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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO
B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes)
on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de
Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation
of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain
amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48
a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver
his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion
and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a
quorum.1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio
Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo
announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he
never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of
the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that
the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
 the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by
the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after
the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from
he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November
21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the
Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published
version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-
sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2)
in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other
versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better
prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as
petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding,
the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of
the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed
is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the
House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years or nays,
but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of
a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that .
. . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,4
the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward
declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5
the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of
order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumption
of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remained upon the resumption of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill
certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of
a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been
properly passed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion
by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the
enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the
House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution
provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules
cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating
to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in
passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for
approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996,
shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee
Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of
petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a
grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin
with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by
courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.
Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will
not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a

particular measure.'"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and
in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a
continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings
does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a
constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly.
Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It
has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a
legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliance with rules."

In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The
Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants
of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter
clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for
the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from
its own rules of procedure."

In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no
inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules
in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that
they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the
rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or
suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three
readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in
case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff
was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the
gambling statute was not properly passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings
had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner.
It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in
violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory
provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force
from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly
weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the
governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule
which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing
its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed

by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with
rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185;
In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark.
101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on
the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinary have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity
is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 18

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard
for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter
upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to
exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and, therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts
can adjudicate constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII,
1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such
as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those
as those relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those
which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, this Court's function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional
limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the
exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was
still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out
for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair
was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo
were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion,
the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by
its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it
suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report.

No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this
involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It
was the way the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and
the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by
Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the
matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has
been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then
the voting comes in.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor
on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with
the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any
objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is approved on second reading." If
there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not
presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance
here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair can announce
how many are in favor and how many are against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even
more just. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second
opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis
of the problem." 25

Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last and
third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto
of the President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the members by
yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was
suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep.
Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m.
of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to
say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four
o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle
to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question
of privilege entitled to precedence.30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn
would have precedence and would have put an end to any further consideration of the question. 31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No.
8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision,
the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should
not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot
be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so
doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21,
1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee
report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the
manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral
conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the
manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Taada would have voted in favor
of the conference committee report.37

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November
21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of
Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the
decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive
presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether
certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been
obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned,
democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings
of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them
a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary
to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not
 to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not
to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of
whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained
provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have
no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions
into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill.
To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two
departments of our government. 41

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art.
VI. 26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42

In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and
abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution. 45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and
overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have
departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new
members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the
change in the membership of the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No.
8740, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4)
provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy
for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith
of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the
Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself
complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself
be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A.
No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof
acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body. 49

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., concurs in the result.

Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been
imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility
of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our
jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent
disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province
the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted
intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no
time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced,
powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and
the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to
assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political
questions provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely
political issues is shown to have attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion
cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent
which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate,
the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with,
my firm stance in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were
posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely
disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive
issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a
substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the
procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have
cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is
cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated.3 To me, the position
then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not,
however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these
principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe
did not call for their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to
emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself. Thus:

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that
attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and
printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be
impugned, having been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent
reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters
pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent
engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters
relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules
on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not
the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument
is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced
towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public
unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative
rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the
Court's review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:

I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "
(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere
with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached.
Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the
Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified
the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino
dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the
instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly violated by
respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the House's
business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the
Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the
petitioners are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act
No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the
fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not that the
substance thereof offends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to
invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive
changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably
unwarranted under the circumstances of instant petition.
 unwarranted under the circumstances of instant petition.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal
of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue
posed by the petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive
as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree
that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even
in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin,1 as a window to view the issues before the Court. It
is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. 2 It held:

xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed
this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members
sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal,
230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity
of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the
presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised
is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e.,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1)
that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court
did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
3
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule
XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority may move for a
reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of
actual executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection of a
nomination shall have been sent to the President before the expiration of the time within which a
motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to
request the President to return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on
a nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.
 disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the Secretary to the
President until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a
motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate.

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power Commission has been
confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President who then signed
the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and
requested the President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A petition for quo
warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction
over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to
the construction of the applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the
Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic
consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different from that adopted by
the Senate itself when the present case was under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of
judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not
the function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule designed to ensure due
deliberation in the performance of the vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for
public office, moreover, should receive from the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the
reasons, above stated, against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in
the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the

Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of immediate notification to the President
as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to perfect the appointment.

Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified before the
Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and
was charged with perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had
no quorum when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's
charge to the members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of the said
Committee, and that "at least that number must have been actually and physically present . . . If such
a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of
March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or
otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did
not remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a
competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the testimony of the
defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning
of the afternoon session . . . .

