36 SCRA247

Acevedo vs. Sarmiento [GR L-28025, 16 December 1970]

JUDGE: Fernando

Facts: On August 3, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a criminal
information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against herein petitioner(David
Acevedo y Dalman) and a certain Chi Chan Tan. Because there were no further proceedings in the
meantime, Acevedo on May 19, 1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. But the respondent Judge
(Malcolm G. Sarmiento) was not in agreement and issued an order of denial on 10 July 1965.After two
more years, In trial the complainant had testified on direct examination but was not yet been fully
cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial the witness did not show up. So the provincial fiscal
moved for postponement. However, the counsel for Acebedo, not only objected but sought the
dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to speedy trial. The Judge this time acceded and
gives his order of dismissal orally. Later that same day, the Judge did reconsider the order and reinstated
the case, his action being due to its being shown that the cross-examination of the complainant had
already started. Acevedo filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether Acevedos right for a speedy trial is violated.

Held: Yes! The supreme court said the right to a speedy trial means one is free from vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be
free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever
legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by
habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus
for the final dismissal of the case. The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good
cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without having his case tried. An
accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are
deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution
intends to remove from the prosecution every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial.
Impossibilities cannot be expected or extraordinary efforts required on the part of the prosecutor or the
court. The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the
prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation
cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to
a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be
commenced. More specifically, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on
the denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at
continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against an accused
being twice put in jeopardy. Herein, Acevedos case is a clear denial of the right to a speedy trial,
because the facts are not once but twice did Acevedo seek to have the case against him terminated; the
case was pending for 6 years. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the complaining witness
testified on direct examination but during the continuation of the cross-examination the witness did not
appear. There was an order of dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No reconsideration could
therefore be had without offending the provision on double jeopardy.

People vs. Laya [GR L-53873, 13 May 1988]

161 SCRA 327

Gutierrez Jr.

Facts: On January 15,1980, Soledad Castro and Crisologo Abines were charged with the crime of grave
coercion in an information filed by Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal Manuel R. Potot with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch 15.The crime was allegedly committed as follows: " On December 29,
1978, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in Barangay Looc, Municipality of Santander, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, without authority of law and by means of violence, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prevent the spouses Leoncio Wenceslao and Valena B.
Wenceslao and their laborers from fencing a piece of land owned by the Wenceslaos, the fencing not
being prohibited by law. Under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code." Upon arraignment, Castro and
Abines pleaded "not guilty." In an order dated the same day, the trial of the case was set on March 14
and 25, 1980 both at 8:30 a.m. "as requested by the prosecution and defense." Representing the
prosecution during the arraignment was Assistant Provincial Fiscal Sotero R. Camello, the prosecutor
assigned to the sala of the judge. Fiscal Camello inhibited himself from prosecuting the case because
when he originally investigated the case. The case was assigned to Assistant Provincial Fiscal Potot.
Fiscal Potot received notice of the hearing scheduled for 14 March 1980. On this same day, Fiscal Potot
filed an urgent ex-parte motion for postponement stating among others that before learning of the
scheduled 14 March 1980 hearing, he was already committed to appear in Branch 3 and Branch 12 of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu and that on March 14, 25, and 26, 1980, all in the afternoon, he, as
special prosecutor of the Tanodbayan, had already set for clarificatory examination the Toledo City
Highways Engineering District cases for estafa and violation of RA 3019. On the scheduled 14 March
1980 hearing, the defense counsel objected to the postponement on the ground that the prosecution
represented by Fiscal Camello had agreed to the scheduled hearings of March 14 and 25, 1980 and
manifested that on said dates Fiscal Potot will be available. The Court granted the motion for
postponement of the scheduled March 14, 1980 hearing but ordered the hearing on 25 March 1980 at
8:30 a.m. to be held as scheduled. On 18 March 1980, Fiscal Potot requested the Provincial Fiscal that
the case be assigned to Assistant Provincial Fiscal Andres Amil. The case was transferred to Fiscal Amil
on 21 March 1980. Fiscal Amil then filed a motion to postpone the scheduled 25 March 1980 hearing on
the grounds that he has long been committed to appear before the Municipal Circuit Court of Barili,
Cebu which date was personally chosen by his and besides the undersigned is not prepared to enter a
trial of the case considering that he is not familiar with the facts of the case since the records of the case
is with Assistant Provincial Fiscal Sotero R. Camello; and that it is physically impossible for the
undersigned to be appearing on two courts in a distance about 50 kilometers apart. Fiscal Amil prayed
that the hearing of the case be transferred to another date in the month of May 1980. During the
scheduled hearing of 25 March 1980, Castro and Abines objected to the motion for postponement. They
manifested their readiness for trial, and insisted on proceeding with the hearing. In an order dated 25
March 1980, the court denied the motion for postponement and sustained the objections of the
accused. The case was ordered dismissed for failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration filed by
the People of the Philippines was denied. Hence, the petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial of Castro and
Abines.

