World Policy Journal-2005-Nichols-1-23 PDF

World Policy Journal
Thomas M. Nichols is professor of strategy and policy and a former chairman of the Strategy and Policy Department a t the
U.S. N aval War College, where he holds the Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy. He is also a senior associate of
the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, and visiting professor ofpolitical science at L a Salle University.
His most recent book is Winning the World: Lessons for Americas Future from the Cold War. The views expressed
here are those of the author and not of any agency of the U.S. government.
Anarchy and Order in the New Age of Prevention

Thomas Ai. Nichols
And I put myself in the position of com If we are in fact reaching the end of an
ing before you and having someone like era dominated by traditional notions of de
you say to me, Let me get this straight, terrence and facing the rise of a new age of
Mr. Secretary. Weve just had a chemical prevention, then it is imperative to consider
weapons attack upon our cities or our how this situation came about and, more
troops, and weve lost several hundred importantly, how to govern the use of force
or several thousand, and this is the in in such a dramatically changed world. Oth
formation, which you had at your fin erwise, it is too easy to envision a future
gertips...and you did what? You did where nations simply resort to raw self-help
nothing? Is that a responsible activity with little pretense of order and even less
on the part of the Secretary of Defense? possibility for international institutions to
And the answer is pretty clear. bind the international community with a
Former secretary of defense sense of common purpose. In turn, the anar
William Cohen, testifying chy that is the fundamental condition of in
before the 9/11 Commission ternational life will become more dominant
about the decision to strike than at any time since the collapse of the
a Sudanese factory in 1998 League of Nations and undermine interna
tional cooperation at the very moments
We are entering a new age of preventive when it will be needed most.
war. The emergence of mass-scale suicide O f course, preventive war, violent inter
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of vention in the affairs of sovereign states, and
mass destruction, and the loosing of rogue forced regime change (all of which can be
states from Cold War constraints are leading described more generally as discretionary
nations and not just the United States uses of military force) are not new. While in
to embrace the temptations of preventive the modern era these have largely been con
military action. The official rhetoric, in sidered unsavory and even illegal tools of
Washington and elsewhere, is couched in statecraft, nations have resorted to their use
the more acceptable language of preemp when their leaders believed their interests
tion, but there can be no mistaking the dictated it, such as Imperial Japans preven
growing acceptance of preventive uses of tive attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor
force.1 While this is in some ways an under in 1941.
standable, and perhaps even inevitable, Likewise, it was an undeniable reality of
development, it is one that threatens to the Cold War that the United States and the
undermine coordinated attempts to battle Soviet Union breached the sovereignty of
terrorists and contain rogue states, and other states and even effected violent regime
will render the United Nations even more change in their spheres of influence as a
irrelevant in coping with such threats than means of policing and expanding their re
it already is. spective coalitions. Still, the international
Anarchy and Order in the New Age of Prevention 1
Published by World Policy Institute

community during the Cold War strongly the worst fears of the administrations crit
professed adherence to a norm against such ics, as American forces rolled into Baghdad
actions, a presumption so powerful that after the expiration of the presidents ulti
even the two mightiest nations on earth felt matum that the Iraqi regime, in effect, ei
the need to show their respect for it in prin ther surrender or be destroyed. The Ameri
ciple even when they disregarded it in prac cans, it seemed, had arrived at Melos...via
tice. Both Moscow and Washington dressed Baghdad.
their actions in veils of legitimacy regard And yet, as two American scholars re
ing fraternal assistance and self-defense, cently noted, despite often hyperbolic criti
even as they crushed rebellions and removed cism of the invasion of Iraq, a mounting
hostile governments. body of evidence suggests that a significant
But they never sank (at least publicly) number of states are beginning to embrace
to the moral poverty of the ancient Atheni the Bush Doctrines underlying logic of
ans on the island of Melos during the Pelo preemption, which seems a great deal like
ponnesian War. The Athenians told the preventive war, despite their initial hostility
militarily helpless Melians (whom they to the Bush Doctrine and continuing wide
would later massacre) that there was no need spread opposition to the [2003] Iraq war.2
to trifle with arguments about justice or This is a puzzle that needs explaining. Are
rights. Rather, they insisted that Melos other states seizing on the American exam
must submit to Athenian rule because it ple out of opportunism, or even just self-de
was the nature of things that the strong do fense? This is a central accusation of critics
what they can and the weak suffer what they who have charged that for many reasons,
must. Moscow or Washington could have U.S. policies will invite imitation and em
easily dictated similar terms to the targets ulation, and get it.3
of their interventions but instead clothed To claim, however, that the United
their actions in legalistic language that States (or any other nation, for that matter)
ironically honored the norm against discre is leading a change in international norms
tionary uses of force even as it was being is to confuse cause and effect. Analyses
violated. that trace these developments to U.S. poli
The idea that the world is shifting away cies after 2001 cannot explain striking
from these Cold War norms toward a changes in beliefs about the use of force on
greater acceptance of discretionary uses of the part of other actors in the international
force may seem an odd claim given the in community over the past decade. These
ternational fury directed at the policies of changes are characterized by the rejection
the Bush administration, which are funda of traditional notions of absolute state
mentally preventive in nature despite at sovereignty, a steep erosion of faith in the
tempts to portray them otherwise. The concept of deterrence, growing concern
Bush Doctrine was enunciated in the over the spread of weapons of mass destruc
2002 National Security Strategy of the United tion ( w m d ), and the demonstrated potential
States of America, which describes a strategy of catastrophic terrorism. While the terror
of prevention with such unapologetic candor ist attacks against the United States in
that some critics have derided it as little September 2001 spurred a greater accep
more than a barely veiled justification for tance of preventive violence, the precondi
the creation of an American empire in tions for the overturning of old notions
which any state or actor resisting U.S. hege about force and the emergence of new norms
mony would suffer Washingtons wrath. The regarding prevention were in place long
2003 American-led invasion of Iraq the before the first airliner ever struck the
Bush Doctrine in action served to confirm Twin Towers.
2 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL FALL 2005

It is true, however, that this collapse of neither law nor custom, nor basic human
previous norms and the transition to a new decency, as well as with international insti
age has accelerated and become more obvi tutions that appear impotent at best and ob
ous since 9/11. Political scientist Stephen structionist at worst. If these frustrations
Krasner warns that if a series of nuclear ter deepen, in the future international order
rorist attacks were to strike three or four may well be secured not by laws or institu
cities concurrently in the developed world, tions or even by coalitions of the willing,
conventional rules of sovereignty would but rather (in the words of a British general)
be abandoned overnight, and preventive by coalitions of the exasperated.5
strikes, including full-scale preventive How did we get to this point, and
wars without even the pretense of United where do we go from here?
Nations approval would become accepted
practices.4 Krasner is correct, but the flaw in Prologue: Humanitarian Intervention
his prediction is timing: much of what he The belief that the international community
sees happening in the future is happening or its members could resort to force even if
now. New norms are already emerging, even it meant breaching the sovereignty of a rec
if new rules to govern them have not yet ognized state did not originate as a response
coalesced. to terrorists or proliferators after September
These changes are due to the cumulative 2001. Rather, the foundations for the new
and corrosive effects of a series of frighten age of prevention can be found in the fail
ing, even sickening, events that have been ures of the international system of the
inexorably altering the way the world thinks 1990s.
about security. Since the Cold Wars end, As the Cold War waned, the superpower
and particularly in the past few years, we coalitions began to disengage from involve
have seen a parade of atrocities: in London ment in the affairs of smaller nations, often
and Madrid, bombings of public transport; leaving instability and uncertainty in their
in the Middle East, beheadings broadcast on wake. As the threat of nuclear war receded,
the Internet; in Russia, mass hostage tak civil war, mass rape, starvation, and geno
ings in a hospital, a theater, and even an ele cide came to the fore. The collapse of order
mentary school in the small town of Beslan and the human suffering it engendered re
(which resulted in a botched rescue and the peatedly challenged the international sys
butchering of scores of Russian schoolchil tem. The performance of the United Na
dren). These outrages followed a decade im tions in this period was dismal even by the
mediately after the Cold War darkened by reckoning of its supporters, and its failures
campaigns of rape, ethnic cleansing, and were bound to have a profound impact.
even genocide in Europe and Africa. The The two most important cases in point
nuclear clock, once slowed by the Cold were the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the
Wars end, has been set ticking again by the attempted genocide in Kosovo five years
North Korean nuclear program, as well as later. In Rwanda, the world organizations
by the evident intention of Irans extremist paralysis induced in no small part by the
mullahs to become members of the nuclear initial unwillingness of U.S. and British of
club. ficials even to speak the word genocide,
It is small wonder that peoples and lead lest it trigger a costly and risky obligation
ers in many nations show greater unwilling to intervene cost thousands upon thou
ness to tolerate risk in a world seemingly sands of lives, and raised fundamental ques
threatened by outright barbarism. Succes tions about its capacity to deal with such
sive atrocities have strained their patience challenges. When genocide loomed in Koso
with states or groups that seem to respect vo, the United States and its N ATO allies (to

