k.

Contempt Power
Inonog vs. Judge Ibay, AM No. RTJ-09-2175, July 28, 2009

FACTS

The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of

Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint
involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which
respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because
complainant parked his superior's vehicle at the parking space reserved for
respondent judge.

Respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for
the delay in the promulgation of the decision in 4 criminal cases scheduled
at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time looking
for another parking space. That same day, respondent judge issued another
order, finding complainant guilty of contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not Inonog can be held guilty of contempt of court

RULING: NO

RATIO:

The phrase improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice is so broad and general that
it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect
contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a slot
allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this
category. There was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith
or that he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court
by making use of the parking slot supposedly reserved for respondent
judge. We cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes
disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy
and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.
The Supreme Court held that power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as
to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of
justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges but for the functions
they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their
contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for
retaliation or vindication. Respondent judge's act of unceremoniously citing complainant
in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority vested upon him by
law.

Respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay was found guilty of grave abuse of authority. He
was ordered to pay a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).

DOCTRINE:

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the rules and procedure for indirect contempt.
Sections 3 and 4 of the said rule read as follows:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.After a charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties

or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of

a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any
real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters
or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession
given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

 (g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be

initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt. xxx xxx xxx

Zarate vs. Balderian, AM No. MTJ-00-1261, Mar 31, 2000

FACTS:

Judge Isauro M. Balderian ordered the arrest and incarceration of Atty. Noe Cangco
Zarate for his failure to appear in Court despite proper notice and for his failure to make
good his promise that he will facilitate the repair of the vehicle, subject matter of the
case. Atty. Zarate filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order for having
been issued without due process of law as the mandatory requirement under Sections 3,
4, and 5 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court have not been observed and therefore null and
void. He claims that for his failure to appear on time respondent Judge summarily
declared him in [c]ontempt of [c]ourt and ordered his immediate and perpetual
incarceration when the factual circumstances of such failure to appear simply constitutes
indirect contempt which can only be issued after due hearing. Motion for
Reconsideration was calendared for hearing in January 5, 1996, but the judge did not
arrive and the motion was considered by the clerk of court and no arrest was made.

On January 13, 1996, he was arrested by virtue of the same Order and detained for 36
hours. When respondent judge issued the Release Order on January 9, 1996, he wittingly
or unwittingly failed to furnish copy of said Order.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Zarate can be held guilty for direct contempt

RULING: NO

RATIO:

Direct contempt is conduct directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of the
court or a judge, or in the doing of a forbidden act, while indirect contempt is the failure
to do something ordered done by the court or judge, such as failure to appear at a hearing
or in the use of disrespectful language in a pleading. A direct contempt may be punished
summarily while an indirect contempt can be punished only after charge and hearing.

Failure to attend a hearing does not constitute direct contempt.

 Indirect contempt can be sanctioned only after the proper charge has been filed and the
respondent has been given the opportunity to be heard. In the instant case neither
requisite was met, as the Order for complainants arrest was issued summarily.

The Order of respondent on so elementary a subject was patently erroneous.

l. No Quasi-Judicial & Administrative Work of Judges

Art. VIII, Sec. 12
Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Co., GR No. L-37878, Nov 25, 1932
Facts:

Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any
franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter
in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on
which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the compensation
to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be
fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision
of a majority of whom shall be final."

Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric
Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such
transportation companies.

Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies

affected by the petition. Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public
utility operators.

Issue:

Can the members of the Supreme Court sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case?

Held: NO

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions
of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
 expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its members should
not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and
illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the
decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric
Company.

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr., AM No. 198-J, May 31, 1971

Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and
San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI
branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28, 1971,
Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that
his Court Room can not be properly established due to problems as to location and as to
appropriations to make his Court up and running. When Macaraig realized that it would
be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended
leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to
pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave
benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The
Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to
assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy
attending to the needs of his court.

Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is
incompetent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that
Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by law. And that
Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been
performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the
judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of the executive oi charge of prosecution
of cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty
as Judge.

HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the
circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like
every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial
duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and
circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.

On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks
with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the
 DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what
he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other
great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed,
lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of
the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated
by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three
departments from each other, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on
check and balance between and among them, have long been acknowledged as more
paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional
scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action
or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal,
before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it
is best that this practice is discontinued.

