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Burgos vs Chief of Staff

Facts: Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued 2 search warrants for 2 different premises
in QC., business addresses of the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers, respectively. Searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the We Forum newspaper, were seized. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Issue: WoN the search warrant is nulld and void

Held: Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos,
Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may
be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be
at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the
warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in
relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled
that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not
so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a
search warrant.

California vs Greenwood
Facts: The police asked the regular trash collector to gather the respondents trash and keep it separate from the other trash in the
neighborhood, so that it might be examined for evidence of narcotics trafficking. Evidence was found in the garbage, and a search
warrant was issued to search the respondents house based upon that evidence. Police searched the respondents house and arrested
him after discovering narcotics. Greenwood was arrested for narcotics trafficking based upon evidence obtained as a result of a police
search of his trash.

Issue: WoN the Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a
Held: The warrantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the Greenwood house would violate the Fourth
Amendment only if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively
reasonable. Respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth Amendment protection. It is
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children,
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose
of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others, such
as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having deposited their garbage "in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner
of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it, respondents could have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded. The police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public. Hence, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."

Washington vs Boland
Facts: The police began a series of four warrantless searches of defendant's garbage hoping to find sufficient evidence to obtain a
warrant to search his residence. Before each of the searches, police officers would observe defendant take his trash out to the corner
for collection where he would place his trash can in approximately the same location. On each occasion, the officers returned to
defendant's residence during the night, emptied the contents of the trash can into a plastic bag and transported it to the police station.
The warrant was issued based on the evidence obtained from defendant's trash and the letter and brochure received from the
informant. The police searched defendant's house and seized a large quantity of legend drugs as well as a card of tablets and a bottle
containing controlled substances. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of legend drugs.

Issue: WoN the search and seizure was valid

Held: Under the facts of this case that defendant Boland's private affairs were unreasonably intruded upon by law enforcement officers
when they removed the garbage from his trash can and transported it to the police station in order to make it available to state and
federal narcotics agents. Boland's trash was in his can and sitting on the curb in expectation that it would be picked up by a licensed
garbage collector. This leads us to the conclusion that it falls squarely within the contemplated meaning of a "private affair". While it
may be true an expectation that children, scavengers, or snoops will not sift through one's garbage is unreasonable, average persons
would find it reasonable to believe the garbage they place in their trash cans will be protected from warrantless governmental intrusion.
In the words of the Hawaii Supreme Court: People reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their trash
bags to discover their personal effects. Business records, bills, correspondence, magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can
reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs.


Rules on DNA Evidence apply whenever DNA evidence is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal
and civil actions as well as special proceedings (Sec. 1).

DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the chain of molecules found in every nucleated cell of the body (Sec. 3, Rule on DNA Evidence). It is
the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up, which is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of
the same person (People v. Umanito, G.R. No. 172607, Oct. 26, 2007).

DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information directly generated from DNA testing of
biological samples (Sec. 3).

DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation
of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from
the same person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (Kinship Analysis) (Sec. 3).

The scientific basis of this test comes from the fact that our differences as individuals are due to the differences in the composition of
our genes. These genes comprise a chemical substance, the deoxyribonucleic acid or DNA [The Court Systems Journal (1999)].


With prior court order
(1) The appropriate court may, at any time, either
(i) motu proprio or
(ii) on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing.
(2) Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected toDNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy of integrity of the DNA
testing. (Sec. 4)

Without prior court order

DNA testing may be conducted absent a prior court order. The Rules on DNA Evidence does not preclude a DNA testing, without need
of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced (Sec.

An order granting the DNA testing is immediately executory and shall not be appealable. Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom
shall not, in any way, stay the implementation thereof, unless a higher court issues an injunctive order (Sec. 5).

The grant of a DNA testing application shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA
evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof (Sec. 5).
Factors in assessing the probative value of DNA evidence
(1) Chain of custody
(a) How the biological samples were collected
(b) How they were handled
(c) Possibility of contamination
(2) DNA testing methodology
(a) Procedure followed in analyzing the samples
(b) Advantages and disadvantages of the procedure scientifically standards in conducting the tests
(3) Forensic DNA laboratory valid
(a) Accreditation by any reputable standardssetting institution
(b) Qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests
(c) If not accredited, relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic work and its credibility (4) Reliability of the testing result (Sec.

Vallejo Standard In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider the following:
(a) How the samples were collected
(b) How they were handled
(c) The possibility of contamination of the samples
(d) The procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed
(e) Qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests

If a DNA test was conducted, the following are possible results that it may yield:
1. The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (Rule of Inclusion). In such a case, the analyst proceeds to
determine the statistical significance of the similarity.
2. The samples are different hence it must have originated from different sources (Rule of Exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and
requires no further analysis;
3. The test is inconclusive. This might occur due to degradation, contamination, failure of some aspect of protocol, or some other
reasons. Analysis might be repeated to obtain a more conclusive result (People v. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656, May 9, 2002).