some degree chastened by their failure to uous among them, military intervention is
stop the carnage in Rwanda) did not wait not merely defensible, but a compelling
until it was too late, and acted without the obligation.8
Security Councils approval rather than risk The commission (composed of a dozen
a Russian veto. noted political and intellectual figures from
In 1999, Secretary General Kofi Annan around the world) argued that this respon
acknowledged the damage done by these sibility to protect is an emerging interna
crises. After Kosovo in particular, he evi tional norm, or guiding principle of behav
dently sensed that important members of ior for the international community of
the international community might have states, and that over time it could even be
crossed a threshold. Annan bowed to new come customary international law.9 And in
realities by embracing (within carefully de a prescient warning, the commission noted
fined limits) the principle that states could that the repeated inability of the United
at times interfere in the internal affairs of Nations to act effectively, coupled with
others: This developing international norm successful interventions outside of its aus
in favor of intervention to protect civilians pices, would eventually erode its stature
from wholesale slaughter will no doubt con and credibility.
tinue to pose profound challenges to the in The emergence of this new norm of in
ternational community.... But it is an evolu tervention led some to the further conclu
tion we should welcome.6 Such a norm, sion that if sovereignty can be violated to
Annan admitted, could even be a deterrent: stop the murder of thousands, it can also be
If States bent on criminal behavior know violated to prevent such disasters including
that frontiers are not the absolute defense terror attacks. For example, Lee Feinstein (a
and if they know that the Security Council former Clinton administration State Depart
will take action to halt crimes against hu ment official) and the Princeton legal schol
manity, they will not embark on such a ar Anne-Marie Slaughter have argued for a
course of action in expectation of sovereign duty to prevent as a corollary to the duty
impunity. to protect. They claim there is nothing
Ironically, some N ATO nations agreed to radical in such a proposal, which simply
participate in the Kosovo operation only be extrapolates from recent developments in
cause they regarded it as a tolerable excep the law of intervention for humanitarian
tion to existing international norms.7 But purposes an area in which over the course
the translation of this exception into a of the 1990s old rules proved counterpro
norm in itself became more evident two ductive at best, murderous at worst.10
years later, when the Canadian-sponsored
International Commission on Intervention Proliferation and Prevention
and State Sovereignty published its report. By the end of the 1990s, it was clear that
The authors went even further than Annan, humans wielding machetes and machine
declaring that the international community guns were more likely to inflict mass death
not only could act during humanitarian dis than intercontinental nuclear missiles. But
asters, but that it had a positive responsibility even as the threat of global nuclear war fad
to do so. The commissions co-chair, former ed, new fears grew about the uncontrolled
Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans, spread of nuclear arms in a world unmoored
later alluded to the soul-searching that pro from the paradoxical security of the Cold
duces such changes in norms, noting that it Wars strategic nuclear standoff (and from
took us most of [the 1990s] to re-learn that previously strict Soviet control of nuclear
war can be a progressive cause: that in some technology and components among its
circumstances, threatened genocide conspic friends and clients). Like the debate on

intervention, reconsideration of the problem thousand people in a single day of terrorist

of proliferation gained a new momentum af attacks was enough to qualify as Mandel-
ter 9/11, but thinkers and policymakers had baums next Hiroshima.
begun to grapple with these changes well Debates related to, but not directly cen
before. tered on, preventive war increased in inten
The question of coercive nonprolifera sity in the late 1990s, as Saddam Husseins
tion, for example, long predates current de continued defiance of U.N. arms inspectors
bates. In 1993, the historian Marc Trachten raised fears that he had reconstituted his
berg wrote: W M D programs. In 1998, President Clinton
gave a speech that just as easily could have
The idea that the international been given by George W. Bush in 2003:
community has a right to inter
vene, albeit in exceptional cases, Now, lets imagine the future. What
in the internal affairs of indepen if {Saddam Hussein] fails to comply,
dent states that sovereignty is and we fail to act, or we take some
in important ways limited by the ambiguous third route which gives
existence of an international com him yet more opportunities to de
munity has suddenly become velop this program of weapons of
widely accepted. In particular, it is mass destruction and continue to
now often argued that the world press for the release of the sanctions
community has a right to prevent and continue to ignore the solemn
countries like Iraq, Libya, and commitments that he made? Well,
North Korea from developing he will conclude that the interna
nuclear capabilities by force if tional community has lost its will.
necessary, many would add. He will then conclude that he can
go right on and do more to rebuild
A year earlier, M IT professor John Deutsch an arsenal of devastating destruc
(who was later appointed CIA director under tion. And some day, some way, I guar
President Clinton) advocated serving notice antee you, hell use the arsenal. And I
to would-be proliferators that they could think every one of you whos really
well face the possibility of multilateral, and worked on this for any length of
in exceptional cases, unilateral military ac time believes that, too.14
tion.12 In 1995, the foreign policy analyst
Michael Mandelbaum made essentially the For a variety of reasons, notably domestic
same point, warning that stopping the political troubles and disarray in the Secu
spread of nuclear weapons to places like Iraq rity Council, Clinton never carried out this
and North Korea may ultimately require implied threat. Nonetheless, in a bipartisan
destroying those states nuclear programs by vote, Congress passed, and Clinton signed,
force. He also noted that such actions the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act, which made
would require the American public to em it the policy of the United States to sup
brace the concept of preventive war, which port efforts to remove the regime headed by
it had never been asked to do, and that the Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to
next Hiroshima that is, a nuclear attack promote the emergence of a democratic gov
on U.S. territory could create in Ameri ernment to replace that regime. (The act,
can public opinion a consensus in favor of however, only supported such efforts by
preventive war to keep the bomb out of the the Iraqi opposition and was notably silent
hands of rogue states.13 For many Ameri on the question of the use of American
cans, it seems, the deaths of nearly three force.)

In all this, however, there was little in al-Qaeda. These included the first attempt
the way of a systematic examination of the to bring down the World Trade Center in
question of preventive war in general, as 1993, the car bombings of U.S. embassies in
concern centered specifically on the nagging Africa in 1998, the failed plan to blow up
problem of Saddam Hussein. The fact that Los Angeles International airport in 1999,
removing Saddam would have constituted the suicide attack against the USS Cole in
a preventive war was elided because the war Yemen in 2000, an Algerian terrorist hi
would have been justified as enforcing U.N. jacking meant to crash an airliner into the
mandates and not as the preventive removal Eiffel Tower in 1994, and a 1999 plot to
of a direct threat to the United States or its bomb Jewish neighborhoods in Canada.18
allies. A more thorough analysis of the ques With 9/11, however, terrorism finally came
tion would occur only after one of the most to be seen not as a disorganized series of
destructive terrorist attacks in history. horrible criminal acts, but as a coherent
means of warfare, the method of choice, as
The Impact of 911 1 George Shultz has put it, of an extensive,
Before 2001, terrorism was viewed (at least internationally connected ideological move
in the United States) as largely a police mat ment dedicated to the destruction of our
ter rather than as an international security international system of cooperation and
issue. As former secretary of state George progress.19
Shultz later recalled, during the 1980s we Treating terrorism as a protracted war
didnt really understand what motivated the rather than an international law enforcement
terrorists or what they were out to do.15 In issue has deep ramifications. It implies that
part, this was because the non-state nature the mechanisms of law enforcement, with
of terrorist organizations did not fit into the their lengthy procedures and unavoidable
state-centric image of the world held by risks that criminals might somehow go
policymakers, who viewed international re free, are unacceptable given the magnitude
lations as a matter between states; terrorism, of the potential destruction. This in turn
by contrast, was viewed as a criminal act pushes aside the presumption of innocence
perpetrated by individuals.16 This changed in favor of a risk-minimizing assumption
with al-Qaedas attacks on New York and that rogue regimes and terrorists intend
Washington in 2001. In the space of min to do harm and will in fact do so unless
utes, terrorism changed from a law enforce stopped. British prime minister Tony Blair
ment problem to an issue of war and peace.17 expressed a common view a year after the
Americas European allies apparently agreed: Iraq invasion:
at a N A TO meeting the day after September
11, N ATO representatives invoked Article 5 From September 11th on, I could
of the Atlantic Charter, declaring that the see the threat plainly. Here were ter
attack against the United States was an at rorists prepared to bring about Ar
tack on all members of the alliance. This mageddon.... And my judgment
was a dramatic statement, as Article 5 was then and now is that the risk of this
originally meant to be triggered in the new global terrorism and its interac
event of a Soviet invasion and had never be tion with states or organizations or
fore been implemented. individuals proliferating W M D , is
The perception of terrorism as a new one I simply am not prepared to
kind of threat began to coalesce quickly, not run. This is not a time to err on the
least because September 11 was preceded side of caution; not a time to weigh
by ever bolder terrorist attacks, most of the risks to an infinite balance; not a
which were the product of movements like time for the cynicism of the worldly