*In re: Rodolfo Manzano, AM No. 88-7-1861-RTC, Oct 5, 1988

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees
on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by
the organic law of its existence

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that

Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under

the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall
be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Justice.

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shag not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges an administrative function, will be in violation of the Constitution, the
Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.
Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
 2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be
enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required
to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit
in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The
essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate
of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be
confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less
than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing
less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility
or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges,
they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication
of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an
orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges
should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which
they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their
judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

Presidential Electoral Tribunal

Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7

*Lopez vs. Roxas, GR No. L-25716, July 28, 1966
R.A. 1793
Macalintal vs. P.E.T., GR No. 191618, Nov 23, 2010 & June 7, 2011

I. November 23, 2010

FACTS:
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal questioned the constitution of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate
its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal"
complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential
employees, to effect the constitutional mandate.
Petitioners averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005
Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules), specifically:
 (1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice
and the Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively;
(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees
and confidential employees of every member thereof;
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal"
with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion
of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme
Court seal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members
of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING: Petition is dismissed.

The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), specifically and

exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President
and Vice-President.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. It states that, The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can
only be invoked after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President.
There can be no "contest" before a winner is proclaimed.
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the
PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The
experiential context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.
PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it has
functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies
not unlawfully defies the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as
well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to
highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions as a special electoral
court.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial
power.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latters exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the
task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority
in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial
power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole,
the Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the
Supreme Court.
PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated.
Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
As regards petitioners claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in
contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, issue raised is more
imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.

Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing

with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is apportioned to courts of
justice.

June 7, 2011

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, Associate Justice

Concurred by: RENATO C. CORONA, Chief Justice

FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal of our the Courts Decision in G.R. No. 191618 dated November 23, 2010,
dismissing his petition and declaring the establishment of respondent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET) as constitutional.

Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional creation of the

PET:

1. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation
of the PET.
2. The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

To bolster his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes the ruling on the
constitutionality of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the
concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public
office which cannot be created by the President, the power to do so being lodged
exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President,as head of the
Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot
create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.

On the other hand, in its Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration, the Office
of the Solicitor General maintains that the constitution of the PET is on firm footing on
the basis of the grant of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

In a nutshell, both parties just repeated the same arguments presented in the
original petition aside from the cited issue of PTCs constitutionality.

ITS THE SAME ISSUE: Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed
of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RULING: Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The Courts DECISION

stands.

The Court reiterated that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of
the Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution.

Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing

what was merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word,
mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain
the specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality
of the PET.

The Court also previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which
Members of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers
of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department. The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution
and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions
on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the
petitioner's, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.
 The decision therein held that the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution. A plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e., last paragraph
of Section 4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that
the two are differently worded and deal with separate powers of the Executive and the
Judicial Branches of government. And as previously adverted to, the basis for the
constitution of the PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members of
the Constitutional Commission during the drafting of the present Constitution.

Chief Justice as Presiding Officer in Presidential Impeachment Trial

Art. XI, Sec. 3 (6)
Chief Justice as Chair of the JBC
m. Report on the Judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 16
n. Manner of Sitting and Votes Required
Art. VIII, Sec. 4
Art. VIII, Sec. 11
Art. VII, Sec. 18
Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7
Secretary of the DPWH vs. Sps. Tecson, GR No. 179334, July 1, 2013, April 21, 2015

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by respondents-movants spouses Heracleo
and Ramona Tecson imploring the Court to take a second look at its July 1, 2013 Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the valuation of the subject
property owned by respondents shall be P0.70 instead of P1,500.00 per square meter, with interest
at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead of March 17, 1995, until full
payment.2
In view of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Third Division on the instant motion, and
the transcendental importance of the issue raised herein, the members of the Third Division opted
to refer the issue to the En Banc for resolution.
As in the aforementioned cases, just compensation due respondents-movants in this case should,
therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is Seventy
Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per
square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA.
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-
movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be
noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but
to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by a
plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.
All told, We hold that putting to rest the issue on the validity of the exercise of eminent domain is neither
tantamount to condoning the acts of the DPWH in disregarding the property rights of respondents-movants
nor giving premium to the government's failure to institute an expropriation proceeding. This Court had
steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according
to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. 49 To
entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by law and
 jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies - a matter which this Court has no
competence to take cognizance of. Time and again, we have held that no process of interpretation or
construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. 50 Equity and
equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence. 51 As we have
shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the case at bar, hence,
should be upheld.

