ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN ET AL., respondents.

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RlGHT OF DOMICILE; LlBERTY; HABEAS CORpus; CONTEMPT.One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for women
of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at night, without their
consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. No law,
order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. Held: That the writ of habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of Manila who was primarily responsible for the
deportation, is in contempt of court for his failure to comply with the order of the court.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus. A civil action was never
intended effectively and promptly to meet a situation in which there is restraint of liberty. That the act may be a crime and that the person may be proceeded against is also no
bar to the institution of habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.These women, despite their being in a sense lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattles, but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens.

4.ID.; ID.The privilege of domicile is a principle often protected by constitutions and deeply imbedded in American jurisprudence.

5.HABEAS CORPUS; NATURE.The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

6.ID. ; PARTIES.Where it is impossible for a party to sign an application for the writ of habeas corpus, it is proper for the writ to be submitted by some person in his behalf.

7.ID.; JURISDICTION.It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest
judge of the Court of First Instance.

8.ID. ; ID.The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands.

9.ID.; ID.Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the
particular circumstances.

10.ID.; RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY.A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential objects and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

11.ID.; ID.The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties
were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.

12.ID.; ID.The true principle should be that if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court, and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so.

13.ID.; ID.Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ, is no reason why the writ should
not issue.

14.ID. ; ID.The place of confinement is not important to the relief if the guilty party is within the reach of process so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to
release his grasp.

15.ID.; COMPLIANCE WITH WRIT.For respondents to fulfill the order of the court granting the writ of habeas corpus, three courses were open: (1) They could have produced
the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity these ,persons could not safely
be brought before the Court; or (3) they could have. presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 87.)

16.CONTEMPT OF COURT.The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. . Only occasionally should a
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.

17.ID.When one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the
respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined.

18.ID.An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ -of habeas corpus, when he has power to do so, is contempt committed in the face of the
court.

19.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS.The Government of the Philippine Islands is a. government of laws. The court will assist in retaining
it as a government of laws and not of men.

20.ID, ; ID.No official, however high, is above the law.

21.ID.; ID.The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Habeas Corpus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be
met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of
popular government,. and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary
question isShall the judiciary permit a government of men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands ?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted
for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police.
Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers,. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the
police, acting pursuant to orders from the. chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170
inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a lif e in Mindanao. They had
not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on
board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao
during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by
Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who
had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are
not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others
went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of
the deportees presented an application f or habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to
include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The
application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared f or
the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners
were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did
not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of. Manila. According to an exhibit
attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
admitted, in answer to a question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of
November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao,
and Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk
of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner. On the day named in the order, December 2d, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in
court by the respondents. It has since been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the
secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original
petition. copied a telegram f rom the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the
Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contented with their life in Mindanao and did not
wish to return to Manila. Respondent Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his
control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did
not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918,
promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and
therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the
women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should
demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would
later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, f urther testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the
respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas
corpus. In subStance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that
eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation free, renounced the right through sworn statements;
that fiftynine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city
fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police f orce of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the rplica, al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record. In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.

One f act, and one fact only, need be recalledthese one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to
prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed
necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by
the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the questionBy authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress
these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of Congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a
hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by
a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No, 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to
the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law!
Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order.
But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of
the Philippine Islandsand these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizensto change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public
officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American
constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional
sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or
potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers.
If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents
and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official
can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and
under no law f rom one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no
man, we will not deny or def er to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 Eng. Stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above
the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of
the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the
more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U. S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.
S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U. S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that
the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action,
but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.

As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

"Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two
hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and
not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

"Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his
domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas"
(Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will
institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons
guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to"It would be a
monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, to be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and
therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (1) that there is a defect
in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the persons in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents, It was
finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perf orce they could not bring the women
from Davao.

