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G.R. No.

L-23079 February 27, 1970 results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-
document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents.
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption
petitioners, papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located
vs. former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA adoption, and obtained written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge
CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents. of the pertinent adoption proceedings.

CASTRO, J.: On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the
petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late
(Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent
testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Benita Cruz-Meez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother
Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of
are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to
probate of the will allowed after due hearing. properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides
the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued
Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of
adopted children. the deceased which were not disposed of in the will.

On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby
died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the
court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria.
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of
kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and
adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention
mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions.

Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk
the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria,
couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and
the above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the
granted." other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez,
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the
In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal
of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion adoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its
of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the
genuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which xxx xxx xxx
the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the
decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang
validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:
institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents
Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto,
testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng
article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads: bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana
(legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong
ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan,
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not na namana ko sa aking yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati () ng ilang
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid
na si Fausto Austria.
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are
not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that
free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-
properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime.
succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be
relevance. spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the
institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the
should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or
of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece
whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?
proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads: following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be
stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear
The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he
written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such had known the falsity of the cause.
institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling
of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that
deceased which recite: under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the
testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if
III she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law,
independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her
Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking itinuturing na supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on
mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme.
at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in
the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it
is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect.3 A probate court has found, by
for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary
uncertain implications. capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.4
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be
her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject
still such institution must stand. of a collateral attack.5

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of
false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent
institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act which the court could
that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and
for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the orders so as to make them conformable to law and justices.6 That the court a quo has
institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated
legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless? by the Rules of Court.7

The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang
mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used,
respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the
inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her
estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate (libre
disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children,
and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her
part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to
give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent
had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and
Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the
other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a
result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit
injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which
will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy." 1

Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate,2 as
was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be
avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the
G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of
which, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
surnamed Reyes y Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants, alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first will
vs. presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the lower court
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee. held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband
Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the
same.1
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Case of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.
deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
by his deceasea wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting
of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000. This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not
only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows: to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate
of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of
"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the
Land Records of this Province, being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the
deceased Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors." fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title
thereto, and that the court did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime defendant, who was then a minor.'
they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared
31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337. the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto,
of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano
Milagros Barretto and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the
Felisa Barretto and his nephew an nieces The usufruct o the fishpon situate i basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as follows: .
barrio Sa Roque Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his
widow, Maria Gerardo I the meantime Maria Gerardo was appointe administratrix. A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been
By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her included, shall be null and void.
own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano
distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his
As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such
the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her free part. And it concluded that, as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano
own name. Barretto, she was entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and
successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in view of the
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines establishing that
the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the real
owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received of jurisdiction or fraud.
under the project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros
Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the
this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and defendant. estate, and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition
becomes irrelevant.
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been
misapplied to the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate of
admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud
together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the
one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, and minor Milagros Barretto), and since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs,
was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak nor were any findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no greater
of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being in the nature
or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is
does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority for the proposition that a
Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon
he chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise
Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto. agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the case before us,
however, the agreement of partition was not only ratified by the court's decree of
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long before
or total ommission of a forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.
by appellee, is not at all applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or
omission of children of the testator's former marriage. Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that
the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact,
Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity with the
status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous, probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the provisions whereof no objection had been
since a compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939,
concessions of the parties (Civil Code of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, provided: .
Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while
untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the testator. SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a compromise over letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate. Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is cases of estates in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
the court alone that makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629,
643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed
it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. If the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without
the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court ruled
should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo)
would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said
as the distribution of the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees
Phil. 938, "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place, there is no evidence that when the
acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor,
prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is binding Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud was
against all of them." (See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither
distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor. In the
in the distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) second placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained
There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to within 4 years from its discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long
intestate proceedings. ago.

The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of 24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action accrued
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to to contest on the ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father's estate and
negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case the four-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act. 190).
by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the In fact, conceding that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee's
effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the action was
to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim in this case
ago distributed and disposed of. contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.

It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs. In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that
Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that: appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to
reconvey the properties received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition, evidence of the alleged promise, which rests exclusively on the oral assertions of
and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such
Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise
The mere statement in the project of partion that the guardianship proceedings of the was made, the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the
minor Lucia Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of
had not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet disposition, and not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as to
been terminated, and as a guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a them unless duly authorized by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil.
guardian, Maria Gerardo must have been already appointed when she signed the 136, 142).
project of partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project
of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which shows that Maria In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in
Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project of partition as guardian of the the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by
minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground for the contention that the the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for
order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked being contrary to either Article 1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros
collaterally in these proceedings. Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the
statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the properties
party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the
her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have
Instance which settled her father's estate. been given due course.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is
reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee
Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is
affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records
be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action for
partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits thereof,
as prayed for in the complaint No costs.
G.R. No. L-24365 June 30, 1966 The will of Edward E. Christensen contains, among others, the following clauses which
are pertinent to the issue in this case:
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, deceased.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, executor and appellee, 3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (Now
vs. Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN, oppositor and appellant. who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, oppositor and appellee.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
MAKALINTAL, J.: above-named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died xxx xxx xxx
leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court
of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954. In that same decision the 7. I give, devise, and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she
Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time
and was affirmed in its decision of February 14, 1958 (G.R. No. L-11484). adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
In another incident relative to the partition of the deceased's estate, the trial court Currency, the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with
approved the project submitted by the executor in accordance with the provisions of the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One
the will, which said court found to be valid under the law of California. Helen Garcia Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as
appealed from the order of approval, and this Court, on January 31, 1963, reversed the well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
same on the ground that the validity of the provisions of the will should be governed by
Philippine law, and returned the case to the lower court with instructions that the xxx xxx xxx
partition be made as provided by said law (G.R. No. L-16749).
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney) now residing, as aforesaid, at No. 665
project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
(named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed
merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his at my death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her
daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his lifetime; Provided, however, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at
death. The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been anytime prior to her decease having living issue, then and in that event, the life interest
preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the herein given shall terminate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to
properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the my daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY the rest, remainder and
legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved residue of my property with the same force and effect as if I had originally so given,
by the lower court and distributed to the legatees. devised and bequeathed it to her; and provided, further, that should the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY die without living issue, then, and in that event, I give, devise
The case is once more before us on appeal, this time by Lucy Duncan, on the sole and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property one-half (1/2) to my
question of whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOUISE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124,
to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and one-half (1/2) to the children of my
heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CHRISTENSEN, namely: Mrs. Carol F. Ruggaver, of Los
Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate. Angeles, California, U.S.A., and Joseph Raymond Christensen, of Manhattan Beach,
California, U.S.A., share and share alike, the share of any of the three above named who
may predecease me, to go in equal parts to the descendants of the deceased; and,
provided further, that should my sister Mrs. Carol Louise C. Borton die before my own El testador no ha olvidado por completo al heredero forzoso; le ha dejado bienes; pero
decease, then, and in that event, the share of my estate devised to her herein I give, haciendo un calculo equivocado, ha repartido en favor de extraos o en favor de otros
devise and bequeath to her children, Elizabeth Borton de Trevio, of Mexico City legitimarios por via de legado donacion o mejora mayor cantidad de la que la ley de
Mexico; Barbara Borton Philips, of Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., and Richard Borton, of consentia disponer. El heredero forzoso no puede perder su legitima, pero tampoco
Bakersfield, California, U.S.A., or to the heirs of any of them who may die before my own puede pedir mas que la misma. De aqui su derecho a reclamar solamente lo que le falta;
decease, share and share alike. al complemento de la porcion que forzosamente la corresponde.

The trial court ruled, and appellee now maintains, that there has been preterition of ... Dejar el testador por cualquier titulo, equivale a disponer en testamento por titulo de
Helen Garcia, a compulsory heir in the direct line, resulting in the annulment of the herencia legado o mejora, y en favor de legitimarios, de alguna cantidad o porcion de
institution of heir pursuant to Article 854 of the Civil Code, which provides: bienes menos que la legitima o igual a la misma. Tal sentido, que es el mas proprio en al
articulo 815, no pugna tampoco con la doctrina de la ley. Cuando en el testamento se
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the deja algo al heredero forzoso, la pretericion es incompleta: es mas formularia que real.
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death Cuando en el testamento nada se deja el legitimario, hay verdadera pretericion. (6
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be Manresa, 7th Ed., 1951, p. 437.)
valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
On the difference between preterition of a compulsory heir and the right to ask for
On the other hand, appellant contends that this is not a case of preterition, but is completion of his legitime, Sanchez Roman says:
governed by Article 906 of the Civil Code, which says: "Any compulsory heir to whom
the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand La desheredacion, como expresa, es siempre voluntaria; la pretericion puede serlo pero
that the same be fully satisfied." Appellant also suggests that considering the provisions se presume involuntaria la omision en que consiste en cuanto olvida o no atiende el
of the will whereby the testator expressly denied his relationship with Helen Garcia, but testador en su testamento a la satisfaccion del derecho a la legitima del heredero
left to her a legacy nevertheless although less than the amount of her legitime, she was forzoso preterido, prescindiendo absoluta y totalmente de el y no mencionandole en
in effect defectively disinherited within the meaning of Article 918, which reads: ninguna de sus disposiciones testamentarias, o no instituyendole en parte alguna de la
herencia, ni por titulo de heredero ni por el de legatar o aunque le mencionara o
ART. 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the cause, or for a cause the truth of nombrara sin dejarle mas o menos bienes. Si le dejara algunos, por pocos que sean e
which, if contradicted, is not proved, or which is not one of those set forth in this Code, insuficientes para cubrir su legitima, ya no seria caso de pretericion, sino de
shall annul the institution of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; complemento de aquella. El primer supuesto o de pretericion se regula por el articulo
but the devices and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such 814, y produce accion de nulidad de la institucion de heredero; y el segundo, o de
extent as will not impair the legitimate. complemento de legitima por el 815 y solo original la accion ad suplementum, para
completar la legitima. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2, p. 1131.)
Thus, according to appellant, under both Article 906 and 918, Helen Garcia is entitled
only to her legitime, and not to a share of the estate equal that of Lucy Duncan as if the Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming
succession were intestate. him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir
without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.
Article 854 is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Spanish Civil Code; and Article 906 of Manresa continues:
Article 815. Commenting on Article 815, Manresa explains:
Se necesita pues (a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso; (b) Que la omision
Como dice Goyena, en el caso de pretericion puede presumirse ignorancia o falta de sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.1wph1.t
memoria en el testador; en el de dejar algo al heredero forzoso no. Este no se encuentra
plivado totalmente de su legitima: ha recibido por cualquir titulo una porcion de los xxx xxx xxx
bienes hereditarios, porcion que no alcanza a completar la legitima, pero que influeye
poderosamente en el animo del legislador para decidirle a adoptar una solucion bien B. Que la omision sea completa Esta condicion se deduce del mismo Articulo 814 y
diferente de la sealada para el caso de pretericion. resulta con evidencia al relacionar este articulo con el 815. El heredero forzoso a quien
el testador deja algo por cualquier titulo en su testamento, no se halla propiamente
omitido pues se le nombra y se le reconoce participacion en los bienes hereditarios. se le dejaba por titulo de tal el completo de su legitima, la accion para invalidar la
Podria discutirse en el Articulo 814 si era o no necesario que se reconociese el derecho institucion hecha en el testamento y reclamar y obtener aquella mediante el ejercicio
del heredero como tal heredero, pero el articulo 815 desvanece esta duda. Aquel se de la querella de inoficioso, y aun cuando resultara favorecido como donotario, por otro
ocupa de privacion completa o total, tacita este, de la privacion parcial. Los efectos titulo que no fuera el de heredero, sino al honor de que se le privaba no dandole este
deben ser y son, como veremos completamente distintos (6 Manresa, p. 428.) caracter, y solo cuando era instituido heredero en parte o cantidad inferior a lo que le
correspondiera por legitima, era cuando bastaba el ejercicio de la accion ad
La privacion de la legitima puede ser total o parcial. suplementum para completarla, sin necesidad de anular las otras instituciones de
heredero o demas disposiciones contenidas en el testamento.
Privar totalmente de la legitima es negarla en absoluto al legitimario, despojarle de ella
por completo. A este caso se refiere el articulo 814. Privar parcialmente de la legitima, El Articulo 851 se aparta de este criterio estricto y se ajusta a la unica necesidad que le
es menguarla o reducirla dejar al legitimario una porcion, menor que la que le inspira cual es la de que se complete la legitima del heredero forzoso, a quien por
corresponde. A este caso se refiere el articulo 815. El 813 sienta, pues, una regla general, cualquier titulo se haya dejado menos de lo que le corresponda, y se le otorga tan solo
y las consecuencias del que brantamiento de esta regla se determina en los articulos el derecho de pedir el complemento de la misma sin necesidad de que se anulen las
814 y 815. (6 Manresa p. 418.) disposiciones testamentarias, que se reduciran en lo que sean inoficiosas conforme al
articulo 817, cuya interpretacion y sentido tienen ya en su apoyo la sancion de la
Again Sanchez Roman: jurisprudencia (3); siendo condicion precisa que lo que se hubiere dejado de menos de
la legitima al heredero forzoso, lo haya sido en el testamento, o sea por disposicion del
QUE LA OMISSION SEA TOTAL. Aunque el articulo 814 no consigna de modo expreso testador, segun lo revela el texto del articulo, "el heredero forzoso a quien el testador
esta circunstancia de que la pretericion o falta de mencion e institucion o disposicion haya dejado, etc., esto es por titulo de legado o donacion mortis causa en el testamento
testamentaria a su favor, sea total, completa y absoluta, asi se deduce de no hacer y, no fuera de al. (Sanchez Roman, Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 937.)
distincion o salvedad alguna empleandola en terminos generales; pero sirve a
confirmarlo de un modo indudable el siguiente articulo 815, al decir que el heredero Manresa cites particularly three decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain dated January
forzoso a quien el testador haya dejado por cualquier titulo, menos de la legitima que la 16, 1895, May 25, 1917, and April 23, 1932, respectively. In each one of those cases the
corresponda, podria pedir el complemento de la misma, lo cual ya no son el caso ni los testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but
efectos de la pretericion, que anula la institucion, sino simplemente los del suplemento without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of
necesario para cubrir su legitima. (Sanchez Roman Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 1133.) the estate to other persons. It was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not
ask that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be
The question may be posed: In order that the right of a forced heir may be limited only completed. (6 Manresa, pp. 438, 441.)
to the completion of his legitime (instead of the annulment of the institution of heirs) is
it necessary that what has been left to him in the will "by any title," as by legacy, be The foregoing solution is indeed more in consonance with the expressed wishes of the
granted to him in his capacity as heir, that is, a titulo de heredero? In other words, testator in the present case as may be gathered very clearly from the provisions of his
should he be recognized or referred to in the will as heir? This question is pertinent will. He refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter, and limited her
because in the will of the deceased Edward E. Christensen Helen Garcia is not mentioned share to a legacy of P3,600.00. The fact that she was subsequently declared judicially to
as an heir indeed her status as such is denied but is given a legacy of P3,600.00. possess such status is no reason to assume that had the judicial declaration come during
his lifetime his subjective attitude towards her would have undergone any change and
While the classical view, pursuant to the Roman law, gave an affirmative answer to the that he would have willed his estate equally to her and to Lucy Duncan, who alone was
question, according to both Manresa (6 Manresa 7th 3rd. 436) and Sanchez Roman expressly recognized by him.
(Tomo VI, Vol. 2.0 p. 937), that view was changed by Article 645 of the "Proyecto de
Codigo de 1851," later on copied in Article 906 of our own Code. Sanchez Roman, in the The decision of this Court in Neri, et al. v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185, is cited by appellees in
citation given above, comments as follows: support of their theory of preterition. That decision is not here applicable, because it
referred to a will where "the testator left all his property by universal title to the children
RESPECTO DEL COMPLEMENTO DE LA LEGITIMA. Se inspira el Codigo en esta materia by his second marriage, and (that) without expressly disinheriting the children by his
en la doctrina clasica del Derecho romano y patrio (2); pero con alguna racional first marriage, he left nothing to them or, at least, some of them." In the case at bar the
modificacion. Concedian aquellos precedentes legales al heredero forzoso, a quien no
testator did not entirely omit oppositor-appellee Helen Garcia, but left her a legacy of
P3,600.00.

The estate of the deceased Christensen upon his death consisted of 399 shares of stocks
in the Christensen Plantation Company and a certain amount in cash. One-fourth (1/4)
of said estate descended to Helen Garcia as her legitime. Since she became the owner
of her share as of the moment of the death of the decedent (Arts. 774, 777, Civil Code),
she is entitled to a corresponding portion of all the fruits or increments thereof
subsequently accruing. These include the stock dividends on the corporate holdings. The
contention of Lucy Duncan that all such dividends pertain to her according to the terms
of the will cannot be sustained, for it would in effect impair the right of ownership of
Helen Garcia with respect to her legitime.

One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has been made
in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate
bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This
substitution results in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is
entitled only to the income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have
living issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property
will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this,
point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us, we might call attention to the
limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution, particularly that which says
that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the legitime
must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple.

Wherefore, the order of the trial court dated October 29, 1964, approving the project
of partition as submitted by the executor-appellee, is hereby set aside; and the case is
remanded with instructions to partition the hereditary estate anew as indicated in this
decision, that is, by giving to oppositor-appellee Maria Helen Christensen Garcia no
more than the portion corresponding to her as legitime, equivalent to one-fourth (1/4)
of the hereditary estate, after deducting all debts and charges, which shall not include
those imposed in the will of the decedent, in accordance with Article 908 of the Civil
Code. Costs against appellees in this instance.

Concepcion, C.J., J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, J.P. Bengzon, Zaldivar and Sanchez,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner, claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591
vs. ACEB
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A.
FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors
(respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased
and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the
PARAS, J.: following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108)
ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court,
Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
herein) motion for reconsideration. preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the Intermediate Appellate
Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows: 3; Rollo, p. 159).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and
Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio
in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs. Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition
Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows: for the review of respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6).
Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153).
the issuance to the same petitioner of letters testamentary, docketed as Special Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving Memorandum for petitioner was filed on September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).
a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a
translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection raised by (A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with
private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
the appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the
testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided: (B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity
THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money thereof before it is admitted to probate;
which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother
SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C (C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate.
Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of
the money properties, lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are
constitute my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino, not compulsory heirs in the direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain. heirs;
Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law; succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto
en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra;
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result
mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
bar, explicitly expressed in his will. This is what matters and should be in violable.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification
petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and of such institution of universal heirs-without any other testamentary disposition in the
will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation
unconstitutional and ineffectual. (Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the
whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited. brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs will be, necessarily,
the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: legacies and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
valid insofar as they are not; inofficious. interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who
has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation. there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item
of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of
them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are the Civil Code as a person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
[1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an heir of
concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted
from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the
same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva,
adoption by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587
Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available
were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and
adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction Corporation v.
the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is
is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child. founded on valid grounds (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds:
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo,
of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a
the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A
449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on February 15,
[1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that
certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in
Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The
preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic
complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
upheld the decision of the probate court, induced by practical considerations. The Court resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of
said: certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the
will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v.
validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. Court of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well Court harkens to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate
there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985
proceedings which was fully substantiated by the evidence during the hearing held in and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
SO ORDERED.
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the
petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed
the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright.
Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court
should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid,
supra).
G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006 reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98
90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners, proceedings.2
vs.
HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, The document that petitioners refer to as Segundos holographic will is quoted, as
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO follows:
D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,
SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D. SEANGIO, Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Respondents.
Tantunin ng sinuman
DECISION
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita,
AZCUNA, J.: Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang
inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio
This is a petition for certiorari1 with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan
injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe
dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim
Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in siya at siya nasa ibabaw.
the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396,
and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para
Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking
Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio." Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa
aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
The facts of the cases are as follows:
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r]
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.
intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 9890870 of the
RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. SeangioSantos as Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong
special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio. inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya
anak at hindi siya makoha mana.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition.
They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of tatlong saksi. 3
Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his
business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as (signed)
the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant;
and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of Segundo Seangio
the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left Nilagdaan sa harap namin
a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will. (signed)

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
as SP. Proc. No. 9993396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity
(signed) of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved
(underscoring supplied).
ikatlong saksi
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners motion, SP. Proc. No. 9890870 and SP. Proc. No. DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 9993396 is hereby DISMISSED
9993396 were consolidated.4 without pronouncement as to costs.

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate SO ORDERED.7
proceedings5 primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October
deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil 14, 1999.
Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of
disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other Petitioners contend that:
compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence,
there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN
the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:
decedent.
I
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally,
the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE
validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS,
and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not constitute DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATORS WILL
a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.6 IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF
proceedings: THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE
TESTATORS TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are
Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code II
thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854
does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATORS WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE
to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for respondents
to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its III
face, the will appears to be intrinsically void would have been an exercise in futility. It
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS Civil Code:
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and
Petitioners argue, as follows: descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of (1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of
Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice
of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the (2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law
appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found
notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo; groundless;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as (3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the
its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance spouse of the testator;
of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the
holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void; (4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private
respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the (5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit
compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will such child or descendant;
since there was no institution of an heir;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;8
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the (7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;
hearing of the testate case; and,
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo. Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo
can be considered as a holographic will.
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated,
signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document. written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other
form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed
Segundos intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo. instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is
written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results
document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would
form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a succeed in the absence of Alfredo.10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as
the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to
law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.11

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the
law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones
drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the instrument and the intention of the testator.12 In this regard, the Court is
convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was
intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in
accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,13 the
disinheritance cannot be given effect.14

With regard to the issue on preterition,15 the Court believes that the compulsory heirs
in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Courts opinion, Segundos
last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception
of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir16 to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in
the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was
included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.1wphi1

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the
law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus,
unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be
rendered nugatory.17

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic
will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.18

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent
judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the
holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is
hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966 testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law
prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic
vs. validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees. therein.1

Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant. A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of
Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees. whether or not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that
SANCHEZ, J.: the will has been duly authenticated.2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below
and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability
exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic
On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well
11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.3 After
that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate 2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the below that the will is a complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will
probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of petitioner and the applicable statute.
Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally preterited and that in Reproduced hereunder is the will:
consequence the institution is void.
Nov. 17, 1951
On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection
thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed
a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property
On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing
dismiss.1wph1.t with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day
of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" (Sgd.) Illegible
and dismissed the petition without costs.
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal. The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part,
provides:
1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death
of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly,
valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ... they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a
clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la
Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a este ordenamiento referring to the
814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code.9 The one-sentence will here institutes
petitioner as the sole, universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete.
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa:
the institution of heir; but the legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they
are not inofficious. ... En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo
o en parte? No se aade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa
A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes que se anulara la institucion de heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del
a necessity. On this point Manresa comments: deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion es completa o total, y que este
articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al 817. 10
La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra
siquiera o aun nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman:
deshereda expresamente ni se le asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado
de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima. La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion
de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada
Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento total o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese
omita el testador a uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos
herencia forzosa. instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto
legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la
Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision institucion de heredero." ... 11
sea completa; que el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.
Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the
It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul: totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir
without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration
To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers
204 Pa. 484.6 no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by
the roots the fabric of the statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria
The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which in our opinion expresses
divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; the rule of interpretation, viz:
obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50
38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7 ... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de
heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos
nullify; to abolish; to do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el
774.8 hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o
supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado
And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no llamar a los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase,
descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending cuando el testador no hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas
line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es,
segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no basta que sea conocida to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be
la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las condiciones supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. 20
que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una
interpretacion arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It
heredero cuya institucion fuese anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective
a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.
ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos y a los principios que
informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different
del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, from those of disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there
12 are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall
3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
notwithstanding, "the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated
inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in
universal heir in a will void because of preterition would give the heir so instituted commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one
a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho
such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23
separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two
component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution 5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to
of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. 24
la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the
en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion. 14 Neri case heretofore cited, viz:

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate children by the second marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and,
succession ensues. accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely reduced. This theory, if adopted,
will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every
4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
than one of preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and
"does not apply to the case at bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction 851 regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless
between pretention and disinheritance. and will never have any application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said
article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing,
of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.
are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn,
"is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to
for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la distinguish institution of heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a
legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina special provision. With reference to article 814, which is the only provision material to
pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution of heirs is therein
disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by
universal title of property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property
bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be
taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity".
Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering,
however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as
universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is
hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.
G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005 plant, the "movie property," the commercial areas, and the house where Don Julian was
living. The remainder of the properties was retained by Don Julian, including Lot No. 63.
J.L.T. AGRO, INC., represented by its Manager, JULIAN L. TEVES, Petitioner,
vs. Paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement, at the heart of the present dispute, lays
ANTONIO BALANSAG and HILARIA CADAYDAY, respondents. down the effect of the eventual death of Don Julian vis--vis his heirs:

DECISION 13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties hereinafter adjudicated
to Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as
TINGA, J.: Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be
understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their
Once again, the Court is faced with the perennial conflict of property claims between mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to
two sets of heirs, a conflict ironically made grievous by the fact that the decedent in this them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the
case had resorted to great lengths to allocate which properties should go to which set properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the
of heirs. Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves,
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the Decision1 dated 30 September 1999 of the Court his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and
of Appeals which reversed the Decision2 dated 7 May 1993 of the Regional Trial Court his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves.
(RTC), Branch 45, of Bais City, Negros Oriental. (Emphasis supplied)

The factual antecedents follow. On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of Assignment of
Assets with Assumption of Liabilities8 in favor of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. (petitioner). Less than
Don Julian L. Teves (Don Julian) contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena a year later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an instrument entitled
(Antonia), and after her death, with Milagros Donio Teves (Milagros Donio). Don Julian Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities
had two children with Antonia, namely: Josefa Teves Escao (Josefa) and Emilio Teves (Supplemental Deed)9 dated 31 July 1973. This instrument which constitutes a
(Emilio). He had also four (4) children with Milagros Donio, namely: Maria Evelyn Donio supplement to the earlier deed of assignment transferred ownership over Lot No. 63,
Teves (Maria Evelyn), Jose Catalino Donio Teves (Jose Catalino), Milagros Reyes Teves among other properties, in favor of petitioner.10 On 14 April 1974, Don Julian died
(Milagros Reyes) and Pedro Reyes Teves (Pedro).3 intestate.

The present controversy involves a parcel of land covering nine hundred and fifty-four On the strength of the Supplemental Deed in its favor, petitioner sought the registration
(954) square meters, known as Lot No. 63 of the Bais Cadastre, which was originally of the subject lot in its name. A court, so it appeared, issued an order11 cancelling OCT
registered in the name of the conjugal partnership of Don Julian and Antonia under No. 5203 in the name of spouses Don Julian and Antonia on 12 November 1979, and on
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5203 of the Registry of Deeds of Bais City. When the same date TCT No. T-375 was issued in the name of petitioner.12 Since then,
Antonia died, the land was among the properties involved in an action for partition and petitioner has been paying taxes assessed on the subject lot.13
damages docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 entitled "Josefa Teves Escao v. Julian Teves,
Emilio B. Teves, et al."4 Milagros Donio, the second wife of Don Julian, participated as Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken possession over the
an intervenor. Thereafter, the parties to the case entered into a Compromise subject lot after the execution of the Compromise Agreement. In 1974, they entered
Agreement5 which embodied the partition of all the properties of Don Julian. into a yearly lease agreement with spouses Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday,
respondents herein.14 On Lot No. 63, respondents temporarily established their home
On the basis of the compromise agreement and approving the same, the Court of First and constructed a lumber yard. Subsequently, Milagros Donio and her children executed
Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District, rendered a Decision6 dated 31 a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate15 dated 18 March 1980. In the deed of
January 1964. The CFI decision declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla partition, Lot No. 63 was allotted to Milagros Donio and her two (2) children, Maria
Milagrosa as property owned in common by Don Julian and his two (2) children of the Evelyn and Jose Catalino. Unaware that the subject lot was already registered in the
first marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.7 name of petitioner in 1979, respondents bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio as
Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais, including the electric evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate16 dated 9 November 1983.
lot was still subject to future disposition by Don Julian during his lifetime.23 It cited
At the Register of Deeds while trying to register the deed of absolute sale, respondents paragraph 1424 of the Compromise Agreement in support of his conclusion.25 With Lot
discovered that the lot was already titled in the name of petitioner. Thus, they failed to No. 63 being the conjugal property of Don Julian and Antonia, the trial court also
register the deed.17 declared that Milagros Donio and her children had no hereditary rights thereto except
as to the conjugal share of Don Julian, which they could claim only upon the death of
Respondents, as vendees of Lot No. 63, filed a complaint before the RTC Branch 45 of the latter.26
Bais City, seeking the declaration of nullity and cancellation of TCT No. T-375 in the name
of petitioner and the transfer of the title to Lot No. 63 in their names, plus damages.18 The trial court ruled that at the time of Don Julians death on 14 April 1974, Lot No. 63
was no longer a part of his estate since he had earlier assigned it to petitioner on 31 July
After hearing, the trial court dismissed the complaint filed by respondents. The 1973. Consequently, the lot could not be a proper subject of extrajudicial partition by
dispositive portion of the decision reads: Milagros Donio and her children, and not being the owners they could not have sold it.
Had respondents exercised prudence before buying the subject lot by investigating the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, this Court finds registration of the same with the Registry of Deeds, they would have discovered that
judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, and thus hereby orders: five (5) years earlier, OCT No. 5203 had already been cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
T-375 in the name of petitioner, the trial court added.27
(1) That complaint be dismissed;
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial courts decision. The decretal part of
(2) That plaintiffs vacate the subject land, particularly identified as Lot No. 63 registered the appellate decision reads:
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
(3) That plaintiffs pay costs. SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-375
registered in the name of J.L.T. Agro, Inc. as null and void.
Finding no basis on the counterclaim by defendant, the same is hereby ordered
dismissed.19 With costs against defendant J.L.T. Agro, Inc. represented by its Manager, Julian L. Teves.

