CASE 1:

G.R. No. 77395

Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Calleja, et. al.
November 29, 1988

Facts: On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate
labor organization, filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca Corporation, a duly organized,
registered and existing corporation, employing approximately 205 rank and file employees/
workers. Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others, (1)
that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the filing of
the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986 (c)
6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e)
12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination and destruction of property and (f) 100
simply abandoned their work or stopped working; and (2) that the statutory requirement for
holding a certification election has not been complied with by the union. The Labor Arbiter
granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his order dated August 18,
1986.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is an appropriate bargaining unit

Ruling: No. According to Rothberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of
employees of a given employer comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer,
indicate to be the best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law.
CASE 2:

International school of alliance of educators v. Quisimbing

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a

domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or
other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees. School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the
same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate 25% more than local-
hires. When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June 1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate
labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members of the School,
contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the
question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit,
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure
to reach a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the DOLE which favored the School.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the foreign-hires should be included in bargaining unit of local- hires.

RULING: NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically provides that labor is
entitled to humane conditions of work. These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees. Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon
by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare, In Section 18, Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor full
protection. The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. However,
foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. A bargaining unit is a
group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the
employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial
similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial
Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment
status. The basic test of an asserted bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights. In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated
their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The
collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although
foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires,
foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. These benefits are
reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the
latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group
the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. G.R. No. 77395 Belyca
Corporation v. Dir. Calleja, et. al. November 29, 1988 Facts: On June 3, 1986, private respondent
Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate labor organization, filed a petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/
workers of Belyca Corporation, a duly organized, registered and existing corporation, employing
approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers. Respondent employer, on the other hand,
alleged in its position paper, among others, (1) that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who
authorized, signed and supported the filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of
June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner
union (d) 5 were retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious
insubordination and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped
working; and (2) that the statutory requirement for holding a certification election has not been
complied with by the union. The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by
petitioner union in his order dated August 18, 1986. Issue: Whether or not the statutory
requirement of 30% (now 20%) of the employees in the proposed bargaining unit, asking for a
certification election had been strictly complied with. Ruling: Yes. It is undisputed that petitioner
Belyca Corporation (Livestock and Agro Division) employs more or less two hundred five (205)
rank-and-file employees and workers. It is significant to note that 124 employees out of such
number have expressed their written consent to the certification election; much more than the
required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive Order No. 111.
More than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a
certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted. In fact, once the required percentage
requirement has been reached, even the employees withdrawal from union membership taking
place after the filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition. Also,
until a decision, final in character, has been issued declaring the strike illegal and the mass
dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers cannot be denied participation in the certification
election.
CASE 3:

STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. HON. SECRETARY OF

LABOR ANDEMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA EASTCOMMERCIAL CORPORATION
WORKERSASSOCIATION (CLUP LOCAL CHAPTER)

G.R. No. 162355 August 14, 2009CARPIO, J.:

On 2001, Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP) instituted a petition for
certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation (THE CORPORATION) and its Affiliates. The affiliate companies included in the
petition were SLE Commercial, SLE Department Store, SLE Cinema, Robsan East Trading,
Bowling Center, Planet Toys, Home Gallery and Essentials. On August 2001, Med-Arbiter
Bactin ordered the dismissal of the petition due to inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. Later
CLUP in its local chapter under THECORPORATION reorganized itself and re-registered as
CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association (herein THEUNION),
limiting its membership to the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial
Corporation. On the same date, THE UNION or THE UNION filed the instant petition for
certification election. It claimed that no certification election has been held among them within
the last 12months prior to the filing of the petition, and while there is another union registered
covering the same employees, namely Samahang Manggawa sa SLEC [SMSLEC], it has not
been recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of [THE CORPORATIONs] employees. On
November 2001, THE CORPORATION filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It averred that it
has voluntarily recognized SMSLEC as the exclusive bargaining agent of its regular rank-and-
file employees, and that collective bargaining negotiations already commenced between them.
THECORPORATION argued that the petition should be dismissed for violating the one year and
negotiation bar rules under the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The CBA between
SMSLEC and the corporation was ratified by its rank-and-file employees and registered with
DOLE. In the meantime, on December 2001, the union filed its Opposition to THE
CORPORATIONS Motion to Dismiss questioning the validity of the voluntary recognition of
[SMSLEC] by [THECORPORATION] and their consequent negotiations and execution of a
CBA. According to [THE UNION], the voluntary recognition of [SMSLEC] by [THE
CORPORATION] violated the requirements for voluntary recognition, i.e., non-existence of
another labor organization in the same bargaining unit. It pointed out that the time of the
voluntary recognition on 20 July2001, appellants registration which covers the same group of
employees covered by Samahang Manggagawa sa Sta. Lucia East Commercial, was existing and
has neither been cancelled orabandoned.

The Med-Arbiters Ruling

Med-Arbiter Bactin dismissed THE UNIONs petition for direct certification on the ground of
contract bar rule. The prior voluntary recognition of SMSLEC and the CBA between THE
CORPORATION and SMSLEC bars the filing of THE UNIONs petition for direct certification

THE UNION raised the matter to the Secretary.

The Ruling of the Secretary of Labor andEmployment

The Secretary held that the subsequent negotiations and registration of a CBA executed by THE
CORPORATION with SMSLEC could not bar THE UNIONs petition. THE UNION constituted
a registered labor organization at the time of THE CORPORATIONs voluntary recognition of
SMSLEC.

THE CORPORATION then filed a petition for certiorari before the appellate court.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

The appellate court affirmed the ruling of the Secretary.

Issue:

Whether THE CORPORATIONs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC was done while a

legitimate labor organization was in existence in the bargaining unit.

Held:

The petition has no merit. Legitimate Labor Organization Article 212(g) of the Labor Code
defines a labor organization as "any union or association of employees which exists in whole or
in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms
and conditions of employment." Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the
Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate
indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Any applicant labor
organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration.
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to,
the concept of a bargaining unit. A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer,
comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the
employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties
under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."The fundamental factors in determining
the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1)the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine);
(2)affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties,
or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3)
prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.

