ADMIN LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, AND ELECTION LAWS
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THE LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
CAYO G. GAMOGAMO vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND
TRANSPORT CORP.
G.R. No. 141707. May 7, 2002
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was first employed with the DOH as Dental
Aide and later on promoted to the position of Dentist
1. He remained employed at the DOH for fourteen
years until he resigned on 2 November 1977.
On 9 November 1977, petitioner was hired as company
dentist by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
(LUSTEVECO), a private domestic
corporation. Subsequently, Respondent PNOC
acquired and took over the shipping business of
LUSTEVECO, and on 1 August 1979, petitioner was
among those who opted to be absorbed by the
Respondent. Thus, he continued to work as company
dentist and assumed without interruption petitioners
service credits with LUSTEVECO, but it did not assume
petitioners service credits with the DOH.
On 10 June 1993, President Ramos issued
memorandum approving privatization of PNOC
subsidiaries. Accordingly, respondent implemented a
Manpower Reduction Program wherein under this
program, retrenched employees shall receive a two
month pay for every tear of service. Petitioner
requested to be included in the next retrenchment
schedule but it was denied for a reason that he was
holding a permanent position and that he was already
due for mandatory retirement under his retirement
plan.
Eventually, petitioner retired after serving respondent
for 17 years and 4 months upon reaching 60 yrs old.
However, upon approval of two permanent employees
retrenchment, petitioner now filed a complaint at NLRC
for the full payment of his retirement benefits arguing
that his service with the DOH should have been
included in the computation of his years of service.
Hence, with an accumulated service of 32 years and
should have been paid a two month pay for every year
of service per the retirement plan.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners service rendered in DOH will be
credited and will be added to his creditable service later
acquired in PNOC-Shipping and Transport, a GOCC w/o
original charter.
HELD:
We cannot uphold petitioners contention that his
fourteen years of service with the DOH should be
considered because his last two employers were
government-owned and controlled corporations, and
fall under the Civil Service Law.Article IX(B), Section 2
paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states --
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters.
It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and
LUSTEVECO are government-owned and controlled
corporations, they have no original charters; hence
they are not under the Civil Service Law. In Philippine
National Oil Company-Energy Development
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
we ruled:
xxx Thus under the present state of the law, the test
in determining whether a government-owned or
controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service
Law are [sic] the manner of its creation, such that
government corporations created by special charter(s)
are subject to its provisions while those incorporated
under the General Corporation Law are not within its
coverage.
Consequently, Respondent was not bound by the
opinion of the Civil Service Commission of 18 May
1993.
Petitioners contention that the principle of tacking of
creditable service is mandated by Republic Act No.
7699 is baseless. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7699
reads:
SEC 3. Provisions of any general or special law or rules
and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, a
covered worker who transfer(s) employment from one
sector to another or is employed in both sectors, shall
have his creditable services or contributions in both
systems credited to his service or contribution record
in each of the Systems and shall be totalized for
purposes of old-age, disability, survivorship, and other
benefits in case the covered employee does not qualify
for such benefits in either or both Systems without
totalization: Provided, however, That overlapping
periods of membership shall be credited only once for
purposes of totalization.
Obviously, totalization of service credits is only
resorted to when the retiree does not qualify for
benefits in either or both of the Systems. Here,
petitioner is qualified to receive benefits granted by the
Government Security Insurance System (GSIS), if such
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right has not yet been exercised. The pertinent
provisions of law are:
SEC. 12 Old Age Pension. -- (a) xxx
(b) A member who has rendered at least three years
but less than fifteen years of service at the time of
separation shall, upon reaching sixty years of age or
upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash
payment equivalent to one hundred percent of his
average monthly compensation for every year of
service with an employer (Presidential Decree No,
1146, as amended, otherwise known as the
Government Service Insurance Act of 1977).
SEC. 4. All contributions paid by such member
personally, and those that were paid by his employers
to both Systems shall be considered in the processing
of benefits which he can claim from either or both
Systems: Provided, however, That the amount of
benefits to be paid by one System shall be in proportion
to the number of contributions actually remitted to that
System (Republic Act No. 7699).
In any case, petitioners fourteen years of service with
the DOH may not remain uncompensated because it
may be recognized by the GSIS pursuant to the
aforequoted Section 12, as may be determined by the
GSIS. Since petitioner may be entitled to some benefits
from the GSIS, he cannot avail of the benefits under
R.A. No. 7699.
