GROUP 2

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

CHAPTER IV, Agcaoili, 2015 Ed., pp 407-456

I. PREPARATION OF CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Section 39. Preparation of decree and Certificate of Title. After the judgment directing the
registration of title to land has become final, the court shall, within fifteen days from entry of
judgment, issue an order directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of
registration and certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry of
judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title, and a
certificate stating that the decision has not been amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has
become final. Thereupon, the Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration
as well as the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title. The original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. The decree of registration shall
be signed by the Commissioner, entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The
original of the original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall be
sent, together with the owner's duplicate certificate, to the Register of Deeds of the city or
province where the property is situated for entry in his registration book.

ISSUANCE OF DECREE OF REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

The court shall issue within 15 days from the entry thereof, an order directing the
LRA administrator to issue the corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title.

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
a. The OCT shall be the true copy of the decree of registration
b. Transcript of the decree of registration made by the Register of Deeds in the
Registry.
c. Accumulates in one decree a precise and correct statement of the exact status of
the fee simple title which an owner possesses.
d. The certificate, once issued, is the evidence of the title which the owner has.
e. What appears on the face of the title is controlling on questions of ownership
since the certificate of title is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership
of the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein

DECREE BINDS THE LAND AND IS CONCLUSIVE AGAINST THE WHOLE WORLD
As soon as the decree of title has been registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds, the property included therein becomes registered land. Certificate of title shall
take effect upon the transcription of the decree.
A land registration proceeding being in rem, the decree of registration issued
pursuant to the decision binds the land and quiets title thereto, and is conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the government and all its branches thereof, whether
mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general
prescription To whom it may concern.
 PROBATIVE VALUE OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
a. Serves as an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein and is conclusive as to the identity of the land and its location.
b. The title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible one (1) year from its final
decree.
c. The notations or memoranda at the back of the certificate arent admissible as
proof of the contracts or documents to which they pertain.
d. Validity and correctness of the title is presumed.

A. STATEMENT OF PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Section 45, PD 1529; Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every certificate of
title shall set forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the
whole land, including their civil status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as
well as their citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered belongs to the
conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the names of both spouses.

CONTENTS OF A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

a. Full names of all persons whose interest make up the full ownership of the land;
b. Civil status;
c. Names of the respective spouses, if married;
d. Citizenship; and
e. Residence and postal address.
If the property belongs to the conjugal partnership, the title shall be issued in the
names of both spouses.

All property of the marriage presumed conjugal; exception.

Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the
husband and wife. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse,
this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is
in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involve

B. ENTRY OF ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

SEC. 40, PD 1529: Entry of Original Certificate of Title. Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of
the original and duplicate copies of the original certificate of title the same shall be entered in his
record book and shall be numbered, dated, signed and sealed by the Register of Deeds with the
seal of his office. Said certificate of title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof. The
Register of Deeds shall forthwith send notice by mail to the registered owner that his owners
duplicate is ready for delivery to him upon payment of legal fees.

Entry of original certificate of title.

The certificate of title issued for the first time after initial registration
proceedings is known as the Original Certificate of Title.
Any subsequent title issued pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary
instrument affecting the property covered by the original certificate of title is
known as the Transfer Certificate of Title.
Upon receipt by the Register of Deeds of the original and duplicate copy
of the certificate of title, he shall enter the same in the record book and shall be
numbered, dated, signed and sealed with the seal of his office. The certificate of
title shall take effect upon the date of entry thereof.

C. THE OWNERS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

SEC. 41, PD 1529: Owners duplicate certificate of title. The owners duplicate certificate of title
shall be delivered to the registered owner or to his duly authorized representative. If two or more
persons are registered owners, one owners duplicate certificate may be issued for the whole
land, or if the co-owners so desire, a separate duplicate may be issued to each of them in like
form, but all outstanding certificates of title so issued shall be surrendered whenever the Register
of Deeds shall register any subsequent voluntary transaction affecting the whole land or part
thereof or any interest therein. The Register of Deeds shall note on each certificate of title a
statement as to whom a copy thereof was issued.

Issuance of the owners duplicate certificate

The owners duplicate certificate of title shall be delivered to the registered
owner or his duly authorized representative.
If two or more persons are the registered owners, one owners duplicate may be
issued for the whole land, or if the co-owners so desire, a separate duplicate may be
issued to each of them in like form, but all outstanding certificates of title so issued shall
be surrendered whenever the Register of Deeds shall register any subsequent voluntary
transaction affecting the whole land or part thereof or any interest therein.

Issuance of mortgagees/lessees duplicate certificate discontinued

Rule: No mortgagees or lessees duplicate certificate shall be issued by Registers
of Deeds, and those issued prior to the effectivity of PD No. 1529 on June 11, 1978 are
deemed cancelled and the holders thereof shall surrender the same to the Register of
Deeds concerned

Co-owner can only dispose of his aliquot share in the property held in common
What a co-owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. He has no right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part by
metes and bounds

Registered owner entitled to possession of the owners duplicate.

 The owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name land is registered and
inscribed in the certificate of title has preferential right to the possession of the owners
duplicate as against one whose name does not appear in the certificate but who may have
a claim to or right to the possession of the land.

D. REGISTRATION BOOK

SEC. 42, PD 1529: Registration Books. The original copy of the original certificate of title shall be
filed in the Registry of Deeds. The same shall be bound in consecutive order together with similar
certificates of title and shall constitute the registration book for titled properties.

E. TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

SEC. 43, PD 1529: Transfer Certificate of Title. The subsequent certificate of title that may be
issued by the Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating to
the same land shall be in like form, entitled Transfer Certificate of Title, and likewise issued in
duplicate. The certificate shall show the number of the next previous certificate covering the same
land and also the fact that it was originally registered, giving the record number, the number of
the original certificate of title, and the volume and page of the registration book in which the
latter is found.

Registration book; Contents

Upon entry of the original certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall file the
same in a registration book provided for the purpose.
The transfer certificate of title which may be issued pursuant to any voluntary or
involuntary instrument shall be in like form as the original and titled Transfer Certificate
of Title.
The original is kept in the office of the Register of Deeds while the owners
duplicate is delivered to the party concerned. The transfer certificate of title shall indicate
(a) the number of the next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact
that it was originally registered, (b) giving the record number, (c) number of the original
certificate of title, and (d) the volume and page of the registration book in which it is filed.