The trial court ruled that the resolution of the case specifically hinged on the SO ORDERED.28
interpretation of paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement.20 It added that the
direct adjudication of the properties listed in the Compromise Agreement was only in Per the appellate court, the Compromise Agreement incorporated in CFI decision dated
favor of Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio.21 31 January 1964, particularly paragraph 13 thereof, determined, adjudicated and
Paragraph 13 served only as an amplification of the terms of the adjudication in favor of reserved to Don Julians two sets of heirs their future legitimes in his estate except as
Don Julian and his two children by the first marriage. regards his (Don Julians) share in Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa.29 The two sets of heirs
acquired full ownership and possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to
According to the trial court, the properties adjudicated in favor of Josefa and Emilio them in the CFI decision and Don Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same,
comprised their shares in the estate of their deceased mother Antonia, as well as their including Lot No. 63. The disposition in the CFI decision constitutes res judicata.30 Don
potential share in the estate of Don Julian upon the latters death. Thus, upon Don Julian could have disposed of only his conjugal share in the Hacienda Medalla
Julians death, Josefa and Emilio could not claim any share in his estate, except their Milagrosa.31
proper share in the Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa which was adjudicated in favor of Don
Julian in the Compromise Agreement. As such, the properties adjudicated in favor of The appellate court likewise emphasized that nobody in his right judgment would
Don Julian, except Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa, were free from the forced legitimary preterit his legal heirs by simply executing a document like the Supplemental Deed
rights of Josefa and Emilio, and Don Julian was under no impediment to allocate the which practically covers all properties which Don Julian had reserved in favor of his heirs
subject lot, among his other properties, to Milagros Donio and her four (4) children.22 from the second marriage. It also found out that the blanks reserved for the Book No.
and Page No. at the upper right corner of TCT No. T-375, "to identify the exact location
The trial court further stressed that with the use of the words "shall be," the adjudication where the said title was registered or transferred," were not filled up, thereby indicating
in favor of Milagros Donio and her four (4) children was not final and operative, as the that the TCT is "spurious and of dubious origin."32
time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Article 1347
Aggrieved by the appellate courts decision, petitioner elevated it to this Court via a of the New Civil Code explicitly provides:
petition for review on certiorari, raising pure questions of law.
ART. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future
Before this Court, petitioner assigns as errors the following rulings of the appellate things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are not intransmissible may also
court, to wit: (a) that future legitime can be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior be the object of contracts.
to the death of Don Julian; (b) that Don Julian had no right to dispose of or assign Lot
No. 63 to petitioner because he reserved the same for his heirs from the second No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
marriage pursuant to the Compromise Agreement; (c) that the Supplemental Deed was authorized by law.
tantamount to a preterition of his heirs from the second marriage; and (d) that TCT No.
T-375 in the name of petitioner is spurious for not containing entries on the Book No. All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
and Page No.33 policy may likewise be the object of a contract.

While most of petitioners legal arguments have merit, the application of the Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even future ones, which are not outside the
appropriate provisions of law to the facts borne out by the evidence on record commerce of man may be the object of a contract. The exception is that no contract
nonetheless warrants the affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals in may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the
favor of respondents. exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.35

Being the key adjudicative provision, paragraph 13 of the Compromise Agreement has For the inheritance to be considered "future," the succession must not have been
to be quoted again: opened at the time of the contract.36 A contract may be classified as a contract upon
future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article 1347, where the
13. That in the event of death of Julian L. Teves, the properties herein adjudicated to following requisites concur:
Josefa Teves Escao and Emilio B. Teves, (excluding the properties comprised as
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa together with all its accessories and accessions) shall be (1) That the succession has not yet been opened;
understood as including not only their one-half share which they inherited from their
mother but also the legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to (2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and
them of the other half belonging to their father, Julian L.Teves. In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Teves (not including his share in the (3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is
Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa) shall exclusively be adjudicated to the wife in second purely hereditary in nature.37
marriage of Julian L. Teves and his four minor children, namely, Milagros Donio Teves,
his two acknowledged natural children Milagros Reyes Teves and Pedro Reyes Teves and The first paragraph of Article 1080, which provides the exception to the exception and
his two legitimated children Maria Evelyn Donio Teves and Jose Catalino Donio Teves." therefore aligns with the general rule on future things, reads:
(Emphasis supplied)
ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by will,
With the quoted paragraph as basis, the Court of Appeals ruled that the adjudication in such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the
favor of the heirs of Don Julian from the second marriage became automatically compulsory heirs.
operative upon the approval of the Compromise Agreement, thereby vesting on them
the right to validly dispose of Lot No. 63 in favor of respondents. ....

Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in holding that future legitime can be In interpreting this provision, Justice Edgardo Paras advanced the opinion that if the
determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the death of Don Julian. The Court partition is made by an act inter vivos, no formalities are prescribed by the Article.38
agrees. Our declaration in Blas v. Santos34 is relevant, where we defined future The partition will of course be effective only after death. It does not necessarily require
inheritance as any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the the formalities of a will for after all it is not the partition that is the mode of acquiring
ownership. Neither will the formalities of a donation be required since donation will not
be the mode of acquiring the ownership here after death; since no will has been made Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
it follows that the mode will be succession (intestate succession). Besides, the partition compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the
here is merely the physical determination of the part to be given to each heir.39 will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. Manresa defines
The historical antecedent of Article 1080 of the New Civil Code is Article 105640 of the preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or,
old Civil Code. The only change in the provision is that Article 1080 now permits any while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without
person (not a testator, as under the old law) to partition his estate by act inter vivos. disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties.44 It is the
This was intended to abrogate the then prevailing doctrine that for a testator to total omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance.45 It consists in
partition his estate by an act inter vivos, he must first make a will with all the formalities the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the
provided by law.41 testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the
hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in
Article 1056 of the old Civil Code (now Article 1080) authorizes a testator to partition the will in the latter case.46 But there is no preterition where the testator allotted to a
inter vivos his property, and distribute them among his heirs, and this partition is neither descendant a share less than the legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced
a donation nor a testament, but an instrument of a special character, sui generis, which heir.47
is revocable at any time by the causante during his lifetime, and does not operate as a
conveyance of title until his death. It derives its binding force on the heirs from the In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
respect due to the will of the owner of the property, limited only by his creditors and partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court approved Compromise
the intangibility of the legitime of the forced heirs.42 Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of preterition prior to the
death of Don Julian in the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides,
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid pursuant to there are other properties which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from
Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally operative only upon Don Julian upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are
the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs from the second marriage to the properties indicative of Don Julians desire along this line.48 Hence, the total omission from
adjudicated to him under the compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It inheritance of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage, a requirement for
was a bare hope of succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
future acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of
property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent and might Despite the debunking of respondents argument on preterition, still the petition would
never exist.43 ultimately rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer effected by Don Julian to
petitioner. Notably, Don Julian was also the president and director of petitioner, and his
Evidently, at the time of the execution of the deed of assignment covering Lot No. 63 in daughter from the first marriage, Josefa, was the treasurer thereof. There is of course
favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property since ownership over no legal prohibition against such a transfer to a family corporation. Yet close scrutiny is
the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the second marriage at the time of his in order, especially considering that such transfer would remove Lot No. 63 from the
death. Thus, as the owner of the subject lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to estate from which Milagros and her children could inherit. Both the alleged transfer
dispose of it during his lifetime. His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and deed and the title which necessarily must have emanated from it have to be subjected
her children on the ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the to incisive and detailed examination.
compromise agreement.
Well-settled, of course, is the rule that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
Emerging as the crucial question in this case is whether Don Julian had validly indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.49
transferred ownership of the subject lot during his lifetime. The lower court ruled that A certificate of title accumulates in one document a precise and correct statement of
he had done so through the Supplemental Deed. The appellate court disagreed, holding the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is
that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, containing as it does a prohibited preterition the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner.50
of Don Julians heirs from the second marriage. Petitioner contends that the ruling of
the Court of Appeals is erroneous. The contention is well-founded. To successfully assail the juristic value of what a Torrens title establishes, a sufficient
and convincing quantum of evidence on the defect of the title must be adduced to
overcome the predisposition in law in favor of a holder of a Torrens title. Thus, contrary
to the appellate courts ruling, the appearance of a mere thumbmark of Don Julian What appears instead on OCT No. 5203 is the following pertinent entry:
instead of his signature in the Supplemental Deed would not affect the validity of
petitioners title for this Court has ruled that a thumbmark is a recognized mode of Entry No. 1374: Kind: Order: Executed in favor of J.L.T. AGRO, INC.
signature.51
CONDITIONS: Lost owners duplicate is hereby cancelled, and null and void and a new
The truth, however, is that the replacement of OCT No. 5203 in the name of Julian by Certificate of Title No. 375 is issued per Order of the Court of First Instance on file in this
T.C.T. No. T-375 is marred by a grave irregularity which is also an illegality, as it office.
contravenes the orthodox, conventional and normal process established by law. And,
worse still, the illegality is reflected on the face of both titles. Where, as in this case, the Date of Instrument: November 12, 1979
transferee relies on a voluntary instrument to secure the issuance of a new title in his
name such instrument has to be presented to the Registry of Deeds. This is evident from Date of Inscription: Nov. 12, 1979 4:00 P.M.
Sections 53 and 57 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 or the Property Registration
Decree. The sections read, thus: (SGD) MANUEL C. MONTESA
Acting Deputy Register of Deeds II
SEC. 53. Presentation of owners duplicate upon entry of new certificate. No voluntary (Emphasis supplied)52
instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owners duplicate
certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly provided for in What the entry indicates is that the owners duplicate of OCT No. 5203 was lost, a
this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause shown. (Emphasis supplied) petition for the reconstitution of the said owners duplicate was filed in court, and the
court issued an order for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate and its replacement
.... with a new one. But if the entry is to be believed, the court concerned (CFI, according to
the entry) issued an order for the issuance of a new title which is TCT No. T-375 although
SEC. 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner desiring to convey his the original of OCT No. 5203 on file with the Registry of Deeds had not been lost.
registered land in fee simple shall execute and register a deed of conveyance in a form
sufficient in law. The Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the registration book Going by the legal, accepted and normal process, the reconstitution court may order the
a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and deliver to him an owners reconstitution and replacement of the lost title only, nothing else. Since what was lost
duplicate certificate. The Register of Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate is the owners copy of OCT No. 5203, only that owners copy could be ordered replaced.
certificate the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in which Thus, the Register of Deeds exceeded his authority in issuing not just a reconstituted
the new certificate is registered and a reference by number to the last preceding owners copy of the original certificate of title but a new transfer certificate of title in
certificate. The original and the owners duplicate of the grantors certificate shall be place of the original certificate of title. But if the court order, as the entry intimates,
stamped "cancelled." The deed of conveyance shall be filed and endorsed with the directed the issuance of a new transfer certificate of titleeven designating the very
number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed. number of the new transfer certificate of title itselfthe order would be patently
(Emphasis supplied) unlawful. A court cannot legally order the cancellation and replacement of the original
of the O.C.T. which has not been lost,53 as the petition for reconstitution is premised
As petitioner bases its right to the subject lot on the Supplemental Deed, it should have on the loss merely of the owners duplicate of the OCT
presented it to the Register of Deeds to secure the transfer of the title in its name.
Apparently, it had not done so. There is nothing on OCT No. 5203 or on the succeeding Apparently, petitioner had resorted to the court order as a convenient contrivance to
TCT No. T-375 either which shows that it had presented the Supplemental Deed. In fact, effect the transfer of title to the subject lot in its name, instead of the Supplemental
there is absolutely no mention of a reference to said document in the original and Deed which should be its proper course of action. It was so constrained to do because
transfer certificates of title. It is in this regard that the finding of the Court of Appeals the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a deed of conveyance of the "registered
concerning the absence of entries on the blanks intended for the Book No. and Page No. land in fee simple" "in a form sufficient in law," as required by Section 57 of P.D. No.
gains significant relevance. Indeed, this aspect fortifies the conclusion that the 1529.
cancellation of OCT No. 5203 and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-375 in its place
are not predicated on a valid transaction. A plain reading of the pertinent provisions of the Supplemental Deed discloses that the
assignment is not supported by any consideration. The provision reads:
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, apparently considered the 1948 mortgage
.... which is annotated on the back of the TCT No. T-375 as the consideration for the
assignment.56 However, the said annotation57 shows that the mortgage was actually
WHEREAS, in the Deed of Assignment of Assets with the Assumption of Liabilities executed in favor of Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, not of petitioner.58 Clearly,
executed by Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escao at Dumaguete City on said mortgage, executed as it was in favor of the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation and
16th day of November 1972 and ratified in the City of Dumaguete before Notary Public there being no showing that petitioner itself paid off the mortgate obligation, could not
Lenin Victoriano, and entered in the latters notarial register as Doc. No. 367; Page No. have been the consideration for the assignment to petitioner.
17; Book No. V; series of 1972, Julian L. Teves, Emilio B. Teves and Josefa T. Escao,
transferred, conveyed and assigned unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., all its assets and liabilities as Article 1318 of the New Civil Code enumerates the requisites of a valid contract, namely:
reflected in the Balance Sheet of the former as of December 31, 1971. (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of
the contract; and (3) Cause of the obligation which is established.
WHEREAS, on the compromise agreement, as mentioned in the Decision made in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, 12th Judicial District Branch II, on Dec. 31, Thus, Article 1352 declares that contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause
1964 pertaining to Civil Case No. 3443 the following properties were adjudicated to Don produce no effect whatsoever. Those contracts lack an essential element and they are
Julian L. Teves. We quote. not only voidable but void or inexistent pursuant to Article 1409, paragraph (2).59 The
absence of the usual recital of consideration in a transaction which normally should be
From the properties at Bais supported by a consideration such as the assignment made by Don Julian of all nineteen
Adjudicated to Don Julian L.Teves (19) lots he still had at the time, coupled with the fact that the assignee is a corporation
of which Don Julian himself was also the President and Director, forecloses the
.... application of the presumption of existence of consideration established by law.60

Lot No. 63, Tax Dec. No. 33, Certificate of Title No. 5203, together with all improvements. Neither could the Supplemental Deed validly operate as a donation. Article 749 of the
Assessed value - P2,720.00 New Civil Code is clear on the point, thus:

.... Art. 749. In order that the donation of the immovable may be valid, it must be made in
a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
WHEREAS, this Deed of Assignment is executed by the parties herein in order to effect which the donee must satisfy.
the registration of the transfer of the above corporation.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the above premises the ASSIGNOR hereby document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO, INC., the above described parcel of
land[s] with a fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof
Philippine Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and assignment shall become in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
absolute upon signing.54 (Emphasis supplied)
In Sumipat, et al v. Banga, et al.,61 this Court declared that title to immovable property
The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the dispositive portion of the instrument does does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and
not represent the consideration for the assignment made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a unless it has been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof.
mere statement of the fair market value of all the nineteen (19) properties enumerated The acceptance may be made in the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance
in the instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that were transferred by Don Julian in does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Where the deed of
favor of petitioner. Consequently, the testimony55 of petitioners accountant that the donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance,
assignment is supported by consideration cannot prevail over the clear provision to the made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the
contrary in the Supplemental Deed. deed of donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.
In the case at bar, although the Supplemental Deed appears in a public document,62
the absence of acceptance by the donee in the same deed or even in a separate
document is a glaring violation of the requirement.

One final note. From the substantive and procedural standpoints, the cardinal objectives
to write finis to a protracted litigation and avoid multiplicity of suits are worth pursuing
at all times.63 Thus, this Court has ruled that appellate courts have ample authority to
rule on specific matters not assigned as errors or otherwise not raised in an appeal, if
these are indispensable or necessary to the just resolution of the pleaded issues.64
Specifically, matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which are
necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case, or to serve
the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice.65

In the instant case, the correct characterization of the Supplemental Deed, i.e., whether
it is valid or void, is unmistakably determinative of the underlying controversy. In other
words, the issue of validity or nullity of the instrument which is at the core of the
controversy is interwoven with the issues adopted by the parties and the rulings of the
trial court and the appellate court.66 Thus, this Court is also resolute in striking down
the alleged deed in this case, especially as it appears on its face to be a blatant nullity.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated 30 September 1999 of


the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner J.L.T. Agro, Inc.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs. liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ,
legatees, oppositors- appellants. Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust

Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose
Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle MENOS:
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski. Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-

The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator
provided for substitutions. VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad,
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose
follows: Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su
defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
INVENTARIO
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a
que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen continuadores del apellido Ramirez,

la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00 B.Y en usufructo a saber:

Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle
Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34 sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00 de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:

por accion ................................................................................8,347.00


En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo Jankowski, The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno
de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not
D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F. entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her
legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en
cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion alguna 2. The substitutions.
de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art.
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 857, Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or
'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall common, brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.)
go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really
the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The
with a usufruct in favor of Wanda. others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the
widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or should
survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within
the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise
usufruct over real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise
alien, violates Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the provided.
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between
the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in its
order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
Court. instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir
the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
1. The widow's legitime. substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in the death of the testator.
full ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's
legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the
widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar
he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind reciprocal entre ambos.
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and appellants question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle Wrobleski" in connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow
because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate.
Marcelle However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of
the widow is not entitled to any usufruct. Wanda is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition
of lands by aliens.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
Horace v. Ramirez.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal
or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid. the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
their claim that it is void for the following reasons: prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent
the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related a piece of land.
to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
degree from the heir originally instituted." usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is
the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or distributed as follows:
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of pronouncement as to costs.
the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.) SO ORDERED.

(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits
"that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when
he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of
the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)

3. The usufruct of Wanda.


G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974 August 8, 1967 upon a bond of P5,000; the petition being particularly directed against
the orders of the respondent court of October 12, 1966 denying petitioner's motion of
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate April 22, 1966 and its order of July 18, 1967 denying the motion for reconsideration of
of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), said order.
petitioner,
vs. Related to and involving basically the same main issue as the foregoing petition, thirty-
THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of three (33) appeals from different orders of the same respondent court approving or
Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, respondents. otherwise sanctioning the acts of administration of the respondent Magno on behalf of
the testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges.
G.R. Nos. L-27936 & L-27937 March 29, 1974
THE FACTS
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1307). TESTATE
ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES (Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE On May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a will executed on
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, administrator-appellant, November 22, 1952 pertinently providing as follows:
vs.
LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, FIRST: I direct that all my just debts and funeral expenses be first paid out of my
BELCESAR CAUSING, FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO estate.
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN, PEPITO IYULORES,
ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA, ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of
PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved
Administratrix in Sp. Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband,
INC., movant-appellee. during his natural lifetime.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin for Philippine Commercial and Industrial THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall
Bank. have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he
is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate,
Manglapus Law Office, Antonio Law Office and Rizal R. Quimpo for private respondents by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or
and appellees Avelina A. Magno, etc., et al. additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any
property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for
BARREDO, J.:p oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents,
Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction; certiorari to "declare all acts of emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further
the respondent court in the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307 of authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo) subsequent to the order of December 14, 1957 as provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the
null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction"; prohibition to enjoin the improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas,
respondent court from allowing, tolerating, sanctioning, or abetting private respondent but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime,
Avelina A. Magno to perform or do any acts of administration, such as those enumerated above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein.
in the petition, and from exercising any authority or power as Regular Administratrix of and may sell unimproved town lots.
above-named Testate Estate, by entertaining manifestations, motion and pleadings filed
by her and acting on them, and also to enjoin said court from allowing said private FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give,
respondent to interfere, meddle or take part in any manner in the administration of the devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and
Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1672 of the same court and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and
branch); with prayer for preliminary injunction, which was issued by this Court on sisters, share and share alike, namely:
3. That during the lifetime of Linnie Jane Hodges, herein petitioner was engaged in
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Saddie Rascoe, Era Roman and the business of buying and selling personal and real properties, and do such acts which
Nimroy Higdon. petitioner may think best.

FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, 4. That deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants,
above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as executor surviving spouse, to inherit
bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share the properties of the decedent.
which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived.
5. That the present motion is submitted in order not to paralyze the business of
SIXTH: I nominate and appoint my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to be petitioner and the deceased, especially in the purchase and sale of properties. That
executor of this, my last will and testament, and direct that no bond or other security proper accounting will be had also in all these transactions.
be required of him as such executor.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, petitioner C. N. Hodges (Charles
SEVENTH: It is my will and bequest that no action be had in the probate court, in Newton Hodges) be allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was
the administration of my estate, other than that necessary to prove and record this will engaged and to perform acts which he had been doing while deceased Linnie Jane
and to return an inventory and appraisement of my estate and list of claims. (Pp. 2-4, Hodges was living.
Petition.)
City of Iloilo, May 27, 1957. (Annex "D", Petition.)
This will was subsequently probated in aforementioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 of
respondent court on June 28, 1957, with the widower Charles Newton Hodges being which the respondent court immediately granted in the following order:
appointed as Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.
It appearing in the urgent ex-parte motion filed by petitioner C. N. Hodges, that the
Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower (hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) business in which said petitioner and the deceased were engaged will be paralyzed,
had been appointed Special Administrator, in which capacity he filed a motion on the unless and until the Executor is named and appointed by the Court, the said petitioner
same date as follows: is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged and to
perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living.
URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION TO ALLOW OR AUTHORIZE PETITIONER TO CONTINUE THE
BUSINESS IN WHICH HE WAS ENGAGED AND TO PERFORM ACTS WHICH HE HAD BEEN SO ORDERED.
DOING WHILE DECEASED WAS LIVING
City of Iloilo May 27, 1957. (Annex "E", Petition.)
Come petitioner in the above-entitled special proceedings, thru his undersigned
attorneys, to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states: Under date of December 11, 1957, Hodges filed as such Executor another motion thus:

1. That Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving her last will and testament, a copy of which MOTION TO APPROVE ALL SALES, CONVEYANCES, LEASES, MORTGAGES THAT THE
is attached to the petition for probate of the same. EXECUTOR HAD MADE FURTHER AND SUBSEQUENT TRANSACTIONS WHICH THE
EXECUTOR MAY DO IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAST WISH OF THE DECEASED LINNIE
2. That in said last will and testament herein petitioner Charles Newton Hodges is JANE HODGES.
directed to have the right to manage, control use and enjoy the estate of deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, in the same way, a provision was placed in paragraph two, the Comes the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, thru his undersigned attorney,
following: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my to the Hon. Court, most respectfully states:
estate, to my beloved husband, Charles Newton Hodges, to have and (to) hold unto him,
my said husband, during his natural lifetime." 1. That according to the last will and testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges,
the executor as the surviving spouse and legatee named in the will of the deceased; has
the right to dispose of all the properties left by the deceased, portion of which is quoted 6. That the Executor is under obligation to submit his yearly accounts, and the
as follows: properties conveyed can also be accounted for, especially the amounts received.

Second: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that, all the sales, conveyances, leases, and
both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my beloved husband, Charles mortgages executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court, and also the
Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages in consonance with the wishes
lifetime. of the deceased contained in her last will and testament, be with authorization and
approval of the Hon. Court.
Third: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he City of Iloilo, December 11, 1967.
is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate,
by sale or any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or (Annex "G", Petition.)
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any which again was promptly granted by the respondent court on December 14, 1957 as
property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for follows:
oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, ORDER
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. ... As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor for the reasons stated in his
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken all the sales,
2. That herein Executor, is not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. That Hodges executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said
during the lifetime of herein Executor, as Legatee has the right to sell, convey, lease or Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and
dispose of the properties in the Philippines. That inasmuch as C.N. Hodges was and is mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance
engaged in the buy and sell of real and personal properties, even before the death of with the wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter.
Linnie Jane Hodges, a motion to authorize said C.N. Hodges was filed in Court, to allow
him to continue in the business of buy and sell, which motion was favorably granted by So ordered.
the Honorable Court.
Iloilo City. December 14, 1957.
3. That since the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. C.N. Hodges had been buying and
selling real and personal properties, in accordance with the wishes of the late Linnie (Annex "H", Petition.)
Jane Hodges.
On April 14, 1959, in submitting his first statement of account as Executor for approval,
4. That the Register of Deeds for Iloilo, had required of late the herein Executor to Hodges alleged:
have all the sales, leases, conveyances or mortgages made by him, approved by the Hon.
Court. Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, herein executor of the deceased,
renders the following account of his administration covering the period from January 1,
5. That it is respectfully requested, all the sales, conveyances leases and mortgages 1958 to December 31, 1958, which account may be found in detail in the individual
executed by the Executor, be approved by the Hon. Court. and subsequent sales income tax return filed for the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, to wit:
conveyances, leases and mortgages in compliances with the wishes of the late Linnie
Jane Hodges, and within the scope of the terms of the last will and testament, also be That a certified public accountant has examined the statement of net worth of the
approved; estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, as well as the income and
expenses, copy of which is hereto attached and made integral part of this statement of
account as Annex "A".
filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the estate of Linnie
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is most respectfully prayed that, the statement of net Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned income of
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, the assets and liabilities, income and P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal assets and
expenses as shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.)
and marked as Annex "A", be approved by the Honorable Court, as substantial
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court. xxx xxx xxx

That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the Under date of July 21, 1960, C.N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account
herein accounts be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of
deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959 annexed
Honorable court. thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income
of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges.
City of Iloilo April 14, 1959. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1959 on the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned
(Annex "I", Petition.) income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal
assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92. Appellee's Brief.)
The respondent court approved this statement of account on April 21, 1959 in its order
worded thus: xxx xxx xxx

Upon petition of Atty. Gellada, in representation of the Executor, the statement of net Under date of April 20, 1961, C.N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account
worth of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, assets and liabilities, income and expenses as by the Executor for the Year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement
shown in the individual income tax return for the estate of the deceased and marked as of Net Worth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December
Annex "A" is approved. 31, 1960 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided evenly between him and the estate of
SO ORDERED. Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for
calendar year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said
City of Iloilo April 21, 1959. estate as having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of
his combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (Pp. 92-93,
(Annex "J", Petition.) Appellee's Brief.)

His accounts for the periods January 1, 1959 to December 31, 1959 and January 1, 1960 Likewise the following:
to December 31, 1960 were submitted likewise accompanied by allegations identical
mutatis mutandis to those of April 14, 1959, quoted above; and the respective orders In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters
approving the same, dated July 30, 1960 and May 2, 1961, were substantially identical of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the
to the above-quoted order of April 21, 1959. In connection with the statements of will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green
account just mentioned, the following assertions related thereto made by respondent- ROA). Immediately, C.N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name
appellee Magno in her brief do not appear from all indications discernible in the record included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order the heirs
to be disputable: of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were
really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. .
Under date of April 14, 1959, C.N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of the
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C.N. Hodges and the As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C.N. Hodges under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule
reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of P328,402.62, "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was
divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he
contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests 2. That last December 22, 1962, the said Charles Newton Hodges was stricken ill,
passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered: and brought to the Iloilo Mission Hospital for treatment, but unfortunately, he died on
December 25, 1962, as shown by a copy of the death certificate hereto attached and
"None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other marked as Annex "A".
legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the 3. That in accordance with the provisions of the last will and testament of Linnie
devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses Jane Hodges, whatever real and personal properties that may remain at the death of
of administration are finally determined and paid." her husband Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall be equally divided among
their heirs. That there are real and personal properties left by Charles Newton Hodges,
Again, on August 9, 1962, barely four months before his death, he executed an which need to be administered and taken care of.
"affidavit" wherein he ratified and confirmed all that he stated in Schedule "M" of his
estate tax returns as to his having renounced what was given him by his wife's will.1 4. That the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as that of Charles
Newton Hodges, have not as yet been determined or ascertained, and there is necessity
As appointed executor, C.N. Hodges filed an "Inventory" dated May 12, 1958. He listed for the appointment of a general administrator to liquidate and distribute the residue
all the assets of his conjugal partnership with Linnie Jane Hodges on a separate balance of the estate to the heirs and legatees of both spouses. That in accordance with the
sheet and then stated expressly that her estate which has come into his possession as provisions of Section 2 of Rule 75 of the Rules of Court, the conjugal partnership of Linnie
executor was "one-half of all the items" listed in said balance sheet. (Pp. 89-90, Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges shall be liquidated in the testate proceedings
Appellee's Brief.) of the wife.

Parenthetically, it may be stated, at this juncture, that We are taking pains to quote 5. That the undersigned counsel, has perfect personal knowledge of the existence
wholly or at least, extensively from some of the pleadings and orders whenever We feel of the last will and testament of Charles Newton Hodges, with similar provisions as that
that it is necessary to do so for a more comprehensive and clearer view of the important contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges. However, said last will
and decisive issues raised by the parties and a more accurate appraisal of their and testament of Charles Newton Hodges is kept inside the vault or iron safe in his office,
respective positions in regard thereto. and will be presented in due time before this honorable Court.

The records of these cases do not show that anything else was done in the above- 6. That in the meantime, it is imperative and indispensable that, an Administratrix
mentioned Special Proceedings No. 1307 until December 26, 1962, when on account of be appointed for the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and a Special Administratrix for the
the death of Hodges the day before, the same lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who had estate of Charles Newton Hodges, to perform the duties required by law, to administer,
been previously acting as counsel for Hodges in his capacity as Executor of his wife's collect, and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of both
estate, and as such had filed the aforequoted motions and manifestations, filed the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, as provided for in Section 1
following: and 2, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A 7. That there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration,
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX because the last will and testament of deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, is still kept in
his safe or vault, and in the meantime, unless an administratrix (and,) at the same time,
COMES the undersigned attorney for the Executor in the above-entitled proceedings, to a Special Administratrix is appointed, the estate of both spouses are in danger of being
the Honorable Court, most respectfully states: lost, damaged or go to waste.

1. That in accordance with the Last Will and Testament of Linnie Jane Hodges 8. That the most trusted employee of both spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C.N.
(deceased), her husband, Charles Newton Hodges was to act as Executor, and in fact, in Hodges, who had been employed for around thirty (30) years, in the person of Miss
an order issued by this Hon. Court dated June 28, 1957, the said Charles Newton Hodges Avelina Magno, (should) be appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
was appointed Executor and had performed the duties as such. and at the same time Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges.
That the said Miss Avelina Magno is of legal age, a resident of the Philippines, the most
fit, competent, trustworthy and well-qualified person to serve the duties of court issued the corresponding order of probate and letters of administration to Joe
Administratrix and Special Administratrix and is willing to act as such. Hodges and Atty. Mirasol, as prayed for.

