Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No.

217126-27,
Nov. 10, 2015 (Digest on RA 6770)
Posted on August 31, 2016
Carpio-Morales vs. Binay, G.R. No. 217126-27, Nov. 10, 2015
(RE: Validity of 1st and 2nd paragraphs of RA 6770)

FACTS:
The Ombudsmans argument against the CAs lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and
her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman
Act, which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of
the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.

The Ombudsmans maintains that the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from
extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office. Despite the usage of
the general phrase [n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court, the Ombudsman herself concedes that
the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Are the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770, valid and constitutional?

RULING: The first paragraph is declared INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular duly issued; The second paragraph is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND INVALID.

The Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took
away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Courts constitutional rule-making authority. Through this provision,
Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules
of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every courts exercise of judicial power. Without the
Courts consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of
procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the
separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it
also practically dilutes a courts ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be
mooted by supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same.

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against decision or findings of the
Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770- attempts
to effectively increase the Supreme Courts appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is
therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the
Ombudsmans posturing, Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are
in part materia in that they cover the same specific or particular subject matter, that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the
CAs subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent
proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve
this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion):
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised
at any time or on the courts own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at
any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own
jurisdiction in any proceeding.