I.
STRICT LIABILITY TORTS
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
DAVID UY and TERESITA UY, G.R. No. 74431, November 6, 1989
FACTS:
Theness Uy is the daughter of the respondents who died due to broncho pneumonia. Before said death
happened, Theness, a child of 3 yrs old was bitten by Andoy, a dog owned by the deceased Vicente
Vestil, the father of Purita Vestil who is the petitioner in this case. After the child got bitten by the dog,
she was rushed to the hospital, she was discharged 9 days later. After a week, she was brought again
to the hospital since she suffered nausea and was vomiting and later died due to broncho pneumonia.
Seven months later, the spouses Uy filed for damages against the petitioners alleging that it was their
dog who had bitten their daughter which caused her death. The Vestil spouses on the other hand
denied liability on the ground that the dog was owned by their deceased father Vicente Miranda and that
the dog was tamed and no one saw the dog bite Theness. The case was dimissed by CFI Cebu, when it
was appealed the Vestils were asked to pay the respondent spouses with damages.
Thus, this petition was filed by the Vestils, they insist that they are not the owners of the house or of the
dog since the estate was not yet partitioned and there are other heirs of the property, the death of the
child was not due to the dog bite but was due to broncho pneumonia and that the dog was tamed.
ISSUE: WON the Vestils are liable.
HELD:
Yes. Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only
in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
While Purita Vestil is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate,
she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. There is evidence
showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly and used it virtually
as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when she
was bitten by the dog. The dog remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973
and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. Also, the Vestils offered to assist the Uys with
their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually.
The contention that broncho pneumonia is not related to the dog bite is belied by the statement of the
doctors that it is a complication which may arise from rabies. Theness showed signs of hydrophobia, a
symptom of rabies.
Lastly, the court ruled that for 2183 applies not only to wild and vicious animals but also tamed animals.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the
damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant.
This appeal requires a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the
Pharmacy Law.
FACTS:
Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug
store located at Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some
sick horses, presented a copy of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other
occasions Santos had given to his horses with good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The
prescription read "clorato de potasa 120 gramos en seis papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo."
Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned to Santos in the form of six
papers marked, "Botica Pineda Clorato potasa 120.00 en seis papeles para caballo Sto.
Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila."
Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium chlorate which he had asked for, put two
of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for
another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the preparation, died shortly
afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for
examination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages
contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also
went to the drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found
to be barium chlorate. (Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr.
Buencamino, a veterinarian, performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result
of poisoning.
ISSUE: Whether or not the pharmacist is guilty of negligence of selling drug under fraudulent name..
RULING:
The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one demanding care and skill. The
responsibility of the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a
special high degree," "the highest degree of care known to practical men." Even under the first
conservative expression, "ordinary care" with reference to the business of a druggist, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the highest practicable degree of prudence,
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 1
thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable
conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be constantly be exposed to the danger
flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." (Tombari vs. Connors [1912], 85
Conn., 235. See also Willson vs. Faxon, Williams and Faxon [1913], 208 N. Y., 108; Knoefel vs. Atkins
[1907], 81 N. E., 600.) The "skill" required of a druggist is denominated as "high" or "ample." (Peters vs.
Jackson [1902], 50 W. Va., 644; 57 L. R. A., 428.) In other words, the care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior
knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the
question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor
of what he sells. In a decision which stands alone, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said:
As applicable to the owners of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending drugs and medicines by
retail, the legal maxim should be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor. That
is to say, let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a patient one drug for
another, as arsenic for calomel, cantharides for or mixed with snakeroot and Peruvian bark, or even one
innocent drug, calculated to produce a certain effect, in place of another sent for and designed to
produce a different effect. If he does these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the
alleged pretext that it was an accidental or an innocent mistake; that he had been very careful and
particular, and had used extraordinary care and diligence in preparing or compounding the medicines as
required, etc. Such excuses will not avail him. (Fleet vs. Hollenkemp [1852], 56 Am. Dec., 563.)
Under the other conception, in which the proof of negligence is considered as material, where a
customer calls upon a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the
druggist is prima facie negligence, placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the
circumstances consistent with the exercise of due care. (See Knoefel vs. Atkins, supra,) The druggist
cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate give instead to the customer
barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium chlorate," and expect to
escape responsibility on plea of mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for himself, was
negligence. So in a case where a druggist filled an order for calomel tablets with morphine and placed
the morphine in a box labeled calomel, it was said:
It is not suggested, nor can we apprehend that it is in any wise probable, that the act of furnishing the
wrong drug in this case was willful. If it was furnished by the clerk, it was undoubtedly a mistake and
unintentional. However, it was a mistake of the gravest kind, and of the most disastrous effect. We
cannot say that one holding himself out as competent to handle such drugs, and who does so, having
rightful access to them, and relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of
caution and care called for by the peculiarly dangerous nature of this business, can be heard to say that
his mistakes by which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs for those comparatively
harmless is not, in and of itself, gross negligence, and that of an aggravated form. (Smith's Admrx. vs.
Middleton [1902], 56 L. R. A., 484.)
The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the
vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the
druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to anyone who relies on his
absolute honesty and peculiar leaning. The nature of drugs is such that examination would not
avail the purchaser anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination
of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist
warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.
In civil cases, the druggist is made liable for any injury approximately resulting from his negligence. If B
negligently sells poison under the guise of a beneficial drug to A, he is liable for the injury done to A. In
a case, which has repeatedly been termed the leading case on the subject and which has been followed
by the United States Supreme Court, it was said, "Pharmacists or apothecaries who compound or sell
medicines, if they carelessly label a poison as a harmless medicine, and sent it so labeled into the
market, are liable to all persons who, without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine,
in consequence of the false label; the rule being that the liability in such a case arises not out of any
contract or direct privity between the wrong-doer and the person injured, but out of the duty which the
law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others." (Nat. Savings Bank
vs. Ward [1879], 100 U. S., 195, following Thomas vs. Winchester [1852], 2 Seld. [N. Y.], 387.) In
reality, for the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense. Throughout the criminal law, run
the same rigorous rules. For example, apothecaries or apothecary clerks, who are guilty of negligence
in the sale of medicine when death ensues in consequence, have been held guilty of manslaughter.
(See Tessymond's Case [1828], 1 Lewin, C. C., 169.)
Bearing these general principles in mind, and remembering particularly the care and skill which are
expected of druggist, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have
the burden placed upon them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine
Legislature intended to use the word "fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake
cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless there be wanton and criminal carelessness and
neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the circumstances the fact of occurrence
is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs
which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name,"
what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne out by
Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish
"supuesto" is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of
fraud, falsify, deception, and injury must be present-but not scienter.
In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and
medicines, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell
one drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 2

II. SPECIAL TORTS
[G.R. No. 122823. November 25, 1999]
SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
JAMANDRE INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO JAMANDRE, respondents.
FACTS:
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of selling and distributing agricultural machinery,
products and equipment. On September 20, 1966, SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership
agreement whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer in the City and Province of Iloilo.