9. That Miss Avelina Magno is also willing to file bond in such sum which the Hon. At this juncture, again, it may also be explained that just as, in her will, Mrs. Hodges
Court believes reasonable. bequeathed her whole estate to her husband "to have and to hold unto him, my said
husband, during his natural lifetime", she, at the same time or in like manner, provided
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is most respectfully prayed that, Miss that "at the death of my said husband I give devise and bequeath all of the rest,
AVELINA A. MAGNO be immediately appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie residue and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or
Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, with located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike
powers and duties provided for by law. That the Honorable Court fix the reasonable ". Accordingly, it became incumbent upon Hodges, as executor of his wife's will, to duly
bond of P1,000.00 to be filed by Avelina A. Magno. liquidate the conjugal partnership, half of which constituted her estate, in order that
upon the eventuality of his death, "the rest, residue and remainder" thereof could be
(Annex "O", Petition.) determined and correspondingly distributed or divided among her brothers and sisters.
And it was precisely because no such liquidation was done, furthermore, there is the
which respondent court readily acted on in its order of even date thus: . issue of whether the distribution of her estate should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines or those of Texas, of which State she was a national, and, what is more, as
For the reasons alleged in the Urgent Ex-parte Motion filed by counsel for the Executor already stated, Hodges made official and sworn statements or manifestations indicating
dated December 25, 1962, which the Court finds meritorious, Miss AVELINA A. MAGNO, that as far as he was concerned no "property interests passed to him as surviving spouse
is hereby appointed Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special "except for purposes of administering the estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the charges" and it was the intention of the surviving husband of the deceased to distribute
last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the
real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses
unless a Special Administratrix is appointed. of administration are finally determined and paid", that the incidents and controversies
now before Us for resolution arose. As may be observed, the situation that ensued upon
Miss Avelina A. Magno is required to file bond in the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS the death of Hodges became rather unusual and so, quite understandably, the lower
(P5,000.00), and after having done so, let letters of Administration be issued to her." court's actuations presently under review are apparently wanting in consistency and
(Annex "P", Petition.) seemingly lack proper orientation.

On December 29, 1962, however, upon urgent ex-parte petition of respondent Magno Thus, We cannot discern clearly from the record before Us the precise perspective from
herself, thru Atty. Gellada, Harold, R. Davies, "a representative of the heirs of deceased which the trial court proceeded in issuing its questioned orders. And, regretably, none
Charles Newton Hodges (who had) arrived from the United States of America to help in of the lengthy briefs submitted by the parties is of valuable assistance in clearing up the
the administration of the estate of said deceased" was appointed as Co-Special matter.
Administrator of the estate of Hodges, (pp. 29-33, Yellow - Record on Appeal) only to be
replaced as such co-special administrator on January 22, 1963 by Joe Hodges, who, To begin with, We gather from the two records on appeal filed by petitioner, as
according to the motion of the same attorney, is "the nephew of the deceased (who appellant in the appealed cases, one with green cover and the other with a yellow cover,
had) arrived from the United States with instructions from the other heirs of the that at the outset, a sort of modus operandi had been agreed upon by the parties under
deceased to administer the properties or estate of Charles Newton Hodges in the which the respective administrators of the two estates were supposed to act conjointly,
Philippines, (Pp. 47-50, id.) but since no copy of the said agreement can be found in the record before Us, We have
no way of knowing when exactly such agreement was entered into and under what
Meanwhile, under date of January 9, 1963, the same Atty. Gellada filed in Special specific terms. And while reference is made to said modus operandi in the order of
Proceedings 1672 a petition for the probate of the will of Hodges,2 with a prayer for the September 11, 1964, on pages 205-206 of the Green Record on Appeal, reading thus:
issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, albeit the motion was
followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be The present incident is to hear the side of administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, in
appointed as his co-administrator. On the same date this latter motion was filed, the answer to the charges contained in the motion filed by Atty. Cesar Tirol on September
3, 1964. In answer to the said charges, Miss Avelina A. Magno, through her counsel, Atty. motion and opposition heard the verbal arguments of Atty. Cesar Tirol for the PCIB and
Rizal Quimpo, filed a written manifestation. Atty. Rizal Quimpo for Administratix Magno.

After reading the manifestation here of Atty. Quimpo, for and in behalf of the After due consideration, the Court hereby orders Magno to open all doors and locks in
administratrix, Miss Avelina A. Magno, the Court finds that everything that happened the Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City in the presence of the PCIB or its
before September 3, 1964, which was resolved on September 8, 1964, to the satisfaction duly authorized representative and deputy clerk of court Albis of this branch not later
of parties, was simply due to a misunderstanding between the representative of the than 7:30 tomorrow morning October 28, 1965 in order that the office of said estates
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank and Miss Magno and in order to restore the could operate for business.
harmonious relations between the parties, the Court ordered the parties to remain in
status quo as to their modus operandi before September 1, 1964, until after the Court Pursuant to the order of this Court thru Judge Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964, it is
can have a meeting with all the parties and their counsels on October 3, as formerly hereby ordered:
agreed upon between counsels, Attys. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta, Attys. Tirol and Tirol
and Atty. Rizal Quimpo. (a) That all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account of the estates
of Linnie Jane Hodges and estates of C.N. Hodges;
In the meantime, the prayers of Atty. Quimpo as stated in his manifestation shall not be
resolved by this Court until October 3, 1964. (b) That whatever cash collections that had been deposited in the account of
either of the estates should be withdrawn and since then deposited in the joint account
SO ORDERED. of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and the estate of C.N. Hodges;

there is nothing in the record indicating whatever happened to it afterwards, except (c) That the PCIB should countersign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
that again, reference thereto was made in the appealed order of October 27, 1965, on Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of the Linnie
pages 292-295 of the Green Record on Appeal, as follows: Jane Hodges estate chargeable to the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only;

On record is an urgent motion to allow PCIB to open all doors and locks in the Hodges (d) That Administratrix Magno is hereby directed to allow the PCIB to inspect
Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City, to take immediate and exclusive possession whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her possession in the same
thereof and to place its own locks and keys for security purposes of the PCIB dated manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow Administratrix Magno to
October 27, 1965 thru Atty. Cesar Tirol. It is alleged in said urgent motion that inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have in its possession;
Administratrix Magno of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges refused to open the
Hodges Office at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City where PCIB holds office and (e) That the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall have access to all
therefore PCIB is suffering great moral damage and prejudice as a result of said act. It is records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the estate of Linnie Jane
prayed that an order be issued authorizing it (PCIB) to open all doors and locks in the Hodges; and in like manner the accountant or any authorized representative of the
said office, to take immediate and exclusive possession thereof and place thereon its estate of C.N. Hodges shall have access to the records of transactions of the Linnie Jane
own locks and keys for security purposes; instructing the clerk of court or any available Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C.N. Hodges.
deputy to witness and supervise the opening of all doors and locks and taking possession
of the PCIB. Once the estates' office shall have been opened by Administratrix Magno in the
presence of the PCIB or its duly authorized representative and deputy clerk Albis or his
A written opposition has been filed by Administratrix Magno of even date (Oct. 27) thru duly authorized representative, both estates or any of the estates should not close it
counsel Rizal Quimpo stating therein that she was compelled to close the office for the without previous consent and authority from this court.
reason that the PCIB failed to comply with the order of this Court signed by Judge
Anacleto I. Bellosillo dated September 11, 1964 to the effect that both estates should SO ORDERED.
remain in status quo to their modus operandi as of September 1, 1964.
As may be noted, in this order, the respondent court required that all collections from
To arrive at a happy solution of the dispute and in order not to interrupt the operation the properties in the name of Hodges should be deposited in a joint account of the two
of the office of both estates, the Court aside from the reasons stated in the urgent
estates, which indicates that seemingly the so-called modus operandi was no longer An opposition has been filed by the Administrator PCIB thru Atty. Herminio Ozaeta
operative, but again there is nothing to show when this situation started. dated July 11, 1964, on the ground that payment of the retainers fee of Attys.
Manglapus and Quimpo as prayed for in said Manifestation and Urgent Motion is
Likewise, in paragraph 3 of the petitioner's motion of September 14, 1964, on pages prejudicial to the 100% claim of the estate of C. N. Hodges; employment of Attys.
188-201 of the Green Record on Appeal, (also found on pp. 83-91 of the Yellow Record Manglapus and Quimpo is premature and/or unnecessary; Attys. Quimpo and
on Appeal) it is alleged that: Manglapus are representing conflicting interests and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
should be closed and terminated (pp. 1679-1684, Vol, V, Sp. 1307).
3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C.N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and
Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, Atty. Leon P. Gellada filed a memorandum dated July 28, 1964 asking that the
Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied
Messrs. William Brown and Ardell Young acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to because no evidence has been presented in support thereof. Atty. Manglapus filed a
be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel reply to the opposition of counsel for the Administrator of the C. N. Hodges estate
representing the aforementioned parties entered into an amicable agreement, which wherein it is claimed that expenses of administration include reasonable counsel or
was approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain attorney's fees for services to the executor or administrator. As a matter of fact the fee
sums of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates agreement dated February 27, 1964 between the PCIB and the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs
and that the assets (to the extent they existed) of both estates would be administered & Ozaeta as its counsel (Pp. 1280-1284, Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which stipulates the fees for
jointly by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno said law firm has been approved by the Court in its order dated March 31, 1964. If
as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid payment of the fees of the lawyers for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership Hodges will cause prejudice to the estate of C. N. Hodges, in like manner the very
of one hundred percent (100%) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent (75%) of all agreement which provides for the payment of attorney's fees to the counsel for the PCIB
assets owned by C.N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On will also be prejudicial to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1801-1814, Vol. V, Sp.
February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended 1307).
its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changed its recognition of the afore-
described basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges to Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a rejoinder dated August 10, 1964 to the reply to the
one hundred percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates. opposition to the Manifestation and Urgent Motion alleging principally that the estates
of Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges are not similarly situated for the reason that C.
but no copy of the mentioned agreement of joint administration of the two estates N. Hodges is an heir of Linnie Jane Hodges whereas the latter is not an heir of the former
exists in the record, and so, We are not informed as to what exactly are the terms of the for the reason that Linnie Jane Hodges predeceased C. N. Hodges (pp. 1839-1848, Vol.
same which could be relevant in the resolution of the issues herein. V, Sp. 1307); that Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo formally entered their appearance in
behalf of Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on June 10, 1964 (pp. 1639-
On the other hand, the appealed order of November 3, 1965, on pages 313-320 of the 1640, Vol. V, Sp. 1307).
Green Record on Appeal, authorized payment by respondent Magno of, inter alia, her
own fees as administratrix, the attorney's fees of her lawyers, etc., as follows: Atty. Manglapus filed a manifestation dated December 18, 1964 stating therein that
Judge Bellosillo issued an order requiring the parties to submit memorandum in support
Administratrix Magno thru Attys. Raul S. Manglapus and Rizal. R. Quimpo filed a of their respective contentions. It is prayed in this manifestation that the Manifestation
Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 asking for the approval of the and Urgent Motion dated June 10, 1964 be resolved (pp. 6435-6439, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
Agreement dated June 6, 1964 which Agreement is for the purpose of retaining their
services to protect and defend the interest of the said Administratrix in these Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a counter- manifestation dated January 5,
proceedings and the same has been signed by and bears the express conformity of the 1965 asking that after the consideration by the court of all allegations and arguments
attorney-in-fact of the late Linnie Jane Hodges, Mr. James L. Sullivan. It is further prayed and pleadings of the PCIB in connection therewith (1) said manifestation and urgent
that the Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be directed to pay motion of Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo be denied (pp. 6442-6453, Vol. VII, Sp. 1307).
the retailers fee of said lawyers, said fees made chargeable as expenses for the Judge Querubin issued an order dated January 4, 1965 approving the motion dated June
administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 1641-1642, Vol. V, Sp. 1307). 10, 1964 of the attorneys for the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and
agreement annexed to said motion. The said order further states: "The Administratrix
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is authorized to issue or sign whatever check or order. It is worthy to note that in the motion dated January 24, 1964 (Pp. 1149- 1163,
checks may be necessary for the above purpose and the administrator of the estate of Vol. V, Sp. 1307) which has been filed by Atty. Gellada and his associates and Atty. Gibbs
C. N. Hodges is ordered to countersign the same. (pp. 6518-6523, Vol VII, Sp. 1307). and other lawyers in addition to the stipulated fees for actual services rendered.
However, the fee agreement dated February 27, 1964, between the Administrator of
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a manifestation and motion dated January the estate of C. N. Hodges and Atty. Gibbs which provides for retainer fee of P4,000
13, 1965 asking that the order of January 4, 1965 which was issued by Judge Querubin monthly in addition to specific fees for actual appearances, reimbursement for
be declared null and void and to enjoin the clerk of court and the administratrix and expenditures and contingent fees has also been approved by the Court and said lawyers
administrator in these special proceedings from all proceedings and action to enforce have already been paid. (pp. 1273-1279, Vol. V, Sp. Proc. 1307 pp. 1372-1373, Vol. V,
or comply with the provision of the aforesaid order of January 4, 1965. In support of said Sp. Proc. 1307).
manifestation and motion it is alleged that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void
because the said order was never delivered to the deputy clerk Albis of Branch V (the WHEREFORE, the order dated January 4, 1965 is hereby declared null and void.
sala of Judge Querubin) and the alleged order was found in the drawer of the late Judge
Querubin in his office when said drawer was opened on January 13, 1965 after the death The manifestation and motion dated June 10, 1964 which was filed by the attorneys for
of Judge Querubin by Perfecto Querubin, Jr., the son of the judge and in the presence the administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is granted and the
of Executive Judge Rovira and deputy clerk Albis (Sec. 1, Rule 36, New Civil Code) (Pp. agreement annexed thereto is hereby approved.
6600-6606, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307).
The administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is hereby directed to be needed
Atty. Roman Mabanta, Jr. for the PCIB filed a motion for reconsideration dated February to implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion and the
23, 1965 asking that the order dated January 4, 1964 be reversed on the ground that: administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges is directed to countersign the said check or
checks as the case may be.
1. Attorneys retained must render services to the estate not to the personal heir;
SO ORDERED.
2. If services are rendered to both, fees should be pro-rated between them;
thereby implying somehow that the court assumed the existence of independent but
3. Attorneys retained should not represent conflicting interests; to the prejudice simultaneous administrations.
of the other heirs not represented by said attorneys;
Be that as it may, again, it appears that on August 6, 1965, the court, acting on a motion
4. Fees must be commensurate to the actual services rendered to the estate; of petitioner for the approval of deeds of sale executed by it as administrator of the
estate of Hodges, issued the following order, also on appeal herein:
5. There must be assets in the estate to pay for said fees (Pp. 6625-6636, Vol. VIII,
Sp. 1307). Acting upon the motion for approval of deeds of sale for registered land of the PCIB,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges in Sp. Proc. 1672 (Vol. VII, pp. 2244-
Atty. Quimpo for Administratrix Magno of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges filed a 2245), dated July 16, 1965, filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol in representation of the law firms
motion to submit dated July 15, 1965 asking that the manifestation and urgent motion of Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and Tirol and Tirol and the opposition thereto of Atty. Rizal
dated June 10, 1964 filed by Attys. Manglapus and Quimpo and other incidents directly R. Quimpo (Vol. VIII, pp. 6811-6813) dated July 22, 1965 and considering the allegations
appertaining thereto be considered submitted for consideration and approval (pp. and reasons therein stated, the court believes that the deeds of sale should be signed
6759-6765, Vol. VIII, Sp. 1307). jointly by the PCIB, Administrator of the Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A.
Magno, Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and to this effect the
Considering the arguments and reasons in support to the pleadings of both the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign
Administratrix and the PCIB, and of Atty. Gellada, hereinbefore mentioned, the Court the deeds of sale.
believes that the order of January 4, 1965 is null and void for the reason that the said
order has not been filed with deputy clerk Albis of this court (Branch V) during the SO ORDERED. (p. 248, Green Record on Appeal.)
lifetime of Judge Querubin who signed the said order. However, the said manifestation
and urgent motion dated June 10, 1964 is being treated and considered in this instant
Notably this order required that even the deeds executed by petitioner, as administrator "1. In his lifetime, the late C. N. Hodges executed "Contracts to Sell" real property,
of the Estate of Hodges, involving properties registered in his name, should be co-signed and the prospective buyers under said contracts have already paid the price and
by respondent Magno.3 And this was not an isolated instance. complied with the terms and conditions thereof;

In her brief as appellee, respondent Magno states: "2. In the course of administration of both estates, mortgage debtors have already
paid their debts secured by chattel mortgages in favor of the late C. N. Hodges, and are
After the lower court had authorized appellee Avelina A. Magno to execute final deeds now entitled to release therefrom;
of sale pursuant to contracts to sell executed by C. N. Hodges on February 20, 1963 (pp.
45-46, Green ROA), motions for the approval of final deeds of sale (signed by appellee "3. There are attached hereto documents executed jointly by the Administratrix in
Avelina A. Magno and the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, first Joe Hodges, Sp. Proc. No. 1307 and the Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 1672, consisting of deeds of
then Atty. Fernando Mirasol and later the appellant) were approved by the lower court sale in favor
upon petition of appellee Magno's counsel, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, on the basis of section
8 of Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court. Subsequently, the appellant, after it had taken Fernando Cano, Bacolod City, Occ. Negros
over the bulk of the assets of the two estates, started presenting these motions itself. Fe Magbanua, Iloilo City
The first such attempt was a "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for Registered Land Policarpio M. Pareno, La Paz, Iloilo City
and Cancellations of Mortgages" dated July 21, 1964 filed by Atty. Cesar T. Tirol, counsel Rosario T. Libre, Jaro, Iloilo City
for the appellant, thereto annexing two (2) final deeds of sale and two (2) cancellations Federico B. Torres, Iloilo City
of mortgages signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino, Assistant Vice- Reynaldo T. Lataquin, La Paz, Iloilo City
President and Manager of the appellant (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol. V, pp. 1694- Anatolio T. Viray, Iloilo City
1701). This motion was approved by the lower court on July 27, 1964. It was followed Benjamin Rolando, Jaro, Iloilo City
by another motion dated August 4, 1964 for the approval of one final deed of sale again
signed by appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307. and cancellations of mortgages in favor of
Vol. V, pp. 1825-1828), which was again approved by the lower court on August 7, 1964.
The gates having been opened, a flood ensued: the appellant subsequently filed similar Pablo Manzano, Oton, Iloilo
motions for the approval of a multitude of deeds of sales and cancellations of mortgages Ricardo M. Diana, Dao, San Jose, Antique
signed by both the appellee Avelina A. Magno and the appellant. Simplicio Tingson, Iloilo City
Amado Magbanua, Pototan, Iloilo
A random check of the records of Special Proceeding No. 1307 alone will show Atty. Roselia M. Baes, Bolo, Roxas City
Cesar T. Tirol as having presented for court approval deeds of sale of real properties William Bayani, Rizal Estanzuela, Iloilo City
signed by both appellee Avelina A. Magno and D. R. Paulino in the following numbers: Elpidio Villarete, Molo, Iloilo City
(a) motion dated September 21, 1964 6 deeds of sale; (b) motion dated November 4, Norma T. Ruiz, Jaro, Iloilo City
1964 1 deed of sale; (c) motion dated December 1, 1964 4 deeds of sale; (d) motion
dated February 3, 1965 8 deeds of sale; (f) motion dated May 7, 1965 9 deeds of "4. That the approval of the aforesaid documents will not reduce the assets of the
sale. In view of the very extensive landholdings of the Hodges spouses and the many estates so as to prevent any creditor from receiving his full debt or diminish his
motions filed concerning deeds of sale of real properties executed by C. N. Hodges the dividend."
lower court has had to constitute special separate expedientes in Special Proceedings
Nos. 1307 and 1672 to include mere motions for the approval of deeds of sale of the And the prayer of this motion is indeed very revealing:
conjugal properties of the Hodges spouses.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, under Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of
As an example, from among the very many, under date of February 3, 1965, Atty. Cesar Court, this honorable court approve the aforesaid deeds of sale and cancellations of
T. Tirol, as counsel for the appellant, filed "Motion for Approval of Deeds of Sale for mortgages." (Pp. 113-117, Appellee's Brief.)
Registered Land and Cancellations of Mortgages" (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Vol.
VIII, pp. 6570-6596) the allegations of which read: None of these assertions is denied in Petitioner's reply brief.
Further indicating lack of concrete perspective or orientation on the part of the they were executed by him before or after the death of his wife. The orders of this
respondent court and its hesitancy to clear up matters promptly, in its other appealed nature which are also on appeal herein are the following:
order of November 23, 1965, on pages 334-335 of the Green Record on Appeal, said
respondent court allowed the movant Ricardo Salas, President of appellee Western 1. Order of March 30, 1966, on p. 137 of the Green Record on Appeal, approving
Institute of Technology (successor of Panay Educational Institutions, Inc.), one of the the deed of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Lorenzo Carles on
parties with whom Hodges had contracts that are in question in the appeals herein, to February 24, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on June 17, 1958,
pay petitioner, as Administrator of the estate of Hodges and/or respondent Magno, as after the death of his wife, which contract petitioner claims was cancelled by it for failure
Administrator of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, thus: of Carles to pay the installments due on January 7, 1965.

Considering that in both cases there is as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor 2. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 139-140, id., approving the deed of sale executed
distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto, the Court believes that by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Salvador Guzman on February 28, 1966
payment to both the administrator of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges and the pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on September 13, 1960, after the death
administratrix of the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges or to either one of the two of his wife, which contract petitioner claims it cancelled on March 3, 1965 in view of
estates is proper and legal. failure of said appellee to pay the installments on time.

WHEREFORE, movant Ricardo T. Salas can pay to both estates or either of them. 3. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 167-168, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Purificacion Coronado on March 28,
SO ORDERED. 1966 pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on August 14, 1961, after the
death of his wife.
(Pp. 334-335, Green Record on Appeal.)
4. Order of April 20, 1966, on pp. 168-169, id., approving the deed of sale
On the other hand, as stated earlier, there were instances when respondent Magno was executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Florenia Barrido on March 28, 1966,
given authority to act alone. For instance, in the other appealed order of December 19, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 21, 1958, after the death
1964, on page 221 of the Green Record on Appeal, the respondent court approved of his wife.
payments made by her of overtime pay to some employees of the court who had helped
in gathering and preparing copies of parts of the records in both estates as follows: 5. Order of June 7, 1966, on pp. 184-185, id., approving the deed of sale executed
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Belcezar Causing on May 2, 1966, pursuant
Considering that the expenses subject of the motion to approve payment of overtime to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 10, 1959, after the death of his wife.
pay dated December 10, 1964, are reasonable and are believed by this Court to be a
proper charge of administration chargeable to the testate estate of the late Linnie Jane 6. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 211-212, id., approving the deed of sale
Hodges, the said expenses are hereby APPROVED and to be charged against the testate executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Artheo Thomas Jamir on June 3,
estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. The administrator of the testate estate of the late 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 26, 1961, after the death
Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to countersign the check or checks necessary of his wife.
to pay the said overtime pay as shown by the bills marked Annex "A", "B" and "C" of the
motion. 7. Order of June 21, 1966, on pp. 212-213, id., approving the deed of sale
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Graciano Lucero and Melquiades
SO ORDERED. Batisanan on June 6 and June 3, 1966, respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed
by Hodges on June 9, 1959 and November 27, 1961, respectively, after the death of his
(Pp. 221-222, Green Record on Appeal.) wife.

Likewise, the respondent court approved deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno 8. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., approving the deed of sale
alone, as Administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, covering properties in the name executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Espiridion Partisala, Winifredo
of Hodges, pursuant to "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges, irrespective of whether Espada and Rosario Alingasa on September 6, 1966, August 17, 1966 and August 3, 1966,
respectively, pursuant to "contracts to sell" signed by Hodges on April 20, 1960, April for the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the following self-
18, 1960 and August 25, 1958, respectively, that is, after the death of his wife. explanatory motion was filed:

9. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 137-138, id., approving the deed of sale executed URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Alfredo Catedral on March 2, 1966, pursuant ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL OF THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF
to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on May 29, 1954, before the death of his wife, THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23, 1957
which contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on February 16, 1966 for failure of PLUS ALL THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM.
appellee Catedral to pay the installments due on time.
COMES NOW the co-administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges, through
10. Order of April 5, 1966, on pp. 138-139, id., approving the deed of sale executed his undersigned attorneys in the above-entitled proceedings, and to this Honorable
by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Jose Pablico on March 7, 1966, pursuant to a Court respectfully alleges:
"contract to sell" signed by Hodges on March 7, 1950, after the death of his wife, which
contract petitioner claims it had cancelled on June 29, 1960, for failure of appellee (1) On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City.
Pablico to pay the installments due on time.
(2) On June 28, 1957 this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and
11. Order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 303-304, id., insofar as it approved the deed Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges executed November 22, 1952 and
of sale executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellee Pepito Iyulores on appointed C. N. Hodges as Executor of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 24-25, Rec.
September 6, 1966, pursuant to a "contract to sell" signed by Hodges on February 5, Sp. Proc. 1307).
1951, before the death of his wife.
(3) On July 1, 1957 this Honorable Court issued Letters Testamentary to C. N.
12. Order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, id., approving three deeds of sale Hodges in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307).
executed by respondent Magno, one in favor of appellees Santiago Pacaonsis and two
in favor of appellee Adelfa Premaylon on December 5, 1966 and November 3, 1966, (4) On December 14, 1957 this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following
respectively, pursuant to separate "promises to sell" signed respectively by Hodges on allegations in a Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as attorney
May 26, 1955 and January 30, 1954, before the death of his wife, and October 31, 1959, for the executor C. N. Hodges:
after her death.
"That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but
In like manner, there were also instances when respondent court approved deeds of also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges."
sale executed by petitioner alone and without the concurrence of respondent Magno,
and such approvals have not been the subject of any appeal. No less than petitioner (p. 44, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
points this out on pages 149-150 of its brief as appellant thus:
issued the following order:
The points of fact and law pertaining to the two abovecited assignments of error have
already been discussed previously. In the first abovecited error, the order alluded to was "As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executory, for the reasons stated in
general, and as already explained before, it was, as admitted by the lower court itself, his motion dated December 11, 1957 which the court considers well taken, all the sales,
superseded by the particular orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
the appellee, Avelina A. Magno, which are subject of this appeal, as well as the particular Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The said executor is further authorized to execute
orders approving specific final deeds of sale executed by the appellant, Philippine subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
Commercial and Industrial Bank, which were never appealed by the appellee, Avelina A. deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the wishes contained in the last will
Magno, nor by any party for that matter, and which are now therefore final. and testament of the latter."

Now, simultaneously with the foregoing incidents, others of more fundamental and all (p. 46, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.)
embracing significance developed. On October 5, 1963, over the signature of Atty.
Allison J. Gibbs in representation of the law firm of Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta, as counsel
(5) On April 21, 1959 this Honorable Court approved the inventory and accounting (p. 100. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14, 1959 wherein
he alleged among other things (10) On December 26, 1962 Letters of Administration were issued to Avelina Magno
pursuant to this Honorable Court's aforesaid Order of December 25, 1962
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the "With full authority to take possession of all the property of said deceased in any
deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the province or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary
Honorable Court." for the preservation of said property, said Administratrix and/or Special Administratrix
having filed a bond satisfactory to the Court."
(pp. 77-78, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.).
(p. 102, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
(6) On July 30, 1960 this Honorable Court approved the "Annual Statement of
Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on July 21, (11) On January 22, 1963 this Honorable Court on petition of Leon P. Gellada of
1960 wherein he alleged among other things: January 21, 1963 issued Letters of Administration to:

"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the (a) Avelina A. Magno as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament of the (b) Avelina A. Magno as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." Hodges; and

(pp. 81-82. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.) (c) Joe Hodges as Co-Special Administrator of the Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges.
(7) On May 2, 1961 this Honorable court approved the "Annual Statement of
Account By The Executor for the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on April (p. 43, Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307)
20, 1961 wherein he alleged:
(12) On February 20, 1963 this Honorable Court on the basis of a motion filed by
That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, of the time and place of Leon P. Gellada as legal counsel on February 16, 1963 for Avelina A. Magno acting as
examining the herein account, as herein Executor is the only devisee or legatee of the Administratrix of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (pp. 114-116, Sp. Proc. 1307)
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament of the issued the following order:
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court.
"... se autoriza a aquella (Avelina A. Magno) a firmar escrituras de venta definitiva de
(pp. 90-91. Rec. Sp. Proc. 1307; emphasis supplied.) propiedades cubiertas por contratos para vender, firmados, en vida, por el finado
Charles Newton Hodges, cada vez que el precio estipulado en cada contrato este
(8) On December 25, 1962, C.N. Hodges died. totalmente pagado. Se autoriza igualmente a la misma a firmar escrituras de cancelacion
de hipoteca tanto de bienes reales como personales cada vez que la consideracion de
(9) On December 25, 1962, on the Urgent Ex-parte Motion of Leon P. Gellada filed cada hipoteca este totalmente pagada.
only in Special Proceeding No. 1307, this Honorable Court appointed Avelina A. Magno
"Cada una de dichas escrituras que se otorguen debe ser sometida para la aprobacion
"Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and as Special Administratrix of the de este Juzgado."
estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in the latter case, because the last will of said Charles
Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron safe and that the real and personal (p. 117, Sp. Proc. 1307).
properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or go to waste, unless a Special
Administratrix is appointed." [Par 1 (c), Reply to Motion For Removal of Joe Hodges]
(13) On September l6, 1963 Leon P. Gellada, acting as attorney for Avelina A. Magno and the rents, emoluments and income therefrom belong to the Higdon family who are
as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, alleges: named in paragraphs Fourth and Fifth of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 5, Rec. Sp.
Proc. 1307).
3. That since January, 1963, both estates of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton
Hodges have been receiving in full, payments for those "contracts to sell" entered into WHEREFORE, premises considered, movant respectfully prays that this Honorable
by C. N. Hodges during his lifetime, and the purchasers have been demanding the Court, after due hearing, order:
execution of definite deeds of sale in their favor.
(1) Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting of all of the funds,
4. That hereto attached are thirteen (13) copies deeds of sale executed by the properties and assets of any character belonging to the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
Administratrix and by the co-administrator (Fernando P. Mirasol) of the estate of Linnie and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession, with full details of what she has
Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges respectively, in compliance with the terms and done with them;
conditions of the respective "contracts to sell" executed by the parties thereto."
(2) Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the Administrator of the estate of
(14) The properties involved in the aforesaid motion of September 16, 1963 are all C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character remaining in her
registered in the name of the deceased C. N. Hodges. possession;

(15) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has been advertising (3) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, Avelina A.
in the newspaper in Iloilo thusly: Magno to stop, unless she first secures the conformity of Joe Hodges (or his duly
authorized representative, such as the undersigned attorneys) as the Co-administrator
For Sale and attorney-in-fact of a majority of the beneficiaries of the estate of C. N. Hodges:

Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Charles Newton Hodges. (a) Advertising the sale and the sale of the properties of the estates:

All Real Estate or Personal Property will be sold on First Come First Served Basis. (b) Employing personnel and paying them any compensation.