Factors that determine the reliability of the DNA Testing Methodology
(1) Falsifiability of the principles or methods used
(2) Subject to peer review and publication of the principles or methods
(3) General acceptance of the principles or methods by the scientific community
(4) Existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of data generated
(5) Existence of an appropriate reference population database
(6) General degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles
(7) Significance and limitation of statistical calculations used in comparing DNA profiles

In evaluating DNA testing results, courts should consider the following:

1. The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA evidence;
2. The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented in the case; and
3. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity (Sec. 9).

Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and
executory judgment.

Requisites for the applicability of the Post-conviction DNA testing:

1. Existing biological sample;
2. Such sample is relevant to the case; and
3. The testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction (Sec. 6).

Remedy if Results Favorable to the Convict

Convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin, CA or SC or any member of said courts.

General Rule: If the court, after due hearing, finds the petition meritorious, it shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and
order the release of the convict.
Exception: If continued detention is justified for a lawful cause. (Sec. 10)

People vs Umanito (2007)

Facts: AAA was accosted by a young male (whom she later knew as Umanito). He waited for her by the creek, and he pointed as knife
at her abdomen. He dragged, and undressed her while still holding the knife. He set her down on a bench, put down the knife, and had
sex with her. He dressed up and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident. Six months later, AAA s mother noticed the
prominence on her stomach, and it was then that she divulged to her mother the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police
station. (Umanito s alibi: He was at home all day. Re: AAA, he admitted that he courted her but she spurned him. He conjectured that
she had a crush on him since she frequently visited him.)

Issue: WoN the prosecution ave enough proof to convict the accused
Held: The fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may provide the definitive key to Umanito s absolution, since it can
now be determined with reasonable certainty WON he is the father of her child. AAA and her child are directed to submit themselves to
DNA testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC) which took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days
before promulgation of this case).
DNA print / identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to absolve
one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. The groundwork for acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing
was first laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed DNA analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in
our jurisdiction. Tecson v. COMELEC said that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA testing could be
resorted to.
The determination of WON Umanito is the father (through DNA testing) is material to the fair and correct adjudication of his
appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SC, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA
testing. However, since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to RTC for reception of

People vs Umanito (2009)

Facts; Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation who testified on the examination she conducted,
outlining the procedure she adopted and the result thereof. She further declared that using the Powerplex 16 System,
Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Rufino Umanito y
Millares, to determine whether or not Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match
in all of the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of Rufino Umanito y Milalres and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there
is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological father of [BBB].

Held: considering that under Section 9, A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC, if the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall
be a disputable presumption of paternity, the instant case was set for reception of evidence for the accused on April 29, 2008 to
controvert the presumption that he is the biological father of [BBB]. the accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B"
inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not also present evidence to controvert the results of the DNA analysis.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity. The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and
overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A"
and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.


Facts: Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code. Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de
Leon and Arturo Logronio went to CFI with proper documents. Judge Vivencio Ruiz asked his secretary to take the deposition and
when done stenographer read it to the judge. Logronio took the oath ans was warned by judge that he may be charged with perjury if
found lying. Search warrant was issued and served. Petitioners lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of
documents. BIR based on the documents seized. Petitioner contend that judged failed to personally examine the complainant and

Doctrine: Unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1, Constitution.)

"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the
record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code.
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno is not applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant was issued for violation of only
one code. The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred
sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein
the phrase "in connection with one specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:

"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense."

Facts: Petitioner was duly registered as a lumber dealer with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Special Actions and Investigation
Division of the DENR were informed that a huge stockpile of narra flitches,shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the
petitioner. The SAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance. Since the driver could not
produce the required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded them at the
DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able to
secure a search warrant. By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber;

Issue: WoN the seizure was valid

Held: the petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with lauan and almaciga
lumber of different sizes and dimensions which were not accompanied with the required invoices and transport documents. The seizure
of such truck and its cargo was a valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest officer or employee by Section 80 of P.D. No. 705, as
amended by P.D. No. 1775. Then, too, as correctly held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals in the FIRST CIVIL CASE, the
search was conducted on a moving vehicle. Such a search could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant.

Search of a moving vehicle is one of the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure
shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of probable cause. The other
exceptions are (1) search as an incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) customs searches, and (4)
consented warrantless search. We also affirm the rulings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the search on 4 April 1990
was a continuation of the search on 3 April 1990 done under and by virtue of the search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Executive
Judge Osorio. Under Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a search warrant has a lifetime of ten days. Hence, it could be served at
any time within the said period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be continued the
following day or days until completed. Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued under
the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.

Facts: Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and
Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search warrant against
Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The
Consumer Act of the Philippines).

