Maribel informed Noel that she
was pregnant. Noel grudgingly agreed to marry
Maribel. Noel and Maribel agreed to live with
Noels family. Maribel remained aloof and did
not go out of her way to endear herself to them.
Maribel refused to contribute to the household
expenses. She also refused to have any sexual
contact with Noel. Despite Maribels claim of
being pregnant, Noel never observed any
symptoms of pregnancy in her and this was
confirmed by Maribels officemates. One day,
Maribel told Noel and his family that she had a
miscarriage. Noel confronted her about her
alleged miscarriage, which escalated into an
intense quarrel. Maribel left Noels house and
did not come back. Noel tried to communicate
with Maribel but he failed. After less than two
years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Despite
summons, Maribel did not participate in the
proceedings.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Noel.
The RTC found that Maribel failed to perform
the essential marital obligations of marriage,
and such failure was due to a personality
disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder
characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity
and incurability as determined by a clinical
psychologist.
On appeal by the OSG, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Maribels
Narcissistic Personality Disorder is not the
psychological incapacity contemplated by law.
Her refusal to perform the essential marital
obligations may be attributed merely to her
stubborn refusal to do so. Also, the
manifestations of the Narcissistic Personality
Disorder had no connection with Maribels
failure to perform her marital obligations. Noel
having failed to prove Maribels alleged
psychological incapacity. Finally, Maribels
misrepresentation that she was pregnant to
induce Noel to marry her was not the fraud
contemplated under Art. 45(3) as it was not
among the instances enumerated under Art. 46.
Noel contends that the CA failed to consider
Maribels refusal to procreate as psychological
incapacity. He argues that making love for
procreation and consummation of the marriage
for the start of family life is different from plain,
simple and casual sex. He points out that
Maribels psychological incapacity was proven
to be permanent and incurable with the root
cause existing before the marriage. The
psychologist testified that persons suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder were
unmotivated to participate in therapy session
and would reject any form of psychological
help rendering their condition long lasting if not
incurable.
The OSG maintains that Maribels refusal to
have sexual intercourse with Noel did not
constitute psychological incapacity under Art.
36 as her traits were merely mild peculiarities in (2) The root cause of the psychological
her character or signs of ill-will and refusal or incapacity must be
neglect to perform her marital obligations.

(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged

ISSUE: in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Art. 36 requires that the incapacity must be
Whether the marriage is null and void under psychological not physical, although its
Art.36. manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical.

HELD:
(3) The incapacity must be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
No. The marriage is valid.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be

medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
RATIO:
Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
The phrase psychological incapacity is not same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
meant to comprehend all possible cases of relevant to the assumption of marriage
psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental obligations.
incapacity that causes a party to be truly non
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to
by the parties to the marriage which, as
bring about the disability of the party to assume
expressed by Art. 68, include their mutual
the essential obligations of marriage. The illness
obligations to live together, observe love,
must be shown as downright incapacity or
respect and fidelity and render help and support.
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
The intendment of the law has been to confine
much less ill will.
it to the most serious of cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
The following are guidelines in resolving
regard to parents and their children.
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Art. 36:

(7) Interpretations given by the National

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling
the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
or decisive, should be given great respect by our
should be resolved in favor of the existence and
courts.
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.

(8) The trial court must order the

prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which
will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.
18 Dino v. Dino

In this case, the totality of evidence presented

by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding
that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.
Noels evidence merely established that Maribel FACTS:
refused to have sexual intercourse with him
Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were
after their marriage, and that she left him after
childhood friends and sweethearts who started
their quarrel when he confronted her about her
living together in 1984, separated in 1994, and
alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root
lived together again in 1996. On January 14,
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity
1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel
and establish the requirements of gravity,
Aguilar of Las Pinas City. On May 30, 2001,
juridical antecedence, and incurability. The
petitioner filed for the Declaration of Nullity of
report of the psychologist, who concluded that
Marriage on the ground of the respondents
Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic
psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleged that
Personality Disorder traceable to her
respondent failed in her marital obligation to
experiences during childhood, did not establish
give love and support to him, abandoned her
how the personality disorder incapacitated
responsibility to the family and that she was
Maribel from validly assuming the essential
unfaithful. Petitioner later learned that
obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same
respondent filed a petition for divorce and was
psychologist even testified that Maribel was
granted by the Superior Court of California and
capable of entering into a marriage except that
that she married a certain Manuel Alcantara.
it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere
Doctor Tayag submitted a report establishing
difficulty is not the incapacity contemplated by
that the respondent was suffering from
law.
Narcissitic Personality Disorder.