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume there was a continuous
quorum simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules,
a quorum once established is presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court
assumed jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the
issue as "what rules the House had established and whether they have been followed." It held:

xxx xxx xxx

Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our
concern, and by the same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of
legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us.
The question is neither what rules Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether
presumptions of continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather
what rules the House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has the
power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish its
competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it the jury was
allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact was
 allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact was
not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a consequence of this
conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An essential
part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the
crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the
instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed
the jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we
agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a majority of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was a majority
present two or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence
indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the
offense is committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but
denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all

the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.

The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once established
is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in
effect, invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.

The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. 5 Yellin
was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress
on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he
assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in
executive session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of
the Committee or sub-committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly
injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in
an executive session for the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such
interrogation thereafter in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, held:

xxx xxx xxx

Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers at trial that his
rights have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee's practice leads witnesses to
misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be
distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that the
Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based
upon those rules, simply because the witness was deceived by the Committee's appearance of
regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case
meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its
own rules.

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the "political thicket." In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for
maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts
cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political'
exceeds constitutional authority."

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political
question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas
government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ.

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national security cases. To a
great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to
penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ".
. . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following postulates:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the Constitutional
Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.

This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute political question.

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this
Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
by the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the
significant changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered
during martial law. One of the areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great branches of our government the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it further
protected the security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members." It also
guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar Council which
was tasked with screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming
appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise given a
 appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise given a
specific time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the
vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of
recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was given the
power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law." And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of government more
watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing
quasi judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the
Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of the two other branches of government, especially the
Executive. Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now subject to
revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power
may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.

The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" constitutes the capstone of the
efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other
branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with
grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations
by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but
what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies
the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as
the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of
the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the
judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy,
orders of our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated
by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.

II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify
the dismissal of the petition at bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper
officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.

The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative
branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial as
emanating from the highest tribunal in the land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the
same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the
conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus made is the exercise
of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended,
dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of parliament; for
it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11

Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have
adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the
enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively
appears in the journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more
appears in the journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more
of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which
holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie
presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the
constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other
extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or
mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale
for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance, and to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.

The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is
also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also
believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed
by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published as law is to be
tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an
amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a
hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on
the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.

These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United
States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr.
Justice Regalado cited some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if
not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity originally attributed to
that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the competency of
judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole
expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is
nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of
which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.

In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices and filed with the
secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown
from the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative
officers, contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious
and not a part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber
Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they control,
and against such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13,
More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13,
1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et
al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder.

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of decisions of
this court which created and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.

xxx xxx xxx

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the legislature must follow
before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a
bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled
and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety of its
enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was
reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second,
reasons of convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records
and anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a preference
for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the legislature. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim. There are four
historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was not subject to
attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the
courts, being coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the
rule was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing
of equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been without its critics. From
an examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial

presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The
rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for
the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide a
remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare
decisis et non quieta movere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb
settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation
of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72
(1941).

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the
extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation of
the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether
there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to
go from one doubtful rule to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle that
has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from a change.

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is
unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it
supports.

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-keeping of the
legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in record-keeping by
our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording
 our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording
equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts
and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.

It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's modern and developing
judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth
and see that justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit
and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.

Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government requires that
we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in government. We simply
do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the
constitution is "void." The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which
is unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section
228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any person, corporation,
state agency or branch or government are brought to light and corrected. To countenance an
artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with violations of our constitution is not
acceptable to this court.

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the
"extrinsic evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill
is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
establishing that constitutional requirements have not been met.

We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called enrolled bill
doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . .
.

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United States.
Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the
adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any
authoritative source of information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a
duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed
up this ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and different from
"urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and "formaldehyde," and that the members
of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors
Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that
enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde"
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved
by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias
vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we
cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not
by judicial decree.

In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:

. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the
other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers
 other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers
of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would
be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen
in the labyrinth of law-making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress.
After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by
the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter
worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.

Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia
stressed:

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases
the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to
apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:
xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should
be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends
when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress
and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says
that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President."
In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State
Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it
follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof
that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof
by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no
attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act
No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's
inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the entries in the journal
should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort
to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments
were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text
sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments
into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate
and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that
the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
 consequences not intended by the law-making body.

In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the case of Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In
rejecting this contention, this Court ruled:

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to

resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.
81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of
the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to
be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case of U.S. vs.
Pens, where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill
and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its companion cases. 25
Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:

xxx xxx xxx

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be
resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fad that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed
the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer
an enrolled bill to consider.
 an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in
Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the enrolled
bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that
we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this
suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated
because in England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of
the courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of
contemporary developments in lawmaking.27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled
bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill.
This section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show
that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled
bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of
truth cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we
live not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national
policy 29 requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will
defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was
given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the
enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice
based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere
prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.

III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues posed by
petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the
complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not concern
violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the
House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are
procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws.
As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is
a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this
judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Davide, Jr., J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

VITUG, J., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article
VIII, of the Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been
imposed, could not have been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility
of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our
jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patent
disregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province
the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted
intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no
time, it would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial
deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced,
 deviation, let alone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced,
powers of the three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and
the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to
assume jurisdiction over, and to undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political
questions provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely
political issues is shown to have attended the contested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companion
cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent
which I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate,
the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with,
my firm stance in Tolentino.

