G.R. No.
119976 September 18, 1995 Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of
a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline
for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have
been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in hAmended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning
respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued
such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to
remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative
district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to
achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to
submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's
Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one
year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the
printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her
domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she
has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been
a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration
in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation
or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks
for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban
City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what
was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in the question that
insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to
be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment
may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA
957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which
cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of
elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the
filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month
period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was
"since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy
can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a
resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The
dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of
time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that
it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it
is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year
residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered
as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto
Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-
Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she
returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was
not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of
the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a
color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted
by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband
was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the
Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the
office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in
the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest
that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places, including Metro
Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to
make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different
places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident
of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a
new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled
with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must
likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's
statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent
has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse,
what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident
of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a
resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,
petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of
six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte.
But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District
of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24,
1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution
tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
 Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the
May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78
of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence"
is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases,
this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the
 district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty
especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to
the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to
be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would
be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement
in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the
First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances
and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run
in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in
her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which
she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency
where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence
in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted
down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries
in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she
could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the
First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in
the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it
bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to
do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his
own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without
having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and
having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from
his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself
as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run
the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting
its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's
various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored
settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's
assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949
when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991,
she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the
last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She
grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always
with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of
origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein
for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil
Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot
be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile
and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a
place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it
is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But
the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije
su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part
of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive
act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from
one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to
move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of
the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and
the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could,
for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single
place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife
to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and
support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer
to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
"domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where
the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons,
stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used
with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is
a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the
word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other
times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her
husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from
being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that
"[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts,
.under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could
not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained.
But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best
such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of
those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly
the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other
and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes
criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders,
and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English
law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained
by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy
of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve
in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one
court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow
and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the
City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36
La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was
decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain
appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de
Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in
the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and
to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur.
Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return
of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other
penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not
appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have
been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix
as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places
as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to
have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision
(Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands
clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations
of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954,
she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission
to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested
in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila
merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties
weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of
the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory
and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held
that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a
statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a
decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are
usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some
incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained
from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial
bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed
to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for
us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a
ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly
deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes
of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996]
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T.
ALANON, ROBERTO A. TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE
TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA
ARUEGO, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
On March 7, 1983, a Complaint[1] for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement
of Successional Rights was filed before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and her alleged sister
Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian.
Named defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of
the deceased Gloria A. Torres, represented by their father and natural guardian,
Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.
In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married
man, had an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his
death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and
Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The
complaint prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be
declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein
petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory heirs
of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of
their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open
and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children as stated in
paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:
6. The plaintiffs father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein
plaintiffs as his children verbally among plaintiffs and their mothers family friends, as
well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not limited to the following:
(a) Regular support and educational expenses;
(b) Allowance to use his surname;
(c) Payment of maternal bills;
(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;
(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of
family rejoicing;
(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;
(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;
(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.
7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status
of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego who showered them, with
the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above
outlined.[2]
Petitioners denied all these allegations.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -
1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and
Luz Fabian;
2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz
Fabian;
3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to portion of share of the
legitimate children of Jose Aruego;
5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the
illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;
6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share
in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;
7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of
P10,000.00 as atty.s fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.[3]
Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision
alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of
the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227),
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3,
1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14,
1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due
course on the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31,
1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in
a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
 Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following
grounds:
A Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO
THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
B Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY
PETITIONERS BEFORE IT DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF
JURISDICTION.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO
PERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND
THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT THE TIME AN ACTION FOR
COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE
CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY
RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE
STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED DURING THE
LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING
OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL
CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED, OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY THE
CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.
D lifetime of the alleged parent.
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR
PROHIBITION AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN
APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY BEEN LOST.[4]
Private respondents action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child
was brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically
Article 285 thereof, which states the manner by which illegitimate children may prove
their filiation, to wit:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter
may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority; x x x.
Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on
August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private
respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under
provided that an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on
the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the
action will be barred by prescription. The law cited reads:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173
[during the lifetime of the child], except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private
respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year
after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has clearly
prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further,
maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family
Code which provides:
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be:
Should the provisions of the Family Code be applied in the instant case? As a
corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or impair any
vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive
effect in this particular case?
 The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256, is not defined by the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
Family Code. The Committee did not define what is meant by a vested or acquired dated August 31, 1993 and its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby
right, thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each particular issue AFFIRMED.
is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question
that may arise in the future.[5] SO ORDERED.

In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,[6] a case which involves a similar complaint

denominated as Claim for Inheritance but treated by this court as one to compel
recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, we had occasion to rule that:

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action
of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the
regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein
adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
et. al.[7] where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication
in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the
instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private
respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of
which have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court
is, therefore, correct in applying the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in
holding that private respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed.

Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be
governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code. The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant
case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of private
respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right
was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil
Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not
yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father was
already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed,
an exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence,
the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint,
never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known
as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether
in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings
or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from
attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the
case.[8]
 [G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002] On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under
the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of
Appeals, the complaint is now barred x xx.[6]

ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian

ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent. Orders of the Trial Court

DECISION
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted
PANGANIBAN, J.: Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and
ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or
taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative
which to file an action for recognition. father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for
recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him
the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition[1]
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals [2] (CA)
Decision[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA
Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the
reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of
justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article
285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four
years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of
the Family Code did not take away that right.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Hence, this appeal.[7]
Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be
remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.[5]
Issues

The Facts
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
I
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of
twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting
on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, after the putative fathers death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of
leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. paternity by the latter.

On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying II
that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as
such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had
held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided
in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express]
provisions of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the
Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for
failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them
jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for
recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the
provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given
retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for
recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years
from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should
appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been
omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in
a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be
brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no
distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the
putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering
that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus
be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or she
cannot do if he or she is already dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already
vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action
for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already
vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional,
to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.[11] Respondent however contends
that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws. [12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in these
words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect
may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those
rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal
relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates
rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to
adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion.[14](Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for determining
whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right,
the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal,
it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure. [16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code
is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within
four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or
take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already
vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar, because
the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer
a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals[18] the Court ruled that
an action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected
by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already
vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of
natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by
respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from
marrying each other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not
disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v.
Angeles,[19] the Court explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a natural child.[20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by
this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for
recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There,
the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an
extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate
children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in
1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of
their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from marrying
each other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been
filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the time of his death,
both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said that the
rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the
prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children.
Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children,
commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of
wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a
married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support
and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the
investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is
that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious
children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on
proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is
used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or
instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish
the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes
of voluntary recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then
his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for
compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of
natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious
children.[22] (Citations omitted, italics supplied)

Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights
over spurious ones.[23] However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other
rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family
Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given
the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to
four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken
away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who
could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As
respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24] the State as parens patriae should
protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the
Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The
minor must be given his day in court.

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA

Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer

required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or
respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a
copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as
a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed the petitioners petition under Rule 47 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic,
Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the
petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the
appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.
This case arose from the following facts:
After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight children during their coverture, whose
names and dates of births are as follows:
a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959
b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961
c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962
d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963
e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965
f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967
g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968
h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19, 19703
On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the
petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a
plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor.
CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila. 4
On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of
the conjugal properties were adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children,
including the following:
b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No.
120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the
family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort
Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and
all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were
distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12)
each.6
The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement.
Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting
Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the
knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.
In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that
the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No.
72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court issued
summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition. 8 The sheriff served the
summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the
petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite.9
On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the
court stating that the summons and a copy of the petition were served on the
petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its
annexes was received by the herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta
[III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on
June 6, 1995.
June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.
Sheriff10
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the
respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for
hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was
no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and
offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The
trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the
respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and
adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order
granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. 11 The
clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of the Order of the court on July 16,
1996.12
On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were
married in civil rights before the municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite. 13
On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the
Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment
of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in
Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the
respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of
her right to be heard in the said case, and ultimately secure a favorable judgment
without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused
the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her
married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite,
where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed
to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the
petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1)
for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated
by the respondent. She further contended that there was no factual basis for the trial
courts finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the
petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000.
Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of
Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.
The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor,
thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment
granting the Petition.
1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).
2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner
a. 1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
b. 500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c. 200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for
every hearing;
d. 100,000.00 as litigation expenses;
e. Costs of suit.14
On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following
ground:
We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any
clear and specific averment by petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the
present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor,
that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for new trial,
or petition for relief.15
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending
thereto an amended petition in which she alleged, inter alia, that:
4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period
after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.
6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have
been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.
8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies were no longer available through no fault of petitioner;
neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition is the only
available remedy to her.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the
respondents marriage was null and void for the court a quos failure to order the
public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between
the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.
On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.
The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the
CA erred as follows:
 1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to
be annulled.
2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.
3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements
of the Rules of Court.
4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.
5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to Admit the
Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.
6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality. 17
The petition is meritorious.
An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, to annul a judgment or final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC
may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based
on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 18 The petitioner must allege
in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no
fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of
the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or
negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to
the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her
inaction or negligence.19
It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer
available through no fault of her own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her
failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely
to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be
limits thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment
of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The
prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits. 21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief, were no longer available through
no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of
the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioners amended petition did not cure the
fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did
not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she
did not explain why she failed to do so.
We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition
and denying admission of the amended petition. This is so because apparently, the
Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that
the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the
complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition
and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the nullification of the
assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a
sufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of the petitioner, notwithstanding the
absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC
filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the
petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer
available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final
order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any
time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order
in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23
In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in
light of the material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but
also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because
of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint.
She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and
complaint.
Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its
annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given
due course by the Court of Appeals.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired
by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of
summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been
filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as
to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence
of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void. 25 Jurisdiction cannot
be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case
against him unless he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy
thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to
her.27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally
on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be
effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies of defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.28
In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly
followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to
find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that
such effort failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to be
accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because substituted
service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that
substituted service of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may
be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances categorized by statutes.31
As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes
thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the
same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III,33 the petitioners son. When the return of summons was submitted to the
court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of
locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made
by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio
Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly
residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III had been residing at
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and
the complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he
was not furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.
4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal,
Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining land consisting of
two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal
partnership. Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.
5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated
on my fathers lot), my father came to see me and then asked me to sign
and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me
to read. Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the
case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not
given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original
petition of the petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final
order of the trial court. However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in
the court a quo as shown by the records. The records show that for the petitioners
failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the
respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts
of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The
trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered
judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance
of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon
a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.35
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985
Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which
provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If
the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to
answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. 36
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. 38
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in
Republic v. Court of Appeals,40regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State. 41 The trial court, abetted
by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the Rules
of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.
The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and
zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage
as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but
the exposure of an invalid one as well.42

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the

danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of
marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear
on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties
and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-
spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default
but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists
between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for
legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his
opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic

social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can
find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the
concern of the family members alone.43Whether or not a marriage should continue to
exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims and caprices of
only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance,
incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of

