G.R. No.

L-8327 December 14, 1955

ANTONINA CUEVAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. CRISPULO

CUEVAS,Defendant-Appellee.

Pedro D. Maldia for appellant.

Teodoro P. Santiago for appellee.

REYES, J. B. L., J.:

On September 18, 1950, Antonina Cuevas executed a notarized

conveyance entitled "Donacin Mortis Causa," ceding to her nephew
Crispulo Cuevas the northern half of a parcel of unregistered land in
barrio Sinasajan, municipality of Penaranda, Province of Nueva Ecija
(Exhibit A). In the same instrument appears the acceptance of
Crispulo Cuevas.chanroblesvi rtuala wlibra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

"Subsequently, on May 26, 1952, the donor executed another

notarial instrument entitled "Revocacion de Donacion Mortis Causa"
(Exhibit B) purporting to set aside the preceding conveyance; and
on August 26, 1952, she brought action in the Court of First
Instance to recover the land conveyed, on the ground (1) that the
donation being mortis causa, it had been lawfully revoked by the
donor; and (2) even it if were a donation inter vivos, the same was
invalidated because (a) it was not properly accepted; (b) because
the donor did not reserve sufficient property for her own
maintenance, and (c) because the donee was guilty of ingratitute,
for having refused to support the donor. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law li bra ry

Issues having been joined, and trial had, the Court of First Instance
denied the recovery sought, and Antonina Cuevas thereupon
appealed. The Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this Court
because, the case having been submitted on a stipulation of facts,
the appellant raised only questions of law. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s vi rtual law lib rary

The first issue tendered converns the true nature of the deed
"Exhibit A"; whether it embodies a donation inter vivos, or a
disposition of property mortis causa revocable freely by the
transferor at any time before death. 1 chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry
It has been rules that neither the designation mortis causa, nor the
provision that a donation is "to take effect at the death of the
donor", is a controlling criterion in defining the true nature of
donations (Laureta vs. Mata, 44 Phil., 668; Concepcion vs.
Concepcion, 91 Phil., 823). Hence, the crux of the controversy
revolves around the following provisions of the deed of donation:

Dapat maalaman ni Crispulo Cuevas na samantalang ako ay

nabubuhay, and lupa na ipinagkakaloob ko sa kaniya ay ako pa rin
and patuloy na mamomosecion, makapagparatrabaho,
makikinabang at ang iba pang karapatan sa pagmamayari ay sa
akin pa rin hanggang hindo ko binabawian ny buhay ng Maykapal at
ito naman ay hindi ko nga iya-alis pagkat kung ako ay mamatay na
ay inilalaan ko sa kaniya.

There is an apparent conflict in the expression above quoted, in that

the donor reserves to herself "the right of possession, cultivation,
harvesting and other rights and attributes of ownership while I am
not deprived of life by the Almighty"; but right after, the same
donor states that she "will not takle away" (the property) "because I
reserve it for him (the donee) when I die." chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry

The question to be decided is whetehr the donor intended to part

with the title to the property immediately upon the execution of the
deed, or only later, when she had died. If the first, the donation is
operative inter vivos; if the second, we would be confronted with a
disposition mortis causa, void from the beginning because the
formalities of testaments were not observed (new Civil Code, Arts.
728 and 828; heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 2 50 Off. Gaz.
(8), p. 3568; Tuason vs. Posadas, 54 Phil., 289; Sent. Trib. Sup. of
Spain, 8 July 1943).chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary cha nrob les vi rtua l law lib rary

We agree with the Court below that the decisive proof that the
present donation is operative inter vivor lies in the final phrase to
the effect that the donor will not dispose or take away ("hindi ko
nga iya-alis" in the original) the land "because I am reserving it to
him upon my death." By these words the donor expressly renounced
the right to freely dispose of the property in favor of another (a
right essential to full ownership) and manifested the irrevocability of
the conveyance of the naked title to the property in favor of the
donee. As stated in our decision in Bonsato vs. Court of
Appeals, ante, such irrevocability is characteristic of donations inter
vivos, because it is incompatible with the idea of a disposition post
mortem. Witness article 828 of the New Civil Code, that provides:

ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time before
his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void.

