I.
PHILIPPINE LAW ON TORTS Elements of Quasi-Delict (Culpa Aquiliana)
A. New Civil Code Art. 1157
Art. 1557. Obligations arise from: LAW, CONTRACTS, QUASI
CONTRACTS, ACTS OR OMISSIONS PUNISHED BY LAW; AND
QUASI-DELICTS
Obligation Ex Lege (Law) must be expressly or impliedly
set forth and cannot be presumed
Obligation Ex Contractu (Contract) must be complied
with in good faith; it is the law between parties
- Neither party may unilaterally evade his obligation in
the contract UNLESS 1) contract authorizes it; 2) Other
party assents
- Parties may freely enter into any stipulations, provided
they are not contrary to la, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy
Obligation Ex Quasi-Contractu (Quasi-Contract)
juridical relation resulting from lawful, voluntary and
unilateral acts, which has for its purpose the payment of
indemnity to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched
or benefited at the expense of another
- ACT giving rise to a QC must be lawful, voluntary and
unilateral
- Kinds:
a) Negotiorum Gestio unauthorized
management; arises whenever a person
voluntarily takes charge of the agency or
management of anothers abandoned business
or property without the latters authority
b) Solutio Indebiti undue payment; arises when
a person unduly delivers a thing through mistake
to another who has no right to demand it
Obligatons Ex Maleficio or Ex Delicto (Delicts)
- Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable
- Scope of Liability
a) Restitution
b) Reparation for the Damage Caused
c) Indemnity for Consequential Damages
- Effects of Acquittal in Criminal Case
a) When due to reasonable doubt no civil liability
b) When due to exempting circumstances there is
a civil liability
c) When there is preponderance of evidence there
is civil liability
- Crimes without Civil Liability
a) Contempt
b) Insults to persons in authority
c) Gambling
d) Violations of Traffic Regulations
Obligaton Ex Quasi-Delicto or Quasi Maleficio (Quasi-
Delict) an act or omission arising from fault or negligence
which causes damage to another, there being no pre-
existing contractual relations between parties
- Elements:
a) There must be an act or omission
b) There must be fault or negligence attributable to
the person charged
c) There must be damage or injury
d) There must be a direct relation of cause and
effect between the act arising from fault or
negligence and the damage injury (proximate
cause)
e) There is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties
B. New Civil Code, Arts. 2176 to 2194
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.
- It covers all wrongful acts or omissions as long as they are
not constitutive of breach of contract or not punishable as
offenses either under RPC or SL
a) Damage to the plaintiff
b) Negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant or some
person for whose acts, he must respond was guilty; and
c) Connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and damage
*Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury
*Fault condition where a person acts in a way or manner contrary to
what normally should have been done ; breach of statutory duty or
other act omission which gives rise to a liability in torts or would give
rise to the defense of contributory negligence
*Negligence omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place
Tests of Determining Negligence
- Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued?
Causal Connection Between the Fault or Negligence and the
Damage
- There must be a clear evidence that the cause of the
damage is the fault or negligence of the defendant.
- The fault or negligence of the defendant is the proximate
cause of the injury of the plaintiff
If there is a pre-existing contract
- The proper cause of action is breach of contract or culpa
contractual
- Exception: Contract of Carriage (In here, the basis of the
liability is the deliberate and malicious violation of the
contract)
Can there be a TORT or QUASI-DELICT in Breach of Contract?
- Gen. Rule: NO
- Exception: However, the existence of the contract does not
bar the commission of a tort by one against the other and
the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort, the contractual
relations of the parties does not bar the recovery of
damages
Interference with Contractual Relations
- It constitutes torts when a person induced another to violate
the latters contract with a third person
Cases where Art. 2176 is not applicable
a) Where there was a pre-existing contractual relation of
employer and employee between the parties
b) When the fault or negligence is punished by law as a crime
c) If the action for quasi-delict is instituted after 4 years
d) When the injury suffered is the result of a fortuitous event
e) If there is no damage or injury caused to another party
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant
Kinds of Negligence
a) Criminal violation of the criminal law
b) Civil distinct and separate negligence which is CA or QD
of ancient origin, having always its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence
Modes of Enforcing Civil Liability Due to Fault or Negligence
The injured party has the option to:
a) Pursue a criminal action which includes the claim for civil
liability arising from the crime based on Art. 100 of the RPC;
or
b) Pursue an independent civil action based on QD under Arts.
2176-2194 of the NCC
General Rule: The acquittal of the accused will not necessarily
exonerate him from civil liability. The civil liability arising from CA or
QD was never intended by la to be merged in the criminal action. The
criminal prosecution is not a condition precedent to the enforcement
of the civil rights.
Exception:
1. when it declares that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist
2. when it is declared that the accused is not the author of the
crime
3. when the judgment expressly declares that the liability is
only civil in nature
4. where the civil liability is not derived or based on the criminal
act of which the accused was acquitted
5. where the acquittal is based on a reasonable doubt
6. where the civil action has prescribed
Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable
to QD
Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation also demandable,
but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according
to the circumstances
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligation consists
in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows BF, the provisions of Arts. 1171
and 2201, par 2, shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to
be observed in the performance, that which is expected of
a good father of a family shall be required.
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law,
or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no
person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen were inevitable.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
awarded.
Proximate Cause
- is the adequate and efficient cause as in the natural order
of events, and under the particular circumstances
surrounding the case, would necessarily produce the event.
- Is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred
- It is not necessarily the immediate cause, it is necessarily
the nearest time, distance or space
Contributory Negligence
- Act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the
part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendants negligence is the proximate cause of the injury
- To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it
must be shown that he performed an act that brought about
his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending
danger to health and body
- Omission of the diligence required by the circumstances by
virtue of which a person could have avoided injury to himself
- It requires foreseeability of harm to oneself
- A child under 9 years of age must be conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a
matter of law.
Effects of Contributory Negligence
a) There can be no recovery for damages
b) A plaintiff is barred from recovering the damages for loss
or injury caused by the negligence of defendant only when
plaintiffs negligence is the sole legal cause of the damage,
or the negligence of the plaintiff and some persons other
than the defendants was the sole cause of the damage
c) If the plaintiff and defendant are both at fault, the former
may recover, but the amount of his recover may only be
such proportion of the entire damage plaintiff sustained as
the defendants negligence bears to the combined
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant.
Doctrine of Comparative Negligence
- The negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant are
compared for the purpose of reaching an equitable
apportionment of their respective liabilities for the damages
caused and suffered by the plaintiff
Test to Determine Proximate Cause
a) Foreseeability Test where the particular harm was
reasonably foreseeable, at the time of the defendants
misconduct, his act or omission is the legal cause thereof
b) Natural and Probable Consequence Test where the
defendants liability is recognized only if the harm or injury
suffered is the natural and probable consequence of his act
or omission complained of
c) Sine qua non test where the defendants conduct will not
be considered as proximate cause of the event if the event
just the same would have occurred without it
d) Cause and Condition Test test where a distinction is
made between the active cause of the harm or injury and
the existing conditions upon which that cause operated. If
the defendant has made a passive static condition, which
made the damage possible, he is not liable
Assumption of Risk
Attractive Nuisance
- One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto,
is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby,
even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
- Not applicable to the bodies of water
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
- Allows the recovery to plaintiff who happened to have been
negligent also, provided the defendant has the last
opportunity to avoid the incident but failed to do so
- There must be negligence on the part of both parties
- Also called the Humanitarian Negligence Doctrine, it being
an exception to the rule on contributory negligence. It
proceeds from the precepts of humanity and natural justice
- Elements:
a) Plaintiff is placed in danger by his own negligent
acts and he is unable to get from such situation
by any means
b) Defendant knows that the plaintiff is in danger
and knows or should have known that the plaintiff
was unable to extricate himself therefrom
c) Defendant had the last clear chance or
opportunity to avoid the accident through the
exercise of ordinary care, but failed to do so, and
the accident occurred as a proximate cause of
such failure.
- Not applicable-
a) Collapse of a building or structure
b) When the claim or demand of the injured passenger is
the enforcement of the carriers contractual obligation
to bring him safely to his destination
c) When the injury or accident cannot be avoided by
application of all means at hand after peril has been
discovered
Res Ipsa Loquitor
- The thing or transaction speaks for itself
- Conditions to be met for RIL to apply:
a) The accident was of such character as to warrant
an inference that it would not have happened
except for defendants negligence
b) The accident must have been caused by an
agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged
with the negligence complained of
c) The accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured
Principal Defenses in Actions Based on Negligence
a) Emergency Rule one who suddenly finds himself in place
of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence
b) Assumption of Risk - a voluntary assumption of a risk of
harm arising from the negligent conduct of the defendant; it
presupposes an intentional exposure to a known peril
c) Contributory Negligence when the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages
d) Volenti Non Fit Injuria - to which a person assent is not
esteemed in law as injury; one is not legally injured if he has
consented to the act complained of or was willing that it shall
occur
Rules in the Application of Comparative Negligence
a) Pure Comparative Negligence Rule - the plaintiff can
recover from the defendant regardless of the extent of the
negligence of the former
b) Arkansas Comparative Negligence Rule the plaintiff
can recover if his negligence is lesser in degree than that of
the defendant. If the combined negligence of both parties
falls on 50/50 basis, plaintiff cannot recover.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasked, even though the former are not engaged in the business or
industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupil and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Principle of Vicarious Liability or Imputed Liability one is not only
liable for his own quasi-delictual acts but also for those persons for
whom he is responsible under the law
Child and Youth Welfare Code, Art. 58 Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental
authority in accordance with the Civil Code
Basis of Vicarious Liability; Pater Familias
*Art. 2180 is not respondeat superior, which under American
Jurisprudence means that the negligence of the servant is
conclusively the negligence of the master.
*Basis: Principle of Pater Familias. The reason for the masters
liability is negligence in the supervision of the subordinates. The
master; however, will be freed from liability if he can prove that he had
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
*Bahia vs Litonjua: The responsibility imposed by this article arises
by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible under the article, derived from their failure
to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to
prevent them from causing damage
*Actual Torfeasor is not exempt from liability. The minor, ward,
employee, special agent, pupil, students and apprentices who actually
committed the delictual acts are not exempted by law from personal
responsibility. They may be sued and made liable alone as when the
person responsible for them or vicarious obligor proves that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family or when the minor
or insane person has no parents or guardians. In the latter instance,
they are answerable with their own property.