the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No.
59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with
the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-716 October 25, 1995
MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC, Manukan and
Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found to be
patently wrong and indefensible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in
weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted out now, it will take from
here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.1
Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates chosen for
their probity, integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning. And so, any judge wanting
in any of these qualities should be broomed off and out of the bench in order to
improve the judicial landscape. Screening off the misfits, considering the great
number of judges and justices in the country at present, is the arduous and Herculean
task of this Court. The effort if dramatized with rectitude and sincerity should bring
about the strengthening of the people's abiding faith in democracy and the integrity of
our courts of justice.
The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992,
filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent,
Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful
conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge."
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross
immorality on the part of the respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously
and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence of his
legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious
situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said
Priscilla Baybayan on May 23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a bigamous
union because of the fact that the respondent was then still very much married to
Teresita Banzuela.
Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage
contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed with the requirements of a marriage contract by
invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.
Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier, respondent's
wife filed a complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein for abandoning the
family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent
caused to be registered as "legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla
Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970
Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971
Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975
by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration
was due to inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight, when in truth
and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered
as legitimate.
The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:
(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice of law by the
preparation and notarization of documents, out of which he charged fees beyond the
authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary Public. These acts which, according to
the charge, amount to the private practice of law, prejudice public interest.
Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these allegations:
a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to the fact
that respondent Judge Tabiliran prepared a Simultaneous Deed of
Sale, (Annex "C", Doc. No. 901, Page No. 77, Book No. V, Series
of 1991 of Ex-Officio Notary Public Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and
collect P600.00 from the vendees (par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9
records);
b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent showing
that he received P250.00 thru MCTC Aide Ely O. Inot for
preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit declaring the correct
ages of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud
and Amman Eddai dated November 12, 1991, when the legal fees
therefor should have been P10.00 only (Annex "D") (par. 10(a) a-2
Complaint, p. 9 records);
c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction of the
respondent dated November 12, 1991, showing that said
respondent received from Reynaldo Subebe the sum of P150.00 for
preparation and notarization by him of a Joint Affidavit declaring the
correct age of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias
(par. 10(a) a-c Complaint, p. 9 records);
d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12, 1991,
signed by the respondent himself showing that he received from
 Nelly Baradas the sum of P50.00 for preparation and notarization of
Joint Affidavit attesting to the correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba
(par. 10(a) a-d Complaint, p. 9 records);
e) Another receipt (Annex "G") dated November 12, 1991, issued
by the respondent, showing that he received from Torres P. Modai
the sum of P50.00, thru the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for
preparation of Joint Affidavit attesting to the correct age of Flores
Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).
(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by an affidavit
(Annex "M") executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide, stating that he saw
Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by respondent, hand over to the latter
a bag of fish and squid which respondent Judge received.
(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of which he
collected the amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio Oriola, as supported by
the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant therein, and Benito Sagario, one of
the persons present when the accused perpetrated the acts aforesaid. (Submitted as
Annexes "I" and "J", respectively.)
Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts
renders him unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser of justice. By the
example shown by the respondent, the public had allegedly lost confidence in the
administration of justice, perceiving as is evident to see that the person occupying the
position of a judge lacks the morality and probity required of one occupying such a
high office.
Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his
cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither bigamous nor immoral
because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife had already
left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her
whereabouts is not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He
further avers that 25 years had already elapsed since the disappearance of his first
wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil
Code in order to show the legality of his acts:
After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes
except for those of succession. (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of
Court.)
After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
except for those of succession. (Art. 390, Civil Code.)
The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for the
purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee is to respondent's mind, a case in point.
He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but he
denied the charge that he acted with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming that,
since there were only three words to choose from, namely: Single, Widow or
Divorced, he preferred to choose the word "single", it being the most appropriate.
Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to
Banzuela was honestly divulged.
On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes "4" & "5")
from the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to the fact that there
was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such, respondent may be allowed to
notarize documents. He denied having charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all the
amounts received by him were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he
had been receiving from the municipal government were not enough to cover
expenses in maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a certification (Annex "6")
from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government of Manukan to the
effect that his yearly expenditures were more than the yearly appropriations.
Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which states:
A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities
to improve . . . the administration of justice.
Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was
inconceivable for him to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his residence was
42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or office was located. It takes
one an hour and a half by bus to reach Katipunan and so, by the time he reaches his
house, the fish and the squid should have become rotten. In support of his denials,
respondent submitted as Annex "8", an affidavit of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter
who declared:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge, Jose C.
Tabiliran, Jr., from the morning until we went home in the afternoon
and we in fact dined together in the local Carenderia of Jose
Dalman as it is the usual ways of the Judge to eat lunch together
with the court personnel;
4. That when we went home in the afternoon of that day we were
also together riding in a bus, the Lillian Express and until I drop in
Roxas and he proceeded to Katipunan where his residence is;
 5. That all the time during that day I did not noticed him bringing
anything except his "Hand Bag" which he used to carry in going to
the office; (Annex "8", Affidavit of Ely O. Inot, December 17, 1992.)
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an Affidavit of
Desistance in a case pending in his sala and thereafter charged the accused, Antonio
Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The complainant, he said, was the one
who induced Arcelita Salvador (the complainant in the rape case) to execute an
affidavit (Annex "I") in support of the charge of corruption against respondent.
Complainant's filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and resentment
because, earlier, respondent filed an administrative case (A.M. No. P-91-597) against
her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct". The Supreme Court decided to
reprimand her with a warning that a repetition of her acts will be severely dealt with.
Respondent claims that the complainant had nevertheless repeatedly continued to do
acts of insubordination in the following manner:
1) She continues to keep court records and has kept refusing to
hand them over to respondent inspite of verbal and written orders;
2) She refused to receive a memorandum from the Vice-Mayor
requiring the Clerk of Court to submit an Annual report;
3) She refused to prepare the said annual report required of her as
Clerk of Court;
4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of the
Court.
On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein administrative case
was referred to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court,
Dipolog City, for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Angeles found
respondent guilty only on two (2) counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public
and collecting fees for his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in
a case pending in his Court and receiving payment for it.
In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge Angeles
found that:
ON GROSS IMMORALITY:
In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23,
1986, (p. 13 of the records), respondent did not hide the fact that he
was married to Teresita T. Banzuela, having disclosed it in his
affidavit jointly executed with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23,
1986 (p. 115 of the records), particularly paragraph 4 thereof which
reads:
4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to
Teresita T. Banzuela but who left and abandoned their family home
sometime in 1965 in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until
now at present her whereabouts is not known.
It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83 (2) of the
Civil Code which, although bigamous, remains valid until
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42, Family Code).
Respondent's assertion that since 1965 to the present, his first wife
Teresita T. Banzuela had left their conjugal dwelling and did not
return, her whereabouts being unknown, was not controverted.
Living as husband and wife pursuant to an authorized bigamous
marriage, respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and
scandalous manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union
since 1969 duly declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit, may be
considered cleansed by their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the
Civil Code on ratification on contracts in general is allowed to be
applied, it being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil
Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Colde was intended to facilitate
and encourage the marriage of persons who have been living in a
state of concubinage for more than five years (Tolentino, Civil
Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family
Code, 1992 Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage
contract as "single" is hardly considered a misrepresentation of
fact, specially to the solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C.
Ruedas, Jr. to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit was submitted.
ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:
Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran,
all of whom were born before their marriage, were disclosed and
made known to the solemnizing officer and the latter himself, in his
affidavit dated May 23, 1986 (p. 116 of the records) which supports
the marriage contract of respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan,
having shown such fact.
Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T. Zanoria dated
May 27, 1993, consisting of three pages, was submitted by the
complainant for the purpose of proving her charge that the
respondent falsely executed his three separate affidavits, namely:
Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983 regarding the late registration of birth
of his daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M dated May 28,
1988 regarding the late registration of birth of his third child Saturn
B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in
reference to the late registration of birth of his second child Venus
B. Tabiliran, stating inadvertence, excusable negligence or
oversight as the reasons for the delayed registration of their births,
without however presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently
denying respondent the opportunity to cross examine her. Her
affidavit is not among those brought out in the pre-hearing
conference, and was not discussed during the hearing itself,
submitting it only after the investigation proper was terminated. The
supposed affiant claimed she was the government midwife who
attended to the births of respondent's three children, denying, as
the affidavit shows, negligence, inadvertence or oversight on her
part to register their birth on time. Not having been presented for
respondent to confront her, or an opportunity to do so, Exhibit P
cannot be considered evidence of the charge. An affidavit is
hearsay unless the affiant is presented (People vs. Villeza, 127
SCRA 349), or admitted by the party against whom it is presented.
ON CORRUPTION:
1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and collecting fees:
Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents and
collected fees, in the instances specified in par. 10 of the complaint,
namely: (1) affidavit of Ponciana Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo
Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman
Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose
Juneser Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Luzviminda
Jacoba; and (5) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Flores
Jalampangan, but not necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts
therein stated as having been collected by him from them (please
see Pre-Hearing Order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge).
Seeking justification of his acts, respondent submitted Annexes 4 &
5 of his comments (pp. 118 and 119, records) which are
certifications of Manukan Mayor Eugene U. Caballero attesting that
in the absence of a Notary Public in Manukan town, respondent
who is a Judge thereat was allowed "to prepare and ligalize (sic)
documents".
He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and notarization
of documents were mostly used by respondent to buy supplies and
materials of his Office", explaining that his office needs cannot be
sustained by the appropriations of the local government which are
inadequate. On page 120 of the records, his Annex 6 shows a
shortage in his appropriations for supplies. And supplies from the
Supreme Court can only be obtained if secured personally but has
to assume the expenses for transportation, freight and handling.
Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial conduct
does not prohibit him from acting as Notary Public, and the fees he
has received were much lower than the rates prescribed by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Zamboanga del Norte Chapter,
submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of the records, to prove it.
Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge may, with due regard
to official duties, engaged in activities to improve the administration
of justice, respondent claims that due to his efforts, he was able to
secure an extension room of his office covering a floor area of 24
square meters, from the Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX
based in Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per certification
shown in his Annex 7 (page 121 of the records).
In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-a-vis the power of
Municipal Trial Court Judges and Municipal Circuit Trial Court
Judges to act in the capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio, the
Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. 89-11-1303, MTC, Dec. 19,
1989, has ruled:
MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with
no lawyers or notaries public may, in their capacity as notary public
ex-officio perform any act within the competency of a regular Notary
Public, provided that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the
account of the Government and turned-over to the municipal
treasurer (Lapea, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June
29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in the
notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit.
Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and
residing in Manukan town, even in Jose Dalman which is within his
circuit is confirmed, respondent Judge while he may be justified in
so acting as notary public, did not, however, comply with
requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge for the account of
the Government and turn-over to the municipal treasurer all notarial
fees. And there is no way of determining the truth of his assertion
that the notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to buy
supplies and materials for his office, absent any accounting.
2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:
Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in the
records, respondent, however, denied the imputation therein
contained by affiant Calixto Calunod that he received a sando bag
full of fish and squid from a certain Edna Siton who had a case with
respondent's court as complainant in a certain criminal case.
Instead of calling the affiant himself, complainant presented the
Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed that there was squid
and fish contained in a plastic bag which was left in Aseniero
Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some members of the
Court staff. When informed by the carenderia owner that the stuff
was intended for Judge Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it, and
they afterwards partook of it without the Judge who already
boarded the passenger bus". (Record of Proceedings, p. 1, par. No.
1, dated June 11, 1993). Being her witness, complainant is bound
by her testimony. This particular charge is, therefore, not proved.
3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for his
Services:
Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd Asst.
Provincial Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted: one by
Arcelita Salvador, complainant in an attempted rape case who was
categorical in her declaration that respondent Judge asked and
received from Pitoy Oriola, brother of accused Antonio Oriola the
amount of P500.00 after the Judge prepared the affidavit of
desistance and motion to dismiss which he made her sign (Annex I,
p. 40 records). Benito Sagario who was present executed another
separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the records,
confirming it. In admitting the affidavit, respondent, however, denied
the imputation, asserting that it is false, but without confronting
them or presenting witnesses to dispute their accusation. He could
have demanded that the affiants, including the persons they
mentioned were present in the transaction, namely: accused
Antonio Oriola, his brother Pitoy Oriola, Ignacio Salvador, and INC
Minister Antonio Calua be required to appear for his confrontation,
but respondent chose not, contented himself only with the
explanation that it was just the handiwork of complainant Abadilla
and her husband, a major in the military who is an active member
of the Iglesia Ni Cristo of which affiant Arcelita Salvador also
belonged, which is bare and unsubstantiated. No other conclusion
can be drawn other than holding, as the Investigating Judge does,
that this particular charge is true. Evidently, Judge Tabiliran wants
to avoid meeting them by way of confrontation. If he is innocent,
and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will surely raise hell to
insist that he confronts them face to face. Clearly, his deportment
betrays his insistence of innocence.
On Respondent's Counterclaim:
It was not proven. On the contrary, the controverting evidence
shows that the records of Criminal Case No. 2279 referred to in his
Annex 9, p. 123 of the records, were not in the possession of
complainant. Quite obviously, Ely O. Inot, respondent's Court
Interpreter tried to cover up the fact that the same were already
being kept by Judge Tabiliran before he issued the memorandum,
Annex 9. Complainant, who is respondent's Clerk of Court was not,
therefore, in a position to comply with his Order.
Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual report of the
Court in 1992 as called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A was, contrary to
respondent's claim, not by reason of her obstinate refusal to obey
her superior but, by sheer impossibility to comply, considering that
monthly reports upon which the annual report shall be based, were
not prepared by her, not because of her refusal to do so which is
among those included in her job description, but because the Judge
himself took the work from her for no other reason than to establish
the false impression that the complainant is disobedient to the
Judge, and does not attend to her duties.
By and large, there is no harmony in their office. Complainant and
respondent are not in talking terms. They are hostile to each other.
Respondent's complaint that Mrs. Abadilla spat saliva in front of him
whenever they meet each other; destroying the Court dry seal by
throwing it at him one time she was mad; showing face; and
sticking out her tongue to him, are all puerile acts which the
undersigned cannot conclude as sufficiently established even with
the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is far from being definite and
categorical, whose actuation is understandable because Judge
Tabiliran, being her superior, has moral ascendancy over her
(Record of Proceedings, June 11, 1993).
The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge Tabiliran,
and not on Mrs. Abadilla, who has been in the service as Clerk of
Court under a previous Judge of the same Court for quite long
without any complaint having been filed. The evidence disputing his
counterclaim tends to show that respondent tried to build up a
situation of undesirability against his Clerk of Court whom he
wanted pulled out from her position in his Court.
Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And Comments:
The authority to investigate being confined only to matters alleged
in the complaint on the basis of which respondent filed his
comments, other matters not therein covered which complainant
brought out by way of presenting documentary exhibits, (from
Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not subject of this report and
recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION:
The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL CONDUCT
have not been proven, but the undersigned believes evidence is
sufficient to sustain pronouncement of guilt on two counts of
CORRUPTION, namely: acting as notary public and collecting fees
for his services in preparing affidavit of desistance of a case in his
Court. Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false imputation
against his Clerk of Court are found duly established.
 WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the
service for a period of three months is recommended.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross
immorality, he having scandalously and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla
Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran.
Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal home
in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living
with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot
three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran.
Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while
Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and
Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent's marriage to his
first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of
Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven
years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse
shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be
invoked by respondent. By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the
conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to
cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent
had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all
purposes. Thus, respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970
when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes
gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage
as a basic social institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract,
but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony." (Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino).
By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his
high office and utterly failed to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of
morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).
As to respondent's act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not
in a position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper
determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the Investigating
Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code.
With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has likewise
been duly established. An examination of the birth certificates (Exhs. "J", "L", & "M")
of respondent's three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that
these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry
therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and
Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975,
respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986.
As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable
legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(R.A. 386 as amended) which provides:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of
the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous
relations (Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code: (Executive Order, No.
209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision
thus:
Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be
legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:
1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of
successional rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores
change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous
children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many
years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia v.
Sempio Diy).
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give
refuge to the deceitful actuations of the respondent.
It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita disappeared in
1966 and has not been heard from since then. It appears that on December 8, 1969,
Teresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran (G.R. No.
1155451) which was decided by this Court in 1982. In the said case, respondent was
sued for abandonment of his family home and for living with another woman with
whom he allegedly begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of
the failure of his wife to substantiate the charges. However, respondent was
reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live
Separately from Bed", with a stipulation that they allow each of the other spouse to
live with another man or woman as the case may be, without the objection and
intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where respondent declared that
he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed
Tabiliran, who are his legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked
as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn and Venus are his third and second children
respectively, are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his legitimate
children.
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross
immorality, deceitful conduct and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal
from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-employment in
the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the SO ORDERED.
Investigating Judge that respondent should be found culpable for two counts of
corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees in preparing an
Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.

Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the documents

(Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he was
legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to the fact that
there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient
to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.

Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus:

Sec. 252. Compensation of Notaries Public No fee,

compensation, or reward of any sort, except such as is expressly
prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected or received for
any service rendered by a notary public. Such money collected by
notaries public proper shall belong to them personally. Officers
acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the
fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government
funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the
Philippines, p. 202.)

Respondent's failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by
him as Ex-Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law
raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use.

With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a

rape case filed before his sala for which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the
complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said imputation but failed to offer
any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA
166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this remind him
once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:

Canon 2
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA
ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA.
DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA
DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO,
GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO
DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO,
CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R.
DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA
CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR.,
namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN
RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-
MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in SP Case No.
97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals in its
decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively simple: who, between
petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is
attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided
into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and
full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2)
the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,7 his nephews and
nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of
the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa11 Delgado by one Lucio
Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely,
Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa
Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings
were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before
him was Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her
relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of
marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is
crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their successional
rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been
validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother
of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and
his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis
Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate
estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In
support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented to establish it, not
even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is
clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with
Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento14 stated
that he was "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa
Delgado),15 significantly omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of
his father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a
record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took
place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by
Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months
later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado 17 but
whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two
eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their
assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the
civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the
sponsors referred to her as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a
marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They
maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919
and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on
September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were
known among their relatives and friends to have in fact been married. To support their
proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs.
Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to
the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25,
1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting
from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the United States-
Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia
wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to Josefa
Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he
was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of
their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and
Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was
known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an
illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo
Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his
own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status
from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary
which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of
their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no
interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to compulsory
acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim
voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the
authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code.21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo
Rustia filed a petition for the adoption22 of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia.
He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition was overtaken by his death
on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his
sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the
children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia
Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia
and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed
the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55.25 This
petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of
Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the theory that
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law
from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings,
claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia.
Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was
granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to
state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely
lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The
motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other
claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of
evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister,
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the
estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in
this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado
who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition
the same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this
Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only
surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of
the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late
Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force
and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement
[is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with law, a single
administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota
Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the
ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA DELGADO in
relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the
petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and
desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to
turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections of the rentals and income
due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records
and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this
Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her
actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the
record on appeal was not filed on time.29 They then filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus30 which was dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial
justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of
Appeals, on the ground that oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the
reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October
10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion of
our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under
exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to
certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs of the
decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate, which were to be
raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal
upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is
apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the
administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private respondents Record on
Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional
Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals34 partially set aside the trial courts
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration,35 the Court of Appeals amended its earlier
decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the
intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate
estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this
decision; 3.) the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo
Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion
referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to
inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as
administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation
to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-
appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of
FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist
from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed
administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to
such estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his
qualification and posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her
(Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a
period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of
the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo
Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of
Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts
are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into
presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either
conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more
than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married.
Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for
letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to
them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the
absence of a record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting
that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa
Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its
absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. 40 Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof.
The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least
be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity
issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia,41 the passport issued to her as
Josefa D. Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that
he was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name of
"Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and convincing evidence sufficient to overcome
the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily
relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed
marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as
husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or
unmarried ("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in
fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what
they hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the
common rules of law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always
presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the
cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be
addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. 48On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied
on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon
Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable
presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname
Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de
Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of
Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married.
Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio
and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, 51 were her natural
children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and
Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they
succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate
children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood
between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab
intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of
the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate
child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are
only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions
between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between
illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children
are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons.
They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-
blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate
brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all
are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood,
except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate,
they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces,
grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil
Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her
death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to
determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled
to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not
have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself by
means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent
left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by
their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they
see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and
should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is
only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo
Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an
admission or recognition of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter
on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in
effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children
absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed
in the new Civil Code which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children
but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. 60 Recognition is
compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense
coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father (or mother)61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition
through the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and
second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did
not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action
for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillermas right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on
February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.67 Did intervenors
report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary
prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature
of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenors
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation.
Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted
the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on
September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing
contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was
the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself
and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure to present
the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who
was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was
filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters
death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her
a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from
them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons
a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only
an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law
at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory
requirements must be strictly carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute
nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by
the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo
Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil
Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting
of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate
of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or
both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
 (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond
the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.
or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be No pronouncement as to costs.
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
SO ORDERED.
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the

