672 So.
2d 16
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
(Cite as: 672 So.2d 16)


Supreme Court of Florida.
The Honorable Joe A. WILD, As Acting Circuit
Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Petitioner,
v.
Robert Lee DOZIER, Respondent.
No. 85050.
Feb. 8, 1996.
Rehearing Denied April 11, 1996.
Defendant in felony case being tried in circuit court
petitioned for writ of prohibition claiming that county
court judge assigned to his trial lacked authority to
preside over his trial. The District Court of Appeal,
659 So.2d 1103, granted writ, quashed circuit judge's
order denying disqualification and administrative
order appointing county court judge for six-month
period, and certified question for review. The Su-
preme Court held that: (1) Supreme Court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review judicial assignments; (2)
county court judge was properly assigned succes-
sively and repeatedly in six-month assignments over
several years to preside in circuit court over half of
all felony cases in county; but (3) another county
judge was improperly assigned to hear cases.
Certified question answered, decision below quashed,
and petition for prohibition denied.
Kogan, J., filed opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, in which Shaw and Anstead, JJ., con-
curred.
West Headnotes
[1] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
County court judge may be assigned successively and
repeatedly in six-month assignments over several
years to preside in circuit court over half of all felony
cases in county. West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 1
2.050(b)(4).
[2] Courts 106 472.2
106 Courts
106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction
106VII(A) Courts of Same State
106VII(A)1 In General
106k472 Exclusive or Concurrent Ju-
risdiction
106k472.2 k. Appellate or Supreme
Courts. Most Cited Cases
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review
judicial assignments and litigant who is affected by
judicial assignment made by chief judge of judicial
district must challenge assignment in trial court and
then seek review in Supreme Court either by petition
for writ of prohibition or petition for relief under “all
writs” power. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, §§ 2(a, b),
3(b)(7).
[3] Courts 106 216
106 Courts
106VI Courts of Appellate Jurisdiction
106VI(B) Courts of Particular States
106k216 k. Florida. Most Cited Cases
District Court of Appeal lacked authority to review
administrative order reassigning county court judge
to circuit court duty. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, §
2(a, b).
[4] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
Whether judicial assignment is proper “temporary
assignment” is not merely function of duration of
assignment, but rather successive nature of assign-
ment, type of case covered by assignment, and prac-
tical effect of assignment on circuit court jurisdiction
over particular type of case must also be considered.
West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(4).
 672 So.2d 16
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
(Cite as: 672 So.2d 16)


[5] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
County judge was properly appointed to successive
six-month assignments to preside in circuit court over
half of criminal cases in county, where judge contin-
ued to do all his county judge work and criminal di-
vision was only one of several division in circuit
court. West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(4).
[6] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
County judge was improperly appointed to six-month
assignment to preside in circuit court over half of
criminal cases in county, after another county judge
had been appointed to six-month assignment to pre-
side over other half of criminal cases in county, since
assignments in combination effectively usurped ma-
jor segment of circuit court work within county.
West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(4).
*16 Application for Review of the Decision of the
District Court of Appeal-Certified Great Public Im-
portance Fourth District-Case No. 94-1104 and An
Original Proceeding-Writ of Prohibition.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Joan
Fowler, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief,
West Palm Beach Bureau, and *17 Georgina Jime-
nez-Orosa, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West
Palm Beach, for Petitioner.
Jeffrey H. Garland of Kirschner & Garland, P.A.,
Fort Pierce, for Respondent.
Louis B. Vocelle, Jr. of Clem, Polackwich & Vocelle,
Vero Beach, for Honorable L.B. Vocelle, Chief Judge
of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Amicus Curiae.
PER CURIAM.
[1] We have for review Dozier v. Wild, 659 So.2d
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 2
1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), wherein the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal quashed an administrative order
of the Chief Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit
assigning a county court judge to circuit court duty
and certified the following question to be of great
public importance:
MAY A COUNTY COURT JUDGE BE ASSIGNED
SUCCESSIVELY AND REPEATEDLY IN SIX
MONTH ASSIGNMENTS OVER SEVERAL
YEARS TO PRESIDE IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OVER HALF OF ALL FELONY CASES IN A
COUNTY?
FN1
Id. at 1106. We have jurisdiction and quash the
decision under review.
FN1. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Since July 1990 the Honorable Joe A. Wild, Judge of
the County Court of Indian River County, has been
assigned by the various Chief Judges of the Nine-
teenth Judicial Circuit to serve for six-month periods
as an acting circuit court judge to preside over one
half of all felony cases in Indian River County. Dur-
ing this period, Judge Wild has continued to handle a
county court docket. In January 1994 the Chief Judge
assigned a second county judge to preside over the
other half of felony cases arising within the county.
In April 1994 the respondent, Robert Lee Dozier,
sought to disqualify Judge Wild from presiding over
his felony case, alleging that the judge had become a
“de facto permanent” circuit judge and therefore
lacked jurisdiction to hear his case. Judge Wild de-
nied the motion.
Dozier then filed a petition for writ of prohibition in
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, claiming that as
a county court judge assigned to de facto permanent
duty in the circuit court, Judge Wild lacked authority
to preside over his case. The district court agreed,
granted the writ, and quashed the order denying dis-
qualification along with the administrative order ap-
pointing Judge Wild through 1994. 659 So.2d at
1105-06. In holding the assignment invalid, the dis-
trict court relied on this Court's decisions in Payret v.
Adams, 500 So.2d 136 (Fla.1986), and Crusoe v.
Rowls, 472 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1985), but certified the
above question for our consideration. Judge Wild
seeks review.FN2
 672 So.2d 16
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
(Cite as: 672 So.2d 16)


FN2. The Honorable L.B. Vocelle, Chief
Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
who was not allowed to intervene in the dis-
trict court, has filed an amicus curiae brief in
support of Judge Wild's position.
First, Judge Wild claims that the district court lacked
authority to quash the administrative order assigning
him to circuit court duty. Judge Wild correctly points
out that this Court's decisions in Payret and Crusoe,
wherein judicial assignments were reviewed by the
district court, do not control because the district
court's jurisdiction was not challenged in those cases.
[2] After considering the issue, we conclude that this
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to review judicial
assignments. This authority derives from article V,
sections 2(a) and (b) of the Florida Constitution.
Article V, section 2(a) gives this Court authority to
adopt rules for the administrative supervision of all
courts. Article V, section 2(b) gives the Chief Justice
of this Court, as the chief administrative officer of the
judicial system, power to assign justices or judges to
temporary duty in any court for which the judge is
qualified and to delegate that power to the chief
judges of the judicial circuits.
Delegation of the Chief Justice's assignment power to
the chief judges of the judicial circuits is necessary to
the proper administration of our court system. This is
because, as the administrative officer of all courts
within a judicial circuit,FN3 the chief judge is *18 best
equipped to assess the needs of each trial court and to
allocate the judicial labor available within the circuit
accordingly. With this reality in mind, Florida Rule
of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4) expressly
authorizes the chief judges of the judicial circuits to
“assign any judge to temporary service for which the
judge is qualified in any court in the same circuit.”
We explained in State ex rel. Treadwell v. Hall, 274
So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1973), that the rule FN4 delegating
the power to assign judges
FN3. Art. V, § 2(d), Fla. Const.;
Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.050(b)(2).
FN4. Florida Rule of Judicial Administra-
tion 2.050(b)(4) is substantially the same as
former Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.020(b)(3)(ii), which was approved in State
ex rel. Treadwell v. Hall, 274 So.2d 537,
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 3
539 (Fla.1973).
was designed, in part, to obviate the need for each
incoming chief justice to specifically delegate to the
twenty chief judges of the circuits the authority to
make assignments; it also was designed to obviate the
need for specific delegations when the chief judges
within the circuits were re-elected or changed. Unless
a chief justice indicates otherwise, his desire to con-
tinue delegation via the Rule is assumed.
When a chief judge exercises this delegated assign-
ment authority, the judge is acting under the Chief
Justice's constitutional power to make temporary ju-
dicial assignments to ensure the speedy, efficient, and
proper administration of justice within the various
circuits. Because of the vital role temporary judicial
assignments play in the administration of our court
system, this Court must have exclusive jurisdiction to
review such assignments under its article V, section
2(a) authority to oversee the administrative supervi-
sion of all courts. This grant of exclusive authority
ensures this Court's plenary control over the state's
court system and avoids the disruptive effect allow-
ing district courts to quash judicial assignments
would have on that system. Moreover, there is noth-
ing in our Constitution to indicate that district courts
are to share in the administrative supervision of our
trial courts, and we decline to read our Constitution
to sanction the disruption to the judicial system in-
herent in such shared authority.
Accordingly, we hold that a litigant who is affected
by a judicial assignment made by a chief judge of a
judicial circuit must challenge the assignment in the
trial court and then seek review in this Court by way
of petition for writ of prohibition or petition for relief
under the “all writs” power.FN5 SeeArt. V, § 3(b)(7),
Fla. Const. (this Court “may issue writs of prohibi-
tion to courts and all writs necessary to the complete
exercise of its jurisdiction”); accord State ex rel.
Treadwell v. Hall, 274 So.2d 537 (Fla.1973) (chal-
lenge of assigned judge's jurisdiction raised in trial
court, followed by petition for writ of prohibition
filed in this Court).
FN5. General questions concerning the ad-
ministration or management of the courts of
the circuit should be directed to the Chief
Justice through the state courts administra-
tor, as provided in Florida Rule of Judicial
 672 So.2d 16
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
(Cite as: 672 So.2d 16)


