In Re Lureta

11/10/2017 G.R. No.
68635 March 12, 1987 - IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA : MARCH 1987 - PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE - CH
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EN BANC
[G.R. No. 68635. March 12, 1987.]
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO

LAURETA, AND OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. NO.
68635, entitled "EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET
AL."
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, J.:
In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa,
Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this Court, (incorporated herein by
reference), and in feigned ignorance of the Constitutional requirement that the Courts Divisions are
composed of, and must act through, at least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to
effect a change of the Courts adverse resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Please forgive us for taking the liberty of addressing you this letter which we do hope you will read very
carefully.
DebtKollect Company, Inc. "It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of Case No. G.R. 68635 entitled Eva Maravilla
Ilustre v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., by an untenable minute-resolution although an
extended one, dated 14 May 1986 which we consider as an unjust resolution deliberately and knowingly
promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.
x x x
"We consider the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986;
and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history
of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.
x x x
"Your attention is called to minute-resolution of 9 July 1986 which writes finish to our case before the
Supreme Court (. . . THIS IS FINAL) There is nothing final in this world. We assure you that this case is
far from finished by a long shot. For at the proper time we shall so act and bring this case before another
forum where the members of the Court can no longer deny our action with minute resolutions that are
not only unjust but are knowingly and deliberately promulgated. The people deserve to know how the
members of the highest tribunal of the land perform in the task of decision making by affixing their
ChanRobles Intellectual Property respective signatures on judgments that they render on petitions that they themselves give due course.
Division "Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We
intend to hold responsible members of the First Division who participated in the promulgation of these
http://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1987marchdecisions.php?id=103 1/12
11/10/2017 G.R. No. 68635 March 12, 1987 - IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA : MARCH 1987 - PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE - CH
three minute-resolutions in question. For the members thereof cannot claim immunity when their action
runs afoul with penal sanctions, even in the performance of official functions; like others, none of the
division members are above the law.
"In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid doing injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First
Division, providing that they had no hand in the promulgation of the resolution in question. That is why
we are requesting you to inform us your participation in the promulgation of these resolutions in
question. Even we who are poor are also capable of playing fair even to those who take advantage of our
poverty by sheer power and influence. We shall then wait for your reply. If, however, we do not hear
from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supported the dismissal of our
petition. We will then be guided accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
The letter also attacked the participation in the case of Justice Pedro L. Yap, Chairman of the First
Division in this wise:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As Division Chairman, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, as a copy of Resolution dated 14 May 1986 we
received indicate, did not even have the elementary courtesy of putting on record that he voluntarily
inhibited himself from participating in the promulgation of this minute-resolution, although an extended
one, which he should have done consistent with judicial decorum and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. After
all he is the law partner of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez, counsel for respondents, now the distinguished
Solicitor General . . . indicative that even at this stage of the proceeding in point of time, the Supreme
Court still recognizes Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez as counsel for respondents, even as he is already the
Solicitor General. For not withdrawing from the case formally Atty. Ordoez has manifested his
unmitigated arrogance that he does not respect the Canons of Professional Ethics, similar to the
actuation of his law partner, Associate Justice Pedro Yap, Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme
Court, an act that further aggravates the growing wrinkles in the domain of judicial statesmanship,
impressed as it is, with very serious and dangerous implications.
"(9) By 11 April 1986, date of the reorganization of the First Division, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez already
became the Solicitor General. With such amazingly magical coincidence, Dr. Pedro Yap, law partner of
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez in the law firm Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Padlan became the Chairman of the
Division.
x x x
March-1987 Jurisprudence "(11) So we see that on 11 August 1986 to 14 May 1986 when some members of the Division were still
busy putting their respective offices in order and had possibly have no idea about the Maravilla case.
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILS. v. BENJAMIN RELOVA Was it possible for Chairman Yap to have convinced the Division members that Maravilla petition is
without merit, and since the members the new ones knew nothing about the case, readily agreed to
G.R. No. L-29062 March 9, 1987 - PHILIPPINE
the dismissal of the petition by a minute-resolution extended one. After all this was the case of the
REFINING CO. v. ENRICO PALOMAR
Solicitor General. If this is what happened, then we are sorry to say that you were deliberately had.
G.R. No. L-30644 March 9, 1987 - COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. FIREMANS FUND After all, the 14 May 1986 untenable minute resolution although an extended one, does not bear the
INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL. signatures of the Division members. The members should have signed the resolution, after all, the
Supreme Court had given the petition due course, indicating whether they concur, dissent or otherwise
G.R. No. L-33952 March 9, 1987 - ORTIGAS & CO., abstain from voting." cralaw virtua1aw library
LTD. v. VIVENCIO M. RUIZ

The letter to Justice Herrera went on to state.
G.R. No. L-59974 March 9, 1987 - TEODORA
MARIANO v. JESUS R. DE VEGA "We assume, of course, that you had studied the case thoroughly since you were with the original 7-man
First Division under the chairmanship of then Justice Claudio Teehankee. We assure you that we will
G.R. No. L-65510 March 9, 1987 - TEJA MARKETING
bring this case before another forum to hold responsible the members of the Division who participated in
v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
the dismissal of the case by the unjust minute-resolutions, knowingly rendered for intended objective
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987 - PHOENIX that your conscience you are aware.
CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT x x x
G.R. No. 70360 March 11, 1987 - AREVALO GOMEZ

CORP. v. ANDRES LAO HIAN LIONG "We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation in the promulgation of the minute-
resolutions in question. Please do not take this matter lightly for we know justice in the end will prevail.
G.R. No. 68635 March 12, 1987 - IN RE: For if we do not hear from you within a week, we will consider your silence as your admission that you
WENCESLAO LAURETA supported the dismissal of the petition. In this way, we shall then be guided accordingly. The moment we
take action in the plans we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio
G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987 - REPUBLIC OF THE
coverage Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should or ought to know why we were
PHILS. v. PABLO FELICIANO
thwarted in our quest for plain justice.
G.R. No. L-29701 March 16, 1987 - PHIL. RABBIT
BUS LINES, INC. v. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA x x x
G.R. No. L-33836 March 16, 1987 - SOFIA L.