It is apparent from the entire context of the deed of donation that

the donor intended that she should retain the entire beneficial
ownership during her lifetime, but that the naked title should
irrevocably pass to the donee. It is only thus that all the expressions
heretofore discussed can be given full effect; and when the donor
stated that she would continue to retain the "possession, cultivation,
harvesting and all other rights and attributes of ownership," she
meant only the dominium utile, not the full ownership. As the Court
below correctly observed, the words "rights and attributes of
ownership" should be construed ejusdem generis with the preceding
rights of "possession, cultivation and harvesting" expressly
enumerated in the deed. Had the donor meant to retain full or
absolute ownership she had no need to specify possession,
cultivation and harvesting, since all these rights are embodied in full
or absolute ownership; nor would she then have excluded the right
of free disposition from the "rights and attributes of ownership" that
she reserved for herself. chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

Hence, the Court below rightly concluded that the deed Exhibit A
was a valid donation inter vivos, with reservation of beneficial title
during the lifetime of the donor. We may add that it is highly
desirable that all those who are called to prepare or notarize deeds
of donation should call the attention of the donors to the necessity
of clearly specifying whether, notwithstanding the donation, they
wish to retain the right to control and dispose at will of the property
before their death, without need of the consent or intervention of
the beneficiary, since the express reservation of such right would be
conclusive indication that the liberality is to exist only at the donor's
death, and therefore, the formalities of testaments should be
observed; while, a converso, the express waiver of the right of free
disposition would place the inter vivos character of the donation
beyond dispute (Heirs of Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, 50 Off. Gaz.
(8), p. 3568). chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry chanrobles vi rt ual la w libra ry

The argument that there was no sufficient acceptance, because the

deed "merely recites that (1) the donee has duly read all the
contents of this donation; (2) that he 'shall fully respect all its
terms'; and (3) that 'for the act of benevolence' he is expressing his
gratitude" but there is no show of acceptance (Appellant's brief, p.
7), is without basis. To respect the terms of the donation, and at
the same time express gratitude for the donor's benevolence,
constitutes sufficient acceptance, If the donee did not accept, what
had he to be grateful about? We are no longer under the formulary
system of the Roman law, when specific expressions had to be used
under paid of nullity. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary cha nro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Also unmeritoriious is the contention that the donation is void

because the donor failed to reserve enough for ther own support. As
we have seen, she expressly reserved to herself all the benefits
derivable from the donated property as long as she lived. During
that time, she suffered no diminution of income. If that was not
enough to support her, the deficiency was not dur to the
donation. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary c hanro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Finally, the donee is not rightfully chargeaboe with ingratitude,

because it was expressly stipulated that the donee had a total
income of only P30 a month, out of which he had to support
himself, his wife and his two children. Evidently his means did not
allow him to add the donor's support to his own burdens. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary ch anro bles vi rtua l law lib ra ry

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs in this

instance, appellant having obtained leave to litigate as a pauper. So
ordered.chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary chan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur. chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The latter
will contained a revocation clause which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He died
without any forced heirs but he was survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana. The
oppositors to the probate were his nephews and nieces.

2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was found. The widow filed a petition for the
probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to probate but subsequently set aside on ground
that the petitioner failed to prove its due execution.

3. As a result, the petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will this time.
Again the oppositors alleged that said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will.
They contended that despite the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation clause is
valid and thus effectively nullified the 1918 will.

Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will

RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine laid down in Samson v. Naval that a
subsequent will,containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed for
the reason that it was not executed in accordance with law cannot produce the effect of
annulling the previous will, inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is void.