Administration 2.050(b)(3). Likewise, ad-
ministrative orders also may be challenged
as court rules or local rules by applying for a
determination by the Local Rules Advisory
Committee, as provided in Florida Rule of
Judicial Administration 2.050(e)(2).
[3] Accordingly, we hold that the district court of
appeal lacked authority to review the administrative
order assigning Judge Wild to circuit court duty.
However, we treat the petition for writ of prohibition
filed in the district court as if it had been filed in this
Court FN6 and address the certified question in an at-
tempt to further define the parameters of a proper
temporary assignment under rule 2.050(b)(4).
FN6. Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.
In Treadwell we approved an order appointing a
county judge to act as a circuit judge in DeSoto
County “in all matters of probate, guardianship, in-
competency, trusts, proceedings under the ‘Florida
Mental Health Act’ and all juvenile proceedings, dis-
solutions of marriage, and all uncontested civil mat-
ters in circuit court.” 274 So.2d at 538. Likewise, in
Crusoe v. Rowls, 472 So.2d 1163 (Fla.1985), we up-
held the successive and repetitive assignment of
county court judges to hear all petitions to enforce
child support orders that directed support payments to
be made through the child support section of the sher-
iff's office. In addressing whether the assignment was
proper, we explained that an *19 assignment is “tem-
porary” under rule 2.050(b)(4) if it is not “perma-
nent:”
“Temporary” is an antonym for “permanent.” It is a
comparative term. It can be said that if a duty is not
permanent it is temporary. If a county judge is as-
signed to perform solely circuit court work, the as-
signment must be for a relatively short time for it to
be temporary. If a county judge is assigned to spend a
portion of his time performing circuit work, the as-
signment can be longer, but the assignment cannot
usurp, supplant, or effectively deprive circuit court
jurisdiction of a particular type of case on a perma-
nent basis.
472 So.2d at 1165 (footnotes omitted). Where a
county judge is assigned solely to perform circuit
court duties, we suggested that a sixty-day assign-
ment was acceptable; where the judge is ordered to
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 4
spend only a portion of his time performing circuit
court work, we suggested that a six-month assign-
ment was acceptable. Id. at 1165 nn. 2-3. These time
periods were suggested with the recognition that
chief judges must be given flexibility to effectively
utilize available judicial labor. Id. at 1165.
Although the successive assignments at issue in Cru-
soe totalled two-and-one-half years, we upheld them
as proper temporary assignments in part because the
county judges were assigned only a limited class of
support orders and the assignment was to “supple-
ment and aid the circuit judges rather than to replace
them.” Id.
Shortly after the decision in Crusoe, this Court was
asked to further define the parameters of a temporary
judicial assignment under rule 2.050(b)(4). In Payret
v. Adams, 500 So.2d 136 (Fla.1986), the Court held
that a county court judge may not be indefinitely as-
signed, by successive orders, circuit court duties in a
specially created jury district. The county judge in
Payret had been annually reassigned for a five-year
period to be the acting circuit judge for a specially
created district of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. We
noted:
Rather than being assigned to aid or assist the circuit
judges in a limited class of cases, respondent has
been assigned to hear all circuit court matters in the
Glades district. Indeed, respondent has conceded that
for all intents and purposes, he is the circuit judge for
the Glades district.
Id. at 138. Under the circumstances, this Court held
the successive one-year assignments invalid as a de
facto permanent assignment. Id. at 138.
[4] These decisions illustrate that whether a judicial
assignment is a proper “temporary” assignment under
rule 2.050(b)(4) is not merely a function of the dura-
tion of an individual assignment. The successive na-
ture of the assignment, the type of case covered by
the assignment, and the practical effect of the as-
signment on circuit court jurisdiction over a particu-
lar type of case also must be considered. For exam-
ple, Crusoe illustrates that successive assignments
totalling more than two years may be considered
temporary if the class of circuit court case covered by
the assignment is limited and the practical effect of
the assignment is to aid and assist circuit judges
 672 So.2d 16
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
(Cite as: 672 So.2d 16)


rather than to usurp circuit court jurisdiction over a
particular type of case. 472 So.2d at 1165. Similarly,
Payret demonstrates that successive and repetitive
assignments that, when considered individually, may
be facially valid will not be considered temporary
where their practical effect is to create a de facto
permanent circuit judge by administrative order. 500
So.2d at 138.
In multi-county circuits the county judges in the less
populous counties are often underutilized, yet they
are willing to do circuit judge work. In some in-
stances there are no circuit judges resident within
those counties. The most efficient use of scarce judi-
cial resources dictates the assignment of county
judges to handle limited aspects of circuit judge work
in such counties, provided that the assignments do
not interfere with the full performance of county
judge duties.
[5] In the instant case, Judge Wild continues to do all
of his county judge work. In addition, Judge Wild has
received new assignments every six months to hear
one half of the criminal circuit court work. Obvi-
ously, the criminal division is only one of several
divisions of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court,
and Judge Wild is assigned to only *20 half of the
cases within that division. The orders appointing
Judge Wild more nearly resemble those approved in
Treadwell and Crusoe rather than the order disap-
proved in Payret. See also J.G. v. Holtzendorf, 648
So.2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (approving successive
six-month assignments of county judge to hear juve-
nile and domestic matters in circuit court), review
granted, 659 So.2d 271 (Fla.1995). Thus, we con-
clude that the successive six-month assignments of
Judge Wild to hear half of the cases in Indian River
County are permissible.
[6] However, we cannot ignore the fact that County
Judge Balsiger has now been assigned to hear the
other half of the felony cases in Indian River County.
To permit this practice to continue would have the
effect of permanently usurping a major segment of
circuit court work within the county. Therefore, we
direct the Chief Judge of Indian River County to
make the appropriate judicial reassignments in order
that county judges not be assigned to more than half
of the felony cases within the county. However, in
view of the fact that Judge Wild and Judge Balsiger
have each been sitting on felony cases pursuant to
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 5
valid orders, this directive shall not be construed to
mean that they have been without jurisdiction to hear
these cases.
We answer the certified question in the affirmative,
quash the decision below, and deny the petition for
prohibition.
It is so ordered.
GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, HARDING and
WELLS, JJ., concur.
KOGAN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with
an opinion, in which SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ.,
concur.KOGAN, Justice, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part.
I agree that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to
review judicial assignments. However, I cannot agree
that the successive assignments at issue here are
proper temporary assignments under Florida Rule of
Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4) and article V,
section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution.
The majority recognizes that an assignment is “tem-
porary” under rule 2.050(b)(4) if it is not “perma-
nent”:
“ ‘Temporary” is an antonym for ‘permanent.’ It is a
comparative term. It can be said that if a duty is not
permanent it is temporary. If a county judge is as-
signed to perform solely circuit court work, the as-
signment must be for a relatively short time for it to
be temporary. If a county judge is assigned to spend a
portion of his time performing circuit work, the as-
signment can be longer, but the assignment cannot
usurp, supplant, or effectively deprive circuit court
jurisdiction of a particular type of case on a perma-
nent basis.”
Majority op. at 19 (quoting Crusoe v. Rowls, 472
So.2d 1163, 1165 (Fla.1985)). It further recognizes
that, under our caselaw,
whether a judicial assignment is a proper “tempo-
rary” assignment under rule 2.050(b)(4) is not merely
a function of the duration of an individual assign-
ment. The successive nature of the assignment, the
type of case covered by the assignment, and the prac-
tical effect of the assignment on circuit court jurisdic-
tion over a particular type of case also must be con-
sidered.
 672 So.2d 16
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
(Cite as: 672 So.2d 16)