Limketkai Sons Milling vs. CA, GR No. 118509, Dec 1, 1995, Mar 29, 1996, Sept 5, 1996
In this motion for reconsideration, the Court * is called upon to take a second hard look on its December
1, 1995 decision reversing and setting aside respondent Court of Appeals' judgment of August 12, 1994
that dismissed petitioner Limketkai Sons Milling Inc.'s complaint for specific performance and damages
against private respondents Bank of Philippine Island (BPI) and National Book Store (NBS). Petitioner
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc., opposed the motion and filed its Consolidated Comment, to which private
respondent NBS filed a Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed its Manifestation and Motion for the voluntary
inhibition of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa from taking part in any "subsequent deliberations in this
case". The Honorable Chief Justice declined.

The court is swayed to reconsider.

The bottom line issue is whether or not a contract of sale of the subject parcel of land
existed between the petitioner and respondent BPI. A re-evaluation of the attendant facts
and the evidence on record, specifically petitioner's Exhibits "A" to "I", yields the
negative.

Corrolarily, as the petitioner's exhibits failed to establish the perfection of the contract
of sale, oral testimony cannot take their place without violating the parol evidence rule.
21 It was therefore irregular for the trial court to have admitted in evidence testimony to
prove the existence of a contract of sale of a real property between the parties despite the
persistent objection made by private respondents' counsels as early as the first scheduled
hearing. While said counsels cross-examined the witnesses, this, to our view, did not
constitute a waiver of the parol evidence rule. The Talosig v. Vda. de Nieba, 22 and
Abrenica v. Gonda and de Gracia 23 cases cited by the Court in its initial decision, which
ruled to the effect that an objection against the admission of any evidence must be made
at the proper time, i.e., ". . . at the time question is asked", 24 and that if not so made it
will be understood to have been waived, do not apply as these two cases involved facts
25 different from the case at bench. More importantly, here, the direct testimonies of the
witnesses were presented in "affidavit-form" where prompt objection to inadmissible
evidence is hardly possible, whereas the direct testimonies in these cited cases were
delivered orally in open court. The best that counsels could have done, and which they
did, under the circumstances was to preface the cross-examination with objection.

Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and
the parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded from seeking relief therefrom,
by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more
than anything else, is of paramount importance.
 Firestone Ceramics vs. CA, GR No. 127022, Sept 2, 1999, June 28, 2000
This resolves petitioners' Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases, which the Third
Division decided on September 2, 1999. The motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the
petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending.

The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals by a
court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the said decision and the original certificate
of title as well as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification of subject
area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the validity of the disposition thereof is in order.

It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution
and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering objective
and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention
and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage of sheer voting
strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its
actual membership that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and
decision of the whole Court. It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the
land are always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions
of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly
safeguarded and rule of law be observed.

Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the Sumilao case is misplaced. The said
case is not on all fours with these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc en
consulta, the motion for reconsideration of the decision therein rendered had been voted upon by
the Second Division with a vote of 2-2. The Court ruled that the stalemate resulting from the said
voting constituted a denial of the motion for reconsideration.

In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the Motions for Reconsideration of
the petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., are pending and
unresolved.

Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues raised, let alone the enormous value of
the area in litigation, which is claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of petitioners
that their pending motions for reconsideration should be resolved by the Court En Banc.

Rule 56, Sec. 7, Rules of Court

Rule 125, Sec. 3, Rules of Court
o. Requirements as to Decisions
Art. VIII, Sec. 13
Consing vs. CA, GR No. 78272, Aug 29, 1989
From the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner-spouses filed this petition for review citing the
following reasons why the decision of respondent court should be reviewed and their petition
allowed:

