Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 179754 November 21, 2012

JOAQUIN G. CHUNG, JR., PAZ ROYERAZ-SOLER, and MANSUETO

MACEDA, Petitioners,
vs.
JACK DANIEL MONDRAGON, (deceased), substituted by his sisters namely:
TEOTIMA M. BOURBON, EMMA M. MILLAN, EUGENIA M. RAMA and ROSARIO
M. CABALLES; CLARINDA REGIS-SCHMITZ and MARIA LINA
MALMISA, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In making the indictment that a courts decision fails in the fundamental

mandate that no decision shall be rendered without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, the demurring party
should not mistake brevity for levity.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails 1) the November 23, 2006
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79615, which affirmed
the May 19, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Br. 24, Maasin
City, Southern Leyte in Civil Case No. R-3248, which in turn dismissed the
herein petitioners Complaint for quieting of title, and 2) the September 2, 2007
CA Resolution4 denying reconsideration thereof.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioners Joaquin G. Chung, Jr., Paz Royeras-Soler, and Mansueto Maceda are
descendants of Rafael Mondragon (Rafael) by his first wife, Eleuteria Calunia
(Eleuteria), while respondent Jack Daniel Mondragon5 (Jack Daniel) is Rafaels
descendant by his second wife, Andrea Baldos (Andrea).

Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 224476 is registered in the name of "Heirs
of Andrea Baldos represented by Teofila G. Maceda" and covers 16,177 square
meters of land in Macrohon, Southern Leyte (the land).

Petitioners claim that from 1921 up to 2000, Rafael appeared as owner of the
land in its tax declaration, and that a free patent was issued in 1987 in the

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
name of Andreas heirs upon application of Teofila G. Maceda (Teofila), who is
petitioners sister.

On the other hand, respondents claim that Andrea is the exclusive owner of the
land, having inherited the same from her father Blas Baldos. They add that
during Andreas lifetime, she was in lawful, peaceful and continuous possession
thereof in the concept of owner; that in 1954, Andrea conveyed a portion
thereof to one Crispina Gloria de Cano via a document written in the vernacular
wherein she categorically stated that she inherited the land from her father and
she was the true and exclusive owner of the land; that after Andrea died in
1955, her son Fortunato Mondragon took over, paying taxes thereon religiously;
and when Fortunato died, his son Jack Daniel (herein respondent) came into
possession and enjoyment thereof.

On August 18, 2000, Jack Daniel sold a 1,500-square meter portion of the land
to his co-respondent Clarinda Regis-Schmitz (Regis-Schmitz).

On the claim that Jack Daniel had no right to sell a portion of the land and that
the sale to Regis Schmitz created a cloud upon their title, petitioners filed Civil
Case No. R-3248, with a prayer that Jack Daniel be declared without right to sell
the land or a portion thereof; that their rights and those belonging to the
legitimate heirs of Rafael and Eleuteria be declared valid and binding against
the whole world; that the respondents be restrained from creating a cloud upon
OCT No. 22447; and that Jack Daniels sale to Regis-Schmitz be declared null
and void.

After respondents filed their Answer, petitioners moved for judgment on the
pleadings. In an October 16, 2002 Order,7 the trial court denied the motion.
Notably, during proceedings taken on the motion, petitioners made an
admission in open court that respondent Jack Daniel is Andreas grandson and
heir.8

At the pre-trial conference, it was mutually agreed by the parties that the sole
issue to be resolved is whether Jack Daniel possessed the right to dispose a
portion of the land.9

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the court a quo rendered its May 19, 2003 Decision10 dismissing the
case. It held that with the admission that Jack Daniel is an heir of Andrea, he
being the latters grandson and therefore her heir, he is thus a co-owner of the
land which forms part of Andreas estate, and thus possesses the right to
dispose of his undivided share therein. The trial court held that petitioners
remedy was to seek partition of the land in order to obtain title to determinate
portions thereof.

