CAYETANO v. MONSOD, G.R. No.

100113, September 3, 1991, 201 SCRA 210

Facts: Atty. Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to be COMELEC Chairman.
He was subsequently confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. His appointment was however
challenged by Cayetano, who argued that his appointment to the COMELEC was invalid, as he did not
possess the minimum requirement of being engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, as
required by Article IX-C Section 1, par.1 of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Is Atty. Monsod qualified to sit as COMELEC Chairman? What constitutes practice of law?

Held: The term practice of law means any activity in or out of court which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession.Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
Atty. Monsod graduated from the UP College of Law and passed the bar examinations. He then
worked for the law firm of his father. He also held various positions in the World Bank as operations
officer, the Meralco group, as CEO of an investment bank and a business conglomerate. He was also
Secretary-General and Chair of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), he also served
in the Davide Commission, and he also served as a member of the 1986 Constitutional Convention.
Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator for both the rich and
the poor, in view of the definition of practice of law cited above, more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years. Furthermore, the
Court cannot invalidate Atty. Monsods appointment as COMELEC Chairman as appointment is purely
discretionary in character and it thus constitutes a political question of wisdom to which only the
appointing authority can decide.

Decision: Petition is DISMISSED.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME THE PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, B.M. 1678,
December 17, 2007.

Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the bar in 1960, and thus practice law. He migrated to Canada in
1998 to seek treatment for his various ailments, and he became a Canadian citizen in 2004. He then
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003. He then returned to the Philippines and expressed his intention to continue his law
practice in the Philippines. The Office of the Bar Confidant opined that by virtue of the reacquisition
of his Philippine citizenship, petitioner has again met all of the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for membership in the Bar. It recommended that he be readmitted to the practice of
law in the Philippines, with the condition that he re take his Layers Oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine Bar.

Issue: Is petitioner who lost and reacquired his Philippine citizenship qualified to be readmitted as a
member of the Philippine Bar?

Held: Yes, he is qualified. The practice of law is burdened with certain conditions. One of them is that
to be a member of the Philippine Bar, one must be a Filipino citizen. Such is a continuing requirement,
such that if one loses his Philippine citizenship, he/she also loses his membership in the Philippine Bar.
Yet, because of the provision in RA 9225 that people who reacquired their Philippine citizenship in
accordance with such law are deemed never to have lost at all their Philippine citizenship, then if a
lawyer who reacquired his/her Philippine citizenship in accordance with such law is also deemed to
never have lost his/her membership to the Bar. Yet, such right is not automatic, one who wishes to be
readmitted to the Bar must apply with the Supreme Court for a license to engage in such practice
subject to certain conditions such as retaking of the lawyers oath, compliance with the MCLE,
payment of professional tax, and the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues of
the IBP.

Decision: The petition of Atty. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED.

IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THR PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B.
MUNESES, B.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012.

Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the IBP in 1966, then, he emigrated to the USA and became a citizen
thereof. Thus, he lost his privilege to practice law in the Philippines. He then re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship by virtue of RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. He states
in his petition that he intends to retire and practice law in the Philippines if his petition is approved.
He then submitted several documents, in compliance with the requirements in filing a petition for
re-admittance to the Philippine Bar.

Issue: Is petitioner qualified to be readmitted as a member of the Philippine Bar?

Held: As stated in the Dacanay petition, a Filipino who becomes a lawyer and acquires foreign
citizenship loses his privilege to practice law in the country. Yet, if he/she also reacquires his/her
Philippine citizenship in accordance with RA 9225, then he/she can resume the practice of his/her law
profession, granting that he/she files a petition before the Supreme Court to gain re-admittance to
the Bar. The Court stated yet again that the practice of law is burdened with certain conditions and
that in order to be able to practice, one must readily comply with these conditions. The petitioner was
found to have successfully complied with all the requirements necessary, and he was found to
possess all of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be re-admitted as a member of
the Philippine Bar. Thus, upon the favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same
and sees no bar to his petition to be readmitted to the Philippine Bar.

Decision: The Petition is GRANTED, the OBC is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for the
re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench and the
Bar.