LUZ LUMANTA, ET AL. vs. NLRC and FOOD
TERMINAL, INC.
G.R. No. 82819 February 8, 1989
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners file a complaint against FTI for unpaid
retrenchment/separation pay and underpayment of
wages and non-payment of ECOLA with the DOLE. FTI
moved for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction contending that employees of government
owned and controlled corporation is not governed by
the Labor Code but the Civil Service Law and hence,
fall within jurisdiction of the CSC and not the DOLE.
Petitioners on the other hand contends that FTI has
still a mark of a private corporation for it directly hires
its employees without seeking approval from CSC and
that its employees are covered by SSS and not GSIS.
ISSUE:
Whether labor law claim against GOCC without original
charter like FTI falls within the jurisdiction of DOLE.
HELD:
Yes. The 1987 Constitution which took effect on 2
February 1987, governs and which reads:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter.
(Article IX-B, Section 2 [1])
The jurisdiction is determined as of the time of the
filing of the complaint. At the time the complaint
against private respondent FTI was filed (i.e., 20 March
1987), and at the time the decisions of the respondent
Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission
were rendered (i.e., 31 August 1987 and 18 March
1988, respectively), the 1987 Constitution had already
come into effect. latter of Instruction No. 1013, dated
19 April 1980, included Food Terminal, Inc. in the
category of "government-owned or controlled
corporations." Since then, FTI served as the marketing
arm of the National Grains Authority (now known as
the National Food Authority). The pleadings show that
FTI was previously a privately-owned enterprise,
created and organized under the general incorporation
law, with the corporate name "Greater Manila Food
Terminal Market, Inc." The record does not indicate
the precise amount of the capital stock of FM that is
owned by the government; the petitioners' claim, and
this has not been disputed, that FTl is not hundred
percent (100%) government-owned and that it has
some private shareholders.
We conclude that because respondent FTI is
government-owned and controlled corporation without
original charter, it is the Department of Labor and
Employment, and not the Civil Service Commission,
which has jurisdiction over the dispute arising from
employment of the petitioners with private respondent
FTI, and that consequently, the terms and conditions
of such employment are governed by the Labor Code
and not by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
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ROBERTO A. FLORES Et., Al. vs. HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary,
and RICHARD J. GORDON
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities
at Subic, challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d)
of the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which directs the President to appoint a professional
manager as administrator of the SBMAprovided that
for the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of
Olongapo City (Richard Gordon) shall be appointed as
the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the proviso violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
2. Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio
to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an
excepted circumstance.
3. Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing
an elective official to receive
double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be
useless if no elective official may be appointed to
another post.
4. Whether there is legislative encroachment on the
appointing authority of the President.
5. Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per
diems, allowances and other emoluments which he
may have received pursuant to his appointment.
HELD:
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of
the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be
eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless
otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso
directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e.
the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post
(as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what
the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a
situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in
government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the
SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office of
the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase
shall be appointed unquestionably shows the intent
to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of
the subject proviso. In any case, the Vice-President for
example, an elective official who may be appointed to
a cabinet post, may receive
the compensation attached to the cabinet position if
specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the
President the power to appoint the Chairman of SBMA,
he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the
power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress
clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of
the President to only one candidate. Such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing
power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction
on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed
that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the
officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e.,
he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly
an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Since the ineligibility of an elective official
for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first
from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-
attached disqualification before he may be considered
fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible
for appointment to another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is
ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman
and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not
necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de
facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is
entitled to such benefits.
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CITY MAYOR ROGELIO R. DEBULGADO and
VICTORIA T. DEBULGADO vs. CSC
G.R. No. 111471 September 26, 1994
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayor Rogelio Debulgado is the incumbent
Mayor of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. He
promoted his wife, petitioner Victoria Debulgado, as
General Services Officer, that is, as head of the Office
of General Services of the City Government of San
Carlos. Before her promotion, petitioner Victoria had
been in the service of the City Government for about
thirty-two (32) years and she rose from the ranks by
successively occupying different government offices.