Held: The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

THINGS TO BE SEIZED." (Emphasis supplied)

In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the application for its issuance suffered from a
grave defect, "which escaped (her) attention," considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New
Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de
la Montana St., Cebu City. We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.

There are two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause
for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no
license to sell drugs.

Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant,
considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said
warehouse is owned by a different person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point. This Court has held that the applicant
should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.

Facts: A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrant issued by Judge
Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant. An application for a search warrant was made
by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt
1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was
issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest
of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.

Issue: WoN the search warrant was valid

Held: Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things
to be seized.

it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge
after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
describe the place to be searched, the manifest intention being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described. There was
therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be
searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation **
(inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor
General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the residential apartment units -- the place to be
searched being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in
the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished
by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive evidence which ** (the
People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in
the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion
that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search warrant is different from that which the
officers actually searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had
described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.


Search incidental to lawful arrest, Rule 126, Sec.13

Facts: Accused were charged and found guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for having in their possession 946.9 grams
of marijuana and were sentenced to death. Police officer received and information, then a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and
overtook the trisikad, the accused-appellants were accosted. The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At that point,
accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will
settle this. SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants
Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.

Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest is valid

Held: Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made --- the process cannot be reversed.[26] As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);
and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another
(arrest of escaped prisoners).[27]

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a
trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
accused-appellant Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such
response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an
equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not
for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers),
accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.

While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon,
however, admitted that he only learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon
indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once,
pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1
Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon
caught a glimpse of him.

Facts: Enrique Manarang noticed the accused appellants car running fast. After a while, a screech of tires was heard and thus, made
the officer run out and investigate. Not so long, the car continued to run, so a hot-pursuit took place. Manarang then radioed the
incident to the Police. When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled down the windows with his hands raised. The officers then
noticed that it was the famous actor, Robin Padilla. While apprehended, because of the hit-and-run incident, the police saw the revolver
tucked in the left waist of Robin. So, the police insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was legal. The gesture then revealed a
magazine clip of a rifle which made the police suspect that there is a rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The other firearms
were voluntarily surrendered by Robin.

Issue: WoN the search and seizure without warrant is valid

Held: arrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:[28]

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting
to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person.[29] Both elements concurred here, as it has been
established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who
then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the
offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene."[30] As testified to by Manarang,
he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and
thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report
to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner.

The firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.

The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid,[44] are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court[45] and by prevailing
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:[47]
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.


Facts: There is rampant smuggling of contraband in La Union and police are patrolling the coastline. Police assistance was requested
by Almoite regarding an unfamiliar speedboat and the same was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID, Almoite and six other
policemen observed the speedboat. A male passenger alighted carrying a strawbag and run after seeing the officers. They were able to
stop the man and introduced themselves as officers. The man seem not to understand them using different languages so they resorted
to sign language and asked him to open the bag. It contained packets of yellowish crystals. They asked him to follow them but he did
not understand so CID placed his arms around him and escorted him to the station. They looked for an interpreter to apprise his rights.
He was charged, tried and convicted of transporting shabu.

Held: In cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer,
therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact[14] or as recent case law[15] adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The term probable cause had been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[16] Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested.[17] In People v. Montilla,[18] the Court acknowledged that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing
criminal charges, and correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. Noting that the previous statutory
and jurisprudential evidentiary standard was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been dubiously equated with probable cause, the
Court explained:

[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set
aright, at least on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the
quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to engender as well founded belief as to the fact
of the commission of the crime and the respondents probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in
other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, or where a probable cause
exists. It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.
(emphasis supplied). Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on record reasonably suggestive or
demonstrative of CHUAs participation in an ongoing criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the
obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but predicated mainly its decision on the finding that "accused
was caught red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended. In short, there is no probable cause.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.


Facts: ccused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659,
and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs. Polce officer received a report from their confidential
informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night in Angeles City. Informer pointed to a car driven by accused-
appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-
appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket.

Held: We ruled that the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about
to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest
is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or
for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime,
or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a stop-and-frisk as a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons, as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop-and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk
serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

Warrantless Search of Computers & Cellphones

Facts: Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned complaint letter which was marked Confidential and was sent
through a courier service (LBC). The letter contains allegations that the petitioner has been helping many who have pending cases in
the CSC and the letter sender pleas that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good behaviour of their
office. David immediately formed a team to conduct an investigation and specifically to back up all the files in the computers found in
the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions. The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal
Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said
activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the
time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.

Issue: WoN the search of computer is valid

Held: The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable searches and seizures. But
to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the
doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction.

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer
which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone,
or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or
adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people,
whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as full of people, his friends,
unknown people and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is personally assisting incoming
clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public
Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the
office as a paying customer.

*[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has
the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer, x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public
sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
*In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees legitimate expectations of
privacy against the governments need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.
*the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an
investigation involving a work-related misconduct