Avelina A. Magno (4) Such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
Administratrix premises. (Annex "T", Petition.)

(16) Avelina A. Magno, it is alleged on information and belief, has paid and still is Almost a year thereafter, or on September 14, 1964, after the co-administrators Joe
paying sums of money to sundry persons. Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all
(17) Joe Hodges through the undersigned attorneys manifested during the hearings the heirs of Hodges approved by the court, and because the above motion of October
before this Honorable Court on September 5 and 6, 1963 that the estate of C. N. Hodges 5, 1963 had not yet been heard due to the absence from the country of Atty. Gibbs,
was claiming all of the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and petitioner filed the following:
C. N. Hodges situated in Philippines because of the aforesaid election by C. N. Hodges
wherein he claimed and took possession as sole owner of all of said assets during the MANIFESTATION AND MOTION, INCLUDING MOTION TO SET FOR HEARING AND
administration of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on the ground that he was the sole RESOLVE "URGENT MOTION FOR AN ACCOUNTING AND DELIVERY TO ADMINISTRATORS
devisee and legatee under her Last Will and Testament. OF THE ESTATE OF C. N. HODGES OF ALL THE ASSETS OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
OF THE DECEASED LINNIE JANE HODGES AND C. N. HODGES EXISTING AS OF MAY 23,
(18) Avelina A. Magno has submitted no inventory and accounting of her 1957 PLUS ALL OF THE RENTS, EMOLUMENTS AND INCOME THEREFROM OF OCTOBER
administration as Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Special 5, 1963.
Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, from manifestations made by
Avelina A. Magno and her legal counsel, Leon P. Gellada, there is no question she will COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as
claim that at least fifty per cent (50%) of the conjugal assets of the deceased spouses PCIB), the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, in Special Proceedings
No. 1672, through its undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully 6. Since its appointment as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges the PCIB
alleges that: has not been able to properly carry out its duties and obligations as administrator of the
estate of C. N. Hodges because of the following acts, among others, of Avelina A. Magno
1. On October 5, 1963, Joe Hodges acting as the co-administrator of the estate of and those who claim to act for her as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges:
C. N. Hodges filed, through the undersigned attorneys, an "Urgent Motion For An
Accounting and Delivery To Administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges of all Of The (a) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as if she is in exclusive control of all of the assets
Assets Of The Conjugal Partnership of The Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. in the Philippines of both estates including those claimed by the estate of C. N. Hodges
Hodges Existing as Of May, 23, 1957 Plus All Of The Rents, Emoluments and Income as evidenced in part by her locking the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, Iloilo City on
Therefrom" (pp. 536-542, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672). August 31, 1964 and refusing to reopen same until ordered to do so by this Honorable
Court on September 7, 1964.
2. On January 24, 1964 this Honorable Court, on the basis of an amicable
agreement entered into on January 23, 1964 by the two co-administrators of the estate (b) Avelina A. Magno illegally acts as though she alone may decide how the assets
of C. N. Hodges and virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges (p. 912, CFI Rec., S. P. No. of the estate of C.N. Hodges should be administered, who the PCIB shall employ and
1672), resolved the dispute over who should act as administrator of the estate of C. N. how much they may be paid as evidenced in party by her refusal to sign checks issued
Hodges by appointing the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges (pp. 905- by the PCIB payable to the undersigned counsel pursuant to their fee agreement
906, CFI Rec. S. P. No. 1672) and issuing letters of administration to the PCIB. approved by this Honorable Court in its order dated March 31, 1964.

3. On January 24, 1964 virtually all of the heirs of C. N. Hodges, Joe Hodges and (c) Avelina A. Magno illegally gives access to and turns over possession of the
Fernando P. Mirasol acting as the two co-administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges, records and assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges to the attorney-in-fact of the Higdon
Avelina A. Magno acting as the administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and Family, Mr. James L. Sullivan, as evidenced in part by the cashing of his personal checks.
Messrs. William Brown and Ardel Young Acting for all of the Higdon family who claim to
be the sole beneficiaries of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and various legal counsel (d) Avelina A. Magno illegally refuses to execute checks prepared by the PCIB
representing the aforenamed parties entered into an amicable agreement, which was drawn to pay expenses of the estate of C. N. Hodges as evidenced in part by the check
approved by this Honorable Court, wherein the parties thereto agreed that certain sums drawn to reimburse the PCIB's advance of P48,445.50 to pay the 1964 income taxes
of money were to be paid in settlement of different claims against the two estates and reported due and payable by the estate of C.N. Hodges.
that the assets (to the extent they existed)of both estates would be administrated jointly
by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges and Avelina A. Magno as 7. Under and pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court, particularly those of
administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, subject, however, to the aforesaid January 24 and February 1, 1964, and the mandate contained in its Letters of
October 5, 1963 Motion, namely, the PCIB's claim to exclusive possession and ownership Administration issued on January 24, 1964 to the PCIB, it has
of one-hundred percent (10017,) (or, in the alternative, seventy-five percent [75%] of
all assets owned by C. N. Hodges or Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. On "full authority to take possession of all the property of the deceased C. N. Hodges
February 1, 1964 (pp. 934-935, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672) this Honorable Court amended
its order of January 24, 1964 but in no way changes its recognition of the aforedescribed "and to perform all other acts necessary for the preservation of said property." (p. 914,
basic demand by the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to one hundred CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672.)
percent (100%) of the assets claimed by both estates.
8. As administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB claims the right to the
4. On February 15, 1964 the PCIB filed a "Motion to Resolve" the aforesaid Motion immediate exclusive possession and control of all of the properties, accounts
of October 5, 1963. This Honorable Court set for hearing on June 11, 1964 the Motion receivables, court cases, bank accounts and other assets, including the documentary
of October 5, 1963. records evidencing same, which existed in the Philippines on the date of C. N. Hodges'
death, December 25, 1962, and were in his possession and registered in his name alone.
5. On June 11, 1964, because the undersigned Allison J. Gibbs was absent in the The PCIB knows of no assets in the Philippines registered in the name of Linnie Jane
United States, this Honorable Court ordered the indefinite postponement of the hearing Hodges, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, or, C. N. Hodges, Executor of the Estate of
of the Motion of October 5, 1963. Linnie Jane Hodges on December 25, 1962. All of the assets of which the PCIB has
knowledge are either registered in the name of C. N. Hodges, alone or were derived party entitled to the sole and exclusive possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.
therefrom since his death on December 25, 1962. N. Hodges.

9. The PCIB as the current administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, deceased, 11. The PCIB's predecessors submitted their accounting and this Honorable Court
succeeded to all of the rights of the previously duly appointed administrators of the approved same, to wit:
estate of C. N. Hodges, to wit:
(a) The accounting of Harold K. Davies dated January 18, 1963 (pp. 16-33, CFI Rec.
(a) On December 25, 1962, date of C. N. Hodges' death, this Honorable Court S.P. No. 1672); which shows or its face the:
appointed Miss Avelina A. Magno simultaneously as:
(i) Conformity of Avelina A. Magno acting as "Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie
(i) Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. Jane Hodges and Special Administratrix of the Estate of C. N. Hodges";
1307) to replace the deceased C. N. Hodges who on May 28, 1957 was appointed Special
Administrator (p. 13. CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1307) and on July 1, 1957 Executor of the estate (ii) Conformity of Leslie Echols, a Texas lawyer acting for the heirs of C.N. Hodges;
of Linnie Jane Hodges (p. 30, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307). and

(ii) Special Administratrix of the estate of C. N. Hodges (p. 102, CFI Rec., S.P. No. (iii) Conformity of William Brown, a Texas lawyer acting for the Higdon family who
1307). claim to be the only heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges (pp. 18, 25-33, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).

(b) On December 29, 1962 this Honorable Court appointed Harold K. Davies as co- Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on January 22, 1963 (p. 34,
special administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges along with Avelina A. Magno (pp. 108- CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1672).
111, CFI Rec., S. P. No. 1307).
(b) The accounting of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as of January 23, 1964,
(c) On January 22, 1963, with the conformity of Avelina A. Magno, Harold K. Davies filed February 24, 1964 (pp. 990-1000, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672 and pp. 1806-1848, CFI
resigned in favor of Joe Hodges (pp. 35-36, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672) who thereupon was Rec. S.P. No. 1307).
appointed on January 22, 1963 by this Honorable Court as special co-administrator of
the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 38-40 & 43, CFI Rec. S.P. No. 1672) along with Miss Magno Note: This accounting was approved by this Honorable Court on March 3, 1964.
who at that time was still acting as special co-administratrix of the estate of C. N.
Hodges. (c) The PCIB and its undersigned lawyers are aware of no report or accounting
submitted by Avelina A. Magno of her acts as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane
(d) On February 22, 1963, without objection on the part of Avelina A. Magno, this Hodges or special administratrix of the estate of C.N. Hodges, unless it is the accounting
Honorable Court appointed Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as co-administrators of of Harold K. Davies as special co-administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges dated
the estate of C.N. Hodges (pp. 76-78, 81 & 85, CFI Rec., S.P. No. 1672). January 18, 1963 to which Miss Magno manifested her conformity (supra).

10. Miss Avelina A. Magno, pursuant to the orders of this Honorable Court of 12. In the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964, Miss Avelina A. Magno agreed to
December 25, 1962, took possession of all Philippine Assets now claimed by the two receive P10,000.00
estates. Legally, Miss Magno could take possession of the assets registered in the name
of C. N. Hodges alone only in her capacity as Special Administratrix of the Estate of C.N. "for her services as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges"
Hodges. With the appointment by this Honorable Court on February 22, 1963 of Joe
Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol as the co-administrators of the estate of C.N. Hodges, and in addition she agreed to be employed, starting February 1, 1964, at
they legally were entitled to take over from Miss Magno the full and exclusive
possession of all of the assets of the estate of C.N. Hodges. With the appointment on "a monthly salary of P500.00 for her services as an employee of both estates."
January 24, 1964 of the PCIB as the sole administrator of the estate of C.N. Hodges in
substitution of Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol, the PCIB legally became the only 24 ems.
13. Under the aforesaid agreement of January 24, 1964 and the orders of this WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PCIB respectfully petitions that this Honorable
Honorable Court of same date, the PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges court:
is entitled to the exclusive possession of all records, properties and assets in the name
of C. N. Hodges as of the date of his death on December 25, 1962 which were in the (1) Set the Motion of October 5, 1963 for hearing at the earliest possible date with
possession of the deceased C. N. Hodges on that date and which then passed to the notice to all interested parties;
possession of Miss Magno in her capacity as Special Co-Administratrix of the estate of
C. N. Hodges or the possession of Joe Hodges or Fernando P. Mirasol as co- (2) Order Avelina A. Magno to submit an inventory and accounting as
administrators of the estate of C. N. Hodges. Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and Co-Administratrix of the Estate
of C. N. Hodges of all of the funds, properties and assets of any character belonging to
14. Because of Miss Magno's refusal to comply with the reasonable request of PCIB the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges which have come into her possession,
concerning the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges, the PCIB dismissed Miss Magno as with full details of what she has done with them;
an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges effective August 31, 1964. On September 1,
1964 Miss Magno locked the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and denied the PCIB (3) Order Avelina A. Magno to turn over and deliver to the PCIB as administrator
access thereto. Upon the Urgent Motion of the PCIB dated September 3, 1964, this of the estate of C. N. Hodges all of the funds, properties and assets of any character
Honorable Court on September 7, 1964 ordered Miss Magno to reopen the aforesaid remaining in her possession;
premises at 206-208 Guanco Street and permit the PCIB access thereto no later than
September 8, 1964. (4) Pending this Honorable Court's adjudication of the aforesaid issues, order
Avelina A. Magno and her representatives to stop interferring with the administration
15. The PCIB pursuant to the aforesaid orders of this Honorable Court is again in of the estate of C. N. Hodges by the PCIB and its duly authorized representatives;
physical possession of all of the assets of the estate of C. N. Hodges. However, the PCIB
is not in exclusive control of the aforesaid records, properties and assets because Miss (5) Enjoin Avelina A. Magno from working in the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Magno continues to assert the claims hereinabove outlined in paragraph 6, continues Street, Iloilo City as an employee of the estate of C. N. Hodges and approve her dismissal
to use her own locks to the doors of the aforesaid premises at 206-208 Guanco Street, as such by the PCIB effective August 31, 1964;
Iloilo City and continues to deny the PCIB its right to know the combinations to the doors
of the vault and safes situated within the premises at 206-208 Guanco Street despite (6) Enjoin James L. Sullivan, Attorneys Manglapus and Quimpo and others
the fact that said combinations were known to only C. N. Hodges during his lifetime. allegedly representing Miss Magno from entering the premises at 206-208 Guanco
Street, Iloilo City or any other properties of C. N. Hodges without the express permission
16. The Philippine estate and inheritance taxes assessed the estate of Linnie Jane of the PCIB;
Hodges were assessed and paid on the basis that C. N. Hodges is the sole beneficiary of
the assets of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges situated in the Philippines. Avelina A. (7) Order such other relief as this Honorable Court finds just and equitable in the
Magno and her legal counsel at no time have questioned the validity of the aforesaid premises. (Annex "U" Petition.)
assessment and the payment of the corresponding Philippine death taxes.
On January 8, 1965, petitioner also filed a motion for "Official Declaration of Heirs of
17. Nothing further remains to be done in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges except Linnie Jane Hodges Estate" alleging:
to resolve the aforesaid Motion of October 5, 1963 and grant the PCIB the exclusive
possession and control of all of the records, properties and assets of the estate of C. N. COMES NOW Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (hereinafter referred to as
Hodges. PCIB), as administrator of the estate of the late C. N. Hodges, through the undersigned
counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges that:
18. Such assets as may have existed of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were
ordered by this Honorable Court in special Proceedings No. 1307 to be turned over and 1. During their marriage, spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane
delivered to C. N. Hodges alone. He in fact took possession of them before his death and Hodges, American citizens originally from the State of Texas, U.S.A., acquired and
asserted and exercised the right of exclusive ownership over the said assets as the sole accumulated considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in the States of
beneficiary of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. Texas and Oklahoma, United States of America. All said properties constituted their
conjugal estate.
4. On November 14, 1953, C. N. Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo his Last Will
2. Although Texas was the domicile of origin of the Hodges spouses, this and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "B ". In said Will, C. N.
Honorable Court, in its orders dated March 31 and December 12, 1964 (CFI Record, Sp. Hodges designated his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, as his beneficiary using the identical
Proc. No. 1307, pp. ----; Sp. Proc. No. 1672, p. ----), conclusively found and categorically language she used in the second and third provisos of her Will, supra.
ruled that said spouses had lived and worked for more than 50 years in Iloilo City and
had, therefore, acquired a domicile of choice in said city, which they retained until the 5. On May 23, 1957 Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City, predeceasing her
time of their respective deaths. husband by more than five (5) years. At the time of her death, she had no forced or
compulsory heir, except her husband, C. N. Hodges. She was survived also by various
3. On November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed in the City of Iloilo her brothers and sisters mentioned in her Will (supra), which, for convenience, we shall
Last Will and Testament, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A". The bequests refer to as the HIGDONS.
in said will pertinent to the present issue are the second, third, and fourth provisions,
which we quote in full hereunder. 6. On June 28, 1957, this Honorable Court admitted to probate the Last Will and
Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), and appointed C. N. Hodges
SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of as executor of her estate without bond. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 24-25). On
my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated, or located, to my husband, July 1, 1957, this Honorable Court issued letters testamentary to C. N. Hodges in the
Charles Newton Hodges, to have and to hold unto him, my said husband during his estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 30.)
natural lifetime.
7. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respect to the order of succession, the
THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic of its testamentary provisions, should
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and he be governed by Philippine laws because:
is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate
by sale of any part thereof which he think best, and the purchase of any other or (a) The testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, intended Philippine laws to govern her Will;
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without
general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any (b) Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "the national law of the person whose
property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee regardless of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail. However,
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he may elect to sell. All rents, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law see paragraph 2, supra)
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is should govern the testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables
provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the (personal properties), and the law of the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to
improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas, properties located in the Philippines) with regards immovable (real properties). Thus
but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied by our Supreme Court in the
as above provided. He shall have the right to sub-divide any farmland and sell lots case of "In The Matter Of The Testate Estate of Eduard E. Christensen", G.R. No.
therein, and may sell unimproved town lots. L-16749, promulgated January 31, 1963, Philippine law should apply to the Will of Linnie
Jane Hodges and to the successional rights to her estate insofar as her movable and
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, immovable assets in the Philippines are concerned. We shall not, at this stage, discuss
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and what law should govern the assets of Linnie Jane Hodges located in Oklahoma and Texas,
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and because the only assets in issue in this motion are those within the jurisdiction of this
sisters, share and share alike, namely: motion Court in the two above-captioned Special Proceedings.

"Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and 8. Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses
Nimray Higdon." shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon the death of Linnie
Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, one-half (1/2) of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges
spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles Newton
Hodges, not by way of inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the conjugal 13. In his capacity as sole heir and successor to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as
partnership. The other one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate constituted the above-stated, C. N. Hodges, shortly after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, appropriated
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. This is the only portion of the conjugal estate capable of to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in business and
inheritance by her heirs. performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own
name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie
9. This one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal assets pertaining to Linnie Jane Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962, therefore, all said
Hodges cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control, and registered in his name alone,
increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death on May not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all said assets.
23, 1957. Linnie Jane Hodges' Will provides that "all rents, emoluments and income from
said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use any 14. All these acts of C. N. Hodges were authorized and sanctioned expressly and
part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire." (Paragraph 3, Annex "A".) impliedly by various orders of this Honorable Court, as follows:
Thus, by specific provision of Linnie Jane Hodges' Will, "all rents, emoluments and
income" must be credited to the one-half (1/2) portion of the conjugal estate pertaining (a) In an Order dated May 27, 1957, this Honorable Court ruled that C. N. Hodges
to C. N. Hodges. Clearly, therefore, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, capable of "is allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, and to
inheritance by her heirs, consisted exclusively of no more than one-half (1/2) of the perform acts which he had been doing while the deceased was living." (CFI Record, Sp.
conjugal estate, computed as of the time of her death on May 23, 1957. Proc. No. 1307, p. 11.)

10. Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code provide that the surviving (b) On December 14, 1957, this Honorable Court, on the basis of the following fact,
spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of alleged in the verified Motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Leon P. Gellada as
right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges:
deceased, and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect
this right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2) That herein Executor, (is) not only part owner of the properties left as conjugal, but also,
portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886, Civil Code.) Clearly, therefore, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.' (CFI Record,
immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 44; emphasis supplied.)
least three-fourths (3/4) or seventy-five (75%) percent of all of the conjugal assets of the
spouses, (1/2 or 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of issued the following order:
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death (see paragraph 9, supra). "As prayed for by Attorney Gellada, counsel for the Executor, for the reasons stated in
his motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, all the sales,
11. The late Linnie Jane Hodges designated her husband C.N. Hodges as her sole conveyances, leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
and exclusive heir with full authority to do what he pleased, as exclusive heir and owner Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The
of all the assets constituting her estate, except only with regards certain properties said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases
"owned by us, located at, in or near the City of Lubbock, Texas". Thus, even without and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in
relying on our laws of succession and legitime, which we have cited above, C. N. Hodges, consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter." (CFI
by specific testamentary designation of his wife, was entitled to the entirely to his wife's Record. Sp. Proc. No. 1307, p. 46; emphasis supplied.)
estate in the Philippines.
24 ems
12. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "the rights of the successor are
transmitted from the death of the decedent". Thus, title to the estate of Linnie Jane (c) On April 21, 1959, this Honorable Court approved the verified inventory and
Hodges was transmitted to C. N. Hodges immediately upon her death on May 23, 1957. accounting submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada on April 14,
For the convenience of this Honorable Court, we attached hereto as Annex "C" a graph 1959 wherein he alleged among other things,
of how the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges should be divided in accordance with
Philippine law and the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges. "That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the
herein account, be given notice, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and sisters, share and
Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, pp. 77-78; emphasis supplied.) share alike, namely:

(d) On July 20, 1960, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual "Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and
Statement of Account" submitted by C. N. Hodges through his counsel Leon P. Gellada Nimray Higdon."
on July 21, 1960 wherein he alleged, among other things.
Because of the facts hereinabove set out there is no "rest, residue and remainder", at
"That no person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining the least to the extent of the Philippine assets, which remains to vest in the HIGDONS,
herein account, be given notice as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the assuming this proviso in Linnie Jane Hodges' Will is valid and binding against the estate
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe of C. N. Hodges.
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307,
pp. 81-82; emphasis supplied.) 18. Any claims by the HIGDONS under the above-quoted provision of Linnie Jane
Hodges' Will is without merit because said provision is void and invalid at least as to the
(e) On May 2, 1961, this Honorable Court approved the verified "Annual Statement Philippine assets. It should not, in anyway, affect the rights of the estate of C. N. Hodges
of Account By The Executor For the Year 1960" submitted through Leon P. Gellada on or his heirs to the properties, which C. N. Hodges acquired by way of inheritance from
April 20, 1961 wherein he alleged: his wife Linnie Jane Hodges upon her death.

"That no person interested in the Philippines be given notice, ofthe time and place of (a) In spite of the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges, C.
examining the herein account, as herein executor is the only devisee or legatee of the N. Hodges acquired, not merely a usufructuary right, but absolute title and ownership
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, in accordance with the last will and testament ofthe to her estate. In a recent case involving a very similar testamentary provision, the
deceased, already probated by this Honorable Court." (CFI Record, Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Supreme Court held that the heir first designated acquired full ownership of the
pp. 90-91; emphasis supplied.) property bequeathed by the will, not mere usufructuary rights. (Consolacion Florentino
de Crisologo, et al., vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962.)
15. Since C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of Linnie Jane Hodges, not
only by law, but in accordance with the dispositions of her will, there was, in fact, no (b) Article 864, 872 and 886 of the New Civil Code clearly provide that no charge,
need to liquidate the conjugal estate of the spouses. The entirely of said conjugal estate condition or substitution whatsoever upon the legitime can be imposed by a testator.
pertained to him exclusively, therefore this Honorable Court sanctioned and authorized, Thus, under the provisions of Articles 900, 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code, the
as above-stated, C. N. Hodges to manage, operate and control all the conjugal assets as legitime of a surviving spouse is 1/2 of the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently,
owner. the above-mentioned provision in the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is clearly invalid insofar
as the legitime of C. N. Hodges was concerned, which consisted of 1/2 of the 1/2 portion
16. By expressly authorizing C. N. Hodges to act as he did in connection with the of the conjugal estate, or 1/4 of the entire conjugal estate of the deceased.
estate of his wife, this Honorable Court has (1) declared C. N. Hodges as the sole heir of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, and (2) delivered and distributed her estate to C. N. (c) There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized
Hodges as sole heir in accordance with the terms and conditions of her Will. Thus, by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution,
although the "estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" still exists as a legal and juridical personality, sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary
it had no assets or properties located in the Philippines registered in its name substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely variations of these. The
whatsoever at the time of the death of C. N. Hodges on December 25, 1962. substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not
fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N.
17. The Will of Linnie Jane Hodges (Annex "A"), fourth paragraph, provides as Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the properties for the substitute heirs.
follows: (Consolacion Florentino de Crisologo et al. vs. Manuel Singson, G. R. No.
L-13876.) At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order that a vulgar
"At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, devise and bequeath or simple substitution can be valid, three alternative conditions must be present,
all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate both real and personal, wherever namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die before the testator; or (2) should
not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the
above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is 4. That C. N. Hodges was the sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane
void. Manresa, commenting on these kisses of substitution, meaningfully stated that: Hodges;
"... cuando el testador instituyeun primer heredero, y por fallecimiento de este nombra
otro u otros, ha de entenderse que estas segundas designaciones solo han de llegar a 5. That, therefore, the entire conjugal estate of the spouses located in the
tener efectividad en el caso de que el primer instituido muera antes que el testador, Philippines, plus all the "rents, emoluments and income" above-mentioned, now
fuera o no esta su verdadera intencion. ...". (6 Manresa, 7 a ed., pag. 175.) In other constitutes the estate of C. N. Hodges, capable of distribution to his heirs upon
words, when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first heir, the termination of Special Proceedings No. 1672;
second designation can have effect only in case the first instituted heir dies before the
testator, whether or not that was the true intention of said testator. Since C. N. Hodges 6. That PCIB, as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges, is entitled to full and
did not die before Linnie Jane Hodges, the provision for substitution contained in Linnie exclusive custody, control and management of all said properties; and
Jane Hodges' Willis void.
7. That Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges,
(d) In view of the invalidity of the provision for substitution in the Will, C. N. as well as the HIGDONS, has no right to intervene or participate in the administration of
Hodges' inheritance to the entirety of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate is irrevocable and the C. N. Hodges estate.
final.
PCIB further prays for such and other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the
19. Be that as it may, at the time of C. N. Hodges' death, the entirety of the conjugal premises."
estate appeared and was registered in him exclusively as owner. Thus, the presumption
is that all said assets constituted his estate. Therefore (Record, pp. 265-277)

(a) If the HIGDONS wish to enforce their dubious rights as substituted heirs to 1/4 Before all of these motions of petitioner could be resolved, however, on December 21,
of the conjugal estate (the other 1/4 is covered by the legitime of C. N. Hodges which 1965, private respondent Magno filed her own "Motion for the Official Declaration of
can not be affected by any testamentary disposition), their remedy, if any, is to file their Heirs of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as follows:
claim against the estate of C. N. Hodges, which should be entitled at the present time to
full custody and control of all the conjugal estate of the spouses. COMES NOW the Administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and, through
undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states and manifests:
(b) The present proceedings, in which two estates exist under separate
administration, where the administratrix of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate exercises an 1. That the spouses Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were
officious right to object and intervene in matters affecting exclusively the C. N. Hodges American citizens who died at the City of Iloilo after having amassed and accumulated
estate, is anomalous. extensive properties in the Philippines;

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after trial and reception of evidence, 2. That on November 22, 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges executed a last will and
this Honorable Court declare: testament (the original of this will now forms part of the records of these proceedings
as Exhibit "C" and appears as Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 17-18);
1. That the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was and is composed exclusively of one-
half (1/2) share in the conjugal estate of the spouses Hodges, computed as of the date 3. That on May 23, 1957, Linnie Jane Hodges died at the City of Iloilo at the time
of her death on May 23, 1957; survived by her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, and several relatives named in her
last will and testament;
2. That the other half of the conjugal estate pertained exclusively to C. N. Hodges
as his share as partner in the conjugal partnership; 4. That on June 28, 1957, a petition therefor having been priorly filed and duly
heard, this Honorable Court issued an order admitting to probate the last will and
3. That all "rents, emoluments and income" of the conjugal estate accruing after testament of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I, pp. 24-25, 26-28);
Linnie Jane Hodges' death pertains to C. N. Hodges;
5. That the required notice to creditors and to all others who may have any claims
against the decedent, Linnie Jane Hodges has already been printed, published and 7. That under the provisions of the last will and testament already above-quoted,
posted (Sp. Proc. No. 1307, Folio I. pp. 34-40) and the reglamentary period for filing such Linnie Jane Hodges gave a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate to her husband,
claims has long ago lapsed and expired without any claims having been asserted against Charles Newton Hodges, and a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, approved by the Administrator/Administratrix of the estate to her relatives named therein;
said estate, nor ratified by this Honorable Court;
8. That after the death of Linnie Jane Hodges and after the admission to probate
6. That the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges already admitted to of her last will and testament, but during the lifetime of Charles Newton Hodges, the
probate contains an institution of heirs in the following words: said Charles Newton Hodges with full and complete knowledge of the life-estate or
usufruct conferred upon him by the will since he was then acting as Administrator of the
"SECOND: I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of estate and later as Executor of the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, unequivocably and clearly
my estate, both personal and real, wherever situated or located, to my beloved through oral and written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced,
husband, Charles Newton Hodges to have and to hold unto him, my said husband, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane
during his natural lifetime. Hodges;

