An Epistemological Foundation for Library and Information Science

Author(s): John M. Budd

Source: The Library Quarterly, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 295-318
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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 AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIBRARY AND
INFORMATION SCIENCE'

John M. Budd2

For most of its modern history libraryand information science has been gov-
erned by the mode of thinking best characterizedas positivism.This epistemol-
ogy, shared with most of the social sciences for some time, features the quest
for universal laws and the reduction of all phenomena, including behavioral,
cognitive, and so on, to the physical, among other elements. This means to
knowledge is unworkablefor this field; a proposed replacement for it is herme-
neutical phenomenology. This article outlines the elements of a revised episte-
mologicalapproach that seeks an understandingof the essences of things (such
as the library)and that takes into account, among other things, the intentional
stancesof the human actorswithin the realm of libraryand information science.
Such a re-formed epistemology allows for a different set of questions asked
and a different approach to answering them.

The Past and the Present in LIS and the Social Sciences

Possibly by accident but more likely by subtle or overt intention, there

is an epistemology that governs thought and work in library and infor-
mation science, whether or not it is realized or accepted. The governing
epistemology is that which we commonly call positivism, and its as-
cendance has resulted in both a philosophical stance and a mode of
behavior. The force of positivism has been recognized by Michael Har-
ris, who says, "This positivist epistemology now governs the thinking
of most serious researchers in library science (and probably all who
refer to themselves as 'information scientists')" [1, p. 220]. Harris has
also written that "research in library and information science has been
characterized by an increasingly rigid commitment to a positivist episte-

1. I would like to thank the following individuals for their invaluable comments and
suggestions: Robert Martin, Kathleen McCook, Douglas Raber, Charles Seavey, Danny
Wallace, and Wayne Wiegand.
2. School of Library and Information Science, University of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri
65211.

[LibraryQuarterly,vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 295-318]

C 1995 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0024-25 19/95/6503-0003$0 1.00

295

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296 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

mology that has led us to make a fetish of certain methodological ap-

proaches to our research and has blinded us to the right questions"[1,
p. 2171. Perhapswhat should be foremost in our own thinking in library
and information science is that research should be governed by ques-
tion, not by method. Harris'sis indeed a damning indictment,but before
determining whether it is warranted, some questions beg to be asked.
What exactly is positivism?The answer to this question is a bit elusive;
several genera and species of positivism have evolved over the years
since Auguste Comte coined the term [2]. At times, different names
have been applied to particularinterpretationsof the positivist episte-
mology, but there have been some shared features that have defined
the positivist stance.
Paul Tibbetts offers eight claims of positivism;some of these claims
are especially applicable to a generic mode of thought and have been
especially enduring. One of the claims (and perhaps the first in impor-
tance to operational positivism) is what Tibbetts, and others, refer to
as the deductive-nomological model of explanation [3, p. 185]. One
articulationof this claim expresses it as a "covering-lawmodel," which
Richard Miller describes as, "A valid explanation of an event [which]
must describe general characteristicsof the situation leading up to the
event and appeal to general empirical laws dictating that when such
characteristicsare realized, an event of that kind always (or almost al-
ways) follows"[4, p. 15]. Miller further points out that such a model, as
part of a governing positivistepistemology, extends beyond the natural
sciences and to the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)as well. Finn
Collin expresses it thusly: "According to the positivist view, why-
questions concerning human actions must be answered by specifying a
general law of human conduct of which the action to be explained is
an instance"[5, p. 75]. The lure of nomological explanation is indeed
compelling. In the intellectualsense it intimatesa structure upon which
predictions can be based; in the practicalsense it provides a rationale
for policy and decision making.
An example of this model of explanation exists in a prominent book
in our own field, An Introduction to Scientific Research in Librarianship.
Herbert Goldhor states that "a scientificlaw is the statement of a univer-
sal, invariant relationship between two or more variables.... The for-
mulation of such laws is the goal of research"[6, pp. 9-10]. There is
no subtlety here; Goldhor'sis an explicit statement of belief in the effi-
cacy of a nomological aim for library and information sciences. The
ultimate aim is a power of prediction of human behavior that rivals that
of physicalphenomena. Such a belief seems to forget that some physical
phenomena, such as the weather, are very difficult to predict because
of their inherent complexity. In commenting on Goldhor'sagenda, Ter-

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 297

rence Brooks observes that "[Goldhor] urges us to employ a positivist

methodology of experimentation and measurement to find universal
relationships among library variables. Such positivism is in the main-
stream of modern science where truth is equated with fact as revealed
by scientific experimentation. Unfortunately, the research experience
so far seems to indicate that information resists identification and mea-
surement, and relevance may be a chimera" [7, p. 239]. Brooks's specific
criticisms point to elusive concepts (and terminology) extant in library
and information science. Such concepts as relevance, and even informa-
tion, present definitional problems, most notably consistency of applica-
tion. For instance, is there a universal definition of relevance and a
universally applied determination of what may or may not be relevant?
A second claim common to positivism is that of reductionism. The
following is Paul Durbin's definition: "Reductionism is the philosophical
or ontological claim that there is nothing more to mental activity than
brain activity, or nothing more to brain activity than physiochemical
reactions, or-at the extreme-that there is nothing more to social phe-
nomena than, say, correlated nervous discharges in the physiology of
individual human organisms" [8, p. 263]. Reductionism is at the heart
of Rudolf Carnap's construction of language as the basis of distilling
all statements, including those expressing private experience, into ones
about the physical state of a person. In the extreme this entails reduction
to the physical state of making the statement itself. This extreme, as
Daniel Dennett observes, "is reductionism with a vengeance, taking on
the burden of replacing, in principle, all mentalistic predicates with co-
extensive predicates composed truth-functionally from the predicates
of physics" [9, p. 66]. A weakened form of reductionism is still implicit,
if not explicit, in much social science thought and research.
Third is the concept of phenomenalism (not to be confused with phe-
nomenology). According to phenomenalism, sensory observation is the
truest (and, in the most extravagant form, the only valid) grounding
for any claim. Further, any epistemological claim with a basis in anything
other than sensation is unreliable or meaningless. This strong version
of empiricism has its roots in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume but is beyond
even the empirical claims of Hume. Phenomenalism is also influenced
by Kant's definition of what constitutes phenomena (such as space, time,
and substance), while separating these elements from noumena (that
which can be conceived by reason, but not experienced by the senses,
such as the concept of a deity) [10, pp. 156-57]. The most radical ver-
sion of phenomenalism has been expressed by Ernst Mach, who, while
admitting that knowledge (at least of the working sort) may be suprasen-
sational, believed that sensation is the ultimate basis of all genuine
knowledge claims. The reason Mach was so skeptical of an atomic theory