F. SEVERAL CERTIFICATES COVERING THE SAME LAND

General Rule: Where two or more certificates cover the same land, the earlier in date
prevails.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS CFI, GR No. L-35273

July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441

FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent court in the
case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Register of Deeds
of Nueva Ecija, and the National Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondent
court upheld the primacy of the respondent banks title and ordered the
cancellation of the petitioners title. Petitioner raised the sole issue of: which of
 the two titles is superior, an earlier title secured administratively or a latter title
secured thru judicial proceedings?
The property in question is covered by T.C.T. No. NT-14302 in the name
of the plaintiff, and T.C.T. No. NT-53573 in the name of defendant Iglesia ni Kristo;
that said property was acquired by the plaintiff in a foreclosure sale from Emilio
Libunao in whose name the same was previously registered by virtue of a
homestead patent; that defendant acquired the said property from Victoria
Maravilla who was the registered owner of a parcel of land including the land in
question under O.C.T. by virtue of a decree/decision, of the CFI of Nueva Ecija .
The lower court declared the title of Iglesia ni Kristo as null and void. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but the respondent Court denied it. Failing to
obtain a reversal of the decision, the petitioner filed this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in holding that title acquired earlier by
homestead is superior to that secured in a subsequent land registration
proceedings.

RULLING:
The petitioner contends that the land covered by the conflicting titles had
been possessed by Victoria Maravilla and her predecessor Mariano Padilla even
several years before the Revolution of 1896 and that is why it was adjudicated as
private land and ordered registered in her name in Land Registration Case No.
3244, LRC. With this as factual background, the petitioner attacks the validity of
the homestead patent and title issued to the respondent banks predecessor,
Emilio Libunao.
In case of Lahora vs Dayang-hirang: "The rule in this jurisdiction,
regarding public patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be
issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor, is recorded and the
certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically
brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the
grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided in Section 38 of said Act.
In other words, upon the expiration of one year from its issuance, the certificate
of title becomes irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a
registration proceeding."
Applying the case of Pajomayo, Et. Al. v. Manipon, Et Al., (39 SCRA 676)
Supreme Court held that once a homestead patent granted in accordance with
the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, the certificate
of title issued in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title
under the Land Registration Act. Supreme Court should add that the Director of
Patents, being a public officer, has in his favor the presumption of regularity in
issuing the questioned homestead patent

Exception:

(a)Anomaly or Irregularity,
 Mathay v Court of Appeals
GR No. 15788 17, September 1988

The Spouses-Private respondents are the valid owners of the individual

properties in question because all the subsequent certificates of title including
the petitioners titles are void for the same were forged and falsified. It was
further proved that the titles issued to Mathays are void for the allegedly Sales
Certificate executed by Tomas Lucido in favor of Pedro Pugay was not signed by
the said Tomas Lucido. Neither does it bear the signature of the latter. It further
proved that the deeds showed by Banayo and Pugay were not for the individual
property in question. The circumstances surrounding the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale by Pedro Banayo and Pablo Pugay in favor of the spouses Sonya
Mathay and Ismael Mathay further showed that it did not comply with the legal
formalities and was not duly notarized. Furthermore, the residence certificates of
vendors Banayo and Pugay appeared to be of dubious source. The Spouses
Mathay utterly failed to discharge the burden of proving the sustainability of their
posture of them being buyers in good faith. Furthermore, the title of Pedro
Banayo and Pablo Pugay relied upon by them has been shown by preponderance
of evidence to be the product of forgery.

(b) Mistake, or
Legarda v Saleeby
GR No 8936, October 1915, 31 Phil 590

FACTS:
The plaintiffs, Consuelo and Mauro, and the defendant, Saleeby, are
owners of adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila. Between
the said lots was a stone wall which is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
On the 2nd day of March, 1906, the plaintiffs presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration
of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title
of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate
provided for under the Torrens system. Said registration and certificate included
the wall. Subsequently, the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him.
On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of
said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the Torrens system.
The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said
wall. On December 13, 1912, the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had
been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the
certificate granted to the defendant.
They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration
for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in
the registered title of each of said parties. However, the lower without notice to
the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of
the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any
objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the
defendant.
 The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action
for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that
the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and
oppose it.

ISSUE:
Who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different
persons? What is the purpose of registration?

RULLING:
The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop
forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted
at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent
thereto.
That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility
of losing his land.
If the holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then
the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot
rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and
the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of
his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all.
In case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the
owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between
original parties.

(c) Faulty or fraudulent registration tainting the prior title

Carpo v Ayala Land

GR No. 166577, February 2010, 611 SCRA 436

FACTS:
Spouses Morris and Socorro Carpo (Carpos) filed a Complaint for Quieting
of Title against Ayala Land, Incorporated (ALI) claiming that they are the owners
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 296463 issued
in their names. They further alleged that ALI was claiming to have titles
(specifically, TCT Nos. 125945, T-4366, T-4367 and T-4368) over the property
covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463.
In its Answer, ALI pointed out that the areas covered by TCT Nos. T-4366,
T-4367, and T-4368 do not overlap with the Carpos claimed property and the
dispute pertained only to the land covered by the Carpos TCT No. 296463 and
TCT No. T-5333 in the name of Las Pias Ventures, Inc. (LPVI) which was derived
from TCT No. 125945 in the name of Ayala Corporation. It appeared that Ayala
Corporation contributed the property to LPVI and LPVI had, in turn, also merged
with ALI. Further, ALI alleged that it is the true owner of the property covered by
TCT No. T-5333 as it traces back its title to Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
242 issued in 1950 while the Carpos title was derived from OCT No. 8575 issued
only in 1970. ALI also claimed the Carpos complaint was barred by res judicata in
view of the 1941 decision of this Court in Guico v. San Pedro which upheld the
ownership of a certain Eduardo Guico over the subject property as Lot 3, of Psu-
80886 over the claim of a certain Florentino Baltazar who was asserting
ownership of the same under his plan, Psu-56007.
The RTC ruled that the Carpos title is superior to that of ALI. The CA
reversed RTCs decision. The Carpos filed their motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied by the CA. Hence, the instant petition for review.
The Carpos contend that it is error on the part of the CA to rule that their
cause of action has been barred by prescription and laches. According to them,
since the OCT from which ALI derived its title is void for want of a duly approved
survey plan, their cause of action did not prescribe.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Carpos cause of action has been barred by prescription
and laches.