The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge to the
constitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were
posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
who, incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely
disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive
issues. My main objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a
substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the
procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have
cavalierly put to rest by hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is
not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules allegedly violated.3 To me, the position
then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not,
however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much because I found these
principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe
did not call for their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to
emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself. Thus:

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities that
attended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and
printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be
impugned, having been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent
reason why we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters
pertaining to the procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent
engrossment, printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters
relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of
the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rules
on legislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not
the bill had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution.
Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument
is also made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced
towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public
unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative
rules, both the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the
Court's review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:

I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "
(j)udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
 been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere
with the internal procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that the
introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the
pertinent House and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the
Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached.
Hence, in view of these lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the
Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified
the Court in questioning the actuations of the legislative branch.

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited in the Tolentino
dissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold true in the
instant petition.

For one thing, unlike in Tolentino, the rules of the House of Representatives allegedly violated by
respondents in the instant petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of the House's
business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the requirements and proscriptions of the
Constitution in the passage of a bill which would otherwise warrant the Court's intervention. Likewise, the
petitioners are not in any way complaining that substantial alterations have been introduced in Republic Act
No. 8240. The thrust of petitioners' arguments in attacking the validity of the law is merely with respect to the
fact that Rep. Joker Arroyo was effectively prevented from invoking the question of quorum and not that the
substance thereof offends constitutional standards. This being the case, I do not now feel called upon to
invoke my previous argument that the enrolled bill theory should not be conclusive as regards "substantive
changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous trip through Congress," when it is palpably
unwarranted under the circumstances of instant petition.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result. I do appreciate the fine legal disquisition of Mr. Justice Mendoza to justify the dismissal
of the case at bar. Nevertheless, I have to express my views on the alleged non-justiciability of the issue
posed by the petitioner as well as the applicability of the archaic enroll bill doctrine in light of what I perceive
as new wrinkles in our law brought about by the 1987 Constitution and the winds of changing time.

With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree
that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even
in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v. Ballin,1 as a window to view the issues before the Court. It
is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review
congressional rules. 2 It held:

xxx xxx xxx

The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that "each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed
this as one of its rules:

Rule XV

3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members
sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal,
230, Feb. 14, 1890)

The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity
of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the
presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the
journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to
 between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised
is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.

Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules, i.e.,
whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1)
that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court
did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
3
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. In Smith, the meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule
XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority may move for a
reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the next two days of
actual executive session of the Senate; but if a notification of the confirmation or rejection of a
nomination shall have been sent to the President before the expiration of the time within which a
motion to reconsider may be made, the motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to
request the President to return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on
a nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a final
disposition of such motion.

4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the Secretary to the
President until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to reconsider the same, or while a
motion to reconsider is pending, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate.

It appears that the nomination of Mr. Smith as member of the Federal Power Commission has been
confirmed by the US Senate. The resolution of confirmation was sent to the US President who then signed
the appointment of Mr. Smith. The Senate, however, reconsidered the confirmation of Mr. Smith and
requested the President to return its resolution of confirmation. The President refused. A petition for quo
warranto was filed against Mr. Smith. The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction
over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to
the construction of the applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Significantly, the Court rejected the
Senate interpretation of its own rules even while it held that it must be accorded the most sympathetic
consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

Sixth. To place upon the standing rules of the Senate a construction different from that adopted by
the Senate itself when the present case was under debate is a serious and delicate exercise of
judicial power. The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to make its own rules; and it is not
the function of the Court to say that another rule would be better. A rule designed to ensure due
deliberation in the performance of the vital function of advising and consenting to nominations for
public office, moreover, should receive from the Court the most sympathetic consideration. But the
reasons, above stated, against the Senate's construction seem to us compelling. We are confirmed in
the view we have taken by the fact, since the attempted reconsideration of Smith's confirmation, the
Senate itself seems uniformly to have treated the ordering of immediate notification to the President
as tantamount to authorizing him to proceed to perfect the appointment.

Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test spelled out in Ballin.

Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4 Christoffel testified before the
Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and
was charged with perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that the committee had
no quorum when the perjurious statement was given. Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's
charge to the members of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a reasonable doubt
that

xxx xxx xxx

. . . the defendant Christoffel appeared before a quorum of at least thirteen members of the said
Committee, and that "at least that number must have been actually and physically present . . . If such
 Committee, and that "at least that number must have been actually and physically present . . . If such
a Committee so met, that is, if thirteen members did meet at the beginning of the afternoon session of
March 1, 1947, and thereafter during the progress of the hearing some of them left temporarily or
otherwise and no question was raised as to the lack of a quorum, then the fact that the majority did
not remain there would not affect, for the purposes of this case, the existence of that Committee as a
competent tribunal provided that before the oath was administered and before the testimony of the
defendant was given there were present as many as 13 members of that Committee at the beginning
of the afternoon session . . . .

Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury to assume there was a continuous
quorum simply because it was present at the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules,
a quorum once established is presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised. Again, the court
assumed jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the
issue as "what rules the House had established and whether they have been followed." It held:

xxx xxx xxx

Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative business is of course none of our
concern, and by the same token the considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of
legislative practice to treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not control the issue before us.
The question is neither what rules Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether
presumptions of continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather
what rules the House has established and whether they have been followed. It of course has the
power to define what tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that establish its
competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the charge that was given it the jury was
allowed to assume that the conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact was
not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts contradicted the assumption.

We are measuring a conviction of crime by the statute which defined it. As a consequence of this
conviction, petitioner was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of from two to six years. An essential
part of a procedure which can be said fairly to inflict such a punishment is that all the elements of the
crime charged shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An element of the crime charged in the
instant indictment is the presence of a competent tribunal, and the trial court properly so instructed
the jury. The House insists that to be such a tribunal a committee must consist of a quorum, and we
agree with the trial court's charge that to convict, the jury had to be satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that there were "actually and physically present" a majority of the committee.

Then to charge, however, that such requirement is satisfied by a finding that there was a majority
present two or three hours before the defendant offered his testimony, in the face of evidence
indicating the contrary, is to rule as a matter of law that a quorum need not be present when the
offense is committed. This not only seems to us contrary to the rules and practice of the Congress but
denies petitioner a fundamental right. That right is that he be convicted of crime only on proof of all
the elements of the crime charged against him. A tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal, and it is
unthinkable that such a body can be the instrument of criminal conviction.

The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and practice that a quorum once established
is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in
effect, invalidates that rule . . . ." The minority view commanded only the vote of three (3) justices.

The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States. 5 Yellin
was indicted on five counts of willfully refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court of contempt of Congress
on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he
assailed his conviction on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in
executive session. He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV which provides that "if a majority of
the Committee or sub-committee, duly appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives,
believes that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly
injure his reputation, or the reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in
an executive session for the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of conducting such
interrogation thereafter in a public hearing." in a 5-4 decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, held:

xxx xxx xxx

Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial review when he discovers at trial that his
rights have been violated. This is especially so when the Committee's practice leads witnesses to
misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be
 misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the Committee's rules, which must be
distributed to every witness under Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that the
Committee actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To foreclose a defense based
upon those rules, simply because the witness was deceived by the Committee's appearance of
regularity, is not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in Yellin's case
meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its
own rules.

It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has pruned the "political thicket." In the
benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question doctrine, a tool for
maintenance of government order, will not be so applied as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts
cannot reject as 'no law suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated 'political'
exceeds constitutional authority."

In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the political

question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our
Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where
abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question
doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of habeas
corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government can no longer invoke the political question defense.
Section 18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning
of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ.

The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question defense in national security cases. To a
great degree, it diminished its use as a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to
penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of the government ".
. . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 7 I posited the following postulates:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Former Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepcion, the sponsor of this provision in the Constitutional
Commission explained the sense and the reach of judicial power as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.
 This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute political question.

The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it can
decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this
Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its officials done
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
by the people.

It is, however, theorized that this provision is nothing new. I beg to disagree for the view misses the
significant changes made in our constitutional canvass to cure the legal deficiencies we discovered
during martial law. One of the areas radically changed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution is the
imbalance of power between and among the three great branches of our government the
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary. To upgrade the powers of the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commission strengthened some more the independence of courts. Thus, it further
protected the security of tenure of the members of the Judiciary by providing "No law shall be passed
reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members." It also
guaranteed fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.

More, it depoliticalized appointments in the judiciary by creating the Judicial and Bar Council which
was tasked with screening the list of prospective appointees to the judiciary. The power of confirming
appointments to the judiciary was also taken away from Congress. The President was likewise given a
specific time to fill up vacancies in the judiciary ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the
vacancy in case of the Supreme Court and ninety (90) days from the submission of the list of
recommendees by the Judicial and Bar Council in case of vacancies in the lower courts. To further
insulate appointments in the judiciary from the virus of politics, the Supreme Court was given the
power to "appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law." And to make the separation of the judiciary from the other branches of government more
watertight, it prohibited members of the judiciary to be ". . . designated to any agency performing
quasi judicial or administrative functions." While the Constitution strengthened the sinews of the
Supreme Court, it reduced the powers of the two other branches of government, especially the
Executive. Notable of the powers of the President clipped by the Constitution is his power to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus and to proclaim martial law. The exercise of this power is now subject to
revocation by Congress. Likewise, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of said power
may be reviewed by this Court in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.

The provision defining judicial power as including the "duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" constitutes the capstone of the
efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis-a-vis the other
branches of government. This provision
was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed with
grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as a nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations
by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this
Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do but
what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies
the present.

I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional provision as
the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of
the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the
judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy,
orders of our courts. In Tolentino, 8 I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision

stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated
by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own
history should provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.

II

Again with due respect, I dissent from the majority insofar as it relied on the enrolled bill doctrine to justify
the dismissal of the petition at bar.