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners appealed the dismissal, claiming that the trial courts Decision
violated the constitutional requirement that no decision shall be rendered
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
it is based.11 They continued to question Jack Daniels sale to Regis-Schmitz,
who they claim was married to a foreign national and thus disqualified from
purchasing a portion of the land; the non-registration of the sale; the alleged
false claim on the deed of sale by Jack Daniel that he is the exclusive owner of
the land; and the lack of authority of the notary public who notarized the sale.

The respondents countered that the sole issue that required resolution was, as
circumscribed by the trial court, the capacity of Jack Daniel to dispose of a
portion of the land, and nothing more.

The CA sustained the trial court. It held that petitioners were bound by the
agreement during pre-trial and by the pre-trial order to limit the determination
of the case to the sole issue of whether Jack Daniel possessed the capacity to
dispose a portion of the land. Since they did not object to the trial courts pre-
trial order, petitioners are bound to abide by the same. It concluded that the
other issues which were not related to Jack Daniels capacity to dispose
deserved no consideration, citing the pronouncement in Philippine Ports
Authority v. City of Iloilo12 that "the determination of issues at a pre-trial
conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal."

The CA further ruled that contrary to petitioners submission, Civil Case No. R-
3248 was decided on the merits, as the trial court squarely addressed the
issues and the evidence; that it having been discovered through petitioners
own admission in court that Jack Daniel was a co-heir, and thus co-owner, of
the land, all questions relative to his capacity to convey a portion thereof have
therefore been resolved in the affirmative.

On the other hand, the CA noted that while Jack Daniel is admittedly a direct
descendant of Rafael by his second wife Andrea, petitioners do not appear to
be her heirs and instead are descendants of Rafael by his first wife Eleuteria
which thus puts their claimed title to the land in doubt; and that although OCT
No. 22447 cites Teofila, petitioners sister, it includes her in the title merely as
the purported "representative" of Andreas heirs and does not indicate her as
an owner of the land. Finally, the CA observed that it was Jack Daniel, and not
the petitioners, who occupied the land. Nevertheless, it affirmed the trial
courts Decision.

Issues

The instant petition now raises the following issues for resolution:

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 1. NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE VIII, SEC. 14, CONSTITUTION AND RULE
36 TO DECLARE THE DECISION NULL AND VOID.

2. MISAPPREHENSION OF [SIC] TO THE TRUE AWARDEE OF OCT NO.

22447 TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

3. FAILURE TO ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF

RESPONDENT CLARINDA REGIS SCHMITZ.

4. FAILURE TO DECLARE THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND DECISION AS NULL AND VOID FOR
FAILING TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS SINE QUA NON TO SUPPORT
THE ORDER AND DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE CASE.

5. WHETHER X X X ATTY. PATERNO A. GONZALEZ WAS A DULY

AUTHORIZED NOTARY PUBLIC; PURPORTED COPY OF APPOINTMENT
BEARS NO COURT SEAL, AS COURT EVIDENCE.13

Petitioners Arguments

In their Petition, the petitioners, speaking through their counsel and co-
petitioner Chung, persistently argue, as they did in the CA, that the trial courts
Decision violated the constitutional requirement that no decision shall be
rendered without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. They claim that it is not true that Andrea is the owner of
the land; that Jack Daniels sale to Regis-Schmitz is null and void because she is
disqualified from owning land in the Philippines; that he had no right to sell the
said portion, and the sale deprived them of their supposed legitime; that their
admission made in open court to the effect that Jack Daniel is an heir of
Andrea cannot supplant a declaration of heirship that may be issued by a
proper testate or intestate court; that the claim that Andrea is the true and
lawful owner of the land is false; that when their motion for judgment on the
pleadings was denied, their judicial admission that Jack Daniel was Andreas
grandson and heir was expunged; and that Jack Daniels deed of sale with
Regis-Schmitz was a falsity for lack of authority of the notarizing officer.