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298 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

of matter, for instance, was that atoms, at least in his time, were beyond
the possibilityof direct observation.Mach'sarticulationof phenomenal-
ism was very influentialon the Vienna Circle, although the logical posi-
tivists incorporated the non-Machian aspect of the logic of language
into empirical verification. A form of phenomenalism is expressed in
librarianshipby Charles H. Busha and Stephen P. Harter. "In order to
study phenomena relating to libraries,information, or communication,
some method must be devised to measure them (or some part of them)
or to otherwise perceive them with the senses and, perhaps, with the
aid of special instruments"[11, pp. 6-7].
Mach'sphenomenalism also influenced what has become another of
the consistentclaimsof positivism,unity of science. In a sense, the unity-
of-science concept is the culminationof the three preceding claims. The
notion that general laws govern not just action but also essence implies,
and maybe even necessitates, a reductionist stance. For any law to be
a covering law means reducing it to as fundamental a set of principles
as possible. Such a set of principleslies behind Comte's hierarchyof the
sciences, in which he places mathematicsas primary and other sciences
derivative of it; further, the other sciences are derived from a con-
sciously ordered structure. Unity of science is tied as well to phenome-
nalismsince what else would science and its laws be based on but empiri-
cal observation?It is true that the unity-of-science doctrine, and all of
the consistent claims of positivism, have been attacked often and furi-
ously. The strength of the opposition to these concepts, and the force
of arguments against them, have led to substantialmoderation on the
part of their proponents. In fact, the practice of philosophy of science
no longer adheres to the strong version of these claims. While the strong
version is too constricting an epistemology (and one that is difficult to
defend), weaker versions still linger [12], although many philosophers
would choose not to couch their ideas in terms formerly employed. Even
in the face of this retreat, a work such as The Searchfor a ScientificProfes-
sion, by L. Houser and Alvin M. Schrader[13], is permeated by a convic-
tion that science is a singular force, of which library and information
science should be a part.
In what we know as the social sciences, and library and information
science as well, the claims of positivism have been tenacious, although
a direct debt to the positivisttraditionis not alwaysacknowledged.While
to some extent the positivist influence has waxed and waned, it has
seldom disappeared utterly, perhaps because of the attractivenessof its
claims, specificallythe phantasm of certainty. More recent theoretical
positions,which may be tacitlyor explicitlyadopted in libraryand infor-
mation science, share aspects of positivism,though again with scarcelya
mention of the word. In articulatingthe principlesof structuralanalysis,

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 299

Claude Levi-Strauss borrows heavily from the older discipline of struc-

tural linguistics, the basis of which was formulated in the heyday of
logical positivism. The point emphasized by Levi-Strauss is that "struc-
tural linguistics aims at discovering general laws" [14, p. 33] and that
induction is one means of deriving these laws. A nomological founda-
tion, it seems, is not only desirable but possible as well, given enough
data. Other theories are a bit further removed, but vestiges of the consis-
tent claims remain. For instance, functionalism-a theory of cognition-
grew from a machine stance, which held that neurophysiological de-
scriptions of brain function would lead to computational description of
specific states, to a modified position, though still one vested in the
physical sciences [15, 16]. Much of functionalism is tinged with a teleo-
logical element (a belief that action, as well as intention, is marked by
a purposive causality). Some degree of teleological characterization is
seen to provide a link between the mental and the physical with, as
William Lycan asserts, a connection of mental processes and biological,
and even psychological, laws [17]. In most explanations of teleological
functionalism, final cause is determined to be a product of, or at least
related to, evolution, whereby the past is a reasonable predictor of the
present, and the probable future can help to explain the present.
If positivism, in the generic sense, has been deemed viable in so many
theoretical constructions it should not be surprising that it is still seen
by a number of knowledgeable observers as persistent. Since library
and information science is related in subject and concept to, and shares
methods with, other social sciences, the practice of these related disci-
plines needs to be examined in brief as instructive to our own. James
Faulconer and Richard Williams recognize that positivism is not a single,
monolithic, school of thought, but assert that it "in one form or another
has dominated thinking and research in psychology for most of its his-
tory" [18, p. 1180]. Donald McCloskey looks at his own discipline of
economics and admits that positivism is alive and well. It is, as he says, a
"crude version" that almost eschews the philosophical foundation while
practicing the methods most clearly suited to observation and verifica-
tion [19]. Perhaps the discipline most enamored of a positivistic ap-
proach is sociology. Peter Halfpenny traces the influence of positivism
through sociological study and practice and finds a clear pedigree begin-
ning with Comte and continuing through Herbert Spenser and Ikmile
Durkheim to the present day [20]. Even in the more humanistic-leaning
disciplines, such as history, a positivistic bent not only has been evident,
but has also continued to find adherents, as Peter Novick points out,
in the name of objectivity [21, pp. 610-12].
It would be foolish to believe that all involved in the study and practice
of library and information science, and the social sciences at large, are

