Perez vs.
Mendoza 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land
G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.
Facts:
1. Petra Montalbo, wife of Basilio Perez, and
Felisa Montalbo are named the two remaining
heirs of Estanislao Montalbo for a 4, 765
sq.m. parcel of land in Brgy. Dagatan, Taysan,
Batangas. They divided the land equally
among themselves.
2. In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega
exchanged the land she inherited from her
father with the land of her aunt, Andrea
Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate
a
piece of land to the municipality of Taysan,
Batangas, to be used as a school site and
the municipality preferred the land belonging
to Felisa as it was adjacent to the
other properties of the municipality.
3. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost
one-half of the land to the municipality and
gave the other to her daughter
Margarita when the latter married Nicolas
Mendoza in 1972.
4.Since then, Margarita
and Nicolas possessed and occupied the land
continuously, in the concept of owners.
5. When Nicolas sought the transfer of the
property in their names he submitted the
deed of exchange of property executed by
Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and
witnessed by the Municipal Secretary, Rafael
Manahan.
6.)When Basilio Perez came to
know of the alleged deed of exchange, he had
it investigated and found that the
signature of the municipal secretary was
forged. Accused of falsification of private
document, Mendoza was convicted; but the
Court of Appeals acquitted him for
insufficiency of evidence.
7. On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and
his wife Petra brought an action against
respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for
quieting of title, alleging that the land
in dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa
from Estanislao Montalbo who died in
1918; that the heirs partitioned said land in
in question, was sold by her husband, Jose
Ortega, and her children to petitioners; and
the deed of sale was lost a year after;
that they leased the said parcel of land to
respondents in 1946, but that when the
lease expired in 1951, the latter refused to
return the land prompting the former to
file an unlawful detainer action which was still
pending during the trial of this case.
8. The trial court dismissed the complaint and
declared respondents with a better right
over the property in litigation. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.
Perez
There was a falsification in the document
submitted by the Mendozas to the Court as
evidence
They are the owners of the said lot based on
the lost deed of sale
Mendoza
They had continuous possession of the
subject lot since 1927
The subject lot was a donation made by
Andrea to the spouses in consideration of
their marriage
Issue:
Whether or not thesubject lot is owned by
lspouses Perez
Held:
NO. The claim of private respondents that
they are the owners of the
land in dispute must be upheld on the ground
that they were in actual and
continuous possession of the land, openly,
adversely, and in the concept of owners
thereof since 1927 thereby acquiring
ownership of the land through acquisitive
prescription.
Possession is an indicium of ownership of the
thing possessed and to the possessor goes
the presumption that he holds the thing under
a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the Civil
Code provides that "(A)ctual possession
under claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. The true
owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property."
There is a testimony of respondent Nicolas
Mendoza that after the land was donated to
his wife in 1927 they built a house on it and
lived there continuously.
Respondent's testimony was found both by
the trial and appellate courts credible because
(1) petitioner Basilio Perez himself admitted
during cross-examination that even before the
last world war the Mendozas had constructed
a house on the land in litigation which
admission disproves the allegation in the
complaint and Perez' testimony that it was
only in 1946 when the Mendozas occupied the
property as lessees;
(2) the testimony of Nicolas Mendoza was
corroborated by witness Adriano Gonzales, a
retired justice of the peace of Taysan,
Batangas, who declared that he knew the
Mendozas since 1937 and he saw them living
on the land in question and they have not
changed residence at all since he had known
them; and
(3) the respondents Mendoza were the ones
who were living on the property and not the
petitioners at the time the provincial
government in 1937 widened the Lobo road
which crosses said land.
Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that
possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities
except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question
arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there
are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of possession are the
same, the one who presents a title;