Petitioners likewise argue that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of Regis-Schmitz because her counsel did not possess the
appropriate authority to represent her.

Petitioners thus pray that the CA Decision be set aside; that the Court quiet title
to OCT No. 22447; that the sale by Jack Daniel to Regis-Schmitz be declared
null and void; and that the Court award them P50,000.00 moral damages,
P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and P30,000.00 attorneys fees.

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
Respondents Arguments

Respondents point out a defective verification in the Petition, and add that
petitioners continue to raise irrelevant issues such as the capacity of Regis-
Schmitz to acquire a portion of the land and the commission of the notary
public which the CA properly disregarded. They point out that the CA is
correct in its observation that petitioners apparently do not possess the
required title to maintain a suit for quieting of title, they being strangers to
OCT No. 22447 as they proceed from Eleuteria, Rafaels first wife, and not his
second wife Andrea, who in fact owns the land and in whose name it is titled.

Respondents echo the trial court and the CAs common pronouncement that on
account of petitioners admission that Jack Daniel is an heir of Andrea, this
makes him a co-owner of the land, and as such, he possessed the capacity to
dispose of his undivided share to Regis-Schmitz. This admission, they argue,
thus settled the lone issue in Civil Case No. R-3248 of whether Jack Daniel may
validly dispose of a portion of the land.

On the question of the notary publics commission, respondents argue that they
have adduced sufficient evidence to refute petitioners claim that the notary
public, Atty. Paterno Gonzalez, possessed the authority to notarize documents
at the time. They direct the Courts attention to the appointment issued by
Executive Judge Fernando Campilan, Jr., the testimony of the latters clerk of
court confirming the issuance of the notarial commission, and Atty. Gonzalezs
oath of office as notary during the period in question.

Finally, on the issue that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Regis-Schmitz, respondents point to the fact that since Regis-Schmitz
appointed Jack Daniel as her attorney-in-fact to represent her in Civil Case No.
R-3248, no authority from her was required in order that Jack Daniels counsel
may represent her.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The constitutional requirement that every decision must state distinctly and
clearly the factual and legal bases therefor should indeed be the primordial
concern of courts and judges. Be that as it may, there should not be a
mechanical reliance on this constitutional provision. The courts and judges
should be allowed to synthesize and to simplify their decisions considering that
at present, courts are harassed by crowded dockets and time constraints. Thus,
the Court held in Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals:

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
It is understandable that courts with heavy dockets and time constraints, often
find themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent
most desirable. We have thus pointed out that judges might learn to synthesize
and to simplify their pronouncements. Nevertheless, concisely written such as
they may be, decisions must still distinctly and clearly express at least in
minimum essence its factual and legal bases.14 (Emphasis supplied)

The Court finds in this case no breach of the constitutional mandate that
decisions must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which
they are based. The trial courts Decision is complete, clear, and concise.
Petitioners should be reminded that in making their indictment that the trial
courts Decision fails to express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, they should not mistake brevity for levity.

The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need to
prove only two things, namely: "(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2)
that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated differently, the plaintiff
must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real
property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or
efficacy."15

This case does not involve complex issues that require extensive disquisition.
Quite the contrary, it could have been resolved on a simple motion to dismiss.
The trial court apparently was satisfied that the first requisite, possession by
petitioners of a legal or equitable title to the land, was complied with; it
concluded that petitioners held equitable title, being descendants of Rafael,
albeit by his first marriage to Eleuteria. The trial court assumed that although
the land was titled in the name of "Heirs of Andrea Baldos represented by
Teofila G. Maceda", Rafael had a share therein on account of his marriage to
Andrea. From this assumption, the trial court then concluded that petitioners
must at least have a right to Rafaels share in the land, which right grants them
the equitable title required to maintain a suit for quieting of title. This
assumption, nevertheless, is decidedly erroneous.