Tirso Jamandre executed a suretyship agreement binding himself jointly and severally with JII to pay for
all obligations of JII to SEACOM. The agreement was subsequently amended to include Capiz in the
territorial coverage and to make the dealership agreement on a non-exclusive basis. In the course of the
business relationship arising from the dealership agreement, JII allegedly incurred a balance of
P18,843.85 for unpaid deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said amount plus interest and
attorneys fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and interposing a counterclaim for damages representing
unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm Syste Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one (21)
units of Mitsubishi power tillers. In the counterclaim, JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted
to sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power tillers to a group of farmers to be financed by
said corporation, which fact JII allegedly made known to petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of
said information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and dealt with it and sold twenty one (21) units
of said tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of eighty-five thousand four hundred fifteen and
61/100 pesos (P85,415.61).
ISSUE: W/N SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed with its own dealer as regards the
sale of farm machineries to FSDC
HELD:
"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the
untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in
statutory law. If mere fault or negligence in ones acts can make him liable for damages for injury
caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. The absence of good faith
is essential to abuse of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of the law, together with
an absence of all information or belief of fact which would render the transaction unconscientious. In
business relations, it means good faith as understood by men of affairs.
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the
cardinal law on human conduct expressed in said article has given rise to certain rules, e.g. that where
a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is
not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The elements of an abuse of
rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By appointing as a dealer of its agricultural
equipment, SEACOM recognized the role and undertaking of JII to promote and sell said equipment.
Under the dealership agreement, JII was to act as a middleman to sell SEACOMs products, in its area
of operations, i.e. Iloilo and
Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of other places, to send its men to Manila for training on repair,
servicing and installation of the items to be handled by it, and to comply with other personnel and
vehicle requirements intended for the benefit of the dealership After being informed of the
demonstrations JII had conducted to promote the sales of SEACOM equipment, including the
operations at JIIs expense conducted for five months, and the approval of its facilities (service and
parts) by FSDC, SEACOM participated in the bidding for the said equipment at a lower price, placing
itself in direct competition with its own dealer. The actuations of SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.
Even if the dealership agreement was amended to make it on a non-exclusive basis, SEACOM may
not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it
opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-
quoted. This provision, together with the succeeding article on human relation, was intended to embody
certain basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and
for the stability of the social order. What is sought to be written into the law is the pervading principle of
equity and justice above strict legalism.
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents.
FACTS:
Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation
Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the
reason Account Closed. Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature
belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied
that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for
violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who
manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of
such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 3
(Complete version sa facts)
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for
short) delivered to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V. Mapa Street,
Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson
was given Pacific Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00 and drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason "Account Closed." Thereafter,
petitioner Albenson, through counsel, traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that the president of Guaranteed,
the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry,
Albenson was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L. Woodworks, a single
proprietorship business, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon
verification with the drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that the signature
appearing on the subject check belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao."
After obtaining the foregoing information, Albenson, through counsel, made an extrajudicial demand
upon private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao, president of Guaranteed, to replace and/or make good the
dishonored check.
Respondent Baltao, through counsel, denied that he issued the check, or that the signature appearing
thereon is his. He further alleged that Guaranteed was a defunct entity and hence, could not have
transacted business with Albenson.
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against
Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an
affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In said affidavit, the above-
mentioned circumstances were stated.
It appears, however, that private respondent has a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III, who manages
a business establishment, E.L. Woodworks, on the ground floor of the Baltao Building, 3267 V. Mapa
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the very same business address of Guaranteed.
On September 5, 1983, Assistant Fiscal Ricardo Sumaway filed an information against Eugenio S.
Baltao for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. In filing said information, Fiscal Sumaway claimed
that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting evidence, but the latter failed to
do so and therefore, was deemed to have waived his right.
Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given
an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he
never had any dealings with Albenson or Benjamin Mendiona, consequently, the check for which he has
been accused of having issued without funds was not issued by him and the signature in said check
was not his.
On January 30, 1984, Provincial Fiscal Mauro M. Castro of Rizal reversed the finding of Fiscal
Sumaway and exonerated respondent Baltao. He also instructed the Trial Fiscal to move for dismissal
of the information filed against Eugenio S. Baltao. Fiscal Castro found that the signature in PBC Check
No. 136361 is not the signature of Eugenio S. Baltao. He also found that there is no showing in the
records of the preliminary investigation that Eugenio S. Baltao actually received notice of the said
investigation. Fiscal Castro then castigated Fiscal Sumaway for failing to exercise care and prudence in
the performance of his duties, thereby causing injustice to respondent who was not properly notified of
the complaint against him and of the requirement to submit his counter evidence.
ISSUE: Whether there is indeed cause for the damages against Albenson Enterprise.
RULING: Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didnt have the intent to cause damage to
the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of
right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. Albenson Corp. honestly believed that it was
private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:
-SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao.
-Bank said signature belonged to EB
-EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the
III.
There was no malicious prosecution on the part of Albenson: there must be proof that:
the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and that damages was
initiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1.there is a legal right or duty
2.exercised in bad faith
3.for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:
1.there is an act which is legal
2.but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3.it is done with intent to injure.
A person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor
to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount
thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject
the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 4

Development Bank of the Philippines v. CA
GR No. 137916
FACTS:
The Spouses Jacinto Gotangco and Charity Bantug were the owners of seven parcels of land located in
Palayan City, with a total area of 21,000 square meters. The Spouses Gotangco were also the
awardees of another parcel of land located in Canaderia, Palayan City. On August 22, 1980, the
Spouses Gotangco secured a loan for their poultry project in Palayan City from the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP) in the amount of P121,400.00. They then executed a real estate mortgage over
the parcels of land.
Later on, Spouses Gotangco executed in favor of Elpidio Cucio a contract
to sell over said land mortgaged to DBP, payable in installments. With the knowledge of DBP,the parties
agreed that the said amount shall be paid directly to DBP and applied to the debt of the spouses and
that, upon full payment of the purchase price, the spouses shall execute a deed of sale over the said
parcels of land in favor of Cucio. Thereafter, the poultry project of the spouses Gotangco was gutted by
fire.
On February 20, 1989, the DBP wrote the Spouses Gotangco demanding payment of the balance of
their loan in the amount of P408,026.96 within ten (10) days from notice thereof. However, the Spouses
failed to respond or pay their account with the DBP. By September 30, 1989, the outstanding account of
the Spouses Gotangco on the DBP or the principal of their loan account amounted to P246,183.74. The
DBP then wrote the Spouses Gotangco reminding them that their loan would mature on June 30, 1991.
The DBP informed the Spouses Gotangco in a Letter dated February 20, 1990 that it was going to have
the mortgage foreclosed for their failure to settle their account. Jacinto Gotangco arrived at the
Cabanatuan branch office of the DBP to ascertain the balance of his bank account but received no
satisfactory answer. But the DBP sent a letter to the Spouses Gotangco on May 24, 1990, warning them
anew that it would institute foreclosure proceedings for their failure to fulfill their loan obligations which
already amounted to P737,474.33 as of April 30, 1990. On the same date, the DBP filed an application
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed in its favor by the Spouses
Gotangco.