estate of the one to be appointed.71 The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where

justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo
Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the
RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is

hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate
estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and
half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any
of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her,
also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and
grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court
is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados

estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia
Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children
of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose
respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda.
de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia,
 [G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997]
LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and
GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals, affirming
the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private
respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit
from them.
The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the
children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and
1961, respectively.They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935,
predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an
action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they were the
legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to
the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged
that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents residence at
Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the
estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later
withdrew this allegation.
Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo,[2] then 81 years old, mayor of
the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and
Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On
crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they
performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as balitaw dancer and Gavino Balogbog
as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the wedding of Gavino and Catalina
sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio
Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy, [3] a family friend of private
respondents, who testified that private respondents are the children of Gavino and
Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in
the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended
their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her
wedding dress from her residence in Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before
the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon,
Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners claim made
in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan,
Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the
coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couples son, Petronilo, who died
when he was six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.[4] She testified that
after the wedding, she was handed a receipt, presumably the marriage certificate, by
Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived
together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and
Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she
stated that after the death of Gavino, she lived in common law relation with a man for
a year and then they separated.
Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer
(Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this
reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war,
and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias that there was likewise no record of
birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed
during the war. (Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog
testified[5] that Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied that
her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private
respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the
Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of
the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate was prepared by Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935. [6]
Witness Jose Narvasa testified[7] that Gavino died single in 1935 and that
Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not know
whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had children by
a man she had married before the war, although he did not know the names of the
children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who
requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a criminal case filed by a certain
Mr. Cuyos.
Ramonito Balogbog was presented[8] to rebut Leoncia Balogbogs testimony.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment
for private respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting
from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private
respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorneys
fees and costs.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that
the trial court erred in not giving weight to the certification of the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino and
Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their
motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial and/or
reconsideration based on the church records of the parish of Asturias which did not
contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed
to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and
that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life.[9] Hence, this petition.
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have
been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because
this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53
provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven
only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books
thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the
courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by
parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the
registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in
evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of
1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of
the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this
country.[10] Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was
brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined
in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the
former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, [11] and the rules on
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman
conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. [12] This presumption
may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. [13] In this case, petitioners claim
that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of
the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production
of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners
argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged marriage of
private respondents parents.
This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias,[14] the defendants, who
questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the record of
marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to
show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of
marriage,[15] the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. [16] Here, private respondents proved,
through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that
they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted
until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were
recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot
be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that Gavino and
Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other
as husband and wife.[17] An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made
from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the
very purpose for having a wedding is to exchange vows of marital commitment. It
would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite
unnatural for people not to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the
preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional
concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:[18]
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of
Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and
Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion
and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents reliance solely on
testimonial evidence to support their claim that private respondents had been in the
continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the
Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the
Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with
Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children
may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation
shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to
the possession by private respondents of the status of legitimate children because the
Book of Marriagesfor the years 1928-1929 is available.
What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the
filiation of private respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina
has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu
certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be
found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But
Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino and Catalina begot three children, one of whom,
Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito
and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the
children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted. effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can
only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the son
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog of Gavino.
admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court
of Appeals found:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the SO ORDERED.
balance in favor of the appellees. In an investigation before the Police Investigating
Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of
inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban
police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his
nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date
(Exhs. N, N-1, N-2, N-3 and N-4) read:

Atty. Kiamco - May it please this investigative body.

Q.- Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?
A.- Yes I know.
Q.- Why do you know him?
A.- I know because he is my nephew.
Q.- Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?
A.- Yes.
Q.- Do you mean to say that you are close to him?
A.- Yes. We are close.
Q.- Why do you say you are close?
A.- We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we
were also leaving (sic) in the same house in Butuan City, and I even
barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I return
to Balamban, Cebu.
x x xx x x x x x
Q.- Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?
A.- Because he is the son of my elder brother.

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in

another case. It is considered as a reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130,
 G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016
VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ,
REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review oncertiorari1
assailing the Decision2
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for
annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA
Resolution4 dated April 5, 2010 denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Facts
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case,
with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-
Ritua (Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio
Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273
Bo. Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered
in the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate of title, appearing as
Entry No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and
interests over a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.6
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No.
183088 was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466, 7 was issued in
the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale 8 dated January 18, 2005
whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling
TCT No. 183088 was an Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both
the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim
filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making
the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away. 10
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of
falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code against the petitioner.11 However, said criminal charges were eventually
dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra,
instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati
City.12
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the
respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that
they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over
Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their
father and mother.
After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on
September 28, 2007.14 The fallo of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in
favor of [the petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati
City, as Null and Void;
2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No.
221466 issued in the name of [the petitioner], the same having
been issued on the basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and
thereafter to reinstate TCT No. 183088 issued in the name of [the
petitioner] and [Silvestra] with all the liens and encumbrances
annotated thereon, including the adverse claim of [Fidela]; [and]
3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of
PI00,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees,
plus costs of suit.
[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who
purportedly executed said deed of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three
years before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.16 Respecting the respondents'
legal capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the
[respondents] to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage
between [Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the Certificate of
(canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in
[the respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden name
but Fidela signed the same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both
birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the
father.17(Emphasis ours)

Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the
respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of
deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.18
On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with
modification as to the amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for
lack of merit. The Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City,
Branch 147 in Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00
to P50,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the [petitioner].
SO ORDERED.19
The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through
forgery. As to the question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and
thus have the legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the
appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court
found unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of
marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that
their office has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela],
and further claiming the absence of a marriage license.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate
of marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as
well as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the
[respondents].
xxxx
The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license
number and in the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may
not be invalidated on that ground.
x x x.
xxxx
Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. This
jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that
a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It
is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.
Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by
competent and substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born
during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate
children of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.20 (Citations
omitted)
The petitioner sought reconsideration,21 but her motion was denied in the
Resolution22 dated April 5, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that
forgery was indeed committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
consequent transfer of title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the
petitioner continues to assail the legal capacity of the respondents to institute the
present action. Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil Code, 23the petitioner
insists that the respondents have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra for
being illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra,
she, however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation
to Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela
was not sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner, the marriage
contract24 presented by the respondents is not admissible under the Best Evidence
Rule for being a mere fax copy or photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and
which is not even authenticated by the concerned Local Civil Registrar. In addition,
there is no mark or stamp showing that said document was ever received by said
office. Further, while the respondents also presented a Certificate of (Canonical)
Marriage,25 the petitioner asserts that the same is not the marriage license required
under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code;26 that said Certificate of (Canonical)
Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony actually transpired between
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.27cralawred
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents
do not conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.
In their Comment,28 the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that the
petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy can
only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the
former either by consanguinity or affinity.29
Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether or
not the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.
Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.
While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this
Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to
Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the
question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs
of Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial.
At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical
certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage
without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule
130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document
can still be admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified
by law. In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,
which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause
of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is
burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or
existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-
production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on
the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its
subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary
evidence, x x x.32 (Citation omitted)
On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As
early as in the case of United States v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church
registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings,
nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials.34 They are private writings and
their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in
accordance with the rules of evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing that
the authenticity and due execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.
Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact
of a solemnized marriage.36 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
person's birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.37
Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their
respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office38 where
Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.
A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the
same parents their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's
maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24.
DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated
therein that respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang,
Leyte."39
The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the respondents'
legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any evidence to the contrary. The
certificates of live birth contain no entry stating whether the respondents are of
legitimate or illegitimate filiation, making said documents unreliable and unworthy of
weight and value in the determination of the issue at hand.
Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth, only
the signature of Fidela appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She
argues that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent
evidence to establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v.
Local Civil Registrar of Manila40 where it was held that a birth certificate not signed by
the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity.41
The petitioner's contentions are untenable.
"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the
facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer (Civil Registrar)."42Thus, being public documents, the respondents'
certificates of live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth
of the facts stated in them.43
"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient."44
The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in
order to be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law
and jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces45 is misplaced
considering that what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate
child, and not legitimate filiation.
Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration of either parent of the new-
born legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil
register, and only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law
require that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.
The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:
Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or
midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither
parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in
the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela
and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption
the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage
born child. cannot be disregarded. Thus:

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts:
(a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil
status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; if) and such other data as may
be required in the regulations to be issued.
Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity
of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of
the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by SO ORDERED.
which such father could be identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)

Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly
executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of
legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said
documents is of no moment because Fidela only signed as
the declarant or informant of the respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.

Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a
result of which they had two children the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born
more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof
to establish the validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in GR.
No. 183262 entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the
occasion to state:

Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered
to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage
may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's
public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c)
the birth and baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.48 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."50
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created
them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard
voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please
let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a
sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings;
one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man
"Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of
Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name
and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment
surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for
the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded
the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and
breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok,
Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He
then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto"
to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and
his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked
for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a
woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to
be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be
caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on
the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male"
to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing
the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of
sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics
petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case
No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of
name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he
became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes
of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change
of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and
Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative
officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from
the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative
petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition
for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not
alter ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications
in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he
must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this
case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result
of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners
first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have
been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It
was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue
was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue
and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without
a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048
in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in
the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous,
such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and
can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a
mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code
include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of
the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of
sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or
with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner
contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations
of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts,
events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by
the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned
in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total
of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his
family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being
married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as
the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general,
family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption,
emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even
succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt
from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not
later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as
they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the
genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex,"
"male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil
registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection,
sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female." 33Female is "the
sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to
produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the
time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the
context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register
Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that
the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category
"female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal
basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed
on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no
harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is
the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another
man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such
as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, 39 certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of
calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws
underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty
of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in
this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what
grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall
be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his
reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing
the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person
may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has
no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot
enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its
co-equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for
them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve
questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
ManilaSECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676

Petitioner, Present:

- versus - Quisumbing, J., Chairperson,

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Carpio Morales,

Respondent. Tinga,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated
January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name "Jennifer
Cagandahan" changed to "Jeff Cagandahan" and (2) gender from "female" to "male."

The facts are as follows.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate2 before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna.

In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing
up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where
persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her
early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her
ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that
her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the
sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198780

October
16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Pet
itioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D.
ALBIOS, Respond
ent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition
for review on
certiorari under
Rule 45 of the
Rules t of Court
assailing the
September 29,
2011 Decision1 of
the Court of
Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. CV No.
95414, which
affirmed the April
25,
2008Decision2 of
the Regional Trial
Court, Imus,
Cavite (RTC).
declaring the
marriage of Daniel
Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and
respondent Liberty
Albios (A/bios) as
void from the
beginning.

The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City
(MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4
of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any
intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore,
null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The
RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and
determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor
complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial,
hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As
a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the
surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to
enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him
the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be
recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage
was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the
marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that
the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married
and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the
parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live
as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily
for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the
consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD
THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING
FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent
to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew
the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent
should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of
marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand
that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from
the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition
for review on certiorari.
 Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits.
In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular
purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose"
marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the
couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage
fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom
did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard
was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage
was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life
together, to determining the intention of evading immigration laws. 16 It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore,
does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent
for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early
cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In
1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to
stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to
obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled
that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country
was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may
go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact assent,
which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in
jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent
consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake
of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they
will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never
really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is
ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain
entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely
because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration
case of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was
intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts have
generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as
valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution
denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to
the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a
means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC,
the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the
Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest
considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of
American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of
consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made
in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be
real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in
that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both
the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding should
not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the
nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as
nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as
to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full
and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them,
since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such
as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal
in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual
marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound.
The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such
a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to
create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent.
Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent,
but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the
parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios
and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond
necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine
consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that
only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was,
thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple
to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1
provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage
void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples
to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live
apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment
of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a
marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any
of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud
may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham
marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her
marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail
to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply
have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use
the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a
judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed
to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It
must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered
into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-
06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent. ALEX
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of
Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997,
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage
outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering
the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO
A. YMAN got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge
(sic) Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in
Calbayog City, Samar; xxxalex
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT
who acted as our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN
and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN
abandoned me without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to
Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding
my Marriage Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar
of Calbayog City that my marriage was not registered; xxxSc lex
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge
Juan Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman
that all the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken
by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts
prejudicial to my interest such as: x law
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering
our marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registrar."
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito
Yman had to be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though
outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar
due to the following and pressing circumstances: Sc
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically
indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta.
Margarita. In the forenoon of that date, without prior
appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said
City, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage
right then and there, first, because complainants said she
must leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for
abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to go to
another town for the marriage would be expensive and
would entail serious problems of finding a solemnizing
officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in
fact former Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon
Dean were already with them as sponsors; third, if they
failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant
would be out of the country for a long period and their
marriage license would lapse and necessitate another
publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their
plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it
would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all
other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were
considered impracticable by the parties;
1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired
cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage, which respondent
found all in order. Spped
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas
worker, who, respondent realized, deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government
policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he
believed in good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side
of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and
complicated for citizens to get married.
 3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of
registration of the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage
certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following
circumstances beyond the control of respondent: Scmis
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the
marriage certificate, respondent left the three remaining
copies on top of the desk in his private office where the
marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register
the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth
(sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent
gathered all the papers relating to the said marriage but
notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private
files, all the three last copies of the certificate were
missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx
Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he
said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the
marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party.
Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for a
confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now
that she is out of the country, a reasonable conclusion can
be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this
dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that after
August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman,
abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said
husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of
LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it seems reasonably clear who of
the two marriage contracting parties probably absconded
with the missing copies of the marriage
certificate. Jo spped
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no
other recourse but to protect the public interest by trying
all possible means to recover custody of the missing
documents in some amicable way during the expected
hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of
Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer
with the Civil Registrar General for possible registration of
reconstituted copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11,
1998 found that respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning that
the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing
out that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-
Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage is only
limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly,
Calbayog City is no longer within his area of jurisdiction. Miso
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8
of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a
judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to
wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of
death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote
place; Nex old
(3) where both of the parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that
effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his
duty when he failed to register the marriage of complainant to
Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the
Family Code which provides: Ncm
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the
marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the
original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6
and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to
the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized. xxx" (underscoring ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the
respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also
undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic
social institution in our society whose nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge
indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or
reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he
is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His
imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were
 taken by Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and
does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the
evaluation report of the OCA well-taken. Mani kx
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution
thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply
interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides,
among others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers
of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in
the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case
may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect." (Italics ours) Spped jo
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the
judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of
death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of
both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman
was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written
request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the marriage be
solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact,
appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to
solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was "[a]n overseas
worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under
present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the
marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on
the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated for
citizens to get married." Manikan
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live
and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly
uncalled for.[2] A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law;[3] he must also
be conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the very delicate
nature of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties. [5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization
of the marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by
marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country. They also betray
respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more
disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns
upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.Ncmmis
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to
preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of
judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given respondent judge
pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the
performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed
to know the constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus
respondent Judge should be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice
or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines
to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, Judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while
it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.[7]Scnc m
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.[8]
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should
exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties
in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra precautions to
ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the
Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the
marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of
 the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen
days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place
where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be
issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing
officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases,
the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of
the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8.
(Italics supplied) Sdaad
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent
Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged
with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the cases and official
documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events.[9] However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by
carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must
adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster
the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to
devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the
one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. [11]
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the recommendation of the
OCA. Juris
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED.
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.
OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent
is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until
her husband passed away. However, since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners
right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was likewise
deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine
Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his
illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much
hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then
Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001,
the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was
requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage
of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents to
the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000,
Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors
of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in
Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in
Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he
carefully examined the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he
discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused
to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due
to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions
for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human compassion.
He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition
of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give
it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge
that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they
failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave
him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at
the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that
their marriage is valid despite the absence of a marriage license. He attributes the
hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own fault and
negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28
August 2001 with the Office of the Court Administrator. She attested that respondent
judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly issued
marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he
eventually solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative
case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent judge, she
realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed
their Application for Marriage License on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this
Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
 It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a
Certification that it has no record of such marriage that allegedly took place on 17
February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines
Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of
the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the
latter could communicate with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk
of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot
issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death Certificate
of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated
15 November 2000, found the respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage
without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial
jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent
judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the
regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a
wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not
fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We
held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful
is authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites
of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond.
Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a
resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it
may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground
that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
the instant case. x x x While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for
which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of
the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the
requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed
by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal
of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent
from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as
well as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined. [5] Disciplinary actions
of this nature do not involve purely private or personal matters. They can not be made
to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant
in a matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges.
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a public
office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority. [6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,