An enrolled bill is one which has been duly introduced, finally enacted by both Houses, signed by the proper
officers of each House and approved by the President. 9 It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their
presiding officers, to the President that a bill, thus attested, has received in due the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.

The enrolled bill originated in England where there is no written Constitution controlling the legislative
branch of the government, and the acts of Parliament, being regarded in their nature as judicial as
emanating from the highest tribunal in the land are placed on the same footing and regarded with the
same veneration as the judgment of the courts which cannot be collaterally attacked. 10 In England, the
conclusiveness of the bill was premised on the rationale that "an ad of parliament thus made is the exercise
of the highest authority that this kingdom acknowledges upon earth. And it cannot be altered, amended,
dispensed with, suspended or repealed, but in the same forms and by the same authority of parliament; for
it is a maxim in law that it requires the same strength to dissolve as to create an obligation. 11

Over the years, the enrolled bill theory has undergone important mutations. Some jurisdictions have
adopted the modified entry or affirmative contradiction rule. Under this rule, the presumption in favor of the
enrolled bill is not conclusive. The rule concedes validity to the enrolled bill unless there affirmatively
appears in the journals of the legislature a statement that there has not been compliance with one or more
of the constitutional requirements. 12 Other jurisdictions have adopted the Extrinsic Evidence Rule which
holds that an enrolled bill is only prima facie evidence that it has been regularly enacted. The prima facie
presumption, however, can be destroyed by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that the
constitutional requirements in enacting a law have been violated. For this purpose, journals and other
extrinsic evidence are allowed to be received. 13 Some limit the use of extrinsic evidence to issues of fraud or
mistakes. 14

These variants developed after a re-examination of the rationale of the enrolled bill. The modern rationale
for the enrolled bill theory was spelled out in Field v. Clark, 15 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two Houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to
approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the
legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon the assurance, and to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with
the Constitution.
The principle of separation of powers is thus the principal prop of the enrolled bill doctrine. The doctrine is
also justified as a rule of convenience. Supposedly, it avoids difficult questions of evidence. 16 It is also
believed that it will prevent the filing of too many cases which will cast a cloud of uncertainty on laws passed
by the legislature. As explained in Ex Pacte Wren 17 "if the validity of every act published as law is to be
tested by examining its history, as shown by the journals of the two houses of the legislature, there will be an
amount of litigation, difficulty, and painful uncertainty appalling in its contemplation, and multiplying a
hundredfold the alleged uncertainty of the law." The conclusiveness of the enrolled bill is also justified on
the ground that journals and other extrinsic evidence are conducive to mistake, if not fraud.

These justifications for the enrolled bill theory have been rejected in various jurisdictions in the United
States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr.
States. In his Dissenting Opinion in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, and its companion cases, 18 Mr.
Justice Regalado cited some of the leading American cases which discussed the reasons for the withering, if
not demise of the enrolled bill theory, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Even in the land of its source, the so-called conclusive presumption of validity originally attributed to
that doctrine has long been revisited and qualified, if not altogether rejected. On the competency of
judicial inquiry, it has been held that "(u)nder the "enrolled bill rule" by which an enrolled bill is sole
expository of its contents and conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, it is
nevertheless competent for courts to inquire as to what prerequisites are fixed by the Constitution of
which journals of respective houses of Legislature are required to furnish the evidence.

In fact, in Gwynn vs. Hardee, etc., et al., the Supreme Court of Florida declared

(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the legislative offices and filed with the
secretary of state, is the bill as it passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown
from the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed by the legislative
officers, contains provisions that have not passed both houses, such provisions will be held spurious
and not a part of the law. As was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber
Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:

This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they control,
and against such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.

More enlightening and apropos to the present controversy is the decision promulgated on May 13,
1980 by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in D & W Auto Supply, et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et
al., pertinent excerpts wherefrom are extensively reproduced hereunder.

. . . In arriving at our decision we must, perforce, reconsider the validity of a long line of decisions of
this court which created and nurtured the so-called "enrolled bill" doctrine.

xxx xxx xxx

[1] Section 46 of the Kentucky Constitution sets out certain procedures that the legislature must follow
before a bill can be considered for final passage. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Under the enrolled bill doctrine as it now exists in Kentucky, a court may not look behind such a
bill, enrolled and certified by the appropriate officers, to determine if there are any defects.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In Lafferty, passage of the law in question violated this provision, yet the bill was properly enrolled
and approved by the governor. In declining to look behind the law to determine the propriety of its
enactment, the court enunciated three reasons for adopting the enrolled bill rule. First, the court was
reluctant to scrutinize the processes of the legislature, an equal branch of government. Second,
reasons of convenience prevailed, which discouraged requiring the legislature to preserve its records
and anticipated considerable complex litigation if the court ruled otherwise. Third, the court
acknowledged the poor record-keeping abilities of the General Assembly and expressed a preference
for accepting the final bill as enrolled, rather than opening up the records of the legislature. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Nowhere has the rule been adopted without reason, or as a result of judicial whim. There are four
historical bases for the doctrine. (1) An enrolled bill was a "record" and, as such, was not subject to
attack at common law. (2) Since the legislature is one of the three branches of government, the
courts, being coequal, must indulge in every presumption that legislative acts are valid. (3) When the
rule was originally formulated, record-keeping of the legislatures was so inadequate that a balancing
of equities required that the final act, the enrolled bill, be given efficacy. (4) There were theories of
convenience as expressed by the Kentucky court in Lafferty.