HELD:
YES. OCT No. 242 of ALIs predecessor-in-interest was issued on May 7,
1950, or forty-five (45) years before the Carpos filed their complaint on March 10,
1995. As such, it is the Courts firmly held view that the Carpos claim is barred not
only by prescription, but also by laches.
Aside from the fact that OCT No. 242 had become incontrovertible after
the lapse of one (1) year from the time a decree of registration was issued, any
action for reconveyance that the Carpos could have availed of is also barred.
Although the Carpos complaint was for quieting of title, it is in essence
an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust, considering
that the Carpos were alleging in said complaint that there was a serious mistake,
if not fraud, in the issuance of OCT No. 242 in favor of ALIs predecessor-in-
interest. It is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance, which is a legal
remedy granted to a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in anothers name, must be filed within ten years from the
issuance of the title, since such issuance operates as a constructive notice. Since
ALIs title is traced to an OCT issued in 1950, the ten-year prescriptive period
expired in 1960.
By laches is meant the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or
passage of time, but is principally an impediment to the assertion or enforcement
of a right, which has become under the circumstances inequitable or unfair to
permit. In the instant case, the Carpos, as well as their predecessor-in-interest,
have not shown that they have taken judicial steps to nullify OCT No. 242, from
which ALIs title was derived, for forty-five (45) years. To allow them to do so now,
and if successful, would be clearly unjust and inequitable to those who relied on
the validity of said OCT, the innocent purchasers for value, who are protected by
P.D. 1529.
:
Where two (2) certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or
partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates
of title were derived.

a) CO-OWNED LAND

May a co-owner convey a physical portion of the land owned in common?

A co-owner may not convey a physical portion of the land owned in common.
What a co-owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership.
He has no right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part by metes and
bounds.

LOPEZ v. ILUSTRE
GR. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 Phil 567
FACTS:
Francisco Martinez and Pedro Martinez, his son, were the owners as
tenants in common of two separate parcels of land in Calle Dulumbayan, in the
city of Manila, each being the owner of an undivided one-half of each of said
tracts of land. On December, 1902, Francisco Martinez conveyed to the plaintiff
his undivided half interest in both said tracts of land. The deed contained a clause
giving Martinez the right to repurchase the property within one year from
December 26, 1902. He did not repurchase it. The plaintiff caused the proper
marginal entry, in which registry the conveyance had been recorded asking for a
partition of the two lots of land, between himself and the defendant, and that
defendant account for and pay to the plaintiff his part of the rents of the said
properties.
Francisco Martinez and the defendant, his son, were the owners as
tenants in common of twenty-six other parcels of land before the expiration of
the year, right to repurchase the property, he and the defendant, his son, made
a voluntary partition of these twenty-eight tracts of land, which partition was
approved by the Court of First Instance of manila. Twenty-eight tracts of land had
been acquired by Francisco Martinez during his marriage with his wife, Doa
Germana Ilustre. These lands were the property of the conjugal partnership
existing between Francisco Martinez and his wife. His claim is that by this
partition plaintiff lost all his interest in the property. Judgment was entered in the
court below in favor of plaintiff

RULING:
The owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell
and dispose of it that is, of his undivided interest. He has no right to sell a
divided part of the real estate. If he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of
land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to
divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and
bounds. All that Francisco Martinez undertook to do in this case was to convey
his undivided interest in these two properties. This he had a perfect right to do.
 For the purposes of this case we see no difference between it and a case in which
the tenant in common makes an absolute conveyance of his undivided interest in
the property, without reserving the right to repurchase. In the case of an absolute
conveyance of that character, the relation between the grantor in the deed and
his cotenant is terminated. They are no longer cotenants.
The grantee in the deed takes the place of the grantor, and he and the
other owner of the property become cotenants. In such a case the grantor loses
all interest in the property, and of course has no right to take any part in the
partition of it. It would be absurd to say that after such conveyance the grantor,
who had lost all his interest in the property, could by agreement with the other
owner make a partition of property in which he had no interest that would be
binding upon his grantee. Each tract was separate and distinct from all the others.
The parties had a right to deal with one lot without any reference to the
other twenty-seven. The fact that the defendant acquired title to all of them by
inheritance from his mother did not make them physically one tract of land, so
that a conveyance by the son of his undivided half interest in one of these lots
would amount to a conveyance of a divided part of a tract of land held by him in
common with this father.

All co-owners duplicates must be surrendered

Surrender of owners duplicate is conclusive authority for the Register of Deeds
to enter a new certificate or a memorandum of registration. Without the presentation of
the owners duplicate, the Register of Deeds is not authorized to make registration.

Balbin v RD,
28 SCRA 12

FACTS:
Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register
of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owners certificate of title and a deed
of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. The
registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion
of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being
legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law. It appears that previously
annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate
sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto
Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owners duplicate CTs.
Mainly because these 3 co-owners copies of CTs had not been presented by
petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who
upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the refusal of the Register of Deeds to make the annotation is
proper

HELD:
 YES. There being several copies of the same title in existence, their
integrity may be affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is
annotated on one copy and not on the others. If different copies were permitted
to carry different annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would
cease to be available.
Since the property subject of donation is also presumed conjugal, that is,
property of donor Cornelio and his deceased wife Nemesia Mina, there should
first be a liquidation of the partnership before the surviving spouse may make
such a conveyance. Assuming the conjugal nature of the property, the donation
bears on its face an infirmity which justified the denial of registration, namely, the
fact that 2/3 portion of the property which Cornelio donated was more than
his share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he had sold
portions of the same land to 3 other parties.
Pending the resolution of a separate case, wherein Cornelios civil status,
character of land and validity of conveyances are in issue, the registration may
await the outcome of said case and parties may protect their rights by filing the
proper notices of lis pendens.