It is evident from the title that the land belongs to no other than the heirs of
Andrea Baldos, Rafaels second wife. The land could not have belonged to
Rafael, because he is not even named in OCT No. 22447. With greater reason
may it be said that the land could not belong to petitioners, who are Rafaels
children by his first wife Eleuteria. Unless Eleuteria and Andrea were related by
blood such fact is not borne out by the record they could not be heirs to
each other. And if indeed Eleuteria and Andrea were blood relatives, then
petitioners would have so revealed at the very first opportunity. Moreover, the

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
fact that Rafael died ahead of Andrea, and that he is not even named in the
title, give the impression that the land belonged solely to the heirs of Andrea,
to the exclusion of Rafael. If this were not true, then the title should have as
registered owners the "Heirs of Rafael and Andrea Mondragon", in which case
the petitioners certainly would possess equitable title, they being descendants-
heirs of Rafael. Yet OCT No. 22447 is not so written.

Add to this is the fact that petitioners are not in possession of the land. A
different view would have been taken if they were. Indeed, not even the fact
that their sister Teofila Macedas name appears in OCT No. 22447 could
warrant a different conclusion. Her name appears therein only a representative
of Andreas heirs. As mere representative, she could have no better right.16

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, Civil Case No. R-3248 deserved no
greater treatment than dismissal. Petitioners do not possess legal or equitable
title to be land, such that the only recourse left for the trial court was to
dismiss the case. Thus, said although they both arrived at the correct
conclusion, the trial court and the CA did so by an erroneous appreciation of
the facts and evidence.

Petitioners cannot, on the pretext of maintaining a suit for quieting of title.,

have themselves declared as Andreas heirs so that they may claim a share in
the land. If they truly believe that they are entitled to a share in the land, they
may avail of the remedies afforded to excluded heirs under the Rules of Court,
or sue for the annulment of OCT No. 22447 and seek the issuance of new titles
in their name, or recover damages in the event prescription has sent.17

With these findings, the Court finds no need to consider the parties other
arguments, founded as they are on the erroneous pronouncements of the trial
court and the CA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. Civil Case No. R-3248
is accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 169272 July 11, 2012

NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA'IS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by its Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO S. PASCUAL, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director,
Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, Regional Office No.
32, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the National Spiritual
Assembly of the Bahais of the Philippines (petitioner) to assail the December
29, 2004 decision2 and the June 28, 2005 resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66186. The CA decision set aside the June 20,
2001 order4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Branch 36, in
Civil Case No. 36-2931 and dismissed the petitioners complaint for quieting of
title. The CA resolution denied the petitioners subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2000, the petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC for
"quieting of title, injunction, annulment of alias writ of execution, with prayer
for temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory injunction, and
damages" against Silverio Songcuan and/or his heirs, the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR, Regional Office No. 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan.5

The petitioner alleged that it is the lawful and absolute owner of two (2) parcels
of land, known as Cadastral Lot Nos. 3 and 361, together with the two-storey
building thereon, situated in Victory Sur, Santiago City, acquired through a sale
in 1967 from Armando Valdez and Emma Valdez, respectively, who, in turn,
acquired ownership from Marcelina Ordoo. The petitioner had been in open,
continuous and adverse possession for a period of more than thirty (30) years,
and a cloud exists on its title because of an invalid December 4, 1985 decision
of the Bureau of Lands.6 This invalid decision rejected the miscellaneous sales

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
applications of the petitioners predecessors-in-interest for the lots, and
ordered all those in privity with them (specifically including the petitioner) to
vacate the lots and to remove their improvements thereon. The DENR Secretary
affirmed on February 7, 1989 the Bureau of Lands December 4, 1985 decision.
Recourse to the Office of the President (OP) had been unavailing, and the DENR
Regional Office No. 2 issued on December 10, 1996 and June 6, 2000 alias writs
of execution pursuant to the OPs decision.

The DENR Regional Office No. 2, through Regional Executive Director Alfredo S.
Pascual (respondent), moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. It argued that the petitioner had no legal right or title to file the
complaint since the final and executory Bureau of Lands December 4, 1985
decision ruled that the petitioner was not entitled to possess the lots.