Majority op. at 19. The majority properly finds sup-
port for this proposition in this Court's decisions in
Crusoe and Payret v. Adams, 500 So.2d 136
(Fla.1986). As the majority notes, this Court upheld
successive assignments of county court judges to
circuit court duty in Crusoe, where 1) the class of
case covered by the assignment-a limited class of
support orders-was much more limited than the class
of case affected here-all felony cases-and 2) the prac-
tical effect of the assignment was to aid and assist
circuit judges rather than to usurp circuit court juris-
diction over a particular type of case. 472 So.2d at
1165. Whereas, in Payret, the Court held invalid suc-
cessive and repetitive assignments that when consid-
ered individually were facially valid because their
practical effect was to create a de facto permanent
circuit judge by administrative order. 500 So.2d at
138.
Although the majority recognizes the considerations
relevant to the determination at *21 hand, it fails to
consider those factors in the context of this case and
merely concludes, without explanation, that the as-
signments at issue here are more like those approved
in Treadwell and Crusoe than the assignments disap-
proved in Payret. Majority op. at 20. The Treadwell
decision lends no support to the majority's conclusion
because the issue in Treadwell was whether the chief
judge was authorized to assign a county court judge
to circuit court duty, not whether the assignment was
“temporary.” The majority appears to base its holding
on the need for “efficient use of scarce judicial re-
sources.” Id. at 19. While no one could dispute this
basic premise, it is equally clear that judicial re-
sources must be utilized within the constraints of our
constitution. This is what our decisions in Crusoe and
Payret teach.
Turning to the assignment at issue here, I agree with
the Fourth District Court of Appeal that it is a de
facto permanent assignment of a county court judge
to circuit judge duties, in violation of article V, sec-
tions 2(b) and 10(b) of the Florida Constitution. As of
April 1994, Judge Wild had been assigned in eight
consecutive administrative orders to preside over half
of the felony cases in Indian River County. Although
each successive assignment was limited to the six-
month term suggested by this Court in Crusoe, the
effect of the automatic reassignments was to give a
county court judge jurisdiction over half of all felony
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 6
cases arising in Indian River County for a period of at
least four years.
To my mind, the assignment cannot be considered
“temporary.” Such automatic reassignments have the
practical effect of creating a de facto permanent cir-
cuit court judge and are no different than the indefi-
nite assignment by successive order that was held
improper in Payret. Moreover, as of January 1994,
when a second county judge was assigned to preside
over the other half of felony cases arising in Indian
River County, circuit court jurisdiction over felony
cases effectively was redesignated by administrative
order, contrary to this Court's decision in Crusoe. The
majority recognizes as much when it states that to
“permit this practice to continue would have the ef-
fect of permanently usurping a major segment of cir-
cuit court work within the county.” Majority op. at
20.
Even under the majority's analysis, the petition for
writ of prohibition should be granted and the order
denying disqualification of Judge Wild in Dozier's
case quashed. Such relief is warranted because at the
time Dozier's felony case was assigned, he had no
chance of having it heard by a duly elected circuit
judge since jurisdiction over all felony cases had
been unconstitutionally placed in the hands of two
county court judges.
Accordingly, I would answer the certified question in
the negative, grant the petition for writ of prohibition
and quash both the order denying disqualification of
Judge Wild in Dozier's case and the administrative
order at issue here. Moreover, regardless of how this
case is resolved, I agree with Justice Anstead that this
Court should enact specific guidelines for making
temporary judicial assignments. See Wallace v. State,
609 So.2d 64, 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Anstead, J.,
concurring specially). Thus, in the hope of eliminat-
ing much of the confusion that exists in this area, I
would ask the Judicial Administration Rules Com-
mittee to propose specific guidelines for assignments
made under rule 2.050(b)(4).
SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Fla.,1996.
Wild v. Dozier
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
 672 So.2d 16 Page 7
672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57
(Cite as: 672 So.2d 16)

END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

 Date of Printing: Apr 20, 2009

KEYCITE

Wild v. Dozier, 672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57 (Fla.,Feb 08, 1996) (NO. 85,050)
History

Direct History

1 Dozier v. Wild, 1994 WL 524292, 19 Fla. L. Weekly D2068 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. Sep 28, 1994) (NO.
94-1104)
Opinion Superseded on Rehearing by
2 Dozier v. Wild, 659 So.2d 1103, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D199 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. Jan 18, 1995) (NO. 94-
1104)
Review Granted by
3 Wild v. Dozier, 652 So.2d 819 (Fla. Feb 27, 1995) (Table, NO. 85,050)
AND Decision Quashed by
=> 4 Wild v. Dozier, 672 So.2d 16, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S57 (Fla. Feb 08, 1996) (NO. 85,050), rehearing
denied (Apr 11, 1996)

Negative Citing References (U.S.A.)

Holding Limited by
5 1-888-Traffic Schools v. Chief Circuit Judge, Fourth Judicial Circuit, 734 So.2d 413, 24 Fla. L.
Weekly S239 (Fla. May 27, 1999) (NO. 94,314) HN: 2,3,4 (So.2d)
Distinguished by
6 Diaz v. State, 868 So.2d 1281, 29 Fla. L. Weekly D808 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. Mar 31, 2004) (NO. 4D03-
4016) HN: 2 (So.2d)

Related References
7 Dozier v. State, 662 So.2d 382, 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2433 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. Nov 01, 1995) (NO. 94-
2178), rehearing denied (Nov 22, 1995)
Review Granted by
8 State v. Dozier, 669 So.2d 252 (Fla. Feb 13, 1996) (Table, NO. 86,956)
AND Decision Quashed by
9 State v. Dozier, 675 So.2d 110, 21 Fla. L. Weekly S199 (Fla. May 09, 1996) (NO. 86,956), rehearing

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

 denied (Jun 17, 1996)
On Remand to
10 Dozier v. State, 677 So.2d 1007, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1933 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. Aug 28, 1996) (NO. 94-
2178)

Court Documents

Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

Fla. Appellate Briefs

11 Joe A. WILD, Judge, etc., Petitioner, v. Robert Lee DOZIER, Respondents., 1995 WL 17015638
(Appellate Brief) (Fla. Feb. 03, 1995) Amicus Curiae Brief of L. B. Vocelle, Chief Judge of the
Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, in Support of Joe A. Wild, Judge, etc., Petitioner (NO. 85050)
12 The Honorable Joe A. WILD, County Court Judge, Petitioner, v. Robert Lee DOZIER, Respondent.,
1995 WL 17015639 (Appellate Brief) (Fla. Feb. 13, 1995) Respondent's Answer Brief on the
Merits (NO. 85050)
13 The Honorable Joe A. WILD, County Court Judge, Petitioner, v. Robert Lee DOZIER, Respondent.,
1995 WL 17015640 (Appellate Brief) (Fla. Feb. 17, 1995) Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits
(NO. 85050)

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


Supreme Court of Florida.
PHYSICIANS HEALTHCARE PLANS, INC., et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
Raymond PFEIFLER, et ux., Respondents.
Kurshid Kahn, M.D., et al., Petitioners,
v.
Raymond Pfeifler, et ux., Respondents.
Nos. SC01-2062, SC01-2079.
May 1, 2003.
Medical malpractice action was brought and set for
trial on the senior judges' docket in the circuit court.
Defendant physicians filed motion to return the case
to the elected circuit judge. The Circuit Court, Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit, denied motion. Defendant
physicians then petitioned for writ of prohibition. The
Supreme Court held that: (1) appointment of
nonelected judges as senior judges did not violate
suffrage rights; (2) use of senior judge docket
amounted to a proper “temporary assignment”; (3)
use of senior judges to relieve overcrowding of dock-
ets did not constitute a “division” that had to be cre-
ated by local rule and approved by the Supreme
Court; and (4) eligibility for temporary appointment
as a retired judge was not restricted to only those
judges who reached retirement age.
Petition denied.
Wells, J., filed concurring opinion.
Lewis, J., filed opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part.
Pariente and Quince, JJ., concurred in result only.
West Headnotes
[1] Courts 106 472.2
106 Courts
106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction
106VII(A) Courts of Same State
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 1
106VII(A)1 In General
106k472 Exclusive or Concurrent Ju-
risdiction
106k472.2 k. Appellate or Supreme
Courts. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to re-
view judicial assignments. West's F.S.A. Const. Art.
5, § 2(a, b).
[2] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
When a chief judge of a judicial circuit exercises his
or her delegated assignment authority, the judge is
acting under the Chief Justice's constitutional power
to make temporary judicial assignments to ensure the
speedy, efficient, and proper administration of justice
within the various circuits. West's F.S.A. Const. Art.
5, § 2(a, b); West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule
2.050(b)(4).
[3] Courts 106 472.2
106 Courts
106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction
106VII(A) Courts of Same State
106VII(A)1 In General
106k472 Exclusive or Concurrent Ju-
risdiction
106k472.2 k. Appellate or Supreme
Courts. Most Cited Cases
Because of the vital role temporary judicial assign-
ments play in the administration of the state court
system, the Supreme Court must have exclusive ju-
risdiction to review such assignments under its con-
stitutional authority to oversee the administrative
supervision of all courts. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5,
§ 2(a); West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(4).
[4] Prohibition 314 17
314 Prohibition
314II Procedure
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


314k17 k. Presentation of Objections in
Original Proceeding. Most Cited Cases
The Supreme Court should not address by writ of
prohibition issues relating to judicial assignments that
have not been raised to the trial court.
[5] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
Constitutional provision specifically granting the
Chief Justice power to assign retired justices or
judges to temporary duty in any court for which they
were qualified, together with the authority to delegate
this power to the chief judge of a judicial circuit,
permitted appointment of nonelected judges, and thus
such appointment was not a violation of suffrage
rights. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, §§ 2(b), 10(b).
[6] Constitutional Law 92 602
92 Constitutional Law
92V Construction and Operation of Constitutional
Provisions
92V(A) General Rules of Construction
92k595 Intrinsic Aids to Construction
92k602 k. In Pari Materia. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k15)
Constitutional provisions must be read in pari materia
to form a congruous whole so as not to render any
language superfluous.
[7] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
Use of senior judge docket in one circuit amounted to
a “temporary assignment,” and not an improper per-
manent assignment in violation of Chief Justice's
constitutional authority to assign retired judges to
temporary duty, even if some senior judge assign-
ments were successive, where assignment records
and docket records indicated that cases were assigned
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 2
to senior judges primarily to relieve overcrowded and
backlogged calendars in both the civil and criminal
court dockets or because a case was likely to be one
of long duration, and not all long-duration trials were
transferred to senior judge docket. West's F.S.A.
Const. Art. 5, § 2(b); West's F.S.A.
R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(4).
[8] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
A county judge cannot be assigned to perform solely
circuit court work, and vice versa, unless the assign-
ment is for a relatively short time. West's F.S.A.
Const. Art. 5, § 2(b); West's F.S.A.
R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(4).
[9] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
A judge may be assigned to hear other court work on
a temporary, regular basis as long as the assignment
is directed to a specified class of cases, is used to
maximize the efficient administration of justice, and
supplements and assists the judges in the other court
rather than replaces them. West's F.S.A. Const. Art.
5, § 2(b); West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule
2.050(b)(4).
[10] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
In determining whether a judicial assignment is a
“temporary assignment,” the Supreme Court consid-
ers more than the duration of the individual assign-
ment; the successive nature of the assignment, the
type of case covered by the assignment, and the prac-
tical effect of the assignment on the court's jurisdic-
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