Held: Yes! The right to a speedy trial is defined as that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate
defense he may interpose. Whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise
quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable
delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. The right to a speedy trial is a more vague
and generically different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and
cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a
precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived. A claim that a
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct
of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as
length of the delay, the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been
denied. Herein, the manner the prosecution handled a simple case of coercion is deplorable. It must be
noted that after Fiscal Camello inhibited himself from the case because he could not in conscience
prosecute the case considering that he had recommended its dismissal as its initial investigator and after
prosecuting Fiscal Potot asked that he be relieved from the case because of his tight schedule, the court
specifically ordered that the case be assigned to another fiscal furnishing a copy of said order to the
Provincial Fiscal himself. The Provincial Fiscal assigned another Fiscal, Fiscal Amil, but it turned out that
the latter like Fiscal Potot was not also available during the scheduled 25 March 1980 hearing because of
previous commitments on the very same day. The cavalier attitude of the Provincial Fiscal's Office
having less respect for the rights of the accused greatly prejudiced the constitutional right to speedy trial
of Castro and Abines. The case was a simple one. It did not need lengthy and tedious preparation for
trial. The 2-months' delay of the trial from 25 March 1980 to May 1980, if requested for sound reasons
may not be unreasonable. However, owing to the nature of the case, the reasons for the
postponements, and the fact that one of the accused is a municipal mayor, who had to leave his work
everytime he was held to court only to be told to return another day, the delay because vexatious
because the lower court stated " the delay is not only prejudicial to him but also to the people of
Santander, Cebu.

Conde vs. Rivera [GR 21741, 25 January 1924]

Malcolm (J)

Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to
no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and
counsel at hearings no less than on 8 different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice
been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than 1
year from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of
her troubles as she was when originally charged.

Issue: Whether a mandamus will compel the dismissal of the information in light of delays in the trial of
the case.

Held: Yes! The Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons,
has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that
right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on
courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and
openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon the appropriate information,
could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The Government of the Philippine Islands which
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court
is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the
accused is discharged from the custody of the law. Thus, where a prosecuting officer, without good
cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period
of time, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. Hence, the
Supreme Court ordered the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas to abstain from further attempts to prosecute
Conde pursuant to informations, and dismissed the charges pending before the justice of the of Lucena,
Tayabas.

Dacanay vs. People [GR 101302, 25 January 1995]

Quiason (J):

Facts: Jaime C. Dacanay was the vice-president of the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). In
1986, a criminal complaint for economic sabotage through smuggling, with regard to the importation of
raw sugar in 1983 and 1984 by NASUTRA, was filed with the Tanodbayan against the principal officers of
the said corporation including Dacanay. On October 10, 1986, the Tanodbayan approved the resolution
of the team of Special Prosecutors who investigated the case. It found sufficient prima facie against
Dacanay and his co-accused to warrant the filing of an information with Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended. The corresponding information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan. On November 20, Dacanay filed a motion to quash but he later withdrew the same. On
14 October 1988, a resolution was issued by Special Prosecutors Margarito P. Gervacio and Robert E.
Kallos, recommending the dismissal of the complaint against Dacanay and his co-accused for lack of
sufficient evidence and the withdrawal of the information filed in court. The resolution was approved by
Acting Special Prosecutor Jose Ferrer. The resolution issued by Prosecutors Gervacio and Kallos was
reviewed by special Prosecutor Wilfredo Orencia, who recommended its disapproval. The
recommendation was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor Jose F. Guerrero and by Ombudsman
Conrado Vasquez. On February 22, Jose Unson, Dacanay's co-accused, filed a motion to quash the
information in the Sandiganbayan. On December 12, the motion was adopted by Dacanay. But was
denied. Likewise, the motion for reconsideration filed by Unson and Dacanay was denied. On 3 April
1991, Dacanay filed a motion for immediate and separate trial invoking his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. On April 23, the People of the Philippines opposed the said motion on the ground that a
separate trial for Dacanay would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding. In a resolution dated 24
April 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion. On June 6, Dacanay filed a motion for
reconsideration setting forth as grounds therefor his advanced age and the protection of his reputation.
On July 9, the People of the Philippines filed a comment to Dacanay's motion for reconsideration and
alleged that the parties should first await the resolution of the petition for certiorari filed by his co-
accused Jose Unson with the Supreme Court. In a resolution dated 6 August 1991, the Sandiganbayan
denied Dacanay's motion for reconsideration. Dacanay filed the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether Dacanay is entitled to a separate trial.