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300 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

positivists.A diversityof methods is employed, but many of the methods

have a basis in the consistent claims enumerated previously. It would
also be foolish to believe that library and information science has not
been strongly influenced by the research and scholarship-and meth-
ods-of these other disciplines. The positivism as practiced rather
widely even today is one of the stronger influences. That particular
kind of operational positivism employed today may be best described
by ChristopherBryant. He refers to an "instrumentalpositivism,"which
he says is "instrumentalinsofar as it confines social research to only
such questions as the limitation of current research instruments allow,
and it is positivistinsofar as this self-imposed constraint is indicative of
a determinationon the part of sociologiststo submit to rigours compara-
ble to those they attribute to natural sciences" [22, p. 133]. The first
criticismis an important one; it means that the questions asked (if they
are asked at all before the fact) are limited to certain methodologies.
Because of this limitation, the method structures inquiry; the quest, at
times, may be for data first, and only after the collection of data comes
the formulation of a question. His animadversion is applicable to any
pseudoresearch that has no clear notion of the question or problem at
the heart of the inquiry. There is, of course, not just a place for but
also an imperativefor quantitativestudy of social phenomena, including
phenomena intrinsicto the study of librariesand information. Statistical
analysisis a tool, among many tools, that enables the process and prod-
uct of interpretation.Quantificationdefinitely does not equate with posi-
tivism, but quantificationwith no context is frequently symptomaticof
positivist fallacy applied in lieu of genuine inquiry. Where quantitative
research fails is where much poorly conducted research fails-the abdi-
cation of the question in favor of the method. There are many questions
in our field and in all of the social sciences for which quantificationis
not just adequate but necessary as well. But quantitative methods (as
do all researchmethodologies) have limitationsthat must be recognized.
The principal limitation is the notion that statisticsequals empirical re-
search, that quantificationis a form of observation. An effect of the
notion is that what is quantified is not necessarilywhat is observed. An
example of this failing would be a survey that overfly equates responses
to questions with the behavior asked about in the questions. What is
observed in such an instance may be nothing more than the responses
themselves.
The limitations of quantificationare not always recognized. Charles
Davis, for instance,says that "socialand behavioralscientistshave wisely
tried to emulate the physical sciences because the techniques of the
physicalscientistswork.... The best hypotheses are general and quanti-
fiable" [23, p. 328]. The technique of the physical sciences do indeed

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 301

work-for physical phenomena. Davis's unstated assumption is that the

most appropriate stance with regard to the phenomena studied in li-
brary and information science is that of objectivism. There is no differ-
ence between physical and human (social, behavioral, cognitive, af-
fective) phenomena. A related (and also unstated) assumption is that
human phenomena can be reduced to physical phenomena. He is cor-
rect in cautioning against an avoidance of quantitative analysis where
such analysis is appropriate and in noting that quantitative means are
useful to much study in our field. He is incorrect in suggesting that
inferential statistics, by their nature, lead to valid inferences. Statistics,
as is true of any tool, will be as useful as their application permits.
This realization means that a study constructed around incomplete or
ill-defined variables or faulty hypotheses will likely not lead to "truth."
Also, the results of a quantitative study still must be interpreted; the
tool does not provide meaning or determine reasons for relationships
among variables.
Still, some are tempted, as Comte was, to look to the natural sciences
for a model of inquiry for the social sciences. Carl Hempel, who is
resistant to an admission that there is an inherent difference between
the sciences and the social sciences, states that "general laws [which he
defines as any 'statement of universal conditional form which is capable
of being confirmed or disconfirmed by suitable empirical findings'] have
quite analogous functions in history and in the natural sciences" [24,
p. 231]. After admitting to an inability to know all about a historical
event, Hempel claims that confirmable laws can be formulated (or "dis-
covered") in history. This claim is a seeming dualism that Hempel's kind
of positivism invites. The nomological stance beckons us to believe in
the existence of covering laws, but also introduces an ontological quan-
dary: If knowledge is imperfect, can we trust that we know enough,
and enough of the "right" kind of information, to confer anything ap-
proaching the status of a law on our knowledge? In other words, can
we ever assure "suitable empirical findings" to provide confirmation of
anything universal? Others heartily disagree with the natural sciences
model. John Searle puts his finger on the dilemma when he concludes
that "the radical discontinuity between the social sciences and the natu-
ral sciences doesn't come from the fact that there is only a disjunctive
connection of social and physical phenomena. It doesn't even come from
the fact that social disciplines have constitutive concepts which have no
echo in physics nor from the great complexity of social life"; it "derives
from the intrinsically mental character of social and psychological phe-
nomena" [25, p. 84]. Inherent in the mental character of social actors
(human beings) is intention, which underlies action. Intention sets the
social apart from the physical.

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302 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

Through his decidedly postpositivisttreatise, Thomas Kuhn has had

an enormous impact on studies in the history of science and, probably
unintentionally, on the social sciences. This is not the place for any
attempt at explicating Kuhn, but recognition of the influence that
Kuhn's ideas (and, perhaps more important, his terms) have had is es-
sential. In the aftermathof criticismsof imprecision, especially by Mar-
garet Masterman[26, pp. 61-651, Kuhn distills his intended meanings
of paradigm to two related definitions. In one sense, "it stands for the
entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by
members of a given community";in another, "it denotes one sort of
element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, em-
ployed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for
the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science" [27, p. 175].
What Kuhn seems to have meant is that the founding of the beliefs is
sufficiently strong that dispute is diminished and that practice within
the community can proceed on the basis of exemplars that have been
found fruitful in the past. Kuhn himself recognizes that he has "lost
control of the word" and that it has come to "seem a quasi-mystical
entity or property that, like charisma, transforms those affected by it"
[28, p. 272]. In short, "paradigm"has come to be seen less as descriptive
and more as normative. Not only that, but it seems to have attained
qualitativeand authoritarianconnotations. It is a "good thing"in a disci-
pline, and perhaps especially in a social science discipline, to be able to
recognize something that can be called a paradigm (even if paradigm
is redefined to signify little more than an agreed-upon hypothesis or
something as amorphous as "service").For about three decades this has
been a goal of the social sciences. Paul Feyerabend notes that "more
than one social scientist has pointed out to me that now at last he had
learned how to turn his field into a 'science'-by which of course he
meant that he had learned how to improve it. The recipe, according to
these people, is to restrict criticism, to reduce the number of compre-
hensive theories to one, and to create a normal science that has this
one theory as its paradigm"[29, p. 198].
So Kuhn's antipositivisttreatise is read by many about whose disci-
plines his observationswere never intended as a nomological foundation
upon which unity of science can be built. Somehow his ideas have be-
come operationallypositivist. His observationson the practice of scien-
tists have been misconstrued, as is noted above, as an ideal of scientific
behavior. The vast majorityof recent citations to Kuhn's writings have
appeared in the social science literature, and there is no dearth of cita-
tions in the literatureof libraryand information science. It is not uncom-
mon for many of these writings to view Kuhn's observations about the
behavior of scientists as prescriptive.Jeffrey Gatten, for instance, says