The first defense was not pressed with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city
officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of
habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code
of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked f or in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general
rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance.
But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the
discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or
that the women had any means by which to advance their plea bef ore that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original
respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no
restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a
tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is f ound to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action
is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived
these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented
from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila
and released or until they freely and truly waived this right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person
was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the
party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor
and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, these same officials must necessarily have the same means
to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus
be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities f ails
to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a
person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The
membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question
presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J,, with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished
American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on
his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the f ollowing eloquent passages from the opinion
of Justice Cooley are quoted:

"I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on .the petition which was laid before us. * * *

"It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that 'Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign,'
and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause
for the protection of personal liberty, which is; the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without
delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. * * *

"The second propositionthat the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the stateseems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not
passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. * * *

"The important f act to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does
not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by
compelling the oppressor to release his constraint The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the
purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which
are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled
to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The
important question is, where is the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs, People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of England by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the
Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain
date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in
his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

"A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at
the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the
judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted
with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any
lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made
in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period f or the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be 'a contempt. But
the question is not as to what was done bef ore the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ after it was issued by not
producing the child in obedience to its commands." (The Queen vs. Barnardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com.
Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to 'the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three
colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as
he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his
custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be
evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the
custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the
production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United
States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C. C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U. S., 624; Church on Habeas Corpus, 2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defenses offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas
corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondents complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, 'and if it be found that they
did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ bef ore the court on
December 2,1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record
discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought bef ore the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of
the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have
presented affidavits to show ,that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies
of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by
those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by
the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or
were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them
to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts
all tend to indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the
Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every
effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child,
and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the
return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did
not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance
to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao,
placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While
charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our
mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy
incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it
can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose
Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city. of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of
Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does
not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or
fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court.
(Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the
first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority, Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs,
and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have
been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill
his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum
of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was
primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who
conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate
women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the
writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged. It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each,
which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be
possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the
court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court
tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at
once command such respect without being unduly oppressivesuch an amount is P100.

In rsumas before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not
to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Rplica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs
shall be taxed against respondents! So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the f ortifications of an orderly
government of laws and to protect. individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

Arellano, C. J., Avancea, and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the habeas corpus proceeding against Just Lukban, the mayor of this city.

There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a great number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.

We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of public houses of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this
reason, when more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer and transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said
houses of prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal
provision which constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the city of Manila.

We do not believe in the pomp and ostentation of force displayed by the police in complying with the order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of
taking them to the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to suppress the segregated district or the community formed by those
women in Gardenia Street, could have obliged the said women to return to their former residences in this city or in the provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to
Mindanao; hence the said official is obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to the places in which they lived prior to their becoming
inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.

As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not find any apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken
by the mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing the said women who were free at Davao and presenting them
before this court within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the said women were living together in a given place. It was not because they were really detained,
but because on the first days there were no houses in which they could live with a relative independent from one another, and as a proof that they were free a number of them
returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living separate from their companions who continued living together.

To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and whether he has acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community
of prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the rights and interests of the said women and especially of the patrons who have
been directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous
people of Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can
not, with indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.

If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality are to be taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and
permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for, although there were no positive laws prohibiting the existence of
such houses within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public administration, acting
correctly, in exercising the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the inmates thereof
to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty, ,his individual rights,
and his right to property.

A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot invoke in his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and
individual rights, should the administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to free from contagion the
great majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women
dedicated to prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the first persons named have contracted their diseases without their knowledge and even against their
will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that their constant
intercourse with men of all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease known
as syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and women, is still prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and
seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.

If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which can give her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under
the will of another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful
profession, it is undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident
that she cannot join the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the community or
society with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised within that class which is
always subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and morality and to the conservation of public health, and for this reason it
should not be permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.

It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those who have been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a
governmental measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in
general and particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the authorities which administer and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who criticize and
censure the mayor are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take care of their children.

For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a
private citizen but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken,
availing himself of the services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting the immense majority of the population from the social evils and diseases
which the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true center for the propagation of veneral
diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of the domicile of the inmates
thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional law which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the women petitioners
do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.

In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes,
considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such measures more humane :and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in
forma, have been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view the ultimate object of the Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to the
living together in a certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they adopt another manner of living which is
better and more useful to themselves and to society.

In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo Lukban is obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present found in
Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should expressly
make known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must be made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within
the shortest time possible f or its due compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.

ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:

1 regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in these proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt
committed, according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of ?100.

In the said decision, it is said:

"The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on
December 2,1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record
discloses, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the
Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named."

In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as is said in the same decision, the respondents, for the purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have,
(1) produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not safely be
brought before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the same decision, the
said respondents "* * * did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings
that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some
of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could
have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were easily to be found in ,the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents."