THE RTC"s RULING

In its June 20, 2001 order, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss, finding that
the Bureau of Lands December 4, 1985 decision was not yet final and executory
since the OPs ruling on the appeal was "unavailable."7

The respondent elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari,
questioning the propriety of the RTCs denial of his motion to dismiss.

THE CAs RULING

In its December 29, 2004 decision, the CA set aside the RTCs order and
dismissed the complaint for quieting of title for failure to state a cause of
action. It found that the respondents admission of the Bureau of Lands
adverse December 4, 1985 decision precluded the respondents claim over the
lots. The Bureau of Lands decision, being final and executory, is binding and
conclusive upon the petitioner. Even assuming that the OPs ruling on the
appeal was still "unavailable," the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for
prematurity; an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy from an adverse
decision issued by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
function.8

When the CA denied9 on June 28, 2005 the motion for reconsideration that
followed, the petitioner filed the present petition.

THE PETITION

The petitioner argues that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action
when it alleged that the petitioner is in open, exclusive, continuous, public and
uninterrupted possession of the lots for more than thirty (30) years in the
concept of an owner, and that the December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
Lands is invalid since the lots ceased to be public land upon the petitioners
open, exclusive, continuous, public and uninterrupted possession of the lots for
more than thirty (30) years in the concept of an owner, pursuant to The
Director of Lands v. IAC.10

THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT

The respondent submits that the petitioner has no cause of action because the
Bureau of Lands December 4, 1985 decision is final, precluding whatever
ownership rights the petitioner may have had on the lots; the petitioner had
slept on its rights when it failed to initiate the proper judicial remedies against
the ruling; the doctrine of primary jurisdiction disallowed the judicial
determination of the lots ownership since the qualification of applicants in
miscellaneous sales applications, as well as the identity of public lands, was
subject to the Bureau of Lands technical determination.

THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether the CA committed a reversible error in finding
that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the
petitioners complaint for quieting of title for failure to state a cause of action.

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit as the CA committed no reversible error in its ruling.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of

another.

A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements:

(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and whatever law it
arises; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. If any
of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.11

"Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of allegation in the

pleading. In resolving a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause
of action only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test is
whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the
facts alleged and the prayer asked for."12

Under Articles 47613 and 47714 of the Civil Code, there are two (2) indispensable
requisites in an action to quiet title: (1) that the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
action; and (2) that a deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding is claimed to be
casting cloud on his title.

In the present case, the complaint alleges that:

3. Plaintiff has been in open, exclusive, continuous, public and

uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner of the above-
mentioned Lots 3 and 361 for more than thirty (30) years since the time
plaintiff bought said lots in 1967 until the present. That plaintiff bought
the above-mentioned lots both on February 6, 1967 from the following
vendors: Armando Valdez (for Lot 3) and Emma Valdez (for Lot 361). x x
x;

xxxx

9. The reason why plaintiff is filing this case for quieting of title with
prayer for restraining order and/or injunction (preliminary and later on
permanent) is due to the fact that there exists a cloud on the plaintiffs
ownership and/or title over Lots 3 and 361 by reason of a document,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective, but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable and/or
unenforceable and may be prejudicial to plaintiffs ownership, rights
and/or title. Hence this action to remove such cloud or prevent such
cloud from being cast upon plaintiffs rights, interest or title to said
property;

10. This so-called cloud is that Decision/Order issued by the Bureau of

Lands dated December 4, 1985, the dispositive [portion] of which reads
as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Miscellaneous Sales Application Nos. V-65683, V-75134

and (II-2) 1047 of

Marcelina Ordoo, Armando Valdez and Ricardo Gonzaga are hereby

rejected forfeiting in favor of the government any amount paid on
account thereof. Respondents Marcelina Ordoo, Armando Valdez, and
Dionisio Gonzaga and all those in privity with them including the