The Spouses Gotangco wrote DBP anew, on June 14, 1990, protesting the foreclosure, claiming that
they owed DBP only the amount of P246,183.74 as of October 31, 1988. However, the DBP was
undaunted. The Spouses Gotangco forthwith filed a petition before the trial court for a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin the public auction. The trial court issued a subpoena duces tecum to the cashier of
the DBP in Cabanatuan City for the production of the Spouses Gotangcos bank records reflecting the
balance of their account. However, the cashier failed to comply. During the trial, Jacinto Gotangco
testified that he suffered mental anguish and serious anxieties because of the threatened extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage in favor of DBP. Charity Gotangco failed to testify. The Spouses
also adduced in evidence the statement of their account from the DBP.
On February 8, 1992, Jacinto Gotangco died intestate and was survived by his wife Charity Bantug
Gotangco and their children, Jojina Ann Gotangco, Jaime Gotangco and Jacinto B. Gotangco, Jr.
The RTC decided against DBP and awarded moral damages to the Gotangcos. CA affirmed the
decision but lowered the amount of moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent spouses are entitled to moral damages.
HELD: NO
As to the issue of moral damages, we agree with the trial court and the CA that the initiation of
extrajudicial foreclosure by the petitioner of the real estate mortgage pendente lite was premature;
hence, inappropriate. Although the Spouses Gotangco failed to heed the petitioners repeated demands
for the updating of their account and the payment of the balance of the loan, it behooved the petitioner
to tarry until the trial court had decided, with finality, the case on its merits.
Nevertheless, we find no sufficient basis for the award of moral damages in favor of the
respondents spouses based on Article 19 of the New Civil Code as a result of petitioners application for
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Abuse of right under Article 19 of the New Civil Code, on which the
RTC anchored its award for damages and attorneys fees, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice or bad
faith is at the core of said provision.Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to
prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice
connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the petitioner. There was, for sure, a
divergence of opinion between the petitioner, on the one hand, and the Spouses Gotangco, on the
other, relative to the issue of whether Cucios payments were mere deposits or partial payments for the
lot covered by TCT No. NT-177647, and whether the respondents Spouses Gotangco had agreed to the
offer of the pool of insurers to pay the amount of P167,149.14 as indemnity for the loss of their poultry
farm. However, the bare fact that the petitioner filed its application of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage, notwithstanding those differences, cannot thereby give rise to the conclusion that the
petitioner did so with malice, to harass the Spouses Gotangco. The records show that, time and again,
the petitioner had sent notices to the respondents spouses and demanded the updating of their account
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 5
and the payment of the balance thereof, but the respondents spouses failed to comply. In the meantime,
interests and penalties on the loan considerably accrued. Under the terms of the real estate mortgage
and its charter, the petitioner had the right to foreclose the said mortgage extrajudicially. Hence, the
petitioner was constrained to file its application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage for the
Spouses Gotangcos past due obligation. Instead of settling their account, the Spouses filed their petition
for a writ of preliminary injunction. Because of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, the
foreclosure was aborted. Under the circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner acted in bad
faith or with malice in seeking the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage in its favor.
G.R. No. L-39019 January 22, 1988
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR.,
ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and JUAN O. CHAVES, respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
At or about the end of March 1965, Pedro Yambao, a bill collector of MERALCO, went to the residence
of the respondents and presented two overdue bills to Juana Chavez, who informed Yambao that the
said bills would be paid at the MERALCO main office. On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chavez went to the
MERALCO main office, but only paid for one of the two overdue bills. Past 2:30 pm in the afternoon of
April 21, 1965, MERALCO caused the discontinuation of the electric service in the respondents
residence. The next day, Rosendo Chavez went to the main office and paid for the other overdue bill as
of April 2, and also paid for the subsequent bill already due. The power line was reconnected at about
7:00 pm of the same day. In an action for recovery of damages for embarrassment, humiliation,
wounded feelings and hurt pride, caused to the private respondents, by reason of the disconnection of
their electrical service by the petitioners, the then Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the
petitioners jointly and severally to pay the private respondents the sum of Php 10,000.00 as moral
damages, Php 2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php 1,000.00 as attorneys fees. On appeal, the
petitioners contended that their failure to give a notice of disconnection might have been a breach of
duty or of contract, but by itself does not constitute bad faith or fraud, especially that the respondents
were delinquent. Hence, according to the petitioners, no moral damages may be recovered from them
under the clean hands doctrine.
ISSUE: WON moral damages are recoverable by reason of the failure of giving a notice of
disconnection by the petitioners
HELD:
Yes. It was held that MERALCOs right to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer is
absolute, subject only to the requirement that MERALCO should give a written notice of disconnection
48 hours in advance, and that such disconnection shall never be made after 2:00 pm of any working
day. Thus, as held in the case of Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, failure to give such prior
notice amounts to a tort, and the delinquency of a customer cannot be utilized to defeat or null the claim
of damages. At most, such circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the
amount of damages.
[G.R. No. 119107. March 18, 2005]
JOSE V. LAGON, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO V.
LAPUZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi, through an intestate court, two
parcels of land located at Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. A few months after the sale, private respondent
Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages against petitioner before the RTC of Sultan
Kudarat.
Respondent claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi Mengelen
Guiabar over three parcels of land. One of the provisions agree upon was for private respondent to put
up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those
tenants would answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the
lease.
When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed
administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the
tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new
owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against
the latter.
Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer
who allegedly notarized the lease contract between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if
the parties indeed renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty.
Fajardo showed him four copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsigned.
ISSUE:
W/N THE PURCHASE BY PETITIONER OF THE PROPERTY DURING THE EXISTENCE OF
RESPONDENTS LEASE CONTRACT CONSTITUTED TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE?
HELD:
NO, NOT ALL THREE ELEMENTS TO HOLD PETITIONER LIABLE
FOR TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE ARE PRESENT
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 6
is known as interference with contractual relations. The interference is penalized because it violates the
property rights of a party in a contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom.
The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, down the elements of tortuous interference
with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal
justification or excuse.
FIRST ELEMENT, VALID CONTRACT:
As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this,
private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal. While the
contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution
and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless, after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of
petitioners counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid and subsisting, the notarized copy of
the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable proof that private respondent and the
late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled is the rule that until overcome by
clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of
the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.
SECOND ELEMENT, KNOWLEDGE:
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer
that the contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a
cause of action for tortuous interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for
interfering with a contract he is unaware of. While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he
must nonetheless be aware of the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a
complete disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties in the contract.
In this case, petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of
Bai Tonina Sepi) likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease contract.
After a careful perusal of the records, we find the contention of petitioner meritorious. He conducted his
own personal investigation and inquiry, and unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have
made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any conflicting claim over the property. An
examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the leasehold interest of private
respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the same.
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not
sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third element.
THIRD ELEMENT, LACK OF LEGAL EXCUSE:
According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal
justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive. To sustain a
case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by
purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act of interference cannot be justified.
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the
heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a
person causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records
show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of
their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private
respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the
fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing
the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established.