and if all these conditions are equal, the thing
shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings
Republic Vs. Tagle Case Digest
FACts:
1.Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the
registered owner of two (2) parcels of land
located in Barangay Salawag,
Dasmarias, Cavite containing an area of
483,331 square meters more or less.
2.The Philippine Government, through the
Philippine Human Resources
Development Center (PHRDC),
negotiated with the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team
on the technicalities of the establishment
of the ASEAN Human Resources
Development Project in the Philippines.
Among the five (5) main programs of the
proposed project was Program III
(Construction Manpower Development)
which involved the establishment of a
Construction Manpower Development
Center (CMDC).
3.PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z.
Benitez, signed a Memorandum of
Agreement which provides, among others,
that Benitez undertakes to lease within the
period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a
portion of that property (which is no less
than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC
which likewise agrees to lease within a
period of twenty (20) years and/or buy
said property site.
4. The Philippine Womens University (PWU)
and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to
occupy and use the land in question and to
undertake land development, electrical and
road network installations and other related
works necessary to attain its objectives.
Pursuant thereto, the CMDC took
possession of the property and erected
buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations. A deposit
made by the plaintiff with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in the amount of
P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the
assessed value of the property subject
matter hereof based on defendants 1990
tax declaration, was made.
5. At the expiration of the lease contract, the
parties agreed to cease the lease
payments and to proceed with the
negotiations for its sale. However, when
 the Deed of Absolute Sale was done,
Benitez refused to sign it, thereafter The expropriation of real property does not
ordering the payment of rentals and to include mere physical entry or occupation of
vacate the premises in 30 days from land. Although eminent domain usually
notice. She later filed an unlawful detainer involves a taking of title, there may also be
suit against the petitioner. compensable taking of only some, not all, of
the property interests in the bundle of rights
that constitute ownership. The writ of
6. The petitioner also filed a Motion for the
possession is both necessary and practical,
issuance of a Writ of Possession which
because mere physical possession that is
the TC granted but later quashed due to
gained by entering the property is not
the motion for reconsideration of the
equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of
respondents, stating that the writ is only
acquiring ownership over, or even the right to
used as a leverage in the ejectment suit possess, the expropriated property.
filed against it wherein the issue in
possession. Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not
prevail over the States power of eminent
domain. DTI has deposited not just the 10
percent required under EO 1035, but the
Issue: Whether Judge Tagle may quash a writ
whole amount of the just compensation that
of possession on the ground that the
private respondent is entitled to. Thus, there is
expropriating government agency is already
no any legal impediment for the issuance of a
occupying the property sought to be
writ of possession in favor of DTI. Precisely,
expropriated.
the purpose of instituting expropriation
proceedings is to prevent petitioner from
Held: No. Judge Tagle is required to issue a
being ejected from the subject property;
writ of possession in favor DTI pursuant to
otherwise, the above-mentioned absurd and
Sec. 7 of EO 1035:
circuitous rulings would arise.
SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to
agree in negotiation of the sale of the land as
provided in the preceding section, the
government implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned shall have
authority to immediately institute expropriation
proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor
General, as the case may be. The
just compensation to be paid for the
property acquired through expropriation shall
be in accordance with the provisions of P.D.
No. 1533. Courts shall give priority to the
adjudication of cases on expropriation and
shall immediately issue the necessary writ of
possession upon deposit by the government
implementing agency/instrumentality
concerned of an amount equivalent to ten per
cent (10%) of the amount of
just compensation provided under P.D. No.
1533; Provided, That the period within which
said writ of possession shall be issued shall in
no case extend beyond five (5) days from the
date such deposit was made.