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 EPISTEMOLOGICALFOUNDATION FOR LIS 303

that "librariansneed to be conscious of the existence of paradigms,

how libraryscience paradigmsare organized, and how paradigms shape
practicewithin the profession"[30, pp. 583-84]. Others speak of a "new
paradigm"(whichassumesthat there is an old paradigm)and of striving
for the identificationof a paradigm to guide the study of library and
information science [31, 32]. One thing can be learned from Kuhn:
inquiry in our discipline will be advanced by a normative approach to
the key questions facing librariesand information. This lesson does not
necessitate a program aimed at discovering a set of covering laws or
even restricted by a set of methods. It is predicated on a degree of
agreement on the nature of the questions and on a shared, though
broad, way of thinking about them. Kuhn himself recognized that "sta-
bility ... cannot be expected when the unit under study is a social or
politicalsystem. No lasting base for normal, puzzle-solving science need
be availableto those who investigatethem; hermeneutic reinterpretation
may constantly be required" [33, p. 24].
If the foregoing is accepted as a description of the present state, then
Harris's comments strike at a shortcoming in thinking in library and
information science. Library and information science has groped for
an ideal method. As a discipline it has simply encamped itself with the
social sciences, which have been engaged in a quest for respect and
respectabilityas sciences. Insufficient critical questioning has been in-
volved in library and information science, just as there has been an
inadequacyof criticalquestioning in the social sciences at large. A move
to positivismas a workingepistemology is not a new one, though. There
is a hint of homage to empiricismin Pierce Butler'sIntroduction toLibraiy
Science.For instance, he writes, "The first phase in modern thought is
the accumulationof accurate quantitativedata derived solely from ob-
jective observation"[34, p. 11]. Butler should certainly not be taken
for a positivist, though; he emphasizes that observation is primarily a
springboard to explanation and evaluation. Moreover, his "science"is
a broad one, frequently used more in the sense of knowledge generally
than in emulation of natural science. In his later years, as John V. Rich-
ardson Jr. points out [35, pp. 87-89], Butler saw the danger of scien-
tism growing from the fixation on method [36]. This is the kind of
scientismthat F. A. Hayek defines as "a mechanicaland uncriticalappli-
cation of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they
have been formed" [37, p. 24]. The definition of the term offered by
Jurgen Habermas is even more damning: "'Scientism'means science's
belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand
science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather to identify knowl-
edge with science" [38, p. 4]. Discussion above points to the vitality of
scientism in library and information science thinking and writing as

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304 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

reflected in, for instance, Houser and Schrader. The diversity of pur-
pose among various disciplines precludes any effort at unification and
at imposing or prescribinga single approach. This reality has been rec-
ognized by more than one observer [39-411.

A Proposition in Mind

It is not sufficient to cast off positivism. For a discipline to advance

inquiry and to be reflexive it must have an epistemological foundation.
It is proposed here that hermeneuticalphenomenology supplant positiv-
ism as such a foundation. I hasten to note that this foundation is not
a method or set of methods (in fact, the concept of "method"is a decep-
tively problematic one), nor is it a set of problems to be addressed.
Rather, it is a description of a mental state and the public expression
of that state. It is a stance, a position-one that opens the inquirer to
possibilities instead of barricading avenues. It is also a vocabulary, a
means of expression, a way of describing and explaining. An array of
methods, both qualitativeand quantitative,can be employed as an exten-
sion of the stance, each method leading to interpretive potential. From
the perspectiveof an epistemology we can begin to explore the questions
deemed meaningful to libraryand information science. Moreover, this
epistemological foundation can help in the quest for meaningful ques-
tions. These assertionsmay sound simple, but arriving at and accepting
an epistemological foundation for behavior is definitely not simple. It
was by subdety and insinuation that positivism became an operational
epistemology for this field, but it was not a simple process. It is the
complexityof examining and the demands of restating an epistemology
that need to be tackled here.
At the root of this propositionis phenomenology. This does not mean
the constricting set of narrowlyor overly idealistic facets which might
paint one in a corner. In light of this, I recognize from the outset that
Edmund Husserl'sphenomenology is idealistic;that is, he envisions phe-
nomenology being able to make determinationsof essence and intention
(for example) that approach absolute statements. Husserl does, how-
ever, provide elements that form an epistemicbasis for phenomenology;
that is, he constructs a framework for an approach to knowing which
is useful here. I also hasten to add that what is presented here is an
introduction, prolegomena, to be drawn more fully at a future time.
While phenomenology was not new with Husserl, he gave a form at
once more complete and more current than had anyone previously.
Not all questions are answered by Husserl, by any means, but many of
them were asked in a provocativeway for the first time by him. It must
also be noted at this time that the employment of a basicallyHusserlian

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 305

vocabulary should not imply universal acceptance of Husserlian phe-

nomenology. What Husserl gives us is a context, and it is within this
context that the present proposition rests.
Husserl, in one of his earlier writings, sets out the purpose of phe-
nomenology as he sees it. At times what Husserl says may seem to be
antithetical to the important matters of library and information science.
For instance, Husserl's phenomenology is what he refers to as "pure"
or "transcendental" phenomenology. This, he states, is an eidetic sci-
ence, "a science which aims exclusively at establishing 'knowledge of
essences' and absolutely no 'facts"' [42, p. 40]. This "essential" existence
may be seen to be in opposition to real existence (Dasein); that is, the
concrete. Maurice Natanson points out that thinking that Husserlian
phenomenology ignores the concrete is erroneous. Rather, "Husserl is
after the formal qualities of the concrete reality which human beings
recognize as their experience, but form here means the essential imma-
nent in the particular: the truth of the given" [43, p. 4]. In simpler
terms this means that Husserl attempts to inquire into what underlies
"real" existence and how essences are (or may be) evident in what may
be perceived in overt action. While this is a simplification of Husserl,
it is also an understatement. He explains most clearly his vision of the
relationship between the eidetic and empirical sciences in sections 8- 10
of Ideas. Investigation that is based on "science of fact," which is where
many would place library and information science, depends upon an
essence, a being. Because of this, "every factual science (empirical sci-
ence) has essential theoretical bases in eidetic ontologies" [42, p. 57]. It
may, then, be said that the road to Dasein is through Eidos. Concrete
existence is not formless; it has a formal logic. Moreover, the underpin-
nings of existence are ontologies, that is, essences or being.
Lest confusion reign at this point, let us look a little further into the
hierarchy of essence and existence. Jean-Fransois Lyotard clarifies the
relationship succinctly: "Before doing physics one must study the es-
sence of physical fact," and "it is already clear ... that no serious empiri-
cal psychology can be undertaken if the essence of the psychological has
not been grasped in a manner avoiding all confusion with the essence of
the physical"' [44, p. 41]. The same is true of library and information
science; grounded study of the use of libraries, say, or of the transmis-
sion of information is impossible without an understanding of what
underlies the act of using a library or of transmitting information. In
an extreme operational positivism, empirical investigation is confused
with inquiring into essence; there is a belief that it is through empiricism
that understanding of ontology arises. A substantial portion of research
in library and information science is a result of an upsetting of the
hierarchy.
A few recent articles on the searching of online catalogs can be taken