LEGAL JUSTIFICATION, EXPLAINED:
As a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the
actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where the actors motive is to cause
harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers
interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an
economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives
are negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position
should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that
of the others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives.
Petitioners purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial or economic
interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist
v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a
proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a
person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith
involved.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a
legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 7
 G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
SO PING BUN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISES CORP. and MANUEL C. TIONG, respondents.
Synopsis:
Tek Hua Enterprises is the lessee of Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. in the latters premises in Binondo but
it was So Ping Bun who was occupying the same for his Trendsetter Marketing. Later, Mr. Manuel Tiong
asked So Ping Bun to vacate the premises but the batter refused and entered into formal contracts of
lease with DCCSI. In a suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease
contracts between DCCSI and petitioner, and for damages. The trial court ruled in favour of private
respondents and the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. There was tort interference in the
case at bar as petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latters property right. However, nothing
on record imputed malice on petitioner; thus, precluding damages. But although the extent of damages
was not quantifiable, it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and
causing breach of existing ones. Hence, the Court confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification
of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing.
FACTS:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease contracts were
premises located at Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles. The
contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the
premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to occupy
the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved Later, the original members of Tek Hua
Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein respondent
corporation.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Gioks grandson, petitioner
So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing.
On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the latter
of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. The rent increase was later on reduced to 20%
effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees demand. Again on December 1, 1990, the lessor
implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing.
DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest
on the lessees part, and agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did not answer
any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.
On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner, which reads
as follows:
March 1, 1991
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your late grandfather Mr. So Pek
Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua
Enterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal business. Since I decided to go back into
textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my stocks. Therefore, please be advised to
vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse. You are hereby given 14 days to
vacate the premises unless you have good reasons that you have the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be
constrained to take measure to protect my interest. Please give this urgent matter your preferential
attention to avoid inconvenience on your part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong
Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal contracts of lease with
DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So
Pek Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid rent. DCCSI
acceded to petitioners request. The lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed.
In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and petitioner and as well prayed for damages. The Trial Court ruled in their favor as
upheld by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT (Given that no
award for damages were given to the private respondents)?
HELD:
PETITION IS DENIED. The CA did not err in its decision. There can still be tortuous interference despite
no award for damages were given by the Court.
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
non-trespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other
has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is
substantial, (c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either
intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. The
elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification
or excuse.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 8
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse
to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the
property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice on him.
Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, Any third person who induces another
to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Petitioner argues that
damage is an essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court
ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that
he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorneys fees. It is true that the lower courts did not
award damages, but this was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had a
similar situation in Gilchrist, where it was difficult or impossible to determine the extent of damage and
there was nothing on record to serve as basis thereof. In that case we refrained from awarding
damages.
We believe the same conclusion applies in this case. While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking
their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that
the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for
damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not
relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The
respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease
contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved
the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioners interference.
III. KINDRED TORTS
[G.R. No. 130547. October 3, 2000]
REYESvs. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL
FACTS:
Jorge Reyes has been suffering from recurring fever with chills for around days. Home
medication afforded him no relief so he went to Mercy Community Clinic. He was then attended
by Dr. Marlyn Rico.
Since typhoid fever was common at that time, the Widal test was performed and he was found
positive for typhoid. Thereafter, Dr. Marlyn Rico indorse Jorge Reyes to Dr. Marvie
Blanes. Suspecting that that Jorge had typhoid fever, Dr. Marvie Blanes ordered that Jorge be
tested for compatibility with chloromycetin, an antibiotic. Such test was conducted by Nurse
Pagente. As there was no adverse reaction, Dr. Blanes administered 500 mg of the antibiotic.
Another dose was given 3 hours later.
Subsequently, Jorge Reyes developed high fever and experienced vomiting and convulsions. He
then turned blue due to deficiency in oxygen cyanosis and died. The cause of death was
stated to be ventricular arrhythmia secondary to hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.
The heirs of Reyes filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Sisters of Mercy, Sister
Rose Palacio, Dr. Blanes, Dr. Rico and Mercy Community Clinic contending that the death of
Jorge was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. (NOTE: Petitioners action is for
medical malpractice.)
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision. Hence, this
appeal.
Petitioners contend that:
Dr. Marlyn Rico hastily and erroneously relied upon the Widal test, diagnosed Jorges
illness as typhoid fever, and immediately prescribed the administration of the antibiotic
chloromycetin
Dr. Marvie Blanes erred in ordering the administration of the second dose of 500
milligrams of chloromycetin barely 3 hours after the first was given.
Testimony presented: That of Dr. Apolinar Vacalares, (Chief Pathologist of the Northern
Mindanao Training Hospital) who performed an autopsy on the body Dr. Vacalares testified that
Reyes did not die of typhoid fever but of shock undetermined, which could be due to allergic
reaction or chloromycetin overdose.
ISSUE: WON there was medical malpractice. NO
HELD:
Dr. Apolinar Vacalares is not a specialist of typhoid fever and he is thus not qualified to prove
that Dr. Marlyn Rico erred in her diagnosis.
While petitioners presented Dr. Apolinar Vacalares as an expert witness, we do not find him to be so as
he is not a specialist on infectious diseases like typhoid fever. Furthermore, although he may have had
extensive experience in performing autopsies, he admitted that he had yet to do one on the body of a
typhoid victim at the time he conducted the postmortem on Jorge Reyes. It is also plain from his
testimony that he has treated only about three cases of typhoid fever.
The two doctors presented by respondents clearly were experts on the subject
They vouched for the correctness of Dr. Marlyn Ricos diagnosis. Dr. Peter Gotiong, a diplomate whose
specialization is infectious diseases and microbiology and an associate professor at the Southwestern
University College of Medicine and the Gullas College of Medicine, testified that he has already treated
over a thousand cases of typhoid fever.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 9
According to him, when a case of typhoid fever is suspected, the Widal test is normally used, and if the
1:320 results of the Widal test on Jorge Reyes had been presented to him along with the patients
history, his impression would also be that the patient was suffering from typhoid fever. As to the
treatment of the disease, he stated that chloromycetin was the drug of choice. He also explained that
despite the measures taken by respondent doctors and the intravenous administration of two doses of
chloromycetin, complications of the disease could not be discounted.
Respondents also presented the testimony of Dr. Ibarra T. Panopio who is a member of the Philippine
and American Board of Pathology, an examiner of the Philippine Board of Pathology, and chief
pathologist at the MetroCebu Community Hospital, Perpetual Succor Hospital, and the Andres Soriano
Jr. Memorial Medical Center.
He stated that, as a clinical pathologist, he recognized that the Widal test is used for typhoid patients,
although he did not encourage its use because a single test would only give a presumption
necessitating that the test be repeated, becoming more conclusive at the second and third weeks of the
disease.
He corroborated Dr. Gotiongs testimony that the danger with typhoid fever is really the possible
complications which could develop like perforation, hemorrhage, as well as liver and cerebral
complications.