There was no valid revocation in this case. No evidence was shown that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the will executed in 1939.The earlier will can still be probated under
the principle of dependent relative revocation.The doctrine applies when a testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as substitute for the old, and the
new disposition fails of effect for some reason.
In Heirs of Rosendo Lasam, etc. v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006, (Callejo, J),
there was a complaint for unlawful detainer alleging that the plaintiffs were the owners of the
property. The defendants were allegedly possessing the property by mere tolerance. In their
defense, they alleged that they have a better right because they inherited it from their father,
showing a Last Will and Testament which has not yet been probated. The lower courts (MTC and
RTC) ruled that with the will they have a better right, but the CA reversed on the ground that the
will has not yet been probated, hence, it has no passed any right.
In this case, both parties were claiming to have better right of possession due to
ownership. One party claiming that there was conveyance; the other, having inherited it, hence,
claiming a better right of possession following the law on succession.
In upholding the CAs ruling the SC
Held: The Last Will and Testament cannot be relied upon to establish the right of possession
without having been probated, the said last will and testament could not be the source of any
right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of
the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may
be necessary for the allowance of wills on petitioner of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the
lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
In Caiza v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1107 (1997) it was ruled that: a will is essentially
ambulatory; at any time prior to the testators death, it may be changed or revoked; and until
admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law
being quite explicit: No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will means to
prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority for that purpose, that the
instrument offered to be proved is the last will and testament of the deceased person whose
testamentary act it is alleged to be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as
required by law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a proceedings to
establish the validity of the will. Moreover, the presentation of the will for probate is mandatory
and is a matter of public policy. (Guevara v. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Baluyot v. Pao, 163 Phil. 81
(1976); Roberts v. Leonilas, 214 Phil. 30 (1984)).
Since the will has not yet been probated, it has no effect whatsoever and it cannot be the
basis of any claim of any right of possession. The defendants have a better right of possession
based on the deed of conveyances executed by the owner in favor of the children, the defendants
herein. (Heirs of Rolando Lasam v. Umengan, G.R. No. 168156, December 6, 2006).
G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989

BENEDICTO LEVISTE, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE
GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and ANTONIO R. DE
GUZMAN, respondents.

Benedicto Leviste for and in his own behalf.

Gatchalian, Ignacio & Associates for respondents de Guzman.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis
may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's refusal to appeal the
decision of the trial court.

On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with
the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the
holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales
Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee
would be thirty-five per cent (35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will
(Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo).

In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed the following services as Del Rosario's
counsel:

(1) Thoroughly researched and studied the law on probate and succession;

(2) Looked for and interviewed witnesses, and took their affidavits;

(3) Filed the petition for. probate is Special Proceeding No. 58325;

(4) Made the proper publications;

(5) Presented at the trial the following witnesses:

a) Eleuterio de Jesus

b) Lucita de Jesus

c) Purita L. Llanes

d) Rita Banu

e) Jesus Lulod.
On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was
terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This consisted, according to the
letter, in petitioner's moral obligation to protect the interest of his brother-in-law, Gaudencio M.
Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as
lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del Rosario under the will (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo).

On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for
Professional Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.)

In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court denied his motion on the ground that he had
"not filed a claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien." (p. 3, Rollo.)

On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and
Recording of Attorney's Lien,' which was noted in the court's order of December 20, 1965 (Annexes
"D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64, Rollo).

Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner continued to receive
copies of the court's orders, as well the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued
to file pleadings. The case was submitted for decision without the respondents' evidence.

On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a
"Motion To Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise in
her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate,
shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent. (Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.)

In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being
contrary to public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo).

Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements
for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's
signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva.

The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest.

The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct and material
interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-
petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario.

On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for
substitution.

The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus (CA-G.R. No. 41248) praying
that the trial court be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to grant his motion for
substitution.

On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and
substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Special
Proceeding No. 58325 (Annex 1, p. 77, Rollo).
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari to this Court,
assigning the following errors against the Court of Appeals' resolution:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner appears not to be the
proper party to appeal the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

2. Assuming the petitioner's right of appeal is doubtful, the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing his petition for mandamus; and

3. The Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325
denying the probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva, said
decision being patently erroneous.

Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del
Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors,
the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.

The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the
amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to
the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with
the rules established in this Code, it may belong.

he has a right to accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor
(which she in effect repudiated) to protect his contigent attorney's fees.

The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That
legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del
Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the
holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did
not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.

Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal
heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's
will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to
accept in her name.

This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for
contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right
whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal
partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees."

The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as
contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow
that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which
should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those
procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will.
There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.
Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in
the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a
prospective heir. In Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244, We had occassion to rule that one who is only
indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate. Thus:

... the reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that
thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or
necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not
be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the
estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso,
35 Phil. 244, 246.)

Similary, in Morente vs. Firmalino, 40 O.G. 21st Supp. 1, We held:

We are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in holding that notice of an
attorney's lien did not entitle the attorney-appellant to subrogate himself in lieu of his
client. It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case
his client is awarded a certain sum by the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31048 January 20, 1976

LUCENA MAGALLANES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. UNION KAYANAN, Presiding Judge of Branch IV, CFI, Quezon and the HEIRS OF
ELIGIO MAGALLANES, respondents.

Abelio M. Marte and Clemente T. Alcala for petitioner.

Eufemio E. de Mesa for private respondents.

MARTIN. J.:

The validity of a summary judgment rendered in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, in Special
Proceedings No. 3913, entitled Re: Summary Settlement of the Estate of Filomena Magallanes,
Lucena Magallanes, petitioner, versus Heirs of Eligio Magallanes, oppositors, is the main issue in
this petition for review.

On August 4, 1960, petitioner Lucena Magallanes filed a "Solicitud" praying that Lot No. 2657
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1091 and one-half () of Lot No. 3465 covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 6447, both of the Register of Deeds of Tayabas (Quezon) be
partitioned and distributed among the heirs of the deceased Filomena Magallanes.

On October 31, 1961, private respondents, the Heirs of Eligio Magallanes, namely: Maria San
Buenaventura, Godofredo Magallanes and Carmen Magallanes de Ingente filed their opposition and
motion to dismiss the "Solicitud" claiming title and ownership over the parcels of land in question and
raising the issue that the trial court is devoid of jurisdiction to resolve the issues raised in the
pleadings.

On July 12, 1968, the private respondents filed a petition for summary judgment on the pleadings
praying that their absolute right of ownership over the properties in question be recognized and
confirmed. Petitioner files her opposition to the petition for summary judgment on the ground that in
a summary settlement of an estate, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass finally and definitely upon
the title or ownership over the properties involved therein; and that summary judgment is not proper,
there being a genuine issue or material controversy raised by the pleadings of the parties.

On March 21, 1969, the lower court, rendered a summary judgment on the pleadings submitted by
the parties confirming the private respondents' (Heirs of Eligio Magallanes) absolute and exclusive
right of ownership and possession over the whole of Lot No. 2657 and the one-half undivided portion
of Lot No. 3465 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province to cancel the Notice of Lis
Pendens on Original Certificate of Title No. 1091 covering Lot No. 2657.

On April 22, 1969, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid summary judgment
and/or new trial but the lower court on June 19, 1969 denied the motion for reconsideration for being
pro forma and declared its decision dated March 21, 1969 to be final and executory. Accordingly, a
writ of execution was issued and served upon the petitioner on July 14, 1969. However, even before
said date, petitioner was able to perfect her appeal on June 30, 1969, with the filing of the notice of
appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal.
In her brief, petitioner presses upon the lower court the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PASSING UPON FINALLY AND DEFINITELY THE
TITLE TO OR OWNERSHIP OF LOT 2657 OF THE LUCENA CADASTRE,
COVERED BY ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 1091 OF THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF TAYABAS AND ONE-HALF () OF LOT NO. 3465 OF THE
LUCENA CADASTRE, COVERED BY CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 6447 OF THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TAYABAS, WHEN IT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO SO
ACT, THE PETITIONER HAVING CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO SUBMIT THAT
ISSUE TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MERELY DETERMINING IN THE DECISION

