Preciolita V. Corliss v. Manila Railroad Co.

By: Von Ryan Emmanuel Adrias G02 Torts &

GR No. L-21291 March 28, 1969 J. Fernando Damages
Topic: NEGLIGENCE, DEFINED
FACTS
The instant case is an appeal on the decision of the lower court dismissing Preciolita Corliss complaint for
recovery of damages against Manila Railroad Co.

On the evening of February 21, 1957, at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Pampanga in front of Clark Air
Force Base, the husband of Preciolia, Ralph Corliss, an air police, was driving a jeep, together with a P.C. soldier, to
the Clark base to return said jeep. Said jeep Ralph was driving collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad. Ralph
died of serious burns in the base hospital the next day.

Preciolita filed a complaint for recovery of damages against Manila Railroad. The lower court, however,
ruled in favor of Manila Railroad. The lower court opined that Ralph was a victim of his own wrongdoing and
miscalculation when he took the risk and attempted to beat the oncoming locomotive and aiming to reach the other
side of the railroad crossing before said locomotive could pass the jeep by. Hence, the present case.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is negligence on the part of Manila Railroad and therefore, should be held liable for
damages - NO
HELD

The Court ruled that the present action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the
damage done.

The Court cited the cases of U.S. v. Juanillo and U.S. v. Barias in defining what is negligence: The failure
to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person suffers injury.

Also cited was case of Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. which defined Negligence as: want of the care
required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon
the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where
the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under
the circumstances.

In determining the presence of negligence, the court explained that every case must be dependent on its
facts. The circumstances indicative of lack of due care must be judged in the light of what could reasonably be
expected of the parties. If the objective standard of prudence be met, then negligence is ruled out.

In the present case, it is improper to impute negligence on Manila Railroad since material facts show that it
is clear that Ralph Corliss was so sufficiently warned in advance (the lower court pointed out that moments before
the collision, Teodorico Capili who was manning the locomotive which was then 300 meters away from exact point
of accident, blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the regulation) of the oncoming train that it was
incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident and this consisted simply in stopping his vehicle before the
crossing and allowing the train to move on.

A prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in such a manner, but unfortunately, Ralph
had failed to do so despite him having been crossing the checkpoint frequently, if not daily and must have been
aware that locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken place.

In addition, the Court reiterated the ruling the case of U.S. v. Manabat & Pasibi: we think it is
incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing and hearing. He should
approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably
prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track."
NOTES
Witnesses:
Ronald J. Ennis
- a witness of the plaintiff.
- he said that at the time of the accident, he also awaiting transportation at the entrance of Clark Field, which was
about 40 to 50 yards away from the tracks and that while there he saw the jeep coming towards the Base. He said
that said jeep slowed down before reaching the crossing, Elaborating, he declared that while it was slowing down,
Corliss Jr. shifted into first gear and that was what he meant by a brief stop.

Virgilio de la Paz
- another witness of the plaintiff.
- he was at the Balibago checkpoint and saw the train coming from Angeles and a jeep going towards the direction
of Clark Field. He stated that he heard the whistle of the locomotive and saw the collision. The jeep, which caught
fire, was pushed forward. He helped the P.C. soldier. He stated that he saw the jeep running fast and heard the
tooting of the horn. It did not stop at the railroad crossing, according to him." 4

Teodorico Capili,
- one who operated the locomotive.
- testified that before the locomotive, which had been previously inspected and found to be in good condition
approached, the crossing, that is, about 300 meters away, he blew the siren and repeated it in compliance with the
regulations until he saw the jeep suddenly spurt and that although the locomotive was running between 20 and 25
kilometers an hour and although he had applied the brakes, the jeep was caught in the middle of the tracks."
 JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI v. SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAA and ROSALITA CARDAA
G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006

