MALVAR VS KRAFT FOODS PHIL

FACTS: Kraft foods hired Czarina Malvar as its Corporate Planning manager.
from then on, she gradually rose from the ranks. In 1996 as the VP for finance
in the SEA Region of KFI, KFPI mother company. Respondent Bienvenido
Bautista, Chairman of Board of KFPI snet a memo directing her to explain why
no administrative sanctions should be imposed on her for possible breach of
trust and confidence and willful violation of company rules. Investigative body
was formed, and Malvar was placed under preventive suspension with pay.
Ultimately, she was served a notice of termination.

Malvar filed complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter
declared her suspension and dismissal illegal. NLRC additionally ruled that
Malvar was entitled to any and all stck options and bonuses.

Malvar sought reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion on July30, 2008.

Aggrieved, Malvar appealed to the Court, assailing the CAs decision.

On December 9, 2010, while her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and
the respondents entered into a compromise agreement. Ff terms and
conditions:

Simultaneously upon execution of this Agreement in the presence of Ms.

Malvars attorney, KFPI shall pay Ms. Malvar the amount of Philippine Pesos
Forty Million (Php 40,000,000.00), which is in addition to the Philippine Pesos
Fourteen Million Two Hundred Fifty-Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Two
and Twelve Centavos (Php14,252,192.12) already paid to and received by Ms.
Malvar from KFPI in August 2008.

Before the court could act on Malvars motion to dismiss, so-called motion for
intervention to protect attorneys rights, through its counsel retired SC Assoc
Justice Josue Bellosillo (Intervenor). July 2009, Mavar unceremoniously and
without any justifiable reason terminated its legal service and required it to
withdraw from the case. Intervenor filed a Manifestation in the absence of any
legitimate reason foor the termination of their attorney-client relationship, for
withdrawing the Intervenor as Malvars counsel.

According to the Intervenor, it was certain that the compromise agreement was
authored by the respondents to evade a possible loss of 182,000,000.00 or
more as a result of the labor litigation, but considering the Intervenors interest
in the case as well as its resolve in pursuing Malvars interest, they saw the
Intervenor as a major stumbling block to the compromise agreement that it was
then brewing with her. Obviously, the only way to remove the Intervenor was to
have her terminate its services as her legal counsel. This prompted the
Intervenor to bring the matter to the attention of the Court to enable it to
recover in full its compensation based on its written agreement with her.

Opposing the Motion for Intervention, Malvar stresses that there was no truth
to the Intervenors claim to defraud it of its professional fees; that the
Intervenor lacked the legal capacity to intervene because it had ceased to exist.

ISSUES: whether or not Malvars motion to dismiss the petition on the ground
of the execution of the compromise agreement was proper; and (b) whether
or not the Motion for Intervention to protect attorneys rights can prosper,
and, if so, how much could it recover as attorneys fees.

HELD: The client may enter into a compromise agreement with the adverse
party to terminate the litigation before a judgment is rendered therein. If the
compromise agreement is found to be in order and not contrary to law, morals,
good customs and public policy, its judicial approval is in order.

A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation without the intervention
of the attorney, for the former is generally conceded to have exclusive control
over the subject matter of the litigation and may at anytime, if acting in good
faith, settle and adjust the cause of action out of court before judgment, even
without the attorneys intervention. It is important for the client to show,
however, that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third
persons who are not parties to the agreement.

By the same token, a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-
client relationship at any time with or without cause.

The right is also subject to the right of the attorney to be compensated. This is
clear from Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 26. Change of attorneys. - An attorney may retire at anytime from

any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in
court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding,
without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and
attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In
case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be
entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written
notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party.

He shall, however, be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation
stipulated in the contract.

In fine, it is basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and
request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good faith and honesty in
representing and serving the interests of the client should be reasonably
compensated for his service.

But, as earlier pointed out, although a client may dismiss her lawyer at any
time, the dismissal must be for a justifiable cause if a written contract between
the lawyer and the client exists.49

Considering the undisputed existence of the written agreement on contingent

fees, the question begging to be answered is: Was the Intervenor dismissed for
a justifiable cause?