DATED MARCH 21, 1969 WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY ASSUMING THE AFORESAID
DECISION RENDERED THROUGH SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER AND
REGULAR.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING THE DECISION DATED MARCH 21,
1969 THROUGH SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WITHOUT TRIAL, WHERE THERE ARE
GENUINE ISSUES AND MATERIAL CONTROVERSY, THE PETITIONER
CLAIMING IN HER PLEADINGS THAT SHE AND HER CO-HEIRS OWN THE
REALTIES IN QUEZON BY INHERITANCE FROM THE DECEASED FILOMENA
MAGALLANES WHILE THE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OWNERSHIP OVER THE
AFORESAID REALTIES BY PURCHASE FROM THE DECEASED FILOMENA
MAGALLANES DURING HER LIFETIME.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD IN ITS ORDER OF JUNE 19, 1969
THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED APRIL 21, 1969 IS PRO
FORMA AND DID NOT SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF THE PERIOD TO APPEAL.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE DECISION DATED MARCH 21,
1969 FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF

EXECUTION IN THE SAME ORDER OF JUNE 19, 1969.

VII
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED
JUNE 19, 1969 WHICH IS VOID AND OF NO EFFECT.

We find merit in the petitioner's argument that the lower court has no jurisdiction to pass finally and
definitely upon the title or ownership of the properties involved in the summary settlement of the
estate of the deceased Filomena Magallanes instituted by the petitioner. Well established is the
doctrine that the property, whether real or personal, which are alleged to form part of the estate of a
deceased person but claimed by another to be his property by adverse title to that of the deceased
and his estate and not by virtue of any right of inheritance from ' the deceased, cannot be
determined by the probate court. Such questions must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction to try and determine ordinary actions. 1 The probate court may
do so only for the purpose of determining whether or not a given property should be included in the
inventory of the estate of the deceased, but such determination is not conclusive and is still subject
to a final decision in a separate action to be instituted between the parties. 2 Likewise, the probate
court may also determine questions of title to property if the parties voluntarily submitted to its
jurisdiction and introduced evidence to prove ownership.3

In the case at bar, the action instituted by the petitioner was not for the purpose of determining
whether or not a given property should be included in the inventory of the estate of the deceased.
The action was for partition and distribution of the properties left by the deceased. Neither have all of
the parties voluntarily submitted the issue of ownership for resolution by the court. As a matter of fact
the petitioner opposed the petition of private respondents to have the issue of ownership or title
decided in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. It was therefore
erroneous for the lower court to resolve the question of title or ownership over the properties in said
proceeding. It could only pass upon such a question in the exercise of its general jurisdiction in an
ordinary action.

Petitioner faulted the lower court for rendering summary judgment on the case. Summary judgment
can be availed of where no genuine issue as to any material fact is raised in the pleadings. 4 Where
there is an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties or where the facts pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment to take the place of a
trial. 5 Summary judgment can be rendered only where there are no questions of fact in issue or
where the material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed.

An examination of the pleadings in this case clearly shows that there is a genuine issue or material
controversy raised therein. Thus, petitioner claims that she and her co-heirs have the right to inherit
the properties in question as they form part of the estate of Filomena Magallanes. On the other
hand, herein private respondents contend that they acquired the ownership over the said properties
by purchase from Filomena Magallanes during her lifetime. In the face of the conflicting claims of
both petitioner and respondents a factual dispute certainly arises which can only be properly settled
by means of a trial on the merits. Summary judgment was, therefore, uncalled for in the premises.

