[G.R. No. 135083.

May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO

and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III.The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo

Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen,
he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to
be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios

Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. [4] Petitioners
motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered
its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor
of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,

California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he

registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred
seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the

Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a

candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,

upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening
of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC
en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City.Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter

and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent

Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not
an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners
motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed
to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

....

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for

intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City
[who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the
race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several
cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question
is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998,
there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No.
7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered
voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a
rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its
necessity as follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that
of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of

the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries
were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas
Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of

allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to
endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating
a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as
follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual

citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos
still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the
spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our
sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could
be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the
problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most
perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person
with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is
a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her
father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would
want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are
such countries in the world.
 SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under
the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without
any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example,
if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is
really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I
am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will
always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution
of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the time
he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he

renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese
Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon
the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September
4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held
that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
 Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made
when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements
made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION
OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED
HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any
elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since
no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is
no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that

he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath
as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, J., no part.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/135083.htm

MERCADO VS.MANZANO, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance)
FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office on the
ground that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective local
position.

ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.

HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se,
but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
https://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/09/mercado-vs-manzano-digested/

Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083.

May 26, 1999]
FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.

Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation was suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on
the ground that he was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate for said elective position.

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the disqualification of the respondent
was reversed. Respondent was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of
majority and registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on August 31, 1998.

Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in the philippines.

RULING:

The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance on the other hand, refers to a
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law."

Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with
dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other
country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced
his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to
any other country or government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the
legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of
another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the
laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he
may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he
betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through
expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act
constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

http://phlawnotes.blogspot.com/2015/03/mercado-v-manzano-case-digest-gr-no.html

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which
dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy
with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988
local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as
represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is
allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the
then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private
respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448
and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28,
1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue
canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits
tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration
Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh.
"D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the
legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea,
Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out
of the country for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines
since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the
winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes, private respondent was
proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification
for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to
run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A

verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. Any voter contesting the election of any
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation
of the results of the election.

The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987
and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January 22,
1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo
warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that
private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and
qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough
basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified
from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by
substantial and convincing evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of
America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate
of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is
an American and "being an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath
of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or
not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us
here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a
Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his
Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989)
and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the
case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in
1983 per certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed
that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the
Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable,
pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo
who did not find it necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.

Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that
he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government
through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn
statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from
serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court
considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign
state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the
United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both
as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and
the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmea
obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24
years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmea should be regarded as having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering
the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a
brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a
person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University
Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he
is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships.
Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no
implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And
while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under
the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future
law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I concur. I also join in the concurring opinion of Justice Sarmiento.

Cortes, J., concur in the result.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, only that
he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how
he obtained American citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship
(Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus
soli it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if
he were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the
Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a
clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing
alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be
made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless
heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45,
he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous
act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so
register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new
dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage,
specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a
reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be
awaited for one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is
not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal
law, which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the
local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those
of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express
renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June
23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the
United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath
after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was
not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine
citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not
necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still
loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to
whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he
married a second time simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he
has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of
its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of
patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble
this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we
should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private
respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I
think we must answer is: Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the
following observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a made of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate
act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial
documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine
government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American
passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine
citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he
actually did was register with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory,
presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a
voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien.
Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the
Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in
this land that was willing to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be
made in connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation
may be made independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are
prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the
repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the
case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where
Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for
all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother
demanding total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national
is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its
own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I
should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of
their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in
public office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a
relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one
time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a
Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view,
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners
vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private
respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the
Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino
citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be
considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private
respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to
Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate
of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private
respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under
Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar,
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No.
115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document, copy of which
is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a
duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and
signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at
the CID wherein private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of
this document cannot be underestimated For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino
citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every
Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent
executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is
again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a
resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien
with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said
Act provides:

SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in the City of
Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in other
localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other office
designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor
Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-
448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in
the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in
1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that
he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In
his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private
respondent) was born in 1934 hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered
as an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45
years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not
in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and
that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958,
when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an
alien, he was 41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the
age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an
alien 14 years or over has to register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall
have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien
attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days
thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain
a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late)
made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by
private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some
room for contention that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced
his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine
Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the
immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and
registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because
this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same
time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor,
rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason,
among others:

... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken
lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of
the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would
encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both
countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. (Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2)
words" maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to
make a choice at one time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many
ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to
only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It

inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual
nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of convenience
rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is
the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his
 own nationality, and this choice should be honored by all countries. However, he
should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine
Government which, like many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public
interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That
choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a
conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be
presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In
the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al.) I see no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while
holding private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number
of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision).
And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he
was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite
such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn
statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander.
The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that
really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino
citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24,
1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I
regret, however, that I cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my
relative by affinity, within the fourth civil degree.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, offly that
he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how
he obtained American citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship
(Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli
it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he
were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the
Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a
clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing
alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be
made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless
heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45,
he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous
act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so
register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new
dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage,
specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a
reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be
awaited for one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is
not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal
law, which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the
local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those
of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express
renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June
23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the
United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath
after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was
not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine
citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not
necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still
loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to
whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit when he protests he
married a second time simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he
has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.

By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of
its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of
patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble
this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we
should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private
respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I
think we must answer is: Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the
following observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a made of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate
act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial
documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine
government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American
passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine
citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he
actually did was register with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory,
presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a
voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien.
Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the
Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in
this land that was willing to consider him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be
made in connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation
may be made independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are
prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the
repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the
case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where
Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for
all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother
demanding total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national
is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its
own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I
should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of
their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in
public office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a
relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one
time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a
Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view,
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners
vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private
respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the
Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino
citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be
considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private
respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to
Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate
of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private
respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under
Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar,
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No.
115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document, copy of which
is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a
duly-registered alien (American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and
signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at
the CID wherein private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of
this document cannot be underestimated. For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino
citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every
Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent
executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is
again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a
resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien
with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said
Act provides:

SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in the City of
Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in other
localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other office
designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor
Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-
448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in
the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in
1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that
he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In
his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private
respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as
an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45
years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not
in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and
that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958,
when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an
alien, he was 41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the
age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an
alien 14 years or over has to register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall
have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien
attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days
thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain
a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late)
made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by
private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some
room for contention that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced
his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine
Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the
immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and
registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because
this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same
time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor,
rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason,
among others:

... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken
lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of
the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would
encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both
countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides-

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. (Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2)
words" maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to
make a choice at one time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many
ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to
only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It

inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual
nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of convenience
rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is
the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his
own nationality, and this choice should be honored by all countries. However, he
should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine
Government which, like many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public
interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That
choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a
conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be
presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In
the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al.), I see no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Philippine law while
holding private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact, in a number
of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia" (p. 7, Decision).
And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared that he
was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite
such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn
statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gander
The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that
really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino
citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24,
1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I
regret, however, that I cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my
relative by affinity, within the fourth civil degree.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

The majority seems agreed that the private respondent has acquired American citizenship, offly that
he did not necessarily lose his Filipino citizenship. The important question, however, inheres in how
he obtained American citizenship. I find that there is a dearth of facts here.

For, if the private respondent became an American by naturalization, he has lost Filipino citizenship
(Com. Act No. 63; Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989; Labo v. COMELEC, G.R.
No. 86564, August 1, 1989). If he, however, became one by the application of the principle of jus soli
it is by force of circumstances rather than choice. But he does not lose his Filipino citizenship, if he
were otherwise born of Filipino parents.

In the absence of evidence, we can not presume that he had ceased to be a citizen of the
Philippines, simply because he is, at the same time. a citizen of the United States. There must be a
clear showing that he lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the means enumerated by
Commonwealth Act No. 63. The fact that he had obtained an alien certificate of registration, standing
alone, does not amount to "express renunciation."

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R. Padilla.

While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth, a choice will have to be
made by the individual concerned at some point in time in his life, involving as it does the priceless
heritage of citizenship.

That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of 24, and in 1979, at 45,
he obtained Alien Certificates of Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous
act or declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was merely compelled to so
register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the past regime, he could have, under the new
dispensation, asked for the cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his alienage,
specially before he ran for public office in 1988.