Public respondent CSC received a letter from
Congressman Tranquilino Carmona of the First District
of Negros Occidental, calling attention to the
promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in
favor of his wife. After investigation, the CSC
disapproved the promotion of petitioner Victoria to the
position upon the ground that that promotion violated
the statutory prohibition against nepotic appointments.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, contending that
the statutory prohibition against nepotism was not
applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General
Services Officer since the prohibition applies only to
original appointments and not to promotional
appointments. Petitioners believe that because
petitioner Victoria was already in the service of the City
Government before she married petitioner Mayor, the
reason behind the prohibition no longer applied to her
promotional appointment. Petitioners also affirm that
petitioner Victoria deserves to be promoted to General
Services Officer, considering her long and faithful
service to the City Government. The CSC had deprived
petitioner Victoria of her right to due process by
unilaterally revoking her appointment. Petitioners
assert that Victoria can no longer be removed from the
position of General Services Officer without giving her
an opportunity to be heard and to answer the charged
of nepotism.
Petitioner Mayor denies that he had been motivated by
personal reasons when he appointed his wife to the
new post. He states that his wife was the most qualified
among the candidates for appointment to that position,
she having worked for the City Government for thirty-
two (32) years and being highly recommended by the
OIC-Treasurer of San Carlos City. It is also claimed by
petitioner Mayor that his choice of his wife for the
position was concurred in by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod. He further avers that he had consulted
the Field and Regional Officers of the CSC in Bacolod
City, and raised the question of applicability of the
prohibition against nepotism to the then proposed
promotion of his wife in one of the seminars conducted
by the Commission's Regional Office held in San Carlos
City. According to petitioner Mayor, one Gregorio C.
Agdon, a supervising personnel specialist in the
Commission's Bacolod Office, informed him that the
promotional appointment was not covered by the
prohibition.
ISSUE:
Whether prohibition against nepotism apply to
promotional appointments.
HELD:
The prohibition against nepotism applies to BOTH
original and promotional appointments. Both an
original appointment and a promotion are particular
species of personnel action, which must comply with
the prohibition against nepotism.
The original appointment of a civil service employee
and all subsequent personnel actions undertaken by or
in respect of that employee such as promotion,
transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, etc., must
comply with the Implementing Rules including, of
course, the prohibition against nepotism
The prohibitory norm against nepotism in the public
service is set out in Section 59, Book V of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 (also known as EO 292)
under Section 59:
All appointments in the national, provincial, city and
municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative
of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the
chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons
exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby
prohibited.
The following are exempted from the operation of the
rules on nepotism: (a) persons employed in a
confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and
(d) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines:
Provided, however, that in each particular instance full
report of such appointment shall be made to the
Commission.
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It is essential to stress, however, that the prohibition
applies quite without regard to the actual merits of the
proposed appointee and to the good intentions of the
appointing or recommending authority, and that the
prohibition against nepotism in appointments whether
original or promotional, is not intended by the
legislative authority to penalize faithful service. The
purpose of Section 59 is precisely to take out of the
discretion of the appointing and recommending
authority the matter of appointing or recommending
for appointment a relative.
The promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria as
formerly approved by the CSC did not vest in her a right
to that position, therefore, she was not deprived of due
process when she was terminated. Victoria was not
deprived due process as there were no administrative
charges in respect of which she would have been
entitled to notice and hearing. The CSC, in approving
or disapproving an appointment, only examines the
conformity of the appointment with applicable
provisions of law and whether the appointee possesses
all the minimum qualifications and none of the
disqualifications. At all events, as the Solicitor General
has noted, petitioner Victoria was afforded an
opportunity to be heard when she filed an MR with the
CSC and there challenged the disapproval by the
Commission.
Since the promotional appointment in favor of
petitioner Victoria was a violation of Section 59, it was
null and void from the beginning. A void appointment
cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the
holder of such appointment.
The CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on
all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g.,
promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall
an appointment initially approved in disregard of
applicable provisions of Civil Service law and
regulations.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. No. 83896 February 22, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to declare
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides
that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may,
in addition to his primary position, hold not more than
two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation
shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to
boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.
The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO
284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any other profession, participate in
any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.
The petitioners maintained that the phrase unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution used in Section
13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution.
Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that
the phrase unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution in Section 13, Article VII makes reference
to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
The provision relied upon by the respondents provides:
Sec. 7. . . . . .