Petitioner also assailed the order of the lower court denying her motion for reconsideration of the
summary judgment in question as pro forma. A motion for new trial or reconsideration on the ground
that the judgment is contrary to law, which does not point out the supposed defects in the judgment
is pro forma Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court requires the movant for the new trial to point
out the findings of fact or conclusions of law supposed to be insufficiently borne out by the evidence
or contrary to law. 6 A reading of the motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid summary judgment
show's specifically the conclusions reached by the lower court which are contrary to law, the lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the lower court to resolve the issue of ownership and possession of
properties left by a deceased person in the settlement of his estate proceeding and the propriety of
the rendition of the summary judgment on the pleadings submitted by the parties. Although the
former pleadings of the petitioner already contained allegations on the question of jurisdiction and
the propriety of the summary judgment, this fact does not make the motion for reconsideration pro
forma because it expressly made reference to what portion of the lower court's conclusion are
contrary to law and to established jurisprudence. In a case7 the Supreme Court held that the motion
for new trial or reconsideration cannot be considered as simply pro forma where t not only states that
the decision is contrary to law but also explains in detail relevant facts for seeking its revocation.
Since the motion for reconsideration is not pro forma the filing of the same on time stopped the
running of the period within which to appeal the decision. It was therefore an error on the part of the
lower court to issue a writ of execution of the decision in question before it has become final and
executory.

Finally, private respondents claim that the trial court erred in approving petitioner's record on appeal
after it had lost jurisdiction over the case. There is no need to resolve the assigned error. It is
elementary that in a petition for certiorari like the case before Us, the submission of a record on
appeal is not necessary.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the decision of the lower court dated March 21, 1968 and the writ of execution dated
June 19, 1969 null and void; and

2. Remanding the case to the lower court as a court of general jurisdiction to settle the title and
ownership over the parcels of land in question between Lucena Magallanes who claims to have
inherited the same from Filomena Magallanes and-the heirs of Eligio Magallanes who claim to have
purchased them.

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May
30, 1984.
20JUL
[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]
FACTS
The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her sister;
that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and testament according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things
that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The petitioner maintains that since the
respondent judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracions will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity of a will executed
by an undisputed foreigner.

[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed of Adoracions
heirs.

RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must
apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).It is therefore
evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedents
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent. (Article 1039,
Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campos will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.
 Ortega v. Valmonte 478 SCRA 247
FACTS: Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States and at the
age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old. But in a little more than
two years of wedded bliss, Placido died. Placido executed a notarial last will and
testament written in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June
1983but acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of
this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido s sister. According to the notary
public who notarized the testator s will, after the testator instructed him on
the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to
come back on 15 August 1983 to give him time to prepare. The testator and his
witnesses returned on the appointed date but the notary public was out of town
so they were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The formal
execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no longer changed
the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he did not like the document to
appear dirty. Petitioner s argument: 1. At the time of the execution of the
notarial will Placido was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting witnesses in
deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly reflected in the varying dates
of the execution and the attestation of the will.
ISSUE: 1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the will. 2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by
fraud or trickery.
HELD: 1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately
the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their
location. As regards the proper objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he
identified his wife as sole beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the
will did not affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or
deceived as to the nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it
may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of the deception regarding
which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not
have made. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise
shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of
fraud. Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will.
Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will does not
invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a
notarial will be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. The variance
in the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was
satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental
witnesses.
 Sienes v. Esparcia
G.R. No. L-12957, March 24, 1961

FACTS:

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he
had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second
wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. OCT No. 10275
covering Lot 3368, his inheritance, was issued in the name of Francisco. Because
Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property.

When Francisco died single and without any descendant, his mother Andrea, as his sole
heir, executed an EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other
things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question
to appellants.

When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose
Esparcia, the surrender of OOCT No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter
refused.

Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who
as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of
sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale made by the reservista Andrea was void there being no right to
dispose the same.

RULING:

NO. The Court held that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation,
said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival
of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.