PRUDENCIADO v. ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM, "Finally, in view of action that we are prepared to take in this case, that will no doubt cause nationwide
INC. attention, and there should be anyone that will cause me harm personally, may we request you to show
this letter to the authorities concerned so that they will know where to look, when it becomes necessary."
G.R. No. L-35098 March 16, 1987 - GIACOMINA (Emphasis supplied)
MARINI-GONZALES v. GUARDSON R. LOOD
The aforesaid letters were included in the Agenda of the First Division of 22 October 1986, were "Noted,"
G.R. No. L-36402 March 16, 1987 - FILIPINO
and referred en consulta to the Court en banc.
SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS v. BENJAMIN TAN
G.R. No. L-37009 March 16, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE On 28 October 1986, the Court en banc took up the background and history of the case, found no reason
PHILS. v. FAUSTINO HORTELANO to take any further action, and referred the case back to the First Division "as set forth in the latters
resolution of October 27, 1986." In this Resolution, the First Division traced the history of the case,
G.R. No. L-40402 March 16, 1987 - REPUBLIC OF clarified that Justice Yap assumed his position in this Court only on 2 May 1986; that when the resolution
THE PHIL. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986, Justice Abad Santos was the incumbent Chairman of the First
Division, and that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoez was private respondents counsel; that
G.R. No. L-40797 March 16, 1987 - WORLD-WIDE upon realization thereof, Justice Yap inhibited himself from further participation in the case; and that
INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC. v. COURT OF Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division only on 14 July 1986, after the compulsory
APPEALS retirement of Justice Vicente Abad Santos on 12 July 1986. The Resolution of the First Division
(incorporated herein by reference) concluded thus:
G.R. No. L-44484 March 16, 1987 - OSMUNDO G.
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
RAMA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the
G.R. No. L-45164 March 16, 1987 - DOMINICO interests of a party, does not mean that it is an unjust decision or that it has been railroaded.
ETCUBAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
"This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor.
G.R. No. L-47305 March 16, 1987 - VIRGINIA B. YAP, J., took no part." cralaw virtua1aw library
ANCHETA v. ANGEL A. DAQUIGAN

On 3 November 1986, petitioner again addressed similar letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz,
G.R. No. L-48639 March 16, 1987 - ELISEO (incorporated herein by reference), excerpts from which follow: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
ALINSUGAY v. COURT OF APPEALS

"It is rather amazing that when we wrote you our previous letter, we never dreamed that you would
G.R. Nos. L-53364-65 March 16, 1987 - rush, as you did rush for assistance en consulta with the Honorable Court en banc. The unfortunate part
DOMICIANO SOCO v. MERCANTILE CORP. OF DAVAO
of it all is the fact that the Court en banc had to promulgate its resolution dated 28 October 1986 which
to us when considered in its entirety, is just as untenable as the First Division extended and unsigned
G.R. No. L-55932 March 16, 1987 - IGNACIO minute-resolution of 14 May 1986.
DOMALANTA v. COURT OF APPEALS
"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry, to wit: Did you or did you not approve the dismissal
G.R. No. L-58036 March 16, 1987 - ELISEO of our petition under
BOTICANO v. MANUEL CHU, JR.
"1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
G.R. No. L-60575 March 16, 1987 - FRANCISCO E.
POBRE v. ARSENIO M. GONONG
"2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
G.R. No. L-61404 March 16, 1987 - PARAMOUNT
INSURANCE CORP. v. ARTEMON D. LUNA "3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
G.R. No. 70736 March 16, 1987 - BONIFACIO L. "That was all we asked. The other matters contained in our letter were intended merely to give you the
HILARIO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT highlights of our case. This is what we wanted to know to properly guide us when we finally bring our
case to the other forum of justice.
G.R. Nos. 71044-45 March 16, 1987 - PEOPLE OF
THE PHIL. v. RODOLFO DE LA CRUZ "Did it ever occur to you that when you and the other members of the First Division referred our letters
to the Honorable Court en banc en consulta it was all your fault that the Court en banc had to promulgate
G.R. No. 75243 March 16, 1987 - PAZ M. DINGLE v.
its unsigned extended minute-resolution that unfortunately exposed the distinguished members of the
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
newly reorganized Supreme Court and, at the same time, convicted themselves as guilty of distorting
G.R. Nos. L-75511-14 March 16, 1987 - AGUSTIN V. facts involved in our petition?
TALINO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
"This, we are sure, will come as a shock to you. We will show you why
G.R. No. 74816 March 17, 1987 - ERNESTO R.
RODRIGUEZ, JR. v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT x x x
G.R. No. L-43292 March 18, 1987 - MAURICIO

BELLO v. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION "This is just a sample of what we will expose to the nation before the other forum of justice where we will
soon bring this case beyond the reach of the newly reorganized Supreme Court. We are prepared to
G.R. No. L-64508 March 19, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE expose many more of this kind of judicial performance readily constituting travesty of justice. Ponder
PHIL. v. MIGUEL LASAC
upon this well because it is our very firm conviction that the people deserve to know how the
G.R. No. L-22590 March 20, 1987 - SOLOMON distinguished members of the highest tribunal of the land perform their duties in this most sensitive area
BOYSAW v. INTERPHIL PROMOTIONS, INC. of decision making.
G.R. No. L-63260 March 20, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE "Anyhow, whether you referred our letter to the Court en banc (en consulta) or not, the situation remains
PHIL. v. MURPHY BANZALES the same. At the proper time, as we said, we will bring this case before another forum of justice where
the members of the First Division, in fact the Honorable Court en banc may no longer deny our action by
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 - RESTITUTO YNOT mere untenable and unjust minute resolutions. Better believe it that we intend to hold responsible
v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT members of the First Division who took part in the promulgation of the untenable and unjust extended
minute-resolution that is not even signed by any of those who promulgated it; therefore, to us, is clearly
G.R. No. L-27777 March 23, 1987 - NECITAS V. bereft of judicial integrity from its very inception on 14 May 1986.
BINAMIRA v. NECITAS OGAN-OCCENA
x x x
G.R. No. L-46383 March 23, 1987 - DELIA DEL
VALLE VDA. DE ORTIZ v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILS.
G.R. No. L-41861 March 23, 1987 - COMMISSIONER "Thus, we will bring this case before another forum of justice as Eva Maravilla Ilustre against the
OF CUSTOMS v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS distinguished members of the First Division, in fact against the entire membership of the newly organized
Supreme Court (because of its en banc unsigned extended minute-resolution that is without judicial
G.R. No. L-54116 March 23, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE integrity, dated 28 October 1986). But do not be mislead (sic) for we are not alone in this fight. Other
PHIL. v. ALBERTO MAALAC lawyers, not just by their mere sympathy for me personally and my case, but by their firm conviction
that judicial statesmanship must be maintained at all times in the highest tribunal of justice in the land,
G.R. NO. L-72830 March 24, 1987 - JESUS E, that they have offered their free legal services when the legal confrontation begins.
SANGCIANGCO, JR. v. PEOPLE
x x x
G.R. NO. L-73721 March 30, 1987 - AHS
PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION (FFW) v. NLRC
G. R. NO. L- 28156 March 31, 1987 - "Paragraph 4, found on page 3 of the en banc resolution projects the most fantastic, most unbelievable
BUENAVENTURA VS. HALILI UY picture of Division Chairman Justice Yap. It states
G.R. No. L-30159 March 31, 1987 - MUNICIPALITY ". . . When the resolution of dismissal on May 14, 1986, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey A.
OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION v. TIMOTEO STA. Ordoez was private respondents counsel.
ROMANA, ET AL.
"The Honorable Court en banc must think everybody stupid to swallow this statement hook, line and
G.R. No. L-31189 March 31, 1987 - MUNICIPALITY sinker. For Justice Yap we say: Tell that to the marines. But more than this, we leave this matter to the
OF VICTORIAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. conscience of Justice Yap.
G.R. No. L-36654 March 31, 1987 - FRANCISCO
"Ignoramus that we are, unschooled in the domain of law and procedure, but we are learning a few as
NOVESTERAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
we prosecute our case within legitimate limits, we state here that both resolutions that promulgated
G.R. No. L-38513 March 31, 1987 - CHARTERED by the Court en banc of 28 October 1986 and that promulgated by the First Division dated 27 October
BANK v. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUDITING OFFICE, 1986, are nothing but a desperate attempt, when both are considered in their respective entirety, to
ET AL. maneuver without success, some semblance of justification on the untenable and unjust 14 May 1986
extended and unsigned minute-resolution that is bereft of judicial integrity.
G.R. No. L-39767 March 31, 1987 - LORENZO
HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. x x x
G.R. No. L-48610 March 31, 1987 - SOLEDAD