The burden falls upon petitioner, not just to

prove that private respondent suffers from a
psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders her truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty,
a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory
marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
ISSUE:
Did the trial court err when it ordered that a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of parties properties under Article
147 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not
apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. It is
clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio
under Articles 40 and 45 and not under Article
36 which is the ground for the nullification of
the petitioner and respondents marriage. Thus,
the decision of the trial court is affirmed but
with modifications.
19 Yu v. Reyes
DOCTRINE:
It is more proper to rule first on the declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of each
partys psychological incapacity to perform their
respective marital obligations. If the Court
eventually finds that the parties respective
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage is
indeed meritorious on the basis of either or
both of the parties psychological incapacity,
then the parties shall proceed to comply with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code before a
final decree of absolute nullity of marriage can
be issued. Pending such ruling on the
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage,
the Court finds no legal ground, at this stage, to
proceed with the reception of evidence in
regard the issues on custody and property
relations, since these are mere incidents of the
nullity of the parties marriage.
FACTS:
Eric Yu filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage against Caroline T. Yu with the RTC
of Pasig. Judge Suarez on May 30, 2006 issued
an order stating that Erics partial offer of
evidence dated April 18, 2006 would be
submitted for resolution after certain exhibits
have been remarked. But the exhibits were only
relative to the issue of the nullity of the
marriage of Eric and Caroline. On September 12,
2006, Caroline moved to submit the case for
resolution, considering that the incidents on
custody, support, and property relations
(incidental issues) were mere consequences of
the declaration of nullity of the parties
marriage.
Eric opposed this motion saying that the
incident on declaration of nullity cannot be
resolved without presentation of evidence for
the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations. Eric added that the incidental issues
and the issue on declaration of nullity can both
proceed and be simultaneously resolved. RTC
ruled in favour of Erics opposition.
Caroline caused the inhibition of Judge Suarez,
so that the case was re-raffled to another
branch presided by Judge Reyes-Carpio. While
the case was being tried by Judge Reyes-Carpio,
Caroline filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
strict observation by the said judge of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriage as codified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
and that the case on the declaration on nullity
be already submitted for resolution ahead of
the incidental issues, and not simultaneously.
Eric opposed this motion.
Judge Reyes-Carpio granted the Omnibus
Motion, saying that the main cause of action is
the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the incidental issues are merely ancillary
incidents thereto. Eric moved for
reconsideration, which was denied by Judge
Reyes-Carpio. Eric then filed for certiorari with
the CA under Rule 65. CA affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.
ISSUES/HELD:
Whether the main issue of nullity of marriage
must be submitted for resolution first before
the reception of evidence on custody, support,
and property relations (incidental issues) NO.
RATIO:
It appears in the records that the Orders in
question, or what are alleged to have been
exercised with grave abuse of discretion, are
interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order is
one which does not finally dispose of the case,
and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards
each other, but obviously indicates that other
things remain to be done by the Court. Eric Yu
to prove that the assailed orders were issued
with grave abuse of discretion and that those
were patently erroneous. Considering that the
requisites that would justify certiorari as an
appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order have not been complied with, the proper
recourse for petitioner should have been an
appeal in due course of the judgment of the
trial court on the merits, incorporating the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders.
It must be noted that Judge Reyes-Carpio did
not disallow the presentation of evidence on
the incidents on custody, support, and property
relations. It is clear in the assailed orders that
the trial court judge merely deferred the
reception of evidence relating to custody,
support, and property relations. And the trial
judges decision was not without basis. Judge
Reyes-Carpio finds support in the Court En Banc
Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Particularly, Secs. 19 and 21 of the
Rule clearly allow the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations after
the trial court renders a decision granting the
petition, or upon entry of judgment granting the
petition:
Section 19. Decision. (1) If the court renders a
decision granting the petition, it shall declare
therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the
court only after compliance with Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code as implemented under
the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and
Distribution of Properties.
Section 21. Liquidation, partition and
distribution, custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive
legitimes. Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon
receipt of the entry of judgment of the
appellate court granting the petition, the Family
Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed
with the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, including
custody, support of common children and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant
to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous
judicial proceedings.
Evidently, Judge Reyes-Carpio did not deny the
reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations but merely deferred it, based
on the existing rules issued by this Court, to a
time when a decision granting the petition is
already at hand and before a final decree is
issued. Conversely, the trial court, or more
particularly the family court, shall proceed with
the liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children, and
delivery of their presumptive legitimes upon
entry of judgment granting the petition. And
following the pertinent provisions of the Court
En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, this
act is undoubtedly consistent with Articles 50
and 51 of the Family Code, contrary to what
petitioner asserts. Particularly, Arts. 50 and 51
of the Family Code state:
Article 50. The final judgment in such cases shall
provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the
presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment
of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties,
by mutual agreement judicially approved, had
already provided for such matters.
Also, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the
deferment of the reception of evidence on
custody, support, and property relations.
Conversely, the trial court may receive evidence
on the subject incidents after a judgment
granting the petition but before the decree of
nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. And
this is what Judge Reyes-Carpio sought to
comply with in issuing the assailed orders. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, Eric Yus
assertion that ruling the main issue without
receiving evidence on the subject incidents
would result in an ambiguous and fragmentary
judgment is certainly speculative and, hence,
contravenes the legal presumption that a trial
judge can fairly weigh and appraise the
evidence submitted by the parties.

Therefore, it cannot be said at all that Judge

Reyes-Carpio acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner, much less in a way that is
patently gross and erroneous, when she issued
the assailed orders deferring the reception of
evidence on custody, support, and property
relations. To reiterate, this decision is left to the
trial courts wisdom and legal soundness.
Consequently, therefore, the CA cannot likewise
be said to have committed grave abuse of
discretion in upholding the Orders of Judge
Reyes-Carpio and in ultimately finding an
absence of grave abuse of discretion on her part

20 Buado v. People