*Nature of Responsibility of Vicarious Obligor. Direct and primary;
he is solidarily liable with the tortfeasor. His responsibility is not
conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the
negligent tortfeasor.The h
*Reason for VL of Parents. It is a necessary consequence which
imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them
in their company, educating them in proportion of their means, while
on the other hand, gives them the rights to correct and punish them in
moderation
Exception: proof that they exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage
*Liability of the Mother. 1) Death or Insolvency of the father. If the
mother was impleaded as a co-defendant of the father or was
impleaded alone while the husband is still well and alive, may move to
dismiss the case filed against her for being premature
*Absence of the Father. not mentioned in the law. If he is absent
under Arts. 390-391, the mother will be the one who is vicariously
liable. s
*VL Liability of Parents; Requisites
1. The child is below 21 years. RA 6809: reduced the legal age to 18,
nonetheless the fact than the child is already emancipated
2. The child committed a tortious act to the damage and prejudice of
another person
3. The child lives in the company of the parent concerned whether
single or married
Requisites of Employers Liability under Art. 2180, (4)
1. Employee was chosen by the employer personally or through
another
2. The service is to be rendered in accordance with orders which the
employer has the authority to give at all times
3. The illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of
the functions entrusted to him
Primary Liability and Subsidiary Liability of Employers The
injured party has 2 options in pursuing the civil liability of the employer
for the acts of his employees
*Civil Action: the liability of the employer is direct, primary and
solidary, if he proves the negligence of the employee
*Criminal Action: The liability of the employer is subsidiary if the
offender was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
States Imputed Liability only liable for acts imputed for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are
acting as special agents
Exception: When the State engaged in private business or enterprise,
it becomes liable as an ordinary employer
*Special Agent one who receives a definite and fixed order of
commission, foreign to the exercise of the ordinary duties of his office
Imputed Liability of Teachers and Heads of Schools
General Rule: When the school is academic, the responsibility of
the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge
of such students
Exception: In the case of arts and trades, it is the head hereof, and
only he, who shall be held liable
Reddendo Singula Singulis. Teachers should apply to the word
pupils and students, and heads of establishment of arts and
trades to the word apprentices
Limited Liability of the School. The students must be in the school
when the tortious act was committed
-A student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has yet begun or has already ended.
- As lomg as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student right, the responsibility
of the school authorities over the student continues.
*Basis of such liability: in loco parentis and are called upon the to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered of the satisfaction of the claim.
Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no
parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable
with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad
litem is pending
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it
may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the
damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.
*Wild Beast Theory: The true rule of law is that the person who for
his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril,
and if he does not so, is prima facie answerable to all the damages
which is the natural consequence of the escape
*Exceptions to the Rule of Liability of the Possessor
1. If the damage was caused by a force majeure
2. If the damage was caused by the fault of the plaintiff or person
injured
3. If the damage was caused by the act of a third person
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with
his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed
that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless
driving or violating traffic regulations or at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180
are inapplicable.
Rationale: to cope with the alarming increase of vehicular mshaps
-This article has also been applied to a calesa mishap where it was
held that the owner of the calesa who was not in the calesa at the time
of the incident is not liable for the acts of his cochero
Liability of a Car Owner:
*If present in the car If the causative factor for the accident was the
drivers negligence, the owner of the car, who was present in the car,
is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the
exercise of due diligence, but did not do so
*If not present in the car The driver was negligent. The injured
party may still sue the car owner under Art. 2180, par. 5 for imputed
liability. The car owner may avail himself of the defense of not having
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
Pater Familias The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the
servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by
him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage
Effect when Driver is found negligent Once a driver is proven
negligent in causing damage, the law presumes the vehicle owner
equally negligent and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving
proper selection employee as a defense. Malfunction or loss of break
is not a FE.
Effect of Ratification of Tortious Act of Driver or Employee The
employer is still liable if he ratifies the tortious acts or takes no step to
avert the damage
Art. 2185. Unless there is a proof to the contrary, it is presumed that
a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of
the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
*A person driving a motor vehicle who was violating any traffic
regulation at the time of the accident is presumed to be negligent. It is
rebuttable presumption.
Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper
government office a bond executed by a government controlled
corporation or office, to answer for damages to third person. The
amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent
public official.
Motor Vehicle Bond no IRR, but the car owner cannot renew the
registration of his car without first securing an insurance against TPL
Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of food stuffs, drinks, toilet
article and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by
any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual
relation exists between them and the consumers.
Principle of Strict Liability in Torts means that the proof of
negligence is not necessary. It applies even if the defendant
manufacturer or processor has exercised all the possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product.
*Requisites:
1. The defendant is the manufacturer or processor of
foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods involved
2. The defendant used noxious or harmful substances in the
manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drink or toilet articles and
similar goods
3. Plaintiff used or consumed such product unaware of the
injurious condition of the product
4. Plaintiffs injury or death was caused by the product used
or consumed
5. The forms of kinds of damages suffered and the amount
thereof
*Contractual relationship between the manufacturers or processors
and consumers is not necessary
*Effect of Contract between Manufacturer or Processor with
Plaintiff: Plaintiff is not precluded from filing a suit based on breach
of warranty whether express or implied. The principle applies. The
consumers cause of action does not depend upon the validity of his
contract, with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be
between the seller and immediate buyer or attached to and
accompanying the product into consumers hands.
Options on Remedies. The ff are the plaintiffs remedies if he desires
to pursue a complaint against the manufacturer or processor:
1. Theory of Strict Liability in Torts
2. Fault or Negligence
3. Breach of Warranty
4. Crime anchored on the violation of the FDA act wherein
the enforcement of which the doctrine of absolute criminal liability may
be applied
Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part
of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of
dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison
except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his
occupation or business.
* There is a rebuttable presumption that he is negligent when the death
or injury results from the defendants possession of dangerous
weapons or substances.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason
of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other public works under their control or supervision.
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for
the damages resulting from its total or partal collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:
1. By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of
with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances
which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place.
2. By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to person or property
3. By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not
caused by force majeure
4. By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious
matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.
*Injunction may be resorted to in order to prevent damage or injury
Art. 2192. If damages referred to in the two preceding articles should
be the result of ant defect in the construction mentioned in Art. 1723,
the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the
engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article,
within the period therein fixed.
Prescriptive period = 15 years from the time the cause of action has
accrued
Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof,
is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the
same.
Head of the Family usually the father; in his absence, the mother
*Obligation: to supervise the members of the family; co-responsible
with the actual tortfeasor
*Nature of Liability absolute and exclusive
*Purpose of the Absoluteness of the Article
1. to compel the head of a family to see to it that no dangerous things
are placed on the window sills and other parts of the dwelling place
which may be thrown or fall by the accident
2. to compel him to supervise the members of the family or guests
from doing acts or activities which may result in the throwing or falling
of things from their house or dwelling
3. to relieve the victim of the difficult burden of identifying the persons
who caused the throwing or falling of the injurious thing
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
a quasi-delict is solidary.
*It applies if there is joint tortfeasor
*Nature of Liability: civil liability arising from quasi-delict
*Joint Tortfeasors include all persons who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, air or abet
the commission of a tort, or who approve of if after it is done for their
benefit. They are each others principals
II. DEFINITION
A. Tort
- Commission of an act by one, without right, whereby
another receives some injury, directly or indirectly in person,
property or reputation
- A wrong independent of a contract or as a breach of duty
which the law, distinguished from a mere contract, has
imposed
- It is a wrong, and a wrong is a tortious act
B. Torts vs Quasi-Delict
- QD is a term designated by the Code Commission to refer
to those obligations which do not arise from law, contractso
or quasi-contracts or criminal offenses because this term
nearly corresponds to Roman Classification of obligations
and is in harmony with the nature and kind of liability
- it rejected the use of term, Tort , which is broader because
in the general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional
and malicious acts with certain exceptions are governed by
RPC
Naguiat vs NLRC
Petitioner: Sergio F. Naguiat under the name and style of Sergio F.
Naguiat Ent., Inc., & Clark Field Taxi, Inc
Respondent: NLRC, National Organization of Workingmen and its
members, Leonardo T. Galang
Citation: 269 SCRA 564
Date of Promulgation: March 13, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J
FACTS:
Clark Field Taxi Inc (CFTI) held a concessionaires contract
with the Army Air Force Exchange Services (AAEFS) for the
operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base
Sergio Naguiat CFTIs president; Antolin Naguiat CFTIs
VP
Like Sergio Naguiat Enterprises, a trading firm, CFTI was a
family-owned corporation
Individual respondents previously employed by CFTI as taxi
cab drivers
- During their employment, they were required to pay a daily
boundary fee of US$26.50 for those working from 1am-
12nn; and US$ 27 for those working from 12nn to 12mn
- All the incidental expenses were also accounted against
them + gasoline expenses
- They worked for at least 3-4 times a week, depending on
the availability of taxi cabs
- They earned not less than US$ 15 daily
- In excess of that amount, they were also required to make
cash deposits to the company which they could lter
withdraw every 15 days
Due to the phase out of the US military bases in PH, from which
Clark Base was not spared, AAEFES was dissolved, and the
services of the individual respondents were officially terminated
on November 26, 1991
AAFES Taxi Drives Association (Union)- through its
President, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations with
regard to the separation benefits that should be awarded in favor
of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the separated
drivers will be given PhP 500 for every year of service as
severance pay.
Most of the drivers accepted the said amount in December 1991-
January 1992, but the individual respondents herein refused to
accept theirs
Individual Respondents through National Organization of
Workingmen which they subsequently joined after disaffiliating
themselves with AAFES Union, filed a complaint against Sergio
Naguiat and his company, AAFES with Mark Hooper as Area
Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Union with
Eduardo Castillo as President, for payment of separation pay due
to termination/phase out
Complaint was further amended to include additional taxi
drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI
with Antolin Naguiat as VP and Gen. Manager, as party
respondents
- Allegations:
1. They were regular employees of Naguiat
enterprises although their application were
approved by CFTI
2. They have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises
after having been hired by CFTI and that the
former managed, controlled and supervise their
employment
3. They were entitled to separation pay based on
their latest daily earnings of US$ 1 for working 16
days a month
Position Paper submitted to the LA, petitioners claimed the fff:
1. The cessation of CFTI was due to great financial
losses and lost business opportunity resulting from the
phase out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US
Military Base Agreement
2. Admitted that CFT had agreed with the drivers union
through Pres. Castillo who claimed to have had the
blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of
union members, to grant its taxi driver-employees
separation pay equivalent to PhP 500 for every year of
service
Labor Arbiter Findings:
1. Individual complainants were regular workers of CFTI
 2. Ordered CFTI to pay 12k for every year of service for
humanitarian consideration setting aside the earlier
agreement between CFTI and the drivers union of
PhP 500/year of service
3. At the time of the ceased operations, CFTI was
profitably earning and the cessation of its business
was due the untimely closure of Clark Air Base
NLRC:
1. Modified the LA by granting separation pay to the
private respondents
2. Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son
at the same time the President and Vice-President and
General Manager, respectively, should be joined as
indispensable party whose liability is joint and several.