PROVIDO v. OCTAVIO ACENAS, ET AL. "Thus, if the members of the First Division and those of the Honorable Court en banc think for one
minute that because of their respective 4-page minute but extended resolutions apparently impressive
G.R. No. L-61931 March 31, 1987 - JESUS CHAVEZ
for their lack of merit, deliberately unsigned that exposed their lack of judicial integrity, that we will now
v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL.
give up the fight, just forget it. Ignoramus that we are, better believe it when we say we are prepared to
G.R. No. 70223 March 31, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE carry the fight before another forum of justice. When we do, we shall call for a press conference with TV
PHIL. v. DONATO PETIL, ET AL. and radio coverage, so that we can present to the entire nation our quest for justice against the steam-
roller of power and influence and, at the same time, to call the attention of the people to the manner in
G.R. No. 72814 March 31, 1987 - PEOPLE OF THE which the members of the highest tribunal of the land perform their respective individual and collective
PHIL. v. GREGORIO NARAJOS functions in the domain of this most sensitive area of decision making.
"Allow us to restate our previous and now, our present inquiry, to wit: red:chanrobles.com.ph
"Did you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under
"a) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
b) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.
c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No." (Emphasis supplied).
True to her threats, after having lost her case before this Court, petitioner filed on 16 December 1986 an
Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan, totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal
considerations set forth in this Courts aforecited Resolutions of the First Division and en banc. Some
Members of this Court were maliciously charged with having knowingly and deliberately rendered, with
bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Resolution "making" her opponents the "illegal owners" of vast
estates. Some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged with knowingly
rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 "through manifest and evident bad faith," when
their Resolution had in fact and law been upheld by this Court. Additionally, Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of this Court were also maliciously charged with having used their power
and influence in persuading and inducing the members of the First Division of this Court into
promulgating their "unjust extended Minute Resolution of 14 May 1986." cralaw virtua1aw library
All the foregoing, in complete disregard of the Resolutions of this Court, as the tribunal of last resort, 1)
upholding the challenged judgment of the Court of Appeals; 2) dismissing the Petition on the ground that
the doctrine of res judicata was clearly applicable not only as to the probate of the Will of the decedent
but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others, and their right to intervene and participate in the
proceedings; and 3) finding that there was no attempt whatsoever on the part of Justice Yap nor Solicitor
General Ordoez to unduly influence the members of the First Division.
The Complaint before the Tanodbayan (incorporated herein by reference) was allegedly filed "in my quest
for justice, something that has been closed to me by the Supreme Court forever" and specifically
charged: red:chanrobles.com.ph
"CHARGE NO ONE
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of 1) persuading, inducing, influencing the members of
the newly organized First Division . . . into promulgating their unjust, extended minute RESOLUTION of
14 May 1986, knowingly with deliberate intent with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the
entire history of the Supreme Court based on insignificant issues and deliberately evading/prevaricating
the more important substantial ones raised in my petition, in violation of Section 3, sub-letter (a) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, . . .; and.
"(2) Under the same Section 3, subletter (e) of the same Republic Act . . . for causing me and the other
heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by using their power and influence as Solicitor General and
Associate Justice, respectively. . . .
"CHARGE NO. TWO
"Associate Justices Luis Javellana, Vicente Mendoza and Serafin Cuevas, members of the then FOURTH
SPECIAL CASES DIVISION, Intermediate Appellate Court
1) For knowingly rendering their unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 in the exercise of their
functions through manifest and evident bad faith in CA-G.R. No. SP-13680, entitled Francisco Q.
Maravilla, Et. Al. v. Hon. Antonia Corpus Macandog, Et. Al.in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code;"
2) For causing me and the other heirs such undue injury by deliberately, knowingly rendering their
unjust RESOLUTION dated 20 January 1984 . . . in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
Section 3 (e) thereof.
"CHARGE NO. THREE
"Associate Justice Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the Supreme Court
as of 14 May 1986, and Associate Justice Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera and Pedro
Yap, . . .
1) For knowingly and deliberately rendering their unjust, extended MINUTE RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986
dismissing my petition in G.R. No. 68635, . . . with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of
Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez, now the distinguished Solicitor General, the illegal owners of the vast estates
of my aunt Digna Maravilla . . .;
"2) Under Section 3, sub-letter (e) Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, . . . for deliberately causing us
heirs of Ponciano Maravilla undue injury by depriving us of our rights over my aunts vast estates
because of their manifest and evident bad faith in knowingly promulgating their unjust, extended minute
RESOLUTION of 14 May 1986, deliberately intended to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez, now
the Solicitor General, the illegal owners of my aunt Digna Maravillas estates when, under the law, these
Ordoez clients are not entitled to own these vast properties whether under testate or intestate
succession or mixed succession." (Emphasis supplied).
Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press, which was widely
publicized in almost all dailies on 23 December 1986, without any copy furnished this Court nor the
members who were charged. The issue of the Daily Express of 23 December 1986 published a banner
headline reading: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES"
thereby making it unjustly appear that the Justices of this Court and the other respondents were charged
with "graft and corruption" when the Complaint was actually filed by a disgruntled litigant and her
counsel after having lost her case thrice in this Court.
On 26 December 1986, the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) dismissed petitioners Complaint and decreed in
the dispositive portion of his Resolution (herein incorporated by reference) that: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, all the premises considered, this Office resolves to dismiss the complaint against Justices
Pedro Yap, Isagani Cruz, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, Vicente Abad Santos, and will
continue evaluating the complaint against Justices Serafin Cuevas, Luis Javellana and Vicente Mendoza,
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, and the private respondents." cralaw virtua1aw library
The aforestated Resolution indicated at the bottom of the last page: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Copy Furnished: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA
Counsel for the Complainant
919 Prudencio Street
Sampaloc, Manila.
In the Resolution of this Court en banc, dated January 29, 1986, it required: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why she should not
be held in contempt for her aforecited statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court
and/or official actions of the Justices concerned, which statements, unless satisfactorily explained,
transcend the permissible bounds of propriety and undermine and degrade the administration of justice;
and
"(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta, as an officer of the Court, to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice,
why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for the aforecited statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Supreme Court and the official actions of the Justices concerned, and for hiding
therefrom in anonymity behind his clients name, in an alleged quest for justice but with the manifest
intent to bring the Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts and the orderly
administration of justice." (pp. 383-384, Rollo).
(1)
In her Compliance-Answer filed on February 9, 1987, wherein Eva Maravilla Ilustre prays that the
contempt proceedings against her be dismissed, she contends, in essence, that: (1) "there was no
intention to affront the honor and dignity" of the Court; (2) the letters addressed to the individual
Justices were private in character and were never meant for anybody, much less the Supreme Court en
banc, "there (being) a constitutional mandate affording protection to privacy of communications;" (3) if
her statements in those letters were really contemptuous, the Court "should have immediately taken
disciplinary proceedings" against her, and not having done so, the Court has "forfeited" that right and is
now "estopped" from doing so; this citation for contempt is a "vindictive reprisal" for her having filed the
complaint before the Tanodbayan, "an action that lacks sincerity, taken not in the spirit of judicial
statemanship;" (4) she instituted the complaint before the Tanodbayan "in my honest belief that I lost
my case before the Supreme Court not because of lack of merit or of its own merits, assisted by
attorneys who offered their services in the prosecution of my case;" (5) the newspaper publicity of this
case "was no fault of mine; neither is it the fault of my former counsel Dean Wenceslao Laureta," who
prevailed upon her to call off the press conference with TV and radio coverage; that she is not a
"disgruntled litigant" who thrice lost before the Court, rather, she has challenged the validity of the
resolutions of the Court "containing distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken inferences" particularly,
in that (a) there is no res judicata (b) the Court of Appeals in its decision declared that the judgment of
the trial Court had long attained finality, so that it can no longer be set aside, (c) her "opponents," clients
of Atty. Ordoez, are not entitled to own her aunts "vast properties" whether under the law of testate or
intestate succession or mixed succession," (d) that the statement in this Courts Resolution that the
Court of Appeals had denied intervention is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts;" (b) the statement
in the en banc Resolution that some Justices of the Court of Appeals were similarly maliciously charged
with knowingly rendering their "unjust resolution" of 20 January 1984 is a bit "premature, a prejudgment
over a case over which this Court does not have jurisdiction;" (7) Atty. Laureta is not her counsel in the
case before the Tanodbayan; (8) before the latter body, she has "established not only probable cause but
has also proved the collective culpability (of the Justices concerned) as charged;" (9) and that her 53-
page Motion for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan is made an integral part of her Answer.
(2)
In his own Answer, Atty. Laureta maintains substantially that: (1) he is not respondent Ilustres counsel
before the Tanodbayan and that she has consulted and/or engaged the services of other attorneys in the
course of the prosecution of her case, like Atty. Edgardo M. Salandanan and Atty. Vedastro B.
Gesmundo; that he just learned from other sources that respondent Ilustre was planning to bring her
case to the Tanodbayan with the assistance of other lawyers who offered her their legal services; (2) it
was he who dissuaded her from calling her intended press conference and from circulating copies of her
complaint "not only in the performance of duty as an officer of the court, but also as a former president
of Manila III Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a professional lecturer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics in some Manila law schools in his desire to protect and uphold the honor and dignity of the
Supreme Court as the highest tribunal of the land." He should, therefore, be given "a little bit of credit for
what he did" instead of taking this disciplinary proceeding against him; that Ms. Ilustre is not a
"disgruntled litigant" who "lost her case thrice in this Court;" (3) he did not prepare respondent Ilustres
letters to the individual Justices, "appearances to the contrary notwithstanding;" that these letters were
"never, at any time, considered as constituting contempt of court" in the resolutions of this Court,
otherwise, "it would have taken immediate disciplinary action as it is doing now;" the Court has lost its
right to consider the statements in the letters as constituting contempt and it is now "estopped" from
proceeding with this disciplinary action; (4) by doing so, this Court has "unmistakably revealed the intent
and character that underlie its present action as a vindictive judicial vengeance, inconsistent with the
spirit of judicial statesmanship by hiding behind the well-recognized fact that the Supreme Court is
supreme in the domain of the administration of justice;" (5) "there was no disregard intended to the
Resolution of the Honorable Court, as the tribunal of last resort, relative to its upholding the judgment of
the Court of Appeals;" he is just doing "his duty as an officer of the court to put the records in this regard
in their proper light;" particularly (a) that the judgment of the trial court had attained its finality long
ago, (b) the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable, otherwise, this Court would not have remanded the
case to the Court of Appeals for review, (c) the observation in the First Divisions extended Resolution of
14 July 1986 that Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Ordoez was private respondents counsel "defies
every vestige of human understanding;" that Justice Yap had forthwith inhibited himself from
participating in the case is not borne out by the record of this case. Justice Yap had "never voluntarily
entered on the record his inhibition" when he should have done so when respondent Ilustres petition was
taken up; Justice Yaps partner, Atty. Ordoez, continued to be recognized by this Court as counsel for
private respondents even as he was already the Solicitor General; (b) finally, "appearances to the
contrary notwithstanding, he has not committed acts unworthy of his profession. The truth of the matter
is, he should at least be credited in whatever small way for his acts and efforts taken by him to protect
and uphold the honor and dignity of the Honorable Court." cralaw virtua1aw library
We find the explanations of both Ms. Ilustre and Atty. Laureta unsatisfactory. Their claims that they had
done nothing that could constitute an affront to the honor and dignity of this Court dissipate in the face
of attendant facts and circumstances and "defy every vestige of human understanding," to use their own
language. Indeed, they should not "think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of
words." (Mathew 6:7).
Respondents reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual

Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record
and are a matter of concern for the entire Court. The contumacious character of those letters constrained
the First Division to refer the same to the Court en banc, en consulta and so that the Court en banc could
pass upon the judicial acts of the Division. It was only in the exercise of forbearance by the Court that it
refrained from issuing immediately a show cause order in the expectancy that after having read the
Resolution of the Court en banc of October 28, 1986, respondents would realize the unjustness and
unfairness of their accusations.
The Court is far from "estopped" in initiating these proceedings. The Chief Justice had promptly
announced his Statement, dated December 23, 1986, that "the Supreme Court will take appropriate
steps on the matter upon its resumption of sessions on the first working day of the year." cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no vindictive reprisal involved. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is
unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
We are not convinced that Atty. Laureta had nothing to do with respondent Ilustres letters to the
individual Justices, nor with the complaint filed before the Tanodbayan. In the Motion for
Reconsideration, dated June 11, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta in the main petition, he stressed: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"10. The composition of the First Division was reduced to five members. Strangely enough, about one
month later, the Honorable Court promulgated its extended resolution with such promptitude in the
entire history of the Supreme Court unequalled in a manner of speaking. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
In the Manifestation and Motion, dated June 25, 1986, filed by Atty. Laureta (p. 311, Rollo), the same
phrases were incarnated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"the promptitude with which the Resolution of 14 May 1986 was promulgated (par. 9, Motion for
Reconsideration, p. 5) unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court in so far as petitions given
due course is concerned . . ." (Emphasis given).
Those same terms are reproduced verbatim in the letters ostensibly authored by respondent Ilustre
addressed to the individual Justices whom respondents have charged. Thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We consider the three minute resolutions . . . railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the
entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and
judicial ethics" (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 2; ltr. to Justice Cruz, p. 2).
x x x
"with such unusual hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court" (Ltr. to
Justice Narvasa, p. 5; ltr. to Justice Herrera, p. 5; ltr. to Justice Cruz, p. 5)." cralaw virtua1aw library
The same terminologies are reiterated in the Complaint and in the Motion for Reconsideration filed before
the Tanodbayan (p. 2).
Further, in his Manifestation & Motion, dated June 25, 1986, Atty. Laureta stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"counsel for petitioner personally inquired from Division Clerk of Court Corazon Serevo the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) When was the above-entitled case deliberated by the First Division?
(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?
(3) Who among the members of the Division voted for dismissal of the petition to be promulgated by
resolution and who did not, if any?
(4) Who prepared the Resolution?" (p. 312, Rollo).
Atty. Lauretas obsession to receive the answer to his queries surfaces again in the second letters dated
November 3, 1986 to the individual Justices under the supposed signatures of respondent Ilustre,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Evidently you misunderstood our point of inquiry in our first letter. It is a very simple inquiry, to wit Did
you or did you not approve the dismissal of our petition under.
1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No
2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No
3) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No." cralaw virtua1aw library
(Emphasis original) (Ltr. to Justice Narvasa, p. 1; to Justice Herrera, p. 1; to Justice Cruz, p. 1).
Additionally, the disparaging remarks like: exertion of "undue" and "powerful influence" by Atty. Ordoez
and Justice Yap; "distortion of facts, conjectures and mistaken references" ; "untenable minute resolution
although extended" ; "unjust minute resolution" repeated by Atty. Laureta in his several pleadings,
echoed and re-echoed in the individual letters to the Justices, as well as in the Complaint and the Motion
for Reconsideration before the Tanodbayan, reveal the not-too-hidden hand of Atty. Laureta.
The foregoing is bolstered by the reports received by the members of the Court that copies of the
complaint filed with the Tanodbayan were distributed to the editors of the metropolitan newspapers in
envelopes bearing the name of respondent Laureta, who was heard over the radio speaking on the same
complaint, and that he was following up the complaint and the motion for reconsideration of the order of
dismissal of the Tanodbayan.
Furthermore, respondent Laureta as his co-respondent Ilustres lawyer had control of the proceedings. As
stressed by this Court in an early case, as such lawyer, "Whatever steps his client takes should be within
his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should be reminded
him that (a) lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those
things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer
should terminate their relation." (In Re: Contempt Proceedings in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1, 23) Respondent Laureta manifestly failed to discharge such responsibility. For all
intents and purposes, he appears to have encouraged and abetted his client in denigrating the members
of the First Division of this Court, by baselessly charging them with rendering an "unjust" resolution with
"deliberate bad faith," because of his stubborn insistence on his untenable arguments which had been
rejected as without merit by the Courts First Division, whose Resolution was upheld by the Court en
banc. Worse, the dissemination in the print and broadcast media in bold captions falsely depicting the
Justices as "FAC(ING) GRAFT CHARGES" instead of the baseless rantings of a disgruntled litigant appear
to have been timed to place them in a bad light at the height of the Christmas season.
We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.
They charge Associate Justices Vicente Abad Santos (retired) then Chairman of the First Division of the
Supreme Court as of May 14, 1986, Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Pedro Yap for knowingly
and deliberately rendering their "unjust, extended Resolution of May 14, 1986" dismissing their petition
in this case with manifest and evident bad faith to make the clients of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoez (now the
Solicitor General) the "illegal owners" of the estates of Digna Maravilla, thereby causing the heirs of
Ponciano Maravilla (Dignas eldest brother) undue injury by depriving them of their rights over the
estates of Digna Maravilla (Charge No. Three before the Tanodbayan). They further charge Justice Yap
(and Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez) of having "persuad(ed), induc(ed) and influenc(ed) the members of the
newly organized First Division into promulgating their "unjust, extended minute Resolution of 14 May
1986" (Charge No. One before the Tanodbayan), which Resolution, (the "Division Resolution," for short)
is herewith attached as Annex "A."
Preliminarily, respondents deny that respondent Ilustre lost three times in this Court. It cannot be
denied, however, that, as stated in the Resolution of October 28, 1986 of the Court en banc, this is the
third time (in fact, the fourth, if we include Fernandez, Et. Al. v. Maravilla, L-18799, 10 SCRA 589
[1964]) that a controversy involving the estate of the late Digna Maravilla is elevated to this Court. The
first was in G.R. No. L-23225 (37 SCRA 672 [1971], where this Court ruled: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court below denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna
Maravilla (Exhibit A) is reversed and the said testament is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be
returned to the Court of origin for further proceedings conformable to law. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
As stated in the en banc Resolution of October 28, 1986 (hereto attached as Annex "B", and hereinafter
referred to as the "Banc Decision") while respondent Ilustre was not a party in that case, upon remand of
the case to the probate Court, she and other children of the deceased brothers and sisters of the testatrix
filed two Motions for Intervention. Respondent Ilustres participation in the estate involved, therefore,
harks back to that first case.
The Court of Appeals resolved the issue of intervention in CA-G.R. No. 05394, entitled "Heirs of Pastor
Maravilla, Et. Al. v. Hon. Ernesto S. Tengco, Et. Al." in a Decision penned by Justice Venicio Escolin
(hereinafter referred to as the "Escolin Decision") wherein it was categorically ruled that there was no
point to allowing intervention on the part of respondent Ilustre, et als., "for failure to show any right or
interest in the estate in question." Thus: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(2) As heretofore stated, private respondents, in their counter-petition for mandamus, seek this Courts
resolution on the petitioners motion for intervention in Sp. Proc. No. 4977. In their respective pleadings
and memoranda, the parties have lengthily discussed the issue of whether or not petitioners may be
allowed to intervene; and the same may as well be determined in the present case, if only to avoid or, at
least, minimize further protracted controversy between the parties (PCIB v. Hon. Escolin, 56 SCRA 2661.
A resolution of this issue should render moot and academic the question anent the disqualification of
respondent Judge.
We agree with private respondents that petitioners motions for intervention are devoid of merit, for