The majority opinion also recognized that, "The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty
of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this,
the majority decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added "that the return did not show that every possible effort to
produce the women was made by the respondents."

When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed, my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for
contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on January 13,
1919, the women who were not in Manila, unless they could show that it was impossible to comply with the said order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With respect
to this second order, the same decision has the following to say:

"In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao,
placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While
charges and countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfilment with our
mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it."

I do not agree to this conclusion.

The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of the issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month bef
ore taking the first step f or compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of the women appeared before this court on December 2d. Thus,
the said order was not complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstance that seven of the said women having returned to Manila at their own
expense before the said second day of December and being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who was then present at
the trial and to the attorney for the respondents, were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the latter show any effort to present them, in spite of the fact
that their attention was called to this particular by the undersigned.

The result of the said second order was, ,as is said in the same decision, that the respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed for the production of the women before this court,
presented technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to the city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents
themselves brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in Davao they found
eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they desired to return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the affidavits presented by the
respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was not
possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said, have been
illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will, only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented before
this court by the respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents,
twenty-six of whom were brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the
said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we have a total of sixty-six (66),
which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the reasons for
their inability to present any of the said women that the latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other,.that the
respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this court,
could bring before December 2d, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well as before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the
seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent
could count upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the purpose. But the said respondent mayor brought only
eight (8) of the women before this court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said
respondent has substantially complied with the second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he has not complied with the mandate of this court in its
first and second orders; that neither of the said orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is, according to the majority
decision, principally responsible f or the contempt, to which conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent with respect to the second order confirms the contempt
committed by non-compliance with the first order and constitutes a new contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because the production of only eight (8) of the
one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue of his order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26)
women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented by
the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he made any
effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the said two orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to
justice; and lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious
disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same required.

"Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. * * *" (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)

"It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith." (Ruling Case Law vol. 6, p.
502.)

"It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the
service of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as though he had obstructed by some direct means." (Ruling Case Law, vol.
6, p. 503.)

"While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized communities for
establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the courts and obedience to their orders and
just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said
generally that where due respect f or the courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not, however, so much to excite individual
respect as to compel obedience or to remove an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice." /Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)

"The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted of
scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, :the law-making power, or the courts. In the American states the power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive department
and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so f ar as the legislative department is concerned, is obsolete. but it has been almost universally preserved so far as
regards the judicial department. The power which the courts have of vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of justice, whether of record or not;
and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper case for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the whole
fabric of the common law. * * *" (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)

The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of the prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss
might have been caused by noncompliance with the. same orders on the part of the respondent Justo Lukban; the damages which might have been suffered by some of the
women illegally detained, in view of the f act that they were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be presented before the court and of the further fact that some of
them were obliged to come to this city at their own expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the
transportation of the said women; and the delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition interposed by the said petitioners and which was due to the fact
that the said orders were not opportunely and duly obeyed and complied with, are circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing upon the respondent Justo
Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by him, a penalty which, according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist of a fine not
exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration
the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the city, and consequently, the
person obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the orders
emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all
the costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the AttorneyGeneral in order
that, after a study of the same and deduction from the testimony which he may deem necessary, and the proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to
the provincial fiscal of Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the
occasion when the illegal detention of the women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those
crimes committed by reason of the same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby the just hope expressed in the majority decision
will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine Islands there should exist a government of laws and not a government of men and that this decision may serve to bulwark the
fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.

Writ granted.

[Villavicencio vs. Lukban., 39 Phil., 778(1919)]

Shigenori Kuroda, petitioner, vs. Major General Rafael Jalandoni, Brigadier General Calixto Duque, Colonel Margarito Toralba, Colonel Ireneo Buenconsejo, Colonel Pedro
Tabuena, Major Federico Aranas, Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, respondents.

1.Constitutional Law; Validity of Executive Order No. 68 Estab-lishing a National War Crimes Office.Executive Order No. 68 which was issued by the President of the Philippines
on the 29th day of July, 1947, is valid and constitutional. Ar-ticle 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3 that "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."

2.International Law; Violators of the Laws and Customs of War, of Humanity and Civilization, Liability and Respon-sibility of.In accordance with the generally accepted
prin-ciples of international law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant pre-cedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of
crimes and offenses consequential and inci-dental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor*

3.Id.; Power of the President of the Philippines.In the promul-gation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the Pres-ident of the Philippines has acted in conformity with
the gen-erally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.