1. The decision rendered by the respondent Court of Appeals in this case does not comply with the
requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of the New Constitution;
2. It is arbitrary and there is no law to support Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of Appeals in holding
that when the Consings constituted a voluntary right of way on Lots 25 and 26, the portions
subject to the right of way ceased to be owned by the Consings and became streets or road lots
which the Consings have no right to sell;
3. It is arbitrary and contrary to the documented facts for the respondent Court of Appeals to say
that the portions of Lots 25 and 26 subject to a voluntary right of way are actually used as streets or
roads even though it is clearly stated in the lot titles, in the location plans, and in the contract of
sale, that said portions are not streets or roads, but are portions subject to voluntary right of way,
and in spite of the fact that the subdivision was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner as
a simple subdivision plan which clearly shows that there are no streets or road lots in the
subdivision.
4. It is arbitrary for Judge Pineda and the respondent Court of Appeals to suppose that the portions
of Lots 25 and 26 subject to right of way are streets or road lots and then compute the value of the
said portions in a careless and erroneous manner, deducting afterwards the value so computed
from the P 110,000 purchase price; and
5. There is no legal or factual basis in ordering the Consings to pay P 10,000 attorney's fee to
Caridad [Rollo, pp. 24-25].

Thereafter, private respondent, as required by the Court, filed her Answer/Comment to which
petitioners filed their Reply. On May 2, 1988 the Court, after considering the allegations contained,
the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the pleadings submitted by the parties, gave due
course to the petition [Rollo, p. 84].

Petitioners first raise the issue of the Court of Appeals' non-compliance with the certification
requirement under Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution.

Art. VIII, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en banc or in
division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a Member for the writing of
the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and
a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who
took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason
therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. [Emphasis
supplied].

The first sentence of this provision outlining the decision-making process of the Supreme Court is
adopted from both the 1935 2 and 1973 3 Constitutions. The latter Constitution further broadened
the application of the requirement on the decision-making process by mandating that this "shall be
observed by all inferior collegiate courts."

The certification 4 requirement, however, is a new provision introduced by the framers of the 1987
Constitution. Its purpose is to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement that
decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, are reached after consultation with the members of the
court sitting en banc or in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision-
writing. The decision is thus rendered by the court as a body and not merely by a member thereof [I
Record of the Constitutional Commission 498-500], This is in keeping with the very nature of a
collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas,
and the concurrence of the required majority vote.

The absence, however, of the certification would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision
had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion
of the Court since the regular performance of official duty is presumed [Sec. 5 (m) of Rule 131, Rules of
Court]. The lack of certification at the end of the decision would only serve as evidence of failure to
observe the certification requirement and may be basis for holding the official responsible for the omission
 to account therefor [See I Record of the Constitutional Commission 460]. Such absence of certification
would not have the effect of invalidating the decision.

Art. VIII, Sec. 14

Art. VIII, Sec. 4, 11
Fortich vs. Corona, GR No. 131457, Apr 24, 1998, Nov 17 1998 and Aug 19, 1999
This resolves the pending incidents before us, namely, respondents and intervenors
separate motions for reconsideration of our Resolution dated November 17, 1998, as
well as their motions to refer this case to this Court en banc.

Respondents and intervenors jointly argue, in fine, that our Resolution dated November 17, 1998,
wherein we voted two-two on the separate motions for reconsideration of our earlier Decision of
April 24, 1998, as a result of which the Decision was deemed affirmed, did not effectively resolve the
said motions for reconsideration inasmuch as the matter should have been referred to the Court
sitting en banc, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.

Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified
or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the
framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand,
such that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise put, the
word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule
of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article
VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.

With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc
for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply
where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of case and not
matter. The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of
cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case
then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division
and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion
because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must
stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The
assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed.

Writing of the Decision

Valladolid vs. Inciong, GR No. 52364, Mar 25, 1983
The questioned Order of the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of Section 9,
Article X of the Constitution, which requires a statement of the facts and the conclusions
of law upon which it is based. That prescription applies to decisions of Courts of record.
The Ministry of Labor is an administrative body with quasi-judicial functions. Section
 5, Rule XIII, Book V, Ibid, states that proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious
and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law.
As the Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law drawn from those facts by the Regional Director, there was no necessity of
discussing anew the issues raised therein.

Section 14, Chapter 3, Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987

SECTION 14. Decision.Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested
case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law
on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days
following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally
or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.

Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, GR No. L-29064, Apr 29, 1971
Bacolod Murcia Milling Co. vs. Henares, GR No. L-13505, Mar 30, 1960
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. CA, GR No. 114323, July 23, 1998, Sept 28, 1999
The foreign court explicitly declared in its Order that Award Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be part of the
decree. This curt ruling of the foreign court may be categorized in the nature of memorandum
decisions or those which adopt by reference the findings of facts and conclusions of law of inferior
tribunals. In this jurisdiction, it has been held that memorandum decisions do not transgress the
constitutional requirement in Article VIII, Section 14, on clearly and distinctly stating the facts and
the law on which the decision is based.[16] Nonetheless, it would be more prudent for a
memorandum decision not to be simply limited to the dispositive portion but to state the nature of
the case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the
applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunals assessments and conclusions on the case. This
practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate consideration of whether the
dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts
and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the decision. This is particularly true
where the decisions, orders, or resolutions came from a court in another jurisdiction. Otherwise, the
enforcement of the decisions would be based on presumptions that laws in other jurisdictions are
similar to our laws, at the expense of justice based on the merits.

Moreover, the constitutional guideline set forth in Article VIII, Section 14 cannot prevail over the
fundamental elements of due process. Matters of procedure even if laid down in the Constitution must be
tempered by substantial justice provided it has factual and legal basis. Considering that the case involves
significant properties, the overriding consideration of a judgment based on the merits should prevail over
the primordial interests of strict enforcement on matters of technicalities. Procedural lapses, absent any
collusion or intent to defraud the parties or mislead the tribunals, should not be allowed to defeat the claim
of a party who is not well-informed in the technical aspects of the case but whose interest is merely to
enforce what he believes to be his rightful claim.

Francisco vs. Permskul, GR No. 81006, May 12, 1989

When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his petition for review was denied on
September 29, 1987, as so too was his motion for reconsideration, on December 1, 1987. 4 He is now
before us to fault the respondent court, principally for sustaining the memorandum decision of the
regional trial court. His contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution.
 The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court
rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its judgment. But there are
more substantial reasons. For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze
the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a
higher tribunal. For another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing
party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the
litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and
the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a
valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the
resolution of future controversies.

The authority given the appellate court to adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions
of law from those set forth in the appealed decisions should be exercised with caution and
prudence, because the tendency would be to follow the line of least resistance by just adopting the
findings and conclusions of the lower court without thoroughly studying the appealed case.

Considering that the Court spends four days of the week for studying and deliberating on these
cases in its en banc and division sessions, one can appreciate the limited time allowed its members
for the actual writing of its decisions. (This particular decision, while extended, happens fortunately
to be less complicated than many of the other cases submitted to it, which require more time to
write, not to mention the antecedent research that may have to be made.)

Viewed in the light of these practical considerations, the memorandum decision can be welcomed
indeed as an acceptable method of dealing expeditiously with the case load of the courts of justice,
But expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the
Constitution; or to put it more familiarly, the end does not justify the means. It is plain that if
Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 is unconstitutional, it must be struck down.
The law does not define the memorandum decision and simply suggests that the court may adopt
by reference the findings of fact and the conclusions of law stated in the decision, order or
resolution on appeal before it. No particular form is prescribed; the conditions for its use are not
indicated. In fact, B.P. Blg. 129 does not even employ the term "memorandum decision" in Section
40 or elsewhere in the rest of the statute. This phrase appears to have been introduced in this
jurisdiction not by that law but by Section 24 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, reading as follows:

Sec. 24. Memorandum decisions. -The judgment or final resolution of a court in appealed cases
may adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decision or
final order appealed from.

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth both as to the
form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict
enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a
lawless disobedience.

People vs. Ordoo, GR No. 129593 & 143533-35, July 10, 2000
Accused-appellant contends that the decision of the trial court does not contain findings of facts as
required by Art. VIII, 14 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 120, 2 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
and, for this reason, it is void. She claims that the trial court "merely contended itself [with]
paraphrasing the testimony of the witnesses, resulting in a forty (40) page decision."

There is no hard and fast rule as to the form of a decision. Whether or not the trial court chooses to
summarize the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties is immaterial. What is called for is that the
judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared, and signed by the
 judge and that it should contain clearly and distinctly a statement of facts proved or admitted by the parties
and the law upon which the judgment is based.33 The assailed decision complied with this requirement.

Nicos Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 88709, Feb 11, 1992
The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of
Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.

It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided,
with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The
court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at
that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he
lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be
reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the
losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.