failure on their part to show any right or interest in the estate in question. There is no dispute that the
last will and testament of the late Digna Maravilla had already been admitted to probate in a final
judgment which the Supreme Court promulgated on March 2, 1971 (G.R. No. L-23225). In the said will,
Digna instituted her husband Herminio Maravilla as
x x x
The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of the
decedents present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral
relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latters estate through intestate succession or
mixed succession. Having no forced or compulsory heirs, except her husband, the testatrix had the
absolute freedom to institute the latter as her sole, universal heir, and such freedom is recognized by
Article 842 of the Civil Code, which provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor
of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions
of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." cralaw virtua1aw library
There is therefore no point in allowing the petitioners, who clearly appear to have no interest in the
estate, to intervene in the proceedings involving the settlement thereof.
x x x"
The aforesaid Decision was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. L-46155 on November 9, 1977 and has
become final. That was the second case involving the estate filed before this Court.
Respondents contention, therefore, that the statement in the Banc Resolution "that the Court of Appeals
had denied intervention" is an "unadulterated distortion of the facts" is obviously erroneous and intended
to mislead.
The "Escolin Decision" (in CA-G.R. No. 05394-R), which had become final, also finally foreclosed any
claim that respondent Ilustre, and those who sought to intervene with her, may have had on the estate
of Digna Maravilla. In unmistakable terms, what the Court of Appeals held in that Decision, affirmed by
this Court, bears repeating: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The above testamentary provision for the universal heirship of Herminio Maravilla over the residue of
the decedents present and future property legally and completely excluded the petitioners, as collateral
relatives of the testatrix, from inheriting any part of the latters estate through intestate succession or
mixed succession. . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library
To circumvent that judgment, however, two years later, or on February 29, 1979, respondent Ilustre,
with respondent Laureta as counsel, filed a complaint for partition of Digna Maravillas estate and for
damages against the heirs of Digna Maravillas husband, who had then passed away (docketed as Civil
Case No. X-404), before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, San Carlos City, Branch X,
presided over by Judge Antonia Corpuz Macandog. That Court, after declaring defendants therein (private
respondents in the petition under review) in default, ordered "all properties of Digna Maravilla mentioned
in this case to go back to their trunk of origin, the plaintiffs herein who are represented by Eva Maravilla
Ilustre and Eva Maravilla Ilustre herself" (hereinafter referred to as the "Macandog Decision"). In
addition, the judgment awarded damages to the respondent Ilustre, et als., (the plaintiffs therein), and
the sum of P100,000.00 to their counsel, respondent Laureta.
A special civil action for certiorari was filed by the defeated parties (private respondents in the petition
under review) before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. L-58014, praying that the lower Courts
declaration of default in Civil Case No. X-404 and all other actions or decisions taken thereafter be
declared null and void and that the dismissal of the complaint be ordered. on January 21, 1982, this
Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, questions of
fact being involved.
In a Decision dated January 14, 1983, the Court of Appeals (Fourth Division), 1 in AC-G.R. SP No. 13680
(hereafter called the "Busran Decision"), dismissed the petition and denied certiorari slating in one breath
that "the judgment subject of assail had long become final" (at p. 13), and in another "for all we know,
the judgment below had already attained finality long ago." The reason relied upon was that petitioners
therein had the remedy of appeal but instead availed of Certiorari, which is not a substitute therefor.
On motion for reconsideration, however, filed by petitioners (private respondents in the petition under
review), in that appealed case (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680), the same Court of Appeals (Fourth Special Cases
Division) 2 in its Resolution of January 20, 1984 (the "Javellana Resolution"), reconsidered and set aside
the "Busran Decision" and entered another one: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Annulling the order of default of the Hon. respondent Court dated 29 April 1980 and its decision dated
11 August 1981; and
2. Dismissing private respondents complaint in Civil Case No. X-404 and ordering the Hon. respondent
Court not to take further action therein." cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent Ilustre challenged that reversal in the present Petition for Review filed on October 22, 1984.
This is the third case brought before this Court involving the same estate. Review was denied in an
extended minute Resolution by the First Division of this Court in the challenged Resolution of May 14,
1986, for the following reasons: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The appealed Decision stands on firm legal grounds.
(1) The Order of Default of the Trial Court was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The Answer was filed
only one day late besides the fact that when so filed, the Order of default had not yet been issued by the
Trial Court.
(2) While appeal is, indeed, the remedy from a judgment by default, Certiorari may be resorted to when
a party has been illegally declared in default (Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA
300-301 [1975]),or where it is necessary to restore order to proceedings in the Court below (Lim Tanhu
v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 462-463 [1975]).
(3) More importantly, the judgment of the Trial Court, in Civil Case No. X-404 declaring that the
Testatrixs collateral relatives have a rightful claim to her estate to the exclusion of the husband who was
designated her sole and universal heir, nullifies the Will already probated by final judgment and overturns
the pronouncements of both the Appellate Court and this Court on the case.
There being former judgments on the issues which have become final, rendered by Courts having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, the said judgments having been rendered on the
merits, and there being between the prior and subsequent action identity of parties, subject matter and
substantial identity of cause of action, it is clear that the complaint below in Civil Case X-404 is barred by
the principle of res adjudicata, and whatever transpired therein are null and void ab initio and without
any legal effect.
To rule otherwise would upset the fundamental issue on which res judicata rests that parties ought not to
be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when a right or fact has been judicially
determined, the judgment of the Court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sarabia v. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 2 SCRA 54 [1961]).
ACCORDINGLY, the review sought for is denied and respondent Courts judgment in CA-G.R. SP No.
13080 is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondents decry the fact that the First Division set aside the due course Order and denied review in an
extended Minute Resolution instead of in a signed Decision. They allege that said Resolution was
"railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under
circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics," unduly "persuaded, induced
and influenced" by Solicitor General Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap.
Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution."
"The petition for review was assigned to the then First Division of seven Justices, which initially gave it
due course because the resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court had reversed a decision originally
rendered by the then Court of Appeals, and in order to have more time for further study.
Pleadings were submitted, the last being on May 3, 1985, which can be considered as the date when this
case was submitted for resolution.
The First Division of seven (7) was not able to act on the case up to the February, 1986 political
upheaval. The last incident in the case was a motion for the early release of decision filed by petitioner
on November 19, 1985.
When this Court was reorganized in April of 1986, the membership of the First Division was reduced to
five (5) Justices. Taking account of the motion of petitioner for early release of decision, the new First
Division, then chairmanned by Justice Abad Santos, realizing that the doctrine of res judicata was clearly
applicable not only as to the probate of the will but also as to the heirship of petitioner, among others,
and their right to intervene and participate in the proceedings resolved, on May 14, 1986 to dismiss
the petition through an extended resolution which at the same time recalled the due course order. The
new Division of 5 acted unanimously." cralaw virtua1aw library
The recall of a due course Order after a review of the records of the case is a common occurrence in the
Court. Respondents speak as if it were only their petition which has been subjected to such recall. They
have lost all objectivity in this regard. They are hardly qualified, and cannot presume to speak of the
"entire history" of the Supreme Court.
As to the participation of Justice Yap in the case, the "Banc Resolution" stated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Justice Yap clarified that he was on official mission to Switzerland for the Presidential Commission on
Good Government after his appointment to the Supreme Court on April 11, 1986 and did not assume his
position in the Supreme Court until his return on May 2, 1986. When the resolution of dismissal on May