National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahais shall, within sixty (60) days
from receipt of a copy hereof, vacate Lots 3, 360 and 361 of Ccs-116 and
remove their improvements thereon. One District Land Officer concerned
shall thereafter take control and administration of the aforementioned
lot until such time that the same can be disposed of in accordance with
law. Protestant Silverio Songcuan shall file his appropriate public land

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Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 application for Lot 361, Ccs-116 immediately upon the finality of this
order."

xxxx

11. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed on the aforementioned

Decision, but the same was denied in an Order dated June 30, 1986. x x x;

12. Both the December 4, 1985 Decision and the Order dated June 30,
1986 were appealed by herein plaintiff to the Office of the Secretary of
the DENR. However, the appeal was dismissed and the Decision and
Order appealed from [were] affirmed in a Decision dated February 7,
1989. x x x. That Ricardo Gonzagas recourse to the Office of the
President was likewise unavailing;

13. Subsequently Alias Writs of Execution were issued pursuant to the

above Decision, one such writ is dated December 10, 1996, while the
other one is dated June 6, 2000. x x x;

xxxx

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court, after due notice

and hearing to issue judgment:

1. Declaring the plaintiff to be the true and lawful x x x possessor of Lots

3 and 361 all situated in Victory Sur, Santiago City;

2. Declaring defendants claims, documents or proceedings particularly

the above quoted Decision and subsequent Writs of Execution issued by
the DENR and/or Bureau of Lands [] to be null and void and having no
effect whatsoever as far as plaintiffs rights of possession, ownership
over Lots 3 and 361.15

From these allegations, we find it clear that the petitioner no longer had any
legal or equitable title to or interest in the lots.1wphi1 The petitioners status
as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final and executory
December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and
the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession
and ownership of the lots.

Jurisprudence teaches us that the decisions and orders of administrative

agencies, such as the Bureau of Lands, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
authority, upon finality, have the force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.16

The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that x x x a
right or fact [that] has been judicially tried and determined by a [tribunal or]
court of competent jurisdiction x x x should be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them in law or estate[, so long as it remains unreversed].17

Accordingly, the petitioner is now barred from challenging the validity of the
final and executory Bureau of Lands December 4, 1985 decision.

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 95748 November 21, 1996

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is the special civil action of Quieting of Title under Rule 64 the proper remedy
for settling a boundary dispute? Did the respondent Court 1 commit a reversible
error when it did not declare the respective rights of the parties over the
disputed property in said action?

These are the key issues raised in this petition to review on certiorari the
Decision 2 of the respondent Court promulgated on September 28, 1990 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 18155, which affirmed the decision dated December 29, 1987 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, 3 Lingayen, Pangasinan, dismissing a complaint
for quieting of title.

The Facts

In an action for quieting of title commenced before the aforementioned trial

court, the following facts, "stripped of unnecessary verbiage", were established
by the respondent Court: 4

PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of a parcel of

land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan, more particularly
described as fishpond, cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential
land, bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E by Malawa River,
on the S by Anastacio Aviles and on the W by Juana and Apolonio
Joaquin, with an area of 18,900 square meters and declared under
Tax Declaration No. 31446. This property is the share of their
father, Eduardo Aviles and brother of the defendant, in the estate
of their deceased parents, Ireneo Aviles and Anastacia Salazar.

SINCE 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the afore-

described property. In fact, the latter mortgaged the same with the

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank branch in Lingayen. When
the property was inspected by a bank representative, Eduardo
Aviles, in the presence of the boundary owners, namely, defendant
Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin(,)
pointed to the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the boundary
limits of the property and nobody objected. When the real estate
mortgage was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction
but this was redeemed by plaintiffs' mother and the land was
subsequently transferred and declared in her name.

ON March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of

title over the northern portion of the property with an area of
approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo
fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting
and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said
portion.