tion over a particular type of case also must be con-
sidered. West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule
2.050(b)(4).
[11] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
Successive and repetitive judicial assignments of
nonelected judges, which might be valid if consid-
ered individually, are not temporary where the practi-
cal effect is to create a de facto permanent circuit
judge by administrative order. West's F.S.A.
R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(4).
[12] Courts 106 50
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(A) Creation and Constitution
106k50 k. Divisions and Parts of Courts.
Most Cited Cases
Courts 106 70
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
Use of senior judges to relieve overcrowding of the
civil and criminal dockets in a judicial circuit by as-
signing them to cases of long duration did not consti-
tute a complex case “division” that had to be created
by local rule and approved by the Supreme Court, but
could be created by administrative order of the chief
judge of the circuit court. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5,
§ 7; West's F.S.A. § 43.30; West's F.S.A.
R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050.
[13] Courts 106 50
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(A) Creation and Constitution
106k50 k. Divisions and Parts of Courts.
Most Cited Cases
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 3
A special court division may not be created by means
of the temporary appointment power of the Chief
Justice which is delegated to the chief judges of the
circuit courts. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, §§ 2(b), 7.
[14] Courts 106 81
106 Courts
106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(F) Rules of Court and Conduct of Busi-
ness
106k81 k. Making and Promulgation of
Rules. Most Cited Cases
Unlike local court rules, administrative orders of a
chief judge of a judicial circuit generally do not have
to be approved by the Supreme Court. West's F.S.A.
Const. Art. 5, § 7; West's F.S.A. § 43.30; West's
F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050.
[15] Judges 227 16(2)
227 Judges
227II Special or Substitute Judges
227k16 Appointment, Qualification, and Ten-
ure
227k16(2) k. Qualification. Most Cited
Cases
A senior judge may be assigned temporarily to serve
in a circuit other than the one in which he or she re-
sides. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, § 8.
[16] Judges 227 16(2)
227 Judges
227II Special or Substitute Judges
227k16 Appointment, Qualification, and Ten-
ure
227k16(2) k. Qualification. Most Cited
Cases
The accountability for senior judges rests with the
Chief Justice rather than the voters of a particular
circuit or district; because the Chief Justice's author-
ity and responsibility extend throughout the state, the
Chief Justice can assign a senior judge to duty with-
out limitation to the jurisdiction of the senior judge's
prior service. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, § 8.
[17] Courts 106 70
106 Courts
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


106II Establishment, Organization, and Procedure
106II(E) Places and Times of Holding Court
106k70 k. Designation or Assignment of
Judges. Most Cited Cases
As the administrative officer of all courts within a
judicial circuit, the chief judge is best equipped to
assess the needs of each trial court and to allocate the
judicial labor available within the circuit accordingly.
West's F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.050(b)(3).
[18] Judges 227 16(2)
227 Judges
227II Special or Substitute Judges
227k16 Appointment, Qualification, and Ten-
ure
227k16(2) k. Qualification. Most Cited
Cases
Eligibility for temporary appointment as a “retired
judge” was not restricted to only those judges who
reached retirement age. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, §
2(b); West's F.S.A. § 25.073(1); West's F.S.A.
R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.030(a)(3)(B).
[19] Judges 227 16(2)
227 Judges
227II Special or Substitute Judges
227k16 Appointment, Qualification, and Ten-
ure
227k16(2) k. Qualification. Most Cited
Cases
Under both the Rules of Judicial Administration and
statutory definition of a retired judge, there are only
two restrictions on the eligibility of retired judges
who may be assigned to temporary judicial duty: they
may not be engaged in the practice of law; and they
may not have been defeated for reelection or reten-
tion in their last judicial office. West's F.S.A. Const.
Art. 5, § 2(b); West's F.S.A. § 25.073(1); West's
F.S.A. R.Jud.Admin.Rule 2.030(a)(3)(B).
[20] Judges 227 15(1)
227 Judges
227II Special or Substitute Judges
227k15 Necessity and Grounds for Appoint-
ment
227k15(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The express language of the constitutional provision
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 4
that gives the Chief Justice the power to appoint tem-
porary judges does not restrict the power to emergen-
cies. West's F.S.A. Const. Art. 5, § 2(b).
*1131 Louise H. McMurray and Douglas M. McIn-
tosh of McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz & Cartaya, Miami,
FL, on behalf of Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc.; F.
Bryant Blevins of Marlow, Connell, Valerius,
Abrams, Adler & Newman, Miami, FL, on behalf of
Ronald S. Gup, M.A., etc.; Kevin P. O'Connor of
O'Connor, Chimpoulis, Restani, Marreo & McAllis-
ter, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, on behalf of Ralph
Greenwasser, Jr., D.O.; and Nancy W. Gregoire and
Michael J. Rotundo of Bunnell, Woulfe, Kirschbaum,
Keller, McIntyre & Gregoire, P.A., Fort Lauderdale,
FL, on behalf of Khurshid Khan, M.D., et al., Peti-
tioners.
Gary M. Farmer, Jr. of Gillespie, Goldman, Kronen-
gold & Farmer, P.A., Fort *1132 Lauderdale, FL;
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Charles
M. Fahlbusch, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lau-
derdale, FL; and Michael S. Freedland of The Law
Offices of Freedland & Glassman, Weston, FL, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM.
Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc., Dr. Kurshid Kahn,
and others petition this Court for a writ of prohibi-
tion. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(7), Fla.
Const.
The instant case arose from a 1998 medical malprac-
tice action by Raymond and Cynthia Pfeifler against
Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. (Physicians), Dr.
Kurshid Kahn (Kahn), and others, which was set for
trial on the senior judges' docket in the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit. In July 2000, the codefendants filed
a motion in circuit court to return the case to the
elected circuit judge, arguing that the assignment to a
senior judge violated both this Court's general guide-
lines and procedures for the assignment of senior
judges and the Florida Constitution. The circuit court
heard argument in November 2000, denied the mo-
tion, but certified the issue as being of great public
importance and invited the codefendants to seek a
writ of prohibition to resolve the issues presented.
Petitioners Physicians and Kahn have filed two sepa-
rate petitions for writs of prohibition with this Court.
Both petitions raise a number of challenges to the
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


senior judges' docket in the Seventeenth Judicial Cir-
cuit and ask this Court to prohibit the assignment of
senior judges to preside over “long trial” medical
malpractice and other “complex litigation” cases.FN1
We have consolidated the cases as they present the
same issues for the Court's resolution.
FN1. In our recent review of the Report and
Recommendations of the Committee On
Appointment and Assignment of Senior
Judges, “we acknowledge [d] the reality of
problems in isolated cases with senior
judges presiding over complex and lengthy
trials” and urged chief judges “to respond
directly to concerns expressed when such
problems are presented to them.” In re Re-
port & Recommendations of the Comm. on
Appointment & Assignment of Senior
Judges, op. at 15, 847 So.2d 415, 422, 2003
WL 1987980 (Fla. May 1, 2003). Despite
such problems, we declined to adopt “either
a per se prohibition on the assignment of
senior judges to complex cases or a re-
quirement that chief judges be required to
show a good cause for such assignments,”
recognizing that “[c]hief judges must be af-
forded deference and latitude in the man-
agement of judicial assignments and dock-
ets.” Id. at 15-16, at 422. Finally, we re-
minded the chief judges of their duty to “se-
lect senior judges with the proper skills and
experience to preside over complex cases
when such assignments are necessary” and
their responsibility to “periodically review[ ]
the progress of all cases assigned to senior
judges to ensure expeditious and proper
handling.” Id. at 16, at 422.
Before considering the challenges raised in the peti-
tions, we find it necessary to explain the background
relating to the assignment of senior judges. For the
purposes of judicial administration, a “retired judge”
is defined as a judge not engaged in the practice of
law who has been a judicial officer of this state.
SeeFla. R. Jud. Admin. 2.030(a)(3)(B). Section
25.073(1), Florida Statutes (2001), also specifies that
a retired judge may not have been defeated in seeking
reelection or retention to his or her last judicial of-
fice. In 1990, Florida Rule of Judicial Administration
2.030(a)(3) was amended to provide that a retired
judge serving on assignment to temporary judicial
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 5
duty may be referred to by the honorary designation
“senior judge.” This designation had no effect on the
responsibilities or conduct of the retired judge. See In
re Amendment to Rules of Judicial Admin., 560 So.2d
786, 787 (Fla.1990).
*1133 [1][2][3] This Court has exclusive jurisdiction
to review judicial assignments based upon article V,
section 2(a)-(b) of the Florida Constitution. Article V,
section 2(a) gives this Court authority to adopt rules
for the administrative supervision of all courts.
Article V, section 2(b) gives the chief justice of this
Court, as the chief administrative officer of the judi-
cial system, “the power to assign justices or judges,
including consenting retired justices or judges, to
temporary duty in any court for which the judge is
qualified and to delegate to a chief judge of a judicial
circuit the power to assign judges for duty in that
circuit.” Florida Rule of Judicial Administration
2.050(b)(4) delegates the chief justice's assignment
power to the chief judges of the judicial circuits to
“assign any judge to temporary service for which the
judge is qualified in any court in the same circuit.”
“When a chief judge exercises this delegated assign-
ment authority, the judge is acting under the Chief
Justice's constitutional power to make temporary ju-
dicial assignments to ensure the speedy, efficient, and
proper administration of justice within the various
circuits.” Wild v. Dozier, 672 So.2d 16, 18
(Fla.1996). Because of the vital role temporary judi-
cial assignments play in the administration of our
court system, this Court must have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review such assignments under its article V,
section 2(a) authority to oversee the administrative
supervision of all courts. See id.
This Court has long recognized the necessity of as-
signing retired judges and justices to judicial service
in Florida courts. See In re Assignments of Justices &
Judges, 222 So.2d 22 (Fla.1969). As we have ex-
plained, “unless retired justices and judges are as-
signed to ... other courts, long delays in the discharge
of case loads of some of the trial courts will result.”
Id. at 23. Thus, retired judges have provided valuable
service to Florida's judicial system for many years by
assisting with increased caseloads and providing re-
lief to active judges when they are ill or disqualified.
See In re Rules Governing Assignment to Duty of
Retired Justices & Judges, 239 So.2d 254 (Fla.1970).
“Were it not for the availability of this resource, the
delays in scheduling hearings and trials ... would be
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