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306 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

as illustrativeof the hierarchyturned around. One paper inquires into

the remote use of the online catalog of the New York Public Library
[45]. The questions asked center on whether there is remote searching
of the catalog, when this searching occurs, and how remote use of the
catalog compares with internal use. These are reasonablequestions, and
the researcherapplies a reasonablemethodology to the problem. What
is missing, and the author of this article is certainly not to blame for a
shortcoming of the field, is an understanding of the most basic motiva-
tions for turning to an entity such as a libraryat all. Much is taken for
granted regarding libraries,their purposes, their reasons for existence,
and how the thing itself is related to the contents of its collection. It is
useful to know who is searching the library's catalog and when this
searching occurs, but without an understanding of the ontological pur-
pose of the library-its essence or being-the empirical study of its
function as an organization lacks a fundamental context.
The concept of an ontology of the libraryis a complex one that needs
some clarificationhere. By ontology of the library I mean the core of
the library'sbeing, the reason for the library'sexistence. While there
is considerable rhetoric surrounding this idea, it needs to be stated as
clearly as possible. At its core the libraryexists to collect, organize, and
provide access to information. This mission necessitates understanding
what exists, selecting in some way a subset of the totalityof information,
imposing some order on that information,and serving a mediator func-
tion between the user and both the information available and the li-
brary'sstructure.The complexity of the notion of ontology in this con-
text centers on the realization that essence can be reduced to the
aforementioned purpose and also that the ontology of the librarydoes
not include any single means of collecting, organizing, or access. These
applied functions are a result of interpretationby librarians.The inter-
pretative act has resulted in the cataloging rules and classification
schemes in use today. This act also results in the servicesoffered by any
library.With the context provided by an understanding of the library's
ontology we are better equipped to address the questions surrounding
interpretation. Earlier it was stated that the present proposition can
help identify meaningful questions;this is one explicit instance in which
questions, such as those related to the interpretive act of translating
essence to practical application, can be identified for further investi-
gation.
Some other recent studies focus more specificallyon transactionlogs
as a means of tapping into what might be termed the essence of use.
What many of these studies do not take into account is that the act of
searching a library'scatalog is largely a deterministicone; it is a process
determined by the protocolsof a specific system, the structure of biblio-

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 307

graphic records, and preordained authority control such as is reflected

in the Library of Congress Subject Headings.3 Ignoring the deterministic
nature of much of library structure and use inhibits the efficacy of any
empirical inquiry. This example of catalog use studies illustrates how
the reversal of the essence-existence hierarchy leads to a circularity of
thinking that is reflected in research. The problem of existence is delved
into over and over again, many times with consistent results, but little
informing interpretation emerges from this repetition of empirical in-
vestigation. The approach proposed here helps to define questions for
study, such as those surrounding the deterministic nature of current
access mechanisms.
Since "interpretation" has been mentioned, this is as good a time as
any to introduce the other half of the present proposition-herme-
neutical phenomenology. What is hermeneutics? At its root, according
to Richard E. Palmer, it is the study of understanding. This is applied
most frequently, but certainly not exclusively, to texts [48, p. 8]. More
generally, the interpretation can be applied to any set or system of signs,
any symbolic entities. Palmer elucidates: "Hermeneutics is the process
of deciphering which goes from manifest content and meaning to latent
or hidden meaning.... [It] is the system by which the deeper signifi-
cance is revealed beneath the manifest content" [48, pp. 43-44]. It in-
volves the event of understanding a text and the question of what inter-
pretation and understanding are. The notion of "text" is a fluid one that
need not be limited to literary texts. If text can be taken as a formally
constructed system of signs, then many things, and certainly libraries,
qualify as texts. Richard Harvey Brown maintains that even society may
be seen as text-a text subject to interpretation aimed at understanding
its essence and, eventually, its dynamics [49]. The connection between
hermeneutics and phenomenology is suggested in the preceding discus-
sion. This connection is made overt by Martin Heidegger in Being and
Time. The understanding of being, says Heidegger, is necessarily a prod-
uct of one's existence; he ties the nature of existence to ontology, and
ontology is dependent on the process of interpretation [50]. Interpreta-
tion, then, is a cumulative chain, placed historically, relying on existence
that is definitely not static. The connection of interpretation with ontol-
ogy is largely an innovation of Heidegger.
The line of thinking originated by Heidegger has been continued, to
an extent, by Paul Ricoeur, at least insofar as a connection between
3. See, for example, Cherry[46] and Wallace[47]. These papers are offered as exemplary
of a larger set of literatureon transactionlog analysis.The authors look at types of
searchesand the mechanicsof searching.Cherry takes the project a step further and
examines user satisfaction,but the essentialquestions that apply to the work of Lucas
likewise apply here.