AUTHOR: Pio Aguilar

FACTS:
1. On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaa, a 12-yr old grade 6 student, was walking along the perimeter
fence of the San Roque Elementary School (Leyte) when a branch of a caimito tree located within the
school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death.
2. Her parents, Dominador and Rosalita, filed a case for damages before the RTC against Joaquinita
Capili, school principal..
3. The Cardaas alleged that:
1. A resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported 2 months ago on the possible danger
the tree posed to passersby.
2. Lerios even pointed to Capili the tree that stood near the principals office.
3. Capilis gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
4. Capili: Denied the accusation and said that Lerios only offered to buy the tree w/c he would use fo
firewood. Also denied knowing that the tree was dead and rotting and even presented witnesses who
attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting and
assigned her next-in-rank, Remedios Palaa to negotiate the sale.
5. RTC: DISMISSED complaint for failure to establish negligence of Capili.
- Capili exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances require.
- Absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that
required by the attendant circumstances.
6. CA: REVERSED. Found Capili liable for Jasmins death and ordered to indemnify the parents of
Jasmin: the life of Jasmin P50k; burial expenses P15k; moral damages P50k; attorneys fees and
litigation expenses P10k
- Capili should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting.
- No matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed and NOT
merely delegated the task to Palaa.
- The dead caimito tree = nuisance that should have been removed.
7. Hence, the instant petition for review.
8. Capili:
- That she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned Palaa, to
see to its disposal.
- That she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15
teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten despite her physical inspection of the
school grounds.
- That moral damages should NOT be granted against her since there was no fraud nor bad
faith on her part.
9. Sps. Cardaa:
- That Capili knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.

ISSUES & RULING:

1. W/N Capili was NEGLIGENT and therefore liable to pay damages under Article 2206 of the Civil
Code. YES

Negligent act defined.

A negligent act is an inadvertent act. It may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence
and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature.
A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or
similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do
the act or to do it in a more careful manner.

The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a
danger that is foreseeable. As the school principal, Capili was tasked to see to the maintenance of
the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. Being unaware of
the rotten state of a tree only shows that she failed to discharge the responsibility of her position.

Requisites of a tort.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a
preponderance of evidence:
1. damages suffered by plaintiff
2. fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond
3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred

Res ipsa loquitur.

The fact that Jasmin died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises shows
that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where the accident:

1. was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would NOT have happened were it not
for the defendants negligence
2. must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or
control of the person charged with the negligence complained of
3. must NOT have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured

In this case, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur warrants a presumption or inference that the mere
falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of Jasmin was a result of
Capilis negligence, being in charge of the school.

As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. Once the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of all requisites,
the burden shifts to the defendant to explain.

While negligence is NOT ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or
injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on
defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.

Where it is shown (1) that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under
the control or management of the defendant, and (2) that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such
as in the ordinary course of things would NOT happen if those who had its control or management used
proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendants want of care.

As the school principal, Capili was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety
of the children within the school and its premises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree
calls for an explanation on her part.
 - That Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its condition and that
neither did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone
does NOT constitute sufficient explanation to overcome the presumption of negligence.
- Even if Capili had assigned the disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises
supervision over her assignee. Howeve, more than a month had lapsed from the time she
assigned her assistant Palaa, to the time the incident occurred. She obviously failed to
check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been removed. Thus, the Court
cannot accept her defense of lack of negligence.

2. W/N moral damages should be awarded.

NO. Moral damages should not be awarded because Capili was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive.

Moral damages are awarded if the following elements exist in the case:
1. an injury clearly sustained by the claimant
2. a culpable act or omission factually established
3. a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant
4. the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code

However, the person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party.
The action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive. No bad faith or ill
motive in this case.
Case Name: Elcano & Elcano vs. Hill & Hill By: Marjorie L. Alvarez
GR No. L-24803 Topic: Negligence - Quasi Delict
Date: May 26, 1977
FACTS
1. Agapito, son of Elcano was killed by Reginald Hill, a minor. Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
2. After due trial, Hill was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake.
3. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad, Marvin Hill for recovery of damages.
4. The defendants in that Civil Case filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
a. Present action is not only against but a violation of Sec. 1, Rule 107 which is not Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court;
b. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final or in res-adjudicata;
c. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of Reginald through emancipation by marriage;
5. The MTD was first denied by the trial court and only upon motion for reconsideration of defendants that it
was granted. Hence, this appeal of the Spouses Elcano.