THIRD: I desire, direct and provide that my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, shall 9. That, accordingly, the only heirs left to receive the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges
have the right to manage, control, use and enjoy said estate during his lifetime, and, he pursuant to her last will and testament, are her named brothers and sisters, or their
is hereby given the right to make any changes in the physical properties of said estate, heirs, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Aline Higdon and David
by sale of any part thereof which he may think best, and the purchase of any other or Higdon, the latter two being the wife and son respectively of the deceased Roy Higdon,
additional property as he may think best; to execute conveyances with or without Sadie Rascoe Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, all of legal ages, American citizens, with
general or special warranty, conveying in fee simple or for any other term or time, any residence at the State of Texas, United States of America;
property which he may deem proper to dispose of; to lease any of the real property for
oil, gas and/or other minerals, and all such deeds or leases shall pass the absolute fee 10. That at the time of the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957, she was
simple title to the interest so conveyed in such property as he elect to sell. All rents, the co-owner (together with her husband Charles Newton Hodges) of an undivided one-
emoluments and income from said estate shall belong to him, and he is further half interest in their conjugal properties existing as of that date, May 23, 1957, which
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire. It is properties are now being administered sometimes jointly and sometimes separately by
provided herein, however, that he shall not sell or otherwise dispose of any of the the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and/or the Administrator of the
improved property now owned by us located at, in or near the City of Lubbock Texas, estate of C. N. Hodges but all of which are under the control and supervision of this
but he shall have the full right to lease, manage and enjoy the same during his lifetime, Honorable Court;
above provided. He shall have the right to subdivide any farm land and sell lots therein,
and may sell unimproved town lots. 11. That because there was no separation or segregation of the interests of
husband and wife in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation
FOURTH: At the death of my said husband, Charles Newton Hodges, I give, or segregation up to the present, both interests have continually earned exactly the
devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, both real and same amount of "rents, emoluments and income", the entire estate having been
personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided among my brothers and continually devoted to the business of the spouses as if they were alive;
sisters, share and share alike, namely:
12. That the one-half interest of Linnie Jane Hodges in the combined conjugal
Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard Higdon, Roy Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and estate was earning "rents, emoluments and income" until her death on May 23, 1957,
Nimroy Higdon. when it ceased to be saddled with any more charges or expenditures which are purely
personal to her in nature, and her estate kept on earning such "rents, emoluments and
FIFTH: In case of the death of any of my brothers and/or sisters named in item Fourth, income" by virtue of their having been expressly renounced, disclaimed and repudiated
above, prior to the death of my husband, Charles Newton Hodges, then it is my will and by Charles Newton Hodges to whom they were bequeathed for life under the last will
bequest that the heirs of such deceased brother or sister shall take jointly the share and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges;
which would have gone to such brother or sister had she or he survived."
13. That, on the other hand, the one-half interest of Charles Newton Hodges in the c. After such determination ordering its segregation from the combined conjugal
combined conjugal estate existing as of May 23, 1957, while it may have earned exactly estate and its delivery to the Administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges for
the same amount of "rents, emoluments and income" as that of the share pertaining to distribution to the heirs to whom they properly belong and appertain.
Linnie Jane Hodges, continued to be burdened by charges, expenditures, and other
dispositions which are purely personal to him in nature, until the death of Charles (Green Record on Appeal, pp. 382-391)
Newton Hodges himself on December 25, 1962;
whereupon, instead of further pressing on its motion of January 8, 1965 aforequoted,
14. That of all the assets of the combined conjugal estate of Linnie Jane Hodges as it had been doing before, petitioner withdrew the said motion and in addition to
and Charles Newton Hodges as they exist today, the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is opposing the above motion of respondent Magno, filed a motion on April 22, 1966
clearly entitled to a portion more than fifty percent (50%) as compared to the portion alleging in part that:
to which the estate of Charles Newton Hodges may be entitled, which portions can be
exactly determined by the following manner: 1. That it has received from the counsel for the administratrix of the supposed
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges a notice to set her "Motion for Official Declaration of Heirs
a. An inventory must be made of the assets of the combined conjugal estate as they of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges";
existed on the death of Linnie Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957 one-half of these assets
belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; 2. That before the aforesaid motion could be heard, there are matters pending
before this Honorable Court, such as:
b. An accounting must be made of the "rents, emoluments and income" of all these
assets again one-half of these belong to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; a. The examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents
relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges "through ...
c. Adjustments must be made, after making a deduction of charges, disbursements and written declarations and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and
other dispositions made by Charles Newton Hodges personally and for his own personal repudiated life-estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges';
account from May 23, 1957 up to December 25, 1962, as well as other charges,
disbursements and other dispositions made for him and in his behalf since December b. That "Urgent Motion for An Accounting and Delivery to the Estate of C. N.
25, 1962 up to the present; Hodges of All the Assets of the Conjugal Partnership of the Deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
and C. N. Hodges Existing as of May 23, 1957 Plus All the Rents, Emoluments and Income
15. That there remains no other matter for disposition now insofar as the estate of Therefrom";
Linnie Jane Hodges is concerned but to complete the liquidation of her estate, segregate
them from the conjugal estate, and distribute them to her heirs pursuant to her last will c. Various motions to resolve the aforesaid motion;
and testament.
d. Manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing acts of interference of Avelina
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully moved and prayed that this Magno under color of title as administratrix of the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges;
Honorable Court, after a hearing on the factual matters raised by this motion, issue an
order: which are all prejudicial, and which involve no issues of fact, all facts involved therein
being matters of record, and therefore require only the resolution of questions of law;
a. Declaring the following persons, to wit: Esta Higdon, Emma Howell, Leonard
Higdon, Aline Higdon, David Higdon, Sadie Rascoe, Era Boman and Nimroy Higdon, as 3. That whatever claims any alleged heirs or other persons may have could be
the sole heirs under the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges and as the only very easily threshed out in the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges;
persons entitled to her estate;
4. That the maintenance of two separate estate proceedings and two
b. Determining the exact value of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges in accordance administrators only results in confusion and is unduly burdensome upon the Testate
with the system enunciated in paragraph 14 of this motion; Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, particularly because the bond filed by Avelina Magno
is grossly insufficient to answer for the funds and property which she has inofficiously
collected and held, as well as those which she continues to inofficiously collect and hold;
accounting and delivery to the estate of C. N. Hodges of all the assets of the conjugal
5. That it is a matter of record that such state of affairs affects and inconveniences partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges existing as of May 23,
not only the estate but also third-parties dealing with it;" (Annex "V", Petition.) 1957 plus all the rents, emoluments and income therefrom; (c) various motions to
resolve the aforesaid motion; and (d) manifestation of September 14, 1964, detailing
and then, after further reminding the court, by quoting them, of the relevant allegations acts of interference of Avelina Magno under color of title as administratrix of the estate
of its earlier motion of September 14, 1964, Annex U, prayed that: of Linnie Jane Hodges.

1. Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and deliver to the These matters, according to the instant motion, are all pre-judicial involving no issues of
administrator of the Estate of C. N. Hodges all the assets of the conjugal partnership of facts and only require the resolution of question of law; that in the motion of October
the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, emoluments and 5, 1963 it is alleged that in a motion dated December 11, 1957 filed by Atty. Leon Gellada
income therefrom; as attorney for the executor C. N. Hodges, the said executor C. N. Hodges is not only part
owner of the properties left as conjugal but also the successor to all the properties left
2. Pending the consideration of this motion, immediately order Avelina Magno to by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
turn over all her collections to the administrator Philippine Commercial & Industrial
Bank; Said motion of December 11, 1957 was approved by the Court in consonance with the
wishes contained in the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges.
3. Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
That on April 21, 1959 this Court approved the inventory and accounting submitted by
4. Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in C. N. Hodges thru counsel Atty. Leon Gellada in a motion filed on April 14, 1959 stating
the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are therein that executor C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of Linnie Jane Hodges
resolved. in accordance with the last will and testament already probated by the Court.
(Prayer, Annex "V" of Petition.)
That on July 13, 1960 the Court approved the annual statement of accounts submitted
On October 12, 1966, as already indicated at the outset of this opinion, the respondent by the executor C. N. Hodges thru his counsel Atty. Gellada on July 21, 1960 wherein it
court denied the foregoing motion, holding thus: is stated that the executor, C. N. Hodges is the only devisee or legatee of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges; that on May 2, 1961 the Court approved the annual statement of
ORDER accounts submitted by executor, C. N. Hodges for the year 1960 which was submitted
by Atty. Gellada on April 20, 1961 wherein it is stated that executor Hodges is the only
On record is a motion (Vol. X, Sp. 1672, pp. 4379-4390) dated April 22, 1966 of devisee or legatee of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges;
administrator PCIB praying that (1) Immediately order Avelina Magno to account for and
deliver to the administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges all assets of the conjugal That during the hearing on September 5 and 6, 1963 the estate of C. N. Hodges claimed
partnership of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges, plus all the rents, all the assets belonging to the deceased spouses Linnie Jane Hodges and C. N. Hodges
emoluments and income therefrom; (2) Pending the consideration of this motion, situated in the Philippines; that administratrix Magno has executed illegal acts to the
immediately order Avelina Magno to turn over all her collections to the administrator prejudice of the testate estate of C. N. Hodges.
PCIB; (3) Declare the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1307) closed;
and (4) Defer the hearing and consideration of the motion for declaration of heirs in the An opposition (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4415-4421) dated April 27, 1966 of administratrix
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges until the matters hereinabove set forth are Magno has been filed asking that the motion be denied for lack of merit and that the
resolved. motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges be set for
presentation and reception of evidence.
This motion is predicated on the fact that there are matters pending before this court
such as (a) the examination already ordered by this Honorable Court of documents It is alleged in the aforesaid opposition that the examination of documents which are in
relating to the allegation of Avelina Magno that Charles Newton Hodges thru written the possession of administratrix Magno can be made prior to the hearing of the motion
declaration and sworn public statements renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life- for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, during said
estate and usufruct over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (b) the urgent motion for hearing.
declaration of heirs in the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and therefore no
That the matters raised in the PCIB's motion of October 5, 1963 (as well as the other disposition of her estate.
motion) dated September 14, 1964 have been consolidated for the purpose of
presentation and reception of evidence with the hearing on the determination of the WHEREFORE, the motion of the PCIB dated April 22, 1966 is hereby DENIED.
heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. It is further alleged in the opposition that the (Annex "W", Petition)
motion for the official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges is the one
that constitutes a prejudicial question to the motions dated October 5 and September In its motion dated November 24, 1966 for the reconsideration of this order, petitioner
14, 1964 because if said motion is found meritorious and granted by the Court, the alleged inter alia that:
PCIB's motions of October 5, 1963 and September 14, 1964 will become moot and
academic since they are premised on the assumption and claim that the only heir of It cannot be over-stressed that the motion of December 11, 1957 was based on the fact
Linnie Jane Hodges was C. N. Hodges. that:

That the PCIB and counsel are estopped from further questioning the determination of a. Under the last will and testament of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, the late
heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges at this stage since it was PCIB as early as January Charles Newton Hodges was the sole heir instituted insofar as her properties in the
8, 1965 which filed a motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges that Philippines are concerned;
the claim of any heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges can be determined only in the
administration proceedings over the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and not that of C. N. b. Said last will and testament vested upon the said late Charles Newton Hodges
Hodges, since the heirs of Linnie Jane Hodges are claiming her estate and not the estate rights over said properties which, in sum, spell ownership, absolute and in fee simple;
of C. N. Hodges.
c. Said late Charles Newton Hodges was, therefore, "not only part owner of the
A reply (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4436-4444) dated May 11, 1966 of the PCIB has been filed properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the
alleging that the motion dated April 22, 1966 of the PCIB is not to seek deferment of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges.
hearing and consideration of the motion for official declaration of heirs of Linnie Jane
Hodges but to declare the testate estate of Linnie Jane Hodges closed and for Likewise, it cannot be over-stressed that the aforesaid motion was granted by this
administratrix Magno to account for and deliver to the PCIB all assets of the conjugal Honorable Court "for the reasons stated" therein.
partnership of the deceased spouses which has come to her possession plus all rents
and income. Again, the motion of December 11, 1957 prayed that not only "all the sales,
conveyances, leases, and mortgages executed by" the late Charles Newton Hodges, but
A rejoinder (Sp. 1672, Vol. X, pp. 4458-4462) of administratrix Magno dated May 19, also all "the subsequent sales, conveyances, leases, and mortgages ..." be approved and
1966 has been filed alleging that the motion dated December 11, 1957 only sought the authorized. This Honorable Court, in its order of December 14, 1957, "for the reasons
approval of all conveyances made by C. N. Hodges and requested the Court authority stated" in the aforesaid motion, granted the same, and not only approved all the sales,
for all subsequent conveyances that will be executed by C. N. Hodges; that the order conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
dated December 14, 1957 only approved the conveyances made by C. N. Hodges; that Hodges executed by the late Charles Newton Hodges, but also authorized "all
C. N. Hodges represented by counsel never made any claim in the estate of Linnie Jane subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties left by the said
Hodges and never filed a motion to declare himself as the heir of the said Linnie Jane deceased Linnie Jane Hodges. (Annex "X", Petition)
Hodges despite the lapse of more than five (5) years after the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges; that it is further alleged in the rejoinder that there can be no order of and reiterated its fundamental pose that the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges had
adjudication of the estate unless there has been a prior express declaration of heirs and already been factually, although not legally, closed with the virtual declaration of
so far no declaration of heirs in the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges (Sp. 1307) has been Hodges and adjudication to him, as sole universal heir of all the properties of the estate
made. of his wife, in the order of December 14, 1957, Annex G. Still unpersuaded, on July 18,
1967, respondent court denied said motion for reconsideration and held that "the court
Considering the allegations and arguments in the motion and of the PCIB as well as those believes that there is no justification why the order of October 12, 1966 should be
in the opposition and rejoinder of administratrix Magno, the Court finds the opposition considered or modified", and, on July 19, 1967, the motion of respondent Magno "for
and rejoinder to be well taken for the reason that so far there has been no official
official declaration of heirs of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", already referred to favor of appellees Pacaonsis and Premaylon, as to which no motion for reconsideration
above, was set for hearing. was filed.

In consequence of all these developments, the present petition was filed on August 1, 8. Lastly, the order of December 2, 1966, on pp. 305-306, Yellow Record on
1967 (albeit petitioner had to pay another docketing fee on August 9, 1967, since the Appeal, directing petitioner to surrender to appellees Lucero, Batisanan, Javier, Pablito,
orders in question were issued in two separate testate estate proceedings, Nos. 1307 Barrido, Catedral, Causing, Guzman, and Coronado, the certificates of title covering the
and 1672, in the court below). lands involved in the approved sales, as to which no motion for reconsideration was
filed either.
Together with such petition, there are now pending before Us for resolution herein,
appeals from the following: Strictly speaking, and considering that the above orders deal with different matters, just
as they affect distinctly different individuals or persons, as outlined by petitioner in its
1. The order of December 19, 1964 authorizing payment by respondent Magno of brief as appellant on pp. 12-20 thereof, there are, therefore, thirty-three (33) appeals
overtime pay, (pp. 221, Green Record on Appeal) together with the subsequent orders before Us, for which reason, petitioner has to pay also thirty-one (31) more docket fees.
of January 9, 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (pp. 227, id.) and February 15,
1966 (pp. 455-456, id.) repeatedly denying motions for reconsideration thereof. It is as well perhaps to state here as elsewhere in this opinion that in connection with
these appeals, petitioner has assigned a total of seventy-eight (LXXVIII) alleged errors,
2. The order of August 6, 1965 (pp. 248, id.) requiring that deeds executed by the respective discussions and arguments under all of them covering also the
petitioner to be co-signed by respondent Magno, as well as the order of October 27, fundamental issues raised in respect to the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thus
1965 (pp. 276-277) denying reconsideration. making it feasible and more practical for the Court to dispose of all these cases
together.4
3. The order of October 27, 1965 (pp. 292-295, id.) enjoining the deposit of all
collections in a joint account and the same order of February 15, 1966 mentioned in No. The assignments of error read thus:
1 above which included the denial of the reconsideration of this order of October 27,
1965. I to IV

4. The order of November 3, 1965 (pp. 313-320, id.) directing the payment of THE ORDER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
attorney's fees, fees of the respondent administratrix, etc. and the order of February 16, APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
1966 denying reconsideration thereof. ROSARIO ALINGASA, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING
PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE
5. The order of November 23, 1965 (pp. 334-335, id.) allowing appellee Western CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
Institute of Technology to make payments to either one or both of the administrators
of the two estates as well as the order of March 7, 1966 (p. 462, id.) denying V to VIII
reconsideration.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
6. The various orders hereinabove earlier enumerated approving deeds of sale APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO C. ESPADA AND
executed by respondent Magno in favor of appellees Carles, Catedral, Pablito, Guzman, ROSARIO ALINGASA, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE NEVER PAID
Coronado, Barrido, Causing, Javier, Lucero and Batisanan, (see pp. 35 to 37 of this IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL.
opinion), together with the two separate orders both dated December 2, 1966 (pp. 306-
308, and pp. 308-309, Yellow Record on Appeal) denying reconsideration of said IX to XII
approval.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
7. The order of January 3, 1967, on pp. 335-336, Yellow Record on Appeal, PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES, PEPITO G. IYULORES, ESPIRIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO
approving similar deeds of sale executed by respondent Magno, as those in No. 6, in C. ESPADA AND ROSARIO ALINGASA, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
XIII to XV XXXV to XXXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, EXECUTED BY THE
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104), EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.
LIFETIME.
XXXVII to XXXVIII
XVI to XVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLEES, FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO, ALTHOUGH THEY
APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA WERE IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO
PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) COVERING PARCELS OF LAND FOR WHICH THEY HAVE SELL WHICH THEY EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE
NEVER PAID IN FULL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS TO SELL. AMOUNT OF P10,680.00 and P4,428.90, RESPECTIVELY.

XIX to XXI XXXIX to XL

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
PROPERTY OF THE APPELLEES ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 102), SANTIAGO OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATOR, THE
PACAONSIS, AND ADELFA PREMAYLON (LOT NO. 104) WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE INSTANT APPELLANT, TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES,
COURT. FLORENIA BARRIDO AND PURIFICACION CORONADO.

XXII to XXV XLI to XLIII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEES LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND SALVADOR S. APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
GUZMAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF BATISANAN, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, COVERING PARCELS OF
LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, AND THE CONTRACTS
TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME. TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS LIFETIME.

XXVI to XXIX XLIV to XLVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE EXECUTED IN FAVOR THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
OF THE APPELLEES, LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SPELL WHICH WERE CANCELLED BATISANAN, PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL EXECUTED BY THEM WITH THE
AND RESCINDED. DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF WHICH THEY
HAVE NEVER COMPLIED WITH.
XXX to XXXIV
XLVII to XLIX
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP OVER REAL
PROPERTY OF THE LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO, ALFREDO CATEDRAL AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DEPRIVING THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT. OF HIS RIGHT, EXERCISED THROUGH HIS ADMINISTRATION, THE INSTANT APPELLANT,
TO CANCEL THE CONTRACTS TO SELL OF THE APPELLEES, GRACIANO LUCERO, ARITEO
THOMAS JAMIR AND MELQUIADES BATISANAN, AND IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HEARING AND CONSIDERING THE MOTION OF THE
THE SAID APPELLEES OVER REAL PROPERTY WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT. APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3rd, 1965, ON
NOVEMBER 23, 1965, WHEN THE NOTICE FOR THE HEARING THEREOF WAS FOR
L NOVEMBER 20, 1965.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE FINAL DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE LXIV
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO,
COVERING PARCELS OF LAND OWNED BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
AND THE CONTRACTS TO SELL COVERING WHICH WERE EXECUTED BY HIM DURING HIS TECHNOLOGY A RELIEF OTHER THAN THAT PRAYED FOR IN ITS MOTION, DATED
LIFETIME. NOVEMBER 3, 1965, IN THE ABSENCE OF A PRAYER FOR GENERAL RELIEF CONTAINED
THEREIN.
LI
LXV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH HE WAS IN ARREARS IN THE PAYMENTS THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF
AGREED UPON IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT TO SELL WHICH HE EXECUTED WITH THE TECHNOLOGY, TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL THE TERMS AND
DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, IN THE AMOUNT OF P2,337.50. CONDITIONS OF WHICH IT HAS FAILED TO FULFILL.

LII LXVI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPROVING THE DEED OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE RIGHTS OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN
APPELLEE, BELCESAR CAUSING, ALTHOUGH THE SAME WAS NOT EXECUTED IN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OVER THE REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT. CONTRACT TO SELL IT EXECUTED WITH THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES,
WHILE ACTING AS A PROBATE COURT.
LIII to LXI
LXVII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
AND INDUSTRIAL BANK TO SURRENDER THE OWNER'S DUPLICATE CERTIFICATES OF LOWER COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE CONTINUATION OF PAYMENTS BY THE
TITLE OVER THE RESPECTIVE LOTS COVERED BY THE DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE APPELLEE, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, UPON A CONTRACT TO SELL
APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, JOSE PABLICO, EXECUTED BY IT AND THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, TO A PERSON OTHER
ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR S. GUZMAN, FLRENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION THAN HIS LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR.
CORONADO, BELCESAR CAUSING, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MAXIMA BATISANAN AND
GRACIANO L. LUCERO. LXVIII

LXII THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES FROM THE
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RESOLVING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLEE, WESTERN SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF.
INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1965, WITHOUT ANY COPY THEREOF
HAVING BEEN SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL LXIX
BANK.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF RETAINER'S FEES OF
LXIII LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE
HODGES.
LXX LXXVII

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IMPLEMENTING THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE FUNDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF
HEIRS OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, AND THEIR THE DECEASED, CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, BE PLACED IN A JOINT ACCOUNT OF THE
LAWYERS. APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK, AND THE APPELLEE,
AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHO IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID ESTATE.
LXXI
LXXVIII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF RETAINER'S FEES. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, BE
GIVEN EQUAL ACCESS TO THE RECORDS OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED,
LXXII CHARLES NEWTON HODGES, WHEN SHE IS A COMPLETE STRANGER TO THE AFORESAID
ESTATE. (Pp. 73-83, Appellant's Brief.)
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ALL FINAL DEEDS OF SALE EXECUTED
PURSUANT TO CONTRACTS TO SELL ENTERED INTO BY THE DECEASED, CHARLES To complete this rather elaborate, and unavoidably extended narration of the factual
NEWTON HODGES, DURING HIS LIFETIME, BE SIGNED JOINTLY BY THE APPELLEE, setting of these cases, it may also be mentioned that an attempt was made by the heirs
AVELINA A. MAGNO, AND THE APPELLANT, PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL of Mrs. Hodges to have respondent Magno removed as administratrix, with the
BANK, AND NOT BY THE LATTER ONLY AS THE LAWFULLY APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR proposed appointment of Benito J. Lopez in her place, and that respondent court did
OF HIS ESTATE. actually order such proposed replacement, but the Court declared the said order of
respondent court violative of its injunction of August 8, 1967, hence without force and
LXXIII effect (see Resolution of September 8, 1972 and February 1, 1973). Subsequently, Atty.
Efrain B. Trenas, one of the lawyers of said heirs, appeared no longer for the proposed
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES FROM THE administrator Lopez but for the heirs themselves, and in a motion dated October 26,
SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE HODGES, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER 1972 informed the Court that a motion had been filed with respondent court for the
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF. removal of petitioner PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges in Special
Proceedings 1672, which removal motion alleged that 22.968149% of the share of C. N.
LXXIV Hodges had already been acquired by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges from certain heirs of her
husband. Further, in this connection, in the answer of PCIB to the motion of respondent
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL EXPENSES OF Magno to have it declared in contempt for disregarding the Court's resolution of
LAWYERS OF ALLEGED HEIRS TO THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE JANE September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction of August 8, 1967, said petitioner annexed
HODGES. thereto a joint manifestation and motion, appearing to have been filed with respondent
court, informing said court that in addition to the fact that 22% of the share of C. N.
LXXV Hodges had already been bought by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as already stated, certain
other heirs of Hodges representing 17.343750% of his estate were joining cause with
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PREMATURE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as against PCIB, thereby making somewhat precarious, if not
ASSETS TO ALLEGED HEIRS OR BENEFICIARIES THEREOF, BY WAY OF LEGAL EXPENSES. possibly untenable, petitioners' continuation as administrator of the Hodges estate.