UPON the other hand, defendant Camilo Aviles admitted the

agreement of partition (Exh. "1") executed by him and his brothers,
Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the total area of
the property of their parents which they divided is 46,795 square
meters and the area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square
meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters
more or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is
14,470 square meters more or less. The respective area(s) alloted to
them was agreed and measured before the execution of the
agreement but he was not present when the measurement was
made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller area because his brother
Eduardo asked him that he wanted a bigger share because he has
several children to support. The portion in litigation however is
part of the share given to him in the agreement of partition. At
present, he is only occupying an area of 12,686 square meters
which is smaller than his actual share of 14,470 square meters. Tax
Declarations Nos. 23575, 481 and 379 covering his property from
1958 (Exhs. "7", "8" and "9") show that the area of his property is
14,470 square meters. The riceland portion of his land is 13,290
square meters, the fishpond portion is 500 square meters and the
residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470
square meters. That the topography of his land is not the same,
hence, the height of his pilapils are likewise not the same.

In its decision dated December 29, 1987, the trial court disposed of the case
thus: 5

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:

1. Ordering the parties to employ the services of a Land Surveyor of

the Bureau of Lands, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, to relocate
and determine the extent and the boundary limit of the land of the
defendant on its southern side in order that the fourteen thousand
four hundred seventy (14,470) square meters which is the actual
area given to the defendant be determined;

2. Ordering the complaint dismissed for lack of basis and merits;

3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the sum of two

thousand (P2,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and to further pay
the costs of the proceedings;

4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis.

Dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners appealed to the

respondent appellate Court. In its now-assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in part the decision of the trial court, reasoning that a special civil
action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary
dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead.
The dispositive portion of the impugned Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated December

29, 1987 dismissing the complaint is hereby AFFIRMED but without
necessarily agreeing with the ration d'etre (sic) proferred by the
Court a quo. The portion thereof ordering the parties to employ the
service of a land surveyor to relocate and determine the extent and
boundary limit of the land of the defendant on its southern portion
in order that the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470)
square meters which is the actual area given to the defendant be
determined is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against
plaintiffs-appellants.

The Issues

Disagreeing with the respondent Court, petitioners now raise the following
issues: 6

a. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct when it

opined that the . . . complaint for quieting of title instituted by the
petitioners against private respondent before the court a quo is not

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 the proper remedy but rather, it should be a case for eejectment
(sic).

b. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct in rendering

a decision, now subject of the instant petition, without fully
determining the respective rights of the herein parties.

Petitioners deem to be "without basis" the respondent Court's holding that

quieting of title is not the proper remedy in the case a quo. They assert that
private respondent is occupying the disputed lot because he claimed it to be
part of his share in the partitioned property of his parents, whereas petitioners
are claiming the said lot as part and parcel of the land allotted to Eduardo
Aviles, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. They contend that they have been
occupying the aforesaid land as heirs of Eduardo Aviles in "open, actual,
continuous, peaceful, public and adversed (sic) (possession) against the whole
world." Further, they argue that, if indeed the disputed lot belonged to private
respondent, why then did it take him "almost 26 long years from June 27, 1957
or until March 27, 1983" to assert his ownership; why did he not "assert his
ownership" over the property when Eduardo Aviles was still alive; and why did
he not take any "action" when the mortgage over the disputed property was
foreclosed? 7

Private respondent corrects the petitioners' claim in regard to the date when he
had the bamboo fence constructed. He alleges that the petitioners maliciously
concocted the story that private respondent had purportedly encroached some
1,200 meters on their property when, in fact, "he was merely repairing the old
bamboo fence existing where it had always been since 1957." 8

The Court's Ruling

First Issue: Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy

For Settling Boundary Dispute

We agree with respondent Court. The facts presented unmistakably constitute a

clear case of boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action
to quiet title.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or
doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. 9

The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any

interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast

upon a title to real property or any interest therein.