Dr. Rico was not negligent in administering the 2 doses of 500 g of chloromycetin
The chloromycetin was likewise a proper prescription is best established by medical authority. Even if
the deceased suffered from an anaphylactic shock, this, of itself, would not yet establish the negligence
of the appellee-physicians for all that the law requires of them is that they perform the standard tests
and perform standard procedures. The law cannot require them to predict every possible reaction to all
drugs administered.
The practice of medicine requires the highest degree of diligence
The practice of medicine is a profession engaged in only by qualified individuals. It is a right earned
through years of education, training, and by first obtaining a license from the state through professional
board examinations. Such license may, at any time and for cause, be revoked by the government. In
addition to state regulation, the conduct of doctors is also strictly governed by the Hippocratic Oath, an
ancient code of discipline and ethical rules which doctors have imposed upon themselves in recognition
and acceptance of their great responsibility to society. Given these safeguards, there is no need to
expressly require of doctors the observance of extraordinary diligence.
As it is now, the practice of medicine is already conditioned upon the highest degree of diligence. And,
as we have already noted, the standard contemplated for doctors is simply the reasonable average
merit among ordinarily good physicians. That is reasonable diligence for doctors or, as the Court of
Appeals called it, the reasonable skill and competence . . . that a physician in the same or similar
locality . . . should apply.
There are thus four elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury,
and proximate causation
Petitioners action is for medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which consists in
the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill
which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like
surrounding circumstances.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or
she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the
failure or action caused injury to the patient.
The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor is not applicable in this case.
Was there a physician-patient relationship between the respondent doctors and Jorge
Reyes? Yes.
Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably
competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is breach of this duty
which constitutes actionable malpractice.
As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the
breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized
that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is not applicable in the case at bar
Though expert testimony is usually needed to prove malpractice, where common knowledge and
experience teach that the injury would not have occurred if due care had been exercised, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur can be invoked to establish negligence.
Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court
from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common
knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due
care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what
occurred but how and why it occurred.
When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act
or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care.
There is nothing unusual about the death of Jorge Reyes (absence of 1st requisite that the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent)
In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance
was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 10
Prior to his admission, the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the
analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from
a serious illness and professional medical help came too late for him.
It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a
physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The
physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct,
or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.
[G.R. No. 118141. September 5, 1997]
GARCIA-RUEDA, petitioner, vs. WILFREDO L. PASCASIO.
FACTS:
Florencio V. Rueda, husband of petitioner Leonila Garcia-Rueda, underwent surgical operation at the
UST hospital for the removal of a stone blocking hisureter. He was attended by Dr. Domingo Antonio,
Jr. who was the surgeon, while Dr. Erlinda Balatbat Reyes was the anesthesiologist. Six hours after the
surgery, Florencio died of complications of unknown cause, according to officials of the UST Hospital.
Leonila requested that the NBI perform an autopsy on her husbands body. The NBI found that he had
died because of lack of care by the attending physician in administering anesthesia. They
recommended that Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes be charged for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence
before the office of the City Prosecutor.
Addtl facts pero relating na sa in the exercise of its investigative power, this Court has consistently
held that courts will not interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or the Ombudsman to determine the
specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged.
Kay sa prosecutors office gilabaylabay or gipasapasa ra ang kaso ni niabot nala sa 9 prosecutors. Kay
si Prosecutor Antonio M. Israel, who had to inhibit himself because he was related to the counsel of one
of the doctors. Unya na reraffle re-raffled kang Prosecutor Norberto G. Leono who was, however,
disqualified on motion of the petitioner since he disregarded prevailing laws and jurisprudence regarding
preliminary investigation. The case was then referred to Prosecutor Ramon O. Carisma, who issued a
resolution recommending that only Dr. Reyes be held criminally liable and that the complaint against Dr.
Antonio be dismissed. Pending the MR regarding Proecutor Dimagibas resolution the case was
transferred to Prosecutor Leoncia R. Dimagiba, where an endorsement that the complaint against Dr.
Reyes be dismissed and instead, a corresponding information be filed against Dr. Antonio. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the findings of Prosecutor Dimagiba. the case was again
assigned to another prosecutor, Eudoxia T. Gualberto, who recommended that Dr. Reyes be included in
the criminal information of Homicide through Reckless Imprudence. While the recommendation of
Prosecutor Gualberto was pending, the case was transferred to Senior State Prosecutor Gregorio A.
Arizala, who resolved to exonerate Dr. Reyes from any wrongdoing, a resolution which was approved
by both City Prosecutor Porfirio G. Macaraeg and City Prosecutor Jesus F. Guerrero. MAO NI REASON
NA NAGFILE CASE SI LEONILA SA OMBUDSMAN AGAINST SA UABGN PROSECUTORNA NI
FAVOR SA KANG DR. REYES NA DILI IAPIL SA CASE TAPOS GIPASAPASA RA IYA CASE
TAPOS CGE CHANGE2 UG RESOSULTION
A series of nine prosecutors tossed the responsibility of conducting a preliminary investigation to each
other with contradictory recommendations (they played ping pong with the case).
Frustrated, Leonila filed graft charges specifically for violation of Section 3(e)of Republic Act No. 3019
against Prosecutors Guerrero, Macaraeg, and Arizala for manifest partiality in favor of Dr. Reyes before
the office of the Ombudsman. On July 11, 1994, the Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution
dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. Petitioner faults the Ombudsman for, allegedly in grave
abuse of discretion, refusing to find that there exists probable cause to hold public respondent City
Prosecutors liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In fne, petitioner assails the exercise of
the discretionary power of the Ombudsman to review the recommendations of the government
prosecutors and to approve and disapprove the same
ISSUE: Whether or not an expert testimony is needed to prove the negligence of Dr. Antonio and Dr.
Balatbat-Reyes?
HELD: Yes
Ratio:
In the instant case, no less than the NBI pronounced after conducting an autopsy that there was indeed
negligence on the part of the attending physicians in administering the anaesthesia. The fact of want of
competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the veracity of which can best be passed upon after a
full-blown trial for it is virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case without
extensive investigation, research, evaluation and consultations with medical experts. Clearly, the City
Prosecutors are not in a competent position to pass judgment on such a technical matter, especially
when there are conflicting evidence and findings. The bases of a party's accusation and defenses are
better ventilated at the trial proper than at the preliminary investigation.
In its simplest terms, the type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to
redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm.
In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most
cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done;
and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient.
Hence, there are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and
proximate causation.
Evidently, when the victim employed the services of Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes, a physician-patient
relationship was created. In accepting the case, Dr. Antonio and Dr. Reyes in effect represented that,
having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field,
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 11
they will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of their patients. They have a duty to use
at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or
their improper performance, by a physician surgeon whereby the patient is injured in body or in health,
constitutes actionable malpractice. Consequently, in the event that any injury results to the patient from
want of due care or skill during the operation, the surgeons may be held answerable in damages for
negligence.
Moreover, in malpractice or negligence cases involving the administration of anaesthesia, the necessity
of expert testimony and the availability of the charge of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff; have been
applied in actions against anaesthesiologists to hold the defendant liable for the death or injury of a
patient under excessive or improper anaesthesia. Essentially, it requires two-pronged evidence:
evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case, and a
showing that the physician in question negligently departed from this standard in his treatment.
