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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L21749September29,1967

REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES,plaintiffappellee,
vs.

LUZONSTEVEDORINGCORPORATION,defendantappellant.

OfficeoftheSolicitorGeneralforplaintiffappellee.
H.SanLuisandL.V.Simbulanfordefendantappellant.

REYES,J.B.L.,J.:

ThepresentcasecomesbydirectappealfromadecisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila(CaseNo.44572)
adjudging the defendantappellant, Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, liable in damages to the plaintiffappellee
RepublicofthePhilippines.

IntheearlyafternoonofAugust17,1960,bargeL1892,ownedbytheLuzonStevedoringCorporationwasbeing
toweddownthePasigriverbytugboats"Bangus"and"Barbero"1alsobelongingtothesamecorporation,whenthe
bargerammedagainstoneofthewoodenpilesoftheNagtahanbaileybridge,smashingthepostsandcausingthe
bridgetolist.Theriver,atthetime,wasswollenandthecurrentswift,onaccountoftheheavydownpourofManila
andthesurroundingprovincesonAugust15and16,1960.

SuedbytheRepublicofthePhilippinesforactualandconsequentialdamagecausedbyitsemployees,amounting
to P200,000 (Civil Case No. 44562, CFI of Manila), defendant Luzon Stevedoring Corporation disclaimed liability
therefor,onthegroundsthatithadexercisedduediligenceintheselectionandsupervisionofitsemployeesthat
the damages to the bridge were caused by force majeure that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and that the
Nagtahanbaileybridgeisanobstructiontonavigation.

Afterduetrial,thecourtrenderedjudgmentonJune11,1963,holdingthedefendantliableforthedamagecaused
byitsemployeesandorderingittopaytoplaintifftheactualcostoftherepairoftheNagtahanbaileybridgewhich
amountedtoP192,561.72,withlegalinterestthereonfromthedateofthefilingofthecomplaint.

DefendantappealeddirectlytothisCourtassigningthefollowingerrorsallegedlycommittedbythecourtaquo, to
wit:

I The lower court erred in not holding that the herein defendantappellant had exercised the diligence
requiredofitintheselectionandsupervisionofitspersonneltopreventdamageorinjurytoothers. 1awphl.nt

II The lower court erred in not holding that the ramming of the Nagtahan bailey bridge by barge L1892
wascausedbyforcemajeure.

IIIThelowercourterredinnotholdingthattheNagtahanbaileybridgeisanobstruction,ifnotamenace,
tonavigationinthePasigriver.

IV The lower court erred in not blaming the damage sustained by the Nagtahan bailey bridge to the
improperplacementofthedolphins.

VThelowercourterredingrantingplaintiff'smotiontoadducefurtherevidenceinchiefafterithasrested
itscase.

VIThelowercourterredinfindingtheplaintiffentitledtotheamountofP192,561.72fordamageswhichis
clearlyexorbitantandwithoutanyfactualbasis.
However,itmustberecalledthattheestablishedruleinthisjurisdictionisthatwhenapartyappealsdirectlytothe
Supreme Court, and submits his case there for decision, he is deemed to have waived the right to dispute any
findingoffactmadebythetrialCourt.Theonlyquestionsthatmayberaisedarethoseoflaw(Savellanovs.Diaz,L
17441,July31,1963Aballevs.Santiago,L16307,April30,1963G.S.I.S.vs.Cloribel,L22236,June22,1965).A
converso, a party who resorts to the Court of Appeals, and submits his case for decision there, is barred from
contendinglaterthathisclaimwasbeyondthejurisdictionoftheaforesaidCourt.Thereasonisthatacontraryrule
would encourage the undesirable practice of appellants' submitting their cases for decision to either court in
expectation of favorable judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable
(Tyson Tan, et al. vs. Filipinas Compaia de Seguros) et al., L10096, Res. on Motion to Reconsider, March 23,
1966).Consequently,wearelimitedinthisappealtotheissuesoflawraisedintheappellant'sbrief.

Takingtheaforesaidrulesintoaccount,itcanbeseenthattheonlyreviewableissuesinthisappealarereducedto
two:

1)Whetherornotthecollisionofappellant'sbargewiththesupportsorpiersoftheNagtahanbridgewasin
lawcausedbyfortuitouseventorforcemajeure,and

2) Whether or not it was error for the Court to have permitted the plaintiffappellee to introduce additional
evidenceofdamagesaftersaidpartyhadresteditscase.