wise who favor playing it long. which critics contend is based on ethnocen-
Their worldly wise cynicism is trically Western notions of rationality and
actually at best naivete and at reasonableness, whereas likely enemies may
worst dereliction.20 operate under the influence of distorted in
formation (or other unpredictable influ
This unwillingness to tolerate risk under ences, like drugs) and may value transcen
lies debates about future strategies, as it dental goals more than their own lives.24
pits traditional notions of deterrence against These concerns are closely tied to claims
calls for a more active defense. that the world now faces a qualitatively new
kind of danger in leaders and organizations
Fading Faith in Deterrence prone to high-risk strategies and whose
The emergence of large-scale suicide terror willingness to kill indiscriminately means
ism is a challenge to entrenched beliefs that the only prudent course regarding their
about deterrence and rationality in interna attempts to gain W M D is to assume that
tional conflict. Coupled with the reckless possession equals use, and therefore to act
and defiant attitude of potential rogue pro- against them as soon as possible.25
liferators, some argue that it is now point A related objection is that trusting in
less or worse to speak of traditional no deterrence against rogue states and terrorists
tions of deterrence. It is dangerous, the may come down only to trusting in the san
Georgetown political scientist Robert Lieber ity of a single person. While the president
wrote in 2002 with regard to Iraq, to rely of the United States and the secretary gen
on assumptions about containment and de eral of the Soviet Communist Party could
terrence developed in response to a very dif both trigger mind-boggling levels of nu
ferent set of circumstances that prevailed be clear destruction, each side had bureaucratic
tween the United States and the Soviet and military checks in place to ensure that a
Union during the four decades of the cold single madman could not initiate an apoca
war.21 Other analysts as well have noted lypse. Do such checks exist in North Korea
that in many nations classical notions of de to restrain a leader described by some who
terrence and retaliation are increasingly have met him as a vain, paranoid, cognac-
disparaged and renounced.22 guzzling hypochondriac?26 Would a nu
The debate over whether to strike ter clear-armed Saddam Hussein have been any
rorists preventively has thus become inter less reckless than the one who rained Scuds
twined with a parallel debate about what on Israel? Osama bin Laden did not hesitate
to do about rogue nuclear forces, and in par to murder over three thousand people in a
ticular whether it is acceptable to engage day; would he be more reluctant to kill
in preventive attacks to neutralize them.23 three million? No one really knows, and un
These concerns converge in the question of certainty makes preventive action seem
whether to wage preventive war against more attractive than trusting in the reason,
regimes that may serve as the nexus between sanity, or values of a particular leader.
terrorist organizations and weapons of mass Finally, because terrorists and rogues
destruction, which was the primary U.S. ar are fundamentally opponents of the interna
gument for invading Iraq. tional status quo, they do not have a vested
Faced with enemies schooled in a cul interest in its stability. Indeed, they may
ture of martyrdom, or regimes led by delu actually seek to create crises rather than to
sional leaders, it is not difficult to see why resolve them, springing surprises and mak
assumptions of rationality the very corner ing daring moves in an effort to alter or
stone of deterrence no longer persuade. transform the system, as North Korea did
Some call for abandoning the concept, with its sudden and risky announcement

that it had acquired nuclear weapons, or tional one that has held sway since the
as al-Qaeda did with its surprise attack on treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a
9/11. This unreliability and unpredictability countrys internal affairs are for it [to de
provides a strong incentive to strike preven cide] and you dont interfere unless it
tively rather than to trust in deterrence, or threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or trig
in unverifiable agreements, or in negotia gers an obligation of alliance. This differ
tion and diplomacy a path particularly ent philosophy, according to Blair, rejects
discredited by long years of duplicitous and deterrence and containment precisely on the
cynical Iraqi and North Korean behavior grounds that terrorists have no intention
and especially in the unproven deterrability of being contained, and that states that
of terrorists who believe that engaging in proliferate or acquire WMD illegally are
mass murder and instigating a global reli doing so precisely to avoid containment.30
gious war will secure them an eternity in Likewise, even as its members split over
paradise. the Iraq war only weeks earlier, the Euro
pean Union in June 2003 released its Basic
Perspectives on Preemption and Prevention Principles for an EU Strategy against Prolif
Eroding faith in deterrence and a movement eration of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
toward more unilateral preemptive or pre a document that echoed the anxieties ex
ventive policies spreads with each successive pressed by Washington, London, and other
atrocity. As the American scholars Peter members of the eventual coalition of the
Dombrowski and Rodger Payne put it, In willing that supported the invasion of Iraq.
the wake of the horrible 9/11, Madrid, and Weapons of mass destruction, the report
Beslan terrorist attacks, national leaders are notes, are different from other weapons not
more and more declaring their disinterest in only because of their capacity to cause death
absorbing such strikes and then finding and on a large scale but also because they could
prosecuting the perpetrators after the fact.27 destabilize the international system, which,
The French analyst Francois Heisbourg of course, is exactly what the leaders of
noted in 2003 that there are signs that rogue states or terrorists would hope they
preemption can and has already begun to be would do. And although the EU document
incorporated into other countries national understandably privileges nonviolent solu
defense strategies.2 tions to such threats, when these measures
Despite the row between the United (including political dialogue and diplomatic
States and some of its allies over Iraq, many pressure) have failed, coercive measures
European states (if not necessarily their pop under Chapter VII of the U N Charter and
ulations) supported the U.S.-led invasion. international law (sanctions, selective or
This may reflect the fact that, in the words global, interceptions of shipments and,
of one European observer in 2003, they as appropriate, the use of force) could be
have gone through a thought process very envisioned.31
similar to Washingtons, concluding that The French government released its own
pre-9/H security strategies are simply out defense White Paper, symbolically dated
dated.2y Tony Blairs 2004 speech on the September 11, 2002, at about the same time
anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom is the U.S. National Security Strategy was be
representative of this sea change: Already, ing released in Washington. The French de
before September 11th the worlds view of fense minister noted that the new peace in
the justification of military action had been Europe did little to protect France against
changing.... For me, before September 11th, new, asymmetric threats. This in itself is
I was already reaching for a different philos scarcely remarkable; what is noteworthy is
ophy in international relations from a tradi the proposed response:

Outside our borders, within the had a capacity to stop it and there was no
framework of prevention and projec alternative other than to use that capacity,
tion-action, we must be able to then of course you would have to use it.35
identify and prevent threats as soon His government has also called for the U.N.
as possible. Within this framework, Charter to be changed to permit preemp
possible preemptive action is not out tive action against terrorists, although Can
of the question, where an explicit berras staunch support for the U.S. action
and confirmed threat has been rec against Iraq Australia was one of only four
ognized. This determination and the nations to contribute military forces sug
improvement of long range strike gests that its understanding of preemption
capabilities should constitute a de is similar to the rather loose American inter
terrent threat for our potential ag pretation of the term.36 It is a position that
gressors, especially as transnational reflects mainstream Australian sentiment
terrorist networks develop and or since 9/11, especially after the deaths of
ganize outside our territory, in areas dozens of Australians in the 2002 al-Qaeda
not governed by states, and even terror attack in Bali.37
at times with the help of enemy The Japanese face a particular problem
states.... Prevention is the first step due to their proximity to an openly hostile
in the implementation of our de rogue proliferator, and this has raised serious
fense strategy, for which the options questions at least of preemption, if not pre
are grounded in the appearance of vention. In response to a question from a
the asymmetric threat phenomenon.32 Japanese legislator about North Korea,
Shigeru Ishiba, director of the Japan De
While the French use of the term preven fense Agency, said in January 2003: If
tion also includes the use of preventive North Korea expresses the intention of turn
diplomacy and other means, the document ing Tokyo into a sea of fire and if it begins
clearly shows an increased interest in antici preparations [to attack], for instance by fu
patory and discretionary action. Indeed, the eling [its missiles], we will consider [North
language of the White Paper was so blunt Korea] is initiating [a military attack]....38
that the French government quickly had to Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, present
go on record to deny that it had abandoned at the same meeting, agreed. Ishiba later
nuclear deterrence in favor of preventive nu stressed that Japans Peace Constitution
clear strikes against rogue nuclear arsenals.33 did not require complete docility in the face
Even the Vatican changed its position in of danger: Just to be on the receiving end
2004. The late Pope John Paul IIs foreign of the attack is not what our constitution
minister, Archbishop Giovanni Lajolo, in had in mind.... Just to wait for another
response to a question on this issue, said, countrys attack and lose thousands and tens
Certainly there is the need for prompt in of thousands of people, that is not what the
tervention [under U.N. auspices], indeed constitution assumes.39 Ishiba reiterated
prevention of acts of terrorism, an answer this point a month after his initial com
that at the time represented a shift in the ments, saying that it would be too late to
Holy Sees previously firm position against act if North Korean missiles were already on
discretionary military action.34 their way, and that preemption would be a
Australian prime minister John Howard self-defense measure.40
has observed: It stands to reason that if you Ishiba later backed away from these
believe that somebody was going to launch statements, saying that Japan would not use
an attack on your country, either of a con its own forces against North Korea, but
ventional kind or a terrorist kind, and you would rely on U.S. forces to strike back in