LXXVI RESOLUTION OF ISSUES IN THE CERTIORARI AND


PROHIBITION CASES
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION TO THE
PURPORTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE SUPPOSED ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, LINNIE I
JANE HODGES, THE INSTANT APPELLEE, AVELINA A. MAGNO, WHEN THERE IS NEITHER
SUCH ESTATE NOR ASSETS THEREOF. As to the Alleged Tardiness
of the Present Appeals
The priority question raised by respondent Magno relates to the alleged tardiness of all On Whether or Not There is Still Any Part of the Testate
the aforementioned thirty-three appeals of PCIB. Considering, however, that these Estate Mrs. Hodges that may be Adjudicated to her brothers
appeals revolve around practically the same main issues and that it is admitted that and sisters as her estate, of which respondent Magno is the
some of them have been timely taken, and, moreover, their final results hereinbelow to unquestioned Administratrix in special Proceedings 1307.
be stated and explained make it of no consequence whether or not the orders
concerned have become final by the lapsing of the respective periods to appeal them, In the petition, it is the position of PCIB that the respondent court exceeded its
We do not deem it necessary to pass upon the timeliness of any of said appeals. jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in further recognizing after December 14,
1957 the existence of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and in sanctioning
II purported acts of administration therein of respondent Magno. Main ground for such
posture is that by the aforequoted order of respondent court of said date, Hodges was
The Propriety Here of Certiorari and already allowed to assert and exercise all his rights as universal heir of his wife pursuant
Prohibition instead of Appeal to the provisions of her will, quoted earlier, hence, nothing else remains to be done in
Special Proceedings 1307 except to formally close it. In other words, the contention of
The other preliminary point of the same respondent is alleged impropriety of the special PCIB is that in view of said order, nothing more than a formal declaration of Hodges as
civil action of certiorari and prohibition in view of the existence of the remedy of appeal sole and exclusive heir of his wife and the consequent formal unqualified adjudication
which it claims is proven by the very appeals now before Us. Such contention fails to to him of all her estate remain to be done to completely close Special Proceedings 1307,
take into account that there is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all hence respondent Magno should be considered as having ceased to be Administratrix
these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will of the Testate Estate of Mrs. Hodges since then.
inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related incidents and
consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and without taking account After carefully going over the record, We feel constrained to hold that such pose is
anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense and time which would be patently untenable from whatever angle it is examined.
involved in as many individual appeals as the number of such incidents, it is logical and
proper to hold, as We do hold, that the remedy of appeal is not adequate in the present To start with, We cannot find anywhere in respondent Order of December 14, 1957 the
cases. In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or prohibition sense being read into it by PCIB. The tenor of said order bears no suggestion at all to
may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or excess of jurisdiction such effect. The declaration of heirs and distribution by the probate court of the estate
or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough that the remedy of appeal exists of a decedent is its most important function, and this Court is not disposed to encourage
or is possible. It is indispensable that taking all the relevant circumstances of the given judges of probate proceedings to be less than definite, plain and specific in making
case, appeal would better serve the interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, orders in such regard, if for no other reason than that all parties concerned, like the
augmented expense and trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work heirs, the creditors, and most of all the government, the devisees and legatees, should
attendant to the present multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same know with certainty what are and when their respective rights and obligations ensuing
basic issues that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special from the inheritance or in relation thereto would begin or cease, as the case may be,
civil action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, pursued by petitioner, thereby avoiding precisely the legal complications and consequent litigations similar to
preferable, for purposes of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of them, those that have developed unnecessarily in the present cases. While it is true that in
despite the conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common instances wherein all the parties interested in the estate of a deceased person have
fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the parties already actually distributed among themselves their respective shares therein to the
and render more simple the determination of the secondary issues in each of them. satisfaction of everyone concerned and no rights of creditors or third parties are
Accordingly, respondent Magno's objection to the present remedy of certiorari and adversely affected, it would naturally be almost ministerial for the court to issue the
prohibition must be overruled. final order of declaration and distribution, still it is inconceivable that the special
proceeding instituted for the purpose may be considered terminated, the respective
We come now to the errors assigned by petitioner-appellant, Philippine Commercial & rights of all the parties concerned be deemed definitely settled, and the executor or
Industrial Bank, (PCIB, for short) in the petition as well as in its main brief as appellant. administrator thereof be regarded as automatically discharged and relieved already of
all functions and responsibilities without the corresponding definite orders of the
III probate court to such effect.
indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. (Santiesteban vs. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367,
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 370.)
90 provides:
In the cases at bar, We cannot discern from the voluminous and varied facts, pleadings
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, and orders before Us that the above indispensable prerequisites for the declaration of
funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow and heirs and the adjudication of the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been complied with
inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law have been paid, when the order of December 14, 1957 was issued. As already stated, We are not
the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested persuaded that the proceedings leading to the issuance of said order, constituting barely
in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the of the motion of May 27, 1957, Annex D of the petition, the order of even date, Annex
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each E, and the motion of December 11, 1957, Annex H, all aforequoted, are what the law
is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the contemplates. We cannot see in the order of December 14, 1957, so much relied upon
executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If by the petitioner, anything more than an explicit approval of "all the sales, conveyances,
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased leases and mortgages of all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, executed by the Executor Charles N. Hodges" (after the death of his wife and prior to
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. the date of the motion), plus a general advance authorization to enable said "Executor
to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of the properties
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned left the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with wishes conveyed in the
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a last will and testament of the latter", which, certainly, cannot amount to the order of
sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such adjudication of the estate of the decedent to Hodges contemplated in the law. In fact,
time as the court directs. the motion of December 11, 1957 on which the court predicated the order in question
did not pray for any such adjudication at all. What is more, although said motion did
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order that a proceeding for the allege that "herein Executor (Hodges) is not only part owner of the properties left as
settlement of the estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane
should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of Hodges", it significantly added that "herein Executor, as Legatee (sic), has the right to
the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order sell, convey, lease or dispose of the properties in the Philippines during his lifetime",
shall not be issued until after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of thereby indicating that what said motion contemplated was nothing more than either
administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which the enjoyment by Hodges of his rights under the particular portion of the dispositions
is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and of his wife's will which were to be operative only during his lifetime or the use of his
specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the own share of the conjugal estate, pending the termination of the proceedings. In other
court. words, the authority referred to in said motions and orders is in the nature of that
contemplated either in Section 2 of Rule 109 which permits, in appropriate cases,
... it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of advance or partial implementation of the terms of a duly probated will before final
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected adjudication or distribution when the rights of third parties would not be adversely
that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by affected thereby or in the established practice of allowing the surviving spouse to
law to the residue. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 397, dispose of his own share of he conjugal estate, pending its final liquidation, when it
citing Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 49 Phil., 726; Lopez vs. Lopez, 37 Off. Gaz., 3091.) appears that no creditors of the conjugal partnership would be prejudiced thereby, (see
(JIMOGA-ON v. BELMONTE, 84 Phil. 545, 548) (p. 86, Appellee's Brief) the Revised Rules of Court by Francisco, Vol. V-B, 1970 ed. p. 887) albeit, from the tenor
of said motions, We are more inclined to believe that Hodges meant to refer to the
xxx xxx xxx former. In any event, We are fully persuaded that the quoted allegations of said motions
read together cannot be construed as a repudiation of the rights unequivocally
Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section 1, Rule 90) established in the will in favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters to whatever have
what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of distribution not been disposed of by him up to his death.
directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying the
Indeed, nowhere in the record does it appear that the trial court subsequently acted Stated differently, if the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 4, 1957 were really
upon the premise suggested by petitioner. On the contrary, on November 23, 1965, intended to be read in the sense contended by petitioner, We would have no hesitancy
when the court resolved the motion of appellee Western Institute of Technology by its in declaring them null and void.
order We have quoted earlier, it categorically held that as of said date, November 23,
1965, "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is as yet no judicial Petitioner cites the case of Austria vs. Ventenilla, G. R. No. L-10018, September 19, 1956,
declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are entitled thereto." (unreported but a partial digest thereof appears in 99 Phil. 1069) in support of its
In this connection, it may be stated further against petitioner, by way of some kind of insistence that with the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, the closure of Mrs.
estoppel, that in its own motion of January 8, 1965, already quoted in full on pages 54- Hodges' estate has become a mere formality, inasmuch as said orders amounted to the
67 of this decision, it prayed inter alia that the court declare that "C. N. Hodges was the order of adjudication and distribution ordained by Section 1 of Rule 90. But the parallel
sole and exclusive heir of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges", which it would not have attempted to be drawn between that case and the present one does not hold. There the
done if it were really convinced that the order of December 14, 1957 was already the trial court had in fact issued a clear, distinct and express order of adjudication and
order of adjudication and distribution of her estate. That said motion was later distribution more than twenty years before the other heirs of the deceased filed their
withdrawn when Magno filed her own motion for determination and adjudication of motion asking that the administratrix be removed, etc. As quoted in that decision, the
what should correspond to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges does not alter the order of the lower court in that respect read as follows:
indubitable implication of the prayer of the withdrawn motion.
En orden a la mocion de la administradora, el juzgado la encuentra procedente bajo la
It must be borne in mind that while it is true that Mrs. Hodges bequeathed her whole condicion de que no se hara entrega ni adjudicacion de los bienes a los herederos antes
estate to her husband and gave him what amounts to full powers of dominion over the de que estos presten la fianza correspondiente y de acuerdo con lo prescrito en el Art.
same during his lifetime, she imposed at the same time the condition that whatever 754 del Codigo de Procedimientos: pues, en autos no aparece que hayan sido
should remain thereof upon his death should go to her brothers and sisters. In effect, nombrados comisionados de avaluo y reclamaciones. Dicha fianza podra ser por un valor
therefore, what was absolutely given to Hodges was only so much of his wife's estate as igual al de los bienes que correspondan a cada heredero segun el testamento. Creo que
he might possibly dispose of during his lifetime; hence, even assuming that by the no es obice para la terminacion del expediente el hecho de que la administradora no ha
allegations in his motion, he did intend to adjudicate the whole estate to himself, as presentado hasta ahora el inventario de los bienes; pues, segun la ley, estan exentos de
suggested by petitioner, such unilateral act could not have affected or diminished in any esta formalidad os administradores que son legatarios del residuo o remanente de los
degree or manner the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law over what would remain bienes y hayan prestado fianza para responder de las gestiones de su cargo, y aparece
thereof upon his death, for surely, no one can rightly contend that the testamentary en el testamento que la administradora Alejandra Austria reune dicha condicion.
provision in question allowed him to so adjudicate any part of the estate to himself as
to prejudice them. In other words, irrespective of whatever might have been Hodges' POR TODO LO EXPUESTO, el juzgado declara, 1.o: no haber lugar a la mocion de Ramon
intention in his motions, as Executor, of May 27, 1957 and December 11, 1957, the trial Ventenilla y otros; 2.o, declara asimismo que los unicos herederos del finado Antonio
court's orders granting said motions, even in the terms in which they have been worded, Ventenilla son su esposa Alejandra Austria, Maria Ventenilla, hermana del testador, y
could not have had the effect of an absolute and unconditional adjudication unto Ramon Ventenilla, Maria Ventenilla, Ramon Soriano, Eulalio Soriano, Jose Soriano,
Hodges of the whole estate of his wife. None of them could have deprived his brothers Gabriela Ventenilla, Lorenzo Ventenilla, Felicitas Ventenilla, Eugenio Ventenilla y
and sisters-in-law of their rights under said will. And it may be added here that the fact Alejandra Ventenilla, en representacion de los difuntos Juan, Tomas, Catalino y Froilan,
that no one appeared to oppose the motions in question may only be attributed, firstly, hermanos del testador, declarando, ademas que la heredera Alejandra Austria tiene
to the failure of Hodges to send notices to any of them, as admitted in the motion itself, derecho al remanente de todos los bienes dejados por el finado, despues de deducir de
and, secondly, to the fact that even if they had been notified, they could not have taken ellos la porcion que corresponde a cada uno de sus coherederos, conforme esta
said motions to be for the final distribution and adjudication of the estate, but merely mandado en las clausulas 8.a, 9.a, 10.a, 11.a, 12.a y 13.a del testamento; 3.o, se aprueba
for him to be able, pending such final distribution and adjudication, to either exercise el pago hecho por la administradora de los gastos de la ultima enfermedad y funerales
during his lifetime rights of dominion over his wife's estate in accordance with the del testador, de la donacion hecha por el testador a favor de la Escuela a Publica del
bequest in his favor, which, as already observed, may be allowed under the broad terms Municipio de Mangatarem, y de las misas en sufragio del alma del finado; 4.o, que una
of Section 2 of Rule 109, or make use of his own share of the conjugal estate. In any vez prestada la fianza mencionada al principio de este auto, se haga la entrega y
event, We do not believe that the trial court could have acted in the sense pretended adjudicacion de los bienes, conforme se dispone en el testamento y se acaba de declarar
by petitioner, not only because of the clear language of the will but also because none en este auto; 5.o, y, finalmente, que verificada la adjudicacion, se dara por terminada la
of the interested parties had been duly notified of the motion and hearing thereof.
administracion, revelandole toda responsabilidad a la administradora, y cancelando su
fianza. Under date of July 21, 1960, C. N. Hodges filed his second "Annual Statement of Account
by the Executor" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of
ASI SE ORDENA. Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1959
annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net
Undoubtedly, after the issuance of an order of such tenor, the closure of any income of P270,623.32, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person cannot be but Hodges. Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year
perfunctory. 1959 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having
earned income of P135,311.66, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined
In the case at bar, as already pointed out above, the two orders relied upon by petitioner personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 91-92, id.)
do not appear ex-facie to be of the same tenor and nature as the order just quoted, and,
what is more, the circumstances attendant to its issuance do not suggest that such was Under date of April 20, 1961, C. N. Hodges filed his third "Annual Statement of Account
the intention of the court, for nothing could have been more violative of the will of Mrs. by the Executor for the year 1960" of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement
Hodges. of Net Worth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December
31, 1960 annexed thereto, C. N. Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate
Indeed, to infer from Hodges' said motions and from his statements of accounts for the earned a net income of P314,857.94, divided of Linnie Jane Hodges. Pursuant to this, he
years 1958, 1959 and 1960, A Annexes I, K and M, respectively, wherein he repeatedly filed an "individual evenly between him and the estate income tax return" for calendar
claimed that "herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in year 1960 on the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as
accordance with the last will and testament already probated," there is "no (other) having earned income of P157,428.97, exactly one-half of the net income of his
person interested in the Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account combined personal assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (pp. 92-93, id.)
to be given notice", an intent to adjudicate unto himself the whole of his wife's estate
in an absolute manner and without regard to the contingent interests of her brothers In the petition for probate that he (Hodges) filed, he listed the seven brothers and sisters
and sisters, is to impute bad faith to him, an imputation which is not legally permissible, of Linnie Jane as her "heirs" (see p. 2, Green ROA). The order of the court admitting the
much less warranted by the facts of record herein. Hodges knew or ought to have known will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy Higdon (see p. 14, Green
that, legally speaking, the terms of his wife's will did not give him such a right. Factually, ROA). Immediately, C. N. Hodges filed a verified motion to have Roy Higdon's name
there are enough circumstances extant in the records of these cases indicating that he included as an heir, stating that he wanted to straighten the records "in order (that) the
had no such intention to ignore the rights of his co-heirs. In his very motions in question, heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that they
Hodges alleged, thru counsel, that the "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no were really and are interested in the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
descendants and ascendants, except brothers and sisters and herein petitioner, as
surviving spouse, to inherit the properties of the decedent", and even promised that Thus, he recognized, if in his own way, the separate identity of his wife's estate from his
"proper accounting will be had in all these transactions" which he had submitted for own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than five years
approval and authorization by the court, thereby implying that he was aware of his after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging
responsibilities vis-a-vis his co-heirs. As alleged by respondent Magno in her brief as exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have
appellee: been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least,
so much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her
Under date of April 14, 1959, C. N. Hodges filed his first "Account by the Executor" of brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his tax
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. In the "Statement of Networth of Mr. C. N. Hodges and return in the United States to be more extensively referred to anon. And assuming that
the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges" as of December 31, 1958 annexed thereto, C. N. he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis
Hodges reported that the combined conjugal estate earned a net income of of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition
P328,402.62, divided evenly between him and the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. of the rights of his co-heirs. Without purporting to rule definitely on the matter in these
Pursuant to this, he filed an "individual income tax return" for calendar year 1958 on the proceedings, We might say here that We are inclined to the view that under the peculiar
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges reporting, under oath, the said estate as having earned provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable inheritance tax laws,
income of P164,201.31, exactly one-half of the net income of his combined personal Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the
assets and that of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges. (p. 91, Appellee's Brief.) remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death,
and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then alleged tax return he filed with the United States Taxation authorities, identified as
is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities in due Schedule M, (Annex 4 of her answer) and his supposed affidavit of renunciation, Annex
time. 5. In said Schedule M, Hodges appears to have answered the pertinent question thus:

It is to be noted that the lawyer, Atty. Leon P. Gellada, who signed the motions of May 2a. Had the surviving spouse the right to declare an election between (1) the
27, 1957 and December 11, 1957 and the aforementioned statements of account was provisions made in his or her favor by the will and (11) dower, curtesy or a statutory
the very same one who also subsequently signed and filed the motion of December 26, interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
1962 for the appointment of respondent Magno as "Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs.
Linnie Jane Hodges" wherein it was alleged that "in accordance with the provisions of 2d. Does the surviving spouse contemplate renouncing the will and electing to take
the last will and testament of Linnie Jane Hodges, whatever real properties that may dower, curtesy, or a statutory interest? (X) Yes ( ) No
remain at the death of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges, the said properties shall
be equally divided among their heirs." And it appearing that said attorney was Hodges' 3. According to the information and belief of the person or persons filing the
lawyer as Executor of the estate of his wife, it stands to reason that his understanding return, is any action described under question 1 designed or contemplated? ( ) Yes (X)
of the situation, implicit in his allegations just quoted, could somehow be reflective of No (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
Hodges' own understanding thereof.
and to have further stated under the item, "Description of property interests passing to
As a matter of fact, the allegations in the motion of the same Atty. Gellada dated July 1, surviving spouse" the following:
1957, a "Request for Inclusion of the Name of Roy Higdon in the Order of the Court
dated July 19, 1957, etc.", reference to which is made in the above quotation from None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and other
respondent Magno's brief, are over the oath of Hodges himself, who verified the legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to distribute the
motion. Said allegations read: remaining property and interests of the deceased in their Community Estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses
1. That the Hon. Court issued orders dated June 29, 1957, ordering the probate of the of administration are finally determined and paid. (Annex 4, Answer Record, p. 263)
will.
In addition, in the supposed affidavit of Hodges, Annex 5, it is stated:
2. That in said order of the Hon. Court, the relatives of the deceased Linnie Jane
Hodges were enumerated. However, in the petition as well as in the testimony of I, C. N. Hodges, being duly sworn, on oath affirm that at the time the United States Estate
Executor during the hearing, the name Roy Higdon was mentioned, but deceased. It was Tax Return was filed in the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges on August 8, 1958, I renounced
unintentionally omitted the heirs of said Roy Higdon who are his wife Aline Higdon and and disclaimed any and all right to receive the rents, emoluments and income from said
son David Higdon, all of age, and residents of Quinlan, Texas, U.S.A. estate, as shown by the statement contained in Schedule M at page 29 of said return, a
copy of which schedule is attached to this affidavit and made a part hereof.
3. That to straighten the records, and in order the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may
not think or believe they were omitted, and that they were really and are interested in The purpose of this affidavit is to ratify and confirm, and I do hereby ratify and confirm,
the estate of deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, it is requested of the Hon. Court to insert the declaration made in Schedule M of said return and hereby formally disclaim and
the names of Aline Higdon and David Higdon, wife and son of deceased Roy Higdon in renounce any right on my part to receive any of the said rents, emoluments and income
the said order of the Hon. Court dated June 29, 1957. (pars. 1 to 3, Annex 2 of Magno's from the estate of my deceased wife, Linnie Jane Hodges. This affidavit is made to
Answer Record, p. 260) absolve me or my estate from any liability for the payment of income taxes on income
which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges since the death of the said Linnie
As can be seen, these italicized allegations indicate, more or less, the real attitude of Jane Hodges on May 23, 1957. (Annex 5, Answer Record, p. 264)
Hodges in regard to the testamentary dispositions of his wife.
Although it appears that said documents were not duly presented as evidence in the
In connection with this point of Hodges' intent, We note that there are documents, court below, and We cannot, therefore, rely on them for the purpose of the present
copies of which are annexed to respondent Magno's answer, which purportedly contain proceedings, still, We cannot close our eyes to their existence in the record nor fail to
Hodges' own solemn declarations recognizing the right of his co-heirs, such as the note that their tenor jibes with Our conclusion discussed above from the circumstances
related to the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957. 5 Somehow, these documents, whose benefit the law imposes upon him the duty of administration and liquidation. No
considering they are supposed to be copies of their originals found in the official files of liquidation was ever made by Lasam hence, the conjugal property which came into
the governments of the United States and of the Philippines, serve to lessen any possible his possession on the death of his wife in September, 1908, still remains conjugal
apprehension that Our conclusion from the other evidence of Hodges' manifest intent property, a continuing and subsisting trust. He should have made a liquidation
vis-a-vis the rights of his co-heirs is without basis in fact. immediately (desde luego). He cannot now be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong. One of the conditions of title by prescription (section 41, Code of Civil Procedure)
Verily, with such eloquent manifestations of his good intentions towards the other heirs is possession "under a claim of title exclusive of any other right". For a trustee to make
of his wife, We find it very hard to believe that Hodges did ask the court and that the such a claim would be a manifest fraud.
latter agreed that he be declared her sole heir and that her whole estate be adjudicated
to him without so much as just annotating the contingent interest of her brothers and And knowing thus his responsibilities in the premises, We are not convinced that Hodges
sisters in what would remain thereof upon his demise. On the contrary, it seems to us arrogated everything unto himself leaving nothing at all to be inherited by his wife's
more factual and fairer to assume that Hodges was well aware of his position as brothers and sisters.
executor of the will of his wife and, as such, had in mind the following admonition made
by the Court in Pamittan vs. Lasam, et al., 60 Phil., 908, at pp. 913-914: PCIB insists, however, that to read the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957, not as
adjudicatory, but merely as approving past and authorizing future dispositions made by
Upon the death of Bernarda in September, 1908, said lands continued to be conjugal Hodges in a wholesale and general manner, would necessarily render the said orders
property in the hands of the defendant Lasam. It is provided in article 1418 of the Civil void for being violative of the provisions of Rule 89 governing the manner in which such
Code that upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, an inventory shall dispositions may be made and how the authority therefor and approval thereof by the
immediately be made and this court in construing this provision in connection with probate court may be secured. If We sustained such a view, the result would only be
section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prior to its amendment by Act No. 3176 of that the said orders should be declared ineffective either way they are understood,
November 24, 1924) has repeatedly held that in the event of the death of the wife, the considering We have already seen it is legally impossible to consider them as
law imposes upon the husband the duty of liquidating the affairs of the partnership adjudicatory. As a matter of fact, however, what surges immediately to the surface,
without delay (desde luego) (Alfonso vs. Natividad, 6 Phil., 240; Prado vs. Lagera, 7 Phil., relative to PCIB's observations based on Rule 89, is that from such point of view, the
395; De la Rama vs. De la Rama, 7 Phil., 745; Enriquez vs. Victoria, 10 Phil., 10; Amancio supposed irregularity would involve no more than some non-jurisdictional technicalities
vs. Pardo, 13 Phil., 297; Rojas vs. Singson Tongson, 17 Phil., 476; Sochayseng vs. Trujillo, of procedure, which have for their evident fundamental purpose the protection of
31 Phil., 153; Molera vs. Molera, 40 Phil., 566; Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose, 41 Phil., 713.) parties interested in the estate, such as the heirs, its creditors, particularly the
government on account of the taxes due it; and since it is apparent here that none of
In the last mentioned case this court quoted with approval the case of Leatherwood vs. such parties are objecting to said orders or would be prejudiced by the unobservance
Arnold (66 Texas, 414, 416, 417), in which that court discussed the powers of the by the trial court of the procedure pointed out by PCIB, We find no legal inconvenience
surviving spouse in the administration of the community property. Attention was called in nor impediment to Our giving sanction to the blanket approval and authority
to the fact that the surviving husband, in the management of the conjugal property after contained in said orders. This solution is definitely preferable in law and in equity, for to
the death of the wife, was a trustee of unique character who is liable for any fraud view said orders in the sense suggested by PCIB would result in the deprivation of
committed by him with relation to the property while he is charged with its substantive rights to the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, whereas reading them the
administration. In the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, he had wide powers (as other way will not cause any prejudice to anyone, and, withal, will give peace of mind
the law stood prior to Act No. 3176) and the high degree of trust reposed in him stands and stability of rights to the innocent parties who relied on them in good faith, in the
out more clearly in view of the fact that he was the owner of a half interest in his own light of the peculiar pertinent provisions of the will of said decedent.
right of the conjugal estate which he was charged to administer. He could therefore no
more acquire a title by prescription against those for whom he was administering the Now, the inventory submitted by Hodges on May 12, 1958 referred to the estate of his
conjugal estate than could a guardian against his ward or a judicial administrator against wife as consisting of "One-half of all the items designated in the balance sheet, copy of
the heirs of estate. Section 38 of Chapter III of the Code of Civil Procedure, with relation which is hereto attached and marked as "Annex A"." Although, regrettably, no copy of
to prescription, provides that "this chapter shall not apply ... in the case of a continuing said Annex A appears in the records before Us, We take judicial notice, on the basis of
and subsisting trust." The surviving husband in the administration and liquidation of the the undisputed facts in these cases, that the same consists of considerable real and
conjugal estate occupies the position of a trustee of the highest order and is not other personal kinds of properties. And since, according to her will, her husband was to
permitted by the law to hold that estate or any portion thereof adversely to those for be the sole owner thereof during his lifetime, with full power and authority to dispose
of any of them, provided that should there be any remainder upon his death, such involved pertain exclusively to the estate of Hodges depends on the legal meaning and
remainder would go to her brothers and sisters, and furthermore, there is no effect of said orders, the claim that respondent court has no jurisdiction to take
pretension, much less any proof that Hodges had in fact disposed of all of them, and, on cognizance of and decide the said issue is incorrect. If it was within the competence of
the contrary, the indications are rather to the effect that he had kept them more or less the court to issue the root orders, why should it not be within its authority to declare
intact, it cannot truthfully be said that, upon the death of Hodges, there was no more their true significance and intent, to the end that the parties may know whether or not
estate of Mrs. Hodges to speak of. It is Our conclusion, therefore, that properties do the estate of Mrs. Hodges had already been adjudicated by the court, upon the initiative
exist which constitute such estate, hence Special Proceedings 1307 should not yet be of Hodges, in his favor, to the exclusion of the other heirs of his wife instituted in her
closed. will?

Neither is there basis for holding that respondent Magno has ceased to be the At this point, it bears emphasis again that the main cause of all the present problems
Administratrix in said proceeding. There is no showing that she has ever been legally confronting the courts and the parties in these cases was the failure of Hodges to secure,
removed as such, the attempt to replace her with Mr. Benito Lopez without authority as executor of his wife's estate, from May, 1957 up to the time of his death in December,
from the Court having been expressly held ineffective by Our resolution of September 1962, a period of more than five years, the final adjudication of her estate and the
8, 1972. Parenthetically, on this last point, PCIB itself is very emphatic in stressing that closure of the proceedings. The record is bare of any showing that he ever exerted any
it is not questioning said respondent's status as such administratrix. Indeed, it is not effort towards the early settlement of said estate. While, on the one hand, there are
clear that PCIB has any standing to raise any objection thereto, considering it is a enough indications, as already discuss that he had intentions of leaving intact her share
complete stranger insofar as the estate of Mrs. Hodges is concerned. of the conjugal properties so that it may pass wholly to his co-heirs upon his death,
pursuant to her will, on the other hand, by not terminating the proceedings, his interests
It is the contention of PCIB, however, that as things actually stood at the time of Hodges' in his own half of the conjugal properties remained commingled pro-indiviso with those
death, their conjugal partnership had not yet been liquidated and, inasmuch as the of his co-heirs in the other half. Obviously, such a situation could not be conducive to
properties composing the same were thus commingled pro indiviso and, consequently, ready ascertainment of the portion of the inheritance that should appertain to his co-
the properties pertaining to the estate of each of the spouses are not yet identifiable, it heirs upon his death. Having these considerations in mind, it would be giving a premium
is PCIB alone, as administrator of the estate of Hodges, who should administer for such procrastination and rather unfair to his co-heirs, if the administrator of his
everything, and all that respondent Magno can do for the time being is to wait until the estate were to be given exclusive administration of all the properties in question, which
properties constituting the remaining estate of Mrs. Hodges have been duly segregated would necessarily include the function of promptly liquidating the conjugal partnership,
and delivered to her for her own administration. Seemingly, PCIB would liken the thereby identifying and segregating without unnecessary loss of time which properties
Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges to a party having a claim of ownership to some should be considered as constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges, the remainder of which
properties included in the inventory of an administrator of the estate of a decedent, her brothers and sisters are supposed to inherit equally among themselves.
(here that of Hodges) and who normally has no right to take part in the proceedings
pending the establishment of his right or title; for which as a rule it is required that an To be sure, an administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of any particular
ordinary action should be filed, since the probate court is without jurisdiction to pass party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the protection of the rights of
with finality on questions of title between the estate of the deceased, on the one hand, everybody concerned with the estate of the decedent, and from this point of view, it
and a third party or even an heir claiming adversely against the estate, on the other. maybe said that even if PCIB were to act alone, there should be no fear of undue
disadvantage to anyone. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section
We do not find such contention sufficiently persuasive. As We see it, the situation 6 of Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letters of administration should be
obtaining herein cannot be compared with the claim of a third party the basis of which granted that the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not his impartiality
is alien to the pending probate proceedings. In the present cases what gave rise to the alone but, more importantly, the extent of his interest in the estate, so much so that the
claim of PCIB of exclusive ownership by the estate of Hodges over all the properties of one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to another who has less. Taking both
the Hodges spouses, including the share of Mrs. Hodges in the community properties, of these considerations into account, inasmuch as, according to Hodges' own inventory
were the orders of the trial court issued in the course of the very settlement proceedings submitted by him as Executor of the estate of his wife, practically all their properties
themselves, more specifically, the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 so often were conjugal which means that the spouses have equal shares therein, it is but logical
mentioned above. In other words, the root of the issue of title between the parties is that both estates should be administered jointly by representatives of both, pending
something that the court itself has done in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. And their segregation from each other. Particularly is such an arrangement warranted
since in the ultimate analysis, the question of whether or not all the properties herein because the actuations so far of PCIB evince a determined, albeit groundless, intent to
exclude the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges from their inheritance. Besides, to allow PCIB, there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or
the administrator of his estate, to perform now what Hodges was duty bound to do as (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by Article
executor is to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Section 2 of Rule 78 which expressly 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation
provides that "The executor of an executor shall not, as such, administer the estate of is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone
the first testator." It goes without saying that this provision refers also to the else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does,
administrator of an executor like PCIB here. that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and invalid.

We are not unmindful of the fact that under Section 2 of Rule 73, "When the marriage The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition
is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject,
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either." Indeed, of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the present case, no such
it is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or permits the conjugal possible default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be settled or liquidated in the testate substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges
or intestate proceedings of either, but precisely because said sentence allows or permits cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his
that the liquidation be made in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
discretion in which one it should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges
administrator of the husband's estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with was concerned and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and
by Act 3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just cited. sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her
estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
Thus, it can be seen that at the time of the death of Hodges, there was already the dominion over them6 only during his lifetime, which means that while he could
pending judicial settlement proceeding of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and, more completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other
importantly, that the former was the executor of the latter's will who had, as such, failed than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might
for more than five years to see to it that the same was terminated earliest, which was remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency,
not difficult to do, since from ought that appears in the record, there were no serious inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
obstacles on the way, the estate not being indebted and there being no immediate heirs vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative
other than Hodges himself. Such dilatory or indifferent attitude could only spell possible upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any
prejudice of his co-heirs, whose rights to inheritance depend entirely on the existence remainder of her estate then.
of any remainder of Mrs. Hodges' share in the community properties, and who are now
faced with the pose of PCIB that there is no such remainder. Had Hodges secured as Contrary to the view of respondent Magno, however, it was not the usufruct alone of
early as possible the settlement of his wife's estate, this problem would not arisen. All her estate, as contemplated in Article 869 of the Civil Code, that she bequeathed to
things considered, We are fully convinced that the interests of justice will be better Hodges during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the same was to
served by not permitting or allowing PCIB or any administrator of the estate of Hodges last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever against his
exclusive administration of all the properties in question. We are of the considered disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof to anybody other than himself.
opinion and so hold that what would be just and proper is for both administrators of the The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of institution, in this jurisdiction or
two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each under Philippine law, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Hodges as the
other. surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had
no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904, New Civil Code.)
At this juncture, it may be stated that we are not overlooking the fact that it is PCIB's
contention that, viewed as a substitution, the testamentary disposition in favor of Mrs. But relative precisely to the question of how much of Mrs. Hodges' share of the conjugal
Hodges' brothers and sisters may not be given effect. To a certain extent, this contention partnership properties may be considered as her estate, the parties are in disagreement
is correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple or as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code7 should be applied. On the one hand, petitioner
vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary claims that inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges was a resident of the Philippines at the time of her
substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the
principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be the rules of succession under difference in the positions of the parties as to the effect of said laws has reference to
the Civil Code of the Philippines, and, therefore, her estate could consist of no more the supposed legitime of Hodges it being the stand of PCIB that Hodges had such a
than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already legitime whereas Magno claims the negative - it is now beyond controversy for all future
explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900, Civil Code) which she could not have purposes of these proceedings that whatever be the provisions actually of the laws of
disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872, Civil Code). On the other hand, Texas applicable hereto, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is at least, one-fourth of the conjugal
respondent Magno denies that Mrs. Hodges died a resident of the Philippines, since estate of the spouses; the existence and effects of foreign laws being questions of fact,
allegedly she never changed nor intended to change her original residence of birth in and it being the position now of PCIB that the estate of Mrs. Hodges, pursuant to the
Texas, United States of America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question laws of Texas, should only be one-fourth of the conjugal estate, such contention
of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the constitutes an admission of fact, and consequently, it would be in estoppel in any further
Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, proceedings in these cases to claim that said estate could be less, irrespective of what
according to her, do not provide for any legitime, hence, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. might be proven later to be actually the provisions of the applicable laws of Texas; (3)
Hodges are entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal that Special Proceedings 1307 for the settlement of the testate estate of Mrs. Hodges
partnership properties consisting of one-half thereof. Respondent Magno further cannot be closed at this stage and should proceed to its logical conclusion, there having
maintains that, in any event, Hodges had renounced his rights under the will in favor of been no proper and legal adjudication or distribution yet of the estate therein involved;
his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on the point already and (4) that respondent Magno remains and continues to be the Administratrix therein.
mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which petitioner seemingly Hence, nothing in the foregoing opinion is intended to resolve the issues which, as
questions. Besides, the parties are disagreed as to what the pertinent laws of Texas already stated, are not properly before the Court now, namely, (1) whether or not
provide. In the interest of settling the estates herein involved soonest, it would be best, Hodges had in fact and in law waived or renounced his inheritance from Mrs. Hodges,
indeed, if these conflicting claims of the parties were determined in these proceedings. in whole or in part, and (2) assuming there had been no such waiver, whether or not, by
The Court regrets, however, that it cannot do so, for the simple reason that neither the the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code, and in the light of what might be the
evidence submitted by the parties in the court below nor their discussion, in their applicable laws of Texas on the matter, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is more than the one-
respective briefs and memoranda before Us, of their respective contentions on the fourth declared above. As a matter of fact, even our finding above about the existence
pertinent legal issues, of grave importance as they are, appear to Us to be adequate of properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges rests largely on a general appraisal
enough to enable Us to render an intelligent comprehensive and just resolution. For one of the size and extent of the conjugal partnership gathered from reference made thereto
thing, there is no clear and reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of by both parties in their briefs as well as in their pleadings included in the records on
Texas are. 7* Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by respondent appeal, and it should accordingly yield, as to which exactly those properties are, to the
Magno is disputed. And there are a number of still other conceivable related issues more concrete and specific evidence which the parties are supposed to present in
which the parties may wish to raise but which it is not proper to mention here. In Justice, support of their respective positions in regard to the foregoing main legal and factual
therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant matters should first issues. In the interest of justice, the parties should be allowed to present such further
be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings hereafter to be held therein evidence in relation to all these issues in a joint hearing of the two probate proceedings
for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate of Mrs. herein involved. After all, the court a quo has not yet passed squarely on these issues,
Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will. and it is best for all concerned that it should do so in the first instance.