4.Constitutional Law; Power of President as Commander in Chief of Armed Forces of the Philippines.The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of
his powers as Commander in Chief of all our armed forces.

5.Id. ; Id.The President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through
the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.

6.International Law; Hague and Geneva Conventions Form Part of the Law of the Philippines; Even if the Philip-pines was not Signatory Thereof, Provisions of Philip-pine
Constitution has been Comprehensive to that Effect.The rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conven-tions form part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and princi-ples were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to
the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the con-ventions embodying them, for
our Constitution has been delib-erately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

7.Id.; Rights and Obligations of a Nation were not Erased by Assumption of Full Sovereignty; Right to Try and Punish Crimes Theretofore Committed.When the crimes charged
against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound together with the United States
and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full
sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people.

8.Id.; Id.; Id.War crimes committed against our people and our government while we were a Commonwealth, are triable and punishable by our present Republic.

9.Military Commission Governed by Special Law.Military Com-mission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern
ordinary civil courts.

10.Military Commission; Counsel Appearing Before it not Neces-sarily a Member of the Philippine Bar.There is nothing in Executive Order No. 68 which requires that counsel
appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In fact, it is common in military tribunals
that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

11.Id.; Trial of War Crimes Before Philippine Courts; Allowance of American Attorneys to Represent United States.The appointment of the two American attorneys is not
violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a
tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment of sover-eignty, it has not been by our
government but by the United States Government Which has yielded to us the trial and punish-ment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow
them representation in said trials.

12.Id.; Id.; Id.It is of common knowledge that the United States and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands
charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its
government to a military tribunal of our country.

13.Id.; Jurisdiction; Supreme Court Will not Interfere with Due Processes of Military Commission.The Military Com-mission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with
jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the pro-visions of Executive Order No. 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner
in its custody; this court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission. Per Perfecto, J., dissenting:

14.Attorneys at Law; Aliens Cannot Practice Law.It appearing that Attys. Hussey and Port are aliens and have not been au-thorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, they
cannot appear as prosecutors in a case pending before the War Crimes Commission.

15.Constitutional Law; Legislative Power Vested in Congress; Exception.While there is no express provision in the funda-mental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative
power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the constitu-tional intent that the legislative power is to
be exercised ex-clusively by Congress, subject only to, the veto power of the President, to his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to place any part of the Philippines
under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court.

16.Id.; Id.; Scope of Powers of Different Governmental Depart-ments.Because the powers vested by our Constitution to the several departments of the government are in the
nature of grants, not a recognition of pre-existing powers, no department of the government may exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or
by law by virtue of express authority of the Constitution.

17.Id.; Id.; Power of President to Promulgate Executive Order Defining and Allocating Jurisdiction for Prosecution of War Crimes on Military Commissions.The provision in
Ex-ecutive Order No. 68 (series of 1947) of the President of the Philippines, that persons accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions, is clearly legislative in
nature and intends to confer upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war crimes. But, the power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the
prosecution of persons accused of crimes is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress.

18.Id.; Id.; Power to Establish Government Office.Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office; but, the power to establish government offices is
essentially legis-lative.

19.Id.; Rule-Making Power of Supreme Court; President Has no Power, Much Less Delegate Such a Power, to Provide Rules of Procedure for Conduct of Trials.Executive Order
No. 68 provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trials before the War Crimes Office. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power
vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. It further author-izes military commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot
exercise the rule-making power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commissions.
20.Id,; Legislative Power Vested in Congress; Usurpation of Power to Appropriate Funds.Executive Order No. 68 ap-propriates funds for the expenses of the National War
Crimes Office. This constitutes another usurpation of legislative power, as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.

21.Id.; Emergency Powers of President Under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671.Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671, granting the President of the
Philippines emer-gency powers to promulgate rules and regulations during na-tional emergency has ceased to have effect since the liberation of the Philippines, or, at latest,
upon the surrender of Japan on September 2, 1945. The absurdity of the contention that these emergency acts continued in effect even after the sur-render of Japan cannot be
gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation, and even before the surrender of Japan, the Con-gress started to function normally. To let the hypothesis on continuance prevail
will result in the existence of two distinct, separate and independent legislative organsthe Congress and the President of the Philippines. Should there be any disagree-ment
between Congress and the President, a possibility that no one can dispute, the President may take advantage of the long recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year) to repeal
and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

22.Statutory Construction; Presumption that Legislative Body did not Intend to Violate Constitution.It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the
delegation (embodied in Commonwealth Acts Nos. 600, 620 and 671) beyond the emergency created by war, as to extend it farther would be violative of the express provisions
of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question; but, if there could still be any, the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that
the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.

23.Constitutional Law; Due Process and Equal Protection of Law.Executive Order No. 68 violates the fundamental guar-antees of due process and equal protection of the law,
because it permits the admission of many kinds of evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal, and by which it is impossible to determine whether an
accused is guilt or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.

Fred Ruiz Castro, Federico Arenas, Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla, and S. Meville Hussey for respondents.

Moran, C. J.: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines
during a period covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a Mili-tary Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such commander to control the operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and pris-oners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and customs of war"comes before this
Court seek-ing to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines; to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
par-ticipating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission; and to permanently prohibit respond-ents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.

In support of his case, petitioner tenders the following principal arguments:

First."That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our con-stitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact
(that) the Philippines is not a signatory nor an ad-herent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of
'crimes' not based on law, national and international." Hence, petitioner argues"That in view of the fact that this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an
uncon-stitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is without jurisdiction to try hereing petitioner."

Second.That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the Commission in behalf of the United States of America, of attorneys Melville Hus-sey
and Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines, is a diminution of our personality as an independent state, and their
appointments as prosecutors are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

Third.That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecutors, the United States not being a party in interest in the case.

Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations govern-ing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President
of the Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of in-ternational law of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents
of international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression
and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held
accountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulga-tion and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the Pres-ident of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the
generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part of our Constitution.

The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our armed forces, as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said

"War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of
war. 'An important in-cident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to
disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war/ (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Indeed, the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the language of a writer, a military
commission 'has jurisdiction so long as a tech-nical state of war continues. This includes the period of an armis* tice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of
peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty agreement. (Cowles, Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)"

Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals,
through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Con-vention
because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent
nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions. Such rules and prin-ciples, therefore, form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally
bound together with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties be-tween the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations
were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who
committed crimes against our people. In this connection, it is well to remember what we have said in the case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil, 372):

* * * the change of our form of government from Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during
the Commonwealth, be-cause it is an offense against the same government and the same sovereign people * * *."

By the same token, war crimes committed against our peo-ple and our government while we were a Commonwealth, are triable and punishable by our present Republic.

Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys, namely, Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, in the prosecution of his case, on the ground that said attor-neys
are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with our Rules of Court and the appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national
sovereignty.

In the first place, respondent Military Commission is a special jnilitary tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of Court which govern ordinary civil courts. It has
already been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military com-missions is a valid and constitutional law. There is noth-ing in said
executive order which requires that counsel appearing before said commissions must be attorneys qual-ified to practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In fact, it is common in military tri-bunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the United States, which has submitted the
vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed rep-resentation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any
relinquishment of sovereignty, it has not been by our government but by the United States Govern-ment which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The
least that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.

Alleging that the United States is not a party in interest in the case, petitioner challenges the personality of attor-neys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common
knowledge that the United States and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner stands charged before the Military
Com-mission. It can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its government to a military
tribunal of our country.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and
having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due processes of such Military Commission.

For all the foregoing, the petition is denied with costs de oficio.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor, and Reyes, J J., concur.

Perfecto. J., dissenting:

A military commission was empaneled on December 1, 1948, to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori Kuroda for violation of the laws and customs of land warfare.

Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law, were appointed prosecutors representing the American CIC in
the trial of the case.

The commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines, the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on
con-stitutional grounds. Petitioner has also challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to appear as prosecutors before the commission.

The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948, in the name of the People of the Philippines as accusers.

We will consider briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and Port. It appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme
Court to practice law, there could not be any question that said persons cannot appear as prosecutors in petitioner's case, as with such appearance they would be practicing law
against the law.

Said violation vanishes, however, into insignificance at the side of the momentous questions involved in the challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is
challenged on several constitutional grounds. To get a clear idea of the questions raised, it is necessary to read the whole context of said order which is reproduced as follows:

"Executive Order No. 68

"ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR CRIMINALS.

"I, Manuel Roxas, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the Philippines, do hereby establish a National War Crimes
Office charged with the responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all Japanese accused of war crimes committed in the Philippines, and prescribe the rules and
regulations governing such trial.

"The National War Crimes Office is established within the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction, supervision
and control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect from all avail-able sources evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from the commencement
of hostilities by Japan in December, 1941, maintain a record thereof, and bring about the prompt trial of the accused.

"The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and shall exchange with
the said Office information and evidence of war crimes.

"The following rules and regulations shall govern the trial of persons accused as war criminals:

"I. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

"(a) General.Persons accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commissions to be convened by, or under the authority of, the President of the Philippines.

"II. JURISDICTION

"(a) Over Persons.The military commissions appointed here-under shall have jurisdiction over all persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the convening
authority at the time of the trial.

"(b) Over Offenses.The military commissions established here-under shall have jurisdiction over all offenses including, but not limited to, the following:

"(1) The planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
"(2) Violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deporta-tion to slave labor or for any other purpose of
civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or internees or persons on the seas or elsewhere; improper treat-ment of hostages;
plunder of public or private property; wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages; or devastation not justified by military necessity.

"(3) Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts committed against civilian populations before or during the war, or persecutions on political,
racial or religious grounds in execution of, or in connection with, any crime denned herein, whether or not in violation of the local laws.

"III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS

"(a) Appointment.The members of each military commission shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may be
appointed by the convening authority. Such alternates shall attend all sessions of the

commission, and in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an alternate shall take the place of that member. Any va-cancy among the members or
alternates, occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening authority, but the substance of all proceedings had and evidence taken in that case shall be made
known to the said new member or alternate. This fact shall be announced by the president of the commission in open court.

"(b) Number of Members.Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3) members.

"(c) Qualifications.The convening authority shall appoint to the commission persons whom he determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not disqualified
by personal interest or prej-udice, provided that no person shall be appointed to hear a case in which he personally investigated, or wherein his presence as a witness is
required. One specially qualified member shall be designated as the law member whose ruling is final in so far as concerns the com-mission on an objection to the admissibility
of evidence offered during the trial.

"(d) Voting.Except as to the admissibility of evidence, all rul-ings and findings of the Commission shall be by majority vote, except that conviction and sentence shall be by the
affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2/3) of the members present.

"(e) Presiding Member.In the event that the convening author-ity does not name one of the members as the presiding member, the senior officer among the members of the
Commission present shall preside.

"IV. PROSECUTORS

"(a) Appointment.The convening authority shall designate one or more persons to conduct the prosecution before each commission.

"(b) Duties.The duties of the prosecutors are:

"(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for refer-ence to a commission.

"(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission of all cases referred for trial.

"V. POWERS AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSIONS

"(a) Conduct of the Trial.A Commission shall:

"(1) Confine each trial strictly to a fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by the charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay
or interference.

"(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate punishment therefor.

"(3) Hold public sessions except when otherwise decided by the commission.

"(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be directed by the convening authority.

"(b) Rights of the Accused.The accused shall be entitled:

"(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly worded so as to apprise the accused of each offense charged.

"(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel ap-pointed by the convening authority or counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.

"(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the trial in support of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who personally
appears before the com-mission.

"(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and any documentary evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand them.

"(c) Witnesses.The Commission shall have power:

"(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and tes-timony; to administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.

"(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.

"(3) To delegate to the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers and duties set forth in (1) and (2) above.

"(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.

"(d) Evidence.

"(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would have
probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to achieve
expeditious procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:

"(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by any officer, depart-ment, agency or member of the
armed forces of any Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of the document.
"(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by the International Red Cross or a member thereof, or by a doctor of medicine or a member of
any medical service per-sonnel, or by any investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom the commission considers as possessing knowledge of the matters
contained in the report.

"(c). Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.

"(d) Any diary, letter or other document, including sworn or un-sworn statements, appearing to the commission to contain information relating to the charge.

"(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the original is not immediately available.

"(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official government documents of any nation, and the pro-ceedings, records and findings of military
or other agencies of any of the United Nations.

"(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary offer of proof, whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of
such evidence.

"(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility, nor be considered in mitigation of punishment. Fur-ther, action pursuant to an order of the
accused's superior, or of his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that justice so
requires.

"(5) All purported confessions or statements of the accused shall be admissible in evidence without any showing that they were volun-tarily made. If it is shown that such
confession or statement was procured by means which the commission believes to have been of such a character that they may have caused the accused to make a false
statement, the commission may strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as was so procured.

"(e) Trial Procedure.The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially as follows, unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:

"(1) Each charge and specification shall be read, or its substance stated, in open court.

"(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads 'Guilty' or 'Not guilty.'

"(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement.

"(4) The presiding member may, at this or any other time, require the prosecutor to state what evidence he proposes to submit to the commission and the commission
thereupon may rule upon the ad-missibility of such evidence.

"(5) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or presented. At the close of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on motion of the
defense for a finding of not guilty, consider and rule whether the evidence before the commission supports the charges against the accused. The commission may defer action
on any such motion and permit or require the prosecu-tion to reopen its case and produce any further available evidence.

"(6) The defense may make an opening statement prior to pre-senting its case. The presiding member may, at this or any other time, require the defense to state what evidence
it proposes to sub-mit to the commission, where upon the commission may rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.

"(7) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented. Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the
commission may rule as being admissible.

"(8) The defense, and thereafter the prosecution, shall address the commission.

"(9) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless otherwise directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment and
sentence, if any. The commission may state the reasons on which judgment is based.

"(f) Record of Proceedings.Each commission shall make a separate record of its proceedings in the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared by the
prosecutor under the direction of the commission and submitted to the defense counsel. The commission shall be responsible for its accuracy. Such record, certified by the
presiding member of the commission or his successor, shall be delivered to the convening authority as soon as possible after the trial.

"(g) Sentence.The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction, to death by hanging or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine, or such other
punishment as the commission shall determine to be proper.

"(h) Approval of Sentence.No sentence of a military commission shall be carried into effect until approved by the Chief of Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death or life
imprisonment shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President of the Philip-pines. For the purpose of his review, the Chief of Staff shall create a Board of Review
to be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on duty with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall have the
authority to ap-prove, mitigate, remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the accused) remand the
case for rehearing before a new military com-mission; but he shall not have authority to increase the severity of the sentence. Except as herein otherwise provided, the
judgment and sentence of a commission shall be final and not subject to review by any other tribunal.

"VI. RULE-MAKING POWER

"Supplementary Rules and Forms.Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to govern its procedure, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Order, or such rules and
forms as may be prescribed by the convening authority or by the President of the Philippines.

"VII. The amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out of the appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War Crimes Office in the
accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and shall be expended in accordance with the recommendations of the Judge Advocate General as approved by the
President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing, and billeting equipment and other property heretofore used by the Legal Section, Manila Branch, of the General
Headquarters, Supreme Com-mander for the Allied Powers, which will be turned over by the United States Army to the Philippine Government through the For-eign Liquidation
Commission and the Surplus Property Commission are hereby specifically reserved for use of the National War Crimes Office*

"Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16,1945, is hereby repealed.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.

"Manuel Roxas "President of the Philippines

"By the President:

"Emilio Abello

"Chief of the Executive Office"

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION

Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of legislative measure, without the benefit of congressional enactment.

The first question that is thrust at our face, spearhead-ing a group of other no less important questions, is whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the
legislative power expressly vested in Congress by the Constitution.

The Constitution provides:

"The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Phil-ippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Represent-atives." (Section 1, Article VI.)

While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of legislative power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the
Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is to be exer-cised exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the
President of the Philippines, to the specific provisions which allow the President of the Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas curpus and to place any part of
the Philippines under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the Constitu-tion in the Supreme Court.

There cannot be any question that the members of the Constitutional Convention were believers in the tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle,
further elaborated by Montesquieu and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially the United States of America, whose Constitution, after which ours has been
patterned, has allocated the three powers of gov-ernmentlegislative, executive, judicialto distinct and separate departments of government.

Because the powers vested by our Constitution to the several departments of the government are in the nature of grants, not a recognition of pre-existing powers, no
depart-ment of government may exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution or by law by virtue of express authority of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office, and the power to establish government office is essentially legislative.

The order provides that persons accused as war crim-inals shall be tried by military commissions. Whether such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legis-lative in
nature. It confers upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charged with war crimes. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the prose-cution of persons
accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress.

It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trials. This provision on procedural subject constitutes a usurpa-tion of the rule-making power vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court.

It authorizes military commissions to adopt additional rules of procedure. If the President of the Philippines cannot exercise the rule-making power vested by the Con-stitution in
the Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commissions.

It appropriates the sum of P700,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes Office established by the said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of
legislative power as the power to vote appropria-tions belongs to Congress.

Executive Order No. 68, is, therefore, null and void, be-cause, through it, the President of the Philippines usurped powers expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in
the Supreme Court.

Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President of the Philippines issued Execu-tive Order No. 68, respondents could not give any definite
answer. They attempted, however, to suggest that the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68 under the emergency powers granted to him by
Common-wealth Act No. 600, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed below:

"Commonwealth Act No. 600

"AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AU-THORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE THE TRANQUIL-ITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.

uBe it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

"Section 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national emergency which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with
extraordinary powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tran-quility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and all
subversive activities, by preventing or relieving unemployment, by insuring to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply, and by providing means for
the speedy evacuation of the civilian population, the establishment of an air protective service, and the organization of volunteer guard units, and to adopt such other measures
as he may deem necessary for the interest of the public. To carry out this policy the President is authorized to pro-mulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force and
effect of law until the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First Congress of the Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines. Such rules and regula-tions may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress espionage and other subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a)
when not engaged in any lawful occupation, to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such services as may be necessary in the public interest; (3) to
take over farm lands in order to prevent failure or shortage of crops and avert hunger and destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishments in order to insure adequate
production, controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to prevent the unwarranted suspension of work in productive
enterprises or in the interest of national security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of work for wage-earning and salaried employees in industrial or business undertakings of all
kinds; (7) to insure an even distribu-tion of labor among the productive enterprises; (8) to commandeer ships and other means of transportation in order to maintain, as much as
possible, adequate and continued transportation facilities; (9) to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or operation by the Government; (10) to
regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime necessity, both imported and locally produced or manufactured; and (11) to prevent, locally or generally,
scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious specula-tions, and private controls affecting the supply, distribution, and movement of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizers, chemicals,
building ma-terials, implements, machinery, and equipment required in agricul-ture and industry, with power to requisition these commodities subject to the payment of just
compensation. (As amended by Com. Act No. 620.)

"Sec. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objectives, the President may designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any department,
bureau, office, or instru-mentality of the National Government.

"Sec. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision of this Act or of any of the rules or regula-tions promulgated by the President under the
authority of section one of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by both. If such violation
is committed by a firm or corporation, the manager, managing director, or person charged with the management of the business of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally
responsible therefor.
"Sec. 4. The President shall report to the National Assembly within the first ten days from the date of the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been taken by
him under the authority herein granted.

"Sec. 5. To carry out the purposes of this Act, the President is authorized to spend such amounts as may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five of
Commonwealth Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-eight.

"Sec. 6. If any provision of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional and void, such decla-ration shall not invalidate the remainder
of this Act.

"Sec. 7. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved, August 19, 1940."

"Commonwealth Act No. 671

"AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMER-GENCY.

"Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

"Section 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the President
with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.

"Sec. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate such
rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer
the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth
including the de-termination of the order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Departments; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, offices, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become
inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish
those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the National,
provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of
debts; and (i) to exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Govern-ment to fulfill its responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.

"Sec. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as prac-ticable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulations
promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.

"Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval, and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
otherwise provide.

"Approved, December 16, 1941."

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, because they ceased to have any effect much before Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon
the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.

When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have taken direct part in their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of
said legislative body but as chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, popularly known as the "Little Senate." We are, therefore, in a position to state that said measures
were enacted by the Second National Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of an impending war and of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. We approved said extraordinary measures, by which, under the exceptional circumstances then prevailing, legislative powers were
dele-gated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue of the following provisions of the Constitution:

"In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
promulgate rules and regula-tions to carry out a declared national policy." (Article VI, section 26.)

It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the emergency created by the war, as to extend it farther would be violative of the
express provisions of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question; but if there could still be any, the same should be resolved in favor of the
presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.

The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the surrender of Japan cannot be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even
before the surrender of Japan, or since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function normally. In the hypothesis that the contention can prevail, then, since 1945, that is,
four years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic of the Phil-ippines with the proclamation of our Independence, two distinct, separate and