It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to
interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena,
because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving
incidental matters." 4 As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already observed in
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals 5 that

The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final
and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with
the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions
were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the
rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate
decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The order in the case at bar does not come under either of the above exceptions. As it is settled
that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, 6 it is
imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law
on which it is based.

It may be argued that a dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction is not considered a judgment on the
merits and so is not covered by the aforecited provision. There is no quarrel with this established
principle. However, the rule would be applicable only if the case is dismissed on the sole ground of
lack of jurisdiction and not when some other additional ground is invoked.

A careful perusal of the challenged order will show that the complaint was dismissed not only for
lack of jurisdiction but also because of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove the invalidity of the
sheriff's sale. Regarding this second ground, all the trial court did was summarily conclude "from
the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff" that the sheriff's sale "was in complete accord with the
 requirements of Section 3, Act 3135." It did not bother to discuss what that evidence was or to
explain why it believed that the legal requirements had been observed. Its conclusion was
remarkably threadbare. Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it should not and cannot be
substituted for substance. As the ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment on
the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis thereof was fatal to the order.

Significantly, the respondent court found that the trial court did have jurisdiction over the case after all.
This made even more necessary the factual and legal explanation for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient.

People vs. Viernes, GR No. 118091, Oct 3, 1996

Before we end the discussion, we note once more the trial courts decision that did not contain any findings
of fact which are essential in decision-making. In view of the Constitutional provision that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based,[39] the Court reiterates that it is mandatory on all judges to observe this rule which
enlightens not only the counsels, for purpose of appeal, if any, but most especially the parties, as to what
has been decided and why it has been so decided.

Salazar vs. Marigomen, AM No. RTJ-06-2004, Oct 19, 2007

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

De Leon vs. People, GR No. 212623, Jan 11, 2016

South Cotabato Communications Corp. vs. Sto. Tomas, GR No. 217575, June 15, 2016
Minute Resolution
Borromeo vs. CA, GR No. L-82273, June 1, 1990
The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by
minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without
merits where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported
by: substantial evidence and, is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it
is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment
and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition
always gives the legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA 382,417 [1987],
"[T]he Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case" (Italics supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed
before it and, accordingly, discharge its constitutional functions. The Court ordinarily acts on the
incidents or basic merits of three hundred (300) to four hundred (400) cases through its Divisions
every Monday and Wednesday when the Divisions meet and on one hundred (100) to one hundred
twenty (120) cases every Tuesday and Thursday that it meets en banc or around one thousand
(1,000) cases a week. It is only on Fridays; and week-ends that the members of the Court work in
their separate chambers or at home because the Court does not meet in session--either in Divisions
or En Banc.
 Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of
a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to sign
all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of
their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of court and which time
could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of
important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe
out the backlogs accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases coming to it.
Remedial-legislation to meet this problem is also pending in Congress.

Tayamura vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 76355, May 21, 1987
The Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the
facts and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall
under the constitutional provision which states that, "No petition for review ... shall be refused due course
...without stating the legal basis therefor" (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to
deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the
respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient
compliancewith the constitutional requirement.

Komatsu Industries, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 127682, Apr 24, 1998
It was held that when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings,
manifestations, comments or motions, decides to deny due course to a petition, and states in a minute
resolution that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the respondent courts decision
is shown or some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.

Legal Basis for Resolutions

Nunal vs. Commission on Audit, GR No. 78648, Jan 24, 1989

For resolution is petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Minute Resolution of this Court of 11 May
1988 dismissing the Petition for certiorari "for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the public
respondent had committed grave abuse of discretion in holding, among others, that the compromise
agreement of the parties is not enforceable against the Municipality of Isabela, the latter not having been
impleaded as an indispensable party in the case.

Finally, a word on petitioner's contention that the Resolution of this Court under date of 11 May
1988 is not in accordance with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any Court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

In the first place, our "Resolution" of 11 May 1988 was not a "Decision" within the meaning of the
Constitutional requirement. This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e.,
given due course and after the filing of Briefs or Memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case
may be. It is not applicable to an Order or Resolution refusing due course to a Petition for Certiorari.
 In the second place, the assailed Resolution does state the legal basis for the dismissal of the
Petition and thus complies with the Constitutional provision. (Tayamura, et al., vs. IAC, et al., G.R.
No. 76355, May 21, 1987 [en banc]; see also Que vs. People, G.R. Nos. L-75217-18, 154 SCRA 160,
September 21, 1987).

