Dante A.

Lim Legal Ethics-Case Digest November 24, 2015

Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013

FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,

vs.

ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.

RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L.

MACARUBBO.

Facts of the case :

on February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law
for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves
and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage
to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral
conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision
reads:

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for

Compassion and Mercy which the Court denied with finality in the Resolution
dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the
instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) seeking

judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially
treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and
accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4,
2012. On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to the Court by
the Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look
into the substantive merits of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent shall be allowed to the reinstatement of the roll
of attorneys
HELD:

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his

indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked
forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial
relationship with them as .Records also show that after his disbarment,
respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time
tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in
2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile,
Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations
Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office he continues
to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the University of
Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012.
Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his
neighbors and friends who are in dire need.

The following documents attested that the respondents reformed in many ways
by submission of different affidavits of the persons and organizations whom he
belong.

He is not known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime.

Even the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record
on file as of May 31, 2011.

Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan Chapter and by his former and
present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified
that he is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic
Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer. Records further reveal
that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact,
no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends
regular support to his children in compliance with the Courts directive in the
Decision dated February 27, 2004.

The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time
respondent was disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer
product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated
government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil
Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and
certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently
atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years
ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law
profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its
duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its
duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways.
 SERVILLANO BATAC, JR., et al. v. ATTY. PONCIANO V. CRUZ, JR.

538 SCRA 135 (2004)

Servillano Batac, Jr. and Antonio Bonoan are petitioners in a case pending
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) where they seek to
respondent Atty. Ponciano V. Cruz, JR. as an adverse party witness and
requested the issuance of subpoena and testificandum/duces tecum upon him.

The SEC Hearing Panel issued subpoenas and testificandum to Atty. Cruz for
several hearings but the latter failed to appear in all the scheduled hearings.
Thus, Batac charged Cruz and his counsel Atty. Eric Paul I. Fetalino with
several counts of indirect contempt before the SEC.

Issue :

Whether or not Atty. Cruz is guilty of indirect contempt for his failure to attend
the several scheduled hearings.

Held :

Not only by disobedience to SECs orders did Atty. Cruz violate his oath as a
lawyer. He likewise committed dishonesty concerning his excuses for his failure
to attend two hearings.

Atty. Cruz fully knew that several hearings had been postpones due to his
unavailability, and they were reset on dates to adjust to his availability. The
least he could have done was, as correctly pointed out by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), to take steps to cooperate and accommodate in his
schedule the hearings set by the hearing panel. He cannot deny the importance
of his would-be testimony as shown by the continuous request of the
petitioners in the SEC case for his appearance. It was thus very inconsiderate,
to say the least, on his part not to have taken time off from what he wanted to
convey to be hectic schedule. His last minute motions and manifestations that
he be excused from the scheduled hearings confirm his indifference to the
orders of the SEC hearing panel.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO.
July 30, 1979

Facts:

Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who
died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in
the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.

Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also
contend that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partners name in a professional firms name; there is no custom or usage in
the Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that
the name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the
firm.

Issue:

Whether or not the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the
name of the partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:

In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the
SC said:

The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the
relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a
remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm
name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create
undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able
lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from
scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that
old firms reputation established by deceased partners.

The court also made the difference from the law firms and business
corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere
relationship or association for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership
formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property.
11 Thus, it has been stated that the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper.

We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements
requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is
done as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same
for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.

Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A.

DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

FACTS OF THE CASE :

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,

Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination.for lacking of the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education, as a requisite for taking the bar examination. The matter was
investigated by the Solicitor General and found out that Diao was never
completed his high school training and never attended Quisumbing College
therefore his diploma was never obtained.

ISSUE:

Whether or not telesforo diao should be admitted to the practice of law

profession

HELD:

Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to
his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was
thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under
false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked.

The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking
the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential..

The Court ordered that the name of Telesforo A. Diao should be stricken from
the roll of attorney. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma
within thirty days.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF

SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

FACTS OF THE CASE:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the
prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by
the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen
(14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for
probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an
Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T.
Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed
the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was
allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution
dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however,
allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to
take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by
virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. His probation period did not last for
more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago
granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed
three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT MR. ARGOSINO WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE

LAWYERS OATH AS AN ADMISSION TO THE BAR

HELD:

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would

seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of
conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need
to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to
individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence
in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell

far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate
(rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical
injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan,
certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted
such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their
moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by
seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all
of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like
a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that
moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character. Good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations
but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the
bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

The court require Mr. Argosino to submit evidence that he may be now
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed
upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia,
of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for
a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to
make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other
words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that
he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession
of the law.
RODOLFO M. BERNARDO,

VS.

ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA

Facts of the Case :

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney,
Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of

real estate taxes on property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and

b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for

payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the
registration of title of Bernardo to another property in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde V;

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly

executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainants
affidavit dates October 4, 1989);b) a deed of sale dated October 22,
1982

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the

spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardos
favor .
 3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the
bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount
of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.[1]

The court declares atty. Ismael Mejia guilty of all the charges
against him and impose the penalty of disbarment.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage

in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a
Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of
Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of
law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.[2]

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Atty Ismael Mejia should be entitled for
reinstatement in the Roll of attorneys

Held:

The Court granted the petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was
punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not
lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the
fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and
the length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment
are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992,
no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown
remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of
its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion
when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties,
such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a

privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental
fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with
the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the
privilege to practice law
RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged
lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and
prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming Monsods appointment.