Another element in medical negligence cases is causation which is divided into two inquiries: whether
the doctor's actions in fact caused the harm to the patient and whether these were the proximate cause
of the patient's injury. Indeed here, a causal connection is discernible from the occurrence of the
victim's death after the negligent act of the anaesthesiologist in administering the anesthesia, a fact
which, if confirmed, should warrant the filing of the appropriate criminal case. To be sure, the allegation
of negligence is not entirely baseless. Moreover, the NBI deduced that the attending surgeons did not
conduct the necessary interview of the patient prior to the operation. It appears that the cause of the
death of the victim could have been averted had the proper drug been applied to cope with the
symptoms of malignant hyperthermia. Also, we cannot ignore the fact that an antidote was readily
available to counteract whatever deleterious effect the anaesthesia might produce. Why these
precautionary measures were disregarded must be sufficiently explained.
BASTA NEED FULL BLOWN TRIAL TO ASCERTAIN THE MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE KAY NEEDED
REASEARCH, EVALUATION, CONSULTATION WITH MED EXPERTS UNYA ANG CITY
PROSECTOR ARE NOT IN THE COMPETENT POSITION TO PASS JUDGMENT ON TECHNICAL
MATTERS ESPECIALLY IF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS.
ANG MAAYO UNTA DAW GIBUHAT SA PETITIONER KAY APPEAL ANG RESOLUTION SA MGA
CITY PROSECTOR NA DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT SA SEC OF JUSTICE (GDISMISS
ANG CASE NI PETITIONER AGAINST SA CITY PROSECTOR PERO WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO
THE FILING OF AN APPEAL SA SOJ.
Doctrine: To hold hospitals liable for medical malpractice, a patient must only prove that
a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient
ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the
minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON RAYMOND RAMOS vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA
GUTIERREZ, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999
FACTS:
June 17, 1985 afternoon: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an operation to the
stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy" operation
performed by Dr. Orlino Hozaka. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the
anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the operation. He assured Rogelio E. Ramos,
husband that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez. Erlinda's hand was
held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol
Medical Center together with her husband went down with her to the operating room. Instead of 9:30
am, Dr. Hosaka arrived at about 12:15 P.M.Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing,
saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist Dr.
Calderon. She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong. When she went
back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m. she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was since then
comatosed. She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five
minutes. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage". Monthly
expenses ranged from P8,000 to P10,000. Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka
and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.
RTC: favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totaling to P632,000 as of April
15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of
suit. Respondents appealed.
CA: reversed ordering the Ramos' to pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest
ISSUE: WON the Ramos' are entitled to damages.
HELD:
Yes. CA modified in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private respondents the following: 1)
P1,352,000 actual damages computed as of the date of promulgation plus a monthly payment of
P8,000.00 up to the time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000
moral damages, 3) P1,500,000 temperate damages; 4) P100,000 exemplary damages
and P100,000 attorney's fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a
judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a
given inference.
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence - applicable in this case.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 12
Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.
As borne by the records, respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient according to
witness Herminda. With her clinical background as a nurse, the Court is satisfied with her testimony.
Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative
procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility.
Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject
matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or
by practical experience. Dr. Jamora, not an anesthesiologist, stated that oxygen deprivation which led to
anoxic encephalopathy was due to an unpredictable drug reaction to the short-acting barbiturate was
not accepted as expert opinion. Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the
proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. Dr.
Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had
little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that
he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff.
While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying
all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate
consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of
the payment of wages.
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory damages in
instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature of such cases,
no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that
these damages cover two distinct phases.
They should not be compelled by dire circumstances to provide substandard care at home without the
aid of professionals, for anything less would be grossly inadequate. Under the circumstances, an award
of P1,500,000.00 in temperate damages would therefore be reasonable.
The damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the
years. Erlinda Ramos was in her mid-forties when the incident occurred. She has been in a comatose
state for over fourteen years now. Ramos' are charged with the moral responsibility of the care of the
victim. The family's moral injury and suffering in this case is clearly a real one. Award of P2,000,000 in
moral damages would be appropriate.
Finally, by way of example, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are hereby awarded.
Considering the length and nature of the instant suit we are of the opinion that attorney's fees valued at
P100,000 are likewise proper.
[G.R. No. 143196. November 26, 2002]
STI DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The petitioners are truck drivers and truck helpers of herein respondents Siment Transport, Inc. (STI, for
brevity), Family Mercantile (FM, for brevity), Simon Enterprises (SE, for brevity). JRB Manpower Agency
and Edwin Bumatay were likewise included as respondents in the instant petition.
The petitioner drivers formed STI Drivers Association and on May 2, 1994, the said union filed a
petition for certification election duly signed by Atty. Ernesto Arellano. On June 13, 1994, Med-arbiter
Brigada Fadrigon issued an order dismissing the petition which the DOLE affirmed.
Pending resolution of the appeal to the DOLE, however, on June 29, 1994, petitioner drivers Salvador
Caranza, Mariano Tan, Amado Evangelista, Manuel Rudolfo, Johnny Bumatay and Eusebio Tabulod,
Jr. were dismissed by respondent STI for violation of the Union Security Clause provided for in
respondents Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA, for brevity) with the Federation of Democratic
Trade Unions- STI Workers Union Chapter (FDTU-STI, for brevity). Subsequently, the concerned
petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and payment of damages against
the respondents before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. On the same day, the petitioner
drivers also filed a complaint for underpayment of their vacation leave, sick leave and 13th month pay
against the respondents.
The petitioner truck helpers (pahinantes) were also dismissed for abandonment of work when they
failed to report for work on July 13, 1994 on the ground that they allegedly attended an organizational
meeting of the drivers union. Respondent JRB sent notices to the concerned petitioners requiring them
to report for work with a stern warning that their employment would be terminated if they failed to
comply. Inasmuch as they disobeyed the said order, they were dismissed for abandonment of work. On
August 2, 1994, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and payment of
damages against the respondents before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC..
Labor Arbiter Protasio proceeded to hear the case ex parte and dismissed complaints, the dispositive
portion of which says: the dismissal of complainants by respondent Siment Transport, Inc. and its
officers, William Chua, Ely Chua, Simon Chuahe and Elizabeth Tan in Case No. 2 as valid and legal.
The Appeal to NLRC and CA: denied.
ISSUE:
WON they were denied due process for being represented by an impostor lawyer who was negligent in
attending to their case from the moment it was filed up to its dismissal by the appellate court. They
argue that the actions of the impostor lawyer denied them due process for the reason that they were not
given competent representation during the hearing of the case.