JAVELLANA v. DILG, G.R. No. 102549, August 10, 1992,

Facts: Atty. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. He was filed an
Administrative Complaint by the City Engineer for continuing to practice law privately without
securing the consent of the Regional Director of the DILG, as required by a Memorandum Circular
issued by the same department. The Justice Secretary issued an opinion stating that although
members of local councils are permitted by law to practice their professions, they must first secure
permission from the Regional Director pursuant to Memorandum Circular No.74-58 provided that no
government resources shall be used in the practice of their professions, and that the practice of their
professions must not conflict with their public duties. Javellana then sought permission from the DILG
to practice his profession, which was approved by the DILG Secretary. The DILG Secretary then issued
a Memorandum Circular regarding the Practice of Profession of public officials. Javellana then filed a
motion to dismiss the administrative complaint against him on the ground that the DILG
Memorandum Circulars are unconstitutional because only the Supreme Court can regulate the
practice of law. While his petition was pending, the Local Government Code of 1991 was passed into
law. He then assailed Section 90 thereof, which pertains to the practice of professions of local public
officials, as being discriminatory against lawyers because he alleges that the provision is too stringent
against lawyers unlike those with regards to other professions. The lower court denied his motion to
dismiss, thus, this petition.
Issue: Are the assailed Memorandum Circulars of the DILG and Section 90 of the LGC unconstitutional
and discriminatory?

Held: No they are not. As a matter of policy, the Court gives great respect to the decisions of
administrative authorities in light of the principle of Separation of Powers and also because these
agencies are deemed to be knowledgeable in the enforcement of laws entrusted to their jurisdiction.
There is no grave abuse of discretion attributable to the DILG in issuing such Memorandum Circulars.
Neither is Section 90 of the LGC discriminatory against lawyers as it applies to all local officials
engaged in any profession. If there are some prohibitions which apply particularly to lawyers, it is
because among all the professions, it is the legal profession that is most closely linked with public
service.

Decision: Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

CATU v. ATTY. RELLOSA, A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008.

Facts: Complainant Catu is a co-owner of a lot and a building erected therein. He, along with his other
family members, contested the possession of a couple of one of the units of the building. They
demanded that the couple vacate the premises. A complaint was filed against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, where respondent was a Punong Barangay. Thus, he heard the complaint filed in
their barangay. When they failed to reach an amicable settlement, it a court case was recommended
to be filed in court. Complainant then filed an administrative complaint claiming the respondent
committed a violation as a lawyer and a public official when he stood for as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he stood as Punong Barangay in the conciliatory proceedings
between them. The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. According to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty Rellosa violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. They
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 1 month, with a stern warning that any
similar act committed will be dealt with more severely.

Issue: Did the IBP-CBD err in ruling for Atty. Rellosas suspension?

Held: The Court adopts the findings of the IBP-CBD, albeit with modifications. Respondent did not
violate Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because he did not leave government
service, he was the incumbent Punong Barangay of his barangay when the complaint against him was
filed. Section 7 (b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials from practicing their profession during their
incumbency, from engaging in private practice, unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict with their public duties. In the law, certain public officials like
governors and mayors are totally prohibited from practicing their profession, officials such as City or
Municipal Councilors and Punong Barangays are not prohibited from practicing their profession. Thus,
respondent was not prohibited from practicing their profession, but he should have secured prior
permission and authorization from the head of his department as required with Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Civil Service Rules. His failure to comply with such is a violation of his lawyers oath to obey the
laws and his act should not be condoned with.

Decision: Atty. Vicente Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating the
lawyers oath. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months, and is STERNLY
WARNED that any repeat of his prohibited act or other similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

MAGNO v. VELASCO-JACOBA, A.C. No. 6296, November 22, 2005.

Facts: A disagreement arose between complainant and her uncle over a landscaping contract.
Complainant wrote a letter entitled Sumbong to the Barangay Captain of their barangay.
Respondent, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) signed by complainants uncle, appeared
for the latter. Complainant objected to respondents appearance in the conciliatory hearings, but
complainants uncle said that he is entitled to counsel, even remarking that she herself is a lawyer to
which the complainant said that her being a lawyer is merely incidental. Respondent said that she was
appearing as an attorney-in-fact not as counsel of complainants uncle. Yet complainant cites several
instances to prove that she in fact appeared as counsel for her clients and not simply as an
attorney-in-fact. In her answer to the complaint filed against her in the IBP-CBD, the respondent avers
that the prohibition of lawyers appearing in katarungang pambarangay proceedings did not apply in
her case, she also argued further that she appeared not as a counsel, but merely as an
attorney-in-fact. The IBP-CBD recommended her suspension from the legal profession for 6 months,
but the IBP Board of Governors reduced the penalty to a reprimand.

Issue: WON Atty. Velasco-Jacoba violated the prohibition of lawyers appearing in katarungang
pambarangay proceedings and whether she appeared not as a legal counsel, but as an
attorney-in-fact.

Held: The rationale of lawyers being prohibited from appearing in katarungang pambarangay
proceedings is to enable to lupon to secure and ascertain firsthand the facts of the case, which could
be obscured if lawyers were present in a proceeding. Furthermore, lawyers could lengthen and delay
the proceedings in the katarungang pambarangay, instead of expediting the case. The prohibition of
the presence of a lawyer in katarungang pambarangay proceedings was not lost on respondent and
the prohibition applies to all katarungang pambarangay proceedings. Thus, Atty. Velasco-Jacoba
violated said prohibition and she in fact, appeared not merely as an attorney-in-fact, but as legal
counsel for complainants uncle.