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308 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

hermeneutics and phenomenology is concerned. Ricoeur states un-

equivocallythat"phenomenology remains the unsurpassablepresuppo-
sition of hermeneutics"[51, p. 26]. In this vision, phenomenology and
hermeneutics are inextricably linked and mutually interdependent.
Hermeneutics presupposes that interpretationdepends on the meaning
of any "being";phenomenology depends on interpretationof evidence.
Inherent in Ricoeur'sconcept of hermeneutics is the importance of the
dynamic nature of being and also of existence, the realization that hu-
man essence and, so, human existence is a product of history, of pro-
gression through time. This may seem self-evident, but a full apprecia-
tion of the ineluctable passage of time is key to inquiry in the social
sciences. A mode of thinking in the sciences that has largely been aban-
doned is centered on a notion that the observercan examine a snapshot,
a picture removed from time, and that this snapshot is representative
of the object under scrutiny. Though this notion was already fading,
its demise was hastened by Werner Heisenberg, whose UncertaintyPrin-
ciple helped to change thought in the physical sciences and also the
vocabularyof the sciences. His principlewas not just a means of measur-
ing properties of physical particles; it has become a metaphor for an
accepted indeterminacy. Ricoeur's recognition that we exist at a given
time at some point on a continuum has an important implication for
the hermeneutical process: "All interpretation places the interpreter in
medias res and never at the beginning or the end. We suddenly arrive,
as it were, in the middle of a conversation which has already begun
and in which we try to orient ourselves in order to be able to contribute
to it" [51, p. 33].
Even Husserl recognized that, in the process of inquiry, at least some
margin of indeterminacy is inevitable; the implied goal is not one of
absolute certainty,but of moving toward determination or clarification.
Accepting the existence of indeterminacy,while vital to understanding
in the social sciences, presents a dilemma. James Bohman articulatesa
key question: "While placing actions and rules in ever larger contexts
enriches explanation of them, it also raises new problems of indetermi-
nacy: in what of many possible contexts does the action belong?" [52,
p. 102]. The danger of becoming mired in this dilemma could result
in falling prey to the hermeneutic circle-everything is interpretation;
there is no one true interpretation; one interpretation is based on a
series of preceding interpretations.The hermeneutic circle may be un-
breakable,but indeterminacyis rampant without interpretation. While
this means that not everythingcan be known, interpretationis an episte-
mological requisite. One reason for the epistemologicalimport of inter-
pretation is that interpretation is contextual and not isolationist. An
interpretation is not a single event, unrelated to other interpretations,

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 EPISTEMOLOGICALFOUNDATION FOR LIS 309

but is an iterative process based on multiple interpretations. Inaccuracy

of understanding can be lessened as one moves to more components
of action, especially to underlying components, and understanding is a
product of connecting interpretive facets, one building on the others.
A better model for this interpretive reality is helical, rather than circu-
lar; while some of the movement is turned back upon itself, there is
also forward movement.
Ricoeuraddressesthe progressof interpretation,even though he does
not use the word "helical."In speaking of interpreting a text he states,
"An interpretationmust not only be probable, but more probable than
another. There are criteria of relative superiority which may easily be
derived from the logic of subjectiveprobability"[53, p. 2131. His discus-
sion is not limited to textual interpretation; his assessment is relevant
to any object of interpretation.That object, including all of human ac-
tion, is, as Ricoeur says, "a limited field of possible constructions."The
hermeneutical helix has its basis in the dialectical nature of interpreta-
tion. Even in an example as straightforwardas a reference interview
the helical notion comes into play. The librarian does not simply turn
the user's question back upon itself, but, through a series of probable
interpretationsof the question, the librarianattempts to progress more
deeply into the core of the question, validating interpretations along
the way, so as to suggest an answer to the user's need, for which the
question is an articulated approximation. Some degree of diminution
of indeterminacyis dependent on two other elements of phenomenol-
ogy that, together with an ontological focus, form the backbone of this
proposition.
It has already been mentioned that experience is founded in history.
In part this means that the impact and import of what has occurred in
the remote past affects each person in the present. What has already
happened has exerted a series on influences that, while not absolutely
deterministic,has served to limit, in a very real sense, possibilities.While
there are limits on the present because of the past, there is still a wealth
of possibilitiesfor the present. It is important to remember both facets
of this realization;interpretationis not infinite, but it is rich in potential.
The richness has been recognized by a number of writers in fields apart
from library and information science, but who speak to concerns rele-
vant to our work. For instance, the oft-maligned Jacques Derrida says
that reading "cannotlegitimately transgress the text toward something
other than it, toward a referent (a reality that is metaphysical,historical,
psychobiographical,etc.) or toward a signified outside the text whose
content could take place, could have a place outside of language" [54,
p. 158]. It may be said that the privilege Derrida imparts to the text is
extreme, but it is a recognition of limitation, of possibilities that are

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310 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

constrainedby the essence of a thing. A more general stance is adopted

by Umberto Eco, who writes that "we can accept a sort of Popperian
principle according to which if there are no rules that help to ascertain
which interpretationsare the 'best'ones, there is at least a rule ascertain-
ing which ones are 'bad"'[55, p. 52]. Eco sees that there are boundaries
to interpretation that may be based on evidence (evidence having the
broadest meaning possible here).
What, then, helps to establishconstraintsto limit possibilities?In part
it is history itself which serves to eliminate paths not taken. As was
implied previously,history operates to structure, as a result of a tempo-
ral progression, a rich, but limited, set of possibilitiesboth individually
and collectively.As individualswe are products of our experience. This
does not mean simply that what has occurred in our lives has made us
what we are today. In addition to the physical experiences of our past,
we are shaped by what Husserl refers to as "reflexionupon experience."
He writes that "reflexion . . . is an expression for acts in which the
stream of experience, with all its manifold events (phases of experience,
intentionalities) can be grasped and analyzed in the light of its own
evidence" [42, p. 200]. One result of reflection is the moving of what
is past into the present in the sense that consciousness and analysis of
the past is a phenomenon with a locus in the present. As a consciousness
of the past, reflection is a means to knowing. Just as interpretation is
an epistemologicalrequisite,reflection is requisiteto interpretation.The
reflexive act is central to Ricoeur'snotion of interpretation. It is a func-
tion of what he calls "distanciation,"which involves making a historical
connection. "We belong to a historical tradition through a relation of
distance which oscillates between remoteness and proximity. To inter-
pret is to render near what is far (temporally,geographically,culturally,
spiritually)"[51, p. 35].
Reflection, which is vital to us as individuals, is no less vital to library
and information science. As Michael Harris says, it is "aligned against
the positivist conception of science as a suprahistorical,neutral enter-
prise" [56, p. 523]. Whether we are aware of it or not, the structure of
libraries,as well as their contents and use, are based on, or are in reac-
tion to, a wide array of assumptions that have been formed and added
to over time. Just as personal reflection helps lead to better understand-
ing of the present state by enabling an analysisbased on temporal aware-
ness, so too can a kind of collectivereflectionby librarianshipas a profes-
sion foster understandingof the present state of libraryand information
science by providing a context for analysisof the foundational presup-
positions of the field. This portion of the present proposition builds on
Harris's cognizance of the consequences of an absence of reflection.
Such absence "suggests that the reluctance on the part of the library