The rule is not unanimous in the several states, however and it has not been without its critics. From
an examination of cases and treaties, we can summarize the criticism as follows: (1) Artificial
presumptions, especially conclusive ones, are not favored. (2) Such a rule frequently (as in the
present case) produces results which do not accord with facts or constitutional provisions. (3) The
rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
 rule is conducive to fraud, forgery, corruption and other wrongdoings. (4) Modern automatic and
electronic record-keeping devices now used by legislatures remove one of the original reasons for
the rule. (5) The rule disregards the primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide a
remedy for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these considerations, we are
convinced that the time has come to re-examine the enrolled bill doctrine.

[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of stare decisis. The maxim is "Stare
decisis et non quieta movere," which simply suggests that we stand by precedents and to disturb
settled points of law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require perpetuation
of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel's Adm'r v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72
(1941).

The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the
extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation of
the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are whether
there is clear error and urgent reasons "for neither justice nor wisdom requires a court to
go from one doubtful rule to another," and whether or not the evils of the principle that
has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly result from a change.

Certainly, when a theory supporting a rule of law is not grounded on facts, or upon sound logic, or is
unjust, or has been discredited by actual experience, it should be discarded, and with it the rule it
supports.

[3] It is clear to us that the major premise of the Lafferty decision, the poor record-keeping of the
legislature, has disappeared. Modern equipment and technology are the rule in record-keeping by
our General Assembly. Tape recorders, electric typewriters, duplicating machines, recording
equipment, printing presses, computers, electronic voting machines, and the like remove all doubts
and fears as to the ability of the General Assembly to keep accurate and readily accessible records.

It is also apparent that the "convenience" rule is not appropriate in today's modern and developing
judicial philosophy. The fact that the number and complexity of lawsuits may increase is not
persuasive if one is mindful that the overriding purpose of our judicial system is to discover the truth
and see that justice is done. The existence of difficulties and complexities should not deter this pursuit
and we reject any doctrine or presumption that so provides.

Lastly, we address the premise that the equality of the various branches of government requires that
we shut our eyes to constitutional failing and other errors of our copartners in government. We simply
do not agree. Section 26 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that any law contrary to the
constitution is "void." The proper exercise of judicial authority requires us to recognize any law which
is unconstitutional and to declare it void. Without elaborating the point, we believe that under section
228 of the Kentucky Constitution it is our obligation to "support . . . the Constitution of the
commonwealth." We are sworn to see that violations of the constitution by any person, corporation,
state agency or branch or government are brought to light and corrected. To countenance an
artificial rule of law that silences our voices when confronted with violations of our constitution is not
acceptable to this court.

We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor Sutherland describes as the
"extrinsic evidence." . . . . Under this approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill
is valid, but such presumption may be overcome by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence
establishing that constitutional requirements have not been met.

We therefore overrule Lafferty v. Huffman and all other cases following the so-called enrolled bill
doctrine, to the extent that there is no longer a conclusive presumption that an enrolled bill is valid. . .
.

Clearly, the enrolled bill doctrine no longer enjoys its once unassailable respectability in United States.
Sutherland reveals that starting in the 1940's,
". . . the tendency seems to be toward the abandonment of the conclusive presumption rule and the
adoption of the third rule leaving only a prima facie presumption of validity which may be attacked by any
authoritative source of information." 19

It is high time we re-examine our preference for the enrolled bill doctrine. It was in the 1947 case of
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 20 that this Court, with three (3) justices dissenting, first embraced the rule that a
duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. In 1963, we firmed
up this ruling in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez, 21 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

 Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product which is patently distinct and different from
"urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction "and" between the term "urea" and "formaldehyde," and that the members
of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde," not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off Gaz. 615; Mayor Motors
Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
vs. Games and Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 19, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that
enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde"
conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved
by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias
vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we
cannot speculate without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not
by judicial decree.

In the 1969 case of Morales v. Subido, 22 we reiterated our fidelity to the enrolled bill doctrine, viz:

. . . . We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the
other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers
of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would
be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen
in the labyrinth of law-making, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress.
After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by
the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter
worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.