the event of hostilities.41 The debate contin Russian General Staff, declared: As for car
ues, and as a 2003 analysis pointed out, rying out preventive strikes against terrorist
there are many in Japan arguing for jetti bases...we will take all measures to liquidate
soning military minimalism; more impor terrorist bases in any region of the world.45
tant, such figures are no longer considered A few days later, President Vladimir Putin
extremists or militarists and, in some cases, affirmed that Russia was seriously prepar
include senior officials who, in earlier times, ing to act preventively against terrorists.46
would have been fired for their lack of cau The rationale, as Russian security analyst
tion.42 In any case, the Japanese unwilling Andrei Piontkovsky has argued essentially
ness to trust the mercurial North Korean echoing Tony Blairs position is that ter
regime illustrates how the line between pre rorists cannot be deterred or contained as
emption and prevention will be blurred in those concepts have traditionally been ap
coming years, as threatened populations plied, and therefore can only be counter
show a growing unease with traditional acted with preventive measures.47
definitions of preemption that require them Russian diplomatic and military officials
to wait for unambiguous signs of attack be continue to insist that Russia absolutely op
fore responding. poses unilateral actions without U.N. sanc
Russia has repeatedly reserved the right tion, but this seems hard to square with
to engage in both preemptive and preven statements about what Russia believes are
tive action. These claims initially came in its rights regarding terrorists in neighboring
the form of a draft Russian defense doctrine states. It is unclear if Moscow has embraced
published in October 2003 and subsequent a preventive strategy to the degree Wash
statements made by Defense Minister Sergei ington has, especially given its relatively
Ivanov, which were quickly dubbed the poor capacity to project conventional power,
Ivanov Doctrine. Ivanov said that Russia but its pronouncements emphasize the
could use preventive military force in cases Kremlins insistence on the possibility of ac
where a threat is visible, clear, and un tion against sources of instability in former
avoidable, and represents an attempt to Soviet republics.48
limit Russias access to regions that are es France, Great Britain, the United States,
sential to its survival, or those that are im and the Russian Federation have all shown
portant from an economic or financial point an interest in preventive action (although to
of view, which certainly opened a consider judge by their diplomatic activities, the
ably broad range of possibilities.43 This French and Russian positions seem to be
raised Western eyebrows, and Ivanov later that such actions might be acceptable only
tried to clarify the Russian position at a so long as it is not the United States engag
meeting with NATO defense ministers, im ing in them). The position of the fifth per
plying that Russias primary concern was manent member of the Security Council is
not U.S. missiles five thousand miles away, less clear.
but terrorists and rogues nearer to its own China did not support, but did not veto,
borders. The doctrine, he said, does not the authorization of the use of force against
specify any preventive nuclear strikes, it Iraq in 1990, nor did Beijing make a serious
merely implies that Russia retains the right attempt to head off war between the United
to use military might for prevention, CIS States and Iraq in 2003- Indeed, an editorial
[Commonwealth of Independent States} in one of Chinas official newspapers in Sep
countries included.44 tember 2002 warned Baghdad about the
After the Beslan tragedy in September last chance for Saddam Hussein to deprive
2004, Russian officials became more stri the Americans of a legal case against him
dent. Gen. Yuri Baluevsky, chief of the self, and two months later China voted for
10 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL FALL. 2005

Security Council Resolution 1441, which preventive action is justified. O f course,

was intended, however unsuccessfully, as a the reports authors (drawn from a wide
last warning of impending but unspecified range of member states) insist that such
serious consequences should Saddam fail action can occur only with the blessing of
to cooperate with U.N. arms inspectors.49 the Security Council. Although prelimi
Like other authoritarian states, however, nary indications suggest that there is a long
China is allergic to any possibility of inter way to go before the membership in general
ference in its domestic affairs and remains accepts the entire report, current objections
a determined champion as repressive re amount to little more than haggling over
gimes tend to be of a strict understanding the documents details rather than its central
of sovereignty. Beijing strongly opposed conceptions.52
NATOs action against Serbia, for example, The more crippling flaw is that the re
objecting on the grounds that foreign forces port ducks the larger question of how to
had entered a domestic dispute, that NATO govern preventive use of force. Its authors
had bypassed the United Nations, and that sternly reject any redefinition of the charter
military force had been used to further or the role of the Security Council, a stub
NATOs ends.50 This represented a more gen born but not unexpected honoring of tradi
eral division between the democracies and tion that practically guarantees that the re
authoritarian states, as the Chinese position port will become a dead letter, while the
was supported by the states whose leaders United Nations is pushed even further to
were no doubt able to imagine themselves the sidelines.
one day in Serbian president Slobodan Milo
sevics shoes.51 Anarchy and Order: The Role of the U.N.
Since 2001, Beijing has been supportive As new threats grow and traditional notions
of the general idea of a global war on terror, of deterrence collapse, many of the most ca
but most likely because it is embroiled in pable states in the international system are
its own struggle with Muslim Uighur sepa moving toward strategies of preventive ac
ratists in western China. The Chinese, like tion. The most pressing question for the
the Russians in their war with the Che international community is not whether to
chens, no doubt anticipate some insulation accept this development it will soon be
from human rights charges if they appear upon us whether we like it or not but how
cooperative in a common fight against ter to govern it. What are the possible futures
rorism, but it is unlikely that they will ex in an age of prevention, and what can be
plicitly accept a new norm of prevention, done to avert anarchy?
even if at some point they end up practicing The most worrisome possibility would
it themselves on their western borders. be the rapid abandonment of international
In 2003, Kofi Annan, once more try institutions by states strong enough to act
ing to keep the United Nations ahead of on behalf of most of the international com
the innovations put forward by its members, munity without the consent of the rest. In
created the High Level Panel on Threats, such a world, the preventive use of force
Challenges, and Change, which released would be essentially ungoverned and un
its findings in late 2004. The Panels re governable. It is also an outcome that most
port, Dombrowski and Payne dryly note, resembles the present, in which powerful
offers room for a meaningful discussion nations, either alone or with ad hoc coali
between the United States and other U N tions, act to keep international order, stop
member states, in large part because it ac proliferators, change odious regimes, and
cepts the central claim of the Bush adminis extinguish genocidal conflicts. In the long
tration that there are circumstances when term, this would be the least stable alterna

tive, because threats to the status quo would tional problems of mass terrorism and accel
likely be dealt with only erratically by the erating wmd proliferation.
major powers, which would organize the Defenders might argue that the United
equivalent of international posses and take Nations itself is not really the problem, but
selective action depending on the interests rather the unwillingness of the major pow
and beliefs of the coalition of the moment. ers to use it, with American and British ret
This outcome represents a world in icence during the Rwandan genocide an in
which international institutions have lost dicting example. The United Nations, such
any ability to control the use of force. Are reasoning goes, is perfectly capable of taking
there other options? The most important action against the unholy trinity of humani
question in this regard is whether the new tarian disaster, proliferation, and terrorism,
age of prevention will be governed by the if only the most privileged states in the
United Nations or some other institution, Security Council resolve to do so. This re
or even by a new set of arrangements. quires leadership, and critics of U.S. foreign
A renaissance of the United Nations as policy in particular might describe many of
it is currently constituted is unlikely, not the various disasters of the 1990s not as fail
least because the perception that the organi ures of the United Nations, but as failures
zation is dysfunctional, or at the least out of American leadership and imagination.
dated, is now commonplace. This is not a The task, says Gareth Evans, is not to
view limited to traditionally skeptical find alternatives to the Security Council as a
Americans; as Canadian scholar Irving source of authority, but to make the Security
Brecher has written, the United Nations Council work better than it has.57
can be particularly proud of its socio-eco But the bottom line is that those who
nomic achievements but has, in general, wish to salvage a role for the current system
performed abysmally on the political, diplo find themselves supporting the United Na
matic, and military fronts.53 Andrei Piont- tions mostly from a lack of anywhere better
kovsky dismisses the United Nations and to go. As the American legal scholar An
the Security Council: Who indeed, will... thony Arend has put it, Policymakers
define whether the preventive strike is legit could declare the U N Charter framework
imate, and the extent of its validity [regard dead, and admit that charter law is no
ing] the actual threat? The Security Coun longer authoritative and controlling. But
cil? Has the Security Council ever defined to do so, even if it would be the most in
anything?54 (Piontkovskys alternative is tellectually honest approach, would only
to have the G-8 step in to decide such mat bring about a situation in which many
ters, which guarantees the participation of states would rejoice at the funeral and take
the industrial democracies of three conti advantage of such a lawless regime, and so
nents while also, of course, ensuring a the system remains the arbiter of force not
place at the table for the Russian Federa by choice, but by default.58
tion.) The British historian Robert Skidel- One remedy to this problem would be
sky has pointed out that the U N system not to abandon the United Nations, but to
was not set up to deal with the problems work around it. Stanley Hoffmann has pro
posed by rogue and failed states.55 And a posed a two-step process for ratifying inter
decade ago, Stanley Hoffmann wrote that ventions against clearly evil regimes that
the organization is simply not equipped to reinforces a moral order in which decisions
deal with collapsing states or with rulers about employing force would be made not
who systematically violate human rights.56 by a legalistic body like the United N a
Nor does the United Nations seem any bet tions, but by an organization based on
ter prepared today to cope with the addi shared democratic and liberal values. In