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 311

research community to examine its own domain assumptions is both

deliberate and unconscious.... It is all too common for scholars in
this field to affect a sort of willful methodological naivet6. This profes-
sion seems persuaded that it possesses neutrality that gives the work an
almost autonomous and self-authenticating stature" [56, p. 524].
The third, and final, key element of this proposal for a hermeneutical
phenomenology is intentionality. Husserl states unequivocally that in-
tentionality is the feature that characterizes consciousness, since to be
conscious is to be conscious of something. As Husserl observes, "it is
clear that the objective background from which the perceived object of
the cogitatioemerges as the glance of the Ego singles it out, is an oyjective
background in a really experienceable sense. That is, whilst we are even
now turned towards the pure object in the modus cogito, various objects
'appear,' we are intuitively 'aware of' them, they blend into the unity
of a single intuition, that of a consciously grasped field of objects" [42,
p. 223]. There may be an analogy here between the fields of potential
perception/intentional objects and potential energy/kinetic energy. The
former in each pair may or may not be actualized. What is a matter of
vague awareness may or may not become a matter of genuine conscious-
ness; what represents potential energy may or may not be put in motion.
The intentional is important to phenomenology because of its necessity
to the realization of essence or being.
The notion of intentionality forms something of a break with the past.
The concern of phenomenology is not limited to awareness, or even to
intellection, that is, reasoning or cognition. Intentionality necessitates a
transcendence beyond these stances. Maurice Merleau-Ponty touches
on the differences brought about by intentionality: "Whether we are
concerned with a thing perceived, a historical event or a doctrine, to
'understand' is to take in the total intention-not only what these things
are for representation (the 'properties' of the thing perceived, the mass
of 'historical facts,' the 'ideas' introduced by the doctrine)-but the
unique mode of existing expressed in the properties of the pebble, the
glass or the piece of wax, in all the events of a revolution, in all the
thoughts of a philosopher" [57, p. xviii]. The definition of understand-
ing implicit in the concept of intentionality has special significance to
the reference process in libraries. For instance, only if a user under-
stands his or her question can the librarian understand it and respond
to it. All else is an imperfect approximation. The process, though, can
(and probably should, in many instances) be an iterative one that may,
if successful, reveal or develop intention through a joint exploration by
the user and the librarian. If the process is carried far enough, there
may be a transformation that leads to understanding.
Intentionality has a duality as part of its nature. As is evident in the

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312 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

example of understandingin the reference process, at once intentional-

ity is dependent upon the "I," the perceiver (the consciousness), and
the object (that which may be perceived). It should be remembered that
intentionalityis not simply perception, though. Lyotard points out that
"Husserl distinguishes various types of intentional acts: imaginations,
representations, experiences of other people, sensory and categorical
intuitions, receptive and spontaneous acts, etc." [44, p. 55]. What is
primary about intentionalityis that it constitutes an unmistakablelink
between "I"and "other."The other may be a physical object that spurs
memory or some kind of conscious cognitive activity. The other may
be another person, another I, which means that a pair (or set, in the
case of more than two) of intentional stances are at work. The other
may be the physical product of another I, such as a text in the form
of a poem or a novel or a library'scatalog. We cannot forget that the
entirety of the library signifies, directly or indirectly, the product of
intentionality. The catalog, the physical and conceptual organization,
even the physical structure itself are consciously created by an I (be
the "I" individual or collective). The library user-another I-adopts
an intentional stance when perceiving the aspects of a library. To the
user, then, the library (or its catalog or classification system) is the
other.
The complexity of the relationshipis accepted and explained, at least
in a specific context, by Wolfgang Iser, a profound voice of reader-
centered criticism (not incidentally in an essay entitled "The Reading
Process: A Phenomenological Approach").While he is addressing the
act of reading, his observationsare no less pertinent to the act of library
use: "The work is more than the text, for the text only takes on life
when it is realized, and furthermore the realization is by no means
independent of the individual disposition of the reader-though this
in turn is acted upon by the different patterns of the text. The conver-
gence of text and reader brings the literary work into existence, and
this convergence can never be precisely pinpointed, but must always
remain virtual, as it is not to be identified either with the reality of the
text or with the individual disposition of the reader" [58, pp. 274-75].
This notion captures the dynamic nature of the phenomenological ap-
proach; the library,as is true of the text, becomes more than a physical
entity with the interactionof the user. This is so because of the intention-
ality of both library and user. In Husserlian terms this means that the
library first has a sensile quality; it is composed of matter in a physical
sense. The library also has an intentional quality; it has a form that is
consciously and purposely arrived at. It is the form and shape (the
transcendent intellectual and conceptual, as well as the physical, struc-
ture) of the librarythat is the other that is of interest to, and that enters