Significantly, however, Morales diluted the conclusiveness rule of the enrolled bill doctrine. The ponencia
stressed:

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases
the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution
expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question
which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be
entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

In the 1974 case of Astorga v. Villegas, 23 we further diluted the enrolled bill doctrine when we refused to
apply it after the Senate President declared his signature on the bill as invalid. We ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding offices of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on
the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation for his signature meant
that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should
be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends
when the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill
or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress
and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says
that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President."
In Brown vs. Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State
Constitution, said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it
follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, the proof
that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.
 that it has 'passed both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof
by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no
attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act
No. 4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's
inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the
disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted. In such a case the entries in the journal
should be consulted.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risk of misprinting
and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the
text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort
to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments
were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text
sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments
into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate
and the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest
error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief
Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that
the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

In 1993, the enrolled bill doctrine was again used as a secondary rationale in the case of Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, 24 In this case, the judges claimed that the pertinent part of section 35 of R.A. No.
7354 repealing the franking privilege of the judiciary appeared only in the Conference Committee Report. In
rejecting this contention, this Court ruled:

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:

A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to
resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference
committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the
freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.
81).

It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of
the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to
be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but stills valid) case of U.S. vs.
Pens, where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.
 Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill
and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with the
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

Finally in 1994 came the case of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, et al and its companion cases. 25
Involved in the case was the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax Law. The majority 26 partly relied on the enrolled bill doctrine in dismissing challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7716. It held:
xxx xxx xxx

Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be
resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that a proposed
constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not been
obtained or that certain provisions of a statute had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fad that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed
the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer
an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government.

These cases show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill. Even in
Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the enrolled
bill is absolute." I respectfully submit that it is now time for the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that
we no longer give our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are compelling reasons for this
suggested change in stance. For one, the enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated
because in England there is no written Constitution and the Parliament is supreme. For another, many of
the courts in the United States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the enrolled bill in light of
contemporary developments in lawmaking.27 And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled
bill is inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules. In Mabanag, 28 we relied on section 313 of the Old
Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 as a principal reason in embracing the enrolled bill.
This section, however has long been repealed by our Rules of Court. A half glance at our Rules will show
that its section on conclusive presumption does not carry the conclusive presumption we give to an enrolled
bill. But this is not all. The conclusiveness of an enrolled bill which all too often results in the suppression of
truth cannot be justified under the 1987 Constitution. The Preamble of our Constitution demands that we
live not only under a rule of law but also under a regime of truth. Our Constitution also adopted a national
policy 29 requiring full public disclosure of all state transactions involving public interest. Any rule which will
defeat this policy on transparency ought to be disfavored. And to implement these policies, this Court was
given the power to pry open and to strike down any act of any branch or instrumentality of government if it
amounts to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is time to bury the
enrolled bill for its fiction of conclusiveness shuts off truth in many litigations. We cannot dispense justice
based on fiction for the search for justice is the search for truth. I submit that giving an enrolled bill a mere
prima facie presumption of correctness will facilitate our task of dispensing justice based on truth.

III

In sum, I respectfully submit that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar and that issues posed by
petitioner are justiciable. Nonetheless, I do not find any grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondents to justify granting said petition. As the ponencia points out, the petition merely involves the
complaint that petitioner was prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition does not concern
violation of any rule mandated by the Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of the
House which requires constitutional protection. The rules on how to question the existence of a quorum are
procedural in character. They are malleable by nature for they were drafted to help the House enact laws.
As well stated, these rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their observance or non-observance is
a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this
 a matter of judgment call on the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the Court to reverse this
judgment when untainted by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Davide, Jr., J., concurs.

Footnotes

1 JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo, pp. 210, 212: Transcript of November 21, 1996 session, pp. 39-
52; Rollo, pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6 par. 10; Rollo, p. 8.

2 Rule VIII, 35. Voting. Every member present in the session shall vote on every question put
unless he inhibits himself on account of personal pecuniary interest therein.

Rule XVII, 103. Manner of Voting. The Speaker shall rise to put a question saying "As many as
are in favor of (as the question may be), say Aye" and, after the affirmative vote is counted, "As many
as are opposed, say Nay. . . ."

3 Rule XIX, 112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions. The Speaker shall state the motion or, if in
writing shall cause it to be read by the Secretary General before being debated. A motion may be
withdrawn any time before its approval.

4 Rule XVI, 97. Recognition of Member. When two or more members rise at the same time, the
Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to speak first.

5 Rule XX, 121. Definition. Questions of privilege are those affecting the duties, conduct, rights,
privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the House or of its members, collectively or individually.

122. Precedence. Subject to the ten-minute rule, questions of privilege shall have precedence
over all other question, except a motion to adjourn and a point of order.

Rule XXI, 123. Definition and Precedence. A privileged motion pertains to a subject matter which,
under the rules, takes precedence over others.

The order of precedence of privileged motions is determined in each case by the rules.

Rule XVIII, 109. Who May Vote; Procedure; Exceptions. When a bill, report or motion is adopted
or lost a member who voted with the majority may move for its reconsideration on the same or
succeeding session day. The motion shall take precedence over all other questions except a motion
to adjourn a question of privilege, and a point of order.

6 235 SCRA 630 (1994).

7 Rollo, p. 228.

8 Id., p. 229.

9 Art. VI, 16(3).

10 E.g., United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. 1, 36 L.ED. 321 (1862); Exxon Corp. v. FTC,
589 F. 2d 582 (1978); Murray v. Buchanan, 674 F. 2d 14 (1982); Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Com'n. 675 F. 2d 1282 (1982). See also Osmea v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960).