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
ISSUE No. 1:
Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the
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broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?
ISSUE No. 2:
Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio
capacity?
ISSUE No. 3:
Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the
perquisites they have received from the offices they
have held pursuant to EO 284?
HELD:
Number 1:
No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and
his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a
blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple
offices or employment in the government subsuming
both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate
another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure,
unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself.
While all other appointive officials in the civil service
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-
XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be
the exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution must be given a literal interpretation
to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section
3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those
instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3),
Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue
of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Number 2:
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices
or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution must not, however, be construed as
applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said officials
office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise
any other office within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an
imposition of additional duties and functions on said
officials. The term ex-officio means from office; by
virtue of office. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act
done in an official character, or as a consequence of
office, and without any other appointment or authority
than that conferred by the office. The additional
duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the officials primary functions. If the
functions required to be performed are merely
incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function
of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall
under the purview of any other office prohibited by
the Constitution.
Number 3:
During their tenure in the questioned positions,
respondents may be considered de facto officers and
as such entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered. It has been held that in cases where there
is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good
faith has had possession of the office and has
discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an
appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other
compensations attached to the office. Any per diem,
allowances or other emoluments received by the
respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the
questioned positions may therefore be retained by
them.
Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as
it actually allows a member of the cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
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unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.
HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as
Secretary of the DECS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 131012. April 21, 1999
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Abad, Bandigas, Somebang and Margallo, private
respondents, are public school teachers. Sometime in
September and October 1990, during the teachers
strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason,
they were administratively charged with
1) grave misconduct; 2) gross violation of Civil Service
Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4) refusal to perform
official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6) conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL.
They were placed under preventive suspension.
Investigation ended before the lapse of the 90-day
period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The
three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal
to the CA, the court mitigated the punishment to
reprimand only. Hence their reinstatement. Now the
reinstated teachers are asking for back wages during
the period of their suspension and pending appeal
(before the CA exonerated them).
ISSUE:
Whether the teachers are entitled to back wages for
the period pending their appeal if they are
subsequently exonerated.
HELD:
YES, they are entitled to full pay pending their appeal.
To justify the award of back wages, the respondent
must be exonerated from the charges and
his suspension be unjust.
Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the
respondent is exonerated and the administrative
decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he
should be reinstated with full pay for the period of
the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service
Decree states that the respondent shall be considered
as under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand,
if his conviction is affirmed the period of
his suspension becomes part of the final penalty
of suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the
respondents won in their appeal, therefore the period
of suspension pending their appeal would be
considered as part of the preventive suspension,
entitling them to full pay because they were eventually
exonerated and their suspension was unjustified.
They are still entitled to back salaries even if they were
still reprimanded.
LUZVIMINDA DE LA CRUZ, Et. Al. vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CSC and THE SECRETARY
OF THE DECS
G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners are public school teachers who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and
eventually dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It
was alleged that the teachers participated in the mass
action/ illegal strike on Sept. 1990. The teachers also
violated the return-to-work order issued by the DECS.
Respondents failed to explain to the DECS despite the
5-day period given. Hence, they were found guilty as
charged, and subsequently dismissed from office by
Sec. Carino of the DECS. The Civil Service Commission,
upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service, and imposed
upon them the reduced penalty of six months
suspension. However, in view of the length of time that
the teachers had been out of service due to the
dismissal issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC
likewise ordered their immediate reinstatement
without back wages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the teachers conducts are prejudicial to
the best interest of service.
2. Whether or not the teachers are entitled to back
wages for the period of 3 years pending their appeal
deducting the 6 months suspension eventually meted
out to them.
HELD:
1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited
strike of civil service servants. Although the right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances is guaranteed by
the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised within
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reasonable limits. The public-school teachers
committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the service
by staging the mass protests on regular school days,
abandoning their classes and failing to return despite
the return to work order.
2. NO, they are not entitled to back wages. The
teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably
suspended, the 2 circumstances necessary for the
grant of back wages in
administrative disciplinary cases.
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE
RAUL M. GONZALEZ REQUESTING HONORABLE
JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT
ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
A.M. No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16
March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr.
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14
December 1987 with enclosure of the Concerned
Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a
telegram of Miguel Cuenco, for "comment within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had
brought this 1st Indorsement to the attention of the
Court en banc in view of the important implications of
policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor.
He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter-
complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned
employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales
referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr.
Miguel Cuenco against Justice Fernan, and asking him
(Gonzales) to do something about it.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy of
the per curiam Resolution in which, the Court Resolved
to dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco
against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the
same Resolution, the Court Resolved to require
complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not
be administratively dealt with for making unfounded
serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon
request of Mr. Cueco, the Court had granted him an
extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a
pleading which appears to be an omnibus pleading
relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135.
Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned,
the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for
Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15
April 1988, the Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be
disbarred during his term of office.
HELD:
A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the
Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by
him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment
during the incumbency of such public officer. Further,
such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any
other court, with any offense which carries with it the
penalty of removal from office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment
should be dismissed is because under the Constitution,
members of the SC may be removed only by
impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal
from office by any other method. Otherwise, to allow
such public officer who may be removed solely by
impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his
office with an office that carries the penalty of removal
from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of
the Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of
position and disqualification to hold any office of honor,
trust or profit under the Republic. Judgment in cases
of impeachment shall not extend further than removal
from office and disqualification to hold any office. But
the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable
and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment
according to law.
The court is not saying that its Members or other
constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from
liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed
misbehavior. What the court is saying is that there is a
fundamental procedural requirement that must be
observed before such liability may be determined and
enforced. A member of the Supreme Court must first
be removed from office, via the constitutional route of
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impeachment, and then only may he be held liable
either criminally or administratively (that is,
disbarment), for any wrong or misbehavior that may
be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
vs.
GERTRUDES MADRIAGA and ANA MARIE
BERNARDO
G.R. No. 164316. September 27, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Ombudsmans authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance
therewith is not merely recommendatory but
mandatory within the bounds of the law.
FACTS:
The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman charging
Gertrudes Madriaga, school principal of San Juan
Elementary School and Ana Marie Bernardo, Canteen
Manager of the same school, with violation of Section
1 of Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the Rules
Implementing Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees. They were
subsequently found guilty of the offense charged.
Consequently, they were meted out the penalty of six
(6) months imprisonment.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals declared that the six-
month suspension meted out by the Office of the
Ombudsman to Madriaga and Bernardo (Gertrudes) is
merely recommendatory to the Department of
Education, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the
authority to impose administrative sanctions over
public officials
HELD:
Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution grants
the Ombudsman administrative disciplinary power to
direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the
constitutional grant to the Ombudsman of the power
to recommend the imposition of penalty on erring
public officials and employees and ensure compliance
therewith.
The Court notes that the proviso above qualifies the
"order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute" an officer or employee akin to the
questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply
with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an
erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary
action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
"recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but
is actually mandatory within the bounds of law. This
should not be interpreted as usurpation by the
Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or
any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
any illegal act or omission of any public official is not
an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating
therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the
action to be taken against an erring officer or
employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in R.A.
6770 intended that the implementation of the order be
coursed through the proper officer, which in this case
would be the head of the BID.
The word "recommend" in Sec. 15(3) must thus be
read in conjunction with the phrases "ensure
compliance therewith" or "enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21" of R.A. No. 6770.
In fine, the Ombudsman's authority to impose
administrative penalty and enforce compliance
therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is
mandatory within the bounds of the law. The
implementation of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
U.P. BOARD OF REGENTS vs. HON. JAINAL D.
RASUL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig,
Metro Manila, and DR. FELIPE A. ESTRELLA, JR.
G.R. No. 91551. August 16, 1991
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
The UP Board of Regents appointed Dr.
Felipe Estrella as the Director of PGH from September
1986 till April 1992.
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Barely 2 weeks after appointment, Dr. Abuava, as the
President of the UP sent a memorandum to the Board
of Regents to Reorganize PGH.
Upon this recommendation, the Board of Regents
approved the re-organization plan and Nomination
Committee was formed.
This committee ought to choose a replacement
for Dr. Estrella as to fill up the alleged vacant UP-PGH
Director.
Dr. Estrella filed an injunction case against the
Nomination Committee and the Board of Regents to
forestall the removal or dismissal of Dr Estrella.
ISSUE:
Whether Dr Estrella can be rightfully removed because
of PGHs reorganization.