To be more explicit, all that We can and do decide in connection with the petition for Relative to Our holding above that the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than the
certiorari and prohibition are: (1) that regardless of which corresponding laws are remainder of one-fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, it may be mentioned
applied, whether of the Philippines or of Texas, and taking for granted either of the here that during the deliberations, the point was raised as to whether or not said holding
respective contentions of the parties as to provisions of the latter,8 and regardless also might be inconsistent with Our other ruling here also that, since there is no reliable
of whether or not it can be proven by competent evidence that Hodges renounced his evidence as to what are the applicable laws of Texas, U.S.A. "with respect to the order
inheritance in any degree, it is easily and definitely discernible from the inventory of succession and to the amount of successional rights" that may be willed by a testator
submitted by Hodges himself, as Executor of his wife's estate, that there are properties which, under Article 16 of the Civil Code, are controlling in the instant cases, in view of
which should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges and ought to be disposed of or the undisputed Texan nationality of the deceased Mrs. Hodges, these cases should be
distributed among her heirs pursuant to her will in said Special Proceedings 1307; (2) returned to the court a quo, so that the parties may prove what said law provides, it is
that, more specifically, inasmuch as the question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas premature for Us to make any specific ruling now on either the validity of the
applicable to the situation herein is basically one of fact, and, considering that the sole testamentary dispositions herein involved or the amount of inheritance to which the
brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are entitled. After nature reflection, We are of the Upon the other point as to whether the will was executed in conformity with the
considered view that, at this stage and in the state of the records before Us, the feared statutes of the State of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively appear from the
inconsistency is more apparent than real. Withal, it no longer lies in the lips of petitioner transcription of the testimony adduced in the trial court that any witness was examined
PCIB to make any claim that under the laws of Texas, the estate of Mrs. Hodges could in with reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the execution of will. The trial judge
any event be less than that We have fixed above. no doubt was satisfied that the will was properly executed by examining section 1874
of the Revised Statutes of Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's Annotated
It should be borne in mind that as above-indicated, the question of what are the laws of Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he may have assumed that he could take judicial
Texas governing the matters herein issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. notice of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If so, he
Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to was in our opinion mistaken. That section authorizes the courts here to take judicial
be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the notice, among other things, of the acts of the legislative department of the United
rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge States. These words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress of the United States;
of the court, such as when they are well and generally known or they have been actually and we would hesitate to hold that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial
ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim notice of the multifarious laws of the various American States. Nor do we think that any
otherwise. (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 41, 1970 ed.) In Fluemer vs. such authority can be derived from the broader language, used in the same section,
Hix, 54 Phil. 610, it was held: where it is said that our courts may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge
"similar" to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think is to require proof of
It is the theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins West the statutes of the States of the American Union whenever their provisions are
Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and determinative of the issues in any action litigated in the Philippine courts.
that the laws of West Virginia govern. To this end, there was submitted a copy of section
3868 of Acts 1882, c. 84 as found in West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg Charles E., Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may have erred in taking judicial notice
vol. 2, 1914, p. 1960, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this of the law of Illinois on the point in question, such error is not now available to the
was far from a compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove petitioner, first, because the petition does not state any fact from which it would appear
themselves in our courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take that the law of Illinois is different from what the court found, and, secondly, because
judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must the assignment of error and argument for the appellant in this court raises no question
be proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements based on such supposed error. Though the trial court may have acted upon pure
of the law were not met. There was no showing that the book from which an extract conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of Illinois, its judgment could not be set
was taken was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as aside, even upon application made within six months under section 113 of the Code of
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law Civil Procedure, unless it should be made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture
attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the seal of was wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general terms that the will in question is
the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No invalid and inadequate to pass real and personal property in the State of Illinois, but this
evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in is merely a conclusion of law. The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied
force at the time the alleged will was executed." contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited to no authority in the appellant's
brief which might tend to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion of the
No evidence of the nature thus suggested by the Court may be found in the records of trial court. It is very clear, therefore, that this point cannot be urged as of serious
the cases at bar. Quite to the contrary, the parties herein have presented opposing moment.
versions in their respective pleadings and memoranda regarding the matter. And even
if We took into account that in Aznar vs. Garcia, the Court did make reference to certain It is implicit in the above ruling that when, with respect to certain aspects of the foreign
provisions regarding succession in the laws of Texas, the disparity in the material dates laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have any controversy or are more or
of that case and the present ones would not permit Us to indulge in the hazardous less in agreement, the Court may take it for granted for the purposes of the particular
conjecture that said provisions have not been amended or changed in the meantime. case before it that the said laws are as such virtual agreement indicates, without the
need of requiring the presentation of what otherwise would be the competent evidence
On the other hand, in In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, We held: on the point. Thus, in the instant cases wherein it results from the respective
contentions of both parties that even if the pertinent laws of Texas were known and to
be applied, the amount of the inheritance pertaining to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges is as
We have fixed above, the absence of evidence to the effect that, actually and in fact, However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
under said laws, it could be otherwise is of no longer of any consequence, unless the succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
purpose is to show that it could be more. In other words, since PCIB, the petitioner- testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
appellant, concedes that upon application of Article 16 of the Civil Code and the succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
pertinent laws of Texas, the amount of the estate in controversy is just as We have regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
determined it to be, and respondent-appellee is only claiming, on her part, that it could
be more, PCIB may not now or later pretend differently. Thus the aforecited provision of the Civil Code points towards the national law of the
deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, which is the law of Texas, as governing succession "both
To be more concrete, on pages 20-21 of its petition herein, dated July 31, 1967, PCIB with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
states categorically: the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions ...". But the law of Texas, in its conflicts
of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law governs the testamentary dispositions
Inasmuch as Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that "intestate and testamentary and successional rights over movables or personal property, while the law of the situs
successions both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of governs with respect to immovable property. Such that with respect to both movable
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be property, as well as immovable property situated in the Philippines, the law of Texas
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, points to the law of the Philippines.
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found", while the law of Texas (the Hodges spouses being nationals of Applying, therefore, the so-called "renvoi doctrine", as enunciated and applied by this
U.S.A., State of Texas), in its conflicts of law rules, provides that the domiciliary law (in Honorable Court in the case of "In re Christensen" (G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963),
this case Philippine law) governs the testamentary dispositions and successional rights there can be no question that Philippine law governs the testamentary provisions in the
over movables or personal properties, while the law of the situs (in this case also Last Will and Testament of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional
Philippine law with respect to all Hodges properties located in the Philippines), governs rights to her estate, both with respect to movables, as well as immovables situated in
with respect to immovable properties, and applying therefore the 'renvoi doctrine' as the Philippines.
enunciated and applied by this Honorable Court in the case of In re Estate of Christensen
(G.R. No. L-16749, Jan. 31, 1963), there can be no question that Philippine law governs The subject of successional rights.
the testamentary dispositions contained in the Last Will and Testament of the deceased
Linnie Jane Hodges, as well as the successional rights to her estate, both with respect to Under Philippine law, as it is under the law of Texas, the conjugal or community property
movables, as well as to immovables situated in the Philippines. of the spouses, Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges, upon the death of the
latter, is to be divided into two, one-half pertaining to each of the spouses, as his or her
In its main brief dated February 26, 1968, PCIB asserts: own property. Thus, upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, one-half of the conjugal
partnership property immediately pertained to Charles Newton Hodges as his own
The law governing successional rights. share, and not by virtue of any successional rights. There can be no question about this.

As recited above, there is no question that the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, was an Again, Philippine law, or more specifically, Article 900 of the Civil Code provides:
American citizen. There is also no question that she was a national of the State of Texas,
U.S.A. Again, there is likewise no question that she had her domicile of choice in the City If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of
of Iloilo, Philippines, as this has already been pronounced by the above-cited orders of the hereditary estate of the deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the
the lower court, pronouncements which are by now res adjudicata (par. [a], See. 49, other half.
Rule 39, Rules of Court; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156).
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator was solemnized in
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides: articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months from the time of the
marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole heir shall be one-third of the
"Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it hereditary estate, except when they have been living as husband and wife for more than
is situated. five years. In the latter case, the legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified
in the preceding paragraph.
On her part, it is respondent-appellee Magno's posture that under the laws of Texas,
This legitime of the surviving spouse cannot be burdened by a fideicommisary there is no system of legitime, hence the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be one-half of all
substitution (Art. 864, Civil code), nor by any charge, condition, or substitution (Art, 872, the conjugal properties.
Civil code). It is clear, therefore, that in addition to one-half of the conjugal partnership
property as his own conjugal share, Charles Newton Hodges was also immediately It is thus unquestionable that as far as PCIB is concerned, the application to these cases
entitled to one-half of the half conjugal share of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, or of Article 16 of the Civil Code in relation to the corresponding laws of Texas would result
one-fourth of the entire conjugal property, as his legitime. in that the Philippine laws on succession should control. On that basis, as We have
already explained above, the estate of Mrs. Hodges is the remainder of one-fourth of
One-fourth of the conjugal property therefore remains at issue. the conjugal partnership properties, considering that We have found that there is no
legal impediment to the kind of disposition ordered by Mrs. Hodges in her will in favor
In the summary of its arguments in its memorandum dated April 30, 1968, the following of her brothers and sisters and, further, that the contention of PCIB that the same
appears: constitutes an inoperative testamentary substitution is untenable. As will be recalled,
PCIB's position that there is no such estate of Mrs. Hodges is predicated exclusively on
Briefly, the position advanced by the petitioner is: two propositions, namely: (1) that the provision in question in Mrs. Hodges' testament
violates the rules on substitution of heirs under the Civil Code and (2) that, in any event,
a. That the Hodges spouses were domiciled legally in the Philippines (pp. 19-20, by the orders of the trial court of May 27, and December 14, 1957, the trial court had
petition). This is now a matter of res adjudicata (p. 20, petition). already finally and irrevocably adjudicated to her husband the whole free portion of her
estate to the exclusion of her brothers and sisters, both of which poses, We have
b. That under Philippine law, Texas law, and the renvoi doctrine, Philippine law overruled. Nowhere in its pleadings, briefs and memoranda does PCIB maintain that the
governs the successional rights over the properties left by the deceased, Linnie Jane application of the laws of Texas would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not
Hodges (pp. 20-21, petition). inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws
of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are
c. That under Philippine as well as Texas law, one-half of the Hodges properties being made to rely and act upon, PCIB is "not permitted to contradict them or
pertains to the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges (p. 21, petition). This is not subsequently take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with them." (5 Moran, id,
questioned by the respondents. p. 65, citing Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Sta. Ana vs. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31,
1968, 24 SCRA 1018).
d. That under Philippine law, the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges,
automatically inherited one-half of the remaining one-half of the Hodges properties as Accordingly, the only question that remains to be settled in the further proceedings
his legitime (p. 21, petition). hereby ordered to be held in the court below is how much more than as fixed above is
the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and this would depend on (1) whether or not the applicable
e. That the remaining 25% of the Hodges properties was inherited by the laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, under the will of his deceased spouse (pp. 22-23, therein, and (2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from
petition). Upon the death of Charles Newton Hodges, the substitution 'provision of the Mrs. Hodges.
will of the deceased, Linnie Jane Hodges, did not operate because the same is void (pp.
23-25, petition). In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court
that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the
f. That the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, asserted his sole ownership of the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible
Hodges properties and the probate court sanctioned such assertion (pp. 25-29, consequences of dispositions made by Hodges after the death of his wife from the mass
petition). He in fact assumed such ownership and such was the status of the properties of the unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents
as of the time of his death (pp. 29-34, petition). as to whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part
of his own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death
Of similar tenor are the allegations of PCIB in some of its pleadings quoted in the earlier of Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows: (1) any such
part of this option. dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be individuals,
corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of properties
constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his Indeed, inasmuch as the said two estates have until now remained commingled pro-
motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority to make indiviso, due to the failure of Hodges and the lower court to liquidate the conjugal
sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which include partnership, to recognize appellee Magno as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Mrs.
his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right over his Hodges which is still unsegregated from that of Hodges is not to say, without any
own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance pursuant to the qualification, that she was therefore authorized to do and perform all her acts
will of his wife; (2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the complained of in these appeals, sanctioned though they might have been by the trial
proceeds of such sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be court. As a matter of fact, it is such commingling pro-indiviso of the two estates that
considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate should deprive appellee of freedom to act independently from PCIB, as administrator of
which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said the estate of Hodges, just as, for the same reason, the latter should not have authority
products should remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to to act independently from her. And considering that the lower court failed to adhere
her brothers and sisters; (3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges consistently to this basic point of view, by allowing the two administrators to act
must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties belonging to his estate independently of each other, in the various instances already noted in the narration of
considering that being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not facts above, the Court has to look into the attendant circumstances of each of the
have disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such appealed orders to be able to determine whether any of them has to be set aside or
dispositions be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that they may all be legally maintained notwithstanding the failure of the court a quo to
the conjugal partnership automatically ceased when Mrs. Hodges died, and by the observe the pertinent procedural technicalities, to the end only that graver injury to the
peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the remainder of her share descended substantive rights of the parties concerned and unnecessary and undesirable
also automatically upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of proliferation of incidents in the subject proceedings may be forestalled. In other words,
the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these construction of the will of Mrs. We have to determine, whether or not, in the light of the unusual circumstances extant
Hodges should be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of adjudication and in the record, there is need to be more pragmatic and to adopt a rather unorthodox
distribution and/or partition of the two estates in question. approach, so as to cause the least disturbance in rights already being exercised by
numerous innocent third parties, even if to do so may not appear to be strictly in
THE APPEALS accordance with the letter of the applicable purely adjective rules.

A cursory examination of the seventy-eight assignments of error in appellant PCIB's brief Incidentally, it may be mentioned, at this point, that it was principally on account of the
would readily reveal that all of them are predicated mainly on the contention that confusion that might result later from PCIB's continuing to administer all the community
inasmuch as Hodges had already adjudicated unto himself all the properties constituting properties, notwithstanding the certainty of the existence of the separate estate of Mrs.
his wife's share of the conjugal partnership, allegedly with the sanction of the trial court Hodges, and to enable both estates to function in the meantime with a relative degree
per its order of December 14, 1957, there has been, since said date, no longer any estate of regularity, that the Court ordered in the resolution of September 8, 1972 the
of Mrs. Hodges of which appellee Magno could be administratrix, hence the various modification of the injunction issued pursuant to the resolutions of August 8, October 4
assailed orders sanctioning her actuations as such are not in accordance with law. Such and December 6, 1967, by virtue of which respondent Magno was completely barred
being the case, with the foregoing resolution holding such posture to be untenable in from any participation in the administration of the properties herein involved. In the
fact and in law and that it is in the best interest of justice that for the time being the two September 8 resolution, We ordered that, pending this decision, Special Proceedings
estates should be administered conjointly by the respective administrators of the two 1307 and 1672 should proceed jointly and that the respective administrators therein
estates, it should follow that said assignments of error have lost their fundamental "act conjointly none of them to act singly and independently of each other for any
reasons for being. There are certain matters, however, relating peculiarly to the purpose." Upon mature deliberation, We felt that to allow PCIB to continue managing
respective orders in question, if commonly among some of them, which need further or administering all the said properties to the exclusion of the administratrix of Mrs.
clarification. For instance, some of them authorized respondent Magno to act alone or Hodges' estate might place the heirs of Hodges at an unduly advantageous position
without concurrence of PCIB. And with respect to many of said orders, PCIB further which could result in considerable, if not irreparable, damage or injury to the other
claims that either the matters involved were not properly within the probate jurisdiction parties concerned. It is indeed to be regretted that apparently, up to this date, more
of the trial court or that the procedure followed was not in accordance with the rules. than a year after said resolution, the same has not been given due regard, as may be
Hence, the necessity of dealing separately with the merits of each of the appeals. gleaned from the fact that recently, respondent Magno has filed in these proceedings a
motion to declare PCIB in contempt for alleged failure to abide therewith,
notwithstanding that its repeated motions for reconsideration thereof have all been estates are separated from each other, the said orders must be affirmed. Accordingly
denied soon after they were filed.9 the foregoing assignments of error must be, as they are hereby overruled.

Going back to the appeals, it is perhaps best to begin first with what appears to Our Assignments of error Numbers LXVIII
mind to be the simplest, and then proceed to the more complicated ones in that order, to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI.
without regard to the numerical sequence of the assignments of error in appellant's
brief or to the order of the discussion thereof by counsel. The orders complained of under these assignments of error commonly deal with
expenditures made by appellee Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges,
Assignments of error numbers in connection with her administration thereof, albeit additionally, assignments of error
LXXII, LXXVII and LXXVIII. Numbers LXIX to LXXI put into question the payment of attorneys fees provided for in
the contract for the purpose, as constituting, in effect, premature advances to the heirs
These assignments of error relate to (1) the order of the trial court of August 6, 1965 of Mrs. Hodges.
providing that "the deeds of sale (therein referred to involving properties in the name
of Hodges) should be signed jointly by the PCIB, as Administrator of Testate Estate of More specifically, assignment Number LXXIII refers to reimbursement of overtime pay
C.N. Hodges, and Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane paid to six employees of the court and three other persons for services in copying the
Hodges, and to this effect, the PCIB should take the necessary steps so that court records to enable the lawyers of the administration to be fully informed of all the
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno could sign the deeds of sale," (p. 248, Green Rec. on incidents in the proceedings. The reimbursement was approved as proper legal
Appeal) (2) the order of October 27, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration of the expenses of administration per the order of December 19, 1964, (pp. 221-222, id.) and
foregoing order, (pp. 276-277, id.) (3) the other order also dated October 27, 1965 repeated motions for reconsideration thereof were denied by the orders of January 9,
enjoining inter alia, that "(a) all cash collections should be deposited in the joint account 1965, (pp. 231-232, id.) October 27, 1965, (p. 277, id.) and February 15, 1966. (pp. 455-
of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges and estate of C. N. Hodges, (b) that whatever cash 456, id.) On the other hand, Assignments Numbers LXVIII to LXXI, LXXIV and LXXV
collections (that) had been deposited in the account of either of the estates should be question the trial court's order of November 3, 1965 approving the agreement of June
withdrawn and since then (sic) deposited in the joint account of the estate of Linnie Jane 6, 1964 between Administratrix Magno and James L. Sullivan, attorney-in-fact of the
Hodges and the estate of C. N. Hodges; ... (d) (that) Administratrix Magno allow the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, as Parties of the First Part, and Attorneys Raul Manglapus and Rizal
PCIB to inspect whatever records, documents and papers she may have in her R. Quimpo, as Parties of the Second Part, regarding attorneys fees for said counsel who
possession, in the same manner that Administrator PCIB is also directed to allow had agreed "to prosecute and defend their interests (of the Parties of the First Part) in
Administratrix Magno to inspect whatever records, documents and papers it may have certain cases now pending litigation in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo , more
in its possession" and "(e) that the accountant of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges shall specifically in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672 " (pp. 126-129, id.) and directing
have access to all records of the transactions of both estates for the protection of the Administratrix Magno "to issue and sign whatever check or checks maybe needed to
estate of Linnie Jane Hodges; and in like manner, the accountant or any authorized implement the approval of the agreement annexed to the motion" as well as the
representative of the estate of C. N. Hodges shall have access to the records of "administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges to countersign the said check or checks
transactions of the Linnie Jane Hodges estate for the protection of the estate of C. N. as the case maybe." (pp. 313-320, id.), reconsideration of which order of approval was
Hodges", (pp. 292-295, id.) and (4) the order of February 15, 1966, denying, among denied in the order of February 16, 1966, (p. 456, id.) Assignment Number LXXVI imputes
others, the motion for reconsideration of the order of October 27, 1965 last referred to. error to the lower court's order of October 27, 1965, already referred to above, insofar
(pp. 455-456, id.) as it orders that "PCIB should counter sign the check in the amount of P250 in favor of
Administratrix Avelina A. Magno as her compensation as administratrix of Linnie Jane
As may be readily seen, the thrust of all these four impugned orders is in line with the Hodges estate chargeable to the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges only." (p. 294, id.)
Court's above-mentioned resolution of September 8, 1972 modifying the injunction
previously issued on August 8, 1967, and, more importantly, with what We have said Main contention again of appellant PCIB in regard to these eight assigned errors is that
the trial court should have always done pending the liquidation of the conjugal there is no such estate as the estate of Mrs. Hodges for which the questioned
partnership of the Hodges spouses. In fact, as already stated, that is the arrangement expenditures were made, hence what were authorized were in effect expenditures from
We are ordering, by this decision, to be followed. Stated differently, since the the estate of Hodges. As We have already demonstrated in Our resolution above of the
questioned orders provide for joint action by the two administrators, and that is petition for certiorari and prohibition, this posture is incorrect. Indeed, in whichever way
precisely what We are holding out to have been done and should be done until the two the remaining issues between the parties in these cases are ultimately resolved, 10 the
final result will surely be that there are properties constituting the estate of Mrs. Hodges the existence or non-existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. In this respect, the interest
of which Magno is the current administratrix. It follows, therefore, that said appellee of respondent Magno, as the appointed administratrix of the said estate, is to maintain
had the right, as such administratrix, to hire the persons whom she paid overtime pay that it exists, which is naturally common and identical with and inseparable from the
and to be paid for her own services as administratrix. That she has not yet collected and interest of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges. Thus, it should not be wondered why
is not collecting amounts as substantial as that paid to or due appellant PCIB is to her both Magno and these heirs have seemingly agreed to retain but one counsel. In fact,
credit. such an arrangement should be more convenient and economical to both. The
possibility of conflict of interest between Magno and the heirs of Mrs. Hodges would be,
Of course, she is also entitled to the services of counsel and to that end had the authority at this stage, quite remote and, in any event, rather insubstantial. Besides, should any
to enter into contracts for attorney's fees in the manner she had done in the agreement substantial conflict of interest between them arise in the future, the same would be a
of June 6, 1964. And as regards to the reasonableness of the amount therein stipulated, matter that the probate court can very well take care of in the course of the independent
We see no reason to disturb the discretion exercised by the probate court in proceedings in Case No. 1307 after the corresponding segregation of the two subject
determining the same. We have gone over the agreement, and considering the obvious estates. We cannot perceive any cogent reason why, at this stage, the estate and the
size of the estate in question and the nature of the issues between the parties as well heirs of Mrs. Hodges cannot be represented by a common counsel.
as the professional standing of counsel, We cannot say that the fees agreed upon
require the exercise by the Court of its inherent power to reduce it. Now, as to whether or not the portion of the fees in question that should correspond to
the heirs constitutes premature partial distribution of the estate of Mrs. Hodges is also
PCIB insists, however, that said agreement of June 6, 1964 is not for legal services to the a matter in which neither PCIB nor the heirs of Hodges have any interest. In any event,
estate but to the heirs of Mrs. Hodges, or, at most, to both of them, and such being the since, as far as the records show, the estate has no creditors and the corresponding
case, any payment under it, insofar as counsels' services would redound to the benefit estate and inheritance taxes, except those of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges,
of the heirs, would be in the nature of advances to such heirs and a premature have already been paid, 11 no prejudice can caused to anyone by the comparatively
distribution of the estate. Again, We hold that such posture cannot prevail. small amount of attorney's fees in question. And in this connection, it may be added
that, although strictly speaking, the attorney's fees of the counsel of an administrator is
Upon the premise We have found plausible that there is an existing estate of Mrs. in the first instance his personal responsibility, reimbursable later on by the estate, in
Hodges, it results that juridically and factually the interests involved in her estate are the final analysis, when, as in the situation on hand, the attorney-in-fact of the heirs has
distinct and different from those involved in her estate of Hodges and vice versa. Insofar given his conformity thereto, it would be idle effort to inquire whether or not the
as the matters related exclusively to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB, as administrator sanction given to said fees by the probate court is proper.
of the estate of Hodges, is a complete stranger and it is without personality to question
the actuations of the administratrix thereof regarding matters not affecting the estate For the foregoing reasons, Assignments of Error LXVIII to LXXI and LXXIII to LXXVI should
of Hodges. Actually, considering the obviously considerable size of the estate of Mrs. be as they are hereby overruled.
Hodges, We see no possible cause for apprehension that when the two estates are
segregated from each other, the amount of attorney's fees stipulated in the agreement Assignments of error I to IV,
in question will prejudice any portion that would correspond to Hodges' estate. XIII to XV, XXII to XXV, XXXV
to XXX VI, XLI to XLIII and L.
And as regards the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges who ought to be the ones who should
have a say on the attorney's fees and other expenses of administration assailed by PCIB, These assignments of error deal with the approval by the trial court of various deeds of
suffice it to say that they appear to have been duly represented in the agreement itself sale of real properties registered in the name of Hodges but executed by appellee
by their attorney-in-fact, James L. Sullivan and have not otherwise interposed any Magno, as Administratrix of the Estate of Mrs. Hodges, purportedly in implementation
objection to any of the expenses incurred by Magno questioned by PCIB in these of corresponding supposed written "Contracts to Sell" previously executed by Hodges
appeals. As a matter of fact, as ordered by the trial court, all the expenses in question, during the interim between May 23, 1957, when his wife died, and December 25, 1962,
including the attorney's fees, may be paid without awaiting the determination and the day he died. As stated on pp. 118-120 of appellant's main brief, "These are: the,
segregation of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee,
Pepito G. Iyulores executed on February 5, 1961; the contract to sell between the
Withal, the weightiest consideration in connection with the point under discussion is deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellant Esperidion Partisala, executed on
that at this stage of the controversy among the parties herein, the vital issue refers to April 20, 1960; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and
the appellee, Winifredo C. Espada, executed on April 18, 1960; the contract to sell should be considered as payments to the estate of Mrs. Hodges which is to be
between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Rosario Alingasa, distributed and partitioned among her heirs specified in the will.
executed on August 25, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Lorenzo Carles, executed on June 17, 1958; the The five deeds of sale predicated on contracts to sell executed Hodges during the
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, lifetime of his wife, present a different situation. At first blush, it would appear that as
Salvador S. Guzman, executed on September 13, 1960; the contract to sell between the to them, PCIB's position has some degree of plausibility. Considering, however, that the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Florenia Barrido, executed on adoption of PCIB's theory would necessarily have tremendous repercussions and would
February 21, 1958; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, bring about considerable disturbance of property rights that have somehow accrued
and the appellee, Purificacion Coronado, executed on August 14, 1961; the contract to already in favor of innocent third parties, the five purchasers aforenamed, the Court is
sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Graciano Lucero, inclined to take a pragmatic and practical view of the legal situation involving them by
executed on November 27, 1961; the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles overlooking the possible technicalities in the way, the non-observance of which would
Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, executed on May 26, 1961; the not, after all, detract materially from what should substantially correspond to each and
contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, all of the parties concerned.
Melquiades Batisanan, executed on June 9, 1959; the contract to sell between the
deceased, Charles Newton Hodges, and the appellee, Belcezar Causing, executed on To start with, these contracts can hardly be ignored. Bona fide third parties are involved;
February 10, 1959 and the contract to sell between the deceased, Charles Newton as much as possible, they should not be made to suffer any prejudice on account of
Hodges, and the appellee, Adelfa Premaylon, executed on October 31, 1959, re Title No. judicial controversies not of their own making. What is more, the transactions they rely
13815." on were submitted by them to the probate court for approval, and from already known
and recorded actuations of said court then, they had reason to believe that it had
Relative to these sales, it is the position of appellant PCIB that, inasmuch as pursuant to authority to act on their motions, since appellee Magno had, from time to time prior to
the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband was to have dominion over all her estate during their transactions with her, been allowed to act in her capacity as administratrix of one
his lifetime, it was as absolute owner of the properties respectively covered by said sales of the subject estates either alone or conjointly with PCIB. All the sales in question were
that he executed the aforementioned contracts to sell, and consequently, upon his executed by Magno in 1966 already, but before that, the court had previously
death, the implementation of said contracts may be undertaken only by the authorized or otherwise sanctioned expressly many of her act as administratrix involving
administrator of his estate and not by the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges. expenditures from the estate made by her either conjointly with or independently from
Basically, the same theory is invoked with particular reference to five other sales, in PCIB, as Administrator of the Estate of Hodges. Thus, it may be said that said buyers-
which the respective "contracts to sell" in favor of these appellees were executed by appellees merely followed precedents in previous orders of the court. Accordingly,
Hodges before the death of his wife, namely, those in favor of appellee Santiago unless the impugned orders approving those sales indubitably suffer from some clearly
Pacaonsis, Alfredo Catedral, Jose Pablico, Western Institute of Technology and Adelfa fatal infirmity the Court would rather affirm them.
Premaylon.
It is quite apparent from the record that the properties covered by said sales are
Anent those deeds of sale based on promises or contracts to sell executed by Hodges equivalent only to a fraction of what should constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges, even
after the death of his wife, those enumerated in the quotation in the immediately if it is assumed that the same would finally be held to be only one-fourth of the conjugal
preceding paragraph, it is quite obvious that PCIB's contention cannot be sustained. As properties of the spouses as of the time of her death or, to be more exact, one-half of
already explained earlier, 11* all proceeds of remunerative transfers or dispositions her estate as per the inventory submitted by Hodges as executor, on May 12, 1958. In
made by Hodges after the death of his wife should be deemed as continuing to be parts none of its numerous, varied and voluminous pleadings, motions and manifestations
of her estate and, therefore, subject to the terms of her will in favor of her brothers and has PCIB claimed any possibility otherwise. Such being the case, to avoid any conflict
sisters, in the sense that should there be no showing that such proceeds, whether in with the heirs of Hodges, the said properties covered by the questioned deeds of sale
cash or property have been subsequently conveyed or assigned subsequently by Hodges executed by appellee Magno may be treated as among those corresponding to the
to any third party by acts inter vivos with the result that they could not thereby belong estate of Mrs. Hodges, which would have been actually under her control and
to him anymore at the time of his death, they automatically became part of the administration had Hodges complied with his duty to liquidate the conjugal partnership.
inheritance of said brothers and sisters. The deeds here in question involve transactions Viewing the situation in that manner, the only ones who could stand to be prejudiced
which are exactly of this nature. Consequently, the payments made by the appellees by the appealed orders referred to in the assignment of errors under discussion and who
could, therefore, have the requisite interest to question them would be only the heirs and Salvador S. Guzman, the contracts with them had already been unilaterally
of Mrs. Hodges, definitely not PCIB. cancelled by PCIB pursuant to automatic rescission clauses contained in them, in view
of the failure of said buyers to pay arrearages long overdue. But PCIB's posture is again
It is of no moment in what capacity Hodges made the "contracts to sell' after the death premised on its assumption that the properties covered by the deeds in question could
of his wife. Even if he had acted as executor of the will of his wife, he did not have to not pertain to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. We have already held above that, it being
submit those contracts to the court nor follow the provisions of the rules, (Sections 2, 4, evident that a considerable portion of the conjugal properties, much more than the
5, 6, 8 and 9 of Rule 89 quoted by appellant on pp. 125 to 127 of its brief) for the simple properties covered by said deeds, would inevitably constitute the estate of Mrs. Hodges,
reason that by the very orders, much relied upon by appellant for other purposes, of to avoid unnecessary legal complications, it can be assumed that said properties form
May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957, Hodges was "allowed or authorized" by the trial part of such estate. From this point of view, it is apparent again that the questions,
court "to continue the business in which he was engaged and to perform acts which he whether or not it was proper for appellee Magno to have disregarded the cancellations
had been doing while the deceased was living", (Order of May 27) which according to made by PCIB, thereby reviving the rights of the respective buyers-appellees, and,
the motion on which the court acted was "of buying and selling personal and real whether or not the rules governing new dispositions of properties of the estate were
properties", and "to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases and mortgages of strictly followed, may not be raised by PCIB but only by the heirs of Mrs. Hodges as the
the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in consonance with the persons designated to inherit the same, or perhaps the government because of the still
wishes conveyed in the last will and testament of the latter." (Order of December 14) In unpaid inheritance taxes. But, again, since there is no pretense that any objections were
other words, if Hodges acted then as executor, it can be said that he had authority to do raised by said parties or that they would necessarily be prejudiced, the contentions of
so by virtue of these blanket orders, and PCIB does not question the legality of such PCIB under the instant assignments of error hardly merit any consideration.
grant of authority; on the contrary, it is relying on the terms of the order itself for its
main contention in these cases. On the other hand, if, as PCIB contends, he acted as Assignments of error IX to XII, XIX
heir-adjudicatee, the authority given to him by the aforementioned orders would still to XXI, XXX to XXIV, XXXIX to XL,
suffice. XLVII to XLIX, LII and LIII to LXI.