Under this statutory provision, when the

government or its authorized agent makes the
required deposit, the trial court has a
ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.

BENJAMIN DIZON, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
Facts:
1. Spouses Hilario Galang and Martina
Laxamana owned two (2) lots located in San
Agustin, Potrero, Municipality of Bacolor,
Province of Pampanga. They had six (6)
children, namely, Dionisio, Marciana,
Potenciana, Flaviana, Leonora and Gertrudes.
2. The spouses (Hilario and Martina) mortgaged
the aforesaid lots to Camilo Angeles
3. It is alleged by the respondents that Dionisio
Galang redeemed these lots in his own name,
despite the fact that part of the funds used for
the redemption came from his sisters.2 A
cadastral survey involving the two (2) lots was
conducted, and on 19 May 1919, the Court of
First Instance ordered the issuance in 8. 8. On appeal by the respondents, respondent
Cadastral Case No. 14, of OCT Nos. 9010 (for
lot 3548) and 9102 (for lot 3562) in the name
solely of Dionisio Galang ( hereafter Galang). 9.
4. Respondents, who are heirs of Galang's
sisters, claim that Galang and his five (5)
sisters had partitioned the subject lots on 27
June 1920, as embodied in an unnotarized
affidavit executed by Galang (Exh. "C"). As a
consequence thereof, Galang's sisters
constructed their houses on Lot 3548.
5. he structures passed on from generation to
generation, with each of Galang's sisters and
their descendants enjoying the benefits
therefrom. No one questioned or disturbed
them until the petitioners (heirs of Galang),
informed them that the lots in question were
titled in Galang's name and had been
partitioned, on the basis of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition (Exh. "D"), into three (3)
equal parts corresponding to his (Galang's)
three (3) children;
6. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that
the cadastral case which culminated in the
issuance of the original certificates of title over
the subject lots in the sole name of Galang,
was a proceeding in rem, thus binding on the
whole world; that when original certificates of
title (OCT Nos. 9010 and 9102) were issued
on 9 January 1922 to Galang, respondents did
not raise any objection until March 1983 when
they filed the complaint in Civil Case No.
6752, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61) years.
7. The trial court3 upheld Galang's titles over the
lots which, as aforestated, had been issued as
early as 1922 in his name.
-respondents' action had long
prescribed, having been filed only on 24
March 1983, or after a lapse of sixty-one (61)
long years from the issuance of said titles.
- respondents' failed to establish their
relationship to Galang's five (5) sisters,
premising their claim solely on an
unsubstantiated assertion that they are
descendants of the deceased Galang sisters.
- presence or construction of the
houses on Lot No. 3548 was also not
considered as evidence in respondents' favor,
since no proof was submitted establishing
respondents' right to occupy the place.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by
upholding respondents' rights.
9. The appellate court declared that co-
ownership existed between respondents'
predecessors-in-interest and those of
petitioners, on the basis of Galang's affidavit
which, although unnotarized, was
nonetheless an ancient document, pursuant
to Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
since it was executed on 27 June 1920. As
such, proof of its due execution and
authentication could be dispensed with,
according to the appellate court.
ISSUE
1. W/n appellants' present action for
partition prescribed?
2. W/N the properties in question owned
in common by the predecessors-in-
interest of appellants and appellees?
Held:
1. Dionisio Galang's ownership over the
disputed lots (3548 and 3562) had been
judicially confirmed on 19 May 1919 in
Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O. No. 51,
which is a proceeding in rem and hence
binding "on the whole world." OCT No. 1056
(9010) and OCT No. 1057 (9102) were, as a
consequence, issued on 9 January 1922.
None of Galang's co-heirs objected to or
protested their issuance. These titles became
 indefeasible and incontrovertible. Then it was
only after sixty-one (61) years or on 24
March 1983 that the descendants of
Galang's co-heirs asserted co-ownership
claims over the subject lots.

2. It is true that Galang executed an affidavit,

unnotarized at that, on 27 June 1920, the
latter acknowledges that he and his co-heirs
named therein as co-owners of a certain
property which they had mortgaged to a
certain family surnamed Angeles does not
amount to anything for nothing in this
document shows that it pertains to the two
lots involved herein. It merely referred to a
certain "land" which Dionisio Galang and his
co-heirs "co-inherited" and partitioned without
any indication as to which property is being
referred.

They failed to establish their connection or

relationship with any of these five sisters
save for their unfounded averment that they
are indeed descendants and heirs of these
deceased individuals. We likewise agree with
the trial court that in the absence of definite
proof establishing respondents'
link/relationship to their alleged
predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Galang
sisters, they do not have any cause of action,
and the suit for partition must necessarily fall.