We do not think so.

In the absence of the lawyers fault, consent or waiver, a client cannot deprive
the lawyer of his just fees already earned in the guise of a justifiable reason.
Here, Malvar not only downplayed the worth of the Intervenors legal service to
her but also attempted to camouflage her intent to defraud her lawyer by
offering excuses that were not only inconsistent with her actions but, most
importantly, fell short of being justifiable.

To be sure, the Intervenors withdrawal from the case neither cancelled nor
terminated the written agreement on the contingent attorneys fees. Nor did the
withdrawal constitute a waiver of the agreement. On the contrary, the
agreement continued between them because the Intervenors Manifestation
(with Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner)explicitly called upon the
Court to safeguard its rights under the written agreement.
 ELIZA V VENTEREZ VS ATTY. RODRIGO COSME

FACTS: complainants contracted the legal services of respondent for

declaration of ownership with damages filed before the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Respondent respresented the complainants until a decision
thereon was rendered by the MTC on Feb 25, 2004.

MTC ruled against the complainants. Complainants alleged that they directed
the respondent attorney to either file a motion for reconsideration or notice of
appeal, but respondent failed to do so.15-day period to file an appeal or motion
for reconsideration expired on March 18 2004. Venterez was constrained to
contract another lawyer to prepare the motion for reconsideration filed the
next day, but was denied. Respondent was not furnished a copy of the denial of
the motion per a certification.

Motion for issuance of writ of execution was filed by the plaintiff but
respondent never bothered to file an opposition or to any comment on the said
motion.

Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent
filed his Notice of Retirement of Counsel with the MTC on 3 May 2004.
Feeling aggrieved by respondents actuations, complainants filed the instant
administrative complaint against him.

Respondent averred that Salvador Ramirez (the son of one of the complainants,
Inocencia V. Ramirez), informed him that he [was] withdrawing the case from
the respondent because he already engaged another lawyer to take over the
case, so respondent gave the records of the case to him. Respondent explained
that after Salvador Ramirez withdrew the case from the respondent, and
engaged another lawyer.

Pursuant to complain, a hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar

Discipline of the IBP, finding the respondent liable for gross negligence and
recommending the imposition of 3 month suspension.

ISSUE: The core issue is whether the respondent committed culpable

negligence in handling complainants case, as would warrant disciplinary
action.

HELD: once the lawyer agrees to take up the case of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services
without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client. This
means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and
defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense.

We cannot accept respondents defense that he had already withdrawn from the
case two days after his receipt of the MTC Decision and that he had allegedly
communicated this withdrawal to Salvador Ramirez, son of one of the herein
complainants, Inocencia Ramirez. It is an apparent attempt on the part of
respondent to wash his hands of any liability for failing to pursue any of the
available remedies to complainants from the adverse MTC Decision. The client
has the right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time with or
without just cause. Whereas, the right of an attorney to withdraw other than for
sufficient case is restricted. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the
written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon
the adverse party.

Contrary to respondents contention, his professional relations as a lawyer with

his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case
to his clients. Respondents defense completely crumbles in face of the fact
that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had
no authority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to
terminate the latters services.
 ANGELITA ORCINO VS ATTY JOSUE GASPAR

FACTS: Complainant Angelita Orcino prayed that this court impose disciplinary
sanctions on respondent Atty Josue Gaspar for abandoning his duties and for
failing to return the legal fees she fully paid for his services.

Complainant engaged the services of the respondent to prosecute criminal case

filed against several suspects in the slaying of her husband. Complainant
bound herself to pay P20, 000. Respondent entered into his duties: interviewed
the witnesses, gathered evidence, drew up the necessary sworn statements an
attended preliminary investigation.

Respondent however failed to attend the August 1991 hearing, the time when
the court granted bail to all the accused. Complainant went to the house of the
respondent and confronted him with his absence. Respondent said that he did
not receive a notice of hearing. Complainant started accusing the respondent of
jeopardizing the case, but the respondent said that her suspicions were based
on rumors. Complainant asked for the records of the case and that she could
refer them to another lawyer.