14, 1986 was issued, Justice Yap was unaware that Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez was private respondents
counsel.
On June 11, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was taken up by the First Division
on July 9, 1986 with Justice Abad Santos still the Chairman. This time, Justice Yap, realizing that his
former partner, Atty. Ordoez, had submitted the pleadings for petitioner, inhibited himself and Justice
Edgardo L. Paras was designated under Special Order No. 21, dated July 9, 1986, to sit in the Division in
his place. The motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on July 9, 1986.
Justice Yap was designated Chairman of the First Division on July 14, 1986.
On August 7, 1986, petitioner asked leave to file a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied
on September 3, 1986, entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 resolution having been made on July 28,
1986. Justice Yap again took no part in the deliberation of the case." cralaw virtua1aw library
But respondents continue to claim derisively that Justice Yap could not have been "unaware" of the
appearance of Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez. They reacted by saying "tell it to the marines" (Letters of
November 3, 1986 to Justices Narvasa, Herrera, and Cruz, at p. 8, respectively). But that was the true
and untarnished fact. With so many cases being handled by the Court, the appearances of lawyers during
deliberative sessions very often escape attention, concentration being centered on the issues to be
resolved.
Respondents also fault the Court for "still recogniz(ing) Atty. Ordoez as counsel" for their opponents in
the case. In the same "Banc Resolution," it was clarified: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A copy of the resolution, dated May 14, 1986, was sent by the Releasing Clerks to Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoez as his name still appears on the cover page of the Rollo. It was not necessarily because the
Supreme Court still recognizes him as counsel for respondents" (at p. 4).
The fact of the matter is that even Atty. Laureta continued to recognize Atty. Ordoez as counsel as
shown by his pleadings filed before the Court, which inevitably contained the notation "copy furnished
Atty. Sedfrey Ordoez." No withdrawal of appearance having been presented by Atty. Ordoez in the
main petition, his name continues to be in the Rollo of the case and the personnel concerned continue to
furnish him with copies of Resolutions of this Court.
In respect of the charge that the Resolutions of the First Division of May 14, 1986, July 9, 1986 denying
the Motion for Reconsideration with finality, and September 3, 1986 denying leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration since entry of judgment of the May 14, 1986 Resolution had been made on
July 28, 1986, were "unjust" and were "railroaded," the Banc Resolution, adopting the Division
Resolution, explained: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The aforesaid resolutions were by no means railroaded. The pleadings filed by the parties, as in any
other case, were included in the Agenda of the First Division as soon as feasible. The Division acts
promptly on all Agenda items, and the minutes of its deliberations are released as soon as possible after
Agenda day.
x x x
"The dispositions in this case were arrived at after careful study. Because a case is resolved against the
interests of a party, does not mean that it is an unjust decision; or that it has been railroaded.
This Division declares without hesitation that it has consistently rendered justice without fear or favor."
(at p. 4)
Respondents insist that the doctrine of "res judicata" is inapplicable. In their own words "the ordered
probate of the 1944 Will of Digna Maravilla by judgment of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 is
conclusive only as to the genuineness and due execution of said will, but not upon the validity of
testamentary provision, particularly with the invalid designation of Herminio Maravilla as sole and
universal heir of Digna Maravilla." cralaw virtua1aw library
On this point, the "Javellana Resolution," in reversing the "Busran Decision" (AC-G.R. SP No. 13680),
aptly held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The then Court of Appeals held that the questioned decision does not run counter to the decision of the
Hon. Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-23225 admitting the will of Digna Maravilla to probate because the
latter refers to the extrinsic validity of the will, while the former concerns its intrinsic validity. We cannot
agree with this observation because it is quite clear from the questioned decision that the will was in
effect declared not to have been freely and voluntarily executed by the deceased Digna Maravilla but was
the result of the evil and fraudulent machinations of her husband, Herminio Maravilla, and sets aside said
will. The declaration that private respondents, as collateral relatives of the deceased Digna Maravilla, are
entitled to her estate, is an indication that the Hon. respondent Court has nullified the will. Private
respondents are not compulsory heirs and, in the absence of their being named legatees or devisees in
the will, they could only lay claim to the estate of Digna Maravilla if the latter died without a will,
pursuant to Art. 1003 of the New Civil Code, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
"However, assuming arguendo, that the matter complained of by private respondents referred only to the
intrinsic validity of the will, still, it was improper for them to have instituted a separate action in a court
other than that in which the probate proceeding was pending.
x x x
It seems clear from these provisions of the law that while the estate is being settled in the Court of First
Instance in a special proceeding, no ordinary action can be maintained in that court, or in any other
court, by a person claiming to be the heir, against the executor or against other persons claiming to be
heirs, for the purpose of having the rights of the plaintiffs in the estate determined. The very purpose of
the trial or hearing provided for in section 753 is to settle and determine those questions, and until they
are settled and determined in that proceeding and under that section no action such as the present one
can be maintained." cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering that the "Escolin Decision," as affirmed by this Court on November 9, 1977 in G.R. No. L-
46155, had become final, the "Javellana Resolution" aptly observed: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. The questioned decision of the Hon. respondent Court dated 12 August 1981 (referring to the
Macandog Decision) unsettles and reviews issues which had long been laid to rest by the Hon. Supreme
Court and the then Court of Appeals." cralaw virtua1aw library
But respondents ask: if res judicata were applicable, why did this Court, in G.R. No. L-50814, refer the
case to the Court of Appeals? The answer is simple. The issue of whether the remedy of petitioners in
that case was appeal and not certiorari had to be resolved. If certiorari were proper, then the "Macandog
Decision" had not become final. If appeal, its finality would be the consequence. The "Javellana
Resolution;" which reversed the "Busran Decision," held that Certiorari was proper when a party has
been illegally declared in default. It follows that the "Macandog Decision" had not attained finality.
Still undaunted, respondents claim that the Court of Appeals "deliberately evaded/divaricated" two
important issues: (1) that the judgment of the Trial Court (in CC No. X-404) had attained finality as in
fact the Court of Appeals had held that the "judgment of assail had long become final," and (2) that
Digna Maravillas husband could not be instituted as the sole and universal heir of the wife on
indestructible ground of moral impossibility and could not inherit wifes vast estate on the ground of utter
unworthiness." cralaw virtua1aw library
The penchant of respondents for making misleading statements is again obvious. It was not in the
"Javellana Resolution" that the Court of Appeals held that "the judgment of assail (referring to the
Macandog Decision) had long become final." That was in the "Busran Decision," which was precisely
reversed by the "Javellana Resolution." cralaw virtua1aw library
As to the alleged unworthiness of the husband to inherit from his wife, the "Javellana Resolution"
pointedly observed: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The last will and testament of Digna Maravilla which instituted her husband, Herminio Maravilla, as her
sole and universal heir, was admitted to probate, pursuant to a final judgment of the Hon. Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-23225, 27 February 1971. This probate foreclosed all questions as to the age and
mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf,
and the acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required member of witnesses
who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 168). Yet,
more than ten years later, the Hon. respondent Court would nullify the effects of the probate by declaring
that Digna Maravilla did not voluntarily and sanely execute the probated last will and testament,
nullifying the institution of Herminio Maravilla as her sole and universal heir, and ordering the return of
the properties of Digna Maravilla to the trunk of origin." cralaw virtua1aw library
The soundness of the legal conclusions arrived at in the "Escolin Decision" and "Javellana Resolution"
commends itself. Only a disgruntled litigant and a defeated lawyer would claim that those judgments
were accepted "hook, line and sinker" by this Court. The doctrine of res judicata is inescapably
applicable. Thus it was that the First Division, in its challenged Resolution of May 14, 1986, found it
unnecessary, after further study, to have a signed Decision and, instead, recalled the due course Order,
which it had previously issued to give it "more time for further study" (p. 2, Banc Resolution, October 28,
1986). Contrary to respondents claim, the Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the
time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is