HELD:
We deny the petition.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 13
The records show that, aside from Mr. Mostrales, a counsel named Atty. Ernesto R. Arellano,
represented them in all the stages of the proceedings. In fact, the Labor Arbiter issued an order notifying
Atty. Arellano of the reglementary period within which to file the petitioners position papers. We herein
quote the judgment of the NLRC denying petitioners motion for reconsideration as proof of this fact, to
wit:
Records show that contrary to complainants allegations, the Order of February 20, 1995 was served to
their counsel, Atty. Ernesto R. Arellano of Rm. 400, Jino Bldg., Timog Avenue, Quezon City. It was
received by certain Edmond T. Lao on February 27, 1995 (See Record, p. 268). xxx. [7]
The petitioners were duly represented by a bona-fide lawyer and the latters failure to file the required
position papers before the Labor Arbiter or to appeal on time to the NLRC is not a ground to declare the
proceedings a quo null and void. We have ruled time and again that any act performed by a lawyer
within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the
mistake or negligence of petitioners counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment
against them.[13] Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by this Court in cases where
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application
results in the outright deprivation of ones property through a technicality. [14] None of these exceptions
has been sufficiently shown in the instant case.
In the case at bar, the petitioners merely claimed deprivation of their rights as a result of
misrepresentations perpetrated by an impostor lawyer. But, as already discussed, we cannot overlook
the fact that they retained the services of Atty. Arellano. The petitioners failed to show any evidence that
the services of Atty. Arellano violated their right to due process or deprived them of their property
through a technicality. No gross negligence can be attributed to Atty. Arellano inasmuch as he did not
totally abandon or disregard his clients cases. He filed pleadings for and in their behalf. The petitioners
should therefore, as far as this suit is concerned, bear the consequences of their faulty option. After all,
in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded against is not the
lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. The question is not whether the
petitioners succeeded in defending their interest but whether the petitioners had the opportunity to
present their side.[15]
G.R. No. L-36666 December 19, 1973
TESORO v.s. CA
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Orlino Tesoro, private respondent Benjamin Sanidad, Rosario Jaramillo and Avelino
Battad were candidates for mayor of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur in the elections of November 8, 1971.
The municipal board of canvassers issued a certificate that private respondent Benjamin Sanidad
obtained 1,692 votes; petitioner Tesoro, 1,585 votes; Rosario Jaramillo, 917 votes; and Avelino Battad
329 votes. Accordingly, on November 9, 1971, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed
respondent Benjamin Sanidad mayor-elect.
Petitioner Tesoro filed a motion of protest dated November 16, 1971 against the election of respondent
Sanidad, impugning the results of the election in 23 out of 32 precincts, on the ground of serious
irregularities, frauds, massive and systematic terrorism, rampant and massive vote-buying, systematic
utilization of flying voters and other illegally registered voters, misreading of the ballots, misrecording of
the votes, wrong appreciation of the ballots, marked ballots and unjustified rejection of valid votes in
favor of herein petitioner, which if reviewed and corrected, will make herein petitioner the winner.
In his answer dated November 26, 1971 to the protest, herein respondent Sanidad denies the charges
specified in the protest, alleging that the elections were the cleanest, most peaceful and orderly in local
electoral history.
TC: the parties, believing that it "would best expedite the termination of the case, agreed to just admit
the ballots and their other documentary exhibits (election returns, certificates of candidacy, etc.) sans
abduction of further evidence and then let the court render its decision based on these and nothing
more. And afterwards rendered a 164-page decision finding that petitioner garnered 1,626 votes as
against 1,514 votes for herein respondent Sanidad or a majority of 112 votes, and accordingly declared
petitioner as mayor-elect.
Thereafter, respondent Sanidad perfected his appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals.
However, after the respondent Court of Appeals granted the motion of the original counsels of private
respondent Sanidad to withdraw as counsel, Atty. Constante P. Pimentel the new counsel for
respondent Sanidad filed a remand for new trial and/or further proceedings of the case dated
September 18, 1972 to the trial court to allow him to further present additional evidence and to direct the
Chief of the Questioned Documents Section of the National Bureau of Investigation to make available
their services for the purpose of determining the original entries for respondent Sanidad, Rosario
Jaramillo and Avelino Battad in the questioned ballots as well as the immediate photography of 219
questioned ballots. Counsel for respondent Sanidad further stated in his motion to remand that while
examining the questioned ballots and exhibits in the office of Mr. Buenaventura Miguel, Chief of the
Special Civil Action of the Court of Appeals, with the assistance of alleged handwriting and fingerprint
expert Pelagio Casilao, he discovered tampering, erasures, alterations and superimpositions of the
originally good and valid votes in his favor and for the other mayoralty candidates Jaramillo and Battad
just to favor petitioner Tesoro.
CA: motion to remand was denied on the ground that "this being an election contest, it is of public
interest that no further delay be resorted to in the disposition of the case."
However on March 7, 1973 ordered the remand for new trial to enable the parties to adduce further
evidence, even as it quoted the portion of the decision of the trial court stating that the parties agreed to
just submit the case for decision on the basis of the ballots and other documentary exhibits without
abduction of further evidence and expressly recognized that thereafter "the trial court proceeded
carefully to examine, consider and comment on each and every ballot submitted by each side and
correspondingly objected to by the other.
SC: Respondent Sanidad is now estopped from seeking a second chance to submit additional
evidence, after he and his previous counsel submitted the case for decision on the basis of evidence
already before the trial court. He had ample time during the trial to seek the assistance of handwriting
and fingerprint experts either from the NBI or from the private sector. He should not now be rewarded
for his miscalculations or strategic error.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 14
Moreover, as urged by herein petitioner, the proofs he intends to submit at the new trial are not newly
discovered and/or could have been discovered by the exercise of ordinary diligence. They were already
then existing as well as subject to and/or available for his scrutiny at the time of the trial like the
questioned ballots, the certificates of the members of the election inspectors on the casting and
counting of votes, records of challenges of voters and record of watchers, the receipt issued by the
deputy clerk of court of the delivery to him of the ballot boxes of the questioned precincts, the report on
the revision of ballots by the revision committees including the description of the ballot boxes
themselves, as well as the testimonies of the members of the board of election inspectors. Such
forgotten evidence does not justify a new trial Appellate courts do not sit to remedy the tactical
mistake committed by the parties or their counsel at the trial.
It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the
conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had
he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were
to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as
new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. ... Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of
a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense, or
the burden of proof, ... failure to introduce certain evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue
the case are not proper grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great
that his client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case" principle was
reiterated.
Respondent Sanidad does not even impute such gross incompetence to his former counsel in his
motion to remand. Neither was the trial tainted by bias or prejudice on the part of the trial Judge, whose
fairness and diligence are revealed by his 164-page decision (Pulido vs. C.A., 34 SCRA 230, 233-34).
It is therefore evident that the respondent Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion in
directing the remand of the case for new trial.
G.R. No. L-18390 August 6, 1971
VELASCO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.
In 1948, appellant Velasco bought from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation three (3)
adjoining lots situated at the corner of South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City. These lots
are within an area zoned out as a "first residence" district by the City Council of Quezon City.
Subsequently, the appellant sold two (2) lots to the Meralco, but retained the third lot, which was
farthest from the street-corner, whereon he built his house.
In September, 1953, the appellee company started the construction of the sub-station in question and
finished it the following November, without prior building permit or authority from the Public Service
Commission. The facility reduces high voltage electricity to a current suitable for distribution to the
company's consumers, numbering not less than 8,500 residential homes, over 300 commercial
establishments and about 30 industries (T.s.n., 19 October 1959, page 1765). The company built a
stone and cement wall at the sides along the streets but along the side adjoining the appellant's
property it put up a sawale wall but later changed it to an interlink wire fence.