much greater.” In re Certification of Judicial Man-
power, 592 So.2d 241, 246 (Fla.1992). Furthermore,
“[t]he use of retired judges is the most cost effective
and flexible program we have to address calendaring
problems and emergencies as they arise.” In re Certi-
fication of Judicial Manpower, 576 So.2d 1303, 1307
(Fla.1991). We have repeatedly noted that the serv-
ices of retired judges “are available at much less ex-
pense than full-time judges.” In re Certification of
Need for Additional Judges, 669 So.2d 1037, 1039
(Fla.1996). Senior judges currently perform the work
of approximately thirty-five full-time judges, at a cost
of about $2.9 million, a small fraction of the cost of
that number of full-time judges. SeeComm. On Ap-
pointment and Assignment of Senior Judges, Report
and Recommendations of the Committee On Ap-
pointment and Assignment of Senior Judges, 4 (Feb.
22, 2002) (on file with Clerk, Fla. Sup. Ct.).
[4] It is against this background that we address the
petitioners' challenges to the assignment of senior
judges. The petitioners claim that the use of senior
judges violates the suffrage rights of voters; the as-
signment of cases to the senior judges' docket in the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit constitutes an improper
permanent assignment and violates the constitutional
prohibition against the creation of special court divi-
sions; the assignment of a retired judge who resides
in another judicial circuit violates the constitutional
judicial *1134 qualifications; the assignment of com-
plex cases to the senior judge docket results in delay
which constitutes an unconstitutional restraint on
access to courts; judges younger than seventy years
of age and those who are not eligible for retirement
benefits under the state retirement system do not
meet the constitutional definition of a retired judge;
and senior judges may not be appointed for matters of
convenience.FN2
FN2. The Kahn petition makes two chal-
lenges that were not raised below: the time
standards for civil litigation are violated by
the use of senior judges and the intent of the
Medical Malpractice Reform Act is simi-
larly violated. This Court should not address
issues relating to judicial assignments that
have not been raised to the trial court. See
Wild.Accordingly, we decline to address
these challenges.
[5][6] The petitioners argue that the use of senior
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 6
judges violates their suffrage rights. SeeArt. V, §
10(b) Fla. Const. (providing for election of circuit
court and county court judges unless a majority of the
voters in the jurisdiction approve a local option to
select judges by merit selection and retention); id. §
11(b) (providing that when a vacancy occurs on a
circuit or county court where the judges are elected
by the voters the governor shall appoint a judge to fill
the vacancy but an election shall be held to fill the
judicial office at the end of the appointed term). The
petitioners contend that voters are being deprived of
the right to have their cases tried by judges who are
accountable to the public because senior judges are
not elected to judicial office. However, constitutional
provisions must be read in pari materia “to form [a]
congruous whole so as not to render any language
superfluous.” Department of Envtl. Prot. v. Millen-
der, 666 So.2d 882, 886 (Fla.1996). The Florida Con-
stitution specifically grants the chief justice power to
assign retired justices or judges to temporary duty in
any court for which they are qualified and the author-
ity to delegate this power to the chief judge of a judi-
cial circuit. Seeart. V, § 2(b), Fla. Const. Thus, where
appointments fall within the parameters outlined in
this provision, the Florida Constitution obviously
permits appointment of nonelected judges and does
not consider this to be a violation of suffrage rights.
[7][8][9] Next the petitioners contend that the use of
senior judges in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit con-
stitutes an improper permanent assignment, which
violates the chief justice's constitutional authority to
assign retired judges to “temporary duty.” Art. V, §
2(b). Based upon our previous cases, we can glean
some basic constitutional parameters relating to the
temporal nature of judicial assignments. A county
judge cannot be assigned to perform solely circuit
court work, and vice versa, unless the assignment is
for a relatively short time. See Payret v. Adams, 500
So.2d 136 (Fla.1986); Crusoe v. Rowls, 472 So.2d
1163 (Fla.1985). However, a judge may be assigned
to hear other court work on a temporary, regular basis
as long as the assignment is directed to a specified
class of cases, is used to maximize the efficient ad-
ministration of justice, and supplements and assists
the judges in the other court rather than replaces
them. See Holsman v. Cohen, 667 So.2d 769
(Fla.1996); Wild; Crusoe.
[10][11] In determining whether a judicial assign-
ment is a temporary assignment under Florida Rule
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(4), this Court
considers more than the duration of the individual
assignment. The successive nature of the assignment,
the type of case covered by the assignment, and the
practical effect of the assignment on the court's juris-
diction over a particular type of case also must be
considered. See Wild.At one end of the *1135 spec-
trum, this Court has concluded that successive as-
signments totaling more than two years may be con-
sidered temporary where the class of cases covered
by the assignment is limited and the practical effect is
to assist the judges rather than usurp the court's juris-
diction over a particular type of case. See Crusoe.
However, successive and repetitive assignments
which might be valid if considered individually are
not temporary where the practical effect is to create a
de facto permanent circuit judge by administrative
order. See Payret.
The petitioners have not challenged specific succes-
sive senior judge assignments, but instead make a
blanket claim that the senior judge docket in the Sev-
enteenth Judicial Circuit is not a temporary assign-
ment. However, even assuming that some of the sen-
ior judge assignments have been successive, this
Court has approved other successive judicial assign-
ments. See Wild (approving successive six-month
assignments spanning four years of county judge to
preside in circuit court over half of all felony cases in
a county); Rivkind v. Patterson, 672 So.2d 819, 820-
21 (Fla.1996) (approving successive monthly as-
signments spanning several years as “a logical and
lawful means to ensure the expeditious and efficient
resolution of domestic violence issues in the Eleventh
Circuit”); J.G. v. Holtzendorf, 669 So.2d 1043
(Fla.1996)(approving successive six-month assign-
ments of county judge to hear most, though not all, of
the juvenile cases in the county and a few other cir-
cuit court actions over the course of five years);
Holsman (approving successive monthly assignments
spanning several years of circuit court judge to han-
dle a limited number of county court domestic vio-
lence misdemeanors in special domestic violence
court); but see Payret (disapproving successive one-
year assignments of county court judge assigned to
hear all circuit court matters in special jury district of
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit over five years).
Under Wild, however, the successive nature of the
assignment is only one of three factors to be consid-
ered in determining whether an assignment is tempo-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 7
rary. The type of case covered by the assignment and
the practical effect of the assignment on circuit court
jurisdiction over a particular type of case must also
be considered. See Wild, 672 So.2d at 19. In the in-
stant case, there is a factual dispute over the type of
cases handled by the senior judge docket. The peti-
tioners contend that the senior judge docket handles
only complex, long-duration cases. The respondents
counter that the records of the senior judge docket
show that a wide range of circuit court cases and mat-
ters are being handled by senior judges. In fact, the
circuit court's assignment records indicate that cases
are assigned to senior judges primarily because of
overcrowded and backlogged calendars in both the
civil and criminal court dockets or because the case is
likely to be one of long duration. The docket records
of the elected judges also indicate that not all long-
duration trials are transferred to the senior judge
docket. Senior judge utilization statistics reflect sen-
ior judge assignments in each division of the Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit, and far more in the criminal
division than in any other. Further, as noted in the
procedures for assignment of senior judges issued by
this Court and the forms for senior judge assign-
ments, we conclude that the senior judge assignments
in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit are compatible
with the instructions and the guidance of this Court.
As to the final Wild factor of the practical effect of
the assignment on circuit court jurisdiction, the senior
judge assignments here are used to maximize the
efficient administration of justice and have *1136 the
practical effect of supplementing and assisting the
circuit court judges rather than usurping the judges'
jurisdiction over a particular type of case. Under
these criteria, we conclude the senior judge assign-
ments are temporary and thus do not violate the con-
stitutional parameters of article V, section 2(b).
[12][13] Unlike the judicial assignment cases cited
above, the petitioners here challenge more than the
temporal nature of the senior judge assignments. The
petitioners also contend that the senior judge docket
is a de facto complex case division which cannot be
established by administrative order, but must be es-
tablished through a local rule which is approved by
this Court.FN3 The petitioners note that the adminis-
trative judge who handles requests for transfer to the
senior judge docket in the Seventeenth Judicial Cir-
cuit has described the docket as “our complex litiga-
tion division,” handling “cases that take more than
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