The UNIONS initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization
representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, The union subsequently re-registered
as THEUNION, limiting its members to the rank-and-file of THE CORPORATION. THE
CORPORATION cannot ignore the union was a legitimate labor organization at the time of THE
CORPORATIONs voluntary recognition of SMSLEC. THECORPORATION and SMSLEC
cannot, by themselves, decide whether CLUP-THECORPORATION and its Affiliates Workers
Union represented an appropriate bargaining unit. The inclusion in the union of disqualified
employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due
to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances The union having been
validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for THE
CORPORATION is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of registration of CLUP-THE
CORPORATION and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately commence voluntary
recognition proceedings with SMSLEC.
CASE 4:
TOPIC: DETERMINATION OF APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT;
FACTORS-UNIT DETERMINATION; IN GENERAL
G.R. No. 96189 July 14, 1992
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department
of Labor and Employment, and THE ALL U.P. WORKERS' UNION, represented by its
President, Rosario del Rosario, respondent.
Facts:
This is special civil action of certiorari the University of the Philippines seeks the
nullification of the Order dated October 30, 1990 of Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja of the Bureau
of Labor Relations holding that "professors, associate professors and assistant professors (of the
University of the Philippines) are . . Rank-and-file employees. . ;" consequently, they should,
together with the so-called non-academic, non-teaching, and all other employees of the
University, be represented by only one labor organization.
The Organization of Non-Academic Working Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a petition
for certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). It has a membership of
3,236 membersmore than 33% of the 9,617 persons constituting the non-academic personnel
of four UP campuses. On the other hand, another labor union, the All UP Workers Union (All
UP) filed a motion for intervention. It alleged that its membership covers both academic and
non-academic personnel, and that it aims to unite all rank-and-file employees in one union. It
assented to the holding of the certification election provided the appropriate organizational unit
was first clearly defined. It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and
Professorial Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be deemed part
of the organizational unit. UPs General Counsel was of the stand that there should be two unions
one for the non-academic/administrative, and one for the academic personnel. Director Calleja
ruled on the matter on August 7, 1990. She declared that "the appropriate organizational unit
should embrace all the regular rank-and-file employees, teaching and non-teaching, of the
University of the Philippines, including all its branches" and that there was no sufficient
evidence "to justify the grouping of the non-academic or administrative personnel into an
organization unit apart and distinct from that of the academic or teaching personnel." Director
Calleja adverted to Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180, viz.:
Sec. 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit consisting
of rank-and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise require.
 She thus ordered the holding of a certification among all rank-and-file employees,
teaching and non-teaching. At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term
rank-and-file. It claimed that there were some teaching and non-teaching employees whose
functions were in fact managerial and policy-determining. It sought the exclusion of high-level
employees, pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 180: SEC. 3. High-level employees whose functions are
normally considered as policy-making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential
nature shall not be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government employees; It
claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file: (1) Those with the rank of
Assistant Professor or higher; (2) Those administrative employees holding positions Grade 18 or
higher. The University claims that these employees perform supervisory functions and are vested
with effective recommendatory powers. As to the professors, UP notes that the said academic
staff are members of the University Council, a policy-making body. ONAPUP did not oppose
UPs classification. All UP remained firm in its stance to unite all the rank-and-file employees
under a single organizational unit.

Issue: Whether or not all rank-and-file employees of the University are to be organized into a
single collective bargaining unit.

Held:

In the case at bar, the University employees may, as already suggested, quite easily be
categorized into two general classes: one, the group composed of employees whose functions are
non-academic, i.e., janitors, messengers, typists, clerks, receptionists, carpenters, electricians,
grounds-keepers, chauffeurs, mechanics, plumbers; and two, the group made up of those
performing academic functions, i.e., full professors, associate professors, assistant professors,
instructors who may be judges or government executives and research, extension and
professorial staff. Not much reflection is needed to perceive that the community or mutuality of
interests which justifies the formation of a single collective bargaining unit is wanting between
the academic and non-academic personnel of the university. It would seem obvious that teachers
would find very little in common with the University clerks and other non-academic employees
as regards responsibilities and functions, working conditions, compensation rates, social life and
interests, skills and intellectual pursuits, cultural activities, etc. On the contrary, the dichotomy of
interests, the dissimilarity in the nature of the work and duties as well as in the compensation and
working conditions of the academic and non-academic personnel dictate the separation of these
two categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining. The formation of two separate
bargaining units, the first consisting of the rank-and-file non-academic personnel, and the
second, of the rank-and-file academic employees, is the set-up that will best assure to all the
employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. These special circumstances, i.e., the
dichotomy of interests and concerns as well as the dissimilarity in the nature and conditions of
work, wages and compensation between the academic and non-academic personnel, bring the
case at bar within the exception contemplated in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 180. It was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Relations Director to have ruled otherwise,
ignoring plain and patent realities.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Order of October 30, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as
it declares the professors, associate professors and assistant professors of the University of the
Philippines as rank-and-file employees. The Order of August 7, 1990 is MODIFIED in the sense
that the non-academic rank-and-file employees of the University of the Philippines shall
constitute a bargaining unit to the exclusion of the academic employees of the institution i.e.,
full professors, associate professors, assistant professors, instructors, and the research, extension
and professorial staff, who may, if so minded, organize themselves into a separate collective
bargaining unit; and that, therefore, only said non-academic rank-and-file personnel of the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Manila, Los Baos and the Visayas are to participate in
the certification election.
CASES 5 & 10.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. HON. LAGUESMA and NORTH LUZON

MAGNOLIA SALES LABOR UNION-INDEPENDENT

G.R. No. 100485, SEPTEMBER 21, 1994

Facts: North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union (Private respondent) union filed for a petition
for certification election among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the
North Luzon Area. This was opposed by the San Miguel Corp. (petitioner) and questioned the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit to be represented by the union. It claimed that its
bargaining history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit
for each sales office. During the hearing of the petition, the substitute lawyer of the SMC
(petitioner) withdrew its opposition and agreed to consider one bargaining unit in the mentioned
sales office. Upon the order of the Mediator-Arbiter certifying the union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales personnel in the North Luzon area, SMC
appealed to the Secretary of Labor contending a mistake in the decision brought by its substitute
lawyer. In a petition for certiorari, the SMC (petitioner) contends that the prior collective
bargaining is the most pervasive criterion in determining the appropriateness of the CBA.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the collective bargaining history of a company is decisive of what should
comprise the collective bargaining unit.