Hoffmanns alternative, the first resort in seats there in 2005.) During the Cold War,
any proposed intervention would be the Se such bizarre arrangements could be dis
curity Council. But if the Security Council missed as harmless opera bouffe in the halls of
demurs or is paralyzed, Hoffmann proposes an essentially powerless organization. But in
a recourse to a new body, which he calls the an age where states like Libya, or worse,
Association of Democratic Nations. This now demand that decisions about the use of
would be composed of N ATO members and force against terrorists and madmen must be
Asian, African, and Latin American liberal made collectively, the humor is decidedly
democracies, such as India, South Africa, lost.
and Chile, as well as Australia and New The central dilemma here is that it is
Zealand. Only liberal democracies would be inherently illogical to expect democratic
admitted as members. If such an association nations and their authoritarian enemies to
approved a collective intervention to change have a shared vision of international com
a regime, it would report its reasons and its munity. Dictators cannot be expected to
decisions to the secretary-general of the U N , support the overthrow of dangerous dicta
and could proceed to act.59 Hoffmanns plan tors any more than regimes run by religious
is interesting in many respects, but first and extremists can be expected to approve viola
foremost because, unlike purely procedural tions of national sovereignty aimed at the
solutions, it addresses the fundamental flaw elimination of terrorist groups that share
at the heart of the United Nations: its their ideology. As Hoffmann has rightly
membership. noted, Too many states among U N mem
There is no way around the reality that bers have bloody domestic records, and they
the current international order embodied in can be expected to block any proposal for a
the United Nations is one in which brutal forcible collective intervention to change a
*61
autocracies can and do thwart the efforts of regime.
advanced democracies and indeed do so If the United Nations cannot bring it
even while subjecting the ambassadors of self to condemn even the horrors of Darfur
those democracies to grating, high-minded because such naming and shaming can be
speeches about human rights and interna stopped by reprehensible regimes eager to
tional justice. Little wonder that when pro escape such censure themselves, how can it
cedural rigging by some of these nations be expected to exercise actual force against
torpedoed a vote in late 2004 to condemn such regimes in the future? During the
human rights violations in Sudans Darfur 1994 genocide in Rwanda, one of the rotat
region, U.S. ambassador John Danforth said ing seats in the Security Council was held
with frustration: One wonders about the by...Rwanda. (There was no move to expel
utility of the General Assembly on days like it.)62 During the 2003 deliberations about
this.60 Such shameful moments have pro Saddam Husseins repeated defiance of the
duced a kind of international case of cogni councils demands, another of the rotating
tive dissonance, in which the admirable seats was held by Syria, itself a Baathist dic
goals of institutions like the United Nations tatorship like Iraq. If the Security Council
cannot be squared with a feeling that the in must contend with such regimes in its
mates may be running the asylum. midst, how can it ever be expected to gov
A world in which Libya chairs the Hu ern the international system in a way that
man Rights Commission, for example, is a will reassure other nations and convince
world that makes little sense to many peo them to forgo their right to self-help?
ple. (Nor will things improve any time The United Nations cannot be salvaged
soon, with such champions of liberty as Su as the arbiter of discretionary force in an age
dan, Zimbabwe, and China taking their of prevention without significant reform to

both its structure and its charter. And sal are inherently less aggressive (at least
vaged it should be: despite a history of se against each other) than other kinds of
vere, sometimes even buffoonish missteps by regimes. Whether spreading democracy can
its leaders, the organization seeks noble ends stop terrorism or bring international peace
and retains a distinct legitimacy in the eyes is not the issue here; the more important
of many around the world.63 Soldiers have question, given the obstinacy of dictator
died in its service, attempting to save the ships when it comes to efforts to keep a
innocent and to keep peace and order in cor just and humane peace among nations, is
ners of the earth that would otherwise have whether terrorism, genocide, and other such
been left to their unhappy fates. To create an threats can be stopped by anything but
alternative institution in competition with democracies. While the democracies have
it, such as Hoffmanns notional Association much to answer for, recent history nonethe
of Democratic Nations (or the actual Com less confirms that illiberal regimes cannot
munity of Democracies founded by over a be counted on to act against threats to a lib
hundred nations in 2000), would only com eral order. Accordingly, the membership and
plicate matters, as each member of the the procedures of the Security Council must
new institution would in effect be redefin be changed. What follows is a proposal to
ing the original U.N. Charter and their ob that end.
ligations to it, and placing themselves and The conceptual foundation of this re
the remaining U.N. loyalists on a collision form would consist of jettisoning years of
course. hypocrisy and embracing democratic excep
How, then, can these contradictions be tionalism. This means going beyond utili
reconciled so that the United Nations can tarian arguments about the inherent peace
function effectively as an instrument that fulness of democracies, and establishing a
can instill fear in, and act against, genocidal principle that they are fundamentally better
dictators, aggressive rogues, and suicidal systems of government that by moral right
terrorists? Strict interpretations of interna are empowered to make decisions for the
tional law and of the U.N. Charter no sake of the international community that
longer have much force or appeal. Worse, despotisms may not. This would merely
attempts to corral violence under a legalistic codify what Marc Trachtenberg identified
U.N. regime will only increase the tendency over a decade ago as a long-term historical
for states and their leaders to think in terms trend...toward increasing recognition of the
of their own security and values rather than right of the civilized world to uphold certain
loyalty to a universal institution, a perverse standards of behavior that states, for ex
effect, as the legal scholar Michael Glennon ample, should not be free to massacre their
calls it, of the effort to force a legalist use- own citizens or allow their territory to serve
of-force system on a world that is not ready as a base for piracy or terrorism.63 This
for it....64 would amount to an assertion of democratic
The reason the world is not ready for a supremacy: that regimes chosen by, and ac
universalist legal order regarding the use of countable to, their own people have rights
force is that the world is not populated by in the international system that other kinds
universally legalist regimes, and that reali of regimes do not. No longer would a Can
zation points to a difficult, even radical ada or Norway or Japan have to justify itself
answer. to a Cuba or Burma or Iran, a situation that
has long defied common sense and offends
Embracing Democratic Exceptionalism even a rudimentary sense of justice.
Much ink has been spilled in recent years The structural expression of this affirma
over the question of whether democracies tion of the supremacy of democracy would

be to close the membership of the Security accept each other as such), it might be pos
Council to illiberal regimes that is, to sible to create a mechanism by which a su
states whose leaders govern by coercion, are permajority of the council could defeat the
unaccountable to their own people, and who veto of one member. This might be a way
suppress basic human freedoms. out of the paralysis in which the council
Such a restructuring would amount to a constantly finds itself, and could open the
declaration that regimes that violate human way for greater unanimity in its decisions.68
rights, threaten international order, and seek This would help make powerful democ
ever more lethal technologies will no longer racies, including the United States, more in
be welcomed in deliberations about whether clined to think of the United Nations as the
to use force against regimes that consis first resort in times of danger, since its deci
tently violate human rights, threaten inter sions would be the product of deliberation
national order, and seek ever more lethal among states like themselves that they
technologies. There is a reason that felons would be more likely to trust. No great
cannot vote or sit on juries, and this ju power will ever abide by a decision it finds
risprudential principle should now be ap utterly unacceptable, but where there is
plied in the international community as room for compromise, the moral force of a
well. While this could be derided as dis preponderance of voting democracies might
criminatory, the Security Council with its have more influence than a five-way chess
permanent and unaccountable Big Five is game among the veto-holders. And while
already inherently and structurally discrimi there may always be conflicts with prickly
natory. The existence of the veto in particu powers like France, disagreements between
lar makes nonsensical the Charters organiz France and the United States are at least ar
ing principle of sovereign equality.66 guments between allies that have each sacri
Accordingly, concurrent with this re ficed lives for the defense of liberty and have
form of the Security Councils membership, earned a greater right to decide questions of
the veto as it is currently practiced should international order than thuggish states like
be abolished. Irving Brecher rightly argues Syria or North Korea.
that the structure of the Security Council I realize that any radical proposal for re
and the veto are now outdated, and that in form is unlikely to succeed because of the
an age of rogues and terrorists, decisions on tautology of the veto (that is, any proposed
war and peace are too important to be left to changes in the nature of the Security Coun
the whims, threats, or machinations of any cil and the veto will, of course, be vetoed).
single member-state.67 But what I propose is possible if the United
The Security Council veto is not neces States and the major powers of the world
sarily any worse an idea than the veto in a agree to change the charter and threaten
domestic presidential system. It slows in unilaterally to revise their own understand
temperate action and allows the five perma ing of their right to self-defense if their de
nent members the ability to act with less mands are not met.
fear of being overtaken by resolutions of That is, the United States and other
hostile intent. But it is an absolute veto countries advocating reform would have to
and cannot be overturned. In a body whose demand that the United Nations change or
rotating members may include some of the henceforth issues of international security
worlds worst regimes at any given moment, will be settled outside of New York. Amer
this is wise. But if the Security Council ica and other like-minded nations might
were restructured to admit only liberal retain their U.N. membership, but they
regimes (perhaps by vote of established would refuse even to go through the mo
democracies that mutually recognize and tions of submitting proposed military