The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law" (Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a
reaffirmation of an innate conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be
awaited for one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.

It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in effect affirming that he is
not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal
law, which is what really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a citizen of the
local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the basis of its own laws alone and not those
of any other state.

One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63 is by "express
renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June
23,1989, there was such renunciation when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the
United States in which he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of Labo v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the petitioner not only took a similar oath
after his naturalization in Australia but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was
not a Filipino.

The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his disavowal of Philippine
citizenship. "Express renunciation" is a separate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not
necessarily dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and different mode.

When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second marriage, he cannot say he still
loves her despite his desertion. The undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to
whom he has totally and solemnly transferred his troth It does him no credit when he protests he
married a second time simply for material convenience and that his heart still belongs to the wife he
has abandoned. At worst, it would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after renouncing it because of
its meager resources, or for other ulterior and equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of
patriotism. It is a sop to the repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble
this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and simple hypocrisy that we
should not condone, let alone extol.

Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is involved here as the private
respondent claims to be a citizen both of the Philippines and of the United States. The question I
think we must answer is: Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the private
respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an alien with the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in 1979?

In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882, January 24, 1989, I made the
following observations in a separate opinion:

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a made of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate
act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial
documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask the Philippine
government to register him as an alien. Gov. Osmea did.

It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking and using an American
passport, these acts could not have by themselves alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine
citizenship. The problem, though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he
actually did was register with the Philippine government as an alien within its own territory,
presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction it exercises over its nationals. This was a
voluntary act. As a citizen of the Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien.
Nevertheless, he chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked the
Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a Filipino, choosing to be an alien in
this land that was willing to consider him its own.

C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship be
made in connection with the naturalization of the erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation
may be made independently of naturalization proceedings. Moreover, no sacramental words are
prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. As long as the
repudiation is categorical enough and the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the
case at bar, Philippine citizenship is lost.

The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can never be allowed where
Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines for
all her modest resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive mother
demanding total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad enough that the love of the dual national
is shared with another state; what is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its
own territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.

I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the province of Cebu, and also, I
should add, of the commendable record of Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of
their respective jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to maintain in
public office any person who, although supported by the electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a
relentless restriction we cannot ignore.

Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent.

I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario Renner Osmea enjoyed at one
time dual citizenship, i.e,, Philippine and U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a
Filipino father and an American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien registration
dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine immigration authorities was, in my view,
an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners
vs. Go Callano 1 express renunciation means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship holder-like the private
respondent of age, and with full legal capacity to act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the
Philippine Government for registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to remain a Filipino
citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and explicit manifestation of desire to be
considered an alien in the Philippines, the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private
respondent Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C), Permit to
Re- enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate
of Clearance No. D-146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh E) 2

All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration authorities to the private
respondent at his request are predicated on the proposition that private respondent is an alien under
Philippine laws. It should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at bar,
private respondent was likewise issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No.
115883 on 21 November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document, copy of which
is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the proposition that private respondent is a
duly-registered align (American) residing in the Philippines.

Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-entry Permit executed and
signed by private respondent on 3 January 1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at
the CID wherein private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The importance of
this document cannot be underestimated For, if private respondent believed that he is a Filipino
citizen, he would not have executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every
Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact, therefore, that private respondent
executed said sworn Application for Re-entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is
again an abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he continuous to be, a
resident alien (American) in the Philippines.

It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private respondent had already registered as an alien
with the Bureau of Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 RA 562). Section 1 of said
Act provides:

SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those residing in the City of
 Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case of those residing in other
localities at the office of the city or municipal treasurers, or at any other office
designated by the President. ... . 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Miriam Defensor
Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January 1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-
448 and ICR No. 13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered himself in
the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he was 24 years old and again in
1979, when he was 45 years old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly manifested and declared that
he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.

At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a clarification should be made. In
his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo, p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private
respondent) was born in 1934-hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as
an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 45
years old. However, private respondent's immigration records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not
in 1934). On the assumption that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and
that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is erroneous), then in 1958,
when he first registered as an alien, he was 20 years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an
alien, he was 41 years old.

Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view, as an express
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that time, he was almost 21 years old the
age of majority, and (2) more importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act RA 562), an
alien 14 years or over has to register in person (and not through his parents or guardian). It provides:

The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of age, shall
have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever any such alien
attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall, within fifteen days
thereafter, apply in person for registration. (Sec. 1, par. 2)

I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality holder on whether to remain
a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late)
made the notice in 1958 (at age 20) in favor of his U.S. citizenship.

If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship had been made or filed by
private respondent elsewhere (not with the Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some
room for contention that vis-a- vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not renounced
his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation were filed with the Philippine
Government and done right in the Philippines. In turn the Philippine Government, through the
immigration authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid representations, and
registered and documented him TWICE as an alien under Philippine law.

The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage dual citizenship, because
this condition or status assumes as a necessary complement thereof dual allegiance at the same
time to two (2) different countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor,
rejected the principle of jus soli as determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason,
among others:
 ... . Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must not be taken
lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and prevented. But the application of
the principle jus soli to persons born in this country of alien parentage would
encourage dual allegiance which in the long run would be detrimental to both
countries of which such persons might claim to be citizens. 4

This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now provides-

Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. (Article IV)

Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While having the "best of two (2)
words" maybe the result of birth or other factors accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to
make a choice at one time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many
ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and sound public policy, fealty to
only one (1) spouse is both compelling and certainly desirable.

Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and Procedure state:

Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable phenomenon. It

inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to international conflicts. Dual
nationality also makes possible the use of citizenship as a badge of convenience
rather than of undivided loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is
the hallmark of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his
own nationality, and this choice should be honored by all countries. However, he
should not be entitled to claim more than one nationality. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked the Philippine
Government which, like many other countries, considers dual allegiance as against national or public
interest to register him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this country. That
choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. The choice must be respected as a
conscious and knowledgeable act of a discerning, distinguished and respected person who must be
presumed to have known the full import of his acts.

Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is inconsistent in its rulings. In
the light of its recent decision in G.R. No. 86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al., I see no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien upper Ph. Philippine law
while holding private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the majority states: "In fact,, in a
number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia"(p. 7,
Decision). And is exactly what private respondent did. In a number of sworn statements, he declared
that he was a citizen of the United States.

To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the private respondent, despite
such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen, the Court says, "never mind those sworn
statements, you are still a Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the gender
The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should be built on the merits, not on distinctions that
really make no difference.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private respondent not a Filipino
citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of such citizenship.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., separate opinion:

My stand in the cases of Willie Yu vs. Miriam Defensor Santiago, et al. (G.R. No, 83882, January 24,
1989) and Ramon Labo, Jr, v. Commission on Elections (G.R. 86564, August 2, 1989) is clear. I
regret, however, that I cannot participate in this case because one of the principal counsel is my
relative by affinity, within the fourth civil degree.

Footnotes

1 G.R. No. L-24530, October 31, 1968, 25 SCRA 890.

2 Rollo, pp. 117-118.

3 46 OG 11, 5367.

4 79 Phil. 257.

5 Volume 4, Nationality, 1989 ed., p. 11-1 2.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1990/may1990/gr_83820_1990.html

AZNAR VS. COMELEC, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

GR # 83820, May 25, 1990 (Constitutional Law Alien, Loss of Citizenship)

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondents right to hold public office on the ground that the latter
was an alien. Respondent maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a valid subsisting passport, a
continuous resident of the Philippines and a registered voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien
registration certificate.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien.

HELD: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino, it is presumed that he was a Filipino and remained
Filipino until proof could be shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In addition, possession of
an alien registration certificate unaccompanied by proof of performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had
been lost is not adequate proof of loss of citizenship.

https://piusmorados.wordpress.com/2011/11/09/aznar-vs-comelec-digested/
264 Phil. 307

PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which
dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio
"Lito" Osmena as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmena filed his
certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province in the January 19, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-
PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he
is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a
Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner
Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an
American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-
21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133914, issued at
Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin
the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the
votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the final
resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the
Board tip continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner
presented the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is
an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the
Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated November 21,
1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of
private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter
the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Ex. "D");
Immigration Certifitate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp.
117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino
citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilia D. Osmena, a
Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmena, Sr.; that he is a holder
of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March
25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since
birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months; and
that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-
108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of
Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the
highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial
Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the
petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of
sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a
registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of
candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
"(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
'Section
78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filingof the certificate of candidacy and shall
be decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election.
and
"(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. --- Any voter contesting the election
of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial or city
officer on the ground of inelligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the elec
tion."
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy
on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for
disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the
petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day period
required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said
petition was filed cut of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be
treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code
as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was
proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the
respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which
has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly
on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and,
therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and
convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any
of the modes provided for under C. A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1)
by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of
citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmena did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of
the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine
citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of
the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that
private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given
clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an American", private
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required
by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino
citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an
American under the laws of the United States does not concern us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that
private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively
establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193,
June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564,
August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of
the United States in 1983 per certification from the United States District
Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice
Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S. A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the
United States but claimed that he was forced to, embrace American
citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos
government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness
unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the
United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to
abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an
Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in
1976, per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul
in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the Department of Foreign
Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in
a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines,
therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province
of Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered
the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no longer
owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have
sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.
In instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the
oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a
valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated
in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as
a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be
presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact
that because Osmena obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an
American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second
in 1979, he, Osmena should be regarded a having expressly renounced
Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does
not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmena was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus, by way of
analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or
certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does
not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as a student
simultaneously in two universities, namely University X and University Y,
presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not
necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case
of Osmena, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities
or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said
citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose
Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can
be no such loss of Philippine
citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"
(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even
before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already frowned upon the
concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it
noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual
citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has
not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the
Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., joins J. Sarmiento in his concurring opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Cortes, J. in the result.
Fernan, C.J., no part, formerly counsel for Osmea Estate.
Gutierrez, Jr., J, no part.
Gancayco, J., on official leave.