1. Whether or not the union represents an appropriate bargaining unit.

Ruling

1. No, the collective bargaining history of a company is not decisive of what should
comprise the collective bargaining unit. Contrary to SMCs (petitioner) assertion, this
Court has categorically ruled that the existence of a prior collective bargaining history is
neither decisive nor conclusive in the determination of what constitutes an appropriate
bargaining unit.

1. Yes, the court ruled in accordance with the tests in determining an appropriate bargaining
unit. The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit
are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the
employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
 compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior
collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.

Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought
to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests
in terms of employment and working conditions as demonstrated by the type of work they
perform. In the case at bar, respondent union sought to represent the sales personnel in the
various Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There is similarity of employment status
for only the regular sales personnel in the north Luzon area are covered. They have the
same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar compensation and working
conditions. The commonality of interest among the sales personnel in the north Luzon sales
area cannot be gainsaid. Further, the petitioner cannot insist that there should be one
bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position is the meager number of sales
personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the bargaining unit
sought to be represented by respondent union in the entire north Luzon sales area consists
only of approximately

fifty-five (55) employees. Surely, it would not be for the best interest of these employees if
they would further be fractionalized..
CASE 6:

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJJA

[July 14, 1992]

NARVASA, J.

Doctrine/Subject: Right to Self-Organization

FACTS:

March 2, 1990 - The Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP (ONAPUP)

filed a petition for certification of election before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
to which the University of the Philippines (UP) had no objection to the election
ONAPUP claims to have a membership of 3,236 members where 33% are non-
academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baos, Manila, and Visayas.
April 18, 1990 another registered labor union, the All UP Workers Union (AUPWU)
filed a comment as intervenor in the certification election proceeding.
It alleges that its membership covers both academic and non-academic personnel
and that it aims to unite all UP rank-and-file employees in one union
It assent to the holding of the election provided the appropriate organization unit
was clearly defined.
It observed in this connection that the Research, Extension and Professional
Staff (REPS), who are academic non-teaching personnel, should not be deemed
part of the organizational unit.
UP on the other hand made records of its view that there should be 2 unions one for
academic and the other for non-academic or administrative personnel considering the
dichotomy of interest, conditions and rules governing these employees.
Aug 7, 1990 - Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja (Calleja) declared that the organizational
unit should embrace all rank-and-file employees both academic and non-academic,
teaching and non-teaching as stated in Sec. 9 of EO. No. 180.
Calleja commanded that a certification election be conducted among all rank-and-file
employees in all of the 4 campuses and that management appear and bring copies of the
corresponding payrolls for Jan, June, and July, 1990 at the usual pre-election conference
Mar 22, 1990 At the pre-election conference, UP sought clarification of the term rank-
and-file since there were some teaching and non-teaching employees whose functions
were in fact managerial and policy-determining,
It sought the exclusion of high level employees pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 180.
 Sec. 3. High-level employees whose functions are normally considered as policy-
making or managerial or whose duties are of a highly confidential nature shall not
be eligible to join the organization of rank-and file government employees;
It claims that the following should not be considered rank-and-file:
Those with the rank of professor or higher;
Those administrative employees holding positions of Grade 18 or higher
UP claims that these employees perform supervisory functions and are vested with
effective recommendatory powers. As to the professors, these academic staff are
members of the University Council, a policy making body
ONAPUP did not oppose UPs classification. All UP remained firm in its stance to unite
all the rank-and-file employees under a single organizational unit.
Callejas 2nd order declared that professors are rank-and-file employees as stated in Sec.1
Rule1, IRRs of EO 180:
1. High Level Employee is one whose functions are normally considered policy
determining, managerial or one whose duties are highly confidential in nature. A
managerial function refers to the exercise of powers such as:
1. To Effectively recommend such managerial actions;
2. To Formulate or execute management policies and decisions; or
3. To Hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, dismiss, assign or discipline
employees
Calleja stated that a careful perusal of the University Code shows that the policy making
powers of the Council are limited to academic matters, namely prescribing courses of
study and rules of discipline, fixing student admission and graduation requirements,
recommending to the Board of Regents the conferment of degrees and disciplinary power
over students.
On the other hand, the policies referred to in the definition of high level employees refers
to labor-related policies like hiring, firing, discipline, labor standards and benefits, and
terms and conditions of employment.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by UP which was denied hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. WON academic personnel should form a distinct collective bargaining unit from
those non-academic employees of the university.
 2. WON professors, associate professors and assistant professors are high-level employees

RULING:

A bargaining unit has been defined as a group of employees of a given employer,

comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective
interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the
best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law. However our labor laws do not provide a criteria in
determination of the proper bargaining unit.

1. YES, although there was no standard mentioned in forming a collective bargaining unit
the Supreme Court referred to American Jurisprudence for guidance and have followed
principles in the American Magna Carta which stated that the collective bargaining unit
must be based on the following factors:
Will of the employees (Global Doctrine)
Affinity an unit of employees interest --- substantial similarity of work and duties
or similarity of compensation and working conditions
Prior collective bargaining agreement history
Employment status --- temporary, seasonal, probationary

Furthermore the Supreme Court also followed the 10th Annual Report of the NLRB which
sets the following factors:

