EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, G.R. No.

161793
Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,

Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondent, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Oppositor. Promulgated:

February 13, 2009

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DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in
their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the
young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was Rowena who asked that they elope
but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat
ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents
home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of the
house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the
house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and
demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives
and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis
of the latters psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found
both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of
living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around
him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and
has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and
control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent
is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA G.R. No. 183053
AGUINALDO- SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent. Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

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DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of
Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of
Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as null and void. Federico anchors his
oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this
petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the the decision declaring
the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld.

ISSUE:

In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should prevail?
Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:

Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation
to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and
void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time.
Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and
the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental
distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.
The effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of
the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the parties
to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and
produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment.
Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law makes
express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89 which provides
that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and
children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children,
and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the
second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.
MARIO SIOCHI, G.R. No. 169900
Petitioner,

- versus -

ALFREDO GOZON,
WINIFRED GOZON, GIL TABIJE, INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY,
INC., and ELVIRA GOZON,
Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

INTER-DIMENSIONAL REALTY,
INC., G.R. NO. 169977
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J., CHAIRPERSON,

- versus- BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, AND
MARIO SIOCHI, ELVIRA GOZON, PEREZ, JJ.
ALFREDO GOZON, AND
WINIFRED GOZON, Promulgated:
Respondents. MARCH 18, 2010

X--------------------------------------------------X

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS: Alfredo and Elvira are married. Winifred is their daughter. The property involved in this case is a 30,000 sq.
m. lot in Malabon which is registered in the name of Alfredo. The property regime of the couple is conjugal
partnership of gains.

Elvira filed for legal separation. B filed a notice of lis pendens over the title of the lot in Malabon.
While the legal separation case was still pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement with Mario who paid P5 million
in earnest money and took possession of the property. Title still with notice of lis pendens.

Cavite RTC granted legal separation. CPG was dissolved and liquidated. Alfredo, the guilty spouse, did not receive his
share in the net profits, which instead went to their daughter, Winifred. Cavite RTC ruled land in Malabon as
conjugal property.

Alfred executed a Deed of Donation over the property in favour of Winifred. Malabon RTC issued new TCT in the
name of Winifred without annotating the agreement between Alfredo and Mario Siochi, nor the notice of lis
pendens filed by Elvira, the wife. Then, through an SPA, Winifred gave authority to her father, Alfred, to sell the lot.
Alfred sold it to Inter-Dimensional Realty for P18 million. A TCT was issued to Inter-Dimensional Realty.

Mario filed a case with Malabon RTC (property was in Malabon) to Annul donation to Winifred, Annul the Sale to
Inter-Dimensional, and to remove notice of lis pendens over title of land.

Malabon RTC upheld original agreement to buy and sell between Mario and Alfredo and declared void the sale by
Alfredo and Winifred to Inter-Dimensional.

However, Court of Appeals said agreement between Mario and Alfredo is void because (1) it was entered into
without the consent of Elvira, Alfredos wife; and, (2) Alfredo s undivided share has been forfeited in favour of
Winifred by the grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. (Note these reasons given by the CA.)

ISSUES:

(1) Was the agreement between Mario and Alfredo valid? Mario argues that even if the sale to Mario was done
without the consent of Elvira, the sale should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by the
acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Mario alleges that Elviras conduct showed her
acquiescence to the sale.

HELD:

SC says the CA was right in declaring the sale between Mario and Alfredo as void. Under Art 124 of the Family Code,
if one of the spouses was incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers, however do not include the power to
dispose or encumber the properties which require a court order or the written consent of the other spouse. The
agreement is void in its entirety, not just to the share of the husband, Alfredo. The Court however said that the CA
erred in saying that the undivided share of Alfredo was forfeited in favour of Winifred. As regards Marios
contention that the Agreement is a continuing offer which may be perfected by Elviras acceptance before the offer
is withdrawn, the fact that the property was subsequently donated by Alfredo to Winifred and then sold to IDRI
clearly indicates that the offer was already withdrawn.

The Court said the CA erred in saying that Alfredo forfeited his share in the conjugal property as a result of the
grant of legal separation by the Cavite RTC. Art 63 (Effects of legal separation) in relation to Art 43(2) (Effects of
termination of subsequent marriage) provides that the guilty spouse in legal separation forfeits his share in the net
profits of the property. The Court said, Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredos share in the
conjugal partnership property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property. Thus, as regards
this point, the CA erred.
 ENRIQUE AGRAVIADOR yALUNAN, G.R. No. 170729
Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

ERLINDA AMPARO-AGRAVIADOR and REPUBLIC OF December 8, 2010

THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. -- -
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DECISION

BRION, J.:
FACTS:

Enrique first met Erlinda in 1971 at a beerhouse where Erlinda worked. Their meeting led to a courtship, became
sweethearts and soon entered into a common-law relationship, and finally got married in 1973.