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DISSENTING OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
I join Mr. Justice Padilla in his dissent.
It seems to me that when a person voluntarily registers as an alien, he is in
effect affirming that he is not a citizen. The terms "citizen" and "alien" are
mutually exclusive from the viewpoint of municipal law, which is what
really matters in the case at bar. Under this discipline, one is either a
citizen of the local state or he is not; and the question is resolved on the
basis of its own laws alone and not those of any other state.
One of the several modes of losing Philippine citizenship under C.A. No. 63
is by "express renunciation" thereof. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989, there was such renunciation
when the petitioner took an oath as a naturalized citizen of the United
States in which he renounced all allegiance to all other states. In the case of
Labo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86546, August 1, 1989, the
petitioner not only took a similar oath after his naturalization in Australia
but also executed other documents in which he stated that he was
not a Filipino.
The fact that his naturalization was later revoked did not also invalidate his
disavowal of Philippine citizenship. "Express renunciation"
is aseparate mode of losing Philippine citizenship and is not necessarily
dependent on "naturalization in a foreign country," which is another and
different mode.
When a person rejects and divorces his wife to enter into a second
marriage, he cannot say he still loves her despite his desertion. The
undeniable fact is that he has left her for another woman to whom
he has totally and solemnly transferred his troth. It does him no credit
when he protests he married a second time simply for material convenience
and that his heart still belongs to the wife he has abandoned. At worst, it
would reveal his sordid and deceitful character.
By the same token, professing continued allegiance to the Philippines after
renouncing it because of its meager resources, or for other ulterior and
equally base reasons, is to me a paltry form of patriotism. It is a sop to the
repudiated state and a slight to the adopted state. No matter how noble
this attitude may appear to others, it is to me nothing less than plain and
simple hypocrisy that we should not condone, let alone extol.
Coming now to the case at bar, I note first of all that no naturalization is
involved here as the private respondent claims to be a citizen both of the
Philippines and of the United States. The question I think we must answer
is: Was there an express renunciation of Philippine citizenship by the
private respondent when he knowingly and voluntarily registered as an
alien with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation in 1958 and in
1979?
In Yu v. Commission of Immigration and Deportation, G.R. No. 83882,
January 24, 1989, I made the following observations in a separate opinion:
Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly
renounced his Philippine citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my
view rather meager. Express renunciation of citizenship as a mode of losing
citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate act with
full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the
"commercial documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
That case is distinguished from the one before us now in that Yu did not ask
the Philippine government to register him as an alien, Gov. Osmea did.
It is my opinion that if the governor had confined himself to simply seeking
and using an American passport, these acts could not have by themselves
alone constituted a repudiation of Philippine citizenship. The problem,
though, is that he did more than enjoy this legal convenience. What he
actually did was register with the Philippine government as an alien within
its own territory, presumably so he could be insulated from the jurisdiction
it exercises over its nationals. This was a voluntary act. As a citizen of the
Philippines, he was not required to register as an alien. Nevertheless, he
chose to do so of his own free will. By this decision, he categorically asked
the Republic of the Philippines to treat him as an American and not a
Filipino, choosing to be an alien in this land that was willing to consider
him its own.
C.A. No. 63 does not necessarily require that the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship be made in connection with the naturalization of the
erstwhile Filipino in a foreign country. Renunciation may be made
independently of naturalization proceedings. Morever, no sacramental
words are prescribed by the statute for the express renunciation of
Philippine citizenship. As long as the repudiation is categorical enough and
the preference for the foreign state is unmistakable, as in the case at bar,
Philippine citizenship is lost.
The private respondent would have his cake and eat it too, but this can
never be allowed where Philippine citizenship is involved. It is a gift that
must be deserved to be retained. The Philippines, for all her modest
resources compared to those of other states, is a jealous and possessive
mother demanding total love and loyalty from her children. It is bad
enough that the love of the dual national is shared with another state; what
is worse is where he formally rejects the Philippines, and in its own
territory at that, and offers his total devotion to the other state.
I am aware of the praiseworthy efforts of Gov. Osmea to improve the
province of Cebu, and also, I should add, of the commendable record of
Gov. Frivaldo and Mayor Labo in the administration of their respective
jurisdictions. But that is not the point. The point is that it is not lawful to
maintain in public office any person who, although supported by the
electorate, is not a Filipino citizen. This is a relentless restriction we cannot
ignore.
Regretfully, therefore, I must vote to GRANT the petition.
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DISSENTING OPINION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
I join the dissent of Messrs. Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Teodoro R.
Padilla.
While it may be that dual citizenship usually results from accident of birth,
a choice will have to be made by the individual concerned at some point in
time in his life, involving as it does the priceless heritage of citizenship.
That election was made by private respondent when, in 1958, at the age of
24, and in 1979, at 45, he obtained Alien Certificates of
Registration. Registration as an alien is a clear and unambiguous act or
declaration that one is not a citizen. If, in fact, private respondent was
merely compelled to so register because of the "uncooperativeness" of the
past regime, he could have, under the new dispensation, asked for the
cancellation of those Alien Certificates and abandoned his
alienage, specially before he ran for public office in 1988.
The 1987 Constitution declares in no uncertain terms that "dual allegiance
of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"
(Article IV, Section 5). That statement is but a reaffirmation of an innate
conviction shared by every Filipino. The law referred to need not be
awaited for one to consider giving up the legal convenience of dual
citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the Petition.