History, extent and type of organization of employees

History of their collective bargaining
History, extent and type or organization of employees in other plants of the same
employer, or other employers in the same industry
The skill, wages, work and working conditions of the employees
The desires of the employees
The eligibility of the employees for membership in the unions/s involved; and
The relationship between the unit/s proposed and the employers organization,
management ,and operation
Combing these two sets of factors form the community or mutuality of interest tests
 To summarize it, the two groups have nothing mutual in common and have different
interests thus should have their own collective bargaining units.
1. No, although professors supposedly exercise managerial functions (forming policies,
rules and standards) they are purely recommendatory in nature and is still subject to the
review and evaluation of the University Academic Personnel Board (UAPB). They are
still guided by the general guidelines drawn up by the UAPB. Finally the policy
determining functions of the university council where the professors are included merely
govern the relationship between the university and the student, not university and
employees, thus, cannot be considered as exercising such managerial or highly
confidential functions as would justify their being categorized as high-level employees
of the institution.
It is the University Academic Personnel Committee composed of deans, the
assistant for academic affairs and the chief of personnel which formulates the policies, rules and
standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of members of the academic staff.
From the foregoing, it is evident that it is the University Academic Personnel Committee,
composed of deans, the assistant for academic affairs and the chief of personnel, which
formulates the policies, rules and standards respecting selection, compensation and promotion of
members of the academic staff. The departmental and college academic personnel committees
functions are purely recommendatory in nature, subject to review and evaluation by the
University Academic Personnel Board, neither can membership in the University Council elevate
professors to the status of high-level employees.
Even assuming arguendo that UP professors discharge policy-determining
functions through the University Council, still such exercise would not qualify them as high-
level employees within the context of E.O. 180. As correctly observed by private respondent,
Executive Order No. 180 is a law concerning public sector unionism. It must therefore be
construed within that context. Within that context, the University of the Philippines represents
the government as an employer. Policy-determining refers to policy-determination in university
matters that affect those same matters that may be the subject of negotiation between public
sector management and labor. The reason why policy-determining has been laid down as a test
in segregating rank-and-file from management is to ensure that those who lay down policies in
areas that are still negotiable in public sector collective bargaining do not themselves become
part of those employees who seek to change these policies for their collective welfare.
As stated in Franklin Baker Company of the Philippines vs. Trajano, this Court
reiterated the principle laid down in National Merchandising Corp. vs. Court of
 Industrial Relations, that the power to recommend, in order to qualify an employee as a
supervisor or managerial employee "must not only be effective but the exercise of such
authority should not be merely of a routinary or clerical nature but should require the use of
independent judgment." Where such recommendatory powers, as in the case at bar, are
subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other higher
executives of the company, the same, although present, are not effective and not an exercise
of independent judgment as required by law.
Notes:

Sec. 9 of EO. No. 180.

Sec. 9. The appropriate organizational unit shall be the employer unit consisting of rank-
and-file employees, unless circumstances otherwise require.

and Section 1, Rule IV of the Rules Implementing said EO 180 (as amended by SEC. 2,
Resolution of Public Sector Labor Management Council dated May 14, 1989, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

For purposes of registration, an appropriate organizational unit may refer to:

xxx xxx xxx

d. State universities or colleges, government-owned or controlled corporations with

original charters.

She went on to say that the general intent of EO 180 was "not to fragmentize the employer unit,
as "can be gleaned from the definition of the term "accredited employees' organization," which
refers to:

. . a registered organization of the rank-and-file employees as defined in these rules

recognized to negotiate for the employees in an organizational unit headed by an officer
with sufficient authority to bind the agency, such as . . . . . . state colleges and universities.
CASE 7:

d) Corporate Entities

INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILL WORKERS UNION-PTGWO (petitioner) vs. VOLUNTARY

ARBITRATOR TEODORICO P. CALICA and INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS, INC.
(respondents)

FEBRUARY 3, 1992

J. MEDIALDEA

TOPIC: the corporation as an entity exception: doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction when not applicable

FACTS: Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO is a legitimate labor organization and the
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file employees of Indophil Textile Mills,
Incorporated. Teodorico P. Calica is the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment, while Indophil Textile Mills, Inc.
is a corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale and export of yarns of various counts and kinds
and of materials of kindred character.

Indophil Textile Mill Workers Union-PTGWO and Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. executed a
collective bargaining agreement.

7 months later, Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing Corporation was formed and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (different from above Indophil Textile). Acrylic applied for
registration with the Board of Investments for incentives under the 1987 Omnibus Investments
Code. The application was approved on a preferred non-pioneer status.

Acrylic became operational and hired workers according to its own criteria and standards. The
workers of Acrylic unionized and a duly certified collective bargaining agreement was executed.
A year after, the union claimed that the plant facilities built and set up by Acrylic should be
considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of Indophil Textile Mills pursuant to
Section 1(c), Article I of the CBA. In other words, it is the Union's contention that Acrylic is part
of the Indophil bargaining unit. The union alleged that:

1. Both corporations are engaged in the same line of business.

2. Both have their physical plants, offices and facilities in the same compound.

3. Many of Indophil Textiles machines were transferred and installed and were being used
in Acrylic.
 4. Services of a number of units, departments and sections were being provided to Acrylic.

5. Employees of Indophil Textile were the same persons manning and servicing Acrylic.

Indophil Textile opposed, saying it was a juridical entity separate and distinct from Acrylic. It
argued through the SolGen that Acrylic was not an alter ego or an adjunct or business conduit
of Indophil Textile Mills because it had a separate business purpose. Indophil Textile engaged
in the business of manufacturing yarns of various counts and kinds and textiles., while Acrylic
manufactured, bough, sold, at wholesale basis, bartered, imported, exported and otherwise dealt
in yarns of various counts and kinds. Acrylic cannot manufacture textiles while Indophil
cannot buy or import yarns.

The existing impasse led the parties to enter into a submission agreement. The parties jointly
requested Calica to act as voluntary arbitrator in the resolution of the pending labor dispute
pertaining to the proper interpretation of the CBA provision. Calica ruled that the proper
interpretation and application of Sec. 1, (c), Art. I of the 1987 CBA does not extend to the
employees of Acrylic as an extension or expansion of Indophil Textile Mills, Inc.

ISSUE: Were the operations in Indophil Acrylic Corporation an extension or expansion of

Indophil Textile Mills

RULING: NO, they were separate corporations. The CBA did not apply to Acrylic.
Under the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity, when valid grounds therefore
exist, the legal fiction that a corporation is an entity with a juridical personality separate and
distinct from its members or stockholders may be disregarded.

o In such cases, the corporation will be considered as a mere association of persons.

o The members or stockholders or the corporation will be considered as the corporation,

that is, liability will attach directly to the officers and stockholders.

o The doctrine applies when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public convenience,
justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, or when it is made as a shield to confuse the
legitimate issues, or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a
person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so
conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of another
corporation.

In the case at bar, the union seeks to pierce the veil of corporate entity of Acrylic, alleging
that the creation of the corporation is a devise to evade the application of the CBA between
the Union and Indophil Textile. While the Court does not discount the possibility of the
 similarities of the businesses of Indophil Textile Mills and Acrylic, neither is it inclined to
apply the doctrine invoked by the union in granting the relief sought.