11 109 Phil. at 870-71. See also EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA 630.

12 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25 (emphasis added).

13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 (1912) (emphasis added).

14 124 Ohio St. 256, 177 N.E. 910, 911 (1931) (emphasis added).

15 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 (1906) (emphasis added).

16 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185, 186 (1891 ) (emphasis added).

17 5 Okl. 297, 47 Pac. 1094 (1897) (emphasis added).

18 ENRIQUE M. FERNANDO, CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED 188-189 (1977);

Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
19 Petition, p. 25, quoting the sponsorship speech of former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
chairman of the Committee on Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, in 1 RECORDS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).

20 Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, 695
(1989); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).

21 Co. v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 701 (1991); Llamas v.
Orbos, 202 SCRA 849, 857 (1991); Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA at 480-481 (emphasis added).

22 4 CONG. REC. 413-414 (Feb. 15, 1957).

23 United States v. Ballin , Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 324-25; State v. Lewis, 186 S.E.
625, 630 (1936).

24 United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 76 L.Ed. 954 (1931).

25 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F. 2d 539, 549 (1985).

26 Art. VI, 26(2).

27 Id., 16(4).

28 Id., 27(1).

29 Id., p. 17; id., p. 19.

30 INOCENCIO PAREJA, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMENTED AND

ANNOTATED 331 (1963); REYNALDO FAJARDO, PRINCIPLES OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE
157-158, 172-173 (1963).

31 Rule XIX, 13.

32 I RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 436 (Session of July 10, 1986).

33 ALICE STURGIS, STANDARD CODE OF PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE, 17 (1950).

34 PAUL MASON, MANUAL OF LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 335 (1953).

35 Conference Committee Report, Rollo, p. 36; Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 16.

36 Ibid.

37 Petition, p. 14; Rollo. p. 16.

38 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).

39 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 12 (1947).

40 Id. at 17, quoting 4 JOHN WIGMORE TREATISE ON THE LAW ON EVIDENCE 1350 at 702
(1940). This excerpt is preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this locus classicus. See 4 WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE 1350 at 834 (James Chadbourne, ed. 1972).

41 EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672, Cf. Morales v. Subido, 27
SCRA 131 (1969).

42 Philippine Judges Ass'n v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 710 (1993); Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131.

43 Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963); Resins, Inc. v. Auditor
General, 25 SCRA 754 (1968).

44 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 1350 (James H. Chadbourne, ed. 1972); 6 MANUEL V. MORAN,

COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 115 (1980); 7 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT (Pt. II) 454 (1973).

45 Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 249, 303 (1891).

46 The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and nays on the third and
final reading of a bill (Art. VI, 26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any question, at the request of one-
final reading of a bill (Art. VI, 26(2)); (2) the yeas and nays on any question, at the request of one-
fifth of the members present (Id., 16(4)); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the
President's veto (Id., 27(1); and (4) the President's objection to a bill which he has vetoed. (Id.)

47 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348 (1886).

48 Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.

49 Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n. 675 F.2d 1282.

ROMERO, J., concurring:

1 235 SCRA 630.

2 Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No.
7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled
copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even claims that
a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the requisite votes for its approval had not
been obtained or that certain provisions of a state had been "smuggled" in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch of the government.
There is no reason now to depart from this rule.

No claim is here made that the "enrolled bill" rule is absolute. In fact in one case we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate in view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed
the enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect there was no longer
an enrolled bill to consider.

But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the
respect due the other two departments of our government."

3 Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal
Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled, "parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with
their observance the courts have no concern." Our concern is with the procedural requirements of the
Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied
that they have been faithfully observed in these cases."

4 Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.

5 Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1 144 US 1 (1891).

2 The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in violation of House Rule XV
which provided that members present in the chamber but not voting would be "counted and
announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business."

3 286 US 6 (1932).

4 338 US 89 (1948).

5 374 US 109 (1963).

6 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).

7 235 SCRA 630.

8 Supra.

9 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.

10 Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523 [1897].

11 Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 23 L.R.A.
211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to the common law rule of the inviolability of the
 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to the common law rule of the inviolability of the
Sheriff's return. The Sheriff is considered as an officer of the King just as a parliamentary act is
deemed as a regal act and no official can dispute the King's word. Dallas, Sutherland Statutes and
Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).

12 Sutherland, op cit., p. 410.

13 Sutherland, Vol. I, Section 1405 (3rd ed., 1943).

14 See e.g., Mogilner v. Metropolitan Plan Communication, 236 Ind. 298, 140 N.E. 2d 220 [1957].

15 Op. cit, footnote No. 2.

16 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd ed. 1940).

17 63 Miss 512 (1886).

18 Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).

19 Sutherland, op. cit., pp. 224-225.

20 78 Phil. 1 (1947).

21 7 SCRA 374.

22 27 SCRA 131, 134-135.

23 56 SCRA 714.

24 227 SCRA 703.

25 Supra.

26 Justices Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno dissented.

27 See writer's dissenting opinion in Tolentino, supra, p. 818.

28 Op cit.

29 Section 28 of Article II of the Constitution.

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