As can be seen, therefore, it is of no moment whether the "contracts to sell" upon which PCIB raises under these assignments of error two issues which according to it are
the deeds in question were based were executed by Hodges before or after the death fundamental, namely: (1) that in approving the deeds executed by Magno pursuant to
of his wife. In a word, We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the properties contracts to sell already cancelled by it in the performance of its functions as
covered by the deeds being assailed pertain or should be deemed as pertaining to the administrator of the estate of Hodges, the trial court deprived the said estate of the
estate of Mrs. Hodges; hence, any supposed irregularity attending the actuations of the right to invoke such cancellations it (PCIB) had made and (2) that in so acting, the court
trial court may be invoked only by her heirs, not by PCIB, and since the said heirs are not "arrogated unto itself, while acting as a probate court, the power to determine the
objecting, and the defects pointed out not being strictly jurisdictional in nature, all contending claims of third parties against the estate of Hodges over real property," since
things considered, particularly the unnecessary disturbance of rights already created in it has in effect determined whether or not all the terms and conditions of the respective
favor of innocent third parties, it is best that the impugned orders are not disturbed. contracts to sell executed by Hodges in favor of the buyers-appellees concerned were
complied with by the latter. What is worse, in the view of PCIB, is that the court has
In view of these considerations, We do not find sufficient merit in the assignments of taken the word of the appellee Magno, "a total stranger to his estate as determinative
error under discussion. of the issue".

Assignments of error V to VIII, Actually, contrary to the stand of PCIB, it is this last point regarding appellee Magno's
XVI to XVIII, XXVI to XXIX, XXXVII having agreed to ignore the cancellations made by PCIB and allowed the buyers-
to XXXVIII, XLIV to XLVI and LI. appellees to consummate the sales in their favor that is decisive. Since We have already
held that the properties covered by the contracts in question should be deemed to be
All these assignments of error commonly deal with alleged non-fulfillment by the portions of the estate of Mrs. Hodges and not that of Hodges, it is PCIB that is a complete
respective vendees, appellees herein, of the terms and conditions embodied in the stranger in these incidents. Considering, therefore, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges and
deeds of sale referred to in the assignments of error just discussed. It is claimed that her heirs who are the real parties in interest having the right to oppose the
some of them never made full payments in accordance with the respective contracts to consummation of the impugned sales are not objecting, and that they are the ones who
sell, while in the cases of the others, like Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo Catedral
are precisely urging that said sales be sanctioned, the assignments of error under of the probate court and that the order authorized payment to a person other than the
discussion have no basis and must accordingly be as they are hereby overruled. administrator of the estate of Hodges with whom the Institute had contracted.

With particular reference to assignments LIII to LXI, assailing the orders of the trial court The procedural points urged by appellant deserve scant consideration. We must
requiring PCIB to surrender the respective owner's duplicate certificates of title over the assume, absent any clear proof to the contrary, that the lower court had acted regularly
properties covered by the sales in question and otherwise directing the Register of by seeing to it that appellant was duly notified. On the other hand, there is nothing
Deeds of Iloilo to cancel said certificates and to issue new transfer certificates of title in irregular in the court's having resolved the motion three days after the date set for
favor of the buyers-appellees, suffice it to say that in the light of the above discussion, hearing the same. Moreover, the record reveals that appellants' motion for
the trial court was within its rights to so require and direct, PCIB having refused to give reconsideration wherein it raised the same points was denied by the trial court on
way, by withholding said owners' duplicate certificates, of the corresponding March 7, 1966 (p. 462, Green R. on A.) Withal, We are not convinced that the relief
registration of the transfers duly and legally approved by the court. granted is not within the general intent of the Institute's motion.

Assignments of error LXII to LXVII Insofar as the substantive issues are concerned, all that need be said at this point is that
they are mere reiterations of contentions We have already resolved above adversely to
All these assignments of error commonly deal with the appeal against orders favoring appellants' position. Incidentally, We may add, perhaps, to erase all doubts as to the
appellee Western Institute of Technology. As will be recalled, said institute is one of the propriety of not disturbing the lower court's orders sanctioning the sales questioned in
buyers of real property covered by a contract to sell executed by Hodges prior to the all these appeal s by PCIB, that it is only when one of the parties to a contract to convey
death of his wife. As of October, 1965, it was in arrears in the total amount of P92,691.00 property executed by a deceased person raises substantial objections to its being
in the payment of its installments on account of its purchase, hence it received under implemented by the executor or administrator of the decedent's estate that Section 8
date of October 4, 1965 and October 20, 1965, letters of collection, separately and of Rule 89 may not apply and, consequently, the matter has, to be taken up in a separate
respectively, from PCIB and appellee Magno, in their respective capacities as action outside of the probate court; but where, as in the cases of the sales herein
administrators of the distinct estates of the Hodges spouses, albeit, while in the case of involved, the interested parties are in agreement that the conveyance be made, it is
PCIB it made known that "no other arrangement can be accepted except by paying all properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court to give its sanction thereto pursuant
your past due account", on the other hand, Magno merely said she would "appreciate to the provisions of the rule just mentioned. And with respect to the supposed
very much if you can make some remittance to bring this account up-to-date and to automatic rescission clauses contained in the contracts to sell executed by Hodges in
reduce the amount of the obligation." (See pp. 295-311, Green R. on A.) On November favor of herein appellees, the effect of said clauses depend on the true nature of the
3, 1965, the Institute filed a motion which, after alleging that it was ready and willing to said contracts, despite the nomenclature appearing therein, which is not controlling, for
pay P20,000 on account of its overdue installments but uncertain whether it should pay if they amount to actual contracts of sale instead of being mere unilateral accepted
PCIB or Magno, it prayed that it be "allowed to deposit the aforesaid amount with the "promises to sell", (Art. 1479, Civil Code of the Philippines, 2nd paragraph) the pactum
court pending resolution of the conflicting claims of the administrators." Acting on this commissorium or the automatic rescission provision would not operate, as a matter of
motion, on November 23, 1965, the trial court issued an order, already quoted in the public policy, unless there has been a previous notarial or judicial demand by the seller
narration of facts in this opinion, holding that payment to both or either of the two (10 Manresa 263, 2nd ed.) neither of which have been shown to have been made in
administrators is "proper and legal", and so "movant can pay to both estates or either connection with the transactions herein involved.
of them", considering that "in both cases (Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672) there is
as yet no judicial declaration of heirs nor distribution of properties to whomsoever are Consequently, We find no merit in the assignments of error
entitled thereto." Number LXII to LXVII.

The arguments under the instant assignments of error revolve around said order. From SUMMARY
the procedural standpoint, it is claimed that PCIB was not served with a copy of the
Institute's motion, that said motion was heard, considered and resolved on November Considering the fact that this decision is unusually extensive and that the issues herein
23, 1965, whereas the date set for its hearing was November 20, 1965, and that what taken up and resolved are rather numerous and varied, what with appellant making
the order grants is different from what is prayed for in the motion. As to the substantive seventy-eight assignments of error affecting no less than thirty separate orders of the
aspect, it is contended that the matter treated in the motion is beyond the jurisdiction court a quo, if only to facilitate proper understanding of the import and extent of our
rulings herein contained, it is perhaps desirable that a brief restatement of the whole
situation be made together with our conclusions in regard to its various factual and legal it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the
aspects. . "rest, residue and remainder" of his wife's share thereof, as of the time of Hodges' own
death, may be readily known and identified, no such liquidation was ever undertaken.
The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges as well as The record gives no indication of the reason for such omission, although relatedly, it
that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges, who predeceased him by about five years and a appears therein:
half. In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of
them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue 1. That in his annual statement submitted to the court of the net worth of C. N.
and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my Hodges and the Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, Hodges repeatedly and consistently
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to reported the combined income of the conjugal partnership and then merely divided the
have and to hold unto (him/her) during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the same equally between himself and the estate of the deceased wife, and, more
condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of importantly, he also, as consistently, filed corresponding separate income tax returns
what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to for each calendar year for each resulting half of such combined income, thus reporting
the brothers and sisters of the latter. that the estate of Mrs. Hodges had its own income distinct from his own.

Mrs. Hodges died first, on May 23, 1957. Four days later, on May 27, Hodges was 2. That when the court a quo happened to inadvertently omit in its order
appointed special administrator of her estate, and in a separate order of the same date, probating the will of Mrs. Hodges, the name of one of her brothers, Roy Higdon then
he was "allowed or authorized to continue the business in which he was engaged, already deceased, Hodges lost no time in asking for the proper correction "in order that
(buying and selling personal and real properties) and to perform acts which he had been the heirs of deceased Roy Higdon may not think or believe they were omitted, and that
doing while the deceased was living." Subsequently, on December 14, 1957, after Mrs. they were really interested in the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges".
Hodges' will had been probated and Hodges had been appointed and had qualified as
Executor thereof, upon his motion in which he asserted that he was "not only part owner 3. That in his aforementioned motion of December 11, 1957, he expressly stated
of the properties left as conjugal, but also, the successor to all the properties left by the that "deceased Linnie Jane Hodges died leaving no descendants or ascendants except
deceased Linnie Jane Hodges", the trial court ordered that "for the reasons stated in his brothers and sisters and herein petitioner as the surviving spouse, to inherit the
motion dated December 11, 1957, which the Court considers well taken, ... all the sales, properties of the decedent", thereby indicating that he was not excluding his wife's
conveyances, leases and mortgages of all properties left by the deceased Linnie Jane brothers and sisters from the inheritance.
Hodges executed by the Executor, Charles Newton Hodges are hereby APPROVED. The
said Executor is further authorized to execute subsequent sales, conveyances, leases 4. That Hodges allegedly made statements and manifestations to the United
and mortgages of the properties left by the said deceased Linnie Jane Hodges in States inheritance tax authorities indicating that he had renounced his inheritance from
consonance with the wishes contained in the last will and testament of the latter." his wife in favor of her other heirs, which attitude he is supposed to have reiterated or
ratified in an alleged affidavit subscribed and sworn to here in the Philippines and in
Annually thereafter, Hodges submitted to the court the corresponding statements of which he even purportedly stated that his reason for so disclaiming and renouncing his
account of his administration, with the particularity that in all his motions, he always rights under his wife's will was to "absolve (him) or (his) estate from any liability for the
made it point to urge the that "no person interested in the Philippines of the time and payment of income taxes on income which has accrued to the estate of Linnie Jane
place of examining the herein accounts be given notice as herein executor is the only Hodges", his wife, since her death.
devisee or legatee of the deceased in accordance with the last will and testament
already probated by the Honorable Court." All said accounts approved as prayed for. On said date, December 25, 1962, Hodges died. The very next day, upon motion of
herein respondent and appellee, Avelina A. Magno, she was appointed by the trial court
Nothing else appears to have been done either by the court a quo or Hodges until as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings No.
December 25, 1962. Importantly to be the provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges that her 1307 and as Special Administratrix of the estate of Charles Newton Hodges, "in the latter
share of the conjugal partnership was to be inherited by her husband "to have and to case, because the last will of said Charles Newton Hodges is still kept in his vault or iron
hold unto him, my said husband, during his natural lifetime" and that "at the death of safe and that the real and personal properties of both spouses may be lost, damaged or
my said husband, I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my go to waste, unless Special Administratrix is appointed," (Order of December 26, 1962,
estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to be equally divided p. 27, Yellow R. on A.) although, soon enough, on December 29, 1962, a certain Harold
among my brothers and sisters, share and share alike", which provision naturally made K. Davies was appointed as her Co-Special Administrator, and when Special Proceedings
No. 1672, Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, was opened, Joe Hodges, as next spouses were both residents of the Philippines, following the decision of this Court in
of kin of the deceased, was in due time appointed as Co-Administrator of said estate Aznar vs. Garcia, or the case of Christensen, 7 SCRA 95, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges
together with Atty. Fernando P. Mirasol, to replace Magno and Davies, only to be in turn could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership,
replaced eventually by petitioner PCIB alone. notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A., in accordance with Article
16 in relation to Articles 900 and 872 of the Civil Code. Initially, We issued a preliminary
At the outset, the two probate proceedings appear to have been proceeding jointly, with injunction against Magno and allowed PCIB to act alone.
each administrator acting together with the other, under a sort of modus operandi. PCIB
used to secure at the beginning the conformity to and signature of Magno in At the same time PCIB has appealed several separate orders of the trial court approving
transactions it wanted to enter into and submitted the same to the court for approval individual acts of appellee Magno in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Mrs.
as their joint acts. So did Magno do likewise. Somehow, however, differences seem to Hodges, such as, hiring of lawyers for specified fees and incurring expenses of
have arisen, for which reason, each of them began acting later on separately and administration for different purposes and executing deeds of sale in favor of her co-
independently of each other, with apparent sanction of the trial court. Thus, PCIB had appellees covering properties which are still registered in the name of Hodges,
its own lawyers whom it contracted and paid handsomely, conducted the business of purportedly pursuant to corresponding "contracts to sell" executed by Hodges. The said
the estate independently of Magno and otherwise acted as if all the properties orders are being questioned on jurisdictional and procedural grounds directly or
appearing in the name of Charles Newton Hodges belonged solely and only to his estate, indirectly predicated on the principal theory of appellant that all the properties of the
to the exclusion of the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges, without considering whether two estates belong already to the estate of Hodges exclusively.
or not in fact any of said properties corresponded to the portion of the conjugal
partnership pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. On the other hand, Magno made On the other hand, respondent-appellee Magno denies that the trial court's orders of
her own expenditures, hired her own lawyers, on the premise that there is such an May 27 and December 14, 1957 were meant to be finally adjudicatory of the hereditary
estate of Mrs. Hodges, and dealth with some of the properties, appearing in the name rights of Hodges and contends that they were no more than the court's general sanction
of Hodges, on the assumption that they actually correspond to the estate of Mrs. of past and future acts of Hodges as executor of the will of his wife in due course of
Hodges. All of these independent and separate actuations of the two administrators administration. As to the point regarding substitution, her position is that what was
were invariably approved by the trial court upon submission. Eventually, the differences given by Mrs. Hodges to her husband under the provision in question was a lifetime
reached a point wherein Magno, who was more cognizant than anyone else about the usufruct of her share of the conjugal partnership, with the naked ownership passing
ins and outs of the businesses and properties of the deceased spouses because of her directly to her brothers and sisters. Anent the application of Article 16 of the Civil Code,
long and intimate association with them, made it difficult for PCIB to perform normally she claims that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which,
its functions as administrator separately from her. Thus, legal complications arose and she alleges, there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be
the present judicial controversies came about. less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. She further
maintains that, in any event, Hodges had as a matter of fact and of law renounced his
Predicating its position on the tenor of the orders of May 27 and December 14, 1957 as inheritance from his wife and, therefore, her whole estate passed directly to her
well as the approval by the court a quo of the annual statements of account of Hodges, brothers and sisters effective at the latest upon the death of Hodges.
PCIB holds to the view that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed
with the virtual adjudication in the mentioned orders of her whole estate to Hodges, In this decision, for the reasons discussed above, and upon the issues just summarized,
and that, therefore, Magno had already ceased since then to have any estate to We overrule PCIB's contention that the orders of May 27, 1957 and December 14, 1957
administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in amount to an adjudication to Hodges of the estate of his wife, and We recognize the
the estate left by Hodges. Mainly upon such theory, PCIB has come to this Court with a present existence of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as consisting of properties, which, while
petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the lower court's orders allowing registered in that name of Hodges, do actually correspond to the remainder of the share
respondent Magno to continue acting as administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Hodges in of Mrs. Hodges in the conjugal partnership, it appearing that pursuant to the pertinent
Special Proceedings 1307 in the manner she has been doing, as detailed earlier above, provisions of her will, any portion of said share still existing and undisposed of by her
be set aside. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will husband at the time of his death should go to her brothers and sisters share and share
instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a alike. Factually, We find that the proven circumstances relevant to the said orders do
testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, not warrant the conclusion that the court intended to make thereby such alleged final
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may adjudication. Legally, We hold that the tenor of said orders furnish no basis for such a
not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges conclusion, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had
not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made. whereby the institution of Hodges is subject to a partial resolutory condition the
Moreover, the interested parties were not duly notified that such disposition of the operative contingency of which is coincidental with that of the suspensive condition of
estate would be done. At best, therefore, said orders merely allowed Hodges to dispose the institution of his brothers and sisters-in-law, which manner of institution is not
of portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly prohibited by law.
permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third parties,
inasmuch as Mrs. Hodges had no creditors and all pertinent taxes have been paid. We also hold, however, that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and
sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the
More specifically, We hold that, on the basis of circumstances presently extant in the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and
record, and on the assumption that Hodges' purported renunciation should not be the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by
upheld, the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters consists of one- Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively
fourth of the community estate of the spouses at the time of her death, minus whatever renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining
Hodges had gratuitously disposed of therefrom during the period from, May 23, 1957, and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to
when she died, to December 25, 1962, when he died provided, that with regard to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
remunerative dispositions made by him during the same period, the proceeds thereof, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance
whether in cash or property, should be deemed as continuing to be part of his wife's by the court a quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such
estate, unless it can be shown that he had subsequently disposed of them gratuitously. further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is
beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could
At this juncture, it may be reiterated that the question of what are the pertinent laws of not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole
Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof
and considering the respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been
of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for
difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Hodges, even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code
PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one- and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such
fourth of said conjugal estate and Magno contending, on the other hand, that there is one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the
none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any
consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate The foregoing considerations leave the Court with no alternative than to conclude that
of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a party in predicating its orders on the assumption, albeit unexpressed therein, that there is an
related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any estate of Mrs. Hodges to be distributed among her brothers and sisters and that
other controverted fact, create estoppel. respondent Magno is the legal administratrix thereof, the trial court acted correctly and
within its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition has to be
In the process, We overrule PCIB's contention that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will in denied. The Court feels however, that pending the liquidation of the conjugal
favor of her brothers and sisters constitutes ineffective hereditary substitutions. But partnership and the determination of the specific properties constituting her estate, the
neither are We sustaining, on the other hand, Magno's pose that it gave Hodges only a two administrators should act conjointly as ordered in the Court's resolution of
lifetime usufruct. We hold that by said provision, Mrs. Hodges simultaneously instituted September 8, 1972 and as further clarified in the dispositive portion of its decision.
her brothers and sisters as co-heirs with her husband, with the condition, however, that
the latter would have complete rights of dominion over the whole estate during his Anent the appeals from the orders of the lower court sanctioning payment by appellee
lifetime and what would go to the former would be only the remainder thereof at the Magno, as administratrix, of expenses of administration and attorney's fees, it is obvious
time of Hodges' death. In other words, whereas they are not to inherit only in case of that, with Our holding that there is such an estate of Mrs. Hodges, and for the reasons
default of Hodges, on the other hand, Hodges was not obliged to preserve anything for stated in the body of this opinion, the said orders should be affirmed. This We do on the
them. Clearly then, the essential elements of testamentary substitution are absent; the assumption We find justified by the evidence of record, and seemingly agreed to by
provision in question is a simple case of conditional simultaneous institution of heirs, appellant PCIB, that the size and value of the properties that should correspond to the
estate of Mrs. Hodges far exceed the total of the attorney's fees and administration effective, no deductions whatsoever are to be made from said estate; in consequence,
expenses in question. the preliminary injunction of August 8, 1967, as amended on October 4 and December
6, 1967, is lifted, and the resolution of September 8, 1972, directing that petitioner-
With respect to the appeals from the orders approving transactions made by appellee appellant PCIB, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges, in
Magno, as administratrix, covering properties registered in the name of Hodges, the Special Proceedings 1672, and respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as Administratrix
details of which are related earlier above, a distinction must be made between those of the Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, in Special Proceedings 1307, should act
predicated on contracts to sell executed by Hodges before the death of his wife, on the thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from each other, as such
one hand, and those premised on contracts to sell entered into by him after her death. administrators, is reiterated, and the same is made part of this judgment and shall
As regards the latter, We hold that inasmuch as the payments made by appellees continue in force, pending the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the deceased
constitute proceeds of sales of properties belonging to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, as spouses and the determination and segregation from each other of their respective
may be implied from the tenor of the motions of May 27 and December 14, 1957, said estates, provided, that upon the finality of this judgment, the trial court should
payments continue to pertain to said estate, pursuant to her intent obviously reflected immediately proceed to the partition of the presently combined estates of the spouses,
in the relevant provisions of her will, on the assumption that the size and value of the to the end that the one-half share thereof of Mrs. Hodges may be properly and clearly
properties to correspond to the estate of Mrs. Hodges would exceed the total value of identified; thereafter, the trial court should forthwith segregate the remainder of the
all the properties covered by the impugned deeds of sale, for which reason, said one-fourth herein adjudged to be her estate and cause the same to be turned over or
properties may be deemed as pertaining to the estate of Mrs. Hodges. And there being delivered to respondent for her exclusive administration in Special Proceedings 1307,
no showing that thus viewing the situation, there would be prejudice to anyone, while the other one-fourth shall remain under the joint administration of said
including the government, the Court also holds that, disregarding procedural respondent and petitioner under a joint proceedings in Special Proceedings 1307 and
technicalities in favor of a pragmatic and practical approach as discussed above, the 1672, whereas the half unquestionably pertaining to Hodges shall be administered by
assailed orders should be affirmed. Being a stranger to the estate of Mrs. Hodges, PCIB petitioner exclusively in Special Proceedings 1672, without prejudice to the resolution
has no personality to raise the procedural and jurisdictional issues raised by it. And by the trial court of the pending motions for its removal as administrator12; and this
inasmuch as it does not appear that any of the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges or the arrangement shall be maintained until the final resolution of the two issues of renvoi
government has objected to any of the orders under appeal, even as to these parties, and renunciation hereby reserved for further hearing and determination, and the
there exists no reason for said orders to be set aside. corresponding complete segregation and partition of the two estates in the proportions
that may result from the said resolution.
DISPOSITIVE PART
Generally and in all other respects, the parties and the court a quo are directed to
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING adhere henceforth, in all their actuations in Special Proceedings 1307 and 1672, to the
the petition in G. R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, and AFFIRMING, in G. R. Nos. L-27936- views passed and ruled upon by the Court in the foregoing opinion.
37 and the other thirty-one numbers hereunder ordered to be added after payment of
the corresponding docket fees, all the orders of the trial court under appeal enumerated Appellant PCIB is ordered to pay, within five (5) days from notice hereof, thirty-one
in detail on pages 35 to 37 and 80 to 82 of this decision; the existence of the Testate additional appeal docket fees, but this decision shall nevertheless become final as to
Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges, with respondent-appellee Avelina A. Magno, as each of the parties herein after fifteen (15) days from the respective notices to them
administratrix thereof is recognized, and it is declared that, until final judgment is hereof in accordance with the rules.
ultimately rendered regarding (1) the manner of applying Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines to the situation obtaining in these cases and (2) the factual and legal Costs against petitioner-appellant PCIB.
issue of whether or not Charles Newton Hodges had effectively and legally renounced
his inheritance under the will of Linnie Jane Hodges, the said estate consists of one-
fourth of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the time of the death of
the wife on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the husband had already gratuitously
disposed of in favor of third persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that
with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be
part of the wife's estate, unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties
by the husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation be declared legally
G.R. No. L-31703 February 13, 1930 The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the institution of heirs
made in the will of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already admitted to probate, and whose
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff- legal force and effect is not in dispute.
appellee,
vs. The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the
MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:
of Manila, defendants-appellants.
Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-
ROMUALDEZ, J.: law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and
living in this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and universal heiress to the
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association remainder of my estate after the payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my
known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria death and after probate of this will, and after the report of the committee on claims and
Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also appraisal has been rendered and approved, she will receive from my executrix and
deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena. properties composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with God's
blessing and my own.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez
Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall
of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited pass unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall
with La Urbana. serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such
wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the far as it is legally possible.
decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the
execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me while her
plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the children are still in their minority, I order that my estate be administered by my
injunction. executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his
default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be considered
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as as an indication of lack of confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I
fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction. relieve from the duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that his
character is not adapted to management and administration.
The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the decision of the
trial court, assign the following errors: The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple
substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution.
1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by the will of Doa Ana
Maria Alcantara. This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might
give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the instituted
2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the amount of P21,428.58 heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to such substitution,
deposited with La Urbana is the property of the children of the plaintiff as "herederos inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a
fidei-comisarios." matter of fact, however, clause XI provides for the administration of the estate in case
the heiress instituted should die after the testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still
3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and condemning under age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple substitution by the
defendant to pay the costs. heir's death before the testator, and the fact that by clause XI in connection with clause
X, the substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this
cannot be a case of simple substitution.
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and since it cannot substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, nor may it be
be a simple substitution in the light of the considerations above stated, let us now see confused with, the English "trust."
whether the instants case is a fideicommissary substitution.
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may
and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary
approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall substitution.
receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing
explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say whether
fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but
universal heiress does not prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in from the whole context it appears that in making the provisions contained in this clause
conformity with the express desire of the testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as X, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the
provided in the following (above quoted) clauses which cannot be disregarded if we are transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise
to give a correct interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily exclude that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far
the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such word means as it is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the
that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance. possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared null for transcending the
limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that fideicommissary
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond the second degree."
estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is
incompatible with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress instituted does not Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is
receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that
the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in
the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with
it on the second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. another of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation
142 and 143, 5th ed.), says: from Manresa inserted above.

Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution, as held in the Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a
Resolution of June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, requires three things: provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is,
said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate. testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance.

2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary
the whole or a part of the estate. substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in
the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit:
3. A second heir.
1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff
To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another, namely that the was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX
fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is of the will.
to inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary. (Emphasis ours.)
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as referred to in the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which
articles 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the inheritance. And it might here be provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving
observed, as a timely remark, that the fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will,
or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only
disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the
disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix.

3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as
such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.

Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit, that the
fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of the
testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary
consequence derived from the nature of the fideicommissary substitution, in which the
second heir does not inherit from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.

By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress
instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the
moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.

Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is
on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part,
does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment against
Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano
Garchitorena. So ordered.
G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000 (a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,1 petitioner, Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also
vs. at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
respondents. Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs
of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
DECISION
FIFTH
PURISIMA, J.:
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,3 dated December Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, year.
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SIXTH
The antecedent facts are as follows:
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee
Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions: or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition
(Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392
"FIRST from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic)
and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City: my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should they
decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- descendants and my sister."4
4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental. Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla. (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

xxx On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court
FOURTH in Bacolod City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the
provisions of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated
the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to PESOS (P105,000.00).
the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance. on or before December of crop year 1988-89;

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent. For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos, payable
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the on or before December of crop year 1991-92."5
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza. However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement
except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1988 -1989.
1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who
filed his Answer, accordingly. On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing as follows:
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son- prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor
in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney- of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated
in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present
to the following effect: complaint. The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of
the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to
will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit: her claim under the Codicil.

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, DISMISSED without prejudice.
in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned,
and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop SO ORDERED."6
years.
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court
receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants- of Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the
appellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's no such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive of action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was,
consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against
and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this Court the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in
deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the estates accordance with law.
of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant must
institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the appointment It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in order to from the moment of death of the decedent10 and compulsory heirs are called to
enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to
sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies. their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.11 Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza. death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

SO ORDERED."7 Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon
Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code. his death.

The petition is not impressed with merit. In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory
accordance with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
from the sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right
institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in
And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution dismissing the complaint below.
and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge
that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
to as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
descendants" and therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the
substitution should be deemed as not written. Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property
of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition
either (1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass unless it appears that such was his intention.
in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be
incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution,12 or (2) leave his/her property to That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator
others, as in a fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
neither of the two. interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding
by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied
the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the
not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does
correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.19 On the other hand, in a
the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.20 To some extent, it is similar
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; to a resolutory condition.21
the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and
its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."16 Also, the near testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and
to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of his successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
the usufruct to private respondent. respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
degree to the second heir.17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.22
Code provide:
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from
the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the
buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to
the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from
the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.24

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is
thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only
on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable


settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee,
and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that
petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of
the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement
and not the seizure of subject property.

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.25 Since the Will expresses
the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and
desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs

SO ORDERED.

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