MR of petitioners denied; hence they filed this Petition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO
Separation Pay
Petitioners stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base
because of the phase out of the US Military presence; and not
due to any great financial loss because petitioners taxi business
was earning profitably at the time of closure
Individual Respondents were entitled to separation pay
National Organization of Working Mens Personality to Represent
Individual Respondent-Employees
Petitioner is in estoppel for not having seasonably raised this
issue before LA or NLRC
Liability of Petitioner-Corporations and their Officers
Naguiat Enterprise is not the indirect employer of the individual
respondents much less a labor only contractor
Sergio Naguiat in supervising the taxi drivers and determining
their employment terms, was rather carrying out his
responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises
is as separate corporatipn that is not involved at all in the taxi
business
CFTI was the actual and direct employer of the respondents
CFTI President, Sergio Naguiat is jointly and severally liable for
the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees, as
he was the one who actively managed the business
Corporation Code: 5) To the extent that the stockholders are
actively engage(d) in the management or operation of the
business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall
be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among
themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally liable for
corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably
adequate liability insurance.
Corporate Tort no definite scope; but TORT, consists in the
violation of a right given or the omission of the duty imposed by
law. Tort is a breach of legal duty
CFTI failed to comply with its law imposed duty or
obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was actively
engaged in the management or operation of the business
should be held personally and solidarily liable
Antolin Naguiat is not personally liable
No evidence that he participated in the management operation of
the business
No Denial of Due Process
Although Sergio and Antolin were not impleaded parties to the
complaint, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of LA when they filed a position paper in their
respective capacities
Albenson Enterprises vs CA
Petitioner: Albenson Enterprises Corp., Jesse Yap and Benjamin
Mendiona
Respondents: CA and Eugenio Baltao
Citation: 217 SCRA 16
Date of Promulgation: January 11, 1993
Ponente: Bidin, J
FACTS:
September, October and November 1980 Enterprise
delivered to Guaranteed Industries located at 3267 V. Mapa
Street, Sta. Mesa Manila, the mild steel plate which the latter
ordered
Albenson was given a Pacific Banking Corp check with No.
136361 in the amount of PhP 2, 575 and drawn against the
account of E.L Woodworks
When the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored.
Reason: Account Closed
Albenson through counsel traced the origin of the dishonored
check
- From the records of SEC, it was discovered that the
president of the Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild
steel plates was one Eugenio Baltao
- Upon inquiry Albenson was also informed by the Ministry of
Trade and Industry that E.L Woodworks, a single
proprietorship business was registered in the name of one
Eugenio Baltao, and also upon verification with Pacific
Banking Corp, the signature of Baltao on the check was
verified
An extrajudicial demand was then given to Baltao to replace or
make good the check, but he denied issuing such. He also said
that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and could have not
transacted business with Albenson.
Feb. 14, 1983 - Albernson filed at OPP Rizal for violation of BP
22 against Baltao
Complaint Benjamin Mendiona (employee) was the affiant
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake,
his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages a business
establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao
Building, 3267 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same
business address of Guaranteed.
September 5, 1983 Asst. Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an
Information against Eugenio Baltao for violation of BP 22. Fiscal
claimed that he had given him an opportunity to submit evidence,
but failed to do so
Baltao claimed ignorance of the complaint against him. He filed
a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that he has not been given
the opportunity to be heard during the preliminary investigation
Jan. 30, 1984 Fiscal Mauro Castro reversed the findings of
Fiscal Sumaway and exonerated Baltao, for the ff reasons:
- The signature on the check was not Baltaos
- No showing of the records of PI
- Baltao did not actually receive a notice of said investigaton
Fiscal Sumawa was castigated by Fiscal Casto for failing to
exercise care and prudence in the performance of his duties,
thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly
notified of the complaint against him, and of the requirement to
submit counter evidence
Because of the unjust filing, Baltao filed a complaint for damages
against Albenson, Jesse yap and Benjamin Mendiona, its
employee
RTC QC the check is drawn against the account of E.L
Woodworks not of Guaranteed industries of which Baltao used to
be President --- ordered Albenson to pay Baltao damages:
(Actual 133, 350) ; (Moral 1M) ; (Exemplary 200k);
(Attorneys Fees 100k)
CA reduced the moral damages from 1M to 500k and AF from
100k to 50k
Albenson, Yap and Mendiona - filed this instant petition,
alleging that the court erred in:
1) Cause of action is not based on malicious prosecution,
but one for abuse of rights under Art. 21
2) Hitting and in effect maligning with an unjust criminal
case was, without more, a plain cause of abuse of
rights by misdirection and was therefore actionable by
itself, and which became inordinately blatant and
grossly aggravated when Baltao was deprived of his
basic rights to notice and a fair hearing in the so-called
PI
3) No evidence
4) Holding the petitioner corp, Yap and Mendiona jointly
and severally liable without basis in law and in fact
5) Award of damages without evidence
Petitioners Contention:
1) The case filed was for malicious prosecution, not for
damages
2)
Petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of Abuse of
Rights under Art. 19
Sets standards which may be observed in the exercise of ones
rights and duties
 When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with Art. 19 and resulted to damage to another person, a legal
wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible
Elements: 1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised
in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another
When the defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff
Eugenio Baltao is not the same as the Eugenio Baltao the
defendants are dealing with, said defendants ran afoul of Arts.
19-21 when they still pursue a criminal case
Defendants not having been paid the amount certainly had the
right to complain, but the right is limited by certain constraints.
Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of rights.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild
steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at
Baltao building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check
was issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private
respondent conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio
Baltaos conducting business in the same building he and his
son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which
received the goods in payment of which the bouncing check was
issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and
probable cause in filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.
Respondent is not entitled for claim of damages under malicious
prosecution
Elements: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that
the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action
was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice
2nd and 3rd element were lacking in this case
Petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister
design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by well-
founded anxiety to protect their rights
The mere act of submitting a case for the authorities for
prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution
Though petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in
determining the liability of private respondent for dishonored
check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad
faith warranting an award for damages
Case is founded on a case of mistaken identity, and were not
considered to be in bad faith. It could have been corrected only
if Eugenio Baltao filed his counter-affidavit
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be
charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously
Respondent is not also entitled to actual damages
No proof as to the medical treatment expenses incurred for the
alleged nervous breakdown
No proof as to the business losses caused by the unjust litigation
The court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess work
as to the amount
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved,
otherwise, if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages
will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
For these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court
to have affirmed the award of actual damages in favor of private
respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Attorneys Fees cannot also be awarded
Reason: no malicious prosecution
Elcano and Elcano vs Hill and Hill
Petitioner: Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano in their capacity as
ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased
Respondents: Reginald Hill, minor and Marvin Hill, as father and
natural guardian of said minor
Citation: 77 SCRA 98
Date of Promulgation: May 26, 1977
Ponente: Barredo
FACTS:
Reginald Hill minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
caused the death of Agapito, son of Pedro. He lives with his
father, Marvin, with whom he was living and getting subsistence
Pedro and Patricia filed a criminal case against Reginald but
he was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mstake
Elcano then filed a case for damages against Marvin based
on Art. 2180 at CFI QC
Defendants filed for Motion to dismiss, with ff grounds:
1. Present action is against and a violation of Rule 107, Sec.
1 of RoC
2. Action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final or in
res judicata
3. No cause of action bc Marvin as relieved as guardian of
Reginald through emancipation of marriage
MTD denied by the trial court
MR granted
The acquittal of Regibnald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence the acquittal is not a
bar to the instant action against him
The separate individuality of a quasi-delict under the CC has
been fully recognized, even with regard to a negligent ac for
which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted
in a criminal case and for which, after such conviction, he could
have been sued for his civil liability arising from his crime
In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused.
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable
by law
Atty. Hill is not free from his responsibility to Reginald though he has
already been emancipated by marriage
Art. 399 states that emancipation by marriage of the minor is not
really full or absolute
Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of
age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons
It is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
Virata vs Ochoa
PETITIONERS: Candida Virata
Tomas Virata
Manolito Virata
Ederlinda Virata
Napoleon Virata
Aracely Virata
Zenaida Virata
Luzminda Virata
Pacita Virata
Evangelina Virata
RESPONDENTS: Victorio Ochoa
Maximo Borilla
The Court of First Instance of Cavite,
7th Judicial District, Branch V
stationed @ Bacoor, Cavite
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. L46179
PROMUL. DATE: January 31, 1978
PONENTE: Fernandez, J.
FACTS:
September 24, 1975 ARSENIO VIRATA died as a result of
having been bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay
City by a passenger jeepney driven by MAXIMO BORILLA and
registered in the name of VICTORIO OCHOA.
o Borilla is the employer of Ochoa.
o For the death of Arsenio, an action for Homicide
through Reckless Imprudence was instituted on
September 25, 1975 against Borillo in CFI of Rizal, at
Pasay City (Crim. Case No. 3162-P).

At the hearing of the said criminal case on December 12,
1975, Atty. Julio Francisco (priv. prosec.), made a made a
reservation to file a separate civil action for damages against the
driver on his criminal liability.
o On February 19, 1976, Atty. Julio Francisco filed a
motion in said criminal case to withdraw the
reservation to file a separate civil action.
o On June 29, 1976, the heirs of Arsenio again reserved
their right to institute a separate civil action. On July
19, 1977, they commenced Civil No. B-134 in the CFI
of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch V, for damages based on
quasi-delict against the driver Maximo and the
registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio.
o On August 13, 1976, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another
action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between
the same parties for the same cause.
o On September 8, 1976, CFI of Rizal, Pasay City, in
their decision on Crim. Case No. 3162-P, acquitted
accused Maximo on the ground that he caused an
injury by name accident.
o On January 31, 1977, CFI Bacoor, Cavite, granted the
motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages.
The heirs of Arsenio Virata can prosecute an action for damages
based on QD against Borillo and Ochoa
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may
choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided,
they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a
separate civil action for damages against the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The
acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil
Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict. The source
of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is
quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by law. Under
Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict
and an act or omission punishable by law are two different
sources of obligation.
Andamo vs CA
PETITIONERS: Natividad V. Andamo
Emmanuel R. Andamo
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 74761
PROMUL. DATE: November 6, 1990
PONENTE: Fernan, C.J.
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
o Owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private
respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
o WITHIN THE LAND of the religious corporation were
waterpaths and contrivances, which ALLEGEDLY:
inundated and eroded petitioners land,
caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners crops and plants,
washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their
laborers during rainy and stormy seasons,
and
exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
July 1982 petitioners instituted a criminal action before RTC
Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against EFREN MUSNGI,
ORLANDO SAPUAY and RUTILLO MALLILLIN, officers and
directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by
means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal
Code.