actions to the Security Council. (This might composed only of liberal democracies whose
even be popular: a recent German Marshall voters would be no more unpredictable or
Fund study of European and American atti emotional than their own.
tudes toward the use of force found that Here, the United States would have to
Americans by a significant majority value exercise the boldest kind of leadership. A
the approval of their main allies more than stated American willingness to abide by
that of the United Nations, or even N A TO , such a reformed veto would create palpable
while almost as many Europeans would pressure on China and other states to follow
accept the approval of their chief allies as suit, not only because it would represent
they would the blessing of the United Na Washingtons stunning departure from 40
tions as sufficient legitimization for ac years of precedent, but because it would
tion.)69 The democratic great powers would show an American acceptance of new rules
withdraw into a twenty-first-century ver that could actually constrain the use of U.S.
sion of the Concert of Europe, with U.N. power.
bureaucrats left to supervise things like lit One optimistic sign is that China has
eracy and child vaccination programs on not opposed what appears to be a recent ten
whatever budget wealthier states wished to dency for the Security Council to act in fa
afford them. vor of democracy, as the American legal
The most obvious impediment to this scholar John Owen has noted:
idea can be summed up in five words: the
Peoples Republic of China. How can any Is a norm arising calling for the
such reform take place when the worlds extirpation of illiberal government
largest dictatorship holds a permanent seat wherever it is found? Such a norm,
in what should be a conclave of democra of course, would lead to continuous
cies? There is no easy answer to this ques interventions around the world. But
tion. The first step would be to defang so long as China remains illiberal,
the veto: if the United States, Britain, the Security Council will not adopt
France, and even Russia were to agree to that norm. Instead, it seems to have
limits on the veto, Beijing might see this adopted a more limited norm oppos
as a development that it had no choice ing the forcible overthrow of liberal
but to accept. But even this assumes that government. The Council is leaving
Russia and France which exercise diplo established authoritarian States
matic power in the council far in excess alone, but acting to restore liberal
of their actual military or economic government where it has been ille
capacity only because of their absolute gally removed.70
veto would agree to accept a new, demo
cratically sustained veto. (Britain, it could China may not be opposing this trend be
be argued, punches above its weight in cause there appears to be a grandfather
international affairs, not because of its clause for existing dictatorships and, in
veto but because of its unique relationship deed, an assurance that the democracies in a
with the United States and greater will reformed United Nations will not embark
ingness to employ its military forces.) on a democratization crusade might be nec
But France and Russia should be reminded essary. However, there is no reason for the
that their systems of domestic government, democracies to accept a retroactive absolu
like Americas, contain similar veto over tion of current U.N. members when it
ride mechanisms, and it is at least possible comes to Security Council membership (or,
that they might accept that their interests for that matter, seats on committees on hu
would be less threatened by a chamber man rights or nonproliferation).

In the end, if the other major powers in us in our discussions about administering
sist on change another significant assump the global economy and the global peace,
tion, since it would require Russia and you must represent a regime that is like
France to oppose China, which neither na ours. This not only enhances the moral
tion has shown itself inclined to do Bei clarity and political coherence of these or
jing would have the choice of accepting its ganizations, it also provides a powerful
seat in a reformed Security Council or opt incentive to the nations that wish to join
ing out of the U.N. system entirely. If the them. It could be argued, for example, that
worlds largest country in terms of popula Russia has not slid further back toward re
tion withdraws, it could be a mortal blow to pression, and is not a more illiberal regime,
the U.N. Charter. But if China defected precisely because it wants to keep its place
alone, it could also be the beginning of a in the G-8, just as other states would hope
long period in which China returned to its to maintain their right to sit in a new Secu
pre-1971 status as something of a pariah rity Council.
state. Neither alternative is a happy one, but A second answer to charges of discrimi
neither is worse than the collapse of order nation might be to ask: So what?
that will come without reform. At what point do the nations that have
The potentially irresolvable problem created and sustain the liberal international
of China aside, there are numerous other order cease apologizing for insisting on the
diplomatic objections that might be raised right to take measures for the stability of
about redefining U.N. membership and that order without having to suffer the
basing it on the nature of regimes, rather presence of the enemies of that same order
than on their mere existence as states. On in their deliberations? Or as George Shultz
a purely practical level, the symbolism of put it: If you are one of these criminals in
closing the Security Council to illiberal charge of a state, you no longer should ex
states means offending some American pect to be allowed to be inside the system at
friends like Pakistan that are providing the same time that you are a deadly enemy
significant support at the moment, any of it.71
way in the struggle against terrorism. None of this is to deny the historical
(Uzbekistan, for example, recently decided sins, blunders, and even crimes the democ
it has heard enough U.S. criticism of its au racies have committed in the past century in
thoritarian ways and now wants the Ameri establishing the international system as it
can base there vacated by 2006.) Likewise, exists today. But acknowledging, for exam
drawing a clear line between democracies ple, that Belgium and Japan were once cruel
and dictatorships will be difficult to do, colonial powers does not logically lead to
and risks alienating nations in transition. the conclusion that they therefore and in
More alarming is that such exceptionalism perpetuity, no matter what atonement they
in the Security Council could end up widen make, have no better moral right to inter
ing the gulf between the democracies and vene against genocidaires or to destroy terror
the countries they hope to shepherd away ist training camps than the countries that
from authoritarianism. actually produce or support such threats.
But the fact is that the United States Nor is the system perfect; the age of preven
and its major allies already practice discrim tion should not be a pretext for ensuring the
ination in organizations like the G-8, N A TO , hegemony of a small circle of powers by
and even the European Union (just ask crushing all challenges to the status quo.
Russia or Turkey). In these institutions, the But hypothetical fears of imperialism should
democracies have taken the stand that they not be the argument for inaction in the face
should take in the United Nations: to join of tangible dangers.

One final and more immediate objection al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen in 2002.72
to all this is that it is irrelevant, because (Anne-Marie Slaughter, for one, has called
the age of prevention has not arrived and for reforms that would allow the United
never will. Neither the United States nor its Nations to issue death warrants against dan
allies, critics will object, have the unlimited gerous dictators rather than punish innocent
capability or more importantly, the will civilians in wars to remove them.)73 Even
to engage in a series of wars to right the larger operations will not require invest
worlds many wrongs. In the wake of the ments the size of Operation Iraqi Freedom;
costs of the ongoing conflict in Iraq, why the commanding general of the U.N. force
assume that citizens of the democracies will in Rwanda at the height of the genocide
continue to take up the burdens of preven asked for only 5,000 troops.74 Likewise,
tive action even if the United Nations is dousing the civil war in Somalia in the early
changed to allow it? Washington and Lon 1990s a temporary victory, to be sure, and
don, in particular, have been reminded that one that unraveled for political, rather than
regime change is a messy, even sordid, busi military reasons took less than 40,000
ness (as it was, for example, in Haiti a soldiers.
decade ago), and it is an open question how None of this is to say that any of these
many more such complicated operations the actions can be accomplished without com
American and British publics will approve. plications, unintended consequences, or the
There is no way to tell what level of deaths of innocent civilians. Friction and
threat will be required to trigger American confusion are immutable characteristics of
public support for another intervention military conflict. And without question, it
somewhere in the world. As of this writing, should never be assumed that wars to topple
a majority of Americans disapprove of Presi governments, whether on a humanitarian
dent Bushs handling of the war, but the basis or as a preventive campaign against a
current state of affairs in Iraq probably says dangerous regime, will be without risks.
little about what measures they might coun But the fact remains that more limited pre
tenance if al-Qaeda once again burrows into ventive actions or even smaller preventive
a ruling regime as it did in Afghanistan, or wars, meant to achieve specific goals (such
if a bizarre leader like Kim Jong II were to as destruction of a weapons site or elimina
make imprudent or risky threats to use nu tion of a terrorist facility) rather than full-
clear weapons against American territory. scale occupations, are well within the capa
But to ask if the democracies will sup bilities of the developed democracies, espe
port more operations like Iraq is to ask the cially if they act together, and can be con
wrong question. Regime change would ducted without undue strain on their soci
doubtless be the very rarest kind of military eties or their economies. The need to under
action in the age of prevention. Totalitarian take a mission the size of that in Iraq or
states like Baathist Iraq, which due to their even Afghanistan will (it is hoped) be rare;
inability to reform peacefully are likelier in any case, if such actions are undertaken
candidates for regime change when they be with the approval of a reformed United
come a threat beyond their borders or begin Nations they might well attract a larger
the massive extermination of innocents, are multilateral force that will share the burden.
few and far between. Rather, the more com In the end, objections to reforming the
mon incidents will involve smaller-scale op Security Council or the United Nations as a
erations resembling the Israeli raid on an whole risk becoming moot, because they are
Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, or the use of already being overtaken by events. The wars
covert operations, commandos, or other spe in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the subsequent
cialized forces in strikes like the attack on occupations, were in fact actions taken by