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 313

the consciousness of, the user. Herein is another opportunity for investi-
gation: What underlies the intentionality of the library; who formulates
and articulates this intentionality; how does intentionality manifest it-
self? Of course it is not (or not just) the physicality of the library that
is of interest to the user when he or she interacts with a librarian. The
complexity of intentional stances is heightened in such an interchange
and this complexity is explained with clarity and brilliance by Ricoeur:
The latent tension between the reductive and descriptive demands becomes an
open conflict when the other is no longer a thing but another self, a self other
than me. For although, absolutely speaking, the only subject is me, the other
is not given simply as a psycho-physicalobject, situated in nature; it is also a
subject of experience in the same way I am and as such it perceives me as
belonging to the world of its experience. Moreover, it is on the basis of this
intersubjectivitythat a "common"nature and a "common"cultural world are
constituted. [51, p. 491
A failure of the user-library interchange may, at times, be due to a lack
of commonality. That is, the library's creators, the "I" who structures
intellectual and physical access, may not have an "other" in mind. The
concept of intentionality is discussed at great length by Daniel Dennett
[9] and John Searle [59].
While this proposition is offered here as a formal foundation of
thought and knowledge in our field, aspects of it are certaintly not new
to the literature and/or practice of library and information science. Dan-
iel Benediktsson focuses on hermeneutics in his review essay and pre-
sents a model that can provide guidance for inquiry. Benediktsson sur-
veys varying schools of hermeneutic thought and outlines alternative
possibilities based on various aspects of the tenets of these schools. He
suggests that there are specific areas within library and information
science that lend themselves to a hermeneutical-phenomenological am
proach-"Information retrieval (IR), in terms of bibliographic organiza-
tion retrieval and indexing, and personal interaction within reference
theory" [60, p. 227]. He admonishes that, while texts have quantifiable
features (which he acknowledges are, and should remain, fodder for
inquiry), they also comprise ideas encoded in a variety of communica-
tion systems. As such, interpretive means must also be employed to
advance the theoretical foundation of library and information science.
What follows is a discussion of two published works that attempt to
apply interpretation to delve more deeply into assumptions and previ-
ous research in our field. This discussion is necessarily limited here, but
these papers are recommended as applications of the proposition.
Gary Radford, in a perceptive and creative paper, acknowledges, not
only the historical line of operational positivism in library and informa-
tion science, but also its current vitality as a foundation for research and,

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314 THE LIBRARY QUARTERLY

more basically,as an epistemology [61]. He sees the need for revision in

the grounding and evaluationof knowledge in our field, but recognizes
that such revision is in its early stages. His focus in his own effort at
revision is on the thought of Michel Foucault,one who sought explicitly
to question the self-evident. This means of questioning becomes Rad-
ford's tool in examining a seeming aporia-the difference between the
rhetoric surrounding the library'spurpose and reason for being and
the potential actuallyembodied in the library. For instance, the library
does not simply allow for the retrieval of content (which is put to uses
determined by the retriever);it also presents sets of possibilitiesthrough
the patterns and arrangements inherent in library organization. The
library, then, is seen as an active component in the creation of knowl-
edge, not merely a locus for existing knowledge. The primary source
of Foucauldian discourse for Radford's argument is "The Fantasia of
the Library,"which celebrates the potential that is part of the library's
essence. Radford quotes Foucault: "Fantasiesare carefully deployed in
the hushed library,with its columns of books, with its titles aligned on
shelves to form a tight enclosure, but within confines that also liberate
impossible worlds.... The imaginary is not formed in opposition to
reality as its denial or compensation; it grows among signs, from book
to book, in the interstice of repetitions and commentaries; it is born
and takes shape in the interval between books. It is a phenomenon of
the library"[62, pp. 90-91]. The process by which knowledge is created
is, of necessity, an interpretive one, dependent on reflection and an
awarenessof intentionality.Though Radford does not openly aver that
his is a phenomenologicalapproach,it clearlydoes represent an applica-
tion of the present proposition.
Earlierit was stated that the foundation proposed here definitely does
not preclude quantitativestudy. Testimony to this assertion is offered,
if a bit obliquely, by Robert Molyneux [63]. He presents a thorough
examinationof Fremont Rider'shypothesis that academiclibrariesgrow
exponentially. As does Radford, Molyneux begins by questioning the
accepted view. He surveys and analyzes numerical evidence and deter-
mines that Rider'shypothesis is not just a failure of quantitativeanalysis
(that is, of method); it is a failure of scholarship as well. Scholarship,
according to Molyneux, is a far-reachingconcept pertaining to the pro-
cess of seeking correct answers to questions. Analysis of data (that is,
numerical evidence) is a hallmark of a subset of scholarship, science.
The shortcomings of data are those common to all evidence-there is
not enough, they are not comparable,they may be imprecise, they may
be absent, and so on. While it is unstated, an implied assessmentof data
is that they must be interpreted. Molyneux ascribesa reason for Rider's

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 EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATION FOR LIS 315

failure to the following: "When there is a phenomenon to be analyzed,

the processes behind that phenomenon must be analyzed and under-
stood" [63, p. 103]. Understanding is a product, substantially, of inter-
pretation. Molyneux makes the point that one purpose of analysis is
illumination, and illumination is equated with understanding. Data anal-
ysis, while used fairly frequently for purposes of support (for example,
for funding, for decision making), is seldom a means for achieving illu-
mination. Underlying his analysis of Rider's data and conclusions is Mo-
lyneux's adherence to a foundational way of thinking, a commitment
to the question that precedes method or evidence. This, too, is an opera-
tional application of the proposition.
An expressed concern in library and information science is survival.
While this concern is legitimate in the sense that those external to the
field must have an understanding of our purpose, a more central ele-
ment is a self-understanding of purpose. It is true that method, data,
evidence, and analysis contribute to understanding, but something is
antecedent to all these. The key to study, research, and discourse is a
more fundamental understanding. This is achieved by delving into the
nature of knowledge and knowing in the field. To reiterate, what is
presented here is a beginning. The intent is to shift, first thought, then
discourse, then research, by initiating a questioning of assumptions and
purpose. In other words, it is not practical to abandon all work done in
library and information science, but a beginning would be a systematic
reassessment of the thinking dominating the profession. As has been
shown, thought in library and information science (LIS) has largely been
founded on the determinism that is inherent in a positivist approach
to research. A reassessment would have to begin with a realization of
the indeterminacy of much human behavior. Given such a realization,
the thinking within LIS should be more skeptical of methods and prac-
tices that purport to offer suggestions of causality based on the examina-
tion of limited variables or aspects of a phenomenon. The revised think-
ing should be, as Harris says, more holistic; that is, we should explore
not only behavioral outcomes but also contextual influences on human
action, such as political, social, cognitive, and cultural aspects of the
situations of, for instance, library users. One step forward would entail
study of our own methods of research and the potential biases they
may include. (The hope is that this article is a beginning of such a
process.) Eventually this can lead to a re-vision of the foundations of
our discourse; such a change in vision can inform the questions on
which our research is based. It is clear that the adopted epistemology
of positivism does not work for library and information science; the
present proposition expresses a quest for one that will.

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