b) PERSONS ADJUDICATION
Republic v CA 83 SCRA 453

FACTS:
This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal
land located in Mulanay, Quezon. In Land Registration Case Judge Vicente del Rosario
rendered a decision, ordering the registration of said land, Lot 1, allegedly located at
Barrio Cambuga (Anonang), Mulanay, in the names of the spouses Prudencio Maxino and
Tarciana Morales, less 200 hectares which should be registered in the names of the Heirs
of Lorenzo Consolacion. The decision became final and executory. A decree and an
original certificate of title were issued.
More than eight years later, on 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed with
the Gumaca court an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the
ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified
public forest. Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino
spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares. The petition was verified
by the Acting Director of Forestry.
After a hearing on the merits, Judge Agana denied the petition. A copy of the
order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's Office only on September 2,
1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the order. Twenty-two days thereafter or
on September 24 the Solicitor General appealed from that order and filed a motion for
extension of time within which to submit a record on appeal. The appeal was given due
course. the Appellate Court through Justices Asuncion, Porfirio V. Sison and Sundiam
dismissed the petition because the 1970 order had allegedly long become final and
unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:
1. whether the appeal of the State from the trial court's 1970 order of denial was
seasonably made.
2. Whether the land in question still forms part of the unclassified public forest of the
Government.

RULING:
1.We hold that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned
from the time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970 order of denial and
not from the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order. These
representatives of the Solicitor General had no power to decide whether an appeal should
be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor General. The question of
whether an appeal should be made could only be decided by the Solicitor General's Office.
The fact that after the record on appeal was filed on time, the Solicitor General's Office
was late in filing the amendments to it is of no moment.
2.YES. In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly
because public forestal land was registered and the State sought to declare the decision
void, the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents. the
885-hectare area registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and
disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was
certified by Director of Forestry. The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title.
There is a discrepancy between the area of 29 hectares and the actual area of the land
bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks which is 970 hectares as surveyed in 1959.
We have no hesitation in saying that the composition title erred in stating the boundaries.
The trial court grievously erred in applying to this case the rule that the area comprised
in the boundaries should prevail over that stated in the moniments of title.
Prudencio Tesalona died in 1905. He was survived by his two children Maria and
Lucila. On September 24, 1935 the two heirs, without executing an extrajudicial
settlement of Prudencio's estate and adjudicating the said 29-hectare land to themselves,
executed an " absolute sale" of the land in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino the wife of
applicant Prudencio Maxino who was Maria's son and the grandson of Prudencio
Tesalona.
That curious document is not a sale at all. It is a "quit-claim". It is stated therein
that in consideration of P200 the Tesalona sisters "releases and forever quitclaim unto
the said Vendee" the 29-hectare land described in the composition title. The Maxinos
contend that Tesalona's gratuitous adjustment or composition title should prevail in
determining the Identity of the disputed land. For Tesalona is that his gratuitous
adjustment title granted him possessory rights over pasture land with an area of 29
hectares but not ownership over 970 hectares of grazing land.
The Maxinos have the burden of proving that the title justified the considerable
increase in area. They have not shown that a title for 29 hectares could be a valid title for
970 hectares. The boundaries and areas stated in Tesalona's tax declarations reveal that
a different land was covered thereby. The title states that the 29-hectare land was located
in Barrio Yamay. In his tax declarations it is stated that the land was located in Barrio
Cambuga, now Anonang.
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title,
whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system,
nullifies the title. Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.

c) DEFECTIVE TITLE vs. UNBLEMISHED TITLE

 LORENZANA VS COURT OF APPEALS,
231 SCRA 713

Petitioners also missed the thrust of the assailed Decision with their argument
that the respondent court gave more importance to the misleading annotations in their
titles rather than to their technical descriptions.
In pointing out the discrepancies in petitioners' titles, the respondent court was
simply stressing that these titles cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of the
private respondent.
The case at bench is not one where petitioners are correcting the defects in their
titles by reconciling the annotations therein and the technical descriptions of the lots.
Rather, the case involves actions for quieting of titles where petitioners are urging that
their error-filled titles should be adjudged as superior to the regularly issued titles of the
private respondent. Petitioners would also oust private respondent from the lots it has
occupied from 1966 and whose taxes it has paid since then.
In sum, defective titles cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles B.E. San
Diego.

d) OVERLAPPING TITLES
A Land Owner loses his right to claim that his property has been encroached when
his predecessor did not register any objections at the time the alleged encroachment was
made. A Torrens Certificate of Title, complete and valid on its face may not be defeated
by another Torrens Certificate of Title which on its face, is irregular and which contains
defective technical description. No verification survey conducted.

Cambridge Realty and Resources Corp. v Eridanus Development Inc.

GR No. 152445, 4 July 2008

FACTS:
Eridanus and CHITON filed a complaint in the RTC of Marikina against
Cambridge Realty. They allege that the subdivision Cambridge planned to build
encroached the area of their property. The civil complaints were triggered by a
previous verification survey conducted on respondents' respective properties,
where the results allegedly showed that the CAMBRIDGE property encroached or
overlapped upon respondents' lots, to the extent of 357 square meters for
ERIDANUS and 177 square meters for CHITON.
According to the four expert witnesses, Naguit, Lim, De Lara and Sison,
who were geodetic engineers, the problem was that there was no tie point
because the Public Land Survey monument which served as the basis has become
lost or inexistent. Naguit, in particular, was in charge of the partitioning of the
land. What Naguit did back then was to create a tie point. Thus, BLLM 1 Marikina
was created.
The trial court dismissed the case because respondents failed to
overcome the burden of establishing their claim of overlapping. It stated that the
respondents' titles - whose tie points are based on mere PLS monuments (which
are not fixed, and are therefore not in accordance with Sec. 36 of the Manual for
Land Surveys in the Philippines) cannot prevail as against the petitioner's, which
 has a fixed tie or reference point. Simply put, a PLS monument is not one of the
reference points enumerated in Section 36 of the Manual, and cannot be used to
defeat petitioner's title.
Secondly, the trial court held that Nerit, given his training and expertise
as surveyor, should have detected the overlap - if there was one - in his 1960
survey of TCT 18250, and not suddenly discover it only in 1990. Thirdly, the
presence of the old adobe wall as early as the 1960s and the absence of any
protest or objection from Nerit or the predecessors-in-interest of Eridanus work
against the present claim of overlap and encroachment.
This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals using as basis
admissions by Cambridges witnesses that there was an overlap. .