Petitioner,
The antecedent facts are:

- versus
G.R. No. 167746
Present: A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against respondent
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. Chairperson,
COURT OF APPEALS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of

CHICO-NAZARIO, looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who,
Respondents.
for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of
NACHURA, and
the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8
REYES, JJ.
December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony

at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The
Promulgated:
marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The

alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage

August 28, 2007
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14

October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they

DECISION parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,

judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: cancel the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]

Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry
dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to
affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another
in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a
annulment of marriage. mistress with whom he has three children.[8]Petitioner only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a
case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays
that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision
disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2)
children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
3. To pay the costs.[11]
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the
petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be
regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the
presumption.Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is
a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.[13]
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal
and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there
was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133
despite the fact that the same was not identified and
offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the face of the
marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this
Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of
Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA
550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules
to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party
litigants.[14]
We deny the petition.
 (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was

celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to
(2) Their consent, freely given;
the ManilaCity Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them.[15] The

wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel

where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming

a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character.
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil

Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states

that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of

Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage contract bears The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its
the number 7054033 for their marriage license number. involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[21]

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior

to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage
license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,
the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a
relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19] certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that

Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the

certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage
marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he
of the parties states:
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
are complied with:
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a
Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records license was in fact issued to the parties herein.

reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage

license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro

Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite,

certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of reads:

the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary

marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
void ab initio.
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in
this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in favor of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8,
1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.[26]
almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held

that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly

performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct

of official business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the
the marriage void.
presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing

evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption
of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by
should be in favor of its lawfulness.[28]Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by
a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the

local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is precise in that Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license,
it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we
still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of

marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]

either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the

absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication

are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less

irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went

the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his

administratively liable.[31] head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the

the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous

issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners

marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this testimony as follows

argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a

typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the

WITNESS
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either

as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary
the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. document prior to the wedding.

Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean

hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the COURT

marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage

license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I
am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person.He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He

knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
WITNESS
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and
be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the

situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot I dont remember your honor.
COURT
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all

that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil
wedding.[36]
WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a
Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for
the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who
arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain
Rev. AquilinoNavarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not

strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
COURT
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to

the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate

In other words, you represented to the San Jose
de Manuguit church that you have with you already a whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
Marriage Contract? registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued

by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license
WITNESS that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]

Yes your honor.

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the

COURT
validity of the marriage.[39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same
marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which
Marriage License is Number 7054033.
validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great
favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.

WITNESS

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of

Yes your honor.[35] merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the

decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February
2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M.
Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas.1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that
no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their
marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently,
he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil
ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant
Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In
fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued
in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage
was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro
discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their
cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On
October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with
the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted
to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a
lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage.
Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license
issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of
Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay
City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage
license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970
cannot be located as said license no. 3196182 does not appear
from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24,
1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She
affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate
to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of
the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to
locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage
license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She
insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently established the
absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial
court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null and void and
directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred
when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no.
3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was ever
issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the
procurement of the subject marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the
certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and
void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing
officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the
marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him
before the solemnization of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary
and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to establish
that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the
celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one
of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and
inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was
issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her
petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other
witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of
the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony
performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly
known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to
refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or
friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage
between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be
held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the
proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the
same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent
cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings.
There was absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion
between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage
between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not
discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by
the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing
officer.

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by
an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy, that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found
to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and
testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established
the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible
error committed by respondent appellate court.
SO ORDERED.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of
Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by
any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his
office did not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death
benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom he
married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in
toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely,
Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with
respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had
no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent Susan Yee received a total
of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).[4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that
petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she
(petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.
Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial
court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of,
the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she
had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at
the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the
wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number;[5] and 2) a certification dated March 9,
1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses
SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality
on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription
of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever
legal purpose it may serve.[6]
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee,
holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum
of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits
arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount
of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS.
GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING
EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND
UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN
MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF
THE FAMILY CODE.[8]
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. [9] However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of
heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case.[10] In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. [11]
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon
the validity of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the
deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is
a requisite of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions,[13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A
marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This
notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance
of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to
prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage
license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could
have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her
pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently
avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her
case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license,
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits
under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under
Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second
marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their
marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the
property of the spouses according to the applicable property regime. [16] Considering
that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be
absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by
the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of
Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of
bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple
alliances of the same married man,[17] -
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by
each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a
bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the
application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.],
NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a
police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could
not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever
to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased
shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the
deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article
147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxxxxxxxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party
in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants,
each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the
absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases,
the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned
by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages
and the other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed death
benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half
thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the
first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to
his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case
of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, [20] where the Court
awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the
other half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the
conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first
wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil
Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive
him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as
such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in
dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife
to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage.[21]
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the
rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This
is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in
accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of
the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage
is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has
to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could
contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The
same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are
not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to
present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage
from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the
determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved
and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable
laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a
final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00
plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 127263. April 12, 2000]
FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,
BRANCH XLI, and FERNANDO SY, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision[1] dated May 21, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 44144, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition[3] for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on
November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. [4] Both
were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children, Frederick and
Farrah Sheryll who were born on July 8, 1975 and February 14, 1978,respectively. [5]
The spouses first established their residence in Singalong, Manila, then in Apalit,
Pampanga, and later at San Matias, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. They operated a lumber
and hardware business in Sto. Tomas, Pampanga.[6]
On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the
spouses lived separately, and their two children were in the custody of their mother.
However, their son Frederick transferred to his father's residence at Masangkay,
Tondo, Manila on May 15,1988, and from then on, lived with his father.[7]
On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation, docketed as Civil
Case No. 7900 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Later,
upon motion of petitioner, the action was later amended to a petition for separation of
property on the grounds that her husband abandoned her without just cause; that
they have been living separately for more than one year; and that they voluntarily
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated September 29, 1983, containing the
rules that would govern the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. [8] Judgment was
rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of
separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the
spouses.[9] The trial court also granted custody of the children to Filipina. [10]
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her
husband, docketed as Criminal Case No. 88-68006, before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. Filipina testified that in the afternoon of May 15, 1988, she went to the
dental clinic at Masangkay, Tondo, Manila, owned by her husband but operated by
his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San Fernando, Pampanga. While she
was talking to her son, the boy ignored her and continued playing with the family
computer. Filipina got mad, took the computer away from her son, and started
spanking him. At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and
punched her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband
started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he thought
she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on different parts of
her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband, evidenced by a Medical
Certificate issued by a certain Dr. James Ferraren. She said it was not the first time
Fernando maltreated her.[11]
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision[12] dated April 26, 1990,
convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, and sentenced
him to 20 days imprisonment. Edpmis
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private respondent,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8273,on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical
violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and (4)
abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more than one year.
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision [13] dated
December 4,1991, granted the petition on the grounds of repeated physical violence
and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of legal separation. It awarded custody of
their daughter Farrah Sheryll to petitioner, and their son Frederick to respondent.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition[14] for the declaration of absolute nullity of
her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity. She points out
that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in her favor, in her
petitions for separation of property and legal separation, and Fernando's infliction of
physical violence on her which led to the conviction of her husband for slight physical
injuries are symptoms of psychological incapacity. She also cites as manifestations of
her husband's psychological incapacity the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2)
refusal to live with her without fault on her part, choosing to live with his mistress
instead; and (3) refusal to have sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy
himself. Moreover, Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband
existed from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.[15]
The Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, in its decision [16] dated
December 9, 1993, denied the petition of Filipina Sy for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando. It stated that the alleged acts of the respondent,
as cited by petitioner, do not constitute psychological incapacity which may warrant
the declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Lexjuris
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial
court. In the decision[17] of the Court of Appeals dated May 21, 1996, it ruled that the
testimony of petitioner concerning respondent's purported psychological incapacity
falls short of the quantum of evidence required to nullify a marriage celebrated with all
the formal and essential requisites of law. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioner failed to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent had
existed at the time of the celebration of their marriage in 1973. It reiterated the finding
of the trial court that the couple's marital problems surfaced only in 1983, or almost
ten years from the date of the celebration of their marriage. And prior to their
separation in 1983, they were living together harmoniously. Thus, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court which it found to be in accordance
with law and the evidence on record.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] which the Court of Appeals denied in
its resolution dated November 21, 1996.[20]
Hence, this appeal by certiorari[21] wherein petitioner now raises the following
issues: Jurismis
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ON THE DATE
OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGE ON
NOVEMBER 15, 1973, NOT DISPUTED BY RESPONDENT
FERNANDO, THERE WAS NO MARRIAGE LICENSE THERETO;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT THE GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT [herein
petitioner] DO NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY AS WOULD JUSTIFY NULLIFICATION OF HER
MARRIAGE TO APPELLEE [herein respondent];
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS BY STATING
THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED
UNDESIRABLE ACTUATIONS OF APPELLEE HAD EXISTED OR
WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME THEIR MARRIAGE WAS
CELEBRATED IN 1973;Jjjuris
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING
THE ERRONEOUS RULING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT
THERE IS A REDEEMING ATTITUDE SHOWN TO THE COURT
BY RESPONDENT FERNANDO WITH RESPECT TO HIS
CHILDREN AND ALSO BELIEVES THAT RECONCILIATION
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS NOT A REMOTE POSSIBILITY
WHICH IS ERRONEOUS; AND
5.WHETHER OR NOT THE CASE OF SANTOS V.COURT OF
APPEALS (240 SCRA 20) IS APPLICABLE HERETO.[22]
In sum, two issues are to be resolved: justice
1. Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2. Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of
said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Petitioner, for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a
valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. It appears that, according to her,
the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their
marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. Jksm
Although we have repeatedly ruled that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time
on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and justice, [23] in a
number of instances, we have relaxed observance of procedural rules, noting that
technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive
rights of litigants. We said that certain rules ought not to be applied with severity and
rigidity if by so doing, the very reason for their existence would be defeated.[24] Hence,
when substantial justice plainly requires, exempting a particular case from the
operation of technicalities should not be subject to cavil.[25] In our view, the case at
bar requires that we address the issue of the validity of the marriage between Fillipina
and Fernando which petitioner claims is void from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license, in order to arrive at a just resolution of a deeply seated and violent conflict
between the parties. Note, however, that here the pertinent facts are not disputed;
and what is required now is a declaration of their effects according to existing law.
Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her petition for
annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity in the dates of the
marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself would lead to the
conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from the beginning, she points out
that these critical dates were contained in the documents she submitted before the
court. The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate, September
17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract which was attached as Annex "A" in
her petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and
thereafter marked as Exhibit "A" in the course of the trial.[26] The date of celebration of
their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish, on November 15, 1973,
is admitted both by petitioner and private respondent, as stated in paragraph three of
petitioner's petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial
court, and private respondent's answer admitting it.[27] This fact was also affirmed by
petitioner, in open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination, [28] as
follows: Es m
ATTY. RAZON: In the last hearing, you said that you were married
on November 15,1973?
FILIPINA SY: Yes, Sir.
November 15, 1973, also appears as the date of marriage of the parents in both their
son's and daughter's birth certificates, which are also attached as Annexes " B" and
"C" in the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and thereafter marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" in the course of the trial. [29] These
pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the
marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal
requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage
contract shows that the marriage license, numbered 6237519, was issued in
Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.[30]

Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that indeed
petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court that there was
incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date
of the issuance of their marriage license. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the
marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do we find
private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the Civil Code [31] is
clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the
purported marriage between petitioner and private respondent could not be classified
among those enumerated in Articles 72-79[32] of the Civil Code. We thus conclude
that under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the marriage between petitioner and private
respondent is void from the beginning. Es msc

We note that their marriage certificate and marriage license are only photocopies. So
are the birth certificates of their son Frederick and daughter Farrah Sheryll.
Nevertheless, these documents were marked as Exhibits during the course of the trial
below, which shows that these have been examined and admitted by the trial court,
with no objections having been made as to their authenticity and due execution.
Likewise, no objection was interposed to petitioner's testimony in open court when
she affirmed that the date of the actual celebration of their marriage was on
November 15, 1973. We are of the view, therefore, that having been admitted in
evidence, with the adverse party failing to timely object thereto, these documents are
deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.[33]

The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no

longer detain us. It is mooted by our conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to
respondent is void ab initio for lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage
was solemnized. Esmm is