The fact that the businesses of Indophil Textile and Acrylic are related, that some of the
employees of Indophil Textile are the same persons manning and providing for
auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic, and that the physical plants, offices and
facilities are situated in the same compound, it is the Courts opinion that these facts are
not sufficient to justify the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic.

Although it was shown that the two corporations businesses are related, that some of
the employees of the two corporations are interchanged, and that the physical plants,
offices, and facilities, are situated in the same compound, were not considered sufficient
bases to pierce the veil in order to treat the two corporations as one bargaining unit.
The legal corporate entity is disregarded only if it is sought to hold the officers and
stockholders directly liable for a corporate debt or obligation.

DISPOSITION: Petition denied. Award of arbitrator affirmed.

CASE 8.

SMC Employees Union v. Confesor, 262 SCRA 81 (1996)

Facts:

28 June 1990: SMCEU-PTGWO entered into a CBA with SMC to take effect upon the
expiration of the previous CBA or on 30 June 1989, for which the duration shall be for a term of
3years or until 30 June 1992. The terms of the CBA also provided that insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, the term of the CBA shall be for five years: from 1 July
1989 to 30 June 1994.13 August 1991: In a letter, SMC management informed its employees
that the company would undergo a restructuring1 October 1991 the Magnolia and the Feeds &
Live stocks Divisions were spun-off and became two separate and distinct corporations:
Magnolia Corporation and San Miguel Foods, Inc. The CBA was renegotiated after 30 June
1992.SMCEU-PTGWO (petitioner-union) insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should still
include the employees of the spun-off corporations, and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA
shall be effective only for the remaining period of two years or until 30 June 1994.

SMC contended that the members/employees who had moved to Magnolia and SMFI
automatically ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at the SMC, and the renegotiated terms
should be effective for three years in accordance with Article253-A of the Labor Code.
Petitioner-union declared a deadlock on 29 September 1990.On 2 October 1992, a Notice of
Strike was filed against SMC. The NCMB conducted preventive mediation upon the request of
SMC, but no settlement was arrived at. A strike vote was conducted which resulted in a yes
vote.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, after which several
conciliation meetings were held, but still no settlement was reached. Secretary of Labor issued
the assailed order directing that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective for a period
of three years from 30 June 1992, and that such CBA shall over only the employees of SMC and
not of Magnolia and SMFI.

Issues:
Whether the bargaining unit of SMC includes also the employees of the Magnolia and SMFI.
(RE CORPORATE ENTITIES)

Held:

No, the bargaining unit of SMC excludes the employees of Magnolia and SMFI. The
transformation of the companies was a management prerogative and business judgments which
the courts cannot look into unless it is contrary to law, public policy or morals. Magnolia and
SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical personalities

In determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or

commonality of interests.

The employees sought to be represented must have substantial mutual interests in terms of
employment and working conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed. Considering
thespin-offs, the companies would consequently have theirrespective and distinctive concerns in
terms of the nature of work, wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment. The
nature of their products and scales of business may require different skills which must
necessarily be commensurated by different compensation packages. PETITION WAS
DISMISSED.

CASE 9:

Management

Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Unit, et al., vs Torres GR 92357 July 21,
1993

Facts:

On April 6, 1989, private respondent labor union, PGA Brotherhood Association Union of
Filipino Workers (UFW), hereinafter referred to as the Union filed a petition for Direct
Certification/Certification Election among the rank and file employees of Philippine Scout
Veterans Security and Investigation Agency (PSVSIA), GVM Security and Investigations
Agency, Inc. (GVM). and Abaquin Security and Detective Agency, Inc. (ASDA). These three
agencies were collectively referred to by private respondent Union as the PGA Security
Agency, which is actually the first letters of the corporate names of the agencies.

On April 11, 1989, summons was issued to the management of PSVSIA, GVM, ASDA (PGA
Security Agency) at 82 E. Rodriquez Avenue, Quezon City.

On April 11, 26, 1986, petitioners filed a single comment alleging therein that the said three
security agencies have separate and distinct corporate personalities while PGA Security Agency
is not a business or corporate entity and does not possess any personality whatsoever; the petition
was unclear as to whether the rank-and-file employees mentioned therein refer to those of the
three security agencies collectively and if so, the labor union cannot seek a certification election
in three separate bargaining units in one petition.

Issue: WON petitioners can interfere with the certification election proceeding.

Held:

Except where the employer has to file a petition for certification election pursuant to Article 258
of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively, it has nothing to do with a
certification election which is the sole concern of the workers. Its role in a certification election
has aptly been described in Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v.
Trajano, as that of a mere by-stander. It has no legal standing in a certification election as it
cannot oppose the petition or appeal the Med-Arbiters orders related thereto. An employer that
involves itself in a certification election lends suspicion to the fact that it wants to create a
company union.

This Courts disapprobation of management interference in certification elections is even more

forceful in Consolidated Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, where we held:

On a matter that should be the exclusive concern of labor, the choice of a collective bargaining
representative, the employer is definitely an intruder. His participation, to say the least, deserves
no encouragement. This Court should be the last agency to lend support to such an attempt at
interference with a purely internal affair of labor.
CASE 10: SAME AS CASE 5
CASE 11:

GOLDEN FARMS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

G.R. NO. 102130 JULY 26, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc., (EMPLOYER) is a corporation engaged in the

production and marketing of bananas for export. Private respondent PROGRESSIVE
FEDERATION OF LABOR (UNION) filed a petition before the Med-Arbiter praying for the
HOLDING OF A CERTIFICATION ELECTION AMONG THE MONTHLY PAID OFFICE
AND TECHNICAL RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER GOLDEN FARMS.

EMPLOYER moved to dismiss the petition on three (3) grounds.

1. UNION failed to show that it was organized as a chapter within petitioner's establishment.

2. There was already an existing collective bargaining agreement between the rank-and-file
employees represented by the National Federation of Labor (NFL) and petitioner.

3. The employees represented by UNION had allegedly been disqualified by this Court from
bargaining with management in Golden Farms, Inc., vs. Honorable Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja,
G.R. No. 78755, July 19, 1989.

UNION opposed EMPLOYER's Motion to Dismiss:

1. It countered that the monthly paid office and technical employees should be allowed to form a
separate bargaining unit because they were expressly excluded from coverage in the Collecting
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and NFL.