HELD:

1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work
done involves the determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions
(PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of
the term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as
engaged in the practice of law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their
respective work. The court also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star,
that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that
because of the demands of their specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet
them. These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in management policy
formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group
from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in
1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission in 1990, can be considered to have
been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur,
etc.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its
corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
A.C. NO. 3056 16 AUGUST 1991

Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953. Inaccordance with the said law, the Supreme Court
then passed and admitted to the bar those candidateswho had obtained an
average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.After its approval, many of the
unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
barinvoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pendingalso invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There are also others who havesought simply
the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoidinjustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the
motions for reconsideration, irrespective ofwhether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:

Whether or not, RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held:

RA No. 972 has its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment andreinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have beenindisputably a
judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system
from which ourshas been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or
reinstatement of attorneys at law in thepractice of the profession is concededly
judicial.On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. A.M.
No. 1928 August 3, 1978
IN RE MARCIAL A. EDILLON

Facts:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution
notwithstanding due notice.

Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as
a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

Issue:

Whether or not, the payment of IBP due suffers constitutional infirmity?

Held:

No, all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession.

WhenEdillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were subject to
the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to
the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free
to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional
legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program.
GR NO. 154464 11 SEPT 2008

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter

his appearance for and on his behalf. Petitioner, a fourth year law student,
anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court that a non-
lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission
from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel
for himself. On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. In
a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his
appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that
the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances, but
the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A. The petitioner
filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the following errors.

Issue:

(1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party
litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

Held:

1.It was partially granted. Rule 138-A provides for the appearance of a law
student before the court while Sec 34. of Rule 138 It recognizes the right of an
individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party states that
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized
member of the bar.

2. The court did not agree. It must be noted that because of this incident, the
petitioner filed an administrative case against the respondent for violation of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact in the
administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the
case.In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and
prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from
participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter
of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision
on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical
assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear
and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this
Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee, Haron S. Meiling in
the 2002 bar examinations and for disciplinary action as member of
Philippine Shari'a Bar, Melendrez.

Facts:

MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Sharia Bar.
Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral
Defamation and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife
in front of media practitioners and other people.
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife
causing the injuries to the latter.
Alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications,
as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar.
MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired
Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle
misunderstanding.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge
has moral ascendancy over them, considered the three cases that arose from a
single incident as closed and terminated.
Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral
turpitude.
Use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word Attorney as they were typed by the office clerk.
Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:
Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed
against Meling are still pending. Even if these cases were already dismissed, he
is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character.

Issue:

Whether Or Not Melings act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty.

Held:
 PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders
from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same
is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the
bar).

1. Rule 7.01: A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false

statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.
1. He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why
he signed as attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a
person liable for indirect contempt of court.
2. PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.
1. Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
2. Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than
the possession of legal learning.
3. Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that
applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission
punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or
tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her.
1. Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate
silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971

This is a story of a non-lawyer seeking compensation for services rendered.

QuintinMuning was granted attorneys fees despite not being member of the
bar. Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional
services rendered in the case and QuintinMuning was given 10%.

Issue:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?

Held:

No.Sec. 24.Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. An attorney

shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services.No one is entitled to recover compensation for
services as an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to practice ...
and is an attorney in good standing at the time. Ethics of Legal Profession
should not be violated. acting as an attorney with authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and
the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act
done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would
leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that
non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. WHEREFORE, the
orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the
backwages as attorney's fees for respondent QuintinMuning. Said orders are
affirmed in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
B.M. NO. 553 17 JUNE 1993

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim,
according to Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients
who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a
complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which
contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE.ABSENCE.ANNULMENT.VISA.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041

8:30am 6:00pm

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce.Annulment of Marriage.Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.

Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa.Declaration of
Absence.Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.Adoption.Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.

Call Marivic.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy

Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal
Problems in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The
Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a clients problem
no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers,
who, like doctors, are specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The
Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the

jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of
Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the
public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

Issue:

Whether or not, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether
such is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

Held:

Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice
is not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services
it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

With regards in the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his
legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage,
bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can
facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed such
as (1) Advertisement in a reputable law list (2) Use of ordinary simple
professional card (3) Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to
his specialization and the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to
a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

Facts of the case:

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in
Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to
show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935
Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always
considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a
municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate
child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon
reaching the age of majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching the
age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the
1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing
for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless,
the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special
circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
HELD:

No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court

cannot agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years
had lapsed and its way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme
Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7
years. (It seems it cant be extended any further). Chings special circumstances
cant be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a
Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this
country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didnt give any
explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess its
simply because he never thought hes Chinese not until he applied to take the
bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not
a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained
delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997

This is a story of a 3rd year law student law student appearing before the court.
Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of
Law, conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's
evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer. His appearance
was questioned. Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before
the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer. Court said that For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a
law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should
at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A
provides. The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court
unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the
presiding judge. Section 34 may allow the student to appear in court as an aid
of an agent or a friend appointed for the purpose of conducting litigation but
only on inferior court. Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court
as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
As far as Section 2 of Rule 138-A is concerned, a law student appearing before
the RTC should be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that
said law student must be accompanied by a supervising lawyer in all his
appearance.