given, depending on its evaluation of a case.
But obdurately enough, respondents have seen fit to take their case to the Tanodbayan charging the
members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered
an "unjust extended minute Resolution" with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code 3 and for deliberately causing "undue injury" to respondent Ilustre and her co-heirs because
of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 4
Respondents action is brazenly unjustifiable. Nor can they plead ignorance. As aptly declared in the Chief
Justices Statement of December 24, 1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto," (I)t is elementary
that the Supreme Court is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other
department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them unjust." It is elementary that" (A)s
has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo v. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) controlling
and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the risk of
occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them should become final
at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter
beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or
of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts
are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and to
determine the respective rights of the parties." (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc.,
86 SCRA 305, 316-317)
Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering
knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for
decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the
decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the
Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article
has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their
conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also
follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground
that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
The Chief Justices Statement of the supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial power is by no means a
"display of arrogance" as per respondents puerile contention, but a restatement of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of government such
as ours, viz. that the three co-equal branches of government, the executive, legislative and judicial, are
each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other. (Forbes v. Chuoco, 16 Phil. 534 [1910]). As restated by the late
Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 134), our
Constitution "as a definition of the powers of government placed upon the judiciary the great burden of
determining the nature, scope and extent of such powers and when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments .. but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which the instrument secures and guarantees to them."
As an officer of the Court, respondent Laureta, should realize that the cardinal principle he would grossly
impair and violate is that of the independence of the judiciary, which the members of the bar are called
upon to defend and preserve. The independence of the judiciary is the indispensable means for enforcing
the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member of the
Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and
judicial functions is to subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate
the judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to
answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be inconsistent
with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can
be either respectable or useful." (Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).
Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the
same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729; Gardiner,
Et. Al. v. Paredes, Et Al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The Supreme Courts
pronouncement of the doctrine that" (I)t is well settled that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there
has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of
margin fees] on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers
and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to Supreme Court orders,
resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347,
350. (Citing Primicias v. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias v.
Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).
The Court has consistently stressed that "the doctrine of separation of powers calls for the executive,
legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as they see fit" (Tan v.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to
expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its orders or
decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled
either coordinate branch into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes
mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government. (Tecson v. Salas, 34 SCRA
275, 286-287).
To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim that the members acted "with deliberate
bad faith" and rendered and "unjust resolution" in disregard or violation of the duty of their high office to
act upon their own independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy
the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to disregard
utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty. To allow such collateral attack would
destroy the separation of powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all
justiciable disputes.
Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation of powers mandated by
the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by
them and their adversaries for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within the
judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
In resume, we find that respondent Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual
Justices quoted in the show-cause Resolution of this Court en banc, particularly the underlined portions
thereof; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted and underscored in the
same Resolution; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the
official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her
unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from this Court. The fact that said letters are
not technically considered pleadings, nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had
been finally resolved does not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional
right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against
the Court.
We likewise find that Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance
of dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Courts adverse
Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land
by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments
(Montecillo v. Gica, 60 SCRA 234 [1974]); for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting
and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client,
respondent Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which
we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the
facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in this Courts Resolutions of the First Division
and en banc, as the Tribunal of last resort; for making it appear that the Justices of this Court and other
respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" when the complaint before
the Tanodbayan, in essence, is a tirade from a disgruntled litigant and a defeated counsel in a case that
has been brought thrice before this Court, and who would readily accept anything but the soundness of
the judgments of the Courts concerned, all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and
of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.
Atty. Laureta should be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. For like the Court itself, "a lawyer is an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." (Surigao Mineral Conservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1
[1970]; Castaeda v. Ago, 65 SCRA 505 [1975]).
In assessing the penalty on respondent Laureta, the Court notes that "disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or
a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaint nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actions as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney." Viewed
in the light of the demonstrated persistence of grave misconduct and undermining public confidence in
the honor and integrity of the Court and its members (at a time when the Court is exerting every effort
to regain public confidence in our courts after the trauma and debacle undergone by them in the past
regime), the Court shall impose upon him an indefinite suspension, leaving it to him to prove at some
future and opportune time, that he shall have once again regained the fitness to be allowed to resume
the practice of law as an officer of the Courts. (In re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562).
ACCORDINGLY, (1) respondent Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt, and is hereby fined in
the amount of P1,000.00 only, mindful that the power of contempt should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle of punishment; and.
(2) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and is
hereby suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all Courts of the country for their information and guidance,
and spread in the personal record of Atty. Wenceslao Laureta.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., no part.
Endnotes:
1. Composed of Justices Busran (ponente), Coquia and Zosa, as members.
2. Composed of Justices Cuevas, Mendoza and Javellana (ponente).
3. "ART. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. Any judge who shall knowingly
render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by
prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
4. "SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.
x x x
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. . . ."
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[G.R. No. 68635. March 12, 1987.]