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Fernando, Pampanga, dated December 9,1993 as well as the Decision
promulgated on May 21, 1996 by the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated
November 21, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. 44144 are set aside. The marriage celebrated on
November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Yap and private respondent Fernando
Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of
celebration. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285
dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he
claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation
employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel
Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the
City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of
Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said
Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license
for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage
license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to
the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and
Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on
31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages
were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office.
He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married
to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he
and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D.
Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they
executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo
Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father
accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as
witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792
allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in the
marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any
marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him through his
lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D.
Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and
defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan
Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon
City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the
same marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and
expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by his
and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant
resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was
born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he
and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies.
Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult
for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started
living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they
eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's
second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained
a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later
secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that
when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to
him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of
Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was
obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the
religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March
3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and
March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil
Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated
March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20,
1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by
that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him
a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F")
and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it
noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on
May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792
issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan,
identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and
September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar,
and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady
romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in
October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya
ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked
her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned
back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came
back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton
Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents
were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced
them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff
and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to
marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her
father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where
she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch
and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church
wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not participate in
the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual
consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months
when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's
physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic
problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual
sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take
endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in
between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex
between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During
their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant
attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive
liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums.
Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed"
drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers,
like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs
but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since
they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years,
and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial
support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff,
who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became
unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a
break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one
Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the
civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and
grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and
have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew
up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's
expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that
it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements
for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know
that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She
also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of
the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of
irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to live their
own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and
obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"),
it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a
certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During
his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the
marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious. 6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the
parties, the trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage,
the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was
shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued
by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and
the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage
license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May
19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a
certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime
O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D.
Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of
marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the
Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under
Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of
Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a
copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record
and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December
2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme
Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil
registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein
 marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the
employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot
therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties'
marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the
local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license
was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but
rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no.
2770792 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for
scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on
marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis
of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective
with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception
that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record. 8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of
Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with
law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the
presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a
marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts
in question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly
issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption
of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage." 9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No.
2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are
sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the
marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the
validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a
marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license based
on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this
Court in the case of Cario v. Cario13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the
non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion,
as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the
trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the
absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals
and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to
refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence,
the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local
Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic
v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public
officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book
where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was
issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically
state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be
found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof
of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
 SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied
with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office.
With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792, 16 we exert all effort
but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating
the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued
by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert
all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating
the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage
License Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O.
SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in
our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for
whatever legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our
loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be
easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could
not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License
No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with
absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they
cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said
logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not
presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the
logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This
belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents
therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court
among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage
 licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with
you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for
subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage
applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the office
of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license
2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to
license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how
about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did
you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the
moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was
this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were
not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have
been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the
Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that
may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold
the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other
evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act
or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence
of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22The presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as
in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor
of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of
Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at
bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the
validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. 23 The courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for
several years producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime
several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he
married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner
by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process
allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can
find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of
families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the
concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or
deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably,
there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109,
Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion
for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed)
for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC
of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch
109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4,
Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No.
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to the
solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9,
1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence,
located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one
of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of
said ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed
that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license,
and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number
could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing
in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO
and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose
or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him
in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of
his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining
to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that
the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July
11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the
Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their
office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967,
to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and
a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar
with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract
was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office. 17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he
requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this
Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He
further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He
attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her
son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9,
1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage
was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage
license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her
the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev.
Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the
contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was
obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by
Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an
information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a)
she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January
9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the
persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas
Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the
help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the
sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage
license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage
license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the
marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz,
the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9,
1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a
certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage,
and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of
Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in
Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim
rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around
them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage
license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also
took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the
respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
 2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner
and the respondent even if no property was acquired during their
cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective
civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC
denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court of
Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID
DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE
CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE
OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING
THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE
OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE
TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent
search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that
said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there
was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been
validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as
husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The
marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09
January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME
IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS
OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The
pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3),
which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but
the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor
with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of
the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement
of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution
of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued
for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA
held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to
prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed
turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such
license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification
was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or
entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by
a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his
office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular
entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of
maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage
license was issued and such other relevant data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed
probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of
a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear
in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it
did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license appears
to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification
could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by
the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license
could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact
that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does
not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply
for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of
said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of
the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted
not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well
as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a
copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office
and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further
weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cario
further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been
secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can
be reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there
was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of
the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license
was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of
the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria
and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with all
the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of
appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were
presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the
witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious
note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted
and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio,
except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those
exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
same Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it
may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they
had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner.
The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who
took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a
formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5,
2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and
the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration
of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married
Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely,
Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally)
who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins
family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In February
1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was
against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally
brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in
the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and
8783 registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name
of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-
existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the
ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of
the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of
the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial
court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally
named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the
trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also
denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and asked for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of
Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial
court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court
gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10
July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally
still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case
submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial
court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License Series Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court
ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting
marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence
of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on
the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not
parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal support because
she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice
and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37
properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin.
The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the 37
properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the
properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles
were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go"
was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by
Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution
of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681
as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the
trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units
were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the
properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to
Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that
Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial
court forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his
conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on
March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID
AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties
under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in
Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622,
194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631,
194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651,
206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,
Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of
"Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are
directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are
properties acquired from petitioners money without contribution from respondent,
hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife. Consequently,
petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is
ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5)
properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn
over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the
documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are
under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go
Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties
shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15,
2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties
children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the
Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the
motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case for
decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case, all
made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly
warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not
subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the
second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed
no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled
that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that they were
acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof
of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally
shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would
justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-
109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely
owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be
owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-
appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the
share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March
2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial courts ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
the trial courts decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally
null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming
with modification the trial courts decision regarding the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that
she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to
present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court abandoned its
duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a
matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 9 In this case, Sallys
presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were
six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28
October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance.
Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned Sally that
in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other
available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not even
subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate
on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning
due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had
been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements
were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the
case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence,
she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the
case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting
for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial courts
denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not
issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the
trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial
court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and
refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her
marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same
time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to present
her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her
marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to" her; that
Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that
he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his
wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names
of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant
in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At
the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the
marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was
no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed that only
Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month.
Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local
civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent
any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the
National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that
there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court,
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a simulated
marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents
seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court
notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in
Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which
did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." 21 Thus,
the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in all aspects the trial courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision
stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages, it can be
gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the
decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first
or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the
contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what
was committed was contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under
Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of
the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The
daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner
cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has
the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would
be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. 24 In this case, there
was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally
is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions
and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption
shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or
her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience
and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there
must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in
addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In
this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting
the case for decision because of Sallys continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used
uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his
prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the case that
would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad SO ORDERED.
faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded
the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial court
even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by
TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin 27 with
the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were
registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
"married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of
actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under
Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit
himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to
accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge

G.R. No. 187462, June 01, 2016
RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in CA-GR. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner's favor in an
action he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent, while
the CA Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed
by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar. Pertinent portions of the
Petition allege as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner's parents summoned one
Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer,
instructing said clerk to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers were
required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to
take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from
witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage
ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o'clock before dawn of June 1,
1972, on account that there was a public dance held in the town plaza which is just
situated adjacent to the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance
only finished at around 2:00 o'clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in
connection with the procurement of a marriage license;
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the aforenamed clerk of the
treasurer's office was told to obtain the pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31,
1972 so required for the purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the
actual marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage license
therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the marriage solemnized
on even date null and void for want of the most essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner's and Respondent's marriage
aforestated was solemnized sans the required marriage license, hence, null and void
from the beginning and neither was it performed under circumstances exempting the
requirement of such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and respondent held on June
1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and void ab initio and of no legal effect;
x x x x4ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification 5 issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license
issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June
1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly dismissed for lack
of cause of action because there is no evidence to prove petitioner's allegation that
their marriage was celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the
contrary, both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil
registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their marriage
was solemnized.
Upon petitioner's request, the venue of the action was subsequently transferred to the
RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the parties submitted their
respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the petition. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares the marriage
contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata on June 1, 1972 null and
void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the
Family Code. The foregoing is without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and
51 of the Family Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche,
Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree of nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The RTC found that petitioner's evidence sufficiently established the absence of the
requisite marriage license when the marriage between petitioner and respondent was
celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence of the said marriage license rendered the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30, 2006, the
CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus: The Court finds for the petitioner.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25 September 2000 of At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), raises a
Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, procedural question by arguing that the issues presented by petitioner in the present
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between the petitioner-appellee petition are factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these
Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid and subsisting for all intents and issues in a petition for review on certiorari.
purposes.
The Court does not agree.
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application of existing
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the contending
law and prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these issues is the
parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued for that purpose
question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which is a question of fact
and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption. The CA also ruled that the
and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
absence of any indication in the marriage certificate that a marriage license was
of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not without exceptions, viz.:
issued is a mere defect in the formal requisites of the law which does not invalidate
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
the parties' marriage.
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its Resolution
dated January 14, 2009.
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED "ETHICAL DIMENSION" TO PETITIONER'S CAUSE,
ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS
MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH RESPONDENT;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT DESPITE THE LAPSE
(7) When the findings arc contrary to those of the trial court;
OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN COLLATERALLY, HIS
APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH RESPONDENT;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER'S OBVIOUSLY OVERWHELMING
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE LICENSE AND GIVING
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED DECISION; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
4 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
record.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT A In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not there was
NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent, are conflicting.
LICENSE.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.
Petitioner's basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged failure of
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to
the CA to give due credence to petitioner's evidence which established the absence
the effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code governs their union.
or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner and respondent's marriage was
Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage
solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in deciding the case not on the basis
as a contract, to wit:
of law and evidence but rather on the ground of what the appellate court calls as
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ethical considerations as well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
declaration of nullity of his marriage with respondent.
complied with:
 it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 20

(2) Their consent, freely given; As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and Registrar "has no record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of
Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M. Borata [respondent] whose marriage was
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional celebrated on June 1, 1972."21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed
character.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it
becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized
who alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
discharge that burden.
either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code,
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy
marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising
thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating
Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point
priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent
of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages;
could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and
(4) ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6)
Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of
Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and
issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed to do so.
respondent's marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's
observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without
respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony was conducted but
the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the
and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and
marriage contract.15 The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license
petitioner were able to obtain a marriage license, she failed to present evidence to
under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.23
marriage.16Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is
the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
maintenance of which the general public is interested.17
Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license or of any evidence to show that such license was ever issued, the only
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able to secure a
conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued.
marriage license which they presented to the solemnizing officer before the marriage
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a
was performed.
total absence, in the requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the
marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of the validity
license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the
of marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such validity. Indeed,
corresponding marriage license is null and void.
this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the Constitutional policy which
protects and strengthens the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
As to the sufficiency of petitioner's evidence, the OSG further argues that, on the
marriage as the foundation of the family.
basis of this Court's ruling in Sevilla v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local
civil registrar, which attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar
categorically state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent
of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the former Civil Registrar, is
search.
sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25 this Court considered
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the evidence is
the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a certification of due search and
clearly in his favor.
inability to find the record or entry sought by the parties despite the absence of a
categorical statement that "such document does not exist in their records despite
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario.18 There, it was held that the
diligent search." The Court, citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held
certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record of a marriage
that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the
license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.19 It was further held
purported marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he
that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there
is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the abovestated case of Nicdao Cario v. Yee
Cario,27 this Court considered the marriage of the petitioner and her deceased
husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner
and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the local
civil registrar, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that
the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the
marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-
Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another woman. Be that as it may, the same
does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must
be applied. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is
clearly absent, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab
initio.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69218, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated
September 25, 2000, in Civil Case No. 464 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court echoed the
ruling in Republic v. CA30 that, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a
marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the Certification issued by the local
civil registrar, which stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as
the same did not appear in their records. Contrary to petitioner's asseveration,
nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect.
Moreover, in the said case, this Court ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that
an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence
to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. x x x31ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In all the abovementioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding of the
absence of the subject marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage
license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by
a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties.32

Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the absence
of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly
provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning,
except marriages of exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code.
As earlier stated, petitioner's and respondent's marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exceptions.

As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to respondent, it may

well be that his motives are less than pure - that he seeks a way out of his marriage
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581
PHILIPPINES, challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
Petitioner,
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot
- versus - (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.

JOSE A. DAYOT, The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were
Respondent.
x------------------x married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V.
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, G.R. No. 179474
Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
Petitioner,
Present: affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,* wife for at least five years.
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ. On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of

Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He
Promulgated:
JOSE A. DAYOT, contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
Respondent. March 28, 2008 celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that

he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his

consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of

the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately

thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his

landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her

brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from
DECISION
Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told

that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his
refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No.
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man
179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top

of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered
that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the
latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship
as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she
had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her
pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the
latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August
1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently,
she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman,
since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and
Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for
disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension
from service for one year without emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing the
Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of
the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so
holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable
consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the
marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It
dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect
any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose]
could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as
they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it
[was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release
of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have
put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa]
told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the
papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover
that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the
marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was
belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife
when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of
assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he
discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham
and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of
[Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers
her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the
name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under
oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness
to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25,
November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his
[sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract
(page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she
was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered
yes.The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his
consent was procured through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action
for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years
after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his
consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time
when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the
earliest instance. x x x.[12]
 Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did

Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled

appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave

reads: credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the

affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13] marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to

ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses

and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas

appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code

annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong

marriage between the parties.Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established

marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.

law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action
for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
(5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of
marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within
four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband
years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as
and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that
the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then
he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that
Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa. [15]
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of

marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the which reads:

marriage was solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11,
character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C.
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasay City.[19]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The

appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this
Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581,
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being
unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as
follows: Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,

docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not
been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should
be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no resolution.[23]
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and allowance of its Petition, to wit:
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing
them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as I
such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use II
the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united
in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of III
any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar. RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage LICEN[S]E.[24]
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch
as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore,
void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21] misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one

of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not
obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3)

annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.

case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the

declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability. The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the

effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To rules is in order.

reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments

vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa. It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated

on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential

to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, requisites of marriage as a contract:

Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To requisites are complied with:
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa,
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife

for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics (2) Their consent, freely given;

position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was

legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not

invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a

not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either

their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character

addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the

marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding

signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence

evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This

documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, [31] whereby the absence of a marriage

1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of

issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State
to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their
capacity to contract marriage.[32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by
Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1)
marriages inarticulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages
in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4)
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6)
mixed marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article
76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and
a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister
who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in
a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this
union, they desire to marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at
bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties
have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the
marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule
on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but
reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the
exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception in
Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must
have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage
license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76
is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability
carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be
valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a
directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy
to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the
requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the

the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the

essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was

five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and

marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived

June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. [43] The together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the

Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her requirement of a marriage license.

neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA

Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds

June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. [45] that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of
a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a

minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there lawful contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in

is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under Rule 45, apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
[47]
factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review. It is already well- evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. [50] The present case does not

settled that: involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be

applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the
exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of consolidated Petitions.
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this
Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on
substantial evidence.[48] In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that every intendment

of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties

marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by
Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance
Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is
with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
beyond question.
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and

would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent

and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by
making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. [52] The protection of The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is

marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage

union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [53] To permit a false affidavit to take license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,

the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990,

Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,

deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws. estoppel had set in.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [56] Jose

marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion

obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void

parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and

not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-

falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period

cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of

requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. [57] It covers the years

quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity -

the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity

but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no that is unbroken.[58]

affidavit at all.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the

based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without

and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law. [54] There is a
SO ORDERED.
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the

declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal

liability.[55]
 [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint
against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta,
Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent
Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.[2] On
22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized
said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as
the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano
was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as
manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he known that the late
Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again;
otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they
were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus
filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites
the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5] of the late Manzano and of
Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his
instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively;
and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they
had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their
spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he
agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment
to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no
legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to
note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated
the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was
indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is
a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In
fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married
he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous
marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were
subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective
spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows
spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each
other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise
stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the
parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband
and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous
marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses
no one has special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic
legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the
failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA
BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could
file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against
defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of
their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at
the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is
already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased
father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity
of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers
death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the
basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct."
It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. [4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article
58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration
of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family
life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" [12] and case law considers it "not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article
76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken
period of at least five years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is
required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a
valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license.
The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from
legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of
whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment
may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband
and wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only
missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words,
the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The
parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single
requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the
exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all
persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to
the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note
down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the
civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that
they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to
their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of
his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming
that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years,
the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It
is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated
in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of
the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be
applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the
sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as
to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can
be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other
can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the
properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through
actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages
as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and
54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable SO ORDERED.
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its
annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed
as if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a
judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage
void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the
sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient
that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a
court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband
and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage[27] and such absolute
nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish
the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. Juris