Held: Section 8, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly states: "When two or more
accused are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court in its discretion
upon motion of the fiscal or any accused orders separate trials for one or more accused. A separate trial
is in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987
Constitution, more specifically under Section 14(2) of Article III thereof. Herein, it has been 8 years since
the information against Dacanay was filed, but the case against him has yet to be tried. The long delay
has clearly prejudiced Dacanay, who is now more than 73 years of age.the respondents are ORDERED
to proceed with the trial of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 11957, separately if it need be.

People vs. Rivera [GR 139180, 31 July 2001]

Mendoza (J)

Facts: In March 1997, Erlanie Rivera's younger sister, Zaira, was taken by their parents to the Escolastica
Romero Memorial Hospital in Lubao, Pampanga. Erlanie's mother stayed with her sister in the hospital,
but her father, Rolando Rivera, went back home to Santiago, Lubao, Pampanga. At around 11 p.m. of
the same day, Erlanie was awakened as Rolando started kissing her and fondling her breasts. Erlanie
tried to resist by kicking and pushing Rolando, but her efforts were to no avail. Rolando removed her
shorts and panty, touched her private parts, and then had sexual intercourse with her. After he was
through with her, Rolando told complainant not to tell anyone what had happened or he would kill
Erlanie's mother and sister. Hence, when her mother came home the following day, Erlanie did not tell
her what had happened because she was afraid of Rolando. On 9 April 1997, however, Erlanie, in the
presence of her mother, told her aunt, Marietta Pagtalunan, and her grandmother, Maxima Payumo,
that she had been raped by Rolando. For this reason, she was referred to Dr. Barin for physical
examination. She also executed a sworn statement before the police of Lubao, Pampanga. Rolando
Rivera was charged in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, which
reads "That sometime in the month of March 1997, in barangay Santiago, municipality of Lubao,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused ROLANDO RIVERA, by means of violence, threat and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and maliciously succeeded in having carnal knowledge [of] his 13
year old daughter, Erlanie D. Rivera, against the latter's will and without her consent. Contrary to law."
During the arraignment on 30 September 1997, the information was read to Rolando in the local dialect
(Pampango). Rolando, duly assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged,
whereupon trial was held. On 22 June 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, finding Rolando Rivera
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged. For having violated Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, with the attendant circumstances that the victim
is under 18 years of age and the offender is the father of the victim and absent any circumstance that
could mitigate the commission thereof, the Court sentenced Rolando to suffer the supreme penalty of
death by lethal injection, and ordered him, in line with established jurisprudence, to indemnify the
offended party Erlanie Rivera in the sum of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages. Rolando appealed.

Issue: Whether the speedy disposition of justices denies due process to the accused.

Held: No! Rolando was not denied due process considering the speed with which the trial court
rendered judgment against him, which judgment was promulgated one day after he filed his
memorandum. The decision rendered by the trial court gives a clear account of the facts and the law on
which it is based. It discusses in full the court's findings on the credibility of both the prosecution and
defense witnesses and its evaluation of the evidence of both parties. As held in the analogous case of
People v. Mercado (GR. 116239, 29 November 2000.), the speed with which the trial court disposed of
the case cannot be attributed to the injudicious performance of its function. Indeed, a judge is not
supposed to study a case only after all the pertinent pleadings have been filed. It is a mark of diligence
and devotion to duty that a judge studies a case long before the deadline set for the promulgation of his
decision has arrived. The one-day period between the filing of accused-appellants' memorandum and
the promulgation of the decision was sufficient time to consider their arguments and to incorporate
these in the decision. As long as the trial judge does not sacrifice the orderly administration of justice in
favor of a speedy but reckless disposition of a case, he cannot be taken to task for rendering his decision
with due dispatch.
Solar Team Entertainment vs. How [GR 140863, 22 August 2000]