ISSUE: Will the action for encroachment prosper?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Citing
Golloy vs CA, the Court held that a land owner may not now claim that his
property has been encroached upon when his predecessor did not register any
objections at the time the monuments were being placed on the claimed
encroached area; nor did the latter make any move to question the placement of
said monuments at the time.
Previous owners of what now constitutes the respondents' respective
lots did not complain of its presence. The wall appears to have been built in the
1960s. But, it was only in 1989 that the wall became an ungainly sight for
respondents. The lack of objection of their predecessors shall bind the
respondents.

II. EFFECT OF ISSUANCE OF TITLE

A. A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE CANNOT BE USED TO PROTECT A USURPER FROM THE TRUE OWNER,
NEITHER CAN IT BE USED TO PERPETUATE FRAUD.

Pagaduan v. Ocuma
GR No. 176308, May 8, 2009
FACTS:
The conflict arose from a double sale that happened between Cletos and
the petitioners and respondents. Nicolas Cleto owned a big parcel of land. He sold
it to Antonio Cereso, and from then on to the Antipolos which they subsequently
sold to Pagaduan.

The second line of disposition happened after Cletos death. His widow
sold the property to Eugenia Reyes. Reyes was issued a TCT because of the sale.
Reyes executed a unilateral deed of sale of the northern and southern portions
of the land to Pagaduan. Pagaduan was given a TCT. But, Reyes subsequently sold
the entire parcel of land to Ocuma. It included the southern portion of the land
covered by the sale between Reyes and Pagaduan. This resulted in the
cancellation of the TCTs that Pagaduans previously held.
 Pagaduan filed a complaint for reconveyance of the southern portion
with damages with the RTC of Olongapo. The RTC of Olongapo ruled in favor of
petitioners and ordered the reconveyance.
Upon appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs
decision. The CA argued that the registration of the southern portion in the name
of respondents had created an implied trust in favor of Agaton Pagaduan,
petitioners, however, failed to show that they had taken possession of the said
portion. Hence, the appellate court concluded that prescription had set in,
thereby precluding petitioners recovery of the disputed portion.
So now, the petitioners raise the issue to the Supreme Court. They assert
that the Civil Code provision on double sale is controlling. They submit further
that since the incontrovertible evidence on record is that they are in possession
of the southern portion, the ten year prescriptive period for actions for
reconveyance should not apply to them. Respondents, on the other hand, aver
that the action for reconveyance has prescribed since the ten year period, which
according to them has to be reckoned from the issuance of the title in their name
in 1962, has elapsed long ago.

ISSUE: Is the registration of the TCT under respondents name valid?

HELD: No, it wasnt.

There was a double sale here. Otherwise stated, where it is an immovable
property that is the subject of a double sale, ownership shall be transferred: (1)
to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in
possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith. The requirement of the law then is two-fold:
acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith.
In this case there was a first sale by Eugenia Reyes to Agaton Pagaduan
and a second sale by Eugenia Reyes to the respondents. For a second buyer like
the respondents to successfully invoke the second paragraph, Article 1544 of the
Civil Code, it must possess good faith from the time of the sale in its favor until
the registration of the same. Respondents sorely failed to meet this requirement
of good faith since they had actual knowledge of Eugenias prior sale of the
southern portion property to the petitioners, a fact antithetical to good faith. This
cannot be denied by respondents since in the same deed of sale that Eugenia sold
them the northern portion to the respondents for P1,500.00, Eugenia also sold
the southern portion of the land to Agaton Pagaduan for P500.00.
Respondents had prior knowledge of the sale of the questioned portion
to Agaton Pagaduan as the same deed of sale that conveyed the northern portion
to them, conveyed the southern portion to Agaton Pagaduan.
Thus the subsequent issuance of TCT No. T-5425, to the extent that it
affects the Pagaduans portion, conferred no better right than the registration
which was the source of the authority to issue the said title. Knowledge gained
by respondents of the first sale defeats their rights even if they were first to
register the second sale. Knowledge of the first sale blackens this prior
registration with bad faith. Good faith must concur with the registration.
 Therefore, because the registration by the respondents was in bad faith, it
amounted to no registration at all.
This lack of a trust relationship does not inure to the benefit of the
respondents. Despite a host of jurisprudence that states a certificate of title is
indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world, it merely confirms
or records title already existing and vested, and it cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used for the perpetration of fraud;
neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.

B. REGISTRATION AS OPERATIVE ACT BINDING THE LAND.

SECTION 51, 2nd Paragraph PD1529

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration
shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
lies.

Roxas v Dinglasan,
28 SCRA 430
FACTS:
Felisa Kalaw was the registered owner with Certificate of Title No. 9125
of a lot situated at Lipa City. On June 11, 1959, she sold to Francisca Mojica by
means of a public instrument an undivided portion of 11,530 square meters of
the lot for the price of P938.50. In the same month and year, she sold to Victoria
Dinglasan by means of a private instrument the remaining portion of 15,000
square meters for the price of P5,851.40. Long before and at the time of the sales,
Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan were in possession of the Lot. The
vendor's Certificate of Title No. 9125 was not delivered to the vendees because it
was in the possession of another person to whom the lot had been mortgaged by
Felisa Kalaw.
Before December 29, 1961, Pedro Dinglasan, by falsifying a public
document of conveyance, succeeded in having Certificate of Title No. 9125 in the
name of Felisa Kalaw canceled and a new transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10392
issued in his name. The record does not show when and how he had obtained
possession of the owner's duplicate certificate of title.
On December 29, 1961, Pedro Dinglasan mortgaged the lot to Leonora T.
Roxas as security for a loan of P7,000.00 with interest of 6% per annum, payable
within a period of ninety (90) days. Leonora caused the instrument to be
registered on the back of the said transfer certificate of title. She later instituted
the instant foreclosure suit against the mortgagor, Pedro Dinglasan, the latter
having failed or refused to pay the obligation on its due date. Said defendant was
declared in default.
On April 18, 1962, Francisca Mojica and Victoria Dinglasan moved to
intervene and that their complaint in intervention annexed to the motion be
admitted. The complaint alleged that they were the owners of the lot, having
purchased the same from Felisa Kalaw, in June 1959; the title to said land was
fraudulently transferred by Pedro Dinglasan in his name; that Pedro Dinglasan
mortgaged the land in favor of plaintiff Leonora T. Roxas; that said mortgagor has
been convicted of "Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual," and
the document used by him in transferring title in his name was the subject of the
said felony. The intervenors prayed that they be declared the true and absolute
owners of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-10392;
that whatever document executed by Pedro Dinglasan in transferring the
ownership of the land in his name be declared null and void; and that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-10392 be ordered canceled and another title issued in
the intervenors' names.