ISSUES
1. Whether the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case.
2. Whether Art. 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill even though
Reginald was already married.

HELD
1. NO. In Barredo v. Garcia, it was held that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the
Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could
have been sued for this civil liability.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Art. 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that Articles. 1902 to 1902 of the Civil Code refer only to a fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.
Fourthly, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
Arts. 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Criminal negligence is a violation of
criminal law, while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict. Under Art. 2177, acquittal from
an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence covers not only acts not punishable by law but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
 award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. It results, therefore, that
the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence
that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
2. YES. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Art. 327 of the
Civil Code), and under Art. 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Art. 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority
over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he
cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.
Under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the
instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father. Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, in as much as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as
a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.

Order appealed from is reversed and trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion.
Doctrines Notes
1. The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in Aquino, J., concur. Article 2176 of
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or the Civil Code comprehends any
negligent. culpable act, which is blameworthy,
2. Under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of when judged by accepted legal
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not standards. The idea thus expressed is
be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising undoubtedly board enough to include
from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or any rational conception of liability for
culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery. the tortious acts likely to be
developed in any society.
Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc vs Court of Appeals
G.R No. 57079 September 29, 1989
Topic: Proof of Negligence
Author: Jalaine B. Aratan
Facts :
1) July 30, 1968 when the jeep of Sps. Antonio and Gloria Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an
open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit
system.
2) As a result of the accident, Gloria Estaban sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a
permanent scar on her cheek and her husband suffered cut lips. The windshield of the jeep was shattered
too.
3) PLDT denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by the spouses Esteban were the result of
their own negligence and that the entity which should held responsible would be BARTE, an independent
contractor which undertook the construction.
4) The RTC ruled in favor of the Sps. Esteban. However, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and
dismissed the complaint of the respondent spouse.
Issue and Ruling
Whether or not the Sps. Esteban was able to established that there was negligence on the part of PLDT? No ,
Held:
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was
to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of
the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of
respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards
the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning
signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act
would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries were their
own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that
one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban
had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to
petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the
presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence
he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or
negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutative of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent
evidence. Whoever relied on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the
existence of the same if contested, otherwise must fail.
Doctrine : One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof.
Case Name: CHINA AIRLINES, LTD v. CA, PAGSIBIGAN, By: Patricia Arbolado
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. and ESPIRITU Topic: Presumptions of Negligence:
GR No. 45985 and GR No. 46036 Respondent Superior
Date: 18 May 1990
FACTS
1. PAGSIBIGAN, VP and General Manager of Rentokil (Phils.) Inc., purchased a plane ticket from the Transaire
Travel Agency for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight. Said agency contacted Philippine Airlines (PAL)s
Manila Hotel branch. PAL was a sales and ticketing agent of China Air Lines (CAL). On 6 June 1968, PAL, through
its ticketing clerk ESPIRITU, cut and issued him CAL Ticket No. 017991. According to the plane ticket, Pagsibigan
was booked on CAL CI Flight No. 812 to depart from Manila to Taipei on 10 June 1968 at 5:20pm.

2. On 10 June 1968, when PAGSIBIGAN arrived at the airport 1 hour before his scheduled flight to check in, he
was informed that the plane he was supposed to take for Taipei had left at 10:20am of that day. PAL made
arrangements for Pagsibigan to take PALs flight to Taipei on 11 June 1968. PAGSIBIGAN took said flight and
arirved in Taipei around noontime.

3. PAGSIBIGAN filed a complaint against PAL and CAL and prayed for moral damages (P125,000) arising from
the gross negligence of ESPIRITU in indicating an incorrect time on his ticket. He claimed that the purpose of his
trip to Taipei was to confer with Peng Siong Lim, president of Union Taiwan Chemical Corporation, scheduled at
9:00am on 11 June 1968. He suffered from besmirched reputation, embarrassment, mental anguish, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights from his failure to take the plane on 10 June.