Gonzaga-Reyes (J):

Facts: On May 28 1999, the City Prosecutor of Paraaque filed an Information for estafa against Ma. Fe
Barreiro based on the complaint filed by Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. (Criminal Case 99-536) before
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, presided by Judge Rolando G. How. Before the
scheduled arraignment of Barreiro on 5 August 1999 could take place, the court issued an Order dated
29 June 1999, resetting the arraignment of Barreiro on 2 September 1999 on the ground that Barreiro
had filed an appeal with the Department of Justice (DOJ). Barreiro manifested in the same Order that
she would submit a certification from the DOJ granting due course to her appeal on or before the
second scheduled arraignment. On 24 September 1999, the court issued an Order denying Solar Team
Entertainments motion for reconsideration of the order that previously reset the arraignment of
Barreiro. Said order further rescheduled the arraignment of Barreiro to 18 November 1999. On 10
November 1999, Barreiro filed another Motion to Defer Arraignment. On 15 November 1999, before
the scheduled date of the arraignment of Barreiro and before the date set for the hearing of Barreiros
Motion to Defer Arraignment, the court issued an Order further deferring the arraignment of Barreiro
until such time that the appeal with the said office (SOJ) is resolved. Solar Team Entertainments
motion for reconsideration of the order was denied by the court on 22 November 1999. Solar Team
Entertainment filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, bewailing the fact that 6 months have
elapsed since Barreiro appeared or submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court and up to now she
still has to be arraigned.

Issue: Whether the court may indefinitely suspend the arraignment of the accused.

Held: The power of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the
information has already been filed in court is well settled. Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are
subject to appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the
power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse
or modify their rulings. Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Sections 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title
III of the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. Supplementing the aforequoted provisions
are Section 3 of RA 3783 and Section 37 of Act 4007. Review as an act of supervision and control by the
justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps
of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative
authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative remedies are exhausted may
judicial recourse be allowed. Procedurally speaking, after the filing of the information, the court is in
complete control of the case and any disposition therein is subject to its sound discretion. The decision
to suspend arraignment to await the resolution of an appeal with the Secretary of Justice is an exercise
of such discretion. A court can defer to the authority of the prosecution arm to resolve, once and for all,
the issue of whether or not sufficient ground existed to file the information. This is in line with the
Court's general pronouncement that courts cannot interfere with the prosecutors discretion over
criminal prosecution. Thus, herein, Judge How did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
suspended the arraignment of Barreiro to await the resolution of her petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates
even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable conflict with
the 30-day period prescribed by Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act. Section 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of
1998 prescribing the 30-day period for the arraignment of the accused is not absolute. In fact, Section
10 of the same law enumerates periods of delay that shall be excluded in computing the time within
which trial must commence. Section 10 (f) of said law provides that "The following periods of delay shall
be excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence: (f) Any period of delay resulting
from a continuance granted by any justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her
counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge granted such continuance on
the basis of his/her findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best
interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting from a
continuance granted by the court in accordance with this subparagraph shall be excludable under this
section unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for
finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests
of the public and the accused in a speedy trial. Accordingly, the exceptions provided in the Speedy Trial
Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally recognized principle that the concept of speedy trial is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Prudence and wisdom dictate that the court
should hold in abeyance the proceedings while the Secretary of Justice resolves the petition for review
questioning the resolution of the prosecutor. The delay in such a case is justified because the
determination of whether the delay is unreasonable, thus amounting to a transgression of the right to a
speedy trial, cannot be simply reduced to a mathematical process. Hence, the length of delay is not the
lone criterion to be considered, several factors must be taken into account in determining whether or
not the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. The factors to consider and balance are
the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice
caused by such delay.