ISSUE:
Was the mortgage void because Mojica and Dinglasan had the title of Kalaw?

HELD: No. The mortgage was valid.

While the appellants contend that the lower court erred "in not declaring
the contract of mortgage between the plaintiff and defendant void and
consequently in not dismissing the action for foreclosure of mortgage," the
Supreme Court said that the contention is unmeritorious in view of the following
considerations:
1. The complaint in intervention was to vindicate ownership of the land
in the intervenors. But, the deeds of sale involving the parcel of land covered by
Certificate of Title No. 9125 in the name of the vendor, Felisa Kalaw, not having
been registered, the said intervenors did not acquire ownership of the land. It is
well settled that in case of sale of a piece of land titled under the Torrens System,
it is the act of registration, and not tradition, that transfers the ownership of the
land sold.
Their action to vindicate ownership can prosper only upon proof by
plaintiff that he is the owner. But, the intervenors did not acquire ownership of
the land because their deeds of sale were not registered.
2. Furthermore, the mortgage was valid because Leonora T. Roxas was an
innocent mortgagee for value, having relied upon the mortgagor's transfer
certificate of title which according to the Register of Deeds was genuine and free
from any objection. In the case of De Lara, et al. vs. Ayrosa, the Supreme Court
held that where the certificate of title was already in the name of the forger when
the land was sold to an innocent purchaser, the vendee had the right to rely on
what appeared in the certificate and, in the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate
the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
In the case of Morales Development Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court, thru Chief Justice Concepcion, said:
[T]he Deseos were not bound to check the deeds of conveyance by
Reyes to the Abellas, and by Montinola to Reyes. Having found that the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. 21037, in the name of the Abellas, was a genuine copy
of the original on file with the office of the Register of Deeds, the Deseos were
fully justified in relying upon said TCT No. 21037, and had no legal obligation to
make further investigation.
The principles enunciated in these cases are, in our opinion, applicable to
a mortgagee in good faith and for value.
 Egao v CA,
174 SCRA 484
FACTS:
A parcel of land was covered by a free patent certificate in favor of
Apolonio Egao. Later on an original certificate of title over said land was issued in
Egaos name. However, private respondents Dignos and Bontilao filed a
complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with the RTC of Manolo
Fortich in Bukidnon over said parcel of land. They allege that Egao sold the
property to one Roberto Marfori who in turn sold it to private respondents.
Allegedly, upon purchase of Lot No. 662 from Roberto Marfori, improvements
were introduced and taxes paid by private respondents. Sometime in June 1983,
herein petitioners allegedly occupied illegally portions of the land.
Petitioners' answer to the complaint asserted that Apolonio Egao is the
registered owner of the parcel of evidenced by OCT No. P-3559 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Bukidnon pursuant to Free Patent No. 298112 dated 12
August 1965; that has been in actual, physical, adverse, open and continuous
possession thereof even before the issuance to him of the free patent; that the
land has never been sold by reason of the prohibition against alienation under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Law); and that the instant case was the
fourth in a series filed against the Egaos and is part of respondents' scheme to
grab said parcel of land from the petitioners.
The RTC ruled in favor of Egao. This was because the respondents failed
to present or show any title over the land which should be quieted or freed from
any cloud of doubt as prayed for in their complaint and they further failed to show
that they are entitled to the ownership and possession to said land.
This was reversed by the Court of Appeals. According to the CA, Marfori
and Egao were in pari delicto for selling the land despite the five year restriction.
The respondents were declared innocent purchasers.

ISSUE:
Did the respondents have any right over the land as innocent purchasers?

HELD:
No. Contrary to the appellate court's conclusion, respondents are not
innocent purchasers for value. Where a purchaser neglects to make the necessary
inquiries and closes his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his
guard as to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title, and
relying on the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor, purchases
the property without making any further investigation, he cannot claim that he is
a purchaser in good faith for value.
Here, respondents did not verify whether the sale executed between
Marfori and Egao was valid or that the land was under a free patent. Clearly, the
sale between Egao and Marfori is non-existent not because of Egaos denial but
because it was made within the 5-year restrictive period for alienation, etc.
Respondents cannot therefore claim to be innocent purchasers because they
failed to verify that there was a defect in the sale between Egao and Marfori.

C. NOTICE TO THE WORLD

SECTION 52 PD 1529 Constructive notice upon registration.
Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates
lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.

PEOPLE vs. REYES

G.R. Nos. 74226-27, JULY 27, 1989

FACTS:
Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owneda parcel of land in Lipa
City registered in their names under a TCT. Both are now deceased and were
survived by their children: Mizpah Reyes, the accused and her sisters as the
complainants. In 1983, the complainants discovered from the Register of Deeds
that the parcel of land was already transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes
under a TCT.
Accordingly, the property was conveyed to Mizpah Reyes through a deed
of sale executed and signed by their parents. Upon examination in the Register of
Deeds, the complainants found that the signature of their parents were falsified
and that the accused made an untruthful statement by stating that she is single
when in fact she is already married.
The NBI found that only the signature of Patricia Pampo was forged the
complainants then filed two information of falsification of public documents
against Reyes and for allegedly making an untruthful statement of fact in the deed
of sale.
Mizpah Reyes filed a Motiion to Quash on the ground that the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished by prescription of the crime. The trial
court granted Reyes motion to quash stating that more than twenty years has
lapsed before the filing of the two information hence the crimes charged against
Mizpah Reyes have already prescribed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that the
prescriptive period started when the deed of sale was registered with the Registry
of Deeds and not when the falsification was discovered. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Did the action already prescribe?

RULING:
Yes. The rule is well-established that registration in a public registry is a
notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well
as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains. The deed of sale was registered with the Register
of Deeds on May 26, 1961 and the case for falsification was filed on October 18,
1984. In the case, the action already prescribed when it was registered with the
Register of Deeds not when the petitioners found out about it on June 1983.
 It has also been ruled that when an extrajudicial partition of the property
of the deceased was executed by some of his heirs, the registration of the
instrument of partition with the Register of Deeds is constructive notice that said
heirs have repudiated the fiduciary relationship between them and the other
heirs vis--vis the property in question.
The heirs who were not included in the deed of partition are deemed to
have notice of its existence from the time it was registered with the Register of
Deeds.

D. CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land

referred to therein (Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles
are regularly issued and that they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any
"information possessoria" or title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on
the title. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever
any question as to its legality.
Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.

It enjoys the presumption of validity; registration does not vest title; it is not a mode of
acquiring ownership

Ching v. Court of Appeals

181 scra 9

FACTS:
A Decree was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration and Original Certificate of Title correspondingly
given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal covering a parcel of land.
By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng, TCT No. 91137 was issued.
Consequently, Ching Leng died. His legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed a
petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng and was granted.
Thirteen years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was filed by private
respondent Asedillo for reconveyance of the said property and cancellation of
T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession.
Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his estate was directed by
the trial court. The summons and the complaint were published in the "Economic
Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation. The title over the property in the
name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in favor of Asedillo.

Issue:
is the action for reconveyance of property and cancellation of title a proceeding
in personam, and if so, would a dead man or his estates be beound by service of
summons and decision by publication?
Ruling:
Yes, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions
in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against
specific persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed
against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land
is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
Sec. 112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) requires
"notice to all parties in interest." Since ChingLeng was already dead when the
summons were published, he could not have been notified at all and the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Therefore, the judgment in question is null for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng.

Dela Cruz v CA
298 SCRA 172

Facts:
On November 20, 1986, an action for reconveyance with damages was
filed by the heirs of Teodoro dela Cruz against Pacifico Marquez, Filomeno Madrid
and Gregorio Madrid involving a parcel of land situated in Poblacion, San Mateo,
Isabela with a total area of 3,277 square meters.
The heirs of dela Cruz assert that the subject land was bought by their
predecessor in-interest from the private respondents, Madrid brothers, for P4,
000.00 in a deed of sale executed on May 18, 1959, and since then they have been
in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the property.
However, on October 1986, Marquez and the Madrid brothers obtained
a Torrens Title over the said land. The Madrids denied having executed the said
deed of sale and assuming that said document exists, the same is fictitious and
falsified.
During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed of
sale since. Instead, they presented a photo copy of the purported original carbon
copy of the deed of sale. The records show that the disputed property has been
in the possession of the petitioners since 1959. They have since been introducing
several improvements on the land.

Issue:
Should the Certificates of Title issued to Marquez and the Madrid
brotehrs be given more weight than the long possession of the subject land by
the heirs of dela Cruz?

Ruling:
No. The Madrids argue that neither prescription nor laches can operate
against them because their title to the property is registered under the Torrens
system and therefore imprescriptable.
 Such principles, while admittedly correct, are subject to certain
exceptions. The fact that the Madrids were able to secure TCT No. 167250, and
Marquez, TCT Nos. 167220 and 167256, did not operate to vest upon them
ownership of the property.
The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It is not a mode of
acquiring ownership, especially considering the fact that both the Madrids and
Marquezes obtained their respective TCTs only in October 1986, twenty-seven
long (27) years after heirs of dela Cruz first took possession of the land.
If the Madrids and Marquezes wished to assert their ownership, they
should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to
have the land registered under their respective names.

Cabrera v CA
267 SCRA 339

FACTS:
In 1950, a parcel of unregistered land which was owned in mutual by
Daniel, Albertana and Felicidad Teokemian, having inherited the same from their
late father, Domingo Teokemian, was sold to Andres Orais wherein Felicidad was
not able to sign in the Deed of Sale. In 1957, Virgilia Orais, daughter of the vendee
issued Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title over the said property.
In 1972, the one-third share of Felicidad Teokemian in her possession was
sold to spouses Elanoand Felicidad Cabrera who instantly took possession of it. In
1988, Virgilia Orais filed a civil case for quieting of title against Felicidad
Teokemian and Felicidad Cabrera.
On April 27, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
defendants against the plaintiff, ruling that the latter can no longer recover the
portion of land occupied by the past due to laches.
The Court of Appeals reversed such findings upon appeal on the
justification that the defendants action for reconveyance based on an implied
trust had already been barred by prescription and that the action of the plaintiffs
is not barred by laches because what was sold to the Cabreras was a definite
portion of the community property.

Issue: Is the action of the plaintiffs barred by laches?

Ruling:
Yes. The argument that laches does not apply because what was sold to
the Cabreras was a definite portion of the community property, and, therefore,
void, is untenable.
Undisputed is the fact that since the sale of the two-third portion of the
subject property to the plaintiff, the latter had allowed Felicidad Teokemian to
occupy that one-third portion allotted to her. There has, therefore, been a partial
partition, where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a
coowner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and has not
 disturbed the same, for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a
better condition or right.

Avila v Tapucar
201 SCRA 148
FACTS:
Pedro and Dominga Bahan owns a coconut land in Butuan City containing
1.8 hectares. The land was inherited by the Heirs of Bahan. Later on, Magdalena
and Mariano Avila acquired a portion of the land from a certain Luis Cabalan in a
Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land. Meanwhile, the heirs of Bahan filed
an application for patent over the land including those owned by the Avilas.
The heirs of Bahan harvested coconut from the said land so Avila filed a
case for Preliminary Injunction to prevent the Bahans from harvesting coconuts
on their land. The Bahans filed a case for Quieting of Title.
Initially, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. While the case was
pending, the Bahans were able to obtain a Certificate of Title after the Bureau of
Lands erroneously forwarded an approval of their patent application. The Judge
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction after presentation of an Original
Certificate of Title.

ISSUE: Whether the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction was proper.

DECISION:
Judge Tapucar abused his discretion when he ruled that the OCT was
already indefeasible. The parties involved are given one year to question the
validity of the OCT issued. In this case, the free patent was issued erroneously in
favor of the Bahans.
If a person acquires a Certificate of Title by mistake, he does not acquire
title to the land mistakenly included by virtue of the Certificate of Title alone. The
title included lands owned by the Avilas. It should be noted that registration does
not vest title. The OCT is merely evidence of title. The land remains to be owned
by the Avilas despite the OCT erroneously issued.