Decision: Atty. Velasco-Jacoba is FINED P5,000.00 and STERLY WARNED not to repeat similar acts of
impropriety, which will be dealt with more severely.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. AGRAVA, G.R. No. L-12426, February 16, 1959, 105 Phil. 173.

Facts: Respondent Agrava was the Director of the Philippine Patent Office. He issued a circular
scheduling an examination for purposes of determining who are qualified to practice patent law in the
said agency. Petitioner assails the validity of this circular, stating that lawyers, by virtue of their
passing the bar, are licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines, in good standing,
are also licensed to practice patent law in the Philippine Patent Office. Thus, respondent has no
authority to conduct examinations to lawyers to license them to practice patent law in the Philippines
by the giving of an examination. The OSG, for its part, says that the practice of patent law does not
involve purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge
and training, so much so that the practice of patent law may not be held exclusively by lawyers but
also may be engaged in by engineers, scientists, etc. Respondent also avers that the US Patent Law
also authorizes the Patent Office to determine who can practice patent law before the US Patent
Office and that respondent is similarly authorized to do so under our Patent Law.

Issue: WON the Respondent is authorized to conduct examinations on lawyers to authorize them to
practice patent law in the Philippines.

Held: The SC has the exclusive power under the Constitution to regulate the practice of law in the
Philippines. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court, it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings.Practice of
law also embraces the giving of legal advice and the execution of various instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. In the Courts opinion, the practice of
law includes the ability to appear before the patent office. It is reasonable to hold that a member of
the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent
Office without further examination or qualification. Were we to allow the Patent Office to do what it
proposes in absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary function to give
lawyers to submit to and pass an examination prescribed by it before they can be allowed to practice
patent law, then there would be no reason for other agencies to follow suit even if the requirements
for the job were to be simple and less complicated for members of the Bar to fulfill. Under the
present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this court in good standing may practice
their profession in the Patent Office without need to submit themselves to an examination.

Decision: The petition for prohibition is GRANTED.

ALAWI v. ALAUYA, A.M. SDC-97-2-P., February 24, 1997.

Facts: Alawi is a sales representative of a real estate company in Davao City. Alauya is a Clerk of Court
for a Sharia Court in Marawi City.They used to be friends. Through Alawis agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase of a house, thus a housing loan was granted to Alauya. Alauya then wrote a
letter to the president of the real estate company to formally terminate the contract they executed,
because he alleges that Alawi tricked him and secured the housing loan contract without his authority.
Upon learning of Alauyas complaint against her, Alawi filed before the SC a complaint against Alauya
for malicious and libelous charges which blemished her reputation. She also complained that Alauya is
usurping the title Attorney because he allegedly represents himself as one, despite merely being a
member of a Sharia Court and not a regular member of the Philippine Bar. The SC ordered Alauya to
comment on the complaint filed against him. He claimed that he was the one who suffered injury, and
that there was no basis for the complaint against him. Alauya also defended his usage of the title
Attorney as it is lexically synonymous with Counsellors-at-Law a title which Sharia lawyers have
a rightful claim. He adds that he prefers the title Attorney because Counsellor is often mistaken
for Councilor, connoting a local legislator. He pleads for the Courts compassion, saying that he only
said the things he said against Alawi because he was unduly prejudiced and injured by her. The Court
then referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for its recommendation.

Issue: WON Alauyas defenses are tenable, and WON his usage of the title Attorney is proper.

Held: The accusations made by Alauya against Alawi are not in accordance with law, or even morals
and good customs. Even if he had a valid complaint against Alawi, he should not have uttered
malicious and libelous statements against her. Alauya, being an officer of the Court, is subject to a
higher standard more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he
may not use abusive and improper language against another. As an employee of the judiciary, it is
expected that he accord respect for his fellow man and every word he utters must be characterized
by prudence, restraint and dignity. With regards to his use of the title Attorney, the Court has
already declared that members of the Sharia bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice before Sharia Courts. The title of attorney is exclusively reserved for those
who obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and passed the Bar examinations, have been
admitted as members of the IBP, and remain members thereof in good standing. They are the only
ones authorized to practice law in the Philippines. As to his defense that the usage of the title
counsellor may mislead people is immaterial, and does not warrant his use of the title attorney.

Decision: Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for usage of improper language, and for usurping the
title of attorney, he is warned that the commission of a similar act of impropriety will be dealt with
more severely.