2. It also contended that the case invoked by petitioner was inapplicable to the present case.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EMPLOYER'S MONTHLY PAID RANK-AND FILE

EMPLOYEES CAN CONSTITUTE A BARGAINING UNIT SEPARATE FROM THE
EXISTING BARGAINING UNIT OF ITS DAILY PAID RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES.

HELD: YES. EMPLOYER'S MONTHLY PAID RANK-AND FILE EMPLOYEES CAN

CONSTITUTE A BARGAINING UNIT SEPARATE FROM THE EXISTING BARGAINING
UNIT OF ITS DAILY PAID RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES.

The community or mutuality of interest is the essential criterion in the grouping. "And this is so
because 'the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their
collective bargaining rights.
In the case at bench, the evidence established that the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of
petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In contradistinction, the petitioner's
daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the cultivation of bananas in the fields.

It is crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner have very little in
common with its daily paid rank-and-file employees in terms of duties and obligations, working
conditions, salary rates, and skills.

To be sure, the said monthly paid rank-and-file employees have even been excluded from the
bargaining unit of the daily paid rank-and-file employees.

This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a separate and distinct bargaining unit for
the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner. To rule otherwise would deny this
distinct class of employees the right to self-organization for purposes of collective bargaining.

---

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

CASE 12:

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS v. LAGUESMA

G.R. NO. 110399 AUGUST 15, 1997

FACTS: UNION filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for
Direct Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the
SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis.

Med-Arbiter Reynante issued an Order to conduct of certification election among the supervisors
and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando
and Otis as one bargaining unit.

EMPLOYER San Miguel Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal,
pointing out, among others, the Med-Arbiter's ERROR IN GROUPING TOGETHER ALL
THREE (3) SEPARATE PLANTS (Otis, Cabuyao and San Fernando) into one bargaining unit.

UNION contends that the creation of three (3) separate bargaining units, one each for Cabuyao,
Otis and San Fernando as ruled by the respondent Undersecretary, is contrary to the one-
company, one-union policy.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT GROUPING TOGETHER ALL THREE (3) SEPARATE

PLANTS (OTIS, CABUYAO AND SAN FERNANDO) INTO ONE BARGAINING UNIT IS
CORRECT.

HELD: YES. A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial,
mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.

It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have "community or mutuality of
interests," which is the standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining
unit. It is undisputed that they all belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San Miguel
Corporation. This means that, although they belong to three different plants, they perform work
of the same nature, receive the same wages and compensation, and most importantly, share a
common stake in concerted activities.

In light of these considerations, the Solicitor General has opined that separate bargaining units in
the three different plants of the division will fragmentize the employees of the said division, thus
greatly diminishing their bargaining leverage. Any concerted activity held against the private
respondent for a labor grievance in one bargaining unit will, in all probability, not create much
impact on the operations of the private respondent. The two other plants still in operation can
well step up their production and make up for the slack caused by the bargaining unit engaged in
the concerted activity. This situation will clearly frustrate the provisions of the Labor Code and
the mandate of the Constitution.

The fact that the three plants are located in three different places, namely, in Cabuyao, Laguna, in
Otis, Pandacan, Metro Manila, and in San Fernando, Pampanga is immaterial. Geographical
location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are
not sacrificed as demonstrated in UP v. Calleja-Ferrer where all non-academic rank and file
employee of the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, Padre Faura, Manila, Los
Baos, Laguna and the Visayas were allowed to participate in a certification election. We rule
that the distance among the three plants is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in the
administration of union affairs. Neither are there regional differences that are likely to impede
the operations of a single bargaining representative.

----

The assailed Order of March 11, 1993 was SET ASIDE and the Order of the Med-Arbiter on
December 19, 1990 was REINSTATED.

A certification election among the supervisors (level 1 to 4) and exempt employees of the San
Miguel Corporation Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis as
one bargaining unit was ordered to be conducted.
CASE 13

Topic: Unit Severance and Globe Doctrine

Mechanical Department Labor Union vs CIR

Mechanical Department Labor Union sa Philippine National Railways petitioner,

vs.
Court of Industrial Relations and Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Caloocan shops,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-28223

30 August 1968

Ponente: REYES, JBL.:

NATURE OF CASE
Petition for review of an order of the CIR directing the holding of a plebiscite election to
determine whether the employees at the Caloocan Shops desire the respondent union to be
separated from the Mechanical Department Labor Union with a a view to the former being
recognized as a separate bargaining unit.

FACTS
CIR directed to hold a plebiscite election to determine if the Caloocan shops desire the
respondent union Samahan ng mg Manggagawa sa Caloocan to be separated from the
Mechanical Labor Union.

No certification election was held for 12 months. There were three unions in the Caloocan shops
Samahan, Kapisanan ng Manggagawa and the Mechanical Labor Department Union. The
plebiscite was opposed by the company and the Mechanical Labor Department Union. The union
averred that it has already certified for two years and that it has a pending CBA to be signed, the
Caloocan shops is not separate from the Mechanical Department Unit and the Samahan is
composed of supervisors who filed a petition to be declared non-supervisors.
The lower court ruled that though the Caloocan and the Manila shops have the same nature of
work, the difference lies in the fact that the Caloocan shop workers do major repairs while the
Manila workers only do minor repairs. The court ruled that there is community of interest among
the workers in Caloocan as they work in the same place, under the same working time and
conditions and exposed to the same occupational risks. Hence, it favored the plebiscite election.

The railway company has a history of union representation whereby bargaining units are formed
through the separation of new units from existing ones whenever plebiscites show that the
workers desire to have their own representatives. This is also called the Globe Doctrine.
According to the doctrine, the Caloocan shop workers whould be given the chance to vote
whether their group should be separated from tat represented by the Mechanical Department
Labor Union. This was appealed from by the Mechanical Department Labor Union.

ISSUE/s of the CASE

1. Whether a new bargaining unit should be established and for the Caloocan shop workers
to be represented by this separate bargaining unit.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

The court ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the order to hold a
plebiscite election. It further ruled that the Globe Doctrine is applicable as the Caloocan workers
have a community of interest and that they gave a special skill not possessed by the Manila shop
workers hence they can be a separate unit and therefore they should be given a chance to be
represented by a representative of their own choosing.
CASE 14:

FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION vs. FILOIL SUPERVISORY & CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
GR No. L-26736
18 August 1972

FACTS: There exist two labor organizations in Filoil Refinery Corporation. The Filoil
Supervisory & Confidential Employees Association is composed of 47 members among
supervisory, technical men and confidential employees of the company while the Filoil
Employees & Workers Association (FEWA) is composed of its rank-and-file employees. The
company is said to have executed a CBA with FEWA.