It may be added that the Writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a prerogative
Writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3d Rev. [8th ed.]; Francisco, The Revised Rules, 1972 ed., Vol.
IV- B, pp. 4546, citing 14 C.J.S., 121-122).
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of this Court of 11 May 1988 is hereby PARTIALLY
RECONSIDERED in that the disallowance by respondent Commission on Audit of the amounts ordered
paid by the Court of First Instance of Basilan, Branch 1, in its Decision dated 12 December 1984, is hereby
SET ASIDE, but its disallowance of petitioner's claim for separation pay of P54,092.50, is hereby
SUSTAINED. No costs.

San Luis vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. L-80160, June 26, 1989
The first error assigned in the instant petition is not well taken. A thorough perusal of the assailed
resolution of the respondent CA denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration reveals clearly its legal
basis. Thus, its resolution stating that cases have not been accompanied by. any formal certification. In
fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have
to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No.
R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an
oversight.

But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the Court in its
decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion
of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be assigned to write
the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is obviously not required.

Prudential Bank vs. Castro, AM No. 2756, June 5, 1986, Nov 12, 1987, Mar 15, 1988
*People vs. Baring, Jr., GR No. 137933, January 28, 2002
In the case at bar, the trial courts decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant. Such
doubt may be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant but by the
trial courts failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of the
evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence presented,
and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the decision.

Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape despite
prosecutions failure to present the examining physician to appear in court depriving him of his
constitutional right to confront a witness against him.[20] However, a review of the transcript of
stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellants counsel waived presentation of the medico-legal
officer and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said witness
The records reveal that accused-appellants counsel initially asked the court to subject the alleged blood
found in the victims panty to a DNA test for comparison with accused-appellants blood.[34] However, he
voluntarily withdrew his proposition.[35] Obviously, accused-appellants counsel is misleading the Court. It
was even accused-appellants counsel who recalled the submission for DNA testing. The alleged denial of
accuseds right to avail of the DNA tests is a futile attempt to confuse the issues. He lost sight of the
categorical testimony of the victim pinning him down as the perpetrator. It would have been more prudent
for him to attack this damaging evidence directly. It must be noted that in the prosecution of rape cases, the
 presentation of the bloodstained panty is not even essential.[36] The victims credible testimony, standing
alone, is sufficient basis for the conviction of accused-appellant.

Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2

Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, GR No. L-35612-14, June 27, 1973
Our resolution of January 26, 1973 dismissing these petitions for habeas corpus, certiorari and
mandamus for lack of merit is sought to be reconsidered. It was our ruling that petitioner failed to
sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality or that the order
cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It is to credit of his
able counsel, former Senator Estanislao Fernandez, that his fight for provisional liberty is carried on
with a further manifestation of skilled scholarly effort, but such valiant attempt to secure his release
is doomed to fail. The law, as will hereafter be set forth, points to the contrary. Deference to its
command precludes a reconsideration. This resolution will likewise briefly touch upon the question
of why the issuance of a brief dismissal order does not in any wise offend against the constitutional
provision requiring that no decision "shall be rendered by any court of record without on which it is
based.

It is thus not self-evident that petitioner could justly lay claim to a grievance. For if the situation is
subjected, to searching analysis, it cannot be denied that what is really involved is just a mere incident in
the prosecution of petitioner Had he prevailed, he would have been entitled to provisionary liberty. Under
the circumstances, as the facts of the clearly demonstrate, with the plea for habeas corpus be unavailing,
we felt that a minute resolution which certainly would require less time than a full-blown decision, was
not inappropriate. Precisely, the leniency shown the parties dwell at length on their respective contentions
should disprove any suspicion that the decision arrived at was reached without according the parties the
fundamental fairness to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Since, at the most, the relief sought
by petitioner will not, in any way, foreclose the ultimate outcome of the cases against him one way or the
other, we deemed that the constitutional provision invoked did not strictly call for application. In that
sense, a minimum resolution certainly cannot be stigmatized as in any wise failing to abide by a
constitutional command.

Art. VIII, Sec. 13

p. Mandatory Period for Deciding Cases
Art. VIII, Sec. 15