coalitions of democracies in order to topple wave of global democratization, the United

hideous governments and place their popu Nations will be doomed, at least as an ar
lations under de facto trusteeships until biter of the use of force. If states are going
elections could be held to create freely cho to act on notions of rights and justice in go
sen (if not yet completely independent) gov ing to war whether to alleviate suffering
ernments in both of them. or to prevent aggression, terrorism, or other
In Afghanistan, the United States issued disasters international organizations must
an ultimatum to a Neanderthalic regime be constituted by members who believe that
that was not recognized by the rest of the they have the moral standing to levy judg
world (save for Pakistan, which created it), ment on each other. They also must be able
and when the ultimatum expired, the to act in concert, and no matter how much
regime was removed and the country put unseemly hissing and catcalling may some
under the administration of a multinational times take place between democracies, there
force. In Iraq, the United States, Britain, is an essential bond of trust between them
and their allies made a calculation that the that makes this cooperation possible.
regime in Baghdad had finally become an This kind of trust will be essential to
intolerable threat and again, after an ultima governing the use of force in an age of pre
tum, they removed it by force. They have vention, because without it, the temptation
since administered the affairs of Iraq not to self-help will become almost irresistible,
always competently, to be sure with the especially as the formal institutions of inter
U.S. coalition the guardian of the Iraqi state national order become increasingly divorced
until it could be handed to leaders chosen from how international order is actually
by the Iraqi people. Neither Iraq nor Af maintained. Michael Glennon has put it
ghanistan was ever officially called a trus best in comparing the two universes of
teeship or protectorate, but if we are to conflict resolution in the modern world and
call things by their right name, that is what his description is worth considering at
they were. length:
Critics may well object that it is pure
arrogance to declare certain governments in In one universe a de jure regime con
competent or dangerous, and then to attack tinues the traditional pacific dispute
their territory or even remove their leaders. settlement process established by the
But such objections will not stop the great Charter.... In the other universe is a
powers from doing so again when they de facto system. It is a geopolitical
think they must. It might be better simply regime over which the strong pre
to abandon all pretense and accept the reali side. It bears little resemblance to
ty that there are states that either cannot, or the formal regime of the Charter. Its
will not, administer their own affairs in a ordering principle is not consent but
way that is not a danger to their own people power. Its rules are made not by stu
or to others. When they must be reckoned dents international law journals but
with by force, as some of them necessarily by N A TO activation orders and the
will be, such actions should be exercised Pentagons rules of engagement. Its
within the constraints of, and as much as membership is selective. Its partici
possible subject to, the requirements of a re pants are the like-minded states of
formed Security Council. N ATO and other Western democra
The essential point is that unless the cies...[that] by and large trust one
iron tautology of the veto is broken and another because they share the same
the composition of the Security Council values. They support the jaw-jawing
changed in a way that reflects the growing of the de facto regime because they

recognize that when pacific dispute The alternative is a world where inter
settlement fails, it is they who will national order will depend only on the
have to do the heavy lifting: When willingness of powerful states to secure it,
international order is threatened either alone or together. At first glance, this
...they are the ones to restore it.75 might seem an arrangement that favors the
interests of the United States, the most
This de facto order exists because the powerful nation the world has ever seen.
regimes in it realize their democratic and But it cannot be in Americas interest, or
humanistic values cannot be served by inter anyone elses, to live in a world where order,
national institutions that are infested by to say nothing of justice, is administered
some of the worst enemies of democracy and in an anarchic environment where firm
humanity. It is time at least to acknowl alliances against civilizations common
edge, if not solve, this problem. enemies break down into temporary mar
riages of convenience. Such improvised
The Next Step arrangements will solve problems only fit
The dilemma of preventive war is here to fully, and probably only once they reach
stay. There are still too many places that crisis proportions. No matter how noble
stand apart from civilization where hu their intentions, if powerful states take it
man rights are not respected, where dicta upon themselves to act (whether alone or
tors who answer to no one rule with the in packs) to extinguish potential dangers,
whip of violence and intimidation, where they run the risk not only of reprising the
fanatics brew plots against the international arrogant sins of ancient Athens but also of
status quo and seek the weapons that could coming into conflict with each other, with
bring them to fruition. Too many states catastrophic results.
are little better than criminal enterprises,
ethnic killing zones, and havens for terror Notes
ists and other barbarians. They are threats The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the
both to their own people and to interna Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs
tional order. The Westphalian notion of and the Naval War College Foundation, and to thank
sovereignty has already been breached by Andrew Bacevich, Joan Johnson-Freese, Robert
the necessity for humanitarian intervention, Lieber, and Nicholas X. Rizopoulos for their com
and now the international community must ments.
take the next step and legitimize action 1. Preemption, or acting first to spoil the at
not only to prevent terrible regimes from tack of an enemy clearly preparing to strike, has long
annihilating their own people, but also to been an acceptable form of self-defense. Prevention,
coordinate preventive action against such on the other hand, involves striking an opponent
regimes when they seek to undermine inter who may not yet pose an obvious danger based on
national order. calculations about whether it will pose a threat in the
Current international norms and legal future and whether future military circumstances
statutes are outdated, with international in will be as advantageous later.
stitutions consequently incapacitated in the 2. Peter Dombrowski and Rodger A. Payne,
face of these new dangers. Changes legal, Preemptive War: Crafting a New Norm , paper
institutional, normative are necessary, and presented at the International Studies Association
given the dangers of the new century, a dra Annual Meeting, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1-5
matic reinterpretation of traditional notions 2005, p. 14.
of sovereignty and of the traditional prohi 3. Paul Schroeder, Iraq: The Case Against Pre
bitions on the use of force may not be such a emptive War, American Conservative, October 2002,
bad thing after all. http://www.amconmag.com/10_21/iraq.html.

4. Stephen Krasner, "The Day After, Foreign a declaration of war, but since it was an individual, it
Policy, January/February 2005, pp. 68-69- was only propaganda. See Richard Schultz, Jr., How
5. Interview with Maj. Gen. Peter Williams, Clinton Let al-Qaeda G o, Weekly Standard, January
U K Army Reserve, Moscow, April 7, 2005. 19, 2004.
6. This and subsequent references to this 17. President Bush later recalled what he was
speech are from Kofi Annan, speech to United N a thinking when told of the World Trade Center at
tions General Assembly, 54th session, September 20, tack: They had declared war on us, and I made up
1999 (A/54/PV.4), official record. my mind at that moment that we were going to
7. Francois Heisbourg, A Work in Progress: war, an instinct shared by many top U.S. leaders
The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences, Washing that day. See Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New
ton Quarterly, vol. 26 (spring 2003), p. 81. But, as York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 15.
the legal scholar Michael Glennon later noted, these 18. There were other unrelated incidents that
arguments about exceptions were more like wishful sharpened public fears of terrorism as well, like the
thinking. See Michael J . Glennon, Limits of Law, Pre March 1995 nerve gas attack in the Japanese subway
rogatives of Power {New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 185. system and the Oklahoma City bombing a month
8. Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to later, which until 2001 held the record as the worst
Protect: When Its Right to Fight, http://www. act of terrorism within the United States.
progressive-governance.net. 19. Shultz, Essential War, p. 18.
9. Some legal scholars go even further. In de 20. Government of the United Kingdom,
fending the 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, Anthony Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror
D Amato has argued that human rights law not Threat, March 5, 2004, http://www.number-10.
only allows, but demands intervention against tyran gov.uk/output/Page5461 .asp.
ny (emphasis added). See Anthony D Amato, The 21. Robert J . Lieber, Foreign-Policy Realists
Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyr Are Unrealistic on Iraq, Chronicle of Higher Education
anny, American Journal of International Law, vol. 84 online, October 18, 2002.
(April 1990). 22. Dombrowski and Payne, Preemptive War,
10. Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, A p. 14.
Duty to Prevent, Foreign A ffairs, vol. 83 (January/ 23. Secretary of Defense William Perry warned
February 2004), pp. 149-50. almost a decade ago of a future threat that a rogue
11. Marc Trachtenberg, "Intervention in Histor state, that may be impossible to deter, will obtain
ical Perspective, in Emerging Norms ofJustified Inter ICBMs that can reach the United States. Quoted in
vention, ed. Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen (Cam Robert Litwak, The New Calculus of Preemption,
bridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sci Survival, vol. 44 (winter 2002/03), p. 56.
ences, 1993), p- 15. 24. Keith Payne, The Fallacies of Cold War Deter
12. John M. Deutsch, The New Nuclear rence and a New Direction (Lexington, KY: University
Threat, Foreign A ffairs, vol. 71 (fall 1992), p. 133. of Kentucky Press, 2001), p. 87. See also William C.
13. Michael Mandelbaum, Lessons of the Next Martel, Deterrence and Alternative Images of N u
Nuclear War, Foreign A ffairs, vol. 74 (March/April clear Possession, in The Absolute Weapon Revisited:
1995), pp. 24, 37. Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order, ed.
14. The address was to the Pentagon and the T. V. Paul, Richard J . Harknett, and Jam es J . Wirtz
Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 17, 1998 (em (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
phasis added). Available at http://www.cnn.com/ 25. M. Elaine Bunn, Preemptive Action:
ALLPOLITICS/1998/02/17/transcripts/clinton.iraq. When, How, and to What Effect? Strategic Forum,
15. George P. Shultz, An Essential War, Wall U. S. National Defense University, no. 200 (July
StreetJournal, March 29, 2004. 2003), pp. 2-3.
16. The CIA, for example, agreed that if a gov 26. Profile: Kim Jong-11, BBC News World
ernment had issued something akin to Osama bin Edition online, Ju ly 31, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
Ladens fatw a against the United States, it would be 2/hi/asia-pacific/1907197 .stm.