AGUIRRE v. RANA, B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003.

Facts: Respondent Rana passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. A complaint was filed against him for
unauthorized practice of law by the petitioner. He was allowed to take his oath, but he was prevented
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until the resolution of the charges against him. Complainant alleges
that even before he took his oath, respondent appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections. He even filed a pleading before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant alleges that he represented himself as counsel in behalf of a vice
mayoralty candidate of the said municipality.Complainant also avers that since respondent is a
municipal government employee, being the Secretary of the Sangunniang Bayan, he is not allowed to
participate in litigation involving his LGU. Respondent argues that he did not appear as counsel for the
vice- mayoralty candidate, that he only extended assistance to the candidate, and that he has already
resigned as Secretary of the Sangunniang Bayan. In her reply to respondents answer, she refuted his
claim that he only extended assistance to the candidate, that he also signed a pleading in a petition to
proclaim a winning candidate for mayor as her counsel. The OBC, after due investigation, found that
respondent indeed appeared as counsel for the vice-mayoralty candidate before the MBEC despite
not being a lawyer yet. Thus, he engaged in unauthorized practice of law. The OBC recommended that
he be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

Issue: WON the respondent should be admitted to the Philippine Bar.

Held: The Court agrees with the findings of the OBC that the respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law, thus he should not be admitted to the Philippine Bar. It is seen from the investigation
that respondent signed a pleading as counsel for the vice-mayoralty candidate of Mandaon, Masbate.
The winning mayoralty candidate of the same town also retained him as counsel, despite not yet
being a lawyer because he had not taken his oath yet nor had he signed the Roll of Attorneys. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply because he passed the Bar Examinations.
The practice of law can be denied even to those who passed the Bar, if it is found that he illegally
practiced law.

Decision: Respondent is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A MEDADO, B.M. No. 2540,
September 24, 2013.

Facts: Medado graduated from the UP College of Law in 1979 and passed the Bar in 1980. He took his
oath, but was unable to sign the Roll of Attorneys because he lost his notice to sign such Roll. While
rummaging through his old files, he found the notice he lost, and he realized that he had not signed
the Roll, and what he signed at the PICC was merely an attendance sheet. By the time he found out,
he was already working as a corporate and tax lawyer, not actively engaged in litigation. He operated
under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, his signing of the Roll of Attorneys
was not as urgent, and was subsequently forgotten. When he attended MCLE seminars, he could not
give his Roll number, as he did not have one. About 7 years later, he now files this petition to let him
sign the Roll of Attorneys. The OBC recommended that the petition be denied for gross negligence
and utter lack of merit.

Issue: WON Medado should be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

Held: The Court grants the petition, subject to a fine and a penalty tantamount to a suspension from
the practice of law. Not allowing Medado to sign the Roll would be tantamount to disbarment, a
penalty reserved to only the most severe transgressions. For one, petitioner displayed good faith and
good moral character in dealing with his clients, unlike some members of the Bar. We note that
Medado himself admits his transgression, albeit after 30 years. When asked why it took him so long to
file the petition, he says that he was scared of what might happen to him if he did. But now he takes
the necessary requirement for him to be admitted to the Philippine Bar. Furthermore, petitioner also
appears to be an able and competent legal practitioner. Thus, he is fit to become a member of the Bar.
But this does not mean he is free from any liability. Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law
for more than 30 years before he filed the instant petition. He argues that his acts were made out of
ignorance and honest errors of judgment. While an honest mistake of fact is excusable, a mistake of
law is not. Even if his story is to be believed that he operated in the mistaken belief that he was
authorized to practice law despite not signing the Roll of Attorneys, he should have filed the instant
petition upon learning that he was not able to sign the Roll. Thus, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. Engaging in the unauthorized practice of law violated Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits lawyers from assisting and engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law and warrants a suspension of the practice of law. As Medado is into yet a
full pledged lawyer, he cannot be suspended from the practice of law. Thus, we see it fit to impose on
him a penalty akin to a suspension. He is allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys, but he may only do so
one year after receipt of the Resolution of this case. He is also fined the amount of P32,000.00 for his
transgression. During the one year period, petitioner is prohibited from engaging in the practice of
law, and is sternly warned that any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed the Roll
of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Decision: The petition to sign the Roll of Attorneys is GRANTED. Petitioner is ALLOWED to sign the Roll
of Attorneys ONE YEAR after the Receipt of this Resolution. He is ORDERED to pay a fine of P32,000.00
for his unauthorized practice of law, and during the one year period, he is STERNLY WARNED that he
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law before he has signed the Roll of Attorneys and any act that
constitutes practice of law before he has signed the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by
this Court.