three weeks to try.”
FN3. Article V, section 7 of the Florida
Constitution provides that “[a]ll courts ex-
cept the supreme court may sit in divisions
as may be established by general law.”
Section 43.30, Florida Statutes (2001), pro-
vides that divisions may be created by a lo-
cal rule which is approved by this Court.
Thus, a special division may not be created
by means of the temporary appointment
power of the chief justice which is delegated
to the chief judges of the circuit courts.
[14] Pursuant to Florida Rule of Judicial Administra-
tion 2.050(b), chief judges of the circuit courts issue
administrative orders to coordinate administrative
matters within their jurisdiction. Unlike local rules,
administrative orders generally do not have to be
approved by this Court. As explained in In re Report
of Commission on Family Courts, 646 So.2d 178, 181
(Fla.1994), divisions of Florida courts are to be estab-
lished through local rules approved by this Court. See
alsoart. V, § 7, Fla. Const.; § 43.30, Fla. Stat. (2001).
Under the provisions of rule 2.050, local rules must
be approved by a majority of the judges in a circuit,
must be noticed and advertised, and must be ap-
proved by this Court.
Thus, if the senior judge docket is deemed a “divi-
sion” it would need to be created by local rule and
approved by this Court. However, this Court has ap-
proved the creation of a drug “division” of the crimi-
nal court created by administrative order in the Thir-
teenth Judicial Circuit. See Mann v. Chief Judge of
the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, 696 So.2d 1184
(Fla.1997). As this Court explained, despite its char-
acterization as a division, the drug court was “more
properly viewed as a specialized section or subdivi-
sion of the criminal division of the circuit court.” Id.
at 1185. In Mann, we cited our previous opinion in
Administrative Order Fourth Judicial Circuit (Divi-
sion of Courts), 378 So.2d 286, 286 (Fla.1979), for
the proposition that the Florida Constitution “only
requires the establishment of subject matter divisions,
i.e., criminal, civil, juvenile, probate, and traffic.”
Accordingly, we concluded that the drug court divi-
sion at issue in Mann was properly created by admin-
istrative order. 696 So.2d at 1185. We further noted
that it would place “too great a burden upon the effi-
cient administration of justice ... [t]o require every
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 8
specialized section of the major subject-matter divi-
sions of a court to be approved by local rule.” Id.
In light of our reasoning in Mann and the senior
judge utilization statistics for the circuit, we conclude
that the use of senior judges to relieve overcrowding
of the civil and criminal dockets in the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit does not constitute a complex case
division that requires approval*1137 by local rule.
Thus, the senior judge assignments are proper via
administrative order of the chief judge.
[15][16] Next the petitioners argue that the assign-
ment of a retired judge who resides in a different ju-
dicial circuit violates the constitutional eligibility
requirements of article V, section 8 of the Florida
Constitution. This section provides in pertinent part
that “[n]o person shall be eligible for office of justice
or judge of any court unless the person is an elector
of the state and resides in the territorial jurisdiction of
the court.” Despite this seeming constitutional restric-
tion, this Court has ruled that a circuit judge may be
assigned temporarily to serve in a circuit other than
the one in which he or she was elected. See Card v.
State, 497 So.2d 1169 (Fla.1986); see also Judges of
Polk County Court v. Ernst, 615 So.2d 276 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1993) (concluding that a county judge may be
temporarily assigned to serve outside the county
where elected). Based upon these cases, we find no
impediment to a similar temporary assignment of a
senior judge. Further, as we explained in In re Report
& Recommendations of the Committee on Appoint-
ment & Assignment of Senior Judges, 847 So.2d 415,
2003 WL 1987980 (Fla. May 1, 2003), “the account-
ability for senior judges rests with the chief justice
rather than the voters of a particular circuit or district.
Because the chief justice's authority and responsibil-
ity extend throughout the state, the chief justice can
assign a senior judge to duty without limitation to the
jurisdiction of the senior judge's prior service.” op. at
423. Thus, we find no merit to this challenge.
[17] The petitioners argue that the assignment of
complex cases to the senior judge docket results in
delay which constitutes an unconstitutional restraint
on access to courts. Seeart. I, § 21, Fla. Const. (“The
courts shall be open to every person for redress of
any injury, and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial, or delay.”). However, most of the peti-
tioners' delay arguments seem to be addressed to the
crowded civil docket and the resulting delay of civil
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


litigation in general. The petitioners have made no
convincing arguments that these cases would be re-
solved any more quickly if they remained on the
regular civil docket. Statistics indicate that the Seven-
teenth Judicial Circuit is very efficient in its man-
agement and administration of judges and the con-
duct of its jury trials. It is counterintuitive to assume
judicial efficiency would improve if we reduced the
number of judges handling cases in the circuit by
eliminating the use of senior judges. As noted above,
senior judges currently perform the work of approxi-
mately thirty-five full-time judges statewide. Our
judicial system would be severely hamstrung without
these services. See, e.g., In re Certification of Judi-
cial Manpower, 592 So.2d 241, 246 (Fla.1992)
(“Florida trial courts have continued to address work-
load pressures by relying heavily on the temporary
assignment of senior judges.”). We would all like to
see cases disposed of expeditiously. However, lim-
ited judicial resources and burgeoning court dockets
require that the chief judges retain the freedom to
manage the resources for “the efficient and proper
administration of all courts within [the] circuit.” Fla.
R. Jud. Admin. 2.050(b)(3). “[A]s the administrative
officer of all courts within a judicial circuit, the chief
judge is best equipped to assess the needs of each
trial court and to allocate the judicial labor available
within the circuit accordingly.” Wild, 672 So.2d at
17-18 (footnote omitted).
[18] The petitioners make two challenges relating to
the definition of a “retired judge.” First, they argue
that only *1138 those judges who have reached the
constitutional age of retirement, seventy years of age,
meet the definition of a retired judge who may be
temporarily appointed to judicial service under article
V, section 2(b). The petitioners rely upon the judicial
eligibility provision in article V, section 8 of the Flor-
ida Constitution, which provides, in pertinent part,
that “[n]o justice or judge shall serve after attaining
the age of seventy years except upon temporary as-
signment or to complete a term, one-half of which
has been served.” The petitioners contend that when
the mandatory retirement provision in article V, sec-
tion 8 is read in pari materia with the judicial ap-
pointment power in article V, section 2(b), we must
conclude that only those judges who have reached
retirement age are eligible for temporary appoint-
ment. Second, the petitioners contend that only those
judges who are eligible for retirement benefits under
the state retirement system qualify as retired judges
who may be temporarily appointed to judicial service
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 9
under article V, section 2(b). Thus, the petitioners
argue, persons who have resigned from judicial office
or have chosen not to seek reelection to judicial of-
fice are not qualified for appointment as senior
judges. The petitioners argue that these eligibility
restrictions on the appointment of senior judges di-
minish the intrusion on the constitutional right to
suffrage as the judges who have performed the re-
quired years of judicial service have withstood the
challenge of election and reelection and have a dem-
onstrated history of support by their electors.
[19] We are not persuaded by either argument. The
Florida Constitution gives the chief justice authority
to assign “retired justices or judges” to temporary
duty. Art. V, § 2(b), Fla. Const. For the purpose of
judicial administration, a retired judge is defined as
“a judge not engaged in the practice of law who has
been a judicial officer of this state.” Fla. R. Jud.
Admin. 2.030(a)(3)(B). Florida Statutes also define a
retired judge as “any former justice or judge” who
has not been defeated in seeking reelection or reten-
tion in his or her last judicial office and is not en-
gaged in the practice of law. See§ 25.073(1), Fla.
Stat. (2001) (emphasis added). Thus, under both the
Rules of Judicial Administration and the Florida
Statutes there are only two restrictions on the eligibil-
ity of retired judges who may be assigned to tempo-
rary judicial duty: they may not be engaged in the
practice of law; and they may not have been defeated
for reelection or retention in their last judicial office.
In our recent review of the Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Committee on the Appointment and As-
signment of Senior Judges, we concluded that “defer-
ence to the constitutional electoral process dictate[s]”
that “judges or justices who fail to win reelection or
retention in their last judicial position are not eligible
for senior judge service.” In re Report & Recommen-
dations of the Committee on Appointment & Assign-
ment of Senior Judges, op. at 6, 847 So.2d 415, 418,
2003 WL 1987980 (Fla. May 1, 2003). However, the
same concerns do not attend the temporary assign-
ment of qualified and competent judges who have
chosen to resign from judicial office before reaching
the constitutional age of retirement or who are not yet
eligible for retirement benefits under the state retire-
ment system. Thus, we find no merit to the definition
challenges raised by the petitioners.
Finally, the petitioners argue that senior judges may
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