February 22, 1983 petitioners filed another action action
against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed
as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court.
March 11, 1983 - respondent corporation filed its answer to the
complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
o April 26, 1984 - the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil
action, issued an order suspending further hearings in
Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the
related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
August 27, 1984 the trial court DISMISSED the civil case for
lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted
ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. Said order was
anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules
of Court which provides that criminal and civil actions
arising from the same offense may be instituted separately,
but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil
action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.
APPELLATE COURT (February 17, 1986)
o AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court.
o A motion for recon filed the petitioners was DENIED by
the Appellate Court in its reso on May 19, 1986.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners can claim damages for the destruction
caused by the respondents waterpaths and contrivances based on
Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the CC on quasi-delicts
The petitioners can claim damages by reasons of the destruction
caused by the waterpaths and contrivances
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building
these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may
be the basis for the recovery of damages.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of
damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the
causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-
existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without
limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that the owner
of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. xxxx Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that
they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or
a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury
or damage suffered.
Wylie vs Rarang
PETITIONERS: M.H. Wylie
Capt. James Williams
RESPONDENTS: Aurora I. Rarang
The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 74135
PROMUL. DATE: May 28, 1992
PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
AT THE NAVAL BASE.
o February 1978, petnr M.H. Wylie was the assistant
administrative officer and Capt. James Williams was
 the commanding officer of the US Naval Base in Subic
Bay, Olongapo City.
o Aurora I. Rarang was employed as a merchandise
control guard in the Office of the Provost Marshal.
Wylie, in his capacity as the asst. admin. officer, supervised the
publication of the Naval Base stations Plan of the Day
(POD), which featured important announcements, necessary
precautions, and general matters of interest to military
personnel. One of its regular features was the action line
inquiry.
February 3, 1978 the POD published, under the NAVSTA
Action Line Inquiry, the ff:
Question: I have observed that Merchandise Control
inspector/inspectress are (sic) consuming for their own
benefit things they have confiscated from Base
Personnel. The observation is even more aggravated
by consuming such confiscated items as cigarettes
and food stuffs PUBLICLY. This is not to mention
Auring who is in herself, a disgrace to her division
and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. In lieu of this
observation, may I therefore, ask if the head of the
Merchandise Control Division is aware of this
malpractice?
Answer: Merchandise Control Guards and all other
personnel are prohibited from appropriating
confiscated items for their own consumption or use.
Two locked containers are installed at the Main Gate
area for deposit of confiscated items and the OPM
evidence custodian controls access to these
containers.
Merchandise Control Guards are permitted to eat their
meals at their worksite due to heavy workload.
Complaints regarding merchandise control guards
procedure or actions may be made directly at the
Office of the Provost Marshal for immediate and
necessary action. Specific dates and time along with
details of suspected violations would be most
appreciated. Telephone 4-3430/4-3234 for further
information or to report noted or suspected
irregularities. Exhibits E & E-1.
o Aurora Rarang was the Auring being referred to here,
as she was the only one with that name in the Office of
the Provost Marshall, which was conclusively proven
when on February 7, 1978, petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote
her a letter of apology for the inadvertent publication.
Rarang instituted an action for damages in the CFI of Zambales
against Wylie, Capt. James Williams, and the US Naval Base.
She prayed for P300K moral damages, exemplary damages, and
P50K attorneys fees.
o RARANGS ALLEGATIONS: the article constituted
false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel
tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and reputation
exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
o the libel was published and circulated in the English
language and read by almost all the U.S. Naval Base
personnel.
Wylie, Williams, and the Naval Base filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ff grounds:
o 1. Wylie and Williams acted in the performance of their
official functions as officers of the US Navy and are
immune from suit
o 2. The US Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US
government which cannot be sued without its consent
o 3. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties.
o MOTION DENIED.
TRIAL COURT
o the acts of Wylie and Williams werent official acts of
the US government in the operation and control of the
Base but personal and tortious acts which are
exceptions to the general rule that a sovereign country
cant be sued in the court of another country without its
consent. Thus their acts werent imputable against the
US government but were done in their individual and
personal capacities
o They were ordered to pay Rarang P100K moral and
exemplary damages, and P30K attorneys fees.
o However, the suit against the US Naval Base was
dismissed.
APPEAL
o Wylie and Williams asserted that they are immune
from suit since the publication was made in their official
capacities as officers of the U. S. Navy, and that they
did not intentionally and maliciously cause the
publication.
o Rarang also appealed as she wasnt satisfied with the
award.
THE IAC MODIFIED THE TCS DECISION - Rarang was
awarded P175K moral damages and P60K exemplary damages.
PETITION FOR REVIEW
o they made the publication in the performance of their
official functions as administrative assistant (Wylie)
and commanding officer (Williams) of the US Navy and
were, therefore, immune from suit for their official
actions.
Wylie and Williams are liable for the published article in the POD
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires
or where there is showing of bad faith (Chavez v.
Sandiganbayan).
It may be argued, as a general rule, that Capt. Williams as
commanding officer of the naval base was far removed in the
chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be
asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which
goes wrong on the base. However, in this particular case, the
records show that the offensive publication was sent to the
commanding officer for approval and that he approved it.
The grant of rights, powers and authority to the US under the RP-US
Bases Treaty does not cover immunity of its officers from crimes and
torts
Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost
Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name
Auring if the article will be published. The petitioners, however,
were NEGLIGENT because under their direction, they issued the
publication without deleting the said name. Such act or omission
was ULTRA VIRES and CANNOT be deemed part of official duty.
It was a TORTIOUS ACT which ridiculed the private respondent.
As a result of petitioners act, PR suffered besmirched reputation,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
especially so, since the article was baseless and false. The
petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities, are liable for the
damages they caused the Private Respondent.
C. Culpa Acquiliana vs Culpa Criminal
- A crime is an offense against the public pursued by the
sovereign
- Tort is a private injury which is pursued by the injured party
o Criminal punishment is to vindicate states
interest an deter crime
o Tort Liability is to vindicate the individual victim
and the rights and to reinforce public standards of
behavior
Today, a single act might constitute both a crime
and a tort
Phoenix Construction vs Carbonel
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U.
CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
Ponente: FELICIANO, J:
FACTS:
*In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at about 1:30 a.m.
private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home he
lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a cocktails-
and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing
corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had
taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen
car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and
General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and
was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights
(in his allegation) suddenly failed.
*He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford
dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump
truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of
General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing
in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
facing the oncoming traffic.
*The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in
such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way
of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early
warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or
rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home by
petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission
of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out
early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a
collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car
smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
*Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate
cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had
parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix.
Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in
driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of
liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix
also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection
and supervision of the dump truck driver.
*The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against
Phoenix and Carbonel.
*Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court
but modified the award.
No curfew pass was found on the person of Dionisio immediately after
the accident nor was any found in his car
Dionisio just alleged that it was misplaced
He was unable to probe possession of a valid curfew pass and
that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have
such pass that night
The relevance of a possession or non-possession of a curfew
pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related
issues: whether he had purposely put out his headlights before
the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by
the police for travelling onset of curfew without a valid pass
Patrolman Cuynos testimonies were admissible.
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and
suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is
a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than
reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be around
at that time.
The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as
part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the
trial court.
Ssubstantial weight should have been ascribed to such
testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have purported
to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch Dionisio
was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck
Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights before he reached the
intersection
But, he succeeded in switching his lights on again at bright split
seconds before contact with the dump truck
Dionisio was negligent at the night of the accident
He was hurrying home and driving faster than he should have
been
He extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of Gen.
Lacuna and Gen. Santos and thus did not see the dump truck
that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lance
The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios
injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked, and in other words, the negligence of Carbonel
There as a reasonable relationship between Carbonels
negligence on the hand and the accident, and respondents injury
The collision of Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the truck drivers negligence
The truck drivers negligence is far from being a passive and
static condition, but an indispensable and efficient cause.
The collision would have not occurred if the dump truck was not
parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The
improper parking created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down Gen. Lacuna St., and for having so created
the risk, the truck driver must be held responsible
Keeton: Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is
one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under
the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among
other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant
may be negligent only for that reason.
Dionisios negligence was only contributory
He may recover damages as the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury as the truck drivers lack of due care and negligence
Doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable.
Carbonels proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on
the part of his employer, Phoenix in supervising its employees properly
and adequately
The circumstance that Phoenix allowed its truck driver to bring
the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done
early in the morning, when coupled with failure to show any effort
of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is
parked hen away from the company premises, is an affirmative
showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix
Claims of Damages
In view of substantial justice, 20-80 is the ration of the allocation
of damages.
Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate
court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by
private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to
be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be
solidarity liable therefor to the former.
The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs
shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course
entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel
D. Cupla Acquiliana vs Culpa Contractual
- Tort is distinguished from a breach of contract in that the
latter arises under an agreement of the parties, whereas the
tort is ordinarily a violation of a duty fixed by law although it
may sometimes have relation to obligations growing out of
or coincident with a contract
Construction Devt Corp of the PHL vs Estrella
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES,petitioner,
vs.
REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER, PHILIPPINE
PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS LAGUNA
TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO
DATINGUINOO, respondents. G.R.
No. 147791 September 8, 2006
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
*On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her
granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded in San Pablo City, a
BLTB bus bound for Pasay City.
*Their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the
South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and
pinned their knees to the seats in front of them. They regained
consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus and
extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the
Makati Medical Center where the doctors diagnosed their injuries to
be as follows:
Medical Certificate of Rebecca Estrella - Fracture, left tibia mid 3rd,
Lacerated wound, chin, Contusions with abrasions, left lower leg,
Fracture, 6th and 7th ribs, right3
Medical Certificate of Rachel Fletcher - Extensive lacerated wounds,
right leg posterior aspect popliteal area
and antero-lateral aspect mid lower leg with severance of muscles.
Partial amputation BK left leg with severance of gastro-soleus and
antero-lateral compartment of lower leg. Fracture, open comminuted,
both tibial.
*Respondents filed a Complaint5 for damages against CDCP, BLTB,
Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13. They alleged (1) that Payunan, Jr.
and Datinguinoo, who were the drivers of CDCP and BLTB buses,
respectively, were negligent and did not obey traffic laws; (2) that
BLTB and CDCP did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees; (3) that
BLTB allowed its bus to operate knowing that it lacked proper
maintenance thus exposing its passengers to grave danger; (4) that
they suffered actual damages amounting to P250,000.00 for Estrella
and P300,000.00 for Fletcher; (5) that they suffered physical
discomfort, serious anxiety, fright and mental anguish, besmirched
reputation and wounded feelings, moral shock, and lifelong social
humiliation; (6) that defendants failed to act with justice, give
respondents their due, observe honesty and good faith which entitles
them to claim for exemplary damage; and (7) that they are entitled to
a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
*CDCP filed its Answer6 which was later amended to include a third-
party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.