Respondent filed motion to withdraw as counsel. But the court issued an

ordering directing the respondent to secure consent from the complainant and
his appearance as private prosecutor shall continue until he has secured this
consent. Unfortunately, complainant refused to sign respondents withdrawal.

Section 26, Rule 138

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the
written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the
adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file
an application with the court. The court, on notice to the client and adverse
party, shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire.The application
for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.

Granting that respondent's motion without complainant's consent was an

application for withdrawal with the court, we find that this reason is
insufficient to justify his withdrawal from the case. Respondent's withdrawal
was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence"
between them and that there had been "serious diffferences between them
relating to the manner of private prosecution."

Canon 22 Rule 22.01: (a) when a client insists upon an unjust or immoral
conduct of his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) when the client has two
or more retained lawyers and the lawyers could not get along to the detriment
of the case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of the lawyer makes him
incapable of handling the case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately fails
to pay the attorney's fees agreed upon; (f) when the lawyer is elected or
appointed to public office; (g) other similar cases. - the instant case does not
fall under any of the grounds mentioned. The case arose from a simple
misunderstanding between complainant and respondent.

Respondent expressly bound himself under the contract to bring the criminal
case to its termination. He was in fact paid in full for his services. Respondent
failed to comply with his undertaking, hence, it is but fair that he return to
complainant half of the amount paid him. The peculiar circumstances of the
case have rendered it impossible for respondent and complainant to continue
their relation under the contract.

LUISITO BALATBAT VS ATTY EDGARDO ARIAS

FACTS: Luisito Balatbat alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to

undertake his defense in the said civil case. According to complainant, he did
not attend the scheduled hearings because respondent told him that there was
no need to be present. But when he verified the status of the case, he was
surprised that a Decision has already been rendered. Complainant alleged that
the decision caused him and his family untold miseries, embarrassment and
public ridicule.

According to the evidence, city court declared complainant in default for failure
to appear during the hearing. Plaintiff was thereafter allowed to present
evidence ex parte.

Respondent claimed that the notice of the hearing of the June 18, 1976 trial
was "made to appear as though signed by him." He insisted that it was not his
signature. He also alleged that he always tried to take the complainant with him
and it was always the complainant who could not go with him. Furthermore, he
alleged that the complainant had filed a Manifestation terminating his legal
services and a new counsel entered in appearance.
Complainant contention: he had gone to the city court to make a follow-up of
that status of the case since the respondent had not been communicating nor
collecting fees, and then he discovered the decision rendered. He went to
respondents office and respondent told him that they were on the loss. He
asked respondent to show him the copy of the decision, and respondent replied
that "it was already in default." Complainant then demanded that the records of
the case be shown to him but again, respondent refused.

The case was transferred to the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

Based on respondents own admissions, he did not properly withdraw as

counsel for complainant. The settled rule is that the attorney-client relation
continues until the client gives a notice of discharge, or manifests to the court
or tribunal where the case is pending that counsel is being discharged, with a
copy served upon the adverse party. Thus, the only way to be relieved as
counsel is to have either the written conformity of his client or an order from
the court relieving him of the duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138,
Section 26 of the Rules of Court.

The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his
retainer until his effective discharge from the case or the final disposition of
the entire subject matter of the litigation.

As the Investigating Commissioner noted, it was respondents duty, upon being

apprised of the adverse decision, to exhaust all available remedies at the time
to prevent its attaining finality and, more importantly, to forestall the inevitable
execution that would follow considering that at that time, the winning party
had not yet filed the motion for execution.

Indeed, the negligent failure of respondent to act accordingly under the

circumstances clearly negates not only his claim that he "appeared in court
always mindful of his duties," but also his vow to serve his client with
competence and diligence and not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.

Respondents actuations likewise violate Rule 18.04, which mandates that a

lawyer keep the client informed of the status of the case and respond within a
reasonable time to a clients request for information. A client must never be left
in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and confidence reposed
in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal profession in general.