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CASE 1:

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999


PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

ISSUES:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction ofthe Sandiganbayan is being challenged
in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to
prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on theground of lack of
jurisdiction.
(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the
provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.
(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.
(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers
which isessential to the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of
the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Amongthose included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors. Acting on a
media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a ummary execution and
not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate
the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding andrecommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as
accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.

CASE 2:
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INT ERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

ISSUES:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect
repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it
is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate
the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National
Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see
fit, in the case of carabaos.
SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

FACTS:
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued
a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the
carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2
The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for
review on certiorari.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

CASE 3:
G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998
PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners,
vs.
HO N. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice; MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT,
SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT and FORTUNATO MALLARI, respondents.

ISSUES:
The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment2 in this special civil action for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac of
Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows:
A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET
BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY Of THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL
FROM SAID PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND IN DENYING
PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE PENDENCY OF
THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.
C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING HIS ORDER
FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

FACTS:
On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. On 5 November 1995, a
complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of
the Masantol Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David,
Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye, Vladimir
Yumul, a certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a preliminary
examination in the form of searching questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC issued warrants for
the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.
Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested; while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter
affidavit.3
Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the regularity of arraignment, considering that the appeal
was received by the DOJ as early as 23 February 1996.
We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of discretion.
It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal
of the accused 81 or the dismissal of the case 82 is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases, so must it be
where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above discussed.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996 denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding and of 12 April
1996 denying the motion to reconsider the denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3 May 1996
resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996 denying the Motion to Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared
VOID and SET ASIDE. The arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and their separate pleas of not
guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and his
order of 7 June 1996 REINSTATED.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of the Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith
filing with the trial court the amended information for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in said case with all reasonable dispatch.
No pronouncement as to costs.

CASE 4:
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000
JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
vs.
PE OPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ISSUES:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal
charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication
that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion
for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement
and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.1wphi1.nt
The petition is not impressed with merit.

FACTS:
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination
that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu
propio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process
is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances
requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the
immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.2
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by
law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides the
absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.9

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

CASE 5:
G.R. Nos. 138792-804. March 31, 2005
DANTE GUEVARRA, AUGUSTUS F. CESAR and ADRIANO SALVADOR, Petitioners,
vs.
TH E HON. FOURTH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENAIDA P. PIA
and CRESENCIANO D. GATCHALIAN, Respondents.

ISSUES:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999 in Criminal Case Nos. 23082, 23084, 23085,
23086, 23087, 23089, 23090, 23091, 23092, 23093, 23094, 23096 and 23097, ordering the reinstatement of said criminal cases. Cresenciano Gatchalian and
Zenaida Pia, faculty members of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), filed a complaint2 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 with the Office
of the Ombudsman against the administrators of PUP, namely, petitioners Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, the President, Dr. Dante Guevarra, the Vice- President for
Administration and Finance, Atty. Augustus F. Cesar, Administrative Officer V, and Mr. Adriano A. Salvador, the Acting Chief of the Accounting Office. The
charges were made in connection with certain questionable transactions entered into by the PUP. A special audit team of the Commission on Audit (COA)
had, likewise, conducted a special audit of selected transactions, and its findings were contained in SAO-SOG Report No. 93-19. The case was docketed as
COA Case No. 92-290. Petitioner Olonan submitted a copy of the said report, the Memorandum of the COA Review Panel, and her request for reconsideration
of the findings of the special audit team in the said report.
FACTS:
An Information was, thereafter, filed in the Sandiganbayan against all the accused, including petitioner Olonan. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads: That on or about 1989 and for a period subsequent thereto, in Sta. Mesa, Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Dr. Zenaida A. Olonan, a public officer, being then the President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (P.U.P.), accused Dr. Dante G.
Guevarra, likewise a public officer, being then the Vice-President for Administration and Finance, of the P.U.P., accused Atty. Augustus F. Cesar, also a public
officer, being then an Administrative Officer V of the P.U.P., and accused Adriano A. Salvador, a public officer too, being then the Acting Chief of the Accounting
Division of the P.U.P., taking advantage of their positions and the offense being committed in relation to their office, acting in evident bad faith and manifest
partiality with a single criminal intent, and all together, conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
commit the following acts, to wit:
The Special Prosecutor must share the blame with the Sandiganbayan because in his Manifestation and Motion, the Special Prosecutor averred therein that
Justice Marigomen recommended the dismissal of the 13 criminal cases against all the accused, without specifically stating therein that the recommendation
for dismissal pertained only to petitioner Olonan, and not to the other accused who are the petitioners herein. The Special Prosecutor should have been more
precise and forthright so as not to mislead the graft court.

DECISION:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 6, 1999, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 6:
[ G.R. No. L-2349, October 22, 1948 ]
FRED M. HARDEN, PETITIONER,
VS.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

ISSUES:
The petitioner, Fred M. Harden, is being, confined in prison for contempt of court by virtue of an order of the following tenor: "It appearing that the defendant
Fred M. Harden has not up to this date complied with the orders of this court of October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948; "As prayed for the court orders the arrest
of the defendant Fred M. Harden as well as his confinement at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he complies with the aforementioned orders."

FACTS:
The proceeding for contempt arose in a civil case between Mrs. Harden as plaintiff and the petitioner and another person as defendants, commenced on July
12, 1941, and involving the administration of a conjugal partnership, payment of alimony, and accounting. In that case, a receiver was appointed and a
preliminary injunction was issued restraining Fred M. Harden and his codefendant, Jose Salumbides, from transferring or alienating, except for a valuable
consideration and with the consent of the Court first had and obtained, moneys, shares of stock, and other properties and assets, real or personal, belonging
to the aforesaid partnership, and which might be found in the names of said defendants or either of them. On various dates in 1946, Fred M. Harden transferred
to the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Chartered Bank of India, Australia & China, both in Hongkong, over P1,000,000.00 in drafts or
cash; to Virginia Recreation Center, Long Beach, California, P20,196.80, and to an unknown person, P50,000.00.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has steadfastly held that habeas corpus does not lie to correct errors of fact or law. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of Prisons,
58 Phil. 271; Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil. 304; Trono Felipe et al. vs. Director of Prisons, 24 Phil. 121; Gutierrez Repide vs. Peterson, 3 Phil. 276;
Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, et al., G. R. No. L- 1083; McMicking vs. Schields, 238 U. S. 99, 41 Phil. 971; Tinsley vs. Anderson, 43 Law. ed., 91). When
a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas
corpus. The writ of habeas corpus can not be made to perform the function of a writ of error; and this holds true even if the judgment, order or decree was
erroneous, provided it is within the jurisdiction of the court which rendered such judgment or issued such an order or decree. (Slade Perkins vs. Director of
Prisons, supra; Santiago vs. Director of Prisons, supra.) So whether the act charged has been committed or can still be performed is conclusively determined
by the order or judgment of the trial court in the proceeding wherein the petitioner for habeas corpus isadjudged in contempt. (Ex-parte Fisher, 206 S. W. 2d.
1000.)

DECISION:
The petition is denied with costs.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.