not be appointed for matters of convenience and in-
stead all senior judge appointments must be measured
by an “emergency of public business” standard. The
petitioners cite our opinion in Spector v. Glisson, 305
So.2d 777 (Fla.1974), to *1139 support the “emer-
gency of public business” standard. Spector involved
the question of whether a Supreme Court justice's
resignation tendered for a future date created a cur-
rent vacancy that should be filled during an upcom-
ing general election. In concluding that a present va-
cancy had been created and that the vacancy could be
filled in the upcoming election,FN4 this Court stated:
FN4. At the time of our decision in Spector,
appellate judges and Supreme Court justices
were subject to election by the voters. In
November 1976, Florida voters approved an
amendment whereby appellate judges and
justices are subject to merit selection and re-
tention. Seeart. V, § 10(a), Fla. Const.
It has been said that the only excuse for the appoint-
ment of any officer made elective under the law is
founded on the emergency of the public business
and that when an elective office is made vacant the
policy of the law is to give the people a chance to
fill it as soon as possible.
Id. at 781 (quoting 63 Am.Jur.2d, Public Officers and
Employees § 128). When considered in its proper
context, this opinion neither addressed the chief
justice's constitutional power to assign judges to
temporary duty nor created an “emergency of pub-
lic business” before that power could be exercised.
[20] The express language of the constitutional provi-
sion which gives the chief justice the power to ap-
point judges does not restrict the power to “emergen-
cies.” Indeed, this Court has consistently measured
the power to make temporary assignments by a stan-
dard of flexibility and efficiency. See, e.g., Rivkind,
672 So.2d at 820-21 (“We find that the judicial as-
signments at issue constitute a logical and lawful
means to ensure the expeditious and efficient resolu-
tion of domestic violence issues in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.”) (emphasis added); Wild, 672 So.2d at 18
(“When a chief judge exercises this delegated as-
signment authority, the judge is acting under the
Chief Justice's constitutional power to make tempo-
rary judicial assignments to ensure the speedy, effi-
cient, and proper administration of justice within the
various circuits.”) (emphasis added); Holsman, 667
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 10
So.2d at 772 (“The assignment ... is used to maximize
the efficient administration of justice....”); Crusoe,
472 So.2d at 1165 (“Flexibility must be given the
chief judge to utilize effectively judicial manpower in
the mutual assistance of each trial court.”). Thus, we
conclude that an assignment which meets the consti-
tutional requirement of “temporary duty” need not be
based on an emergency of public business.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the
assignment of cases to the senior judge docket in the
Seventeenth Judicial Circuit is constitutional and in
accord with applicable law. Thus, we deny the peti-
tions for writ of prohibition, lift the stay on further
proceedings below, and remand this cause to the Sev-
enteenth Judicial Circuit.
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., WELLS, J., and SHAW and
HARDING, Senior Justices, concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion.
LEWIS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with
an opinion.
PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur in result
only.WELLS, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority's decision.
I write to express my view, however, that it is clearly
necessary to the proper administration of justice in
our trial courts for the chief judge and trial counsel in
each circuit to have an ongoing meaningful *1140
discussion about the type of problems which have
been raised in these proceedings and before our
Committee on the Appointment and Assignment of
Senior Judges. We on this Court are very dependent
on the chief judges of the circuits to exercise their
discretion in the administration of the circuits be-
cause each circuit has different problems which can
only be effectively worked upon by those who have
daily experience at the local level. The chief judges
and their administrative judges benefit from regular
and substantive meetings with trial counsel. Many of
our chief judges presently do this. However, I believe
that there needs to be a regularly working committee
in each circuit for this purpose. I urge that in each
circuit a bench-bar committee be established and that
there be a meeting of this committee at least once
every three months. This committee should consist of
the chief judge of the circuit, all administrative
judges in the circuit, and selected counsel participants
 846 So.2d 1129
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)


who are active trial lawyers in the circuit. I suggest
that the counsel participants be either some or all of
the circuit's representatives on the Board of Gover-
nors of The Florida Bar or their nominees.
LEWIS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the rejection of several challenges
presented here, I write to express my disagreement
with the majority's determination that the assign-
ments of senior judges in the Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit are indeed “temporary,” and that the circuit
has not effectively created a special senior division
for the purpose of trying complex civil cases.FN5 I
believe that the pattern of assigning such cases in that
circuit exceeds the constitutional parameters permit-
ting the assignment of senior judges for temporary
service. In approving this de facto division, I believe
this Court has permitted the concept of temporary
assignment-conceived to serve important public in-
terests-to evolve into a constitutionally impermissible
broad rule of convenience. Moreover, I believe a
separate “complex case” or “senior judges' ” docket
has been created in violation of this State's constitu-
tionally mandated court structure. Thus, for the rea-
sons articulated herein, I must dissent from the ma-
jority's determination that the assignment process in
the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit is constitutionally
proper.
FN5. While the problem presented here may
be unique to the Seventeenth Judicial Cir-
cuit, that fact, standing alone, does not re-
lieve this Court of its responsibility to en-
sure that the circuit adhere to constitutional
constructs governing judicial assignments.
The ability of the Chief Justice of this Court to make
temporary judicial assignments is grounded in the
need to ensure the speedy, efficient, and proper ad-
ministration of justice. See Wild v. Dozier, 672 So.2d
16, 18 (Fla.1996). Senior judges are a vital part of
achieving this important goal. By appointing senior
judges, judicial circuits can increase case disposition,
address court emergencies, and solve calendar con-
flicts in a cost-effective manner. However, neither the
need for efficiency nor the corresponding ability of
senior judges to meet that objective justifies exceed-
ing the constitutional requirement that nonelected
judges receive assignment on a temporary basis, only.
Seeart. V, § 2(b), Fla. Const. We cannot allow the
goal of judicial efficiency, however laudable it may
be, to trammel clear and direct constitutional direc-
© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 11
tives. See Wild, 672 So.2d at 21 (Kogan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
In reaching its decision, the majority must engage in
a “judicial wink” as it considers the true definition of
“temporary.” As recognized by this Court,
“[t]emporary is an antonym for permanent.” *1141
Crusoe v. Rowls, 472 So.2d 1163, 1165 (Fla.1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A temporary as-
signment, by definition, cannot “usurp, supplant, or
effectively deprive circuit court jurisdiction of a par-
ticular type of case on a permanent basis.”Id. Our
decision in Payret v. Adams, 500 So.2d 136
(Fla.1986), compels us to be wary against circum-
stances rendering de facto permanency to allegedly
temporary assignments. See id. at 138 (invalidating
an assignment that was successive and repetitive,
having been renewed annually for a period of five
years). Thus, we must examine the judicial assign-
ment's duration as well as its nature, the type of cases
covered, and the practical effect of the assignment on
circuit court jurisdiction over a particular type of
case. See Wild, 672 So.2d at 19.
The regularized process of assigning complex civil
cases to senior judges in the Seventeenth Circuit ef-
fectively supplants the jurisdiction of active judges
over those matters. The invalidity of this process is
not mitigated by the fact that not every complex civil
litigation matter is assigned to the senior judges'
docket. A substantial percentage are, with consequent
impact on the rights of the parties involved. There is
no corresponding emergency, such as a violation of
the speedy trial rules, to justify consistent reassign-
ment of these cases. Indeed, the only justification
offered is the mantra of judicial efficiency, which,
however noble, cannot create its own constitutional
foundation that so clearly violates constitutional stric-
tures.
In determining that no special division has been cre-
ated in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, the majority,
in my opinion, glosses over the practical de facto
effect of the process in operation there. By giving
notice that the trial of a case will likely exceed two-
and-a-half weeks, attorneys can almost ensure place-
ment on the docket slated for hearing by a senior
judge. The process effectively allocates cases to a
distinct group of judges-not by subject matter-but by
the complexity of the case and projected length of
trial. Cf. Mann v. Chief Judge of the Thirteenth Judi-
 846 So.2d 1129 Page 12
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370
(Cite as: 846 So.2d 1129)

cial Circuit, 696 So.2d 1184, 1185 (Fla.1997). Thus,

a distinct de facto “complex case” division has been
created in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit without
issuance of a local rule in accordance with proper
procedure.

In Broward County, senior judges have become a de

facto permanent circuit division for the trial of com-
plex civil cases not by the method authorized by the
Florida Constitution, but by judicial direction. While
I understand the demands placed upon those respon-
sible for the administration of the local system and
the current status of resources, a de facto system such
as this exists beyond constitutional parameters, and I
must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion
as outlined herein.

Fla.,2003.
Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. v. Pfeifler
846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370

END OF DOCUMENT

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

 Date of Printing: Apr 20, 2009

KEYCITE

Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. v. Pfeifler, 846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370 (Fla.,May 01, 2003)
(NO. SC01-2062, SC01-2079)
History

Direct History

=> 1 Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. v. Pfeifler, 846 So.2d 1129, 28 Fla. L. Weekly S370 (Fla. May
01, 2003) (NO. SC01-2062, SC01-2079)

Court Documents

Dockets (U.S.A.)

Fla.
2 PHYSICIANS HEALTHCARE PLANS, INC., ET AL. v. RAYMOND PFEIFLER, ET UX., NO.
SC01-2062 (Docket) (Fla. Sep. 17, 2001)
3 KHURSHID KHAN, M.D., ET AL. v. RAYMOND PFEIFLER, ET UX., NO. SC01-2079 (Docket)
(Fla. Sep. 28, 2001)

© 2009 Thomson Reuters. All rights reserved.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin., Rule 2.205 Page 1

West's Florida Statutes Annotated Currentness

Florida Rules of Judicial Administration (Refs & Annos)
Part II. State Court Administration
Rule 2.205. The Supreme Court

(a) Internal Government.

(1) Exercise of Powers and Jurisdiction. The supreme court shall exercise its powers and jurisdiction en banc. Five
justices shall constitute a quorum and the concurrence of 4 shall be necessary to a decision. In cases requiring only a
panel of 5, if 4 of the 5 justices who consider the case do not concur, it shall be submitted to the other 2 justices.