(Phoenix).7
*On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP
and BLTB and their employees liable. The trial court held that BLTB,
as a common carrier, was bound to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the safety of its passengers. It must carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances. Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or has acted negligently.
BLTB's inability to carry respondents to their destination gave rise to
an action for breach of contract of carriage while its failure to rebut the
presumption of negligence made it liable to respondents for the
breach.
*Regarding CDCP, the trial court found that the tractor-truck it owned
bumped the BLTB bus from behind. Evidence showed that CDCP's
driver was reckless and driving very fast at the time of the
incident. The gross negligence of its driver raised the
presumption that CDCP was negligent either in the selection or
in the supervision of its employees which it failed to rebut thus
making it and its driver liable to respondents.
*Unsatisfied with the award of damages and attorney's fees by the trial
court, respondents moved that the decision be reconsidered but was
denied. Respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the
The case filed is an action for cupla aquiliana or quasi-delict
It may be instituted against the employer for an employees act
or omission
The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct
and primary, but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees
Petitioner failed to prove that it exercised due diligence of a good
father in the selection and supervision of Payunan
Petitioner is solidarily liable with BLTB for the actual damages
suffered by the respondents because of the injuries sustained
Payunan was driving recklessly because of the skid marks as
shown in the sketch of the police investigator
The owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common
carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same
Rule of Liability applies. The bus company, its driver, the operator
of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and
severally held liable to the injured passenger or their heirs
Petitioner and its driver are jointly and severally liable for moral
damages; hence, there could be no double recovery
Claims of Moral Damages
80k was reduced to 50k, so as to commensurate the damage
inflicted
Exemplary Damages
May be awarded if the defendant acted with gross negligence
Petitioners driver was driving recklessly at the time its truck
rammed the BLTB bus
Petitioner who has direct and primary liability for the negligent
conducts of its subordinates, was also found negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees
20k
Attorneys Fees
Ordinary Concept: AF is the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered. Basis:
Agreement
Extraordinary Concept: AF is an indemnity for damages ordered
by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. Basis:
Art. 2208 ; payable to the client UNLESS, there is an agreement
that the same shall be given to the lawyer as an additional
compensation
AF was correctly awarded; 30% of the total amount recovered
Total amount adjudged shall earn 6% interest per annum from the date
of judgment of the trial court until finality of its judgment
CDCPs claim against Phoenix had already prescribed
Any person having any claim upon the policy issued pursuant to
this chapter shall, without any unnecessary delay, present to the
insurance company concerned a written notice of claim setting
forth the nature, extent and duration of the injuries sustained as
certified by a duly licensed physician. Notice of claim must be
filed within six months from date of the accident, otherwise, the
claim shall be deemed waived. Action or suit for recovery of
damage due to loss or injury must be brought in proper cases,
with the Commissioner or Courts within one year from denial of
the claim, otherwise, the claimant's right of action shall prescribe
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. A written
notice of claim must be filed within six months from the date of
the accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six
months from the date of the accident, its claim has already
prescribed.
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Corp vs IAC
BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY & ARMANDO
PON, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HEIRS OF PAZ VDA.
DE PAMFILO, THE HEIRS OF NORMA NERI, and BAYLON SALES
and NENA VDA. DE ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 74387-90 November 14, 1988
Ponente: PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
*The collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB, for brevity) driven by Armando Pon
and Bus No. 404 of Superlines Transportation Company (Superlines,
for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway
traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of
August 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death of Aniceto
Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and in several injuries to
Nena Rosales (wife of Anecito) and Baylon Sales, all passengers of
the BLTB Bus No. 1046.
*The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the
bend of the highway, it tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus
No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the opposite direction. Seeing
thus, Armando Pon (driver of the BLTB Bus) made a belated attempt
to slacken the speed of his bus and tried to return to his proper lane.
It was an unsuccessful try as the two (2) buses collided with each
other.
*Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of
the deceased Francisco Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri
instituted separate cases in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque
against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers
praying for damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus
costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
*Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and
Dasco, denied liability by claiming that they exercised due care and
diligence and shifted the fault, against each other. They all interposed
counterclaims against the plaintiffs and crossclaims against each
other.
*After trial on the merits, the lower court exonerated defendants
Superlines and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed sole
responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and
ordered them jointly and severally to pay damages to the
plaintiffs. Defendants BLTB and Armando Pon appealed from the
decision of the lower court to respondent appellate court which
affirmed with modification the judgment of the lower court as
earlier stated.
*Hence, this petition to review by certiorari of defendant BLTB
assigning a lone error, to wit: THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING THAT THE ACTIONS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ARE BASED ON CULPA CONTRACTUAL. (p. 12,
Rollo). It is argued by petitioners that if the intention of private
respondents were to file an action based on culpa contractual or
breach of contract of carriage, they could have done so by merely
impleading BLTB and its driver Pon. As it was in the trial court, private
respondents filed an action against all the defendants basing their
action on culpa aquiliana or tort.
Petitioners liability is anchored on both culpa contractual an culpa
acquiliana
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of 3
and injuries of 2 passengers of DLTB was the negligence of the
driver of BLTB bus who recklessly operated and drove said bus
by overtaking a Ford Fiera, as he was negotiating the ascending
bend of the highway which was divided into 2 lanes by a
continuous yellow strip
Driver of BLTB admitted that the continuous yellow strip is a no
overtaking zone
Armando Pons Employer is also liable
Pon = primarily liable
BLTB = primary, direct and immediate, in view of the fact that the
death or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of
its employee, and such liability does not cease even upon proof
that BLTB exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employees
The common carriers liability for the death or injuries to its
passengers is based in its contractual obligation to carry its
passengers safely to their destination
BLTB is solidarily liable with its driver even though the liability of
the driver arose from a QD while that of the bus company from a
contract
The proximate cause of the collision was the sole negligence of the
driver of BLTB
He recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where
overtaking is not allowed by traffic rules and regulations
By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the
express obligation to transport the passengers to their
destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a
due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be
suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault
or negligence of the carrier
Gutierrez vs Gutierrez
Petitoner: Narciso Gutierrez
Respondent: Bonifacio Gutierrez, Maria V. De Gutierrez, Manuel
Gutierrez, Abelardo Velasco, And Saturnino Cortez
Citation:G.R. No. 34840
Date of Promulgation:September 23, 1931
Ponente: MALCOLM, J..
FACTS:
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of
private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other
on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality
of Las Pias, Province of Rizal.
The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and
was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being
operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was
owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
Gutierrez.
At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the
mother, together will several other members of the Gutierrez
family, seven in all, were accommodated therein.
A passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez,
was en route from San Pablo, Laguna, to Manila.
The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in
Narciso Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required
medical attendance for a considerable period of time, and which
even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed properly.
Respondents are guilty of negligence
Bonifacio is an incompetent chauffeur, as he was driving in an
excessive rate of speed
On approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and
contributed negligence to the accident
The guarantee given by the father at the time the son was
granted with license to operate a motor vehicle made the father
responsible for the acts of his son
Jointly and severally liable for 5k
Joseph vs Bautista
Petitoner: Luis Joseph
Respondent: Hon. Crispin V. Bautista, Patrocinio Perez, Antonio
Sioson, Jacinto Pagarigan, Alberto Cardeno And Lazaro Villanueva
Citation:G.R. No. L-41423
Date of Promulgation:February 23, 1989
Ponente: REGALADO, J.
FACTS:
The generative facts of this case as culled from the written submission
of the parties, are as follows:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with
Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73.
On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant
Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan from
Pangasinan.
Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at
Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to
Valenzuela, Bulacan.
While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway
proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to
overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction.
At about the same time, a pick-up truck with Plate No. 45-95 B,
supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto
Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried
to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of
overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer
towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree.
As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his
legs.
The following proceedings thereafter took place:
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent
Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a
breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio
Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver,
respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.
 Respondent Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and
never was an owner of the pick-up truck and neither would he
acquire ownership thereof in the future.
On September 24, 1973, petitioner, with prior leave of court, filed
his amended complaint impleading respondents Jacinto
Pagarigan and a certain Rosario Vargas as additional
alternative defendants. Petitioner apparently could not ascertain
who the real owner of said cargo truck was, whether
respondents Patrocinio Perez or Rosario Vargas, and who was
the real owner of said pick-up truck, whether respondents
Antonio Sioson or Jacinto Pagarigan.
Respondent Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim
against her co-defendants for indemnity and subrogation in the
event she is ordered to pay petitioner's claim, and therein
impleaded cross-defendant Alberto Cardeno as additional
alternative defendant.
On September 27, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva,
Alberto Cardeno, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thru
their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P
1,300.00. By reason thereof, petitioner executed a release of
claim releasing from liability the following parties, viz: Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro
Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan.
On December 2, 1974, respondents Lazaro Villanueva, Alberto
Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance Corporation of the
Philippines, paid respondent Patrocinio Perez' claim for
damages to her cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.
Consequently, respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and
Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross
defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and
Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that
respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61
by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further
that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan
paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.
Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her "Opposition to Cross-
defs.' motion dated Dec. 2, 1974 and Counter Motion" to
dismiss. The so-called counter motion to dismiss was premised
on the fact that the release of claim executed by petitioner in
favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of
respondent Perez, considering that all the respondents are
solidarity liable to herein petitioner.
On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order
dismissing the case, and a motion for the reconsideration
thereof was denied. Hence, this appeal, petitioner contending
that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim
executed by petitioner in favor of respondents Sioson,
Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent
Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case.
The argument that the judgment on the compromise agreement under
the cause of action based on QD is not a bar to the cause of action for
breach of contract of carriage, is untenable
Cause of Action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act
or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission
can be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the
act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and
distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict
or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the
number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one
person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the-
delict or wrong violating the rights of one person
In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner
sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a
single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action
against the different respondents through the appropriate
remedies allowed by law
Respondents are solidarily liable
The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the
parties during the pre-trial conference that, after such payment
made by the other respondents, the case shall proceed as
against respondent Perez is both incredible and unsubstantiated.