E. A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS CONCLUSIVE as to:

i. THE OWNERSHIP OF THE REGISTRANT

TAN vs. BANTEGUI

G.R. No. 154027, OCTOBER 24, 2005
A certificate of title under the Torrens system serves as evidence of an
indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears on
it. While it is true that Transfer Certificates of Title have already been issued in
the names of the subsequent purchasers, they should nonetheless be invalidated.
Considering the failure to abide by the mandatory requirements of a proceeding
in personam, no better title than that of the original owner can be assumed by
the transferees.

FACTS:
 Bantegui is the registered owner of a property in Quezon City. She
obtained the property from the Bautisas and paid real estate taxes until 1977.
The land had current occupants named Caedos. She failed to pay the subsequent
taxes and so the property was sold at a public auction to the Capistranos. The
Capistranos sold the land to the Pereyras. Pereyras mortgaged the land to the
Tans, who obtained it for the extinguishment of the obligation of Pereyras. At this
time, the Caedos thought that the land was still owned by the Banteguis. Tan
informed the Caedos of their ownership of the land and sought to eject the
Caedos. Bantegui later joined the Caedos in filing a complaint for annulment of
sale and quieting of title. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Bantegui, arguing that
the initial auction sale was invalid for not following the rules.

ISSUE: Was the auction sale valid? WHat is the effect of the invalidity to the titles
derived from it?

DECISION:
No. The auction sale did not follow the rules. No notice of delinquency
was given to Bantegui which would afford her due process. An auction sale is in
personam. It derogates the property rights of Bantegui. She was also not given
the excess of the proceeds of the sale. The Bautistas also did not seem to have
taken possession of the property. All titles issued from the void auction sale
should be invalidated. While it is true that Transfer Certificates of Title have
already been issued in the names of the subsequent purchasers, they should
nonetheless be invalidated. Considering the failure to abide by the mandatory
requirements of a proceeding in personam, no better title than that of the original
owner can be assumed by the transferees. The subsequent purchasers were not
innocent because they were aware of the defects in the title.
The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to a
transferee who takes the title despite a notice of the flaw in it. Respondent
Bantegui remained in continuous possession of the owners duplicate copy of the
Certificate of Title. She was even allowed to undertake an administrative
reconstitution of her file copy after its destruction by fire.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds issued a reconstituted title in her
name, in which the property had been registered as early as 1959. For reasons
known only to the alleged purchasers, no attempt was even made to have the
title immediately cancelled. It is basic that registration does not vest title, which
is a mere evidence of title to a property.

ii. THE IDENTITY OF THE LAND

DEMASIADO vs. VELASCO

G.R. No. L-27844, MAY 10, 1976

Under Section 47 of the Land Registration Act, (Act No. 496) the certificate of title
covering registered land "shall be received as evidence in all courts of the
Philippines, and shall be conclusive as to all matters contained therein
 (principally, the Identity of the owner of the land covered thereby) except so far
as provided" in the Act itself.

FACTS:
Demasiado purchased a parcel of land from his uncle with a right to
repurchase. In failing to exercise the right to repurchase, Demasiado and his uncle
entered into a Deed of Definite Sale. The land was obtained by his uncle from a
certain Britanico, who obtained it from Aplasca. The Deeds were not registered
with the Register of Deeds. However, it came out that the Aplasca (represented
by his Heirs including Velascos wife, Moralidad, et. al.) had an Original Certificate
of Title issued in 1934. There is no evidence that the title has been previously
cancelled or of any encumbrances on the title. Demasiado filed a civil case for
recovery of possession claiming that he has been in long possession of the land
when the Aplascas suddenly entered the land.

ISSUE: Who owns the land?

DECISION:
It appears based on the OCT that the Aplascas own the land. The OCT
shall be received in evidence in all courts and is conclusive for all matters
contained therein. The Deeds of Definite sale which are unregistereed have no
probative value in this case even if they are public documents. They cannot
overcome the conclusiveness of the matters contained in the OCT under the
name of the Aplascas. They cannot be considered superior to the OCT.
The adverse possession of Demasiado also does not operate in his favor
because the OCT cannot be derogated even if the Aplascas have known that
Demasiado has occupied their land.

iii. ITS LOCATION

ODSIGUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 11117, JULY 4, 1994

Petitioner contends that private respondents have not identified the

property sought to be recovered as required by Art. 434 of the Civil Code. He
alleges that Sitio Aduas, where the land in question is located, is at the boundary
of Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay Lagundi, Morong, Rizal.
On the other hand, petitioner maintains, the parcel of land he is
occupying is located in Barangay May-Iba. But private respondent's title (OCT No.
4050) indicates that the property is located in Barangay Lagundi.
A certificate of title is conclusive evidence not only of ownership of the
land referred but also its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land
covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly, petitioners will be required to demolish
only whatever is constructed within its boundaries.

F. GENERAL INCIDENTS

SECTION 46, PD 1529

 General incidents of registered land. Registered land shall be subject to such
burdens and incidents as may arise by operation of law. Nothing contained in this decree
shall in any way be construed to relieve registered land or the owners thereof from any
rights incident to the relation of husband and wife, landlord and tenant, or from liability
to attachment or levy on execution, or from liability to any lien of any description
established by law on the land and the buildings thereon, or on the interest of the owner
in such land or buildings, or to change the laws of descent, or the rights of partition
between co-owners, or the right to take the same by eminent domain, or to relieve such
land from liability to be recovered by an assignee in insolvency or trustee in bankruptcy
under the laws relative to preferences, or to change or affect in any way other rights or
liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise
provided in this Decree.

BUDLONG vs. PONDOC

G.R. No. L-27702, SEPTEMBER 9, 1977

We find the appeal to be meritorious. The trial court erred in assuming

that the donee ceased to be a co-owner because her name does not appear in
OCT No. 4718 which was issued two years after the execution of the deed of
donation.
Overlooked by the trial court is the provision of section 70 of Act No. 496
that "registered land, and ownership therein, shall in all respects be subject to
the same burdens and incidents attached by law to unregistered land", and that
nothing in Act No. 496 "shall in any way be construed" "to change the laws of
descent, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants and other
cotenants" "or to change or affect in any other way any other rights or liabilities
created by law and applicable to unregistered land, except as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act or in the amendments hereof."