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation. Whether this sound constitutes
an actionable nuisance or not is the principal issue in this case.
Plaintiff-appellant Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694
of the Civil Code of the Philippines because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the
concentration and sleep of said appellant, and impaired his health and lowered the value of his property.
Wherefore, he sought a judicial decree for the abatement of the nuisance and asked that he be declared
entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages under Article 2202 of the Civil Code.
ART. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
TC: dismissed the claim of the plaintiff, finding that the sound of substation was unavoidable and did not
constitute nuisance; that it could not have caused the diseases of anxiety neurosis, pyelonephritis,
ureteritis, lumbago and anemia; and that the items of damage claimed by plaintiff were not adequate
proved.
The general rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result
from the proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against
them. But if the prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the
neighbor who causes such disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, 1 being guilty of
causing nuisance.
While no previous adjudications on the specific issue have been made in the Philippines, our law of
nuisances is of American origin, and a review of authorities clearly indicates the rule to be that the
causing or maintenance of disturbing noise or sound may constitute an actionable nuisance (V. Ed.
Note, 23 ALR, 2d 1289). The basic principles are laid down in Tortorella vs. Traiser & Co., Inc., 90 ALR
1206:
A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, Rogers vs. Elliott, 146 Mass, 349, 15 N.E. 768, 4 Am.
St. Rep. 316, Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 104 N.E. 371, Ann. Cas. 1915B,
1954, Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251, 22 A. L. R. 1197, but it
must be a noise which affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an
unreasonable extent.
With particular reference to noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances, the court,
in Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson, 156 S. W. 2d 857, after a review of authorities,
ruled as follows:
There can be no doubt but that commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in themselves may
become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and
property uncomfortable. It is no defense that skill and care have been exercised and the most improved
methods and appliances employed to prevent such result. The determinating factor when noise alone is
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 15
the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to
produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering
adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the noise does that it can well be said to be
substantial and unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all
the circumstances and conditions xxx xxx xxx
In Wheat Culvert Company vs. Jenkins, supra, we held an injunction was properly decreed to stop the
noise from the operation of a metal culvert factory at night which interfered with the sleep of the
occupants of an adjacent residence. It is true the clanging, riveting and hammering of metal plates
produces a sound different in character from the steady hum or buzz of the electric machinery described
in this case. xxx So it is that the intolerable, steady monotony of this ceaseless sound, loud enough to
interfere with ordinary conversation in the dwelling, produces a result generally deemed sufficient to
constitute the cause of it an actionable nuisance.
The principles thus laid down make it readily apparent that inquiry must be directed at the character and
intensity of the noise generated by the particular substation of the appellee. As can be anticipated,
character and loudness of sound being of subjective appreciation in ordinary witnesses, not much help
can be obtained from the testimonial evidence. That of plaintiff Velasco is too plainly biased and
emotional to be of much value.
The impartial and objective evidence points to the sound emitted by the appellee's substation
transformers being of much higher level than the ambient sound of the locality. The measurements
taken by Dr. Almonte, who is not connected with either party, and is a physician to boot (unlike
appellee's electrical superintendent Buenafe), appear more reliable. The conclusion must be that,
contrary to the finding of the trial court, the noise continuously emitted, day and night, constitutes an
actionable nuisance for which the appellant is entitled to relief, by requiring the appellee company to
adopt the necessary measures to deaden or reduce the sound at the plaintiff's house, by replacing the
interlink wire fence with a partition made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the
substation is manifestly impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric
Company who are being serviced from the substation.
Appellee company insists that as the plaintiff's own evidence (Exhibit "NN-7[c]") the intensity of
the sound (as measured by Dr. Almonte) inside appellant's house is only 46 to 47 decibels at the
consultation room, and 43 to 45 decibels within the treatment room, the appellant had no ground
to complain.
----This argument is not meritorious, because the noise at the bedrooms was determined to be
around 64-65 decibels, and the medical evidence is to the effect that the basic root of the
appellant's ailments was his inability to sleep due to the incessant noise with consequent
irritation, thus weakening his constitution and making him easy prey to pathogenic germs that
could not otherwise affect a person of normal health.
Appellee company argues that the plaintiff should not be heard to complain because the sound
level at the North General Hospital, where silence is observed, is even higher than at his
residence.
---This comparison lacks basis because it has not been established that the hospital is located
in surroundings similar to the residential zone where the plaintiff lived or that the sound at the
hospital is similarly monotonous and ceaseless as the sound emitted by the sub-station.
Constancio Soria testified that "The way the transformers are built, the humming sound cannot
be avoided". On this testimony, the company emphasizes that the substation was constructed
for public convenience. Admitting that the sound cannot be eliminated, there is no proof that it
cannot be reduced. That the sub-station is needed for the Meralco to be able to serve well its
customers is no reason, however, why it should be operated to the detriment and discomfort of
others.2
---The fact that the Meralco had received no complaint although it had been operating
hereabouts for the past 50 years with substations similar to the one in controversy is not a valid
argument. The absence of suit neither lessens the company's liability under the law nor weakens
the right of others against it to demand their just due.
DAMAGES:
Regarding the amount of damages claimed by appellant, it is plain that the same are exaggerated.
Moral: Considering, therefore, his actual earnings, the claimed moral damages of P100,000.00 are
utterly disproportionate. The alleged losses for shortening of appellant's, life expectancy are not only
inflated but speculative.
Exemplary: there appears no adequate basis for their award. While the appellee Manila Electric
Company was convicted for erecting the substation in question without permit from the Public Service
Commission, We find reasonable its explanation that its officials and counsel had originally deemed that
such permit was not required as the installation was authorized by the terms of its franchise. Neither the
absence of such permit from the Public Service Commission nor the lack of permit from the Quezon City
authorities is incompatible with the Company's good faith, until the courts finally ruled that its
interpretation of the franchise was incorrect.
Mitigating circumstances on award of damages:
1. The noise from the substation does not appear to be an exclusive causative factor of plaintiff-
appellant's illnesses. This is proved by the circumstance that no other person in Velasco's own
household nor in his immediate neighborhood was shown to have become sick despite the
noise complained of.
2. Realizing as a physician that the latter was disturbing or depriving him of sleep and affecting
both his physical and mental well being, he did not take any steps to bring action to abate the
nuisance or remove himself from the affected area. To evade them appellant did not even have
to sell his house; he could have leased it and rented other premises for sleeping and
maintaining his office a Instead he obstinately stayed until his health became gravely affected.
The law in this jurisdiction is clear. Article 2203 prescribes that "The party suffering loss or
injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting
from the act or omission in question". This codal rule, which embodies the previous
jurisprudence on the point,3 clearly obligates the injured party to undertake measures that will
alleviate and not aggravate his condition after the infliction of the injury, and places upon him
the burden of explaining why he could not do so. This was not done.
BESHIES CASE SET # 4| 16