There is nothing in the records to show, either by way of a pre-
trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-
trial hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement
First PHL Intl Bank vs CA
Facts: In the course of its banking operations, the defendant Producer
Bank of the Philippines acquired 6 parcels of land with a total area of
101 hectares located at Don Jose, Sta. Rosa, Laguna and covered by
TCT No. T-106932 to T-106937. The property used to be owned by
BYME Investment and Development Corporation which hd them
mortgaged with the bank as collateral for a loan. The plaintiff originals,
Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo wanted to purchase the property
and thus initiated negotiations for that purpose. In the early part of
August 1987 said plaintiffs, upon the suggestion of BYME
investments legal counsel, Fajardo met with defendant Mercurio
Rivera, manager of the property management department of the
defendant bank. The meeting was held in pursuant to plaintiffs plan
to buy the property. After the meeting, plaintiff Janolo, following the
advice of defendant Rivera made a formal purchase offer to the Bank
through a letter dated August 30,1987. Negotiations took place and an
offer price was fixed at P5.5million. During the course of the
negotiations, the defendant bank was placed under conservatorship
and a new conservator was appointed to which the name has been
refused to recognize. A derivative suit has been filed against Rivera
for the damages suffered from the alleged perfect contract of sale
involving the 6 parcels of land.
Issue: Whether or not a derivative suit may lie involving the bank and
its stockholders.
Held: No. An individual stockholder is permitted to institute a derivative
suit on behalf of the corporation wherein he hold stock in order to
protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the officials of the
corporation refuse to sue, or are the ones, to be sued or hold the
control of the corporation. In such actions, the suing stockholder is
regarded as a nominal party with the corporation as the real party in
interest.
In the face of the damaging admissions taken from the complaint in
the second case, petitioners, quite strangely, sought to deny that the
second case was a derivative suit, reasoning that it was brought not
by the minority shareholders, but by Henry Co. etal. who not only hold
or control over 80% of the outstanding capital stock, but also constitute
the majority in the board of directors of petitioners bank. That being
so, then they really represent the bank, so whether they sued
derivatively or directly, there is undeniably an identity of interest/entity
represented.
In addition to the many cases, where the corporate fiction has been
regarded, we now add the instant case, and declare herewith that the
corporate veil cannot be used to shield an otherwise blatant violation
of the prohibition against forum shopping. Shareholders, whether
suing as the majority in direct actions or as the minority in a derivative
suit, cannot be allowed to trifle with court processes particularly where,
as in this case, the corporation itself has not been remiss in vigorously
prosecuting or defending corporate causes and in using and applying
remedies available to it. To rule otherwise would be to encourage
corporate litigants to use their shareholders as fronts to circumvent the
stringent rules against forum shopping.
From the facts, the official bank price, at any rte, the bank placed its
official, Rivera is a position of authority to accept offers to buy and
negotiate the sale by having the offer officially acted upon by the bank.
The bank cannot turn around and say, as it now does, that what Rivera
states as the banks action on the matter is not in fact so. It is a familiar
doctrine, the doctrine of ostensible authority, that if a corporation on
knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to do acts
within the scope of apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the
public as possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as
against any one who has in good faith dealt with the corporation
through such agent, he estopped from denying his authority.
A bank is liable for wrongful acts of its officers done in the interest of
the bank or in he course of dealings of the officers in their
representative capacity but not for acts outside the scope of their
authority. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of
confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds they my thus be
enabled to perpetrate in the apparent scope of their employment; nor
will it be permitted to shrink its responsibility for such fraud even
through no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. Accordingly, a
banking corporation is liable to innocent third persons where the
representation is made in the course of its business by an agent acting
within the general scope of its authority even though, in the particular
case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to
perpetrate fraud upon his principal or some other person, for his own
ultimate benefit.
Section 28-A of BP 68 merely gives the conservator power to revoke
contracts that are, under existing law, deemed not to be effective i.e
void, voidable, unenforceable or rescissible. Hence, the conservator
merely takes the place of a banks board of directors. What the said
board cannot do such as repudiating a contract validly entered into
under the doctrine of implied authority the conservator cannot do
either.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of
interest and parties between the first case and the second case. There
is identity of interest because both cases sought to have the
agreement, which involves the same property, be declared
unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even
though the first case is in the name of the bank as defendant, and the
second case is in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still forum
shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the bank.
Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability from the agreement
it entered into with Demetria et al.
The Supreme Court also discussed that to combat forum shopping,
which originated as a concept in international law, the principle of
forum non conveniens was developed. The doctrine of forum non
conveniens provides that a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or
available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere.
Forum Shopping (Blacks Dictionary): occurs when a party
attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or
jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable
judgment or verdict
Test for Determining Forum Shopping: exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other
Vda de Severo et at., vs Go et al.
Petitoner: Julita T. Vda. De Severo, Antoniete Severo, Bernadit
Severo, Ricardo Severo, Jr. And Marisol Severo
Respondent: Luningning Feliciano Go And Joaquin Go, And The
Honorable Court Of First Instance Of Samar, Branch V
Citation:G.R. No. L-44330
Date of Promulgation:January 29, 1988
Ponente: BIDIN, J.
FACTS:
Ricardo Severo was an employee of herein private respondents
Luningning Feliciano Go and Joaquin Go, first as baker of 'Joni's
Cakes and Pastries," an enterprise owned by respondents and
finally, as driver-mechanic from 1961 up to February 16, 1972.
On the latter date, unidentified armed men forcibly took away
and/or carnapped the car owned by respondents and driven by
Ricardo Severo who, in his efforts to resist the carnappers, was
shot and killed by the latter.
Up to now, the parties responsible for Severo's death have not
been Identified nor apprehended.
On September 18, 1974, herein petitioners, the widow and
minor children of Ricardo Severo, filed an action against
respondents-employers before the trial court for "Death
Compensation and Damages" in the total amount of
P74,500.00.
On November 18, 1974, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that respondent Court has
no jurisdiction over the nature of the action but the same was
denied by respondent Court in its order dated January 9, 1975.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the trial court. On May 3, 1975, private respondents filed their
answer traversing the material allegations of the complaint and
raised as special affirmative defenses that the lower court has
no jurisdiction over the claim of the petitioner and that the
complaint failed to state a sufficient cause of action.
During the pre-trial on January 16, 1976, private respondents
again filed a motion to dismiss reiterating their allegation that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over the claim of petitioner and
that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Petitioners filed a reply (opposition) dated February 5, 1976
contending that their claim is not for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act but for damages under Article
1711 and Article 21 of the Civil Code, hence, cognizable by the
regular courts.
The respondent court, acting on the latest motion to dismiss,
issued an order dated April 6, 1976 stating that petitioners'
cause of action falls within the purview of the Workmen's
Compensation Act and the proper forum was the Workmen's
Compensation Commission.
It declared itself without jurisdiction following Our ruling in the
case of Robles vs. Yap Wing, L-20442, October 4, 1971, 41
SCRA 267, to wit:
The Court after a careful consideration of the
grounds in the defendants' motion, and
considering the allegation of the complaint
describing their main cause of action, which is a
claim for death compensation and damages, is of
the opinion and so holds that this Court has no
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The
plaintiffs' right to relief being derived on an
accident resulting in death of Ricardo Severo, an
employee of the defendants, while engaged in the
performance of the task assigned to him, this
Court is devoid of statutory competence to pass
upon the subject matter of the plaintiffs' claim, as
of the time the cause of action accrue, falls within
the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act
as amended and, therefore, the proper form (sic)
was the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
thru its regional offices under the Department of
Labor, a body empowered to act upon all claims
for compensation for death, injury or sickness.
Thus our Supreme Court in the case of Ciriaco
Robles vs. Yap Wing, No. L-20442, Oct. 4, 1971
ruled:
Before the enactment of Republic Act No.
722(Amending Act. No. 3228), which took effect
on June 20, 1952, claims for compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Act were
cognizable by the regular courts, but since then,
as provided in Section 46 thereof as amended,
'the Workmen's Compensation shall have
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court. ... In relation to this, Section 5 of
the Act provides that the rights and remedies
granted by this Act to an employee by reason of
a personal injury entitling him to compensation
shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to an employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin
against the employer under the Civil Code or
other laws, because of said injury.
The claim for compensation of the petitioners based on the NCC
does pertain to the jurisdiction of regular couts
The court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and
remedies granted by the Workmens Compensation Act
The employee or his heirs have the choice of action and
corresponding relief either an ordinary action for damages
before the regular courts or special claim for compensation
under the WCA
Petitioners have opted to seek their remedy before the regular
courts
Their demand is predicated on the employers liabilitu for the
death of their employee
Fabre Jr vs CA
Petitioners: Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil
Respondents: Court of Appeals, The Word for The World Christian
Fellowship, Inc., Amyline Antonio, John Richards, Gonzalo Gonzales,
Vicente V. Que, Jr., Icli Cordova, Arlene Gojocco, Alberto Roxas
Cordero, Richard Bautista, Jocelyn Garcia, Yolanda Cordova, Noel
Roque, Edward Tan, Ernesto Narciso, Enriqueta Locsin, Francis
Norman O. Lopez, Julius Caesar Garcia, Rosario Ma. V. Ortiz,
Marietta C. Clavo, Elvie Seniel, Rosario Mara-Mara, Teresita Regala,
Melinda Torres, Marella Mijares, Josefa Cabatingan, Mara Nadoc,
Diane Mayo, Tess Plata, Mayette Jocson, Arlene Y. Mortiz, Liza Mayo,
Carlos Ranario, Rosamaria T. Radoc and Bernadette Ferrer
Docket No.: G.R. No. 111127
Date of Promulgation: July 26, 1996
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners
o Spouses Fabre were owners of a 1982 model
Mazda minibus which was used as bus service
for school children which they operated in
Manila.
o The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom
they hired in 1981, after trying him out for two
weeks; job was to take school children to and
from the St. Scholasticas College in Malate,
Manila.
November 2, 1984
o Respondent Word for the World Christian
Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with
petitioners for the transportation of 33 members
of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La
Union and back in consideration of which private
respondent paid petitioners the amount of
P3,000.00.
o The group was scheduled to leave on November
2, 1984, at 5:00 o clock in the afternoon; several
members of the party were late, the bus left
Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and
EDSA at 8:00 o clock in the evening.
o Petitioner Porfirio Cabil drove the minibus.
o Usual route to Caba, La Union was through
Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at
Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil,
who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first
trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour
through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan.
o At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a
sharp curve on the highway, running on a south
to east direction, which he described as siete;
road was slippery because it was raining, causing
the bus, which was running at the speed of 50
kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road
shoulder.
o The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign
along the road and rammed the fence of one
Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its
left side, coming to a full stop only after a series
of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road.
o A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and
smashed its front portion.
o Several passengers were injured.
o Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown
on the floor of the bus and pinned down by a
wooden seat which came off after being
unscrewed. It took three persons to safely
remove her from this position. She was in great
pain and could not move.
o The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not
see the curve until it was too late; he said he was
not familiar with the area and he could not have
seen the curve despite the care he took in driving
the bus, because it was dark and there was no
sign on the road.
o He said that he saw the curve when he was
already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly
slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was
too late.