HELD:
NO. As held in numerous cases, appointees of the UP
Board of Regents enjoy security of tenure during their
term of office. Moreover, it is clear from the record
that PGH itself was not abolished in the reorganization
plan approved by the UP Board of Regents. The PGH
was merely renamed UP-PGH Medical Center and
some of its functions and objects were expanded or
consolidated. The UP-PGH Medical Center
is essentially the same as PGH hence, the Medical
Center Director will be performing duties very similar
to the present PGH director. It cannot be invoked to
sustain the argument that respondent is not entitled to
security of tenure. It is true that a valid
and bonafide abolition of an office denies to
the incumbent the right to security of tenure.
In this case, the renaming and restructuring of the PGH
and its component units cannot give rise to a valid
and bona fide abolition of the position of the PGH
Director. This is because where the abolished office
and the offices created in its place have similar
functions, the abolition lacks good faith.
WENONAH L. MARQUEZ AZARCON
vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE ARBITER
CHARITO BUNAGAN,
G. R. No. 124611. March 20, 2003
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
SAGANA and J. M. Builders as vendors, and petitioner
Wenonah L. Marquez-Azarcon (Azarcon) as vendee,
entered into a contract to sell a house and lot located
at Sagana Homes, Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City
under which Azarcon was to pay, as she did, an initial
amount of P49,740.00, the balance to be paid through
an SSS housing loan.
Azarcons SSS loan application was disapproved,
however, on account partly of SAGANAs failure to
submit certain requirements including the title to the
subject property which had been burned and was
pending reconstitution. She thus offered to pay the
balance of P101,560.00 in cash but SAGANA refused to
accept the same unless she paid interest thereon.
As Azarcon refused to pay interest on the balance of
the purchase price, she filed a complaint against
SAGANA and J. M. Builders before the HLURB. Azarcon
in the meantime occupied the subject property.
After hearing, a Housing and Land Use Arbiter (HLA)
rendered a decision ordering Azarcon to pay the
balance of the purchase price, and SAGANA to deliver
the Deed of Sale and the title covering the subject
property.
In accordance with the decision, Azarcon paid the
balance of the purchase price which was received by
SAGANA. SAGANA refused, however, to execute a
Deed of Sale over the subject property and to deliver
the title covering it on the ground that Azarcon had yet
to pay rentals in accordance with the decision.
SAGANA filed before the Board a Motion for
Execution of its decision with respect to its order for
Azarcon to pay rentals.
Azarcon also filed a Motion for Executionof the same
Board decision in light of SAGANAs refusal to issue a
Deed of Sale in her favor and to deliver the title
covering the subject property.
HLA denied Azarcons motion and granted that of
SAGANA, thus directing Azarcon to pay rentals.
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Azarcon thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. In its Comment to Azarcons petition
before the Court of Appeals, SAGANA alleged that
Azarcon failed to exhaust all administrative remedies,
she having failed to appeal to the Office of the
President following the 1987 HLURB Rules of
Procedure.
ISSUE:
Whether amount of rental shall form part of the
amount of the purchase price.
RULING:
To follow the interpretation proffered by SAGANA
would allow the Board to alter the parties agreement
on the purchase price.
Upon the other hand, Azarcons interpretation is more
in accord with the finding of the Board that the delay in
the payment of the purchase price was not due to her
fault, precisely on account of which finding it deleted
the order for the payment of interest by Azarcon. Held
the Board:
[SAGANA] has failed to convincingly refute
[AZARCONs] argument that the non-release of the loan
was due to its non-submission of certain requirements.
Hence, for this reason, the . . . issue [of whether or not
Azarcon is liable for the payment of interest] is resolved
in the
negative. We are convinced that [Azarcon] should not
be held responsible for the delay in the release of the
loan andconsequently for the non-
payment of the purchase price.
Such being the case, we believe that a recall of our
previous ruling ordering [Azarcon] to pay interest by
way of damages is in order.
If Azarcon had been spared by the Board of paying
interest by way of damages because she was not
responsible for the delay in the release of the loan and
consequently for the non-payment of [the balance] of
the purchase price, why should the Board have
intended to make her liable to pay rentals over and
above the balance of the purchase
price, especially given her tender of payment of such
balance after the loan application was not approved,
which tender SAGANA refused to accept without
interest being paid thereon? That the Board had no
such intention, the following portion of its May 10,
1993 decision instructs:
In the absence of payment through housing loan, the
buyer
should effect payment through other means within a r
easonable period. The seller should also extend all
support and assistance to make it possible for the
buyer to find such means, particularly if it contributed
to the non-release of the loan. If parties cannot agree
on the substitute method of payment on the period for
effecting the same, then the Board may step to fix the
same.