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DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I am constrained to dissent.
I start from the premise that the private respondent Emilio Mario
Renner Osmena enjoyed at one time dual citizenship, i.e., Philippine and
U.S. citizenships. He was born in the Philippines of a Filipino father and an
American (U.S.) mother. However, his sworn application for alien
registration dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. B) filed with the Philippine
immigration authorities was, in my view, an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship. As held in Board of Immigration Commissioners vs.
Go Callano,[1] express renunciation means a renunciation that is made
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Nothing can be more distinct and explicit than when a dual citizenship
holder - like the private respondent - of age, and with full legal capacity to
act, voluntarily and under oath applies with the Philippine Government for
registration as an alien, insofar as his intention not to
remain a Filipino citizen is concerned. And because of that distinct and
explicit manifestation of desire to be considered an alien in thePhilippines,
the Philippine immigration authorities issued to private respondent Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 015356 dated 21 November 1979 (Exh. C),
Permit to Re-enter the Philippines No. 122018 dated 21
November 1979 (Exh. D) and Immigration Certificate of Clearance No. D-
146483 dated 3 January 1980 (Exh. E).[2]
All the foregoing documents issued by the Philippine immigration
authorities to the private respondent at his request are predicated on the
proposition that private respondent is an alien under Philippine laws. It
should also be mentioned that, while not marked as exhibit in the case at
bar, private respondent was likewise
issued in Cebu City Native Born Certificate of Residence No. 115883 on 21
November 1979 (as verified from Immigration records). This document,
copy of which is attached hereto as Annex A, is again predicated on the
proposition that private respondent is a duly-
registered alien American) residing in the Philippines.
Another relevant document that merits attention is the Application for Re-
entry Permit executed and signed by private respondent on 3 January
1980, again under oath, and verified from the records at the CID, wherein
private respondent expressly stated that he is a U.S. national. The
importance of this document cannot be underestimated. For, if private
respondent believed that he is a Filipino citizen, he would not have
executed said Application for Re-entry Permit, since it is the right of every
Filipino citizen to return to his country (the Philippines). The fact,
therefore, that private respondent executed said sworn Application for Re-
entry Permit, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex B, is again
abundant proof that he himself, no less, believed that he was, as he
continuous to be, a resident alien(American) in the Philippines.
It will further be noted that earlier, or in 1958, private
respondent had already registered as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration under the Alien Registration Act of 1950 (RA 562). Section 1
of said Act provides:
"SECTION 1. Aliens residing in the Philippines shall, within thirty days
after the approval of this Act, apply for registration, in the case of those
residing in the City of Manila, at the Bureau of Immigration and in the case
of those residing in other localities at the offices of the city
or municpal treasurers, or at any other office designated
by the President. x x x."[3] (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, per certification of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Exh. A), issued on 26 January
1988, private respondent had been issued ACR No. B-21-448 and ICR No.
13391 on 27 and 28 March 1958 respectively. He, therefore, registered
himself in the Philippines as an alien twice; first, in the year 1958, when he
was 24 years old and again in 1979, when he was 45 years
old. By twice registering under oath as an alien with the Bureau of
Immigration, private respondent thereby clearly, distinctly and explicitly
manifested and declared that he was an alien (and, therefore, not a Filipino
citizen) residing in the Philippines and under its laws.
At this point, and to be objectively fair to the private respondent, a
clarification should be made. In his Comment on the Petition at bar (Rollo,
p. 81), it is stated by his counsel that he (private respondent) was born in
1934 hence, our mathematical conclusion that when he first registered as
an alien in 1958, he was 24 years old and in 1979 when he re-registered as
an alien, he was 45 years old. However, private respondent's immigration
records disclose that he was born in 1938 (not in 1934). On the assumption
that the year 1938 is the correct year of birth of private respondent (and
that his alleged year of birth, 1934, as stated in his Comment at bar is
erroneous), then in 1958, when he first registered as an alien, he was 20
years old, while in 1979 when he re-registered as an alien, he was 41 years
old.
Still, his first registration as an alien (at age 20) has to be taken, in my view,
as an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship, because (1) at that
time, he was almost 21 years old - the age of majority, and (2) more
importantly, under the applicable Alien Registration Act (RA 562), an
alien 14 years or over has to register in person (and not through his parents
or guardian). It provides:
"The parent or legal guardian of an alien who is less than fourteen years of
age, shall have the duty of registering such alien: Provided, That whenever
any such alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the Philippines he shall,
within fifteen days thereafter, apply person for registration." (Sec. 1, par. 2)
I take the above provision to mean that the choice by a dual nationality
holder on whether to remain a Filipino citizen or an alien has to be made at
age 14, and private respondent (although a bit late) made the choice in 1958
(at age 20) in favor of his U.S citizenship.
If all the foregoing acts of express renunciation of Philippine citizenship
had been made or filed by private respondent elsewhere (not with the
Philippine Government), there could perhaps be some room for contention
that vis-a-vis the Philippine Government, private respondent had not
renounced his Philippine citizenship. But said acts of express renunciation
were filed with the Philippine Government and done right in the
Philippines. In turn, the Philippine Government, through the immigration
authorities, accepted and acted on private respondent's aforesaid
representations, and registered and documented him TWICE as an alien
under Philippine law.
The policy of our laws has been, and with laudable reason, to discourage
dual citizenship, because this condition or status assumes as a necessary
complement thereof dual allegiance at the same time to two (2) different
countries. As early as 16 September 1947, a unanimous Supreme Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla in the celebrated case
of Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor, rejected the principle of jus soli as
determinative of Philippine citizenship, for the following reason, among
others:
"x x x. Citizenship, the main integrate element of which is allegiance, must
not be taken lightly. Dual allegiance must be discouraged and
prevented. But the application of the principle of jus soli to persons born in
this country of alien parentage would encourage dual allegiance which in
the long run would be detrimental to both countries of which such persons
might claim to be citizens."[4]
This policy found later expression in the 1987 Constitution which now
provides -
"Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizen is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law." (Article IV)
Dual citizenship, in my considered opinion, must be eschewed. While
having the "best of two (2) worlds" maybe the result of birth or other factors
accidentally brought about, the "dual citizen" has to make a choice at one
time or another. Having two (2) citizenships is, as I see it, similar in many
ways to having two (2) legal spouses, when as a matter of principle and
sound public policy, fealty to only one (1) spouse is both compelling and
certainly desirable.
Gordon and Rosenfield in their book on Immigration Law and
Procedure state:
"Dual nationality is universally recognized as an undesirable
phenomenon. It inevitably results in questionable loyalties and leads to
international conflicts. x x x. Dual nationality also makes possible the
use of citizenship as a badge of convenience rather than of undivided
loyalty. And it impairs the singleness of commitment which is the hallmark
of citizenship and allegiance. A person should have a right to choose his
own nationality, and this choice should be honored by all
countries. However, he should not be entitled to claim more than one
nationality."[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Private respondent made a deliberate and decisive choice when he asked
the Philippine Government - which, like many other countries, considers
dual allegiance as against national or public interest - to register
him at least twice (and, therefore, unmistakably) as an alien in this
country. That choice pro tanto was a renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. The choice must be respected as a conscious
and knowledgable act a discerning, distinguished and respected person who
must be presumed to have known the full import of his acts.
Finally, the last thing that should be said against the Court is that it is
inconsistent in its rulings. In the light of its recent decision in G.R. No.
86565 (Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.), I see
no valid justification for holding Mr. Labo an alien under Philippine law
while holding private respondent herein a Filipino citizen. For, as the
majority states: "In fact, in a number of sworn
statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia"
(p. 7, Decision). And that is exactly what private respondent did. In a
number of sworn statements, he declared that he was a citizen of the United
States.
To Mr. Labo, the Court said, "so be it, you are an Australian," yet to the
private respondent, despite such sworn statements that he is a U.S. citizen,
the Court says, "never mind those sworn statements, you are still a
Filipino." Sauce for the goose, as the saying goes, is sauce for the
gander. The doctrinal basis of the Court's decisions should be built on the
merits, not on distinctions that really make no difference.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the private
respondent not a Filipino citizen by his own acts of express renunciation of
such citizenship.