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in
Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained
only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994
JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.
VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B.
ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.
Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.
Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.
PER CURIAM, J.:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo
Villamora, are Stenographer I, Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively,
of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondents Judge Lucio
P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding
Judge and Clerk of Court II of the same court.
In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on
October 5, 1992, herein respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit:
(1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases;
(3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of receipt
for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6)
requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities. 1
Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective
Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The
case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial
Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was
however transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when
Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason that his wife is a cousin of respondent
Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4
The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this
administrative matter, as culled from the records thereof, are set out under each
particular charge against respondents.
1. Illegal solemnization of marriage
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the
requisite marriage license. Thus, the following couples were able to get married by
the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy, despite the
absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco
Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B, C, D, F, G,
and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license
to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the
attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on the
marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said
marriages.
Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the
employees of the court were already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon
Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her appointment. She avers
that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register
which is in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties
copies of the marriage contract and to register these with the local civil registrar; and
that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this
administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the
marriage contracts were kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had
instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties of their
marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P.
Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt
from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with
the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the
spouses subsequently formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and
executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was filed with the civil registrar;
that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not
illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they
did not contain the date and place of marriage; that copies of these marriage
contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged marriage of
Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato
Gamay and Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not
celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage
license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was celebrated even
without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid
embarrassment to their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage
contract which remains unsigned up to the present.
2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the
number of marriages solemnized and the number of documents
notarized.
It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7)
marriages in the month of July, 1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those
marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made it appear that they
have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will
show that there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized
during that month; and that respondents reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for
each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed to account
for the difference.
Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages
celebrated by respondent judge are entered is under the exclusive control and
custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only one who should be held
responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely
based on the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of
respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is Sambo who is likewise the custodian of
the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever alleged
difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments
tendered to her by Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered
by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is remitted directly to the Supreme
Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general fund
of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur. Respondent theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report
were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he is the one in charge of
the preparation of the monthly report.
Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages
celebrated was intentionally placed by complainant Sambo; that the number of
marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for that month
since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that
there were actually only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which
tallied with the official receipts issued by the clerk of court; that it is Sambo who
should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees because he
is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant
Sambo is merely in retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court.
Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not the one supervising or
preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the
same.
3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court
Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent
judge forwarded to the Supreme Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon
Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when respondent Baroy
reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that
respondent Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-
conditioning unit to respondent judge.
Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-
conditioning unit but when she was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to
Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner, she decided to sell the
same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office
was with the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.
Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of
clerk of court to the Supreme Court which has the sole authority over such
appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of respondent Baroy. He
contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy
had been appointed clerk of court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit
to the public as item which could not be defended as a matter of honor and prestige.
4. Cash bond issued without a receipt
It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al.,
"bondswoman Januaria Dacara was allowed by respondent judge to change her
property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00 but was never
issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has
been paid; that despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the
bondswoman; and that it has not been shown that the money was turned over to the
Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of
court, then turned over to the acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a
corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the bank; and that should
the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper
procedure therefor.
Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of
the bondsman to deliver the body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he
has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this is the duty of the clerk of
court.
5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners
Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work
in his house, one of whom was Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No.
5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano was in the custody of
respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to
conceal this fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent
judge dated April 6, 1992.
Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed
detention prisoners and that he has adequate household help; and that he had to
order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six (6) months
and the accused therein remained at large.
6. Unlawful collection of docket fees
Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc. although such entity is exempt by law from the
payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was issued,
respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she
deposited the same in her personal account.
Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro
(because respondent judge was on sick leave) who instructed her to demand
payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check for
P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the
check and, instead, was instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for
clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account; and that after the check
was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was
paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.
On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N.
Gerona prepared and submitted to us his Report and Recommendations dated May
20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have perspicaciously reviewed
the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive
presentation and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the
investigating judge for his industry and perspicacity reflected by his findings in said
report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported by logical
illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of
marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having solemnized
without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh.
B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias
and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).
In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the
marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was
solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not
filled up. While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed
their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his
signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and
Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as
he claims that he solemnized this marriage under Article 34 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the
Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.
The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage license. The
testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the
photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their
marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that
they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10)
days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their
marriage license. In the meantime, they already started living
together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites of
marriage were complied with.
Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of
Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not have a
marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the
parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the
marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the
marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains
that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was
actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one.
This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the
contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to show that
as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food
for the wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were
already invited and the place of the parties where the reception
would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the
poblacion of Tinambac.
The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The
fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract,
the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do
not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His
uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya
and his bride were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten
(10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had not
been impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of Judge
Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4,
K-4-a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot
possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage.
One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation of
Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.
Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge
Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he was
solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he
did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly
improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an
instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and
Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not
solemnize their marriage.
With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B),
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but
he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here
executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as
husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh.
AA).
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it
was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only eighteen (18)
years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin had
been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years
already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit,
Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old when
he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe.
Judge Palaypayon should ha(ve) been aware of this when he
solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a
false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding
the marriage license requirement.
On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge
Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this time with a
marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple
for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he
solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at
all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his
instruction that the date should be placed in the marriage certificate
to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting
parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.
This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of
Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage license
already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he
solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage
license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage
certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under
exceptional character where a marriage license was not required,
why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license
when he solemnized their marriage for the second time?
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of
Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the marriage
certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized
and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their
marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those
grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code
which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one,
however, received a copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage
is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by
blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official
function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to
furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.
With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido
(Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G),
Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint
affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage
(Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the
respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-
examination, however, both admitted that they did not know who
prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain
Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to
just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there
which were already prepared before the Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga
(Exh. f), their marriage contract was signed by them and by their
two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs.
F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June
7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).
Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of
Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no marriage
license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did
she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she
thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-
93).
Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge
Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and Belga
as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the marriage was
solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to
believe.
Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized
also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting
parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and
paid the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not
solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge
Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor
of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina,
however, did not testify in this case and so his affidavit has no
probative value.
Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have
been that before the contracting parties and their witnesses enter
his chamber in order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of
preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their
witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to
Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His
purpose was to save his precious time as he has been solemnizing
marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN,
p. 12;
2-1-94).
This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and
irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties are
supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare
that they take each other as husband and wife before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses
before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6,
Family Code).
The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as
to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing a
marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the
testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the
practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting
parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after
Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that
he was really solemnizing three (3) to four (4) marriages everyday.
On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows
that his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he
solemnized only seven (7) marriages for the whole month (Exh. E).
His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that
he solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month
(Exh. 7).
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages,
respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of
persons and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs.
12-B to 12-H). These persons who executed affidavits, however,
did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not
charged of having solemnized these marriages illegally also. He is
not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.
The second charge against herein respondents, that of having
falsified the monthly report of cases submitted to the Supreme
Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the
notarial fees, have been sufficiently proven by the complainants
insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and September,
1992 are concerned.
The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur for July, 1992 both signed by the respondents, show that for
said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to
H-1-b). The notarial register of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines
Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said
month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).
Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the
monthly report of cases for July, 1992 because there were only six
(6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged
official receipts showing that the notarial fee for the six (6)
documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with
respect to the number of documents notarized should not be based
on how many notarized documents were paid of the notarial fees,
but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial
register.
Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying
and checking anymore the correctness of the monthly reports
because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court
and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the
records. He merely signs the monthly report when it is already
signed by respondent Baroy.
The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he
is required to have close supervision in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their correctness.
As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of
his functions (The Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102
SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581, it was held that
"A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or
mismanagement of his court personnel."
On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the
falsification of the monthly report of cases on complainant Sambo
whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly
report of cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage
contracts, notarized documents and the notarial register. By her
own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she
was supposed to perform, yet according to her she never
bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find out the
number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).
Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the
monthly report of cases to Sambo, which was denied by the latter
as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the
data given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check
whether the report is correct.
The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in
custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and notarial
register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as
clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and
supervision of all court records including documents and other
properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full
control of all the records of the court including receipts (TSN, p. 11;
11-23-93).
The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge
of falsification, however, also shows that respondent Baroy did not
account for what happened to the notarial fees received for those
documents notarized during the month of July and September,
1992. The evidence adduced in this case also sufficiently show that
she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to a
bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued
temporary receipts for said cash bond deposits.
For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have
been notarized by Judge Palaypayon although the documents
notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen (113)
as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there
were only five (5) documents reported as notarized for that month,
though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six (56)
documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized
as appearing in the notarial register was P18.50. Respondent
Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged
was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the
Supreme Court and P1.50 was being turned over to the Municipal
Treasurer.
Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she
really sent to the Supreme Court the notarial fees of P18.50 for
each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the
additional notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for
considering that Baroy herself declared that some notarial fees
were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly,
the solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy
considering that she admitted that even (i)n those instances where
the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license
the solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the
contracting parties made a demand for their return. Judge
Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when
solemnization fee was returned when the marriage was not
solemnized due to lack of marriage license.
Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over
to her some of the notarial fees. This is difficult to believe. It was
not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of
the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated
January 20, 1992 shows that on that date Baroy informed the
personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she
assigned to Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7).
The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did not turn over to her
were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992
already. Besides there never was any demand she made for
Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly in his
possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on
this matter, in spite of the fact that she has been holding meetings
and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W,
FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and
8-S).
It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash
bond deposit of a certain Dacara in the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office
and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh.
Y). She did not deposit this cash bond in any bank or to the
Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the
alleged ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond
was deposited informed her that they would settle the case
amicably.
Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the
aforementioned cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos
with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after
this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-
93). The Pass Book, however, shows that actually Baroy opened
an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993
when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00)
Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims that One Thousand
(P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of
Dacara. If it were true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash
bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for around one year and
five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of
this case.
On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally
deposited the One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of
Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost
three (3) months after she withdrew it, when she redeposited said
cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).
The evidence presented in this case also show that on February
28, 1993 respondent Baroy received also a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in
Crim. Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent
Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary receipt (Exh. X and
X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos
cash bond to herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or
(with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation was that the parties
in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the
case amicably. It was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later
when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the release of said
cash bond (Exh. 7).
Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on
October 21, 1991 she used to issue temporary receipt only for cash
bond deposits and other payments and collections she received.
She further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she
issued she failed to place the number of the receipts such as that
receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that
she did not know that she had to use the official receipts of the
Supreme Court. It was only from February, 1993, after this case
was already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.
The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be
appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave Judge Palaypayon an air
conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this
charge, show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air
conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
(P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in
cash and in check (Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was
brought to court in order to be installed in the chamber of Judge
Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought
and was not used yet.
The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for
Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00) Pesos on installment basis with a
down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May
29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt was signed by both respondents
and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and
another person as witness.
The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It
was bought by Baroy at a time when she was applying for the
vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air
conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it was installed in the office of
Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge
Palaypayon was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt
dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already filed. The receipt
could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of
Tinambac who signed in the receipt as a witness did not testify in
this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the Judge of
the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at
least impropriety. Judges should avoid such action as would
subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free from
the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA
27).
With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash
bond deposit of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria
Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a
receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond she deposited (Exh. N). Her
affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that
this cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of
respondent Baroy who issued only a temporary receipt for it and
this has been discussed earlier.
Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of
detention prisoners to work in his house and one of them escaped
while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact,
the case against said accused was ordered archived by Judge
Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect to this particular
charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs.
Stephen Kalaw, Alex Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano
and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and placed in the
municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-
3; Exh. 25). The evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by
Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where said accused was
confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge
Palaypayon is solely testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a
former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.
Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The
complainants should have presented records from the police of
Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the
municipal jail Alex Alano where he was under detention and said
accused escaped while in the custody of Judge Palaypayon.
The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in
Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said case appears to be without
basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and
the records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the
accused, but up to this moment there is no return of service for the
warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The
records of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return
of the service of the warrant of arrest dated April 12, 1991 showing
that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).
Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992
archiving Crim. Case No. 5047 referred only to one of the accused
who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested.
Judge Palaypayon should have issued an order for the arrest of
Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take
custody of Alano.
The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the
case archived was because he heard from the police that Alano
escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should
ha(ve) set the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano,
the former should have been required to explain in writing why
Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano
escaped from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It
is only later on when he could not be arrested when the case
should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this case
for the reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another
circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion that Alano might have
really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could
not present records or other documentary evidence to prove the
same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing
fees on collection cases filed by the Rural Bank of Tinambac,
Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing
fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was
deposited by respondent Baroy in her personal account in the bank.
The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural
Bank of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against
farmers and it paid the total amount of Four Hundred (P400.00)
Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14
of Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks
(from) the payment of filing fees on collection of sums of money
cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.
Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of
the filing fees of the Rural Bank of Tinambac as it was respondent
Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he
was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid
voluntarily the filing fees. The records, however, shows that
respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated
January 28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she
would submit all Rural Bank cases for dismissal (Annex 6,
comment by respondent Baroy).
Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of
Tinambac was really exempt from the payment of filing fees
pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening
the bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to
have them dismissed. Here the payment of the filing fees was
made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos
was only turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12,
1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in complying with her
obligation as accountable officer.
In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the
complainants sufficiently show that respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license,
and that it having been shown that he did not comply with his duty
in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court,
particularly for the months of July and September, 1992 where it
has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were
falsified with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is
respectfully recommended that he be imposed a fine of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or
similar offenses will be more severely dealt with.
The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts
or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage
license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to
show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not
furnished their marriage contracts and the Local Civil Registrar was
not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve
him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a
marriage license he as the solemnizing officer is the one
responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal
requ(i)sites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of
the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to
comply with his duty of closely supervising his clerk of court in the
performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58
SCRA 16). His explanation that he only signed the monthly report
of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same,
cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check
and verify the records if the monthly reports prepared by his clerk of
court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A judge
cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court
personnel (Nidua vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).
In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the
monthly report of cases for the months of July and September,
1992 with respect to the number of documents notarized, for having
failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2)
months period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization
fees of those marriages allegedly not solemnized, but the
solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of
temporary receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for
receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October 29, 1991 in the
amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued
only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land
Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993, or after one year
and five months in her possession and after this case was already
filed; for withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court order or authority and
redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim.
Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, for which she
issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1)
and for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer
until it was ordered released; and for requiring the Rural Bank of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for
collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four
Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning over said amount to the
Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully
recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-
Baroy be dismissed from the service.
It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk
of court who shall issue official receipt to the provincial, city or
municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court deposits
cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised
Manual of Instructions for Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p.
127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that the
Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon
receipt of deposits from party litigants and thereafter deposit intact
the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer and
their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order
of the Court (DOJ Circular No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for
Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 5, 25
November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of
fiduciary character including rental deposits, shall be deposited
immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon receipt thereof
with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is
located" and that "no withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be
made except upon lawful order of the court exercising jurisdiction
over the subject matter.
Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing
circulars, or deliberately disregarded, or even intentionally violated
them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous unconcern for
the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a
clerk of court and accountable officer. The gross neglect of her
duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct which
warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola
vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City;
A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The clerk of
court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies
received by him/her shall be deposited immediately upon receipt
thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer. Supreme
Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated
December 3, 1982. Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail
bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious misconduct and
her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty.
"Respondent Norma Hiam was found guilty of dishonesty and
serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.
xxx xxx xxx
We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of
everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety
and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should
be an example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without qualification as to rank or
position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of
the exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that
the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the
cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and
that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable. 8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the
illegal marriages, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative
liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The
Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the
Marriage Law."9 This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of
the Government.