4. According to PAL, CAL had not informed or provided them of the revised schedule of its flight. Moreover, PAL
and Espiritu, disclaim any liability on the theory that the former is merely an agent of CAL and that the suit should
have been directed against CAL alone.

5. CAL disclaims liability. It claims that it had revised its schedule of flights since 1 April 1968, which PAL was
informed. In fact, PALs Manila Hotel branch office had been issuing and selling tickets based on the revised time
schedule before June 10, 1968.

ISSUE
1) Who is liable to Pagsibigan? PAL and Espiritu.
2) W/N PAL could be held liable by the negligence of Espiritu, its employee. YES.
HELD
1) As to CAL There is no basis to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. Espiritu is solely and
exclusively responsible for the error. He is not an employee or agent of CAL, and CAL did not contribute to the
negligence committed by PAL and Espiritu.
There is no question that the contractual relation between both CAL and PAL is one of agency. However, in an
action premised on the employees negligence, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and primary liability of
PAL as an employer under said Article 2180.

As to PAL PAL is only an agent of CAL. As a general rule, an agent who duly acts as such is not personally liable
to third persons. However, the exception is, as in this case, where the agent is being sued for damages arising from a
tort committed by his employee. Hence, PAL is liable.

As to ESPIRITU - As an employee of PAL, the nature of his functions requires him to observe that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. He committed a clear neglect of duty. Hence, for
his negligence, he is primarily liable to Pagsibigan under Art. 2176.

2) When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the employer either in a) the selection of the employee or in the b) supervision over
him after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that it has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.
In this case, however, PAL failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee. Hence, PAL is liable under Art. 2180.
Case Name: Pantranco North Express Inc vs. Maricar Baesa and Fe By: Caro, Monica Celine A.
Ico Topic: Doctrine of Last Clear
GR No. 79050-51 Chance
Date: November 14, 1989
FACTS
1. The family of Baesa, together with spouses Ico with their son and seven other persons, were aboard a
passenger jeepney on their wait to a picinic at Malalam River to celebrate the 5 th anniversary of Spouses
Baesa.
2. David Ico, owner of the jeepney, was driving.
3. Upon taking the highway the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about
20kmp, and a speedy PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the
jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve and collided with it.
4. As a result, David Ico, Sps Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa died while the rest
were injured.
5. After the accident, the driver of the PANTRANCO Bus, Ambrosio Ramirez, boarded a car and has
remained in hiding. All victims settle the case under the No Fault insurance coverage of Pantranco.
6. Maricar Baesa thru her guardian, and Fe Ico filed a separate action for damages arising from quasi-delict
against PANTRANCO. The latter invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its driver Ramirez.
7. CFI ordered PANTRANCO to pay 2,304,647.00 and 652,672 to Maricar and Fe, respectively.
8. On appeal, CA modified the award to 1,189,927 and 344,000. MR was denied. Hence, this petition for
review. Petitioner claims that under the circumstances the jeepney driver who had the last clear change to
avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competent to
avoid the harm. Petitioner claims that the sole proximate cause was the supervening negligence of the
jeepney driver.
ISSUE
WON THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANGE IS APPLICABLE AS TO THE JEEPNEY DRIVER -
NO
HELD
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.

The subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes
the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more remote
negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant liable to the plaintiff. Generally, the last clear chance doctrine
is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent
negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages.

For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to
avert the accident was aware of the existence of the period or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of
it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could have known the existence of
the peril.

In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw
at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the
dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to the bus to its own lane upon
seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. [In the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, a motorist
who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching
vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane of traffic]

Further, the speed at which the bus was running prevented David Ico from serving the jeepney to the right shoulder
to avoid the collision. Thus he had no opportunity to avoid it. The Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine
can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by
the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have discovered.
The finding of negligence on the part of its driver Ambrosio Ramirez gave rise to the presumption of negligence on
the part of petitioner and the burden of proving that it exercised due diligence not only in the selection of its
employees but also in adequately supervising their work rests with the petitioner. Petitioner failed to show that the
recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed.