As to the first question, considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and
uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including barges like of
appellant's,itisundeniablethattheunusualeventthatthebarge,exclusivelycontrolledbyappellant,rammedthe
bridgesupportsraisesapresumptionofnegligenceonthepartofappellantoritsemployeesmanningthebargeor
thetugsthattowedit.Forintheordinarycourseofevents,suchathingdoesnothappenifpropercareisused.In
Anglo American Jurisprudence, the inference arises by what is known as the "res ipsa loquitur" rule (Scott vs.
LondonDocksCo.,2H&C596SanJuanLight&TransitCo.vs.Requena,224U.S.89,56L.Ed.,680Whitwell
vs.Wolf,127Minn.529,149N.W.299Brynevs.GreatAtlantic&PacificTeaCo.,269Mass.130168N.E.540
Gribsbyvs.Smith,146S.W.2d719).

Theappellantstronglystressestheprecautionstakenbyitonthedayinquestion:thatitassignedtwoofitsmost
powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge L1892 that it assigned to the task the more competent and
experienced among its patrons, had the towlines, engines and equipment doublechecked and inspected that it
instructeditspatronstotakeextraprecautionsandconcludesthatithaddoneallitwascalledtodo,andthatthe
accident,therefore,shouldbeheldduetoforcemajeureorfortuitousevent.

These very precautions, however, completely destroy the appellant's defense. For caso fortuito or force majeure
(whichinlawareidenticalinsofarastheyexemptanobligorfromliability)2bydefinition,areextraordinaryevents
notforeseeableoravoidable,"eventsthatcouldnotbeforeseen,orwhich,thoughforeseen,wereinevitable"(Art.
1174, Civ. Code of the Philippines). It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficultyto
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same: "un hecho no constituye caso fortuito por la sola
circunstanciadequesuexistenciahagamasdificilomasonerosalaacciondiligentedelpresentoofensor"(Peirano
Facio,ResponsibilidadExtracontractual, p. 465 Mazeaud Trait de la Responsibilite Civil, Vol. 2, sec. 1569). The
very measures adopted by appellant prove that the possibility of danger was not only foreseeable, but actually
foreseen,andwasnotcasofortuito.

Otherwisestated,theappellant,LuzonStevedoringCorporation,knowingandappreciatingtheperilsposedbythe
swollen stream and its swift current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger it therefore
assured the risk, and can not shed responsibility merely because the precautions it adopted turned out to be
insufficient.Hence,thelowerCourtcommittednoerrorinholdingitnegligentinnotsuspendingoperationsandin
holdingitliableforthedamagescaused.

Itavailstheappellantnaughttoarguethatthedolphins,likethebridge,wereimproperlylocated.Eveniftrue,these
circumstanceswouldmerelyemphasizetheneedofevenhigherdegreeofcareonappellant'spartinthesituation
involvedinthepresentcase.Theappellant,whosebargesandtugstravelupanddowntherivereveryday,couldnot
safelyignorethedangerposedbytheseallegedlyimproperconstructionsthathadbeenerected,andinplace,for
years.

On the second point: appellant charges the lower court with having abused its discretion in the admission of
plaintiff'sadditionalevidenceafterthelatterhadresteditscase.Thereisaninsinuationthatthedelaywasdeliberate
toenablethemanipulationofevidencetoprejudicedefendantappellant.

Wefindnomeritinthecontention.Whetherornotfurtherevidencewillbeallowedafterapartyofferingtheevidence
hasrestedhiscase,lieswithinthesounddiscretionofthetrialJudge,andthisdiscretionwillnotbereviewedexcept
inclearcaseofabuse.3
In the present case, no abuse of that discretion is shown. What was allowed to be introduced, after plaintiff had
rested its evidence in chief, were vouchers and papers to support an item of P1,558.00 allegedly spent for the
reinforcementofthepanelofthebaileybridge,andwhichitemalreadyappearedinExhibitGG.Appellant,infact,
hasnoreasontochargethetrialcourtofbeingunfair,becauseitwasalsoabletosecure,uponwrittenmotion,a
similarorderdatedNovember24,1962,allowingreceptionofadditionalevidenceforthesaiddefendantappellant.4

WHEREFORE,findingnoerrorinthedecisionofthelowerCourtappealedfrom,thesameisherebyaffirmed.Costs
againstthedefendantappellant.

Concepcion,C.J.,Dizon,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Sanchez,Castro,AngelesandFernando,JJ.,concur.
Bengzon,J.P.J.,onleave,tooknopart.

Footnotes
1Theleadtugboat"Bangus"waspullingthebarge,whilethetugboat"Barbero"washoldingorrestrainingitat
theback.

2Lasamvs.Smith,45Phil.661.

3Lopezvs.Liboro,81Phil.429.

4p.89,RecordonAppeal.

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