The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on

respondent judge should, therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge
of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that he had not taken to heart,
but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal
effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other
offenses charged as hereinbefore narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree
of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to
ineludibly require a higher penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent

Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr., with a stern warning that any repetition of the same
or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt with. Respondent Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of
the Ombudsman for appropriate action.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff
of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus",
namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS,
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-
CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.
Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R.
No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from proceeding with the Habeas
Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the
respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the
respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and 30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and
orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988, this Court required
comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a
temporary restraining order.
The records disclose the following:
Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity),
her full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity)
filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpusbefore the RTC of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was
allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition
was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with
petitioner Tomas Eugenio.
The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas
corpus, but the writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body
of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning
that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides,
according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the
Undersecretary of the Department of Health, authorizing the burial at the palace
quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a
registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and
Founder.
Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy
in his residence on 28 August 1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed
legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated in an explanation filed
before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were
then issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a
funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and its autopsy.
Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to
dismiss the petition therein, claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of
the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court.1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to
a dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a
live person.
Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below)
were granted leave to amend their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death
of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing of the habeas
corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas
Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their
(Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the
Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings
followed. The motion to dismiss was finally submitted for resolution on 21 October
1988.
In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before
the respondent court; the body was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills
Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the presiding Judge of
respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4
Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an
order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:
It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended
petition, up to the second amended petition that the ultimate facts
show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead
then this Court is being prayed to declare the petitioners as the
persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body
of said deceased. The Court, considering the circumstance that
Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only
revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's
counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations
in the body of the petition on the determination as to who is entitled
to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well
as the burial or interment thereof, for the reason that under the
provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as
follows:
 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) In all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions:
xxx xxx xxx
it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try the issue of custody
and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this
Court because of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the
allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in
Sec. 19, pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course,
rendered a decision on 17 January 1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not
said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an action for custody of
a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such
relief, and without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.
Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court8 Articles 305 and
308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section 1104 of the Revised
Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:
. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the
allegations in the original petition as well as in the two amended
petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her
liberty and if she were dead then relief was prayed for the custody
and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition
were but elaborations but the ultimate facts remained the same,
hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction
to entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial
of the dead body because the body of the petition controls and is
binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion
of all other courts, it is the primary duty of this court to decide and
dispose of this case. . . . . 10
Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of
rightful custody over the dead body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of
preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis of the award. Since
there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters
were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being
himself legally married to another woman. 11
On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction was filed with this Court (G.R. No.
86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically Identical to those raised
in the earlier petition (G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12 On
7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to
maintain status quo pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23
February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so far failed to sufficiently establish a
clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now needs
a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further
pleadings.
Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:
1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead body of a 25 year old
female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood
brothers and sisters and a common law husband.
2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority
to treat the action as one for custody/possession/authority to bury
the deceased/recovery of the dead.
3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil
Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which
states:
Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and
two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall
be made in the following order:
(1) From the
spouse;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not
the caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the
nature of the action, and even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief
may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced so warrant. 13
When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not
certain whether Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it
will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of
the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be
made to appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his
judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. 14 While the court may refuse to
grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ should issue
if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima
facie case for relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas
corpus need not be very critical in looking into the petition for very clear grounds for
the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the cause
of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the
petition. 15
In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of
a habeas corpus petition filed by a brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:
All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case
should not have been dismissed. The court below should not have
overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually
sanctioning the continuance of an adulterous and scandalous
relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent
Benildo Nunez against all principles of law and morality. It is no
excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with
said respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an
illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.
xxx xxx xxx
The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court
below should not allow the technicality, that Teofilo Macazo was not
originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full
protection. Even in a habeas corpus proceeding the court had
power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some
other suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties
concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation disclosed by
the records be not allowed to continue. 17
After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas
corpus proceedings, amendment of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was
proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings are generally favored
and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may
so far as possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of
cases or prevent circuity of action and unnecessary expense, unless there are
circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly
alleged by respondents, the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and
academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of liberty, but the issue
of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.
Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the
term spouse used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body.
Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not
recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit
for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not
in the Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships
are present in our society, and that they produce a community of properties and
interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law to the effect that
such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not
in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has
a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru
Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse
and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however
that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-
law spouses)."
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in
cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple
whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are
husband and wife de facto.23 But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case
at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the
contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to
her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers
and sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate
duty of burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the
ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the
persons hereinbelow specified:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or
woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of
 burial shall devolve upon the nearest of kin of the
deceased, if they be adults and within the
Philippines and in possession of sufficient means
to defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby
DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed
the judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a
prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the
resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos
motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-
1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30,
1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacionalat Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and
to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago [4] at
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information [5] filed by
the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the
civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial
question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon
motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal
Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his
first marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez
v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition
anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is
presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
 Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that
the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by
Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage
before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the
first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia
from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to
Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in
this jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending
that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of
law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the
first marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and
since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be
convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY,
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith
upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted
the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would
not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to
a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other
felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith
and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there
is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the
act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good
faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies
upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may
re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account
as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners
contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent,
we must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
 (2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. [26]
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
existence of the first. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency
of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit: duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of
annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly
on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first
Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a
SO ORDERED.[21] penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also
between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or
mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there was no resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that
the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married. [24] The
records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil SO ORDERED.
Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have
been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never
married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were
never married from the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained
where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
likewise obtained afterthe second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein
that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995
MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro
Manila, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The responsibility of a Judge is indeed heavy. As the incarnation of law and justice, it
is his sworn duty to lead by example, to be the example. But how can he inspire the
people to live by the law if he himself fails to do so?
Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law.
Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were married
before respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers that Respondent Judge assured her
that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993.
Complainant then visited the office of the Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993
only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent
Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. 1
In his comment,2 Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo
Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving the complainant.
Respondent contends:
1. That the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig has actually prepared the marriage license
but it was not released due to the subsequent objection of the father of Marcelo
Moreno;
2. That he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the
law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was moved only by a
desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of
assurance or security due to her pregnant condition;
3. That in order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the
marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the marriage license was
definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete;" 3
4. That the contracting parties were not known to him; and
5. That both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the effects of
a marriage performed without the required marriage license.
In a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, we referred this matter for investigation,
report and recommendation to Executive Judge Martin Villarama, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156.
In his Memorandum of October 11, 1994, Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against Respondent for failure of complainant to appear on
any of the scheduled hearings and on the basis of a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay"4 executed on behalf of complainant who has left for Singapore by her elder
sister Sherlita N. Bendanillo expressly withdrawing her complaint against
Respondent.
Judge Villarama, however, also recommended that the Respondent be issued a stern
warning "in view of the fact on record that he indeed solemnized a marriage without
the requisite marriage license. . . ."5
On November 7, 1994, we referred the aforementioned Memorandum to the Office of
the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator
stated:
Careful study of the records reveal that indeed respondent Judge
displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
marriage without a marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to
be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the Family Code of the
Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227), which provides
that one of the formal requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage
license. Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from
the beginning (Article 35 [3], the Family Code of the Philippines).
Judges are enjoined to show more than just a cursory acquaintance
of the law and other established rules.6
It recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a
marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate administrative sanctions
be imposed against him.7
We concur with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator.
Respondent, by his own admission8 that he solemnized the marriage between
complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage license, has dismally
failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence"9 and to his promise to be "faithful to the law." 10
Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which,
at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not exonerate him completely.
Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.
Must we always repeat our reminder in Uy v. Dizon Capulong 11 and several other
cases12 that
. . . the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from
whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law.
For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.
The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law. To fulfill this mission, the judge should keep
abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the
judge is already aware of them, the latter should not deliberately
refrain from applying them; otherwise such omission can never be
excused.
And have we not frequently stressed that:
. . .judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence
and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of justice.
Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, enjoins judges "to conduct
themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of existing laws
and the Code of Judicial Conduct that they be exemplars in their
communities and the living personification of justice and the Rule of
Law. . . . 13
A case in point, a definite precedent and a clear basis in determining the liability of
Respondent in the instant case is Cosca, et al. v. Palaypayon, Jr.,
et a1. 14 where Judge Palaypayon, Jr. was duly fined and sternly warned for, among
others, solemnizing marriages without licenses. We declared:
. . . the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must
be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is
more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It applies, without qualification
as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel,
they being standard-bearers of the exacting norms of ethics and
morality imposed upon a Court of justice.
On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code
pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter
alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage
void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites
shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those
affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for
herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all
without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised Penal
Code provides that "[p]riests or ministers of any religious
denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.
Finally, on the alleged withdrawal of the complaint against Respondent, we reiterate
our ruling in Imbing v. Tiongson:15
The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the
administrative case against herein respondent judge will not
necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been
filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction to
investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the
complaint. The Court has an interest in the conduct of members of
the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people,
and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the
complainant's desistance from further prosecuting the case he or
she initiated.
To condition administrative actions upon the will of every
complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power to
discipline erring members of the Judiciary. Definitely, personal
interests are not material or controlling. What is involved here is a
matter of public interest considering that respondent is no ordinary
citizen but an officer of the court whose personal behavior not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in
his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a
fine of P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two
specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in
office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano
Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October
27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall
within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located
some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations
both as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed
Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon
v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from
his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the
Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the
marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1
of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8
thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. [2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts
complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be
objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration,
the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in
evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer,
subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed
by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him.In their affidavit, the
affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D.
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having
borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and
that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving
rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to
proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage
shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact,
the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code
to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage
has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration,
he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest
error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and
therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following
marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
falling under Article 41."
 The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside
the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general,
consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing
officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for
his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del
Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this
effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of
marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may
be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of
the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing
officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not
invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over
the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not
beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein
as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to
apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They
should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in
instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed,
compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not
penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law,
in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and
Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the
Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in
question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the
necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the law
and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]
TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of
Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
Balalong, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than
the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its
subsequent loss or destruction.Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by
extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its
Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being more
consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision dated 05
April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto. [2]
The decretal portion of the trial court Decision[3] is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein
Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa Guison as follows:
a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage contract
excluded under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said
Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the
issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction
earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]
The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased
Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates
of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and
the deceased.
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by
then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in
Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the
deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive
father Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees claim as the
legal heir of Alfredo.
The following issues were raised in the court a quo:
a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob
was valid;
b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.
On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was
solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in
1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract
stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr.
Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as
secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.
During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution
of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:
 1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by
the solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no
copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil
registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed
his thumbmark on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975
(date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed
between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date
of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived
together as husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his
customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the thumbmark
was logically not genuine. In other words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of
the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never
mentioned that he allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract
to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. And as admitted by appellant at
the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not
present at the date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In
fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one
Benjamin Molina who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose
Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the
copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage
entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the
marriage was allegedly solemnized.
Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special
Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the petition for
adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally
adopted son of Alfredo.
Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge
Moya.
In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moyas signature in
the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge Moya was taken
at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in
judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then
presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from glaucoma.
The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and
genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.
A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document
Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures of Judge Moya
and compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and
significant fundamental differences in handwriting characteristics/habits existing
between the questioned and the standard signature and concluded that the
questioned and the standard signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one
and the same person.
On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas signature, appellee
presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination made by a former
NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32)
specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures
examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of
significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of
writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures and
concluded that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July
1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of
Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine
and authentic.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo
and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-
existent.[4] (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:
Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article 6,
par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife shall be set forth in an instrument signed
by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage.
Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copyof the
marriage contract.
And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
 xxxxxxxxx Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this
Court.[6]
Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, The Issues
may prove its contents by a copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of
As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be this Court:
established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction
a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and subsequent loss that
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and
would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove
the contents of such document.
b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.[7]
In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies
of the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of secondary
evidence of the contents of the reconstructedcontract. Also, appellant failed to The Courts Ruling
sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the original document.

With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents
questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil was adoption has not been sufficiently established.
genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the
performance of his regular duties.
First Issue:

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to
a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of
forgery of Judge Moyas signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statement of whether a writing is genuine or false, but
upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics, and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed
observer. And in the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is
necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the
fitness of the particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will
not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in
determining qualifications of this case.
Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact when ably supported by
substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by the
Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored
by the court below which if considered might vary the outcome of this case nor there
exist cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual
findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially
when established by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence. [5] (citations
omitted, emphasis in the original)
Validity of Marriage
Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a
voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding. [8] Aware of this fundamental
distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob
and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a
marriage ceremony.[9] We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void
because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it
has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.[10] An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and
petitioner.[11] Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not
require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. [12] The Civil Code
governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took
place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.
When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?
 It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses. [13] Upon a showing that the
document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part
of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents. [14]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they
(1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana
and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b)
documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had
solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop
of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at
the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent
authorization issued by the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor,
Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and
(d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the
marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary
evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have
disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss
as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,[15] the Court clarified
this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the
contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by
secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution
are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a
matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the
loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.
xxxxxxxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral
or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined
from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to
produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the
weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.
(emphasis ours)
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this
issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.[16] But even there, we said that marriage
may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.[17]
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution
thereof.[18] The Court has also held that [t]he loss may be shown by any person who
[knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost
was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost. [19]
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela
Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a
party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit
of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration in
court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence
presented, secondary evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be admitted to
prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage
contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been
obtained.[20] Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the
reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not
the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
Proof of Marriage
As early as Pugeda v. Trias[21], we have held that marriage may be proven by
any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:
"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person
who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to
the fact of marriage."[22] (emphasis supplied)
In Balogbog v. CA,[23] we similarly held:
[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure
to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be
presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted)
In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of
marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,[24] in which, because of the
destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its place. [25]
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry
pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and
in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). [26] He finds it quite bizarre for
petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage. [27] On both
counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy
of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. [28] In
the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the civil registrar.Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer. [29]
Presumption in Favor of Marriage
Likewise, we have held:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is xxx of marriage. Marriage
in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio -- Always presume
marriage.[30] (emphasis supplied)
This jurisprudential attitude[31], 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12,
1975.31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.[32] Given the undisputed, even accepted,[33] fact that Dr. Jacob and
petitioner lived together as husband and wife,[34] we find that the presumption of
marriage was not rebutted in this case.
Second Issue:
Validity of Adoption Order
In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the
signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of
Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular
performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of
respondents handwriting expert, for the assessment of the credibility of such expert
witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court x x x. [35]
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great
weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a
testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was
Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two
expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion. [36] Hence, the present case is an
exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions
under Rule 45.[37]
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moyas signature on
the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two
expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent
Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents expert and brushed aside the
Deposition of Judge Moya himself.[38] Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judges
action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya
could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the
following portion as proof:[39]
"Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judges
testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moyas
statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in
the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.[40]
The answer I do not remember did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of
what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent
exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. A deposition[;] will you please recall
whether you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature
appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature
reading Jose[;] I cant make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose
Moya is not my signature.[41]
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of
Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively
declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not
discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the
newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document EPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
shown to him.[42] Indeed, we find no reason and the respondent has not presented Petitioner,
any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI G.R. No. 152577
Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Present:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of
this document? PUNO,
- versus-
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the Chairman,
standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same
person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of
letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital CALLEJO, SR.,
letter J.[43]
TINGA, and
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having
been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
even by Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui. [44] CRASUS L. IYOY,
Promulgated:
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged R e s p o n d e n t.
Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya
declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he
made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded September 21, 2005
guilty.[45] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was
always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
this information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he recognized
his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts
that he performed thereafter.[46] In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr.
Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records DECISION
Management[47] in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon,
Camarines Sur,[48] issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil
had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably
negate the alleged adoption of respondent. [49]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.[50] This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence
presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa
Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED
NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
SO ORDERED.
General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV

No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the

1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their

Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her

Philippines. American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of

her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of

Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for
Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left
declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According
and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of
to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at
reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that
Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they
Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her
had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such
legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that
incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of
Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines
nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family
for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the
Code of the Philippines.
youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a

year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her

requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim [4] with the RTC on 05 June

Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988
their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a
and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously
child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at
married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the
Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely

because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained
that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to

been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing,

the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null

employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00

not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages,

needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.