Doctrine Notes
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of
prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last clear
chance to avoid the injury and failed to do so is made liable for all the
consequences of the accident.
Case Name: Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. IAC and Casiano Pacua By: Chua, Dane Larieze
G.R. No. 66102-04 Topic: Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Date: August 30, 1990

FACTS
1. Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaide Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo, Alejandro Morales and
Zenaida Parejas (passengers) boarded the jeepney, owned by the spouses Mangune and driven by Manalo, bound for
Carmen Rosales, Pangasinan. Their contract with Manalo was for them to pay P24.00 for the trip.
2. Upon reaching Barrio Sinayoan, the right rear wheel of the truck detached, causing it to run in an unbalanced position
so Manalo stepped on the brake. Such action caused the jeepney to make a U-turn, eventually stopping on the opposite
lane of the road (from where it came from) and its rear faced the north (towards where it was going). It thus blocked
the right of way of vehicles coming from the north, among which was Bus 73 of Philippine Rabbit Lines.
3. Philippine Rabbit Lines (bus driven by De Los Reyes) claimed that almost immediately after the sudden U-turn, the
bus bumped the right rear portion of the jeep. It resulted in a collision and the death of three passengers (Catalina
Pascua, Meriales and Estomo). Others sustained injuries.
4. Police investigators of Tacpal found that at the time of the accident, there were no vehicles following the jeepney,
neither were there oncoming vehicles except the bus. The weather condition of that day was fair. Thereafter, the police
filed a criminal complaint for multiple homicide against the two drivers. The case against De Los Reyes was dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence, but Manalo was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment.
5. 3 complaints for recovery of damages were then filed before the CFI of Pangasinan, anchoring the suits against
Spouses Mangune and Manalo on their contractual liability while culpability for quasi-delict for Philippine Rabbit and
De Los Reyes.
6. TC found Manalo negligent. The same was reversed by IAC when it applied the doctrine of last clear chance (the
presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle is guilty and the cause of the accident unless
contradicted by other evidence) and the substantial factor test so De Los Reyes was guilty.
ISSUE
W/N the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable? NO.
W/N De los Reyes is liable for the death and physical injuries suffered by the passengers? NO.
HELD: The IAC erred when it applied the doctrine of last clear chance as it only applies in a suit between the owners and
drivers of two colliding vehicles, not in a suit where passengers demand responsibility from a carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. The reason for such is that it would inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence (Anuran v Buno).

In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger does or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that he had observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755 and 1756 or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.

The spirit behind the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for the driver following a
vehicle to be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the driver in front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its
course either through change of mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is given
the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full control of the situation.
However, the U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt so De Los Reyes could not have anticipated it.

As to the substantial factor test (if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the
actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him
from being liable), the bus drivers conduct was not a substantial factor in bringing about harm. It cannot be said that the bus
was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour is within the speed
limit allowed in highways. Delos Reyes admitted that he was running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the
accident. Using this speed, delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If 80km per hour is adopted, De Los
Reyes would have covered that distance in 2.025 seconds, not giving him enough time to react to the situation.

Proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Manalo and spouses Mangune as they failed to exercise the precautions
needed. The negligence of Manalo was proven during the trial by the unrebutted testimonies of Caridad Pascua, Police
Investigator Tacpal, Police Corporal Cacalda, Manalos conviction for the crime of Multiple Homicide and Multiple Serious
Injuries with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence, and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur supra. The
negligence of the spouses was also shown through their non-attempt of establishing that the collision was caused by a fortuitous
event but even then, an accident caused by defects in the automobile or negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito.