The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation,
only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and
CiprianaYaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a
similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the
third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a
real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case,
CiprianaYaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former becamethe absolute owner of the reservable
property upon Andreas death.
Mendoza v Delos Santos (Succession)

Mendoza v Delos Santos

GR No 176422, March 20, 2013

MARIA MENDOZA, in her own capacity and as Attorney-in-fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA,

DIONISIA, ADORA CION, all surnamed MENDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA,
JULIANA GUILALAS and ELVIRA MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs, CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS, ROSA
BUENA VENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO, LEONILA P. DELOS SANTOS,
ELVIRA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE JOSE, TERESITA P. DELOS SANTOS-CABUHAT, MERCEDITA P.
DELOS SANTOS, LYDIA P. DELOS SANTOS VDA. DE HILARIO, PERFECTO P. DELOS SANTOS, JR., and
CECILIA M. MENDOZA, Respondents.

FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are
presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other
hand, is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half
of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were
subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share went
to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregorias
death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties should have
been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article
891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT
and Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. CA
also denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE
NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS
DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA
TRONCAL.

APPLICABLE LAW:

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

RULING:
No, CA is correct.
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of
Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to
the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and avoid
its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial
for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether Gregoria
predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the
ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the
descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious,
what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel
(ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also
known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias
ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.

II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891
grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the
reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of
the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the
brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
OTHER NOTES:
1. three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by gratuitous title,
whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other
ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from the
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from
which the property came.
2. The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by
lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus
by operation of law; and (4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property came and for whom
the property should be reserved by the reservor.
3. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral. A direct line is
that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants
and descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
4. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
5. Reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on
the title. In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latters
wish or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.
G.R. No. 7890 September 29, 1914

FILOMENA PECSON, as administratix of the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson, et
al., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, defendant-appellee.

S. E. Imperial for appellants.

Tomas Lorayes for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and
testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay
for probate. Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legislation of the will on the ground
that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge,
found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and
denied the opposition on the 17th day of September, 1910.

On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and
Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:

1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased
Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore
the first mentioned is and the second was a grandchild of the latter.

2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her
grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she
failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.

3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to
the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she
now suffers in periodical attacks.

By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the will is unfounded,
the undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause and to make the testator's died
without succession, but is represented now by his father, Basiliso Mediavillo), participants in
the estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the court grant such other relief as it may
deem just and equitable.

After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court, on the 22d day of
September, 1911, rendered the following decision:

This case has come up to-day for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of the decease
Florencio Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.

From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his wife Nicolasa
Manjares, likewise deceased, which children are those named Emerenciano, Teresa,
Filomena, Asunsion, Rufino, Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also
appears that Rufino Pecson absented himself from these Islands twenty-five years ago,
 going to Australia, and that nothing has been heard of him for the past twenty years. The
said Rufino Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was unmarried when he emigrated.
As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is presumed that he died and it is held
that the part of this estate to which he was entitled must be divided among the other heirs.

It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso Mediavillo, by whom
she had two children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo. Teresa also died, leaving these two
children and her husband, Basiliso Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and
childless, before the death of the testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living
daughter of Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso Mediavillo, is also living. The evidence
shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to
study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed
her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third
paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was
then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for
her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.

The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law and sets it aside as
being of no force or value whatever. The court further holds that Rosario Mediavillo, the
daughter of Teresa Pecson, is the heiress of the one-half of the share of this estate
pertaining to the said Teresa, and that her father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also
Teresa's son, is the heris of the other one-half of the said share pertaining to Teresa that
is, of the one-seventh of this estate that pertains to the latter. Moreover, the court decrees
that, besides the two heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano, Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila,
Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children of Teresa, are also heirs of the
estate of Florencio Pecson.

From the decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:

FIRST ERROR

The lower court erred in finding that the part of the will which disinherits Rosario Mediavillo is
contrary to law, and in setting it aside as being of no force or value whatever.

SECOND ERROR

The lower court erred by decreeing that Basaliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo,
is the heir by representation of the one-half of the one seventh of this estate pertaining to
Joaquin Mediavillo.

With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the record it appears that
during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he
had eight children, named Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and
Teresa Pecson; that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in
question. The will made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any provision in
the will for the said Teresa. All of the other children were named as heirs in said will. It appears that
Teresa had been married with one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before the making of the
will in question she died, leaving her husband and two children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario
Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also appears from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs,
leaving as the only heirs of the said Teresa Pecson, her husband, Basilio Mediavillo and the said
Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin Mediavillo died before his grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and
probably before the will in question was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:

I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter
named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, the said Rosario
Mediavillo, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion,
when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that
the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property.