In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's title
to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly misapprehended
the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that respondent Court erred in
holding that there was "no . . . evidence of any muniment of title,
proceeding, written contract, . . .", and that there were, as a matter of
fact, two such contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of Partition executed by private
respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners' father and predecessor-
in-interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property were
agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the redemption by petitioner
Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject property in a foreclosure sale. However,
these documents in no way constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of
petitioners. Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate
and fix the boundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court, "(i)n fact, both plaintiffs and
defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8,
1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted (sic) to them and
that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly measured. There
is no adverse claim by the defendant "which is apparently valid, but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable" and which
constitutes a cloud thereon.

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence

enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not the
"clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an action for quieting of title.

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose
of settling a boundary dispute. The precedent on this matter cited by the
respondent Court in its Decision is herewith reproduced in full: 10

In Ashurst v. McKenzie (1890) 92 Ala. 484, 9 So. 262, where the

complainants' predecessor in title and the defendant had, during
their occupancy, destroyed and obliterated the boundary line
between their adjoining tracts of land, and there was now a dispute
as to its location, it was held that a bill did not lie to remove a
cloud on the complainants' title. The court said: "There is no

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 allegation or evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written
contract, or paper showing any color of title in the defendant,
which could cast a shadow on the title of complainants to any part
of the land; there is no overlapping of description in the muniments
held by either. The land of complainants and defendant join. The
line which separates them is in dispute and is to be determined by
evidence aliunde. Each admits that the other has title up to his line
wherever it may be, and the title papers of neither fix its precise
location. So that there is no paper the existence of which clouds the
title of either party, and nothing could be delivered up and canceled
under the decree of the court undertaking to remove a cloud.

Another similarly instructive precedent reported in the same reference is

also quoted below:

In Kilgannon v. Jenkinson (1883) 51 Mich. 240, 16 N.W. 390, the

court, dismissing a bill to quiet title, said: "The fundamental
dispute is about the correct position of the line between lots 3 and
7. The case is not one where a complainant in possession of a
specific piece of land, and a defendant out of possession, but
claiming some right or title, are contending as to which one has the
better right to that same parcel; but it is a case where the titles are
not opposed, and the basis and existence of all right and claim
depend simply upon where the original line runs. When that is once
settled, there can remain no semblance of claim or cloud to be
passed on, and the issue on that particular question is one regularly
triable at law. . . 11

Second Issue: Should Partie's Rights Have Been Declared?

Petitioners also chide the respondent Court (and the trial court) for not
declaring the respective rights of the parties with respect to the land in
question, arguing that "when one is disturbed in any form in his rights of
property over an immovable by the unfounded claims of others, he has the
right to ask from the competent courts: . . . that their respective rights be
determined . . . ". As support for their thesis, petitioners cite the ancient case
of Bautista vs.
Exconde. 12

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, dealing with actions for declaratory relief,
specifies in Section 1 thereof the grounds, conditions precedent or requisites
for bringing such petitions. 13 This Court has previously held that

Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos
 by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder."
This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance,
to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned
therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio
unius est exclussio alterius. 14

Inasmuch as the enumeration of the causes, grounds or conditions precedent in

the first paragraph of said Sec. 1 is exclusive, by parity of rea-soning, it follows
that similar remedies provided for in the second paragraph of the same section
would also be marked with the same exclusivity as to bar any other cause
possibly clouding one's title as a ground for such petitions. Thus, even
assuming arguendo that the action to quiet title had been brought under Rule
64, the same would still not have prospered, the subject matter thereof not
referring to "a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or
ordinance," but to a boundary dispute, and therefore not warranting the grant
of declaratory relief.

From another perspective, we hold that the trial court (and likewise the
respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the
determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be
tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in
an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the
petitioners' interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of
boundaries is appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or
ownership may properly be considered and where evidence aliunde, other than
the "instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be
introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period
prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the
prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the
boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition is

hereby DENIED and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Ma. Tiffany T. Cabigon

Bachelor of Laws
University of Negros Occidental-Recoletos