Doctrine Notes: Manalo cannot be solidarily liable

(1) The principle of last clear chance is only applicable in a suit between the because the carrier is exclusively
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. responsible to the passenger even if it is
due to the negligence of the driver.
Case Name: Capili v Cardaa
GR No. 157906 Date: 2 November 2006
By: Kylie Dado
Topic: Res Ipsa Loquitur
FACTS: On Feb. 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary
School when a branch of a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous
death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa - filed a case for damages before the RTC against
petitioner. They alleged that even as early as Dec. 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on
the possible danger the tree posed to passersby.

Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principals office. The Cardaas averred that
petitioners gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.

Petitioner denied the accusations and said that Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that
the tree was dead and rotting. She presented 2 witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to
the other teachers during a meeting and assigned who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other
teachers during a meeting.

Trial Court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the
petitioner. Petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances require and that there was
an absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that required by the
attendant circumstances.

But the CA reversed such and found the Petitioner liable. It ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition
of the tree by its mere sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree
removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaa.

Petitioner, before the SC, contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because Lerios merely
offered to buy the tree and did not inform her of its condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her that the tree
was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see the immediate danger posed by the tree by its
mere sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground inspections. She further argues that, even if she
should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another
teacher.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner's explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed immediately sufficient to
exculpate her

HELD: NO. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance
of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred.

The fact that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools premises
shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of
res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant
an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.

The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the
branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the death of respondents daughter was a result of petitioners
negligence, being in charge of the school. The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioners
negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made
out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption or inference may
be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.

As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the schools premises. The fact that she failed to
see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility
demanded by her position.

Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her
assignee.
The record shows that more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant.
Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been removed.

Doctrine: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.
Notes
 Layugan v. IAC
GR 73998, November 14, 1988

Facts:
Pedro Layugan was repairing the tire of a parked truck carrying 10 big logs, and there was an early
warning device in the form of a kerosene lamp.
Layugan was then bumped by Godofredo Isidros truck which was recklessly driven by Daniel
Serrano.
As a result of the incident, Layugan was hospitalized and his left leg was amputated.
Layugan files an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro,
Godofredo Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel
Serrano.
However, Godofredo Isidro said that the proximate cause of the accident was the failure of the
driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device (aka the kerosene lamp)
As such, Godofredo says it is the driver of the parked truck who should be liable to Layugan
Furthermore, Isidro claims that Layugan was merely a bystander, and not a truck helper, and that
the truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane of the road.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Layugan
Godofredo Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses
serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway.
Godofredo Isidro argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb
and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the Layugan, who claims to be a helper of
the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would be
properly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle.
Godofredo Isidro proffers that the Layugan must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that
the driver and he (Layugan) himself, provided an early warning device, like that required by law, or,
by some other adequate means that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that
the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar circumstances of the
occasion.
Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res
ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo
truck as well as his helper, Layugan, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck
IAC: Applies Res Ipsa Loqtuitur; Reversed RTC decision; dismissed the complaint.
IAC: The mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked truck.

Issue: Did the IAC properly apply the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur?

Held: NO. It was improperly applied. Serrano is liable.

In our jurisdiction, Res Ipsa Loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie evidence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence.
It can thus only be invoked when direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
IAC committed a reviersible error applied res ipsa loquitur even if driver Daniel Serranos negligence
was already proven by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Daniel Serrano already admitted that his fault in driving the truck.
 Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the
road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted
kerosene lamp placed 3-4 meters from the back of the truck.
Such warning device was sufficient but the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the
private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck.
As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and
left foot.
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has
been established by clear and convincing evidence.

RE: Presumption of Negligence of Master or Employer

The presumption of negligence on the part of the master or employer is juris tantum and not juris et
de jure and consequently, may be rebutted;
It may be overcome by proof that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection or supervision of his employees
It is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did not check his
vehicle before he took it on the road
The Fact that the private respondent used to instruct his driver to be careful in his driving, that the
driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any accident, as found by the respondent
court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding of negligence
Isidro failed to prove the-diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employees
which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner.
Case Name: Africa v. Caltex (Phil), Inc. By: Trisha Andrea Draper
GR No. L-12986 Topic: Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Date: March 31, 1966 Loquitor
FACTS
In the afternoon of March 18, 1948, a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo
St. and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted.
The fire spread to and burned several houses. The owners, among them petitioner spouses Africa and heirs
of Ong, sued respondents Caltex Phil., Inc., the alleged owner of the station, and Mateo Boquiren, the agent
in charge of its operation, for damages.