Filoil Supervisory & Confidential Employees Association then filed a petition for certification as
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of the companys supervisory and confidential
employees. However, the company moved for its dismissal contending that since the said
employees are part of the management, they do not have the right to bargain collectively
although they may organize an organization of their own. Moreover, it also challenged the
composition of the Filoil Supervisory & Confidential Employees Association as it included
technical men and confidential employees as members.

CIR dismissed the motion and ruled in accordance with Sec. 3 of RA 875, which states that
Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization
of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations of their own. It
likewise dismissed the companys objection against the composition of the association. The rule
states that supervisors should form an association of their own and should exclude all other types
of personnel, unless special consideration exists if the supervisors, technical men, and
confidential employees are all so few in number, they may be constituted into one unit.

The company and the association could not agree on the composition of the appropriate
bargaining unit, hence, Filoil proposed that it should be broken up into 5 separate collective
bargaining units supervisors, confidential employees, professional personnel, fringe
employees, and office and clerical employees.

ISSUE: WON there should be separate collective bargaining units among the employees?
HELD: No. The breaking up of bargaining agents into fragmentary units will greatly impair their
organizational value. As policy of the United States National Labor Relations Board, in deciding
upon whether to include or exclude a group of employees from a bargaining unit, it shall be
guided by the determination as to whether its action will insure the full benefit of the right to
self-organization and to collective bargaining of the employees. The Court does not see any
reason as to why the Tribunal should do less or otherwise depart from this policy.

In the case at bar, since the confidential employees are very few in number and are by practice
and tradition identified with the supervisors in their role as representatives of management, such
identity of interest has allowed their inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for
purpose of collective bargaining as employees in relation to the company as their employer. This
will fulfil the laws objective of insuring to them full benefit of their right to self-organization
and to collective bargaining, which could hardly be accomplished if the membership of Filoil
Supervisory & Confidential Employees Association ere to be broken up into five separate
ineffective tiny units as urged by the company.
CASE 15:

Negros Oriental Electric Cooperative 1 (NORECO1) v. DOLE and (PACIWU-NACUSIP)

Philippine Agricultural Commercial And Industrial Workers Union Trade Union
Congress of the Philippines

FACTS:

On December 4, 1997, some employees of the petitioner organized themselves into a local
chapter of the PACIWU. The Union submitted its charter certificate and supporting documents
on the same date.

On December 10, 1997, PACIWU filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the
NORECO 1 chapter, seeking to represent the 77 rank-and-file employees of NORECO 1.
PACIWU alleged in its petition that it had created a local chapter in NORECO 1 which had been
duly reported to the DOLE regional office on December 4,1997. It was further averred therein
that Noreco 1 is an unorganized establishment, and that there is no other labor organization
presently existing at the said employer establishment.

The med arbiter dismissed the petition stating that the petitioner just applied for registration. The
corresponding certificate has not yet been issued. Accordingly, it has not acquired the status of a
legitimate labor organization.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA decided contrary to the decision of the SC in the case of Toyota Motors
G.R. no. 121084

Whether or not the CA erred in allowing certification elections when all the members of the
union are members of the cooperative

RULING:

Under the first issue, the Toyota case declare the ineligibility of managerial or supervisory
employees to join any labor organization consisting of rank-and-file employees. In this instant
case, there is no persuasive evidence to show that there are indeed supervisory and confidential
employees in the union who under the law are disqualified to join the same.

Factual issues are not also the proper subject for certiorari (filed by NORECO1) which is limited
to the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.

The CA cannot be expected to go over the list of allged supervisory employees attached to the
petition before it and to pass judgement in the first instance on the nature of the functions of each
employee on the basis of the job description pertaining to him. The determination of such factual
issue is vested in the appropriate Regional Office of the DOLE and pursuant tot the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.

On the second issue, however, in so far as it onvolved cooperatives with employees who are not
members or co-owners thereof, certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all
workers to organization, collective bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the
constitution and existing laws of the country.

Not only did NORECO1 fail to show any proof that anyone of the union members are members
or co-owners of the cooperative. It also declared that not all members of the petitioning union are
members of the cooperative.
CASE 16:
Topic: Effect Of Prior Agreements / Non-parties Effect

General Rubber and Footwear Corporation v BLR

General Rubber and Footwear Corporation, petitioner,

vs.
Bureau of Labor Relations and National Association of Trade Union of Monthly Paid Employees
- NATU, respondents.

G.R. No. L-28223

30 August 1968

Ponente: REYES, JBL.:

NATURE OF CASE
Petition for review of an order of the BLR to conduct certification election for the monthly paid
employees

FACTS
The company is engaged in the business of manufacturing sandals and oiler rubber products. It
has an existing union formed by the daily paid employees of the corporation. After the expiration
of the CBA, the monthly paid employees formed a new union and filed for direct certification
election. The Med-arbiter ordered the conduct of certification election. Thus, the company
appealed from the order contending that this will create a new bargaining unit which is a
violation of one company, one union policy and that the members of the new bargaining unit are
managerial employees.

ISSUE/s of the CASE

1. Whether the formation of the monthly paid workers labor union is a violation of the one
company one union policy.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

The court ruled in favor of the monthly paid workers. It held that while it is unusual for a small
corporation to ti deal with two bargaining units, there is no one to blame but itself. It has
indiscriminately suppressed the members of the union to their right to self-organization. The
prior agreement of the company with the previous union to exclude the monthly paid employees
will never bind the newly formed union because the union and its members were not privy to the
agreement. And the court said that even if it were privy to the agreements, it will have no legs to
stand on as the agreement is void for it is a curtailment of the right to self organization provided
for by the labor laws.
CASE 17:

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) G.R. No. 169254, August 23, 2012

FACTS: Respondent DLFSUEA-NAFTEU has two opposing factions. The Aliazas faction filed
a petition for election of union officers in the Bureau of Labor Relations. They alleged that there
has been no election for respondents officers since 1992 in supposed violation of the respondent
unions constitution and by-laws which provided for an election of officers every three years. It
would appear that the respondents members repeatedly voted to approve the hold-over of the
previously elected officers led by Baylon R. Banez (Banez faction) and to defer the elections to
expedite the negotiations of the economic terms covering the last two years of the 1995-2000
collective bargaining agreement.