The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and which is copied above,
alleges that she was disinherited without case. Upon a consideration of that question, the lower court
found that she had been disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will. That
order of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant in her first assignment of
error.

By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio Pecson disinherited the
said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one
occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will
that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."

The lower court admitted proof the question of the responsibility of the said Rosario Mediavillo at the
time she offered the offense to her grandfather, Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the lower
court reached the following conclusion:

The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva
Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she
disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the
third paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who
was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible
for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.

The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts, when a parent
disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or
was not ground for such disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance
shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions
of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance;
or, in other words, the cases or causes in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs.
Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament,
in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs
can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seen to follow
that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the
causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was
sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the
Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance
shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would
appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of
disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to
inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions
of article 851, which in part provides that:

Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if
contradicted, should not be proven . . . shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it
prejudices the person disinherited.
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the justice of a
disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they find that the disinheritance
was without cause, that part of the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains,
however, to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was
sufficient to show that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause. It
appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received
some attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from him and that her
grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the
said young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect
were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather.
The record shows that very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she
has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time. The lower court,
taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of
her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect
and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.

After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the same supports the
conclusions of the lower court and that the same supports the conclusions of the lower court that he
did not commit the error complained of in the first assignment of error.

With reference to the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that Teresa Pecson, the
mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her
husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court
gave one-half of the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share that
would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, and the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo,
to his father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the lower court we think error was committed.
The appellant relies upon the provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his contention that the
lower court committed an error. Article 925 provides that:

The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in
the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood.

The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935 and 936 of the Civil
Code. Article 935 provides that:

In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall
inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.

Article 936 provides that:

The father and mother, if living shall inherits share and share alike. If one of them only
survive, he or she shall succeed to the son's entire estate.

It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first
assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently
believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that
therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch,
however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend,
and for the reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was
entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he
been living. Therefore, and for all the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying
and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that art of said judgment which
decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa
Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby
revoked. And without any findings as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to
the lower court, with direction that judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and that such
further proceedings be had as the interested parties may deem necessary, for the purpose of
disposing of that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson would have belonged to Joaquin
Mediavillo, had he been surviving.

Torres, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA, SEVERINA A. VDA.
DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. v. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-7188, 9 August 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
FACTS: On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed a document purporting to be
his Last Will and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943. He left
properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the
legatees, filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition. During
the hearing, it was established that Father Sancho wrote out the will in longhand in Spanish
which the testator spoke and understood, and that he signed on the left hand margin of the front
page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered
the same with Arabic numerals, and that he signed his name at the end of his writing at the last
page. All this was done in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was
his last will. The said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The trial court found and declared the
will to be a holographic will. Although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's
death, holographic wills were not permitted by law, still, because at the time of the hearing and
when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code
permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention
of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any
defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate the will as
the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors appealed from that
decision, and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to
the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not a will which purportedly is a holographic will executed before the New
Civil Code may be considered for probate as such during the effectivity of the same.
RULING: No. At the time Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted. The
law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as numbering
correlatively each page in letters and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the
three attesting witnesses, requirements which were not complied with. The failure of the testator
and his witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page vitiates the testament. What is
the law to apply to the probate of the will of Father Abadia? May we apply the provisions of the
new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law
in force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the
weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at
the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate
or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the death of the
testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and
among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality,
the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. Of course, there is the view that the
intention of the testator should be the ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate
remedies and interpretations should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that
when statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the
formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes should be applied
so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of execution.
However, we should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will,
the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due
process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning,
when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements
at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared as having
died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law
with more liberal requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution
should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in
the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void
wills. In view of the foregoing, the will concerned is denied probate.