The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the old Civil Code. The trial court and the Court
of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in
the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
ISSUE
Whether or not, without proof as to the cause or origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should
apply so as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees?
HELD
Yes. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose from want of care."

The principle applies with equal force in the case at bar. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and
burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known the cause of the fire were the
appellees and their employees, but they failed to give any explanation. It is fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care.

In a report submitted by a police officer in the performance of his duties, it was stated that the location of
the gasoline station was within a very business district where many people mill around throughout the day
until late at night, and that the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2.5 meters high at most
and cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire. The descriptive facts contained in the
report only strengthened the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on
their face they called for more stringent measures of caution.

Doctrine Notes

Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is show to For the doctrine of res ipsa
be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the loquitur to apply, the following
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not requisites should be present:
happen if those who have its management or control use proper (a) the accident is of a kind which
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation ordinarily does not occur in
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. the absence of someones
negligence;
(b) it is caused by an
instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
(c) the possibility of contributing
conduct which would make
the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
Case Name: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. By: Janlo Fevidal
HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN Topic: GROSS NEGLIGENCE
GR No.: G.R. No. 165969
Date: November 27, 2008
FACTS
In the 1970s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines of 69 kilovolts traversing
the trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon. Over time, the power lines sagged, and reduced their distance from the
ground to only about 8-10 ft.The lines were located on a trail frequented by people, thus it posed as a threat
to passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution. As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao,
Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect trail users from
their high-tension wires.

19-year-old Noble Casionan worked as a pocket miner. In 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner Melchor
Jimenez were at Dalicno. They cut 2 bamboo poles, and walked along the trail underneath the NPC lines on
their way to their work place. As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole that he was carrying
touched one of the dangling wires. Melchor narrated that he heard a buzzing sound and saw Noble fall to
the ground. (He died after)

The authorities noted that people usually used the trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires, and
that the trail was the only viable way since the other side was a precipice. They did not see any danger
warning signs installed. After the GM of NPC was informed of the incident, NPC repaired the
dangling lines and put up warning signs around the area.

Nobles parents filed a claim for damages against NPC. NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the
safety of the lines, averring that signs were installed but they were stolen by children, and that excavations
were made to increase the clearance from the ground but some poles sank due to pocket mining in the area
(by Noble). NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution since Noble
did not suffer extensive burns. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own
negligence.

RTC decided in favor of Nobles parents. RTC observed that NPC witnesses were biased because all but
one were employees of NPC, and they were not actually present at the time of the accident. RTC found
NPC negligent since the company has not acted upon the requests and demands made by the community
leaders since 1991. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE
1) Is there contributory negligence on the part of Noble? NO. (NPC not entitled to a mitigation of its
liability.)
HELD
NPC argues that it was Nobles negligence that caused his death. Negligence is the failure to observe, for
the protection of the interest of another, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm
he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection.
There is contributory negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight
that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want
of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury.

The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled
to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. NCC 2179 provides that
liability will be mitigated in consideration of the injured partys contributory negligence.

In the case at bar, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the
community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should
 they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to
Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in
the area.

Doctrine Notes
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his
own protection.

Gross negligence has been defined to be the want or absence of

even slight care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard
of the safety of person or property.
Case Name: 12. Carillo vs. People By: Golez, Sarah Monique Nicole
GR No. 86890 Topic: Medical Malpractice
Date: January 21, 1994
FACTS
Catherine Acosta, complained to her father of pains in the lower part of her abdomen. Catherine was then brought to r. Elva Pe a.
ra. Pe a called for r. Emilio Madrid and the latter examined Catherine. According to Dr. Madrid, his findings might be
appendicitis. Then r. Pe a told Catherines parents to bring the child to the hospital in Baclaran so that the child will be observed.
The findings became known as appendicitis and the child was scheduled for operation. They did not they did not subject the child to
ECG or X-ray nor did they weigh the patient. Dr. Emilio Madrid then operated on Catherine. He was assisted by Dr. Leandro
Carillo, an anesthesiologist.