November 3, 1984
o Lingayen police investigated the incident then
filed a criminal complaint at Lingayen RTC
against the driver, Porfirio Cabil.
o Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano P1,500.00
for the damage to the latters fence.
o On the basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance
the case against petitioners Fabre was
dismissed.
Respondent Amyline Antonio
o was seriously injured; brought this case in the
RTC of Makati.
o As a result of the accident, she is now suffering
from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed
from the waist down.
o During trial she described the operations she
underwent and adduced evidence regarding the
cost of her treatment and therapy.
o Immediately after the accident, she was taken to
the Nazareth Hospital in Ba-ay, Lingayen but it
was not adequately equipped so she was
transferred to the Sto. Nio Hospital, also in the
town of Ba-ay, where she was given sedatives
however, the x-ray taken showed that the
damage to her spine was determined to be too
severe to be treated there.
o She was therefore brought to Manila, first to the
Philippine General Hospital and later to the
Makati Medical Center where she underwent an
operation to correct the dislocation of her spine.
April 17, 1989 RTC Makati Decision
o No convincing evidence was shown that the
minibus was properly checked for travel to a long
distance trip and that the driver was properly
screened and tested before being admitted for
employment. Indeed, all the evidence presented
have shown the negligent act of the defendants
which ultimately resulted to the accident subject
of this case.
Considering that plaintiffs Word for the World
Christian Fellowship, Inc. and Ms. Amyline
Antonio were the only ones who adduced
evidence in support of their claim for damages,
the Court is therefore not in a position to award
damages to the other plaintiffs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
hereby renders judgment against defendants Mr.
& Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y
Jamil pursuant to articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines and said defendants
are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs the following amount:
1) P93,657.11 as compensatory
and actual damages;
2) P500,000.00 as the
reasonable amount of loss of
earning capacity of plaintiff
Amyline Antonio;
3) P20,000.00 as moral
damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and
5) 25% of the recoverable
amount as attorneys fees;
6) Costs of suit.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court with respect to Amyline Antonio but dismissed it
with respect to the other plaintiffs on the ground that
they failed to prove their respective claims. The Court
of Appeals modified the award of damages as follows:
1) P93,657.11 as actual damages;
2) P600,000.00 as compensatory
damages;
3) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
6) Costs of suit.
 o The Court of Appeals sustained the trial
courts finding that petitioner Cabil failed to
exercise due care and precaution in the
operation of his vehicle considering the
time and the place of the accident. The
Court of Appeals held that the Fabres were
themselves presumptively negligent.
Petitioners were negligent
The relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin
and nature; nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may
be also tort
Cabil drove the bus negligently while his employer, Fabres, failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection and
supervision of their employee
It was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was
raining, and, as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was
dark. He averred these facts to justify his failure to see that there
lay a sharp curve ahead. However, it is undisputed that Cabil
drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only
slowed down when he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters
ahead
By then it was too late for him to avoid falling off the road. Given
the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was Cabils
first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven his vehicle
at a moderate speed. There is testimony that the vehicles
passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20
kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was
running at a very high speed.
Cabre was negligent in the selection and supervision of employees
Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by
finding that the applicant possessed a professional drivers
license. The employer should also examine the applicant for his
qualifications, experience and record of service. Due diligence
in supervision, on the other hand, requires the formulation of
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation
and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules.
Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently
did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school
children only, from their homes to the St. Scholasticas College in
Metro Manila. They had They had tested him for certain matters,
such as whether he could remember the names of the children
he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his
qualification to drive on a long distance travel, especially
considering that the trip to La Union was his first. The existence
of hiring procedures and supervisory policies cannot be casually
invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of
an employer hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship.
Fabres did not have to be engaged in the business of public
transportation for common carriers to apply
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms
or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose
principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or
both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity
(in local idiom, as a sideline).
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise
extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the
passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee
Damages can be awarded to Amyline Antonio
This case falls within Art. 2219 providing for payment of moral
damages in QD
On the theory that petitioners are liable for breach of contract of
carriage, the award of moral damages is authorized by Art. 1764,
in relation to Art. 2220, since Cabils gross negligence amounted
to bad faith
The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was also
properly made
Fabres and Cabil are jointly and severally liable for damages
sustained by the passengers
Emenciana Vda De Medina vs Cresencia
Petitioners: Emerenciana M. Vda. De Medina, Et al.
Respondents: Guillermo Cresencia, Et al.
Docket No.: G.R. No. L-8194
Date of Promulgation: July 11, 1956
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
May 31, 1953
o A passenger jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-
2232 (Manila), driven by Brigido Avorque,
smashed into a Meralco post on Azcarraga
Street, resulting in the death of Vicente Medina,
one of its passengers.
A criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence
was filed against Avorque (criminal case No. 22775 of the
CFI Manila), to which he pleaded guilty on September 9,
1953.
The heirs of the deceased, however, reserved their right to
file a separate action for damages, and on June 16, 1953,
brought suit against the driver Brigido Avorque
and Appellant Guillermo Cresencia, the registered owner
and operator of the jeepney in question.
Defendant Brigido Avorque did not file any
answer; while Defendant Cresencia answered, disclaiming
liability on the grounds:
1. that he had sold the jeepney in question on October
14, 1950 to one Maria A. Cudiamat;
2. that the jeepney had been repeatedly sold by one
buyer after another, until the vehicle was purchased on
January 29, 1953 by Rosario Avorque, the absolute
owner thereof at the time of the accident.
In view of Cresencias answer, Plaintiffs filed leave and was
allowed to amend their complaint making Rosario Avorque
a co-Defendant; and the latter, by way of answer, admitted
having purchased the aforesaid jeepney on May 31, 1953,
but alleged in defense that she was never the public utility
operator thereof.
The case then proceeded to trial, during which, after
the Plaintiffs had presented their
evidence, Defendants Guillermo Cresencia and Rosario
Avorque made manifestations admitting that the former was
still the registered operator of the jeepney in question in the
records of the Motor Vehicles Office and the Public Service
Commission, while the latter was the owner thereof at the
time of the accident; and submitted the case for the
decision on the question of who, as between the two, should
be held liable to Plaintiffs for damages.
The lower court, by Judge Jose Zulueta, held that as far as
the public is concerned, Defendant Cresencia, in the eyes
of the law, continued to be the legal owner of the jeepney in
question; and rendered judgment against him, jointly and
severally with the driver Brigido Avorque, for P6,000
compensatory damages, P30,000 moral damages, P10,000
exemplary damages, P10,000 nominal damages, P5,000
attorneys fees, and costs, while Defendant Rosario
Avorque was absolved from liability.
Defendant Cresencia appealed.
Cresencia is liable to the Commission and the public for the
consequences incident to the operation of jeepneys, also to the
damages sustained by Plaintiff by reason of the death of Vicente
Medina resulting from the reckless imprudence of the driver, Brigido
Avorque
Sale of the jeepned was admittedly without the approval of
Public Service Commission; hence, Guillermo continues to be
liable
The law requires the approval of the Public Service Commission
in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may
be sold or leased without infringing the certificate issued to the
grantee; and that if property covered by the franchise is
transferred or leased without this requisite approval, the transfer
is not binding against the public or the Service Commission; and
in contemplation of law, the grantee of record continues to be
responsible under the franchise in relation to the Commission
and to the public
Plaintiffs action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed
against Brigido and not based on the employers subsidiary liability
 Based on breach of contractual obligation to carry his
passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual)
No need to prove Brigidos insolvency before damages can be
recovered to the carrier, for in CC the liability of the carrier is
direct and immediate
Award of the nominal damages is untenable
Nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages
Aboitiz Shipping vs CA
Petitioner: Aboitiz Shipping Corporation
Respondents: Hon. Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, Lucila C.
Viana, Sps. Antonio Viana and Gorgonia Viana, and Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation
Docket No.: G.R. No. 84458
Date of Promulgation: November 6, 1989
Ponente: Regalado, J.
FACTS:
Appeal by certiorari
May 11, 1975
o Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia,
owned by defendant, at the port at San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila, having
purchased a ticket (No. 117392) in the sum of
P23.10.
May 12, 1975
o Said vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor,
Manila, and the passengers therein disembarked,
a gangplank having been provided connecting
the side of the vessel to the pier. Instead of using
said gangplank Anacleto Viana disembarked on
the third deck which was on the level with the pier.
o After said vessel had landed, the Pioneer
Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive
control of the cargoes loaded on said vessel
pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement
dated July 26, 1975 between the third-party
defendant Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation and
defendant Aboitiz Shipping Corporation.
o The crane owned by the third party defendant and
operated by its crane operator Alejo Figueroa
was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour
after the passengers of said vessel had
disembarked, it started operation by unloading
the cargoes from said vessel.
o While the crane was being operated, Anacleto
Viana who had already disembarked from said
vessel obviously remembering that some of his
cargoes were still loaded in the vessel, went back
to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to
the crew of the said vessel to the place where his
cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him,
pinning him between the side of the vessel and
the crane.
o He was thereafter brought to the hospital where
he later expired three (3) days thereafter, on May
15, 1975, the cause of his death according to the
Death Certificate being "hypostatic pneumonia
secondary to traumatic fracture of the pubic bone
lacerating the urinary bladder".
o For his hospitalization, medical, burial and other
miscellaneous expenses, Anacleto's wife, herein
plaintiff, spent a total of P9,800.00.
Anacleto Viana who was only forty (40)
years old when he met said fateful
accident was in good health; average
annual income as a farmer or a farm
supervisor was 400 cavans of palay
annually.
His parents, herein plaintiffs Antonio
and Gorgonia Viana, prior to his death
had been recipient of twenty (20)
cavans of palay as support or P120.00
monthly.
Because of Anacleto's death, plaintiffs
suffered mental anguish and extreme
worry or moral damages.
For the filing of the instant case, they
had to hire a lawyer for an agreed fee
of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages
against Aboitiz for breach of contract of carriage.
Answer to Vianas complaint: Aboitiz denied responsibility
contending that at the time of the accident, the vessel was
completely under the control of respondent Pioneer as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled
the unloading of cargoes from the vessel of Aboitiz; averred
that since the crane operator was not an employee of
Aboitiz, the latter cannot be held liable under the fellow-
servant rule.
Thereafter, Aboitiz, as third-party plaintiff, filed a third-party
complaint against Pioneer imputing liability thereto for
Anacleto Viana's death as having been allegedly caused by
the negligence of the crane operator who was an employee
of Pioneer under its exclusive control and supervision.