Garcia vs. Domingo [GR L-30104, 25 July 1973]

, Fernando (J):

Facts: In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by Judge Gregorio N. Garcia, there were
commenced, by appropriate informations all dated 16 January 1968, 8 criminal actions against Edgardo
Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint
of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case F-109191, for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case F-
109192, also for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against
Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case F-109196, for
slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case F-109198 for light threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana
(on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised
Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case F-109200, for slander. The trial of the
cases was jointly held on March 4, 18, 23, and 30; April 17 and 20; May 4 and 11; June 1, 15, 22, and 29;
and August 3 and 10, 1968. All 14 trial dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a
Saturday. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of Calo and Carbonnel
who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as
soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days. The
trial of the cases in question were held, with the conformity of the accused and their counsel, in the
chambers of Judge Garcia. During all 14 days of trial, spanning a period of several months, the accused
were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients,
but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day when Atty.
Consengco, representing Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on 20 April 1968. But at the
insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and Carbonnel cross-examined one of the witnesses
presented by the adverse party. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for
and were granted time to submit memoranda. Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael
Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of
the transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and for the conviction of
Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. The promulgation of judgment was first
scheduled on 23 September 1968. This was postponed to 28 September 1968, at the instance of Atty.
Rafael Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to 1 October 1968, this
time at Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 43 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the instance of Atty. Consengco
and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel for Calo and
Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon and supposed defect or
irregularity of the proceedings. Early in the morning of 1 October 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their
counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, alleging jurisdictional
defects. After proceedings duly had, Judge Felix Domingo (CFI Manila) issued an order declaring that the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused had been violated, adversely affecting their right to a
free and impartial trial noting that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in
chambers and not in the court room open to the public; and ordering the city court Judge (Garcia) "to
desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in
the criminal cases in question pending in his Court, until further orders of the CFI. A motion for
reconsideration proving unavailing, Garcia and Lorenzana on 28 January 1969, elevated the matter to
the Supreme Court by means of a suit for certiorari and prohibition. Issue: Whether the conduct of the
trial inside the Judges air-conditioned chambers, rather than the usual open court, render the
proceedings violative of the constitutional mandate for public trial. Held: The 1935 Constitution which
was in force at the time of the antecedents of the petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public
trial to which an accused was entitled. Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of
conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner, and thus serve as a deterrence to arbitrariness. There is no
ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone
interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There
is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship
to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the
accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not
tainted with any impropriety. It is understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural
due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases
are to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of
being present are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public
morals." Still, herein, when the trial was held on Saturdays and in the air-conditioned chambers of the
City Judge for the convenience of the parties and of the Judge, the proceedings were not violative of the
right to public trial. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that
the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a
fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. It suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if
the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may
be charged." Reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least 14 hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of policemen. An objective appraisal of
conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling the apprehension that there was
an evasion of a constitutional command. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled,
civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make
for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence;
nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not
chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably
attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied
whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the persons
in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor
does it change matters, just because, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather
than in the usual place that the trial took place. 320 Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases against Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 ) Narratives (Berne
Guerrero) the Former President Joseph E. Estrada. Perez vs. Estrada [AM 01-4-03-SC, 29 June 2001] En
Banc, Vitug (J): 4 concur, 1 on leave, 2 file separate concurring opinions, 2 file separate dissenting
opinion, 1 joins separate opinion of one concurring justice Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng
mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and authorized television
and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live
media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency
in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N.
Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the
petition. Issue: Whether the press should be allowed to air Estradas trial to the public. Held: The press is
a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it has become an important instrument in the
quest for truth. Recent history exemplifies media's invigorating presence, and its contribution to society
is quite impressive. The Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media in
stirring public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise,
indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would soon culminate in
EDSA II. The propriety of granting or denying the petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to
control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another,
the right of the accused must be preferred to win. With the possibility of losing not only the precious
liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused
receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come
only after the presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any
kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might
detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge
with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions. Due process guarantees the
accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its
individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court,
where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. Thus, an accused has a right to a public trial but it
is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in
balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned
and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to
distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what