http://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c990b

AZNAR vs COMELEC

JOSE AZNAR vs COMELEC and Emilio Mario Renner Osmea

G.R. No. 83820 25 May 1990 Political Law-Citizenship
FACTS: On 19 November 1987, private respondent filed his certification of candidacy with the COMELEC
for the position of Governor of Cebu. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification of
Osmea on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.
In 27 January 1988, Petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a certificate issued by the then
Immigration and Deportation Commission that Osmea is an American Citizen. According to the
evidence presented, Osmea maintained that he is a Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate son of Emilio
Osmea, a Filipino and son of the Late President Sergio Osmea Sr., that he is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and that he
has been a registered voter in the Philippines.

COMELEC dismissed the petition for Disqualification for not having been timingly filed and for lack
of sufficient proof that private respondent is not s Filipino citizen and Osmea was proclaim of winning
candidates for obtaining the highest number of votes.

ISSUE: Whether or not Osmea remains a Filipino and loss of his Philippine Citizenship cannot be
presumed.
HELD: Yes, Petitioner failed to present direct proof that Osmea had lost his Filipino Citizenship by any
of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63 these are :
1. By naturalization in foreign country;

2. By express renunciation of Citizenship; and

3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or Law of the foreign country.
 The evidence clearly shows that Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three (3)
mentioned hereinaboved or any other modes of losing Philippine citizenship.

The 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 5 states Dual allegiance of citizens is iniminical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law has no retroactive effect.

The petition for certiorari DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

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