BARRIOQUINTO VS.

FERNANDEZ
Amnesty Compared w/ Pardon Admission Not Needed in Amnesty
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war.
The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found.
Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal
had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants
amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the
enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke
amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14thAmnesty Commission refused
to process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the
crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one
who committed the crime being charged to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.

HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded
and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public
act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction;
while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes
after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the
right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in
no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that
he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal
act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient
that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to
say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and
avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be
declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty.
For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is
charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he
has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of
amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to
the nation, or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the
Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created
thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted
therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by
the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the
accused is entitled to said benefits.

VERA VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: Petitioners Juan Vera, Expedito Serrano and Romeo Plantado, including intervenor
Alfredo Oliveros, were found guilty of the crime of homicide by CFI of Camarines Sur dated
July 25, 1966. However, at the time the decision of the respondent CFI was promulgated and
read to petitioners on August 23, 1966, the judge who rendered and signed it, the Honorable
Jose T. Surtida, had ceased to hold office as of July 31, 1966. On appeal, all the herein
petitioners including intervenor, no jurisdictional question was included among the alleged
errors. Then came the decision of respondent CA on February 13, 1969. Thereafter, the present
petitioners, including the intervenor, filed petition for certiorari before Supreme Court on July
2, 1969 to review the aforesaid decision of respondent CA. Three legal questions were raised,
in such petition. Again, no jurisdictional question was raised. Two motions for reconsideration
were thereafter filed, however both motions for reconsideration were denied on August 26,
1969. Thus, this petition for certiorari. Petitioners rely on Jimenez v. Republic as well as the
earlier case of People v. Court of Appeals as authority for the view that a decision promulgated
by the judge who prepared it after he had left the bench could have no binding effect.

ISSUE: WON petitioners could still raise the question that Judge Surtida having retired previous
to the promulgation of the sentence, it must be declared null and void.

RULING: It is assumed, of course, that the court that renders the sentence is one of competent
jurisdiction. It is an admitted fact in this case that respondent Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, presided by the then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was vested with jurisdiction to try
and decide the case against petitioners. The canons of fairness are not thereby set at naught.
Petitioners cannot rightfully complain of having been the victims of arbitrary governmental
action. They were given all the opportunity to defend themselves not only before the
respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur but likewise before respondent Court of
Appeals. In an earlier petition for certiorari, to review the judgment of respondent CA, they did
not meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate that they failed to receive the
protection that due process accords every accused. What was said by Justice Cardozo fits
the occasion: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged
with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend.
Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be
acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however
crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is
due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true."

CRISTOBAL VS. LABRADOR

Pardon Restoration of Civil & Political Rights

Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the president but even
prior to his pardon he was already holding the position as the municipality president of
Malabon notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos
should be excluded from the list of electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of
final judgment for any crime against property. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election
Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of
the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights,
except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible
for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no
money or property responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be exercised
after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to
the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or
controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and
must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no
basis for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law
imposes upon those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities,
and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of
imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f
conviction. In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e
clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar
as it restores the respondent to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the suggestion
that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview
of the pardoning power of the president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning
power of the president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to
the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of this nature
except through legislative action.

PEOPLE VS. JOSE

PELOBELO VS. PALATINO

Absolute Pardon
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto
proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already
convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment,
Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino
also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon
was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen.
The pardon was already after Palatinos election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then
held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed and attached
to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for the public
office in question.

PEOPLE VS. PASILAN

Amnesty when cannot be invoked new trial

Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese. In 1944, while cleaning his gun
outside the house of one Justina Miguel, a certain Ciriaco Abarra passed by. Pasilan ordered
Abarra to wait for him. Abarra waited and after cleaning his gun, Pasilan interrogated Abarra.
Abarra was alleged to be supporting the Japanese cause and he was one of the persons who
accompanied the Japanese troops in raiding the barrio where Pasilan lived. After
interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2 stab wounds on Abarras chest. Abarra run away
towards the river. Ten days later, the decaying body of Abarra was found. About 10 years after
the incident, Morales, an agent, was sent to the barrio to investigate crimes committed during
the war. He conducted some investigation and was also able to have Miguel testify against
Pasilan and he later found Pasilan to be guilty for the murder of Abarra. On July 29, 1964,
Pasilan moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which allegedly
would reverse the decision of the lower court. Alleged as newly discovered evidence are
sworn statement attesting to Justina Miguels recantation. Pasilan likewise seeks to avail of
Proclamation No. 8 by President Roxas granting amnesty to persons who during the war
committed any act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance against the
enemy or against person aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for amnesty.
HELD: Not every recantation of a witness entitles the accused to a new trial. Otherwise, the
power to grant a new trial would rest not in the courts but in the witnesses who have testified
against the accused. Recanting testimony, furthermore, is exceedingly unreliable. Since
Justina Miguels alleged recantation has already been passed upon by the trial court, new
trial is uncalled for.
Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle appellant to a new trial. In the first place,
Proclamation No. 8 of President Roxas is not a newly discovered evidence, for it was already
known when the case was tried. Secondly, availing of the benefits granted by the amnesty
proclamation would be inconsistent with the plea of not guilty which appellant entered upon
his arraignment. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when the accused
maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot avail of amnesty.

LEGASPI VS. MINISTER

Amnesty Does not Need Concurrence from Congress if the President Acts Pursuant to His
Power to Legislate
In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty
and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He
argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution (T)he
Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the
President may grant amnesty only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case,
there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already
lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred
that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is
no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the
Batasan Pambansa.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy
the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which
provides that
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa,
grant amnesty.
The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of
executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate
under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator
as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises
concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.

MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN

Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective

Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She
was however granted pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for
her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for
back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and
Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and
that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of
the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about
by her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while
they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil
liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation
of sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized
in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the
rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

LLAMAS VS. EXEC SEC. ORBOS

Pardon Applicable to Administrative Cases

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting
graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days
hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo
III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without
completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.
HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly
see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more
reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.

TORRES VS. GONZALES

152 SCRA 272 Political Law Constitutional Law Pardon Not Subject to Judicial
Review/Scrutiny
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged
with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department
erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges
against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before
Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional
pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the
proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial
act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159
of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict
may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial
and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen
to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial
scrutiny.