Meantime we believe
that until this matter can be resolved, complainant sh
ould pay rentals as equitable payment for use of the p
remises, which can be applied to the balance of the p
urchase price.
From the immediately foregoing disquisition of the
Board, it is clear that the payment of rentals was
devised by it merely as an interim scheme, until a
substitute method of payment [of the balance of the
purchase price] was agreed upon by the parties.
Since Azarcon fully paid the balance of the purchase
price on July 22, 1993, less than three months after
the Board decision was promulgated on May 10, 1993,
that part of the decision respecting payment through
other means devised by the Board for Azarcon to, in
the meantime, pay rentals as equitable payment for
the use of the premises, which can be applied to the
balance of the purchase price, had become functus
oficio. To hold otherwise would be to fault Azarcon in
whom none was, as reflected above, found by the
Board. It would also gloss over Azarcons initial
payment of a substantial amount when they entered
into the contract to sell and her tender of payment of
the balance which was, however, rejected by SAGANA.
It would thus ignore the interest of justice and equity
which underlies all systems of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The position of petitioner,
Wenonah L. Marquez-Azarcon, that the Writ of
Execution in question varied the terms of the HLURB
May 13, 1993 decision is upheld.
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PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS vs. HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO as Ombudsman
G.R. No. 130140 October 25, 1999
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
FACTS:
President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 13, creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans,
In its FOURTEENTH (14TH) REPORT ON BEHEST
LOANS to President Ramos, dated 15 July 1993, the
COMMITTEE reported that the Philippine, Seeds, Inc.,
(hereafter PSI) of which the respondents in OMB-0-96-
0968 were the Directors, was one of the twenty-one
corporations which obtained behest loans.
President Ramos directed COMMITTEE Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo to, inter alia, "proceed with
administrative and judicial actions against the twenty-
one firms. The COMMITTEE the filed with the
OMBUDSMAN a sworn complaint against the Directors
of PSI and the BDM who approved the loans for
violation of RA No. 3019.
In the resolution OMBUDSMAN dismissed the
complaint on the ground of prescription. Relying
on People v. Dinsay, a case decided by the Court of
Appeals, he ratiocinated that since the questioned
transactions were evidenced by public instruments and
were thus open for the perusal of the public, the
prescriptive period commenced to run from the time of
the commission of the crime, not from the discovery
thereof.
The COMMITTEE argues that the right of the Republic
of the Philippines to recover behest loans as ill-gotten
wealth is imprescriptible pursuant to the mandate of
Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution, which
provides:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred
by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
The ruling in Dinsay is not applicable to the case at bar.
First, it is a decision of the Court of Appeals; hence, it
does not establish a doctrine and can only have a
persuasive value.
The OMBUDSMAN takes a different view. For one, he
asserts that Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution
is not applicable, since what the COMMITTEE seeks is
not to recover the unlawfully acquired wealth from the
respondents therein but to hold them criminally liable
for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
According to him, the computation of the prescriptive
period from the date of discovery would only be
resorted to if the commission of the crime be not
known at the day of the commission. The phrase "if the
same be not known" does not mean "lack of actual
knowledge
ISSUE: W/N the OMBUDSMAN gravely abused its
discretion in holding that offenses had already
prescribed
HELD:
We agree with the OMBUDSMAN that Section 15 of
Article XI of the Constitution applies only to civil actions
for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal
cases. It is just the imprescriptibily of the civil action,
it does not cover imprescriptibility of criminal
action.The prescription shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting
double jeopardy.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the
State, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at
the time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the
loans." Thus, the prescriptive period for the should be
computed from the discovery of the commission
thereof and not from the day of such commission.
OMBUDSMAN forthwith dismissed the complaint
without even requiring the respondents to submit their
counter-affidavits and solely on the basis of the dates
the alleged behest loans were granted. It should have
first received from the complainant and the
respondents to resolve the case on merits and on the
issue of the date of discovery of the offense.
Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the
preliminary investigation.