In 2001, Enrique filed a petition to have his marriage with Erlinda null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
He alleged that Erlinda was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage. He
claimed that she was carefree and irresponsible, refused to do household chores, had extramarital affairs, did not
take care of their sick child, consulted a witch doctor, and refused to use the family name in her activities.

Enrique, aside from his testimony, also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric
evaluation report of Dr. Patac. In his psychiatric evaluation report, Dr. Patac found Erlinda unable to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage as she manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before their
marriage. In his conclusion stated that Erlinda is suffering from a Mixed Personality Disorder where there is no
definite treatment for such illness.

Erlinda moved to dismiss the petition. The RTC denied her motion and took side on Enrique.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Enrique can invoke Article 36 of the Family Code as the basis to nullify his marriage to Erlinda.

RULING:
No. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code do not involve a species of vice of consent. The
spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such
rights and obligations. Psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligation does not affect the
consent to the marriage.

The totality of Enriques's evidence is insufficient to prove Erlinda's psychological incapacity. Her refusal or
unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as
immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law
requires.
Dr. Patac's psychiatric evaluation report do not hold sufficient amount in proving that Erlinda was psychological
incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine Erlinda, as
he relied only on the information fed by Enrique, the partie's second[] child and household helper.

CHERRYL B. DOLINA, G.R. No. 182367

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

GLENN D. VALLECERA,

Respondent. Promulgated:

December 15, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.

Facts: In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against
Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint cherryl
added a prayer for support for their supposed child. Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition
was essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not
the childs father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her application for
temporary support for her child? Ruling: Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The
object of R.A. 9262 under

Ruling:

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed
the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or violence. Although the
issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the wife
and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her
or her child lived with Vallecera
DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No. 164948

Petitioner,

Present

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. June 27, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of
Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos and Eugene Dizon
Ramos who was born on. The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother (deceased), and
Amelia Ramos- who went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children .

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for adoption is invalid for lack of consent of the biological mother?

HELD:

No. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the
best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. When she filed her petition with the trial court,
Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological
parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced
the written consent of their legal guardian.

[G.R. No. 154994.

June 28, 2005]

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:

The court consolidated and considered two appeals by former husband and wife Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V and
Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto regarding their divorce and the custody of their child.

Crisanto had filed for divorce and custody of their child - Rafaello. Joycelyn failed to appear at the court proceedings
and the judge awarded custody to Cristiano after having considered evidence that Jocelyn was having extramarital
lesbian relations and that she did not care for and was witnessed slapping her child. It was further held that her
parental authority was subordinated to that of Crisanto under Article 211 of the Family Code. Jocelyn challenged
this decision, which was reversed and she was granted custody on the basis that, according to Article 213 of the
Family Code, a minor child shall not be separated from his mother unless a court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.

At the next instance, the Court of Appeal annulled the second court order on procedural grounds and returned
custody to Crisanto until Jocelyns motion was decided on again. In the current case, both parties petitioned the
Supreme Court against the Court of Appeal's ruling.

Issue and resolution:

Custody of child after parental separation. Whether the Court of Appeal violated Article 213 of the Family Code
when it awarded custody of the child to Crisanto and was it Article 213 or Article 211 which applied in this case. The
Supreme Court held that in cases concerning minor children below the age of 7, Article 213 of the Family Code takes
priority as it is in the best interests of a young child to be cared for by his mother unless 'compelling' reasons are
presented for a court to order otherwise. As no such reasons were presented or proved, custody was awarded to
the mother.

Court reasoning:
The Supreme Court said that the general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated from
their mother finds its reason in the basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care and that this rule is
recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has her baby torn away from her. Any exception to this
rule can only be made for compelling reasons for the good of the child, but such cases must indeed be rare.

Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of
custody. The mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody, but sexual
preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother
is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child.

It was held that in order to deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses
have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted her from exercising proper parental care. It
was, therefore, not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian, but he had to also demonstrate
that she had carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or
under circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral development. However, in the current case, there
was no evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities or that his proper moral and
psychological development suffered as a result.

[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002]

ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL
II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.: