ELECTION LAWS (Case Digests) the above circumstances.
the above circumstances. The proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of
1. THEORY OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
MARIANO LL. BADELLES vs. CAMILO P. CABILI, G.R. No. L-29333, February 27, 1969
Facts:
Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City,
after the elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory
provisions of the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth hereafter, were
dismissed in a single order by the Court of First instance of Lanao del Norte.
In one of them, the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of
Iligan City, was contested by protestant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, the protestants
are the now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilio T. Barazon, who along with the
five protestees were among those who were registered candidates voted for in such
election for councilors in the City of Iligan, with the protestees being credited with the
five highest number of votes, with protestants Legaspi and Barazon obtaining sixth and
seventh places respectively.
In the petition of protestant Badelles, it was stated that both he and protestee Camilo P.
Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City, both
having filed their respective certificates of candidacy in accordance with law and as such
candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged that the
Board of Canvassers, on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected protestee. Protestant
would impugn the election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violations of
mandatory provisions of law relating to or governing elections . . ." in that more than 200
voters were registered per precinct contrary to the provision limiting such number of
200 only and that no publication of the list of voters for each precinct was made up to the
election day itself, enabling persons who under the law could not vote being allowed to
do so. As a result of such alleged "flagrant violations of the laws relative to or governing
elections" around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally.
It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise
their right of suffrage in view of their failure, without any fault on their part, to have the
proper identification cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was
stated further that even in the case of those individuals provided with identification
cards with their names included in the list of voters, they could not avail themselves of
their right of suffrage as their applications for registration could not be found. Mention
was also made of the fact that the final lists of voters and the applications for registration
were delivered to their respective precincts late on election day itself thus preventing
them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was caused by the excessive
number of voters being listed and many having been assigned to precincts other than the
correct ones.
What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to
do so, numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were
duly registered with the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to
the electorate as to who was the mayor elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over
the protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes.
The prayer was for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for elective
positions being set aside and declared null and void, protestant pleading further that he
be granted other such relief as may be warranted in law and equity. The protest of the
candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon, in the other case against protestees was
in substance similarly worded.
In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds:
"1. That the protest was filed beyond the reglementary period; 2. That the lower court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the COMELEC being the proper body to hear
the same; 3. That the complaint states no cause of action."
The single order of dismissal in both cases as indicated was based on the lack of a cause
of action. The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion
that there was no cause of action proceeded along these lines: "Mere irregularities or
misconduct on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect the result of the
elections are not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper matters of
inquiry. . . .There is no allegation in the protest that the alleged irregularities committed
by the election officers would tend to change the result of the election in favor of the
protestants and against the protestees.
Issue: WON the trial courts dismissal was valid.
Ruling:
Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial
abnegation of a sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding
allegations of misconduct and misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining
whether irregularities or serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of
elections was clearly and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision, the opinion
coming from Justice Makalintal. Thus: "The question of whether or not there had been
terrorism, vote-buying and other irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City
should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to Section 174 of the Election
Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the
election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices."
It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and
the flagrant violations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here,
the protest. That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. If that right be
disregarded or frittered away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth.
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent
of the people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and
thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of
established authority. It is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered
choice. The election law has no justification except as a means for assuring a free, honest
and orderly expression of their views. It is of the essence that corruption and
irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a
failure to observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be
left remediless. Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly
serves that purpose. It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a
rather awkward and far from entirely satisfactory manner. That in itself is no reason for
the courts to slam the door against any opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would
happen if the order of dismissal complained of were not set aside.
Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be
misinterpreted however. All that it directs is that the protestees in both cases be
required to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not unlikely, there be a denial of the serious
imputations made as to the alleged irregularities, the lower court could properly inquire
into what actually transpired. After the facts are thus ascertained in accordance with the
accepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied. It must be clearly
emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or lack of it, of
either protest. That would be premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the
order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases
remanded to the lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion
and the law. Without costs.
2. CONGRESS POWER TO REGULATE ELECTIONS
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No.
157013, July 10, 2003
Facts:
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his
intent to return to the Philippines, is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a
voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.
Issue: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
Ruling:
No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as
understood in election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one
is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is the
place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the
Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress
to allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential
and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed
COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and
vice presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to
the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
3. PURPOSE OF ELECTION
ISIDRO MILLARE vs. HON. LEOPOLDO B. GIRONELLA, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, HON. ADRIANO BERNARDINO, Acting Municipal Circuit Judge of
Tayum, Abra, and ALFREDO ELVEA, G.R. No. L-61586, May 30, 1983
Facts:
Petitioner Isidro Millare ran for the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Budac,
Tayum Abra, against private respondent Alfredo Elvea during the barangay election
held on May 17, 1982. On May 10, 1982, Elvea filed in the Municipal Circuit Court of
Tayum, Abra, a petition for the exclusion and disqualification of Millare, docketed as
Barangay Election Case No. 48. The said petition sought to strike out Millare's name from
the voters' list, and to disqualify him as a candidate for the position of barangay captain
of barangay Budac on the ground that he was not an actual resident of the said barangay
for at least six months prior to the elections, as required by Section 7 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222. At the hearing of the said petition, Millare failed to appear and, after receiving
the evidence of Elvea the respondent Municipal Circuit Judge of Tayum, Judge Adriano
Bernardino, issued an order striking out Millare's name from the voters' list and
declaring him disqualified to run as barangay captain of barangay Budac. On May 14,
1982, Millare filed a motion for a reconsideration of the said order. The motion was set
for hearing, and in an order dated May 16, 1982, Judge Bernardino denied the, same,
with the modification that Millare's name was allowed to remain in the voters' list.
Millare received a copy of the order denying his motion for reconsideration at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of May 16, 1982, which was a Sunday, the eve of election day.
Despite the declaration as to his disqualification, Millare ran just the same in the election
held on May 17, 1982. It appears undisputed that he garnered more votes than Elvea
His votes, however, were not considered by the barangay board of tellers, they having
been declared as stray. The barangay board of canvassers proclaimed Elvea as the duly
elected Barangay Captain of barangay Budac. He took his oath of office as such. Millare
did not appeal the orders in Election Case No. 48 which declared him disqualified to run
as barangay captain of barangay Budac. On May 20, 1982, Millare filed with the
respondent Municipal Circuit Court Election Protest No. 49 against Elvea praying for
the annulment of the proclamation of Elvea and for a declaration that he (Millare) was
the duly elected Barangay Captain of barangay Budac. At the hearing of said election
protest, Millare asked that the ballot boxes be reopened so as to show to the court that
he got more votes than Elvea. This prayer was denied. When placed on the witness
stand, Millare was not allowed to testify on the ground that he had already been
disqualified as a candidate. In his order dated June 22, 1982, Judge Bernardino dismissed
the election protest for lack of merit. He reasoned out that the election protest may not
be availed of as a means of appealing the decision dated May 16, 1982 in Election Case
No. 48 which declared Millare as disqualified as a candidate and which had already
become final and executory, there having been no appeal taken from the same. Millare
appealed the order of dismissal of Election Protest No. 49 to the Court of First Instance of
Tayum, wherein it was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 1687 "For Review on certiorari
on Questions of Law." The then court of first instance, through public respondent Judge
Leopoldo B. Gironella, rendered a decision dated July 19, 1982 affirming the decision of
the Municipal Circuit Court in Election Protest No. 49. On August 16, 1982, Millare filed
the instant petition which he entitled as a "Petition for Review on certiorari on Questions
of Law." He prays principally that the aforementioned decision and orders of the
respondents Judge Gironella and Judge Bernardino be nullified, and that Election Protest
No. 49 be remanded to the Municipal Circuit Court of Tayum for trial on the merits. The
petition was given due course and the parties have filed their respective memoranda.
The respondents are pinning down Millare on his failure to appeal the order of Judge
Bernardino in Election Case No. 48 declaring him disqualified to run for the position of
barangay captain of barangay Budac on the ground of non-residence. Such failure, it was
reasoned out, resulted in the said order becoming final and executory, and that by virtue
thereof, Millare lacked the requisite personality to file Election Protest No. -49. It was for
this reason that Judge Bernardino denied his motion to re-open the ballot boxes for a
recanvassing of the contents of the same, and also his attempt to testify in the said
proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not the orders of Judge Bernardino in Election Case No. 48 and
Election Protest No. 49 and the decision of Judge Gironella in Special Civil Case No. 1687
are valid.
Ruling:
From a strict legal standpoint, the view that the order disqualifying Millare had become
final and executory due to his failure to appeal the same may be said to be technically
correct. The law governing barangay elections is contained in Batas Pambansa Blg. 222,
otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982. Section 21 of the said law
provides that "the provisions of the 1978 Election Code and the Revised Barangay
Chapter no, inconsistent herewith shall be applicable in a suppletory character to the
election of barrio officials. " Section 8 of the Revised Barangay Chapter, Republic Act No.
3590, as amended and as adopted by Presidential Decree No. 557, provides in its last
paragraph as follows:
All disputes over barangay elections shad be brought before the municipal court of the
municipality concerned; and in the determination and decision thereof, the court shall
follow as closely as possible the procedure prescribed for inferior courts in Rule 4 (now
Rule 5), Rules of Court. The decision of the municipal court shag be appealable pursuant
to the Rules of Court to the Court of First Instance whose decision shall be final on
questions of fact. (last par., See. 8, R.A. No. 3590, as amended.)
The above-quoted provision deals with "all disputes over barangay elections." It
apparently includes proceedings to disqualify a candidate, there being no other provision
expressly applicable to such cases, unlike in the case of actions for exclusion or inclusion
in the voters' lists which are explicitly provided for in the first paragraph of Section 20 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222 and in Sections 93 to 96 of the 1978 Election Code. The
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court which have been made applicable to "all
disputes over barangay elections" require that the decision of a municipal court be
appealed to the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) "within fifteen
days after notification of the judgment complained of." (Sec. 2, Rule 40, Rules of Court.) It
is a fact that Millare did not take an appeal from the orders issued by Judge Bernardino in
Election Case No. 48.
As to whether Millare should have appealed the said order of disqualification after
election day, more particularly when his votes, which were more than those of his
opponents, were not credited to him, they having been considered stray due to the
aforementioned disqualification, was not plain nor certain enough as the proper course
of action to take. The barangay board of tellers had considered the order of his
disqualification as already final and executory, for which reason they considered his
votes stray. If the order of disqualification was still appealable, as contended by the
respondents, such action on the part of the barangay board of tellers was legally
unjustified and erroneous. The quandary in the mind of Millare as to what course of
action to take after Elvea was proclaimed the winner despite his having received less
votes than Millare was not helped any by the state of the law and of the applicable
decisions on the matter. As aforesaid, there is no express legal provision or pertinent
jurisprudence which indicates whether, under such a situation, Millare should have
appealed the order of his disqualification, or file an election protest. Existing provisions
seemingly indicate that the appropriate step to take is to file an election contest. The
second paragraph of Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 222 provides as follows:
A sworn petition contesting the election of any barangay official shall be filed
with the city or municipal or metropolitan trial court, as the case may be, within
ten days from the date of the proclamation of the winners. The trial court shall
decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The
decision of the municipal or city or metropolitan trial court may be appealed
within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof to the Regional Trial Court (CFI)
which shall decide within thirty days from submission, and whose decision
shall be final.
Section 191 of the 1978 Election Code, in turn, prescribes the following:
A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with
the proper city or municipal court by any candidate for the same office who has
 duly filed a certificate of candidacy, within ten days after the proclamation of
the election.
In the last paragraph of Section 196 of the same Code, We find the following:
xxx xxx xxx
The decision of the city, municipal or municipal district courts in the case stated
in Section 191 hereof shall not be appealable and shall immediately be final and
executory.
The choice between appealing the order of disqualification in Election Case No.
48 and filing election contest after the election had been held was thus not easy
to make. Or, having made such decision, may one be certain as to the
correctness of the same. In several cases brought before the Supreme Court, a
disqualification proceeding based on the so-called "turncoatism" filed after the
election were ordered dismissed, the proper remedy having been held to be an
election contest or a quo warranto proceeding. If filed before the election, the
dismissal of such a case after the proclamation of the winner became the
subject of conflicting views. (Desini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 52502, Dec. 30, 1982;
Venezuela vs. COMELEC, 98 SCRA 790; Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC, 102 SCRA 1;
Singco v. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 420; Faderanga vs. COMELEC, 105 SCRA 124.)
Reliance on the doctrine laid upon in said cases is even impaired by the fact
that not one of them involved the election of barangay officials which is
governed by different provisions of law.
However, We find Ourselves unable to go along with the stoically legalistic stance taken
by the respondents which not only disregards the equities involved, but also contravenes
the unquestioned policy in the interpretation of election laws and the disposition of
election cases. We have repeatedly ruled that "the purpose of election laws is to give
effect to rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
4. RULE ON CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTION LAWS
SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOAN V. ALARILLA,
G.R. No. 194143, October 4, 2011
Facts:
Herein petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the mayoralty race during
the May 10, 2010 elections in the City of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Private respondent was
proclaimed the winner.
On May 21, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition with the COMELEC questioning the
proclamation of private respondent.
Private respondent filed her Answer with Motion to Set for Hearing Affirmative Defenses
in the Nature of a Motion to Dismiss for Being Insufficient in Form and Substance.
Thereafter the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order setting the preliminary
conference on August 12, 2010 and directing the parties to file their Preliminary
Conference Briefs at least one (1) day before the scheduled conference.
On August 11, 2010, private respondent filed her Preliminary Conference Brief.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed his Brief on the day of the scheduled preliminary
conference. He, likewise, filed an Urgent Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference on the
ground that he did not receive any notice and only came to know of it when he inquired
with the COMELEC a day before the scheduled conference. Petitioner also claimed that
on the date set for the preliminary conference, his counsel and his associate were
scheduled to appear before different tribunals in connection with other cases they were
handling. Subsequently, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear during the actual
conference on August 12, 2010. On even date, private respondents counsel moved for
the dismissal of the case.
In its assailed Order dated August 12, 2010, the COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed
petitioners protest on the ground that the latter belatedly filed his Brief in violation of
the COMELEC rule on the filing of briefs.
On August 19, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 with the COMELEC en
banc contending that it was only on August 16, 2010 that he received a copy of the Order
of the COMELEC which set the preliminary conference on August 12, 2010.
In its second assailed Order dated September 21, 2010, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that petitioner failed to file a
verified motion in violation of Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: WON the COMELEC 2nd Division and the COMELEC en banc committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing his electoral protest and in denying his motion for
reconsideration, respectively.
Ruling:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify the outright dismissal of the protest
based on technical grounds where there is no indication of intent to violate the rules on
the part of petitioner and the reason for the violation is justifiable. Thus, the COMELEC
2nd Division committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners protest.
It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all
courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with
public interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival
candidates but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the
real choice of the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the
office within their gift.
Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one whos
right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not
only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be
achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial
of an ordinary action.
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners motion for reconsideration
was not verified, the COMELEC en banc should have considered the merits of the said
motion in light of petitioners meritorious claim that he was not given timely notice of
the date set for the preliminary conference. The essence of due process is to be afforded
a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence in support of ones
claim or defense. It is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due
process of law. More particularly, procedural due process demands prior notice and
hearing.
As discussed above, the fact that petitioner somehow acquired knowledge or
information of the date set for the preliminary conference by means other than the
official notice sent by the COMELEC is not an excuse to dismiss his protest, because it
cannot be denied that he was not afforded reasonable notice and time to adequately
prepare for and submit his brief. This is precisely the reason why petitioner was only
able to file his Preliminary Conference Brief on the day of the conference itself.
Petitioners counsel may not likewise be blamed for failing to appear during the
scheduled conference because of prior commitments and for, instead, filing an Urgent
Motion to Reset Preliminary Conference.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.
5. MAIN FEATURE OF ELECTION LAWS IN THE PHILIPPINES
THE UNITED STATES vs. ELIAS CUETO, G.R. No. L-13626, October 29, 1918
Facts:
In the general election held on June 6, 1916, Elias Cueto, now the defendant and
appellant, was an election inspector for an election precinct in the municipality of
Tiaong, Province of Tayabas. For the position of municipal president of this municipality,
two gentlemen named mayo and Magbiray were candidate. Toribio Briones, a qualified
elector, belonged to the Mayor party. He was given a slip containing the slate of the
candidates of the Mayo faction for the different offices, such as is circulated at election
time, and with this in his possession entered the polling place. Being a disabled person,
because of failing sight and rheumatism in his hand, although still able when necessary
to read and write, Briones secured the assistance of Cueto to prepare his ballot. Instead,
however, of copying the name of Mayo, the candidate for municipal president found on
the slip of paper, for whom Briones desired to vote, Cueto inserted the name of Magbiray.
When once outside the dark booth, Briones noticed that his ballot contained the name of
Magbiray and on his objecting anew ballot with the Name of Mayor was prepared for him
by the election inspector.
Issue: Whether or not Cueto violated the election law.
Ruling:
The accused, as already remarked, was an election inspector. To hold this office it was
necessary for him to have certain qualifications. He had to be qualified elector of his
precinct, of good character, not convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and
able to read, write, and speak either English, Spanish, or the local dialect
understandingly. the accused took an oath honestly and unjustly to administer his duties
according to the Election Law without prejudice or favor toward any person, candidate,
party, society, or religious sect. One of his functions was, in conjunction, with another
inspector to prepare ballots for disabled persons. The made it his duty, and his duty only,
with another inspector, to ascertain the wishes of the disabled voter and to prepare the
ballot of the voter in proper form according to his wishes. (See sections 417-424, 453,
Administrative Code of 1917.)
The election inspector in giving assistance to a disable voter has but on function to
perform, namely, the mechanical act of preparing the ballot. The exercise of any
discretion as to the selection of candidate for the voter assisted is prohibited to the
maker, and the substation of his own for the voter's choice in such selection is a flagrant
violation of an official trust. (Patton vs. Watskins [1901], 131 Ala., 387; 90 Am. St. Rep.,
43; Board vs. Dill [1910], 26 Okla., 104; Ann. Cas. [1912] B, 101; Re Prangley, 21 Ont. L.
Rep., 54.) An inspector who fails to write upon the ballot the name or names expressly
indicated by the voter is guilty of a fraud practiced against the voter and thus of a
violation of the penal provisions of the Election Law.
The defendant not only convicts himself out of his own mouth of an attempt to defeat the
will of the people of this district in their effort to choose their representatives in the
legislative branch of the government, but also violated his oath of office in which he
asked God to help him honestly and justly to administer his duties as an inspector of
elections without prejudice or favor towards any person, candidate, party, society, or
religious sect, which oath must have been taken freely or without evasion or mental
reservation whatsoever. (Section 516, Act No. 2657; section 419, Act No. 2711.) In
addition to convicting himself of an attempt to violate the rights of the people, together
with the violation of a solemn oath, he also convicts himself of the falsification of a public
document, and might be punished for the latter offense in a manner very much more
severe than for the crime for which he is being tried. (Articles 300 and 301 of the Penal
Code, as amended by Act No. 2712.)
The law provides as a punishment for an election officer who fails to perform his official
duties, imprisonment for not less than one month nor then one year or by fine of not less
than P200 nor more than P500 or both. (Section 2639, Administrative Code of 1917.) In
the decision above quoted, the maximum penalty was, for good reasons, imposed. There
the facts were aggravated because the election officer had manipulated and changed the
election totals. Herein, while the inner purpose of the defendant as just as bad, the result
was not disastrous. However, believing that either the maximum or a penalty
approaching the maximum, should always be imposed on election officers who violate
law we must proceed to increase the sentence imposed by the lower court so that the
defendant and appellant shall be condemned to six months imprisonment, and to pay a
fine of P250, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and with the costs of
both instances against him. So ordered.
6. DEFINITION, BASIS AND NATURE OF ELECTION
PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), ELECTION
OFFICER LUDIVICO L. ASUNCION OF SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN; BARANGAY
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF BRGY. STO. TOMAS, SAN JACINTO, PANGASINAN, Board
of Election Tellers of Prec. Nos. 30A/30A1, 31A, 31A1, and 32A1, and REMEGIO
PLACIDO, G.R. No. 154198, January 20, 2003
Facts:
During the barangay elections on July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L.
Placido were the contending candidates for Brgy. Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away. His
widow, petitioner Petronila Betty Rulloda, wrote a letter to the Commission on
Elections seeking permission to run as candidate for Brgy. Sto. Tomas in lieu of her late
husband.
The Comelec issued a directive to the Chairman and members of the Brgy. Board of
Canvassers that, the names Betty or Petronila or Rolluda is written on the ballot,
read the same as it is written but add the words Not Counted like Betty Not Counted
or Rolluda Not Counted. Based on the result of the election, petitioner garnered 516
votes over the 290 votes of Remegio Placido. Despite this, the Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Placido as the Brgy. Chairman based on recommendation of the Law
Department under Resolution No. 5217, that to deny due course the certificates of
candidacy and to delete the name of Petronila Rulloda, and citing Section 9 of Comelecs
Resolution No. 4801, which state that there shall be no substitution of candidates for
barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials. It argue that since the barangay election
is non-partisan, substitution of candidates is not allowed and petitioner did not file any
certificate of candidacy.
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the said Resolution
Nos. 4801 & 5217, to nullify the proclamation or respondent and to proclaim her as the
duly elected Brgy. Chairman.
Issue: WON there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioners
request that she be allowed to run for elections.
Ruling:
Respondents contention that the substitution of candidates in not allowed in barangay
elections under Section 77 of the Omnibus Elections Code which states that, if after the
last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy
to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified Inasmuch as the
barangay election is no-partisan, there can be no substitution because there is no
political party to speak of. But the Court ruled that the purpose of election laws which is
to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. It is a solemn duty to uphold
the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It is well-settled that in case of doubt,
political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate
freely expressed through the ballot.
Petitioners letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when Comelec
issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who
obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases
should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. The Court
ordered the proclamation of Placido to set aside and to proclaim the petitioner as the
duly elected barangay chairman.
7. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ENRIQUE
T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS, G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996
Facts:
Congress enacted RA 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which
among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone.
RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses. Petitioner was
organized with an authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and
fully paid up by the Republic of the Philippines.
The American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine
government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other
installations left by the American navy.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed a Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of
RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993
to the Office of the President.
Respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia,
Calimbas, et al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting
Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227.
Not satisfied, herein respondents resorted to their power of initiative under the Local
Government Code of 1991, Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which provides as follows:
"Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative.
xxxxxxxxx
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the
proponents, through their duly authorized and registered representatives, may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the sanggunian
concerned.
On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623
denied the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that
the subject thereof was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an
ordinance. On July 13, 1993, public respondent Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec
Resolution no. 93-1676) further directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action
on the authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents.
Private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court
against the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to
set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it disallowed the conduct of a local
initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, and Comelec
Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in
support of the initiative and the gathering of signatures.
Respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of
Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the
scheduled referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec
promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan".
Petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the
validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent
on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
Issues:
1. Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating and implementing its Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of
the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan;" and
2. Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the
people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a
national law"
Ruling:
YES. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the
Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below the word "referendum" is repeated at
least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise
as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee";
the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of
Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat,
not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this
exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
Initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-
making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they
desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of
R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the proposal. If its
refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents
through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of
initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the
proponents be able to collect the number of signed conformities within the period
granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the
initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered
voters in the local government unit concerned x x x".
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered
voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution
which is duly enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall
be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on Elections.
In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is
begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by
the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or
rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process
and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum
where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise
an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and
canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people
is in the proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the
electorate. This is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and
complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such
part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that "(n)o petition
embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate," although "two or
more propositions may be submitted in an initiative".
It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government
or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition."
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of
the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making
powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or
change the substance or the content of legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may
(in fact it should have done so already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules
for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our Constitution.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law.
Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is
only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or
resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At
this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual
controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present
controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions
involved here; (ii) the respondent Commission should be given an opportunity to review
and correct its errors in promulgating its Resolution No. 2848 and in preparing -- if
necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that the said Commission has administrative and
initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass upon the question of whether the proposal is
sufficient in form and language and whether such proposal or part or parts thereof are
clearly and patently outside the powers of the municipal council of Morong to enact, and
therefore violative of law.
8. RECALL
JOVITO O. CLAUDIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, G.R. No.
140560, May 4, 2000
Facts:
Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City
in the May 11, 1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998. Sometime during the
second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to
discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence. Several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of
convening the PRA. PRA adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO
INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF
CONFIDENCE.
As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an
affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of
the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the required bulletin boards in
Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the
resolution was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City
designated by the COMELEC.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald
Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the
petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show
attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of
the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the
convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election
case filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the
proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before
recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to
obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually
double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang
kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed
affidavits of retraction.
In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and
dismissed the oppositions against it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by
a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the
May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that
its records showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total membership
of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the
PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on
the verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the
signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient. On whether the pendency of the case
questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it was not and
that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall
proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within
one year from the elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the
negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the petition for
recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after
petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the petition was filed on time.
Hence, these petitions.
COMELEC set the date of the recall elections in Pasay City on April 15, 2000.
Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to compel the COMELEC to
fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay City was no longer tenable. Thus, whats only
left to settle is petitioner Claudio's action for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
1. On Whether or not the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the
Filing by it of a Recall Resolution;
2. On Whether or not the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of
Section 74 of the Local Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular
Election or Simply the Date of Such Election; and
3. On Whether or not the Recall RESOLUTION was signed by a Majority of the PRA and
Duly Verified.
Ruling:
The bone of contention in this case is Section 74 of the Local Government Code (LCG)
which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
*** 1. Yes. According to the Supreme Court, Recall is a process which begins with the
convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least
25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of
a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or
petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of Section 74, "recall" refers to the
election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local
official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this
conclusion.
First, Section 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled
"Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, Section 69 provides that "the power of recall
...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to
initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
Section 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words,
the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the
convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the
gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or
petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of
times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the
purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in Section 74 apply only to the exercise of
the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not merely, the
preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of
Section 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from
the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC where two objections were
raised against the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings
is the sole prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that
by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to
shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local officials. Both objections were
dismissed on the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to
the first objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power to initiate
recall that the Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the second objection, it
was held that a recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before
the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office.
[But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in
office . . . ."
If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether
the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the
prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the
official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to
be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph
(b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of assumption of office of the official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take
place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the
performance of an elective local official. In the Bower case cited by this Court in
Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held that "The only logical reason which we can ascribe for
requiring the electors to wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to
prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official
before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions."
The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the
Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall
be filed against any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months."
But however the period of prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the
purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the performance
of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the
one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before
the end of the first year in office of a local official.
It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official
concerned has been in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without
sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall
resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is
the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall
election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will
not be judged on his performance prematurely.
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the
PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials
would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its
members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the
performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public
opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes
the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to
unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to
assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary,
they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.
Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year
period in paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose"
during which "[his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by
disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide
for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the day an elective official
assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy
to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated and when it is
not. The only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is
the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings
of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may, have the incidental effect of
providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really the purpose of the limitation
on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for
evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.
In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable
as recalls initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing
repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan City's] Preparatory Recall Assembly" when,
instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.
Two points may be made against this argument.
One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local official
whose recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities
and providing for the holding of plebiscites during which the question of cityhood is
submitted to the people for their approval are not always approved by the people. Yet,
no one can say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In
the case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA was resorted
to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the
signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some
plausibility for the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the people's will as are the
25 % of the voters. Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a
local government unit cannot be more representative of the sentiments of the people
than those initiated by PRAs whose members represent the entire electorate in the local
government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to political
maneuverings or manipulations as are those composing PRAs.
The other point regarding Justice Punos claim is that the question here is not whether
recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year
period of limitation in paragraph (b) includes the convening of the PRA. Given that
question, will convening the PRA outside this period make it any more representative of
the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the registered voters is claimed to be?
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not
to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall
1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power
which shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the
voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of
recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph
(b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a
sufficient basis for judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the
day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall
proceedings would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the
Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after
petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding
on that date.
*** 2. Yes. The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . .
. one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended
this limitation to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus
Election Code, it could have expressly said so.
Petitioners contention is untenable. Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by
the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second period of prohibition in
paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does
not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14,
but the election period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days
immediately before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30,
2000, no recall election may be held. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would
severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no
recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective
local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the
period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding
year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the
second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this
period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would
devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more
responsive and accountable."
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the
Omnibus Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period
commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days
thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in
paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of
the people.
To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, Section 74 imposes limitations on the
holding of recall elections. First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election
more than once during the term of office of an elective local official. Second, paragraph
(b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the date the official
assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within
one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v.
COMELEC, "[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates
the period when such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is,
during the second year of office."
*** 3. Yes. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not
raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of the
names in the petition were double entries, that some members had withdrawn their
support for the petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a
prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for recall could be
given due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the stipulations of the parties
and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the issue now being raised by
petitioner.
The contention of the petitioner has no basis. Petitioner alleges other grounds for
seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the holding of a recall
election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was
not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to
petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify
their attendance and not their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the
word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the
74 begin.
Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was
written by mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it.
Apparently, it was mistaken for the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is
absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution
signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they
signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the
pages in question are part.
The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was
not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as
notary public for Pasay City but for Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue
was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be raised now.
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R.
No. 140714 is DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.
9. ELECTION PERIOD VS. CAMPAIGN PERIOD
PEDRO G. PERALTA vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. NATIONAL
TREASURER, and KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978
Facts:
Pedro Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang
Pambansa Elections. He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or
the 1978 Election Code.
There are 6 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of separate provisions
of the 1978 Election Code (Presidential Decree No. 1296).
Petitioners question the constitutionality of Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code, which
provides:
"SEC. 4. Election and campaign periods. The election period shall be fixed by
the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the
Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days
immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the
election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim
Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on February 17,
1978 except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be
conducted on March 23 and 24, 1978."
In support of the allegation of unconstitutionality, petitioners rely on Section 6 of Article
XII-C of the Constitution, thus:
"SEC. 6. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election
period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end
thirty days thereafter."
Issue: Whether or not the 45-day period of campaign prescribed in the 1978 Election
Code violates the Constitution because:
(a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided
by Section 6 of Article XII-C; and
(b) the period should cover at least ninety (90) days.
Ruling:
At the outset, it should be considered that Amendment No. 1 provides that the "number
of representatives from each region and the manner of their election shall be prescribed
and regulated by law" (emphasis supplied). Under Amendment No. 5, "the incumbent
President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been
lifted." The power conferred by these Amendment upon the lawmaker necessarily
included the authority to prescribe the date and procedure for the holding of such
elections.
It should be borne in mind that the forthcoming election for members in the interim
Batasang Pambansa will be a special election during a regime of martial law. It is,
therefore, an election in a state of emergency. The exigencies of the situation require that
it be governed by special rules. At this point, the objective is to hasten the normalization
of government and, at the same time, to ensure that the nation is not exposed to the same
critical problems that necessitated the declaration of martial law. In conferring upon the
incumbent President the authority to determine the date of the election, those who
drafted the Amendments must have realized that it is only the incumbent President who
has the authority and the means of obtaining, through the various facilities in the civil
and military agencies of the government, information on the peace and order condition
of the country, and to determine the period within which an electoral campaign may be
adequately conducted in all the regions of the nation. Thus, the 1978 Election Code was
formulated to meet a special need, and this is emphasized by the fact that the Code itself
limits its application.
Even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period
for campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the
Commission on Elections has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4,
Article I of the 1978 Election Code.
At any rate, insofar as objections to the fixing of the campaign period for elections in
general are concerned, it is apparent that there is a distinction between the terms
"election period" and "campaign period". Thus, Section 4, Article I of the 1978 Election
Code provides that the "election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in
accordance with Section 6, Article XII (C) of the Constitution." The "campaign period",
however, has been fixed so that "it shall not be more than forty-five days immediately
preceding the election: Provided, That for the election of representatives to the interim
Batasang Pambansa, the period of campaign shall commence on February 17, 1978
except that no election campaign or partisan political activity may be conducted on
March 23 and 24, 1978." The distinction is further made apparent by the fact that the
"election period" under Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution extends even beyond
the day of the election itself, while the "campaign period", by reason of its nature and
purpose, must necessarily be before the elections are held. There is, therefore, no conflict
with the constitutional provision.
The instant petitions were dismissed.
10. SUFFRAGE AS A RIGHT OR PRIVILEGED
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. AMADEO CORRAL, G.R. No. L-42300,
January 31, 1936
Facts:
Appellant was charged having voted illegally at the general elections held on June 5,
1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he had voted while laboring
under a legal disqualification. The judgment of conviction was based on section 2642, in
connection with section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Said Section 432 reads as follows:
The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:
(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer not less than
eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removed by
plenary pardon.
(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him to the
United States.
(c) Insane of feeble-minded persons.
(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write.
(e) Electors registered under subsection (c) of the next proceeding section who,
after failing to make sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board of
inspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they are
incapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability,
present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective of
whether such incapacity be real or feigned.
And section 2642 provides:
Whoever at any election votes or attempts to vote knowing that he is not
entitled so to do, ... shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one
month nor more than one year and by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos
nor more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by deprivation of the right
of suffrage and disqualification from public office for a period of not more than
four years.
Issue: WON the State has the right to deprive persons, or the appellant, in this case, to
the right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of crime.
Ruling:
It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of this court
promulgated on March 3, 1910, to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor. No
evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a
plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the general elections held on June 5,
1934, he voted in election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao, Province of
Davao.
The modern conception of the suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The
right to vote is not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege
granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the
public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system of
government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the
inhabitants. But with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in
the modern states has come to embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are
excluded from the franchise. Among the the generally excluded classes are minors idiots,
paupers, and convicts.
The right of the State to deprive persons to the right of suffrage by reason of their having
been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such restrictions
upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The presumption is that one rendered
infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit
to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The exclusion must for this reason be
adjudged a mere disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment, the
withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R.C.L., 1042.)
Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not entitled
to vote on June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which
disqualified from voting any person who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, had been
sentenced by final judgment to offer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon. As above stated, the
appellant had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer eight years and one day
of presidio mayor, and had not been granted a plenary pardon.
Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in 1928 his offense
had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted for illegal voting at the
general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention is clearly without merit. The
disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code
having once attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a
plenary pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general
elections of 1934.
Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant that
the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at
the expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the
nature of the disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated,
the correct view is that it is imposed, "for protection and not for punishment, the
withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation
and long established administrative practice are against such a view.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
11. POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS
IMELDA DIMAPORO vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 81151, January 7, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Dimaporo and private respondent Vicente Belmonte were both
candidates for Representative of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Norte
during the May 14, 2007 elections.
Sometime in the evening of May 19, 2007, the ballot boxes containing the COCs of
Kauswagan, Bacolod and Maigo were allegedly forcibly opened, their padlocks destroyed
and the envelopes containing the COCs and the Statement of Votes (SOV) opened and
violated.
When the PBOC was about to resume the canvassing at around 9:00 a.m. the succeeding
day, the forced opening of the ballot boxes was discovered prompting the PBOC to
suspend the canvass.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8073 adopting in part the recommendation of Atty.
Ausan directing the PBOC of Lanao del Norte to "immediately reconvene solely for the
purpose of retrieving the three envelopes supposedly containing the COCs from the
municipalities of Kauswagan, Bacolod and Maigo" and to "open the same in the presence
of all watchers, counsels, and representatives of all contending parties and the accredited
Citizens Arm of the Commission and right there and then to direct the representatives of
the dominant majority and minority parties to present their respective copies of the
COCs for comparison with the COCs intended for the COMELEC and with the COCs inside
the envelope just opened."
The COMELEC further resolved that when discrepancies show signs of tampering and
falsifying, the PBOC is to "immediately turnover to the NBI the copies of the COCs of said
three (3) municipalities intended for the Commission and the Election Officer for
purposes of comparison with those retrieved from the questioned ballot boxes."
The new Special Provincial Board of Canvassers (SPBOC) convened and opened the
ballot boxes for the towns of Kauswagan, Maigo and Bacolod. As the SPBOC proceeded
with the canvass, private respondent Belmonte objected to the inclusion of the COCs of
the concerned municipalities. The SPBOC denied Belmontes objections due to lack of
jurisdiction.
Belmonte filed his verified notice of appeal before the SPBOC. In the assailed Resolution
of July 10, 2007, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted Belmontes petition. While
conceding that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases against
members of the house, it took cognizance of the petition as one for the correction of
manifest errors, hence, within its jurisdiction as per the last sentence of Section 15 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166. The law provides:
Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and
Member of the House of Representatives. For purpose of the elections for president,
vice-president, senator, and member of the house of representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the
case may be, except as provided for in Sec. 30 hereof. However, this does not preclude
the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns before it.
Dimaporo filed petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC over the case.
Dimaporo claims that the subject matter involved does not pertain to manifest errors but
to the "preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation" of certificates of
canvass, a matter outside the realm of the COMELECs jurisdiction when a congressional
seat is involved.
Dimaporo was also granted a status quo ante order.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in proclaiming Belmonte winner even though
a Status Quo Ante Order was granted
Ruling:
Petition dismissed, Comelec has duly proclaimed BELEMONTE, thus if DIMAPORO wants
to pursue a case, he must file with the HRET.
Private respondent Belmonte filed his comment even before the issuance of the status
quo ante order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of
Lanao del Norte.
He had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his
duties accordingly.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). When there has been a
proclamation and a defeated candidate claims to be the winner, it is the electoral tribunal
that already has jurisdiction over the case.
The COMELEC was not amiss in quickly deciding Belmontes petition to correct manifest
errors then proclaiming him the winner
12. FAILURE OF ELECTION
TOMAS T. BANAGA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO M.
BERNABE, JR., G.R. No. 134696, July 31, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were the candidates for vice-mayor of the City of
Paraaque in the May 11, 1998 election.
On May 19, 1998, the city board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent, Florencio
M. Bernabe, Jr., the winner for having garnered a total of 71,977.
On the other hand, petitioner, Tomas T. Banaga, Jr., received the second highest number
of votes for the said position, with 68,970. Thus, the difference between the votes
received by the private respondent and the petitioner is 3,007 votes.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the COMELEC on May 29, 1998, an action denominated
as "Petition to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections", alleging
that:
"3. xxx the local elections for the office of Vice-Mayor in the City of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, held on 11 May 1998, amounts to a denigration of the expression
of the true will of the people, as it was tainted with widespread election
anomalies which constitutes election fraud. The local elections for the position
of Vice-Mayor in the City of Paraaque, Metro Manila, was replete with election
offenses, specifically vote buying and flying voters being allowed to vote.
Moreover, during the canvassing of votes before the Board of Canvasser,
numerous Election Returns were discovered to contain glaring discrepancies
and are replete with blatant omissions, not to mention the fact that numerous
election returns appeared to be tampered with. All told, it is readily apparent
that the portion of the Election Returns pertaining to the position of Vice-Mayor
in the City of Paraaque, appear to be altered, falsified or fabricated.
4. The will of the legitimate voters of the City of Paraaque were denigrated
during the 11 May 1998 election as a consequence of the fact that an
indeterminable number of flying voters were allowed to vote.
xxx
9. Moreover, several Election Returns are found to have glaring discrepancies
which may materially alter the results of the election for the office of Vice-
Mayor in the City of Paraaque.
xxx
10. Finally, what seriously casts doubt on the legitimacy of the elections for the
office of the Vice-Mayor in the City of Paraaque is the fact that the results
thereof are statistically improbable. A case in point is precinct number 483
where petitioner shockingly is supposed to have received zero (0) votes.
Petitioner is the incumbent Vice-Mayor of the City of Paraaque. It is, thus,
impossible that he will receive zero (0) votes in any given precinct."
On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed petitioners suit. It held that the grounds
relied upon by petitioner do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6
of the Omnibus Election Code. The election tribunal concluded that based on the
allegations of the petition, it is clear that an election took place and that it did not result
in a failure to elect.
Considering that a motion for reconsideration of a COMELEC en banc ruling is prohibited,
except in a case involving an election offense, and aggrieved by the COMELECs dismissal
of his suit, petitioner timely filed the instant petition for certiorari with this Court.
Issue: WON public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioners petition, in the light of petitioners foregoing contentions.
Ruling:
No. While petitioner may have intended to institute an election protest by praying that
said action may also be considered an election protest, in our view, petitioners action is
a petition to declare a failure of elections or annul election results. It is not an election
protest.
First, his petition before the COMELEC was instituted pursuant to Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 7166 in relation to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 4 of RA 7166
refers to "postponement, failure of election and special elections" while Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code relates to "failure of election". It is simply captioned as "Petition
to Declare Failure of Elections and/or For Annulment of Elections".
Second, an election protest is an ordinary action while a petition to declare a failure of
elections is a special action under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended.
An election protest is governed by Rule 20 on ordinary actions, while a petition to
declare failure of elections is covered by Rule 26 under special actions.
In this case, petitioner filed his petition as a special action and paid the corresponding fee
therefor.
Third, petitioner did not comply with the requirements for filing an election protest. He
failed to pay the required filing fee and cash deposits for an election protest. Failure to
pay filing fees will not vest the election tribunal jurisdiction over the case. Such
procedural lapse on the part of a petitioner would clearly warrant the outright dismissal
of his action.
Fourth, an en banc decision of COMELEC in an ordinary action becomes final and
executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation, while an en banc decision in a
special action becomes final and executory after five (5) days from promulgation, unless
restrained by the Supreme Court. For that reason, a petition cannot be treated as both an
election protest and a petition to declare failure of elections.
The COMELECs authority to declare a failure of elections is provided in our election
laws. Section 4 of RA 7166 provides that the COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote
of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the
calling of special election as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said
Section 6, in turn, provides as follows:
Section 6. Failure of Elections. --- If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has
not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation
and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably
close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."
There are three instances where a failure of election may be declared, namely, (a) the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force
majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any
polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the
voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. In these
instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. This is obvious in the first two scenarios,
where the election was not held and where the election was suspended. As to the third
scenario, where the preparation and the transmission of the election returns give rise to
the consequence of failure to elect must as aforesaid, is interpreted to mean that nobody
emerged as a winner.
Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election
two conditions must concur, namely (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts
on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to
elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the election. Note that
the cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.
While petitioner contends that the election was tainted with widespread anomalies, it
must be noted that to warrant a declaration of failure of election the commission of fraud
must be such that it prevented or suspended the holding of an election, or marred fatally
the preparation and transmission, custody and canvass of the election returns. These
essential facts ought to have been alleged clearly by the petitioner below, but he did not.
Finally, petitioner claims that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it
dismissed his petition motu propio. However, the fact that a verified petition has been
filed does not mean that a hearing on the case should first be held before COMELEC can
act on it. The petition to declare a failure of election and/or to annul election results
must show on its face that the conditions necessary to declare a failure to elect are
present. In their absence, the petition must be denied outright. Public respondent had no
recourse but to dismiss petition. Nor may petitioner now complain of denial of due
process, on this score, for his failure to properly file an election protest. The COMELEC
can only rule on what was filed before it. It committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing his petition "to declare failure of elections and/or for annulment of elections"
for being groundless, hence without merit.