When the operation was done and the child was brought out from the operating room, she was observed to be shivering
(nanginginig); her heartbeat was not normal; she was asleep and did not wake up; she was pale; and as if she had difficulty in
breathing and Dr. Emilio Madrid suggested that she be placed under oxygen tank. The patient then started to convulse and stiffen,
the parents were then informed by a cardiologist that catherine suffered severe infection which went up to her head. Dr. Carillo
however assured them that she would wake up. The next day a neurologist examined her and she was diagnosed as comatose. 3 days
later, Catherine died without regaining consciousness.

CA: Catherine had suffered from an overdose of, or an adverse reaction to, anaesthesia, particularly the arbitrary administration of
Nubain, a pain killer, without benefit of prior weighing of the patients body mass, which determines the dosage of Nubain which
can safely be given to a patient. The Court held that this condition triggered off a heart attack as a post-operative complication,
depriving Catherines brain of oxygen, leading to the brains hemorrhage. Court of Appeals identified such cardiac arrest as the
immediate cause of Catherines death. The Court of Appeals found criminal negligence on the part of r. Carillo and r. Madrid,
holding that both had failed to observe the required standard of diligence in the examination of Catherine prior to the actual
administration of anaesthesia and post-operation care.

ISSUE
1. W/N Dr. Carillo along with Dr. Madrid was guilty of simple negligence which resulted in homicide.

HELD: YES
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as a mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate
or the danger not openly visible. The gravamen of the offense of simple negligence is the failure to exercise the diligence
necessitated or called for by the situation which was not immediately life-destructive but which culminated, in the present case, in
the death of a human being 3 days later. Such failure to exercise the necessary degree of care and diligence is a negative ingredient
of the offense charged. In the instant case, the Court is bound to observe that the events which occurred during the surgical
procedure (including whether or not Nubain had in fact been administered as an anaesthesia immediately before or during the
surgery) were peculiarly within the knowledge and control of Dr. Carillo and Dr. Madrid.

In the case at bar, we consider that the chain of circumstances above noted, namely: (1) the failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to
appreciate the serious post-surgery condition of their patient and to monitor her condition and provide close patient care to her (2)
the summons of petitioner by r. Madrid and the cardiologist after the patient s heart attack on the very evening that the surgery
was completed (3) the low level of care and diligence exhibited by petitioner in failing to correct r. Madrid s prescription of
Nubain for post- operative pain; (4) the extraordinary failure or refusal of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to inform the parents of
Catherine Acosta of her true condition after surgery, in disregard of the requirements of the Code of Medical Ethics; and (5) the
failure of petitioner and Dr. Madrid to prove that they had in fact exercised the necessary and appropriate degree of care and
diligence to prevent the sudden decline in the condition of Catherine Acosta and her death three (3) days later, leads the Court to the
conclusion, with moral certainty, that petitioner and Dr. Madrid were guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
Doctrine Notes
Simple negligence is defined as a mere lack of prevision in a situation where either - Dr. Madrid was 45 mins late to the
the threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not openly visible.As early as operation.
in People v. Vistan, the Court defined simple negligence, penalized under what is - Court further held that since the hospital
now Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as a mere lack of prevision in a had inadequate facilities, then a somewhat
situation where either the threatened harm is not immediate or the danger not higher standard of professional diligence on
openly visible. Put in a slightly different way, the gravamen of the offense of both accused
simple negligence is the failure to exercise the diligence necessitated or called for
by the situation which was not immediately life-destructive but which culminated,
in the present case, in the death of a human being three (3) days later. Such failure
to exercise the necessary degree of care and diligence is a negative ingredient of the
offense charged.