Due to the brewing conflict between the two factions, petitioner thru a letter to the respondent
informed the latter that the intra-union dispute between the incumbent set of officers of the
Union on one hand and a sizeable number of its members on the other hand has reached serious
levels. By virtue of the 19 March 2001 Decision and the 06 July 2001 Order of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the hold-over authority of Unions incumbent set of officers
has been considered extinguished and an election of new union officers, to be conducted and
supervised by the DOLE, has been directed to be held. Until the result of this election [come] out
and a declaration by the DOLE of the validly elected officers is made, a void in the Union
leadership exists.

In light of these circumstances, the University has no other alternative but to temporarily do the
following: 1. Establish a savings account for the Union where all the collected union dues and
agency fees will be deposited and held in trust; and

2. Discontinue normal relations with any group within the Union including the incumbent set of
officers.

In view of the foregoing decision of petitioner, respondent filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice in the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on August 21, 2001. It alleged that
petitioner committed a violation of Article 248(a) and (g) of the Labor Code which provides:

Article 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit
any of the following unfair labor practice:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-
organization.
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administrator of any
labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or
supporters.

Respondent union asserted that the creation of escrow accounts was not an act of neutrality as it
was influenced by the Aliazas factionss letter and was an act of interference with the internal
affairs of the union.

Thus, petitioners non-remittance of union dues and discontinuance of normal relations with it
constituted unfair labor practice.

Petitioner, for its defense, denied the allegations of respondent and insisted that its actions were
motivated by good faith.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice against petitioner for lack of
merit affirming the need to conduct an election of the unions officers. The labor arbiter, in
effect, upheld the validity of petitioners view that there was a void in the leadership of
respondent.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor
Code as petitioner, an educational institution, was considered as belonging to an industry
indispensable to national interest.

The Secretary of Labor issued a Decision, finding petitioner guilty of violating Article 248(g) in
relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. The salient portion thereof stated:

The University is guilty of refusal to bargain amounting to an unfair labor practice under Article
248(g) of the Labor Code. Indeed there was a requirement on both parties of the performance of
the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, both [petitioner] and [respondent] entered
into a [CBA] on [March 20, 2001. The term of the said CBA commenced on [June 1, 2000 and
with the expiration of the economic provisions on the third year, [respondent] initiated
negotiation by sending a letter dated March 15, 2003, together with the CBA proposal. In reply
to the letter of [respondent], [petitioner] in its letter dated [March 20, 2003 refused.

Such an act constituted an intentional avoidance of a duty imposed by law. There was nothing in
the [March 19, 2001 and July 6, 2001 orders] of Director Maraan and Cacdac which restrained or
enjoined compliance by the parties with their obligations under the CBA and under the law. The
issue of union leadership is distinct and separate from the duty to bargain.
ISSUE : Whether the petitioners refusal to bargain amount to unfair labor practice under the
Labor Code. HELD : YES. Petitioner erred in unilaterally suspending negotiations with
respondent since the pendency of

the intra-union dispute was not a justifiable reason to do so.

The continued refusal by the University to negotiate amounts to unfair labor practice. The non-
proclamation of the newly elected union officers cannot be used as an excuse to fulfill the duty to
bargain collectively.

Petitioners reliance on the July 12, 2002 Decision of Labor Arbiter Pati, and the NLRCs
affirmance thereof, is misplaced. The unfair labor practice complaint dismissed by Labor Arbiter
Pati questioned petitioners actions immediately after the March 19, 2001 Decision of BLR
Regional Director Maraan, finding that "the reason for the hold-over of the previously elected
union officers is already extinguished." The present controversy involves petitioners actions
subsequent to (1) the clarification of said March 19, 2001 Maraan Decision by BLR Director
Cacdac who opined in a May 16, 2003 memorandum that the then incumbent union officers (i.e.,
the Baez faction) continued to hold office until their successors have been elected and qualified,
and (2) the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 ruling that the
very same intra-union dispute (subject of several notices of strike) is insufficient ground for the
petitioner to suspend CBA negotiations with respondent union. We take notice, too, that the
aforesaid Decision of Labor Arbiter Pati has since been set aside by the Court of Appeals and
such reversal was upheld by this Courts Second Division in its Decision dated April 7, 2009 in
G.R. No. 177283, wherein petitioner was found liable for unfair labor practice.

Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had already
released the escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the latter. The fact
remains that from its receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-
AJ-0015-2003 until its receipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in
OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its duty to collectively bargain with respondent union
without valid reason. At most, such subsequent acts of compliance with the issuances in OS-
AJ-0015-2003 and OS-AJ-0033-2003 merely rendered moot and academic the Secretary of
Labors directives for petitioner to commence collective bargaining negotiations within the
period provided
CASE 18

FILOIL REFINERY CORPORATION vs. FILOIL SUPERVISORY & CONFIDENTIAL

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
GR No. L-26736
18 August 1972

FACTS: There exist two labor organizations in Filoil Refinery Corporation. The Filoil
Supervisory & Confidential Employees Association is composed of 47 members among
supervisory, technical men and confidential employees of the company while the Filoil
Employees & Workers Association (FEWA) is composed of its rank-and-file employees. The
company is said to have executed a CBA with FEWA.

Filoil Supervisory & Confidential Employees Association then filed a petition for certification as
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of the companys supervisory and confidential
employees. However, the company moved for its dismissal contending that the supervisors are
not employees within the meaning of RA 875, and since they are part of management, they do
not have the right to bargain collectively although they may organize an organization of their
own.

Despite the objection of the company, the CIR later certified the Filoil Supervisory &
Confidential Employees Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the
employees in the unit as it clearly represents the majority of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit.

ISSUE: WON the action of CIR is vulnerable to challenge as being arbitrary or capricious?

HELD: No. The industrial court enjoys a wide discretion in determining the procedure necessary
to insure the fair and free choice of bargaining representations by the employees and its action is
entitled to almost complete finality, unless its action is arbitrary or capricious.