Answer to third-party complaint: Pioneer raised the
defenses that Aboitiz had no cause of action against
Pioneer considering
1. that Aboitiz is being sued by the Vianas for
breach of contract of carriage to which Pioneer is
not a party;
2. that Pioneer had observed the diligence of a
good father of a family both in the selection and
supervision of its employees as well as in the
prevention of damage or injury to anyone
including the victim Anacleto Viana;
3. that Anacleto Viana's gross negligence was the
direct and proximate cause of his death;
4. and that the filing of the third-party complaint
was premature by reason of the pendency of the
criminal case for homicide through reckless
imprudence filed against the crane operator,
Alejo Figueroa.
April 17, 1980 Decision of the trial court
o Aboitiz was ordered to pay the Vianas for
damages incurred, and Pioneer was ordered to
reimburse Aboitiz for whatever amount the latter
paid the Vianas.
Both Aboitiz and Pioneer filed separate motions for
reconsideration wherein they similarly raised the trial court's
failure to declare that Anacleto Viana acted with gross
negligence despite the overwhelming evidence presented
in support thereof.
In addition, Aboitiz alleged, in opposition to Pioneer's
motion, that under the memorandum of agreement the
liability of Pioneer as contractor is automatic for any
damages or losses whatsoever occasioned by and arising
from the operation of its arrastre and stevedoring service.
October 27, 1982 Order of the trial court
o Absolved Pioneer from liability for failure of the
Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly establish a
case of negligence against the crane operator
which the court a quo ruled is never presumed,
aside from the fact that the memorandum of
agreement supposedly refers only to Pioneer's
liability in case of loss or damage to goods
handled by it but not in the case of personal
injuries, and, finally that Aboitiz cannot properly
invoke the fellow-servant rule simply because its
liability stems from a breach of contract of
carriage.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of of the trial court
except as to the amount of damages awarded to the Vianas.
The doctrine laid in La Mallorca vs CA is not applicable
Petitioner contends that since one (1) hour had already elapsed from
The the time Anacleto Viana disembarked from the vessel and that he
was given more than ample opportunity to unload his cargoes prior to
the operation of the crane, his presence on the vessel was no longer
reasonable e and he consequently ceased to be a passenger.
Corollarily, it insists that the doctrine in La Mallorca vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 10 is not applicable to the case at bar.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination
and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created,
the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the
carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave
the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises
a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances,
and includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and
prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is
not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has
been carried to his destination if, for example, such person
remains in the carrier's premises to claim his baggage.
It was in accordance with this rationale that the doctrine in the
aforesaid case of La Mallorca was enunciated, to wit:
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier
and passenger does not cease at the moment the
passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place
selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but
continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time
or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable
delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
circumstances. Thus, a person who, after alighting from
a train, walks along the station platform is considered still
a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at
his destination and is proceeding by the usual way to
leave the company's premises, but before actually doing
so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow
passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and
without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to
relieve his brother, he is deemed reasonably and
necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a
passenger entitled as such to the protection of the
railroad company and its agents.
In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one
of his baggages which was not unloaded when they alighted
from the bus. Racquel, the child that she was, must have
followed the father. However, although the father was still on
the running board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand
him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so that even he
(the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was
at this instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was
run over and killed. In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed
that the carrier's agent had exercised the 'utmost diligence' of
a 'very cautious person' required by Article 1755 of the Civil
Code to be observed by a common carrier in the discharge of
its obligation to transport safely its passengers. ... The
presence of said passengers near the bus was not
unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered
still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection
under their contract of carriage. 14
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule
as it did in said case is the fact of the passenger's reasonable
presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness of time
should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the
case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business,
the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account
such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case
of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the
passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case
at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met
the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a
reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near
the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable
cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's
business as a shipper, the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer
period of time to disembark from the ship than other common carriers
such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the
number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of
accommodating a bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity
of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will need
at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel
and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the
bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time. Verily,
petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of
comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's
cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at
bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated therein
to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim
Anacleto Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When
the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his
cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel. As
earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers
safely to their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to
claim their baggage.
It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident,
the victim had already disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner
failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at the time the victim
was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour
earlier. In consonance with common shipping procedure as to the
minimum time of one (1) hour allowed for the passengers to
disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had just gotten off
the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage. Yet, even if he
had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in
petitioner's premises was not without cause. The victim had to
claim his baggage which was possible only one (1) hour after the
vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the
case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall
start only after that time. Consequently, under the foregoing
circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still deemed a
passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
Anacleto Viana was guilty of negligence
Under the law, common carriers are, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to
all the circumstances of each case. 15 More particularly, a
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. 16 Thus, where a passenger dies or is injured, the
common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently. 17 This gives rise to an action for breach of
contract of carriage where all that is required of plaintiff is to
prove the existence of the contract of carriage and its non-
performance by the carrier, that is, the failure of the carrier to
carry the passenger safely to his destination, 18 which, in the
instant case, necessarily includes its failure to safeguard its
passenger with extraordinary diligence while such relation
subsists.
The presumption is, therefore, established by law that in case of a
passenger's death or injury the operator of the vessel was at fault or
negligent, having failed to exercise extraordinary diligence, and it is
incumbent upon it to rebut the same. This is in consonance with the
avowed policy of the State to afford full protection to the passengers
of common carriers which can be carried out only by imposing a
stringent statutory obligation upon the latter. Concomitantly, this Court
has likewise adopted a rigid posture in the application of the law by
exacting the highest degree of care and diligence from common
carriers, bearing utmost in mind the welfare of the passengers who
often become hapless victims of indifferent and profit-oriented
carriers. We cannot in reason deny that petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption against it. Under the facts obtaining in the present case,
it cannot be gainsaid that petitioner had inadequately complied with
the required degree of diligence to prevent the accident from
happening.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the evidence does not show that
there was a cordon of drums around the perimeter of the crane, as
claimed by petitioner. It also adverted to the fact that the alleged
presence of visible warning signs in the vicinity was disputable and not
indubitably established. Thus, we are not inclined to accept petitioner's
explanation that the victim and other passengers were sufficiently
warned that merely venturing into the area in question was fraught
with serious peril. Definitely, even assuming the existence of the
supposed cordon of drums loosely placed around the unloading area
and the guard's admonitions against entry therein, these were at most
insufficient precautions which pale into insignificance if considered vis-
a-vis the gravity of the danger to which the deceased was exposed.
There is no showing that petitioner was extraordinarily diligent in
requiring or seeing to it that said precautionary measures were strictly
and actually enforced to subserve their purpose of preventing entry
into the forbidden area. By no stretch of liberal evaluation can such
perfunctory acts approximate the "utmost diligence of very cautious
persons" to be exercised "as far as human care and foresight can
provide" which is required by law of common carriers with respect to
their passengers.
While the victim was admittedly contributorily negligent, still
petitioner's aforesaid failure to exercise extraordinary diligence
was the proximate and direct cause of, because it could definitely
have prevented, the former's death. Moreover, in paragraph 5.6
of its petition, at bar, 19 petitioner has expressly conceded the
factual finding of respondent Court of Appeals that petitioner did
not present sufficient evidence in support of its submission that
the deceased Anacleto Viana was guilty of gross negligence.
Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise.
3. No.
No excepting circumstance being present, we are likewise bound by
respondent court's declaration that there was no negligence on the
part of Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation, a confirmation of the trial
court's finding to that effect, hence our conformity to Pioneer's being
absolved of any liability.
As correctly observed by both courts, Aboitiz joined Pioneer in proving
the alleged gross negligence of the victim, hence its present
contention that the death of the passenger was due to the negligence
of the crane operator cannot be sustained both on grounds, of
estoppel and for lack of evidence on its present theory. Even in its
answer filed in the court below it readily alleged that Pioneer had taken
the necessary safeguards insofar as its unloading operations were
concerned, a fact which appears to have been accepted by the plaintiff
therein by not impleading Pioneer as a defendant, and likewise
inceptively by Aboitiz by filing its third-party complaint only after ten
(10) months from the institution of the suit against it. Parenthetically,
Pioneer is not within the ambit of the rule on extraordinary
diligence required of, and the corresponding presumption of
negligence foisted on, common carriers like Aboitiz. This, of
course, does not detract from what we have said that no
negligence can be imputed to Pioneer but, that on the contrary,
the failure of Aboitiz to exercise extraordinary diligence for the
safety of its passenger is the rationale for our finding on its
liability.
Calalas vs CA
Petitioner: Vicente Calalas
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and
Francisco Salva
Docket No.: G.R. No. 122039
Date of Promulgation: May 31, 2000
Ponente: Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding
damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as
plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
August 23, 1989 (10:00 AM)
o Respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a
college freshman majoring in Physical Education
at the Siliman University, took a passenger
jeepney owned and operated by petitioner
Vicente Calalas.
o The jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor
an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back
of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
o On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros
Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off; Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger.
o An Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and
owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney; Sunga was injured.
She sustained a fracture of the "distal
third of the left tibia-fibula with severe
necrosis of the underlying skin."
Closed reduction of the fracture, long
leg circular casting, and case wedging
were done under sedation.
Her confinement in the hospital lasted
from August 23 to September 7, 1989.
Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V.
Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon,
certified she would remain on a cast for
a period of three months and would
have to ambulate in crutches during
said period.
October 9, 1989
o Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the
diligence required of him as a common carrier.
o Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-
party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible
for the accident.
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490),
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict,
in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his
driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower
court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict,
and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence
required under the Civil Code.
The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint
against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to
Sunga.
Calalas is liable on the basis of his contract of carriage to Sunga
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He
contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral
damages to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict
ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore,
the principle of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the
same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his
driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to
petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-
delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has
as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger
safely to his destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to
passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This
provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of
proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case
No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that
the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the
truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not
in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law
is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by
the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well
as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business
and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according
to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is
further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6,
and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard
for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and
1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of
petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in
the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
against petitioners contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not
properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters
from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle
of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A.
No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which provides:
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging
that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention
well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year
college student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman
University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the
injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of
that school year. She testified that she had no more intention
of continuing with her schooling, because she could not walk
and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical
Education "because of my leg which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was
under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured
left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also
certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side."
She likewise decided not to further pursue Physical Education
as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x has a defect
already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the
inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and
reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions
for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one
of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.[5] As
an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in
which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided
in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in
the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since
there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted
in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas
contention that petitioners admission in open court that the driver of
the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that
petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger.
If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one
at fault for the accident.

Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his

motor vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the
passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on
passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free
passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner driver took in more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any
motor vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or
cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a
peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention
that Sungas taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the
many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a
greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is
also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for
the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the
debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.
Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.