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO

PER CURIAM, J.:

LTD. v. VIVENCIO M. RUIZ

G.R. No. 70360 March 11, 1987 - AREVALO GOMEZ

G.R. No. L-33836 March 16, 1987 - SOFIA L.

RAMA v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

ANCHETA v. ANGEL A. DAQUIGAN

ALINSUGAY v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-43292 March 18, 1987 - MAURICIO

G.R. No. L-48610 March 31, 1987 - SOLEDAD

"a) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

b) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No.

c) The 3 Sept. 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No." (Emphasis supplied).

"CHARGE NO. TWO

"CHARGE NO. THREE

"ORDONEZ, 8 JUSTICES FACE GRAFT CHARGES"

"Copy Furnished: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

DEAN WENCESLAO LAURETA

Counsel for the Complainant

919 Prudencio Street

Respondents reliance on the "privacy of communication" is misplaced. Letters addressed to individual

(2) Are there recorded minutes of such deliberation?

(4) Who prepared the Resolution?" (p. 312, Rollo).

1) The 14 May 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

2) The 9 July 1986 minute resolution? Yes or No

We come now to the specific accusations of respondents.

SO ORDERED." cralaw virtua1aw library

Nothing is farthest from the truth. As explained in the "Banc Resolution."

Yap, J., no part.

1. Composed of Justices Busran (ponente), Coquia and Zosa, as members.

2. Composed of Justices Cuevas, Mendoza and Javellana (ponente).

4. "SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.

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