had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the

Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the

RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner
children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to
Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. [6]
them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her

children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for

medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his

Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially

denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989,
the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,
by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract
Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage

argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding

an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands

nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently surname, Micklus.[9]

living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent

Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of
witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written
interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and
California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12] and
Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and
California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into
account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his
evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC
issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right
to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the
marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the
following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs
testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to
comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity,
observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the
evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the
defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce
decree in the United States of America and married another man
and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an
anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already
married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent
or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case
in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife
erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant
is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital
obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the
marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude towards
her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible,
the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with
her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to
material things over and above the marital stability. That such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question
is shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to
plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare
the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada
Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of
the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for
declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee
abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the
United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of
his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A
FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS
VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS
THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD
BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM
OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO
SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY
TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-
quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a
Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse,
although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse
because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at
bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American
husbands citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This
Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not
be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually
embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to
defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants
to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a
marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain
married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential
marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual
disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not
countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by
affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage of
the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March
2002,[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the
instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents
wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that
the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the
case at bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys
psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the
Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a
series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated [21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. [22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance,
deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could
not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I
do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
 (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-
courts

serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted
for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.[24]
American husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no

herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by
evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental
a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,

must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence,
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. [26] Irreconcilable differences,
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a

said Article.[27] psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of

their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have

be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and

therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological

afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and

responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. [28] In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the

marriage.[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the

embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, foundation of the family.[32]

nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her

marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to

comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not

identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the

satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or Philippines

grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of

 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
III

The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the

As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a

foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal

interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent

respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her

Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC
divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not

may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration

established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she

of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no

obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United

personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the

same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At
the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to
the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,

status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him

Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of

between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the

from respondent Crasus. Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law
officer and legal defender of the Government. [33] His Office is tasked to represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the
law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the
services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the
realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to
bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. [35] While it is
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State,
in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to
the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor
General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v.
Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)],
this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
 the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA
285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective
on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to
the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the
State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and
take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the
said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve
a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the
date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within
the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties
and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of
their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated.
It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own
memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the
public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the
decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of
fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed
by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor
General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal
within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the
notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage
between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity,
and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage

under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent

Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless

marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the

specific answer to every individual problem.[39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the

RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998,

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid

and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner, Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later

naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or

her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
G.R. No. 154380
Present:

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a

Davide, Jr., C.J.,
definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
(Chairman),

- versus - Quisumbing,
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated
Ynares-Santiago,

Carpio, and May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23

Azcuna, JJ.
and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The

Promulgated: court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated

October 5, 2005 to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph

of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
Respondent.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

x--------------------------------------------------x

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the

United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as
an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained
a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1,
Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to
determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable Brief Historical Background

controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive

adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,

and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [8]
1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship,

obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and
protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended,
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
it now provides:
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
validity of his second marriage. (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
in its enactment?

presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a

instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino

Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against
those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them
abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity
of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose
foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry.
We propose that this be deleted and made into law only
after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.) Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got

married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a

Legislative Intent divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a

Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that

Philippine law and can thus remarry.

the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a

member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where
 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases capacitating him or her to remarry.

involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino

citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the

obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained

as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular
must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present

spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse. petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to

declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
ASIDE.
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such

foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign No pronouncement as to costs.

laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore,
SO ORDERED.
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry

as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient

to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to

allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first
marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign
country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the
adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her
right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the
law books of the husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law
firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time
when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the
Justice of the Peace of Paraaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on
September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNAs marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7)
children, namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano,
Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar
Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed to
separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written agreement entitled
"AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo,
Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage,
this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan,
Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang
Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for 1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on
April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON.
After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was
executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which
was registered bearing the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to
Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M.
Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of
Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E.
Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT
No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the
condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and
headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the
office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the
lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio
Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the
25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De
la Cruz who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the
law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138,
on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged
that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage
between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no
children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY.
LUNA to the extent of pro-indiviso share consisting of her share in the said
properties plus her share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed
to her in the latters last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The
complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the portion of the
subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on
the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a
receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the
heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorneys feesand costs of the suit to
SOLEDAD.3
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the
SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have
been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero
Luna";
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to
deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been
madefor transport and storage.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Decision of the CA
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN
LUCES LUNA;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT
DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS
OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED
OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND
LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND
LUNA;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO
THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN
THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO
THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT
APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG
SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE
148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY
PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY
FILING FEE.7
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT
WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFFS MONEY;
 II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED
BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE
SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW
OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING
PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO
RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL.8
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding
and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latters death
on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe
Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the
RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any
other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect
to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married
to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the
books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican
Republic courts approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of
the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not
entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books
(i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal
Supreme Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that
should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly,
whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner
entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in
the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The
Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue
of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna
on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained
even under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo
in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of
Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce,
even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This
finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a
man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for
the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either
spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy
on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage
between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife
place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes
of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per
sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191
of the Civil Code, as follows:

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in
connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was
enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save
in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it
shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal
separation has been granted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage xxxx
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage,
during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and
did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119
judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any
of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
such creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of
the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.
or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215
shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in
articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of
gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took
place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the
grounds raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and
enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and
public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna
and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna
and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent marriage to Soledad on
January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree
rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted
until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.
Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages
as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab
initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144
of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
eitheror both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to
confirm such fact.1wphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative
for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property.
Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence,
would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue
of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis
because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the
purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled
that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined
by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. This
applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the
relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the
plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant
such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in
the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of 159,072.00, and in repaying the
loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling
146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate contributions of 306,572.00 corresponded
to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit
amounting to 362,264.00 of the units purchase price of 1,449,056.00. 28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal
funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she had
the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna
could not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the income
derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioners assertions on her
actual contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books
subject matter in contentionin this case proof that was required for Article 144 of the
New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply as to cases where
properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the
New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only
if the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry
each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a
prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between the man and his lawful
wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that:
only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their
respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint
deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to
another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even
if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by
the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671,
November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit,
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said
property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were
indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit.
This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for 55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison
was issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the
Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April
29, 1978 in the amount of 97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino.
According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check
which was for 49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for
payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for 4,072.00 was
dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by
plaintiff to the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDADs claim that she made a cash contribution of 100,000.00 is
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDADs claim of co-ownership over
the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the
same was acquired through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the
name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff
does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired
for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation
and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and
plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was
a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law
firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she
actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is
more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and
the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly
beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed.30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because
they were substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any
reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-
ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
contributions, not being evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the
subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption
that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained
to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the
sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit,
and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11,
2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to
set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case
No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said
case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in
Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18,
1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982;
and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting
of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the
conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to
Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in
the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its
supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless
and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged
conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings
before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon
Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is
barred by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national
policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same
is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters
within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or
upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the
parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the
understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the
law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and
proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the
court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any
State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by
the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the
bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to

dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743

Petitioner,
Present: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez, Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
Callejo, Sr., and lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia

hico-Nazario, JJ. Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,

FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Respondent.
Felicisimo.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 134029 whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American
Petitioner,
citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce[5] before the Family Court of the First

Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
- versus -
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.[6]
Promulgated:

FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS

alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
Respondent. February 6, 2007
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United

Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.[7] He had no

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death on December 18, 1992.
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership

assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4,
petition for letters of administration[8] before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
and set aside the September 12, 1995[2] and January 31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May
15, 1998Resolution[4] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
 Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the

his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed

Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,[13] Article

legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[14]

that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
dismiss.[15] They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
letters of administration be issued to her.
given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo

because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 [16] of the Family
Code.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by

his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss [9] on the grounds of improper venue and

failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from
Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
hearing the case.
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of

Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order [17] denying the motions

for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the

legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic[18] because then Acting
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
trial court issued an Order[11] denying the two motions to dismiss.
resolution of said motion.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March

Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19] against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
5, 1994 her opposition[12] thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration [20] from the Order
while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they
law on which it was based.
bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
 Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside

the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order[21] granting the
dispositive portion of which states:
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul
T. Arcangel.

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and

On April 24, 1995,[22] the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the
Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.[29]

respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested[23] that he is

adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
Court, the term place of residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of
papers on June 14,[24] and June 20,[25] 1995, respectively.
the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or

actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence

or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have

been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent

was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[31] It found that the marriage
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus

Respondent moved for reconsideration[26] and for the disqualification[27] of

Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28] With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in
Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the
 enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable reason to sustain
the individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that
Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy
of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever. Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should do is to
give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The foreign
divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14,
1992,[32] the Filipino divorcee, shall x x x have capacity to remarry
under Philippine laws. For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x[33]
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration[34] which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari.[35] Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted.[36]
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue
of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the
time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that
pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray[37] and Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[38]residence is synonymous with domicile which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim
that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void
and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters
marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void
bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v.
Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence as
contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides,
like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or
rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
 synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of
this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association[46] and Ayala
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, Country Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards [49] stating
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more that his home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
than temporary.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
while his office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
in the Regional Trial Court[50] which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
residence for purposes of election laws and residence for purposes of fixing the
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were
has the intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of fixing venue under the
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.[51] Thus,
Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his

legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and

consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition
place and domicile in another.
for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who

is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,

considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale [44] dated January 5, 1983 showing
the affirmative.
that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
 The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage between a As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she

foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not
divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:

Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their

conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity
of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot
be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.[54](Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where the Court
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce
from the bond of matrimony by a competent recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino
domestic relation of husband and wife, and to
free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, wife. The Court stated that the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
when thus severed as to one party, ceases to
bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When not affect or cast obloquy on the other.[56]
the law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that
the guilty party shall not marry again, that party,
as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from
the bond of the former marriage.
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the Court stated that where a

Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to Dorn applies.[58]Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case
sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property.[53] The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited

recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
 obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo xxxx

M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign

divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Legislative Intent

law.[59] In Garcia v. Recio,[60] the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
relation to Article 26.[61]
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the historical background

and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its
discussed, to wit: origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
Brief Historical Background
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed under Philippine law.[63] (Emphasis added)
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38. Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original already established through judicial precedent.
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into
law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be community, relief in some way should be obtainable. [64] Marriage, being a mutual and
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good

to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15[65] and 17[66] of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in
light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[67] In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in
such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the
legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law, so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them.
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice
as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his
due. That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses
the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice
is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with,
that the law be dispensed with justice.[69]
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient
and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.[71]
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized
in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text[72] of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.[73]
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in
1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However,
Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent.[75]
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with
him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144[76] of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the
co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. [77]
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which
has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing
the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each
other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the
extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
 industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and
corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal. THIRD DIVISION

xxxx

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which Petitioner,
involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the Present:
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the BERSAMIN,
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the
- versus - *ABAD, and
case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. x x x[81]

Promulgated:
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the
August 11, 2010
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving DAISYLYN TIROL STO.
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 TOMAS and The
SOLICITOR GENERAL,
of the Family Code.
Respondents. -- -

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

DECISION
reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court
BRION, J.:
which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which
dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case
be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED. Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review
on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
 Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired

Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18,

In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The
2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina,
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April
ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to be able to
affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed
remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of

Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December
8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be

enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. [6]
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined
by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was enacted to avoid the

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who,

divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11]

RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but

submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no

THE PETITION
opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case

herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,

requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to

From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerberts.
 Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15] and
his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the
for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute
standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be
divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He

considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a

the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative

his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227,

would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines,
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
THE COURTS RULING foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The alien spouse can claim
no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil
Filipino spouse
v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses

assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and

the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse]
has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and
still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights
to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. [22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; [25] Article 17 of the
Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as
basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds
that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that
the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in
this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words,
only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition
for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to
petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have
been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a
specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against
a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our
courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have
declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. [27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. [29] The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into
play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, [30] but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. [31] Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the
divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own

parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]

evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,

fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be

taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a

judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between the persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the

parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33] Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees
in the civil registry:

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of
entered:
the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial

recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect,
(a) births;
as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
(b) deaths;
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

Considerations beyond the (e) divorces;
recognition of the foreign
divorce decree (f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and

Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the (i) naturalization; and

decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw (j) changes of name.

attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
xxxx

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the
entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching
upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep
and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they
shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil
status of persons:
 (1) Birth and death register;
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the

RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not
only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
dissolved marriages.
judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of
name and naturalization register.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be

changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of
decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a
the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
registry is located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of
interest must be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for
the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. [40] As these basic

jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot

consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement
Rules of Court.
of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, [36] and

Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 [37] both of which required a
final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign
registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
produce any legal effect.
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to

establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the

Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by which the

applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of

jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,

and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of

the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further

proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK
A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law
of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved
and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian
citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. [6] Petitioner
-- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory
Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in
November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his
first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree
obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the
suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a
divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d]
irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the
ground that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed
with respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce
issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the
marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the
marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian
divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute
the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner. failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
2 Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed.
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for
our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our
3 courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even
by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 [22] and 17[23] of the Civil
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 [25] of the
case. Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A
4 divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. [27]
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case. concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
5 according to their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely of the
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the divorce decree is insufficient.
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our Divorce as a Question of Fact
courts.[19]
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it
must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall
necessity to take up the rest. file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar
which shall specify the following:

xxxxxxxxx
The Courts Ruling
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved
or annulled;
The Petition is partly meritorious.

xxxxxxxxx

First Issue: ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson applicant shall be required to

Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate
divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or
the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or
declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a
public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it
requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed
the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree purports to be a
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested [33] by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. [35] However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989
was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. [38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an
alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states,
don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known
by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the
exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In
civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the
complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that
their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly
admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the
legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are
of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the
marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45] There is
no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional
or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed
period during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions,
remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was
granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court
may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. [47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that
reads:
 1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of contract the second marriage.
bigamy.[48]
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian
may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to
which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to
respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter. marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has January 12, 1994.
been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian
laws. WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage costs.
license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal SO ORDERED.
capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by
the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the
Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent,
had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only
the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a)
Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A.
Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in
Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan
City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended
Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage
in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of
Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the
Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the
Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on
January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to
remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian
 G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, A.K.A. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA
KOIKE," Petitioner, v.MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014
and the Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant
to Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Facts
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki
Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon
City, Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on
January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. 5chanrobleslaw
On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were
divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate 7 and the same was duly
recorded in the Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. 8chanrobleslaw
Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of
Marriage9 on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on
February 7, 2013 a petition10 for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration
of capacity to remarry pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code11 before the RTC, docketed as Sp. Proc.No. Q-13-72692.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. 12 On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of
Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by
the Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of
the Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a
document entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of
Japan in Manila that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as
well as a Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the
original of said divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In
addition, photocopies of the Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English
translation, as well as two (2) books entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000"16 and
"The Civil Code of Japan 2009"17 were likewise submitted as proof of the existence of
Japan's law on divorce.18chanrobleslaw
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in
an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family
Code, the foreign divorce decree and" the national law of the alien recognizing his or
her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and
2521 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the
divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or
official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her
husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the
"The Civil Code of Japan 2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were
not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24
and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the
applicable provisions found therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was
insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified expert witness nor was shown
to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly
those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as
learned treatises pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented and
considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and law.23chanrobleslaw
Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25cralawred dated
November 28, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying
the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code -
which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner - allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The provision reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spousecapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
marriage.26chanrobleslaw
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,27 the Court had the occasion to rule appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This reason for the existence of the courts.35chanrobleslaw
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the
may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action reception of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or accordance with this Decision.
defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
SO ORDERED.
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that
the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws
and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other
fact.31chanrobleslaw

Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as
well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual
that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue
raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of
a Rule 45 petition for review.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are
received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. 32 In this
regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.33chanrobleslaw

Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-

adverted, the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of
Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - x x x

An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues
of fact are involved shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal
likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error in the choice or mode of
appeal.34chanrobleslaw

Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the
appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal
and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further