(2) Chief Justice.

(A) The chief justice shall be chosen by majority vote of the justices for a term commencing on July 1 of even-
numbered years. If a vacancy occurs, a successor shall be chosen promptly to serve the balance of the unexpired
term.

(B) The chief justice shall have the following administrative powers and duties. The chief justice shall:

(i) be the administrative officer of the court and shall be responsible for the dispatch of its business;

(ii) have the power to act on requests for stays during the pendency of proceedings, to order the consolidation of
cases, to determine all procedural motions and petitions relating to the time for filing and size of briefs and
other papers provided for under the rules of this court, to advance or continue cases, and to rule on other proce-
dural matters relating to any proceeding or process in the court;

(iii) have the power to assign active or retired county, circuit, or appellate judges or justices to judicial service
in this state, in accordance with subdivisions (a)(3) and (a)(4) of this rule;

(iv) have the power, upon request of the chief judge of any circuit or district, or sua sponte, in the event of natu-
ral disaster, civil disobedience, or other emergency situation requiring the closure of courts or other circum-
stances inhibiting the ability of litigants to comply with deadlines imposed by rules of procedure applicable in
the courts of this state, to enter such order or orders as may be appropriate to suspend, toll, or otherwise grant
relief from time deadlines imposed by otherwise applicable statutes and rules of procedure for such period as
may be appropriate, including, without limitation, those affecting speedy trial procedures in criminal and juve-
nile proceedings, all civil process and proceedings, and all appellate time limitations; and

(v) perform such other administrative duties as may be required and which are not otherwise provided for by
law or rule.

(C) The chief justice shall be notified by all justices of any contemplated absences from the court and the reasons
therefor.

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin., Rule 2.205 Page 2

(D) If the chief justice dies, retires, or is unable to perform the duties of the office, the justice longest in continu-
ous service shall perform the duties during the period of incapacity or until a successor chief justice is elected.

(3) Administration.

(A) The chief justice may, either upon request or when otherwise necessary for the prompt dispatch of business in
the courts of this state, temporarily assign justices of the supreme court, judges of district courts of appeal, circuit
judges, and judges of county courts to any court for which they are qualified to serve. Any consenting retired jus-
tice or judge may be assigned to judicial service and receive compensation as provided by law.

(B) For the purpose of judicial administration, a “retired judge” is defined as a judge not engaged in the practice
of law who has been a judicial officer of this state. A retired judge shall comply with all requirements that the su-
preme court deems necessary relating to the recall of retired judges.

(C) When a judge who is eligible to draw retirement compensation has entered the private practice of law, the
judge may be eligible for recall to judicial service upon cessation of the private practice of law and approval of the
judge's application to the court. The application shall state the period of time the judge has not engaged in the
practice of law, and must be approved by the court before the judge shall be eligible for recall to judicial service.

(D) A “senior judge” is a retired judge who is eligible to serve on assignment to temporary judicial duty.

(4) Assignments of Justices and Judges.

(A) When a justice of the supreme court is unable to perform the duties of office, or when necessary for the
prompt dispatch of the business of the court, the chief justice may assign to the court any judge who is qualified to
serve, for such time as the chief justice may direct.

(B) When a judge of any district court of appeal is unable to perform the duties of office, or when necessary for
the prompt dispatch of the business of the court, the chief judge shall advise the chief justice and the chief justice
may assign to the court any judge who is qualified to serve, for such time or such proceedings as the chief justice
may direct.

(C) When any circuit or county judge is unable to perform the duties of office, or when necessary for the prompt
dispatch of the business of the court, the chief judge of the circuit may assign any judge in the circuit to temporary
service for which the judge is qualified, in accordance with rule 2.215. If the chief judge deems it necessary, the
chief judge may request the chief justice to assign a judge to the court for such time or such proceedings as the
chief justice may direct.

(b) Clerk.

(1) Appointment. The supreme court shall appoint a clerk who shall hold office at the pleasure of the court and per-
form such duties as the court directs. The clerk's compensation shall be fixed by law. The clerk's office shall be in
the supreme court building. The clerk shall devote full time to the duties of the office and shall not engage in the
practice of law while in office.

(2) Custody of Records, Files, and Seal. All court records and the seal of the court shall be kept in the office and the
custody of the clerk. The clerk shall not allow any court record to be taken from the clerk's office or the courtroom,
except by a justice of the court or upon the order of the court.

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin., Rule 2.205 Page 3

(3) Records of Proceedings. The clerk shall keep such records as the court may from time to time order or direct.
The clerk shall keep a docket or equivalent electronic record of all cases that are brought for review to, or that origi-
nate in, the court. Each case shall be numbered in the order in which the notice, petition, or other initial pleading
originating the cause is filed in the court.

(4) Filing Fee. In all cases filed in the court, the clerk shall require the payment of a fee as provided by law when the
notice, petition, or other initial pleading is filed. The payment shall not be exacted in advance in appeals in which a
party has been adjudicated insolvent for the purpose of an appeal or in appeals in which the state is the real party in
interest as the moving party. The payment of the fee shall not be required in habeas corpus proceedings, or appeals
therefrom, arising out of or in connection with criminal actions.

(5) Issuance of Mandate; Recordation and Notification. The clerk shall issue such mandates or process as may be
directed by the court. Upon the issuance of any mandate, the clerk shall record the issuance in a book or equivalent
electronic record kept for that purpose, in which the date of issuance and the manner of transmittal of the process
shall be noted. In proceedings in which no mandate is issued, upon final adjudication of the pending cause the clerk
shall transmit to the party affected thereby a copy of the court's order or judgment. The clerk shall notify the attor-
neys of record of the issuance of any mandate or the rendition of any final judgment. The clerk shall furnish without
charge to all attorneys of record in any cause a copy of any order or written opinion rendered in such action.

(6) Return of Original Papers. Upon the conclusion of any proceeding in the supreme court, the clerk shall return to
the clerk of the lower court the original papers or files transmitted to the court for use in the cause.

(c) Librarian.

(1) Appointment. The supreme court shall appoint a librarian of the supreme court and such assistants as may be
necessary. The supreme court library shall be in the custody of the librarian, but under the exclusive control of the
court. The library shall be open to members of the bar of the supreme court, to members of the legislature, to law
officers of the executive or other departments of the state, and to such other persons as may be allowed to use the
library by special permission of the court.

(2) Library Hours. The library shall be open during such times as the reasonable needs of the bar require and shall
be governed by regulations made by the librarian with the approval of the court.

(3) Books. Books shall not be removed from the library except for use by, or upon order of, any justice.

(d) Marshal.

(1) Appointment. The supreme court shall appoint a marshal who shall hold office at the pleasure of the court and
perform such duties as the court directs. The marshal's compensation shall be fixed by law.

(2) Duties. The marshal shall have power to execute process of the court throughout the state and such other powers
as may be conferred by law. The marshal may deputize the sheriff or a deputy sheriff in any county to execute proc-
ess of the court and shall perform such clerical or ministerial duties as the court may direct or as required by law.
Subject to the direction of the court, the marshal shall be custodian of the supreme court building and grounds.

(e) State Courts Administrator.

(1) Appointment. The supreme court shall appoint a state courts administrator who shall serve at the pleasure of the
court and perform such duties as the court directs. The state courts administrator's compensation shall be fixed by

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Fla. R. Jud. Admin., Rule 2.205 Page 4

law.

(2) Duties. The state courts administrator shall supervise the administrative office of the Florida courts, which shall
be maintained at such place as directed by the supreme court; shall employ such other personnel as the court deems
necessary to aid in the administration of the state courts system; shall represent the state courts system before the
legislature and other bodies with respect to matters affecting the state courts system and functions related to and
serving the system; shall supervise the preparation and submission to the supreme court, for review and approval, of
a tentative budget request for the state courts system and shall appear before the legislature in accordance with the
court's directions in support of the final budget request on behalf of the system; shall assist in the preparation of edu-
cational and training materials for the state courts system and related personnel, and shall coordinate or assist in the
conduct of educational and training sessions for such personnel; shall assist all courts in the development of im-
provements in the system, and submit to the chief justice and the court appropriate recommendations to improve the
state courts system; and shall collect and compile uniform financial and other statistical data or information reflec-
tive of the cost, workloads, business, and other functions related to the state courts system. The state courts adminis-
trator is the custodian of all records in the administrator's office.

(f) Open Sessions. All sessions of the court shall be open to the public, except proceedings designated as confiden-
tial by the court and conference sessions held for the discussion and consideration of pending cases, for the formula-
tion of opinions by the court, and for the discussion or resolution of other matters related to the administration of the
state courts system.

(g) Designation of Assigned Judges. When any judge of another court is assigned for temporary service on the su-
preme court, that judge shall be designated, as author or participant, by name and initials followed by the words
“Associate Justice.”

CREDIT(S)

Former Rule 2.030 amended June 14, 1979, effective July 1, 1979 (372 So.2d 449); May 3, 1990, effective June 15,
1990 (560 So.2d 786); Oct. 8, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993 (609 So.2d 465); Oct. 24, 1996, effective Jan. 1, 1997
(682 So.2d 89); March 7, 2002 (825 So.2d 889); Nov. 3, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006 (915 So.2d 145). Renumbered
from Rule 2.030 Sept. 21, 2006 (939 So.2d 966).

Current with Amendments received through 1/14/10

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END OF DOCUMENT

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.