they have observed during the proceedings. 321 Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927] Taft (CJ):
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because
of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the
motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within
Hamilton county Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 45 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) as charged, fined him
$100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of
exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court
heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed.
The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed
the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court
refused Tumey's application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then
filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the mayor's court and of the
appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged
that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in
the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the
Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed. Issue: Whether the pecuniary
interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting violations of the
Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case. Held: All questions of judicial
qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy,
remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it
certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law
to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal,
substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has
authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain
in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in
convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which
he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the
result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is
paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the
general practice, either at common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law,
unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim "de
minimis non curat lex." The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in
each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant
brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the
prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary
interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of
law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the
country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons
accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of
dividing between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial
is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to
questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set
aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the
evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what
the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably
raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which
existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive
to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus presented
at the outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is
reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion.
322 Soriano vs. Angeles [GR 109920, 31 August 2000] Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur Facts:
According to Soriano, Ruel Garcia and his uncle, Pedro Garcia, who were members of the Caloocan
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 46 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) police, barged into the barangay hall of
Barangay 56, Zone 5 in Caloocan City, shortly after midnight on 7 November 1991, looking for Ceferino
A. Soriano, the barangay captain. Ruel Garcia gave Soriano fist blows on the face 4 times with his left
hand, while he poked a gun at him with his right hand, at the same time cursing him, "Putang ina mo
cabeza" (You son of a bitch chief"). Although there were 4 barangay tanods (Manuel Montoya, Arturo
del Rosario, Ramiro Samson, and Francisco Raton) in the barangay hall, they could not come to the aid
of Soriano because they were held at bay by Pedro Garcia. The Garcias then left with their companions
who had been waiting outside the hall. Soriano was treated for his injuries in the hospital. On the other
hand, Ruel Garcia denied Soriano's allegation. He alleged that he went to the barangay hall in the
evening of 6 November 1991 because his younger brother had been reportedly arrested for figuring in a
brawl with Dennis Mones and a certain Ocampo, and beaten up by Soriano. As Garcia saw Soriano near
the door of the barangay hall, he asked for the whereabouts of his brother and the reason for the
latter's arrest. Apparently thinking that Garcia was trying to intervene in the case he was investigating,
Soriano angrily told Garcia to lay off: "Walang pulis pulis dito" (Your being a policeman doesn't pull
strings here"). When Garcia insisted on going inside the barangay hall, Soriano blocked him and then
pushed him on the chest. Garcia also pushed Soriano, causing him to fall on a pile of nightsticks and
injure himself. All the time, Garcia claimed he had his gun tucked at his waist. Private respondent's
uncle, Pedro Garcia, then arrived and took him home. Garcia was charged with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 121, Caloocan City, for direct assault (Criminal Case C- 40740). on 26 August 1992, before
Garcia's arraignment, she called the parties and their counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle
the case, and, to which Soriano refused. The hearing on 15 September 1992 was postponed to
September 16 to allow Garcias counsel to prepare for the case. On 15 March 1993, the trial court
acquitted Garcia. In acquitting Garcia, Judge Adoracion C. Angeles found it incredible that Soriano did
not resist or even say anything when Garcia allegedly assaulted him and that none of the four barangay
tanods who were near him came to his aid. She thought that if Soriano had indeed been attacked, he
would have suffered more serious injuries than a contusion on the forehead, erythema on the chest,
and a lacerated wound on the lower lip. The judge also excluded from the evidence the testimonies of
Soriano and barangay tanod Manuel Montoya on the ground that their testimonies had not been
formally offered in evidence as required by Rule 132, 534 to 35 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Soriano filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the decision is void because it was not rendered by an
impartial tribunal. Issue: Whether the judge was biased in trying to make the parties arrive at an
amicable settlement , and allowing Garcias counsel to postpone the hearing on the 16 September 1992
instead of 15 September 1992. Held: It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the
parties is not enough evidence to prove the charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially
weighed against a judge's sacred allegation under oath of office to administer justice without respect to
any person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice
stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than
what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Herein, the judge's efforts to have the parties
arrive at an amicable settlement is not evidence of partiality for Garcia. She could have been motivated
by factors other than a desire to clear Garcia of criminal liability, i.e., the clearing of her court docket or
in setting a good example considering that Soriano and Garcia were neighbors occupying public offices
charged with the maintenance of peace and order in the community. As for the allegation that the trial
was not held until after 3 weeks to give garcia more time to persuade Soriano to amicably settle the
case, it has been shown that it was not judge but court personnel in charge of scheduling cases who
assigned the dates of trial taking into account the court calendar. The cancellation of the 15 September
1992 hearing, on the other hand, was made to give Garcia's counsel, Atty. Maria Lelibet Sampaga, time
to study the case and prepare for trial. Although Atty. Sampaga had once appeared in behalf of Garcia, it
was for the purpose of assisting the latter at the arraignment because the regular counsel was absent.
As new counsel, Atty. Sampaga needed to study the case. A postponement to the next day, 16
September 1992, was not an unreasonable request. Indeed, this did not involve resetting the case since
16 September 1992 had been originally designated as one of the initial trial dates.Nor is there any
showing that the judge decided the criminal case on grounds other than its merits. A reading of her
decision acquitting Garcia shows