27. Dombrowski and Payne, Preemptive War, 44. Quoted in Pavel Felgenhauer, Military
p. 14. Doctrine or Election Manifesto? The Ivanov Doc
28. Heisbourg, Work in Progress, p. 83. trine, Perspectives, vol. 14 (January-February 2004),
29. The belief that pre-9/11 defense strategies p. 1.
do not correspond to new security threats threats 45. Steve Gutterman, Russia Threatens to
not only to the United States but also to Europe is Strike Terror Bases, Associated Press wire, Septem
reflected in the national security documents of the ber 8, 2004.
key European states (Tomas Valasek, New Threats, 46. C N N online, Russia Considers Terror
New Rules: Revising the Law of War, World Policy Strikes, September 17, 2004, http://edition.cnn.
Journal, vol. 20 [spring 2003], p. 20). com/2004/WORLD/europe/09/17/russia.putin.
30. Prime Minister Warns of Continuing 47. Andrei Piontkovsky, The Pillars of Inter
Global Terror. national Security: Traditions Challenged, Yademy
31. European Union, Basic Principles for an Kontrol Digest, vol. 8 (summer/fall 2003),
EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of p. 23.
Mass Destruction, June 16, 2003, http://europa-eu- 48. Ivanov made this point explicitly in an in
un.org/articles/en/article_2478_en.htm. terview in 2003. See Svetlana Babaeva, Rossiia vper-
32. Government of France, Ministry of Defense, vye obiavila o vozmozhnosti primenenie voennoi sily
2003-2008 Military Program, http://www.defense. protiv respublik byvshego Soiuza, Izvestia, October
gouv.fr/english/files/d 140. 12, 2003.
33. Elizabeth Bryant, Paris Denies Ending De 49. Quoted in Antoaneta Bezlova, Chinas Iraq
terrence Strategy, UPI wire, October 27, 2003. Stance Pleases US For Now, A sia Times Online,
34. John Allen, Vatican Shifts on Preventive War," October 10, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
National Catholic Reporter, January 23, 2004, p. 7. China/DJ10Ad06.html.
35. Robert Hill, The U N Charter Is Out 50. Bates G ill and Jam es Reilly, Sovereignty,
dated, International Herald Tribune online edition, Intervention, and Peacekeeping: The View from Bei
December 2, 2002. jing, Survival, vol. 42 (autumn 2000), p. 47.
36. Bunn, Preemptive Action, p. 6. 51. Michael Glennon has pointed out that when
37. Gerard Henderson, World Order From Annan gave his 1999 speech in the wake of NATO's
the Old to the New, Australian Journal of Interna Kosovo operation in which he accepted a norm of hu
tional A ffairs, vol. 57 (November 2003), p. 481. manitarian intervention, most proponents of the idea
38. See Bunn, Preemptive Action, p. 6; and were found among the Western democracies, while
Japan Can Seek Pre-emptive Strike: Constitution the opponents were mostly Latin American, African,
Allows Action If Launch Imminent, Agency Chief and Arab states. See Michael J . Glennon, Why the
SaysJ Jap an Times, January 25, 2003, http://www. Security Council Failed, Foreign A ffairs, vol. 82
japantimes.com. (May/June 2003).
39- Quoted in Bunn, "Preemptive Action, p. 7. 52. Dombrowski and Payne, Preemptive War,
40. Japan Threatens Force against N Korea, p. 8.
BBC News online, February 14, 2003, http://news. 53. Irving Brecher, In Defence of Preventive
bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/world/asia-pacific/27 5792 3 .stm. War: A Canadians Perspective, InternationalJournal,
41. Eric Heginbotham and Richard J . Samuels, vol. 58 (summer 2003), pp. 258-59.
Japans Dual Hedge, Foreign A ffairs online author 54. Piontkovsky, Pillars of International Secu
update, March 2003, http://www.foreignaffairs.org. rity, p. 24.
42. Rajan Menon, The End of Alliances, World 55. Robert Skidelsky, "The Ju st War Tradition,
Policy Journal, vol. 20 (summer 2003), p- 13. Prospect, December 2004, p. 31.
43. Sophie Lambroschini, Russia: Moscow 56. Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled
Struggles to Clarify Stance on Preemptive Force, Peace in the Post-Cold War Era (Lanham, MD: Row-
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report, October 14, man & Littlefield, 1998), p. 185.
2003. 57. Evans, Responsibility to Protect.

58. Anthony Clark Arend, International Law the charter or, in the case of peacekeeping, Chapter
and the Preemptive Use of Military Force, Washing VII and anything involving military force. Since
ton Quarterly, vol. 26 (spring 2003), p. 101. these are the questions on which preventive action
59- Hoffmann, World Disorders, p. 80. would deadlock, I do not see where this solves the
60. Quoted in Robert McMahon, Human problem, but it is a least an argument for limiting
Rights and U .N . Wrongs, Weekly Standard, May 23, the veto. See Jam es Sutterlin, The Past as Pro
2005, p. 19. Criticisms of the human rights records logue, in The Once and Future Security Council, ed.
of Zimbabwe and Belarus were also sabotaged. Bruce Russett (New York: St. Martins, 1997), p. 7.
61. Hoffmann, World Disorders, p. 79. 69- German Marshall Fund, Transatlantic
62. Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell: Amer Trends 2004, p. 15, http://www.transatlantictrends.
ica and the Age of Genocide (New York: Perennial, org.
2003), p. 369- 70. John M. Owen IV, International Law and
63- As Anne-Marie Slaughter rightly notes, the Liberal Peace, in Democratic Governance and In
when [the United Nations] speaks in unison, it ternational Law, ed. Gregory H. Fox and Brad R.
projects moral authority that no individual govern Roth (Cambridge, U K : Cambridge University Press,
ment can match (Mercy K illings, Foreign Policy, 2000), pp. 382-83.
May/June 2003, p. 72). 71. Shultz, Essential War.
64. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power, 72. Tellingly, Washington warned the Yemenis
p. 167. that it would take matters into its own hands if
65. Trachtenberg, Intervention in Historical Yemen was unwilling to take action against the ter
Perspective, p. 30 (emphasis added). rorists there. See Phillip Smucker, The Intrigue be
66. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power, hind the Drone Strike, Christian Science Monitor on
p. 151. line edition, November 12, 2002.
67. Brecher, In Defense of Preventive War, 73. Slaughter, Mercy K illings, pp. 12Tb.
p. 259. lA . Power, Problem from Hell, p. 350.
68. Former U .N . Secretariat member Jam es Sut- 75. Glennon, Limits of Law, Prerogatives of Power,
terlin has argued for keeping the absolute veto, but pp. 177-78.
limiting its use only to issues under Chapter VII of

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Anarchy and Order in the New Age of Prevention

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intervention, reconsideration of the problem thousand people in a single day of terrorist

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Security Council Resolution 1441, which preventive action is justified. O f course,

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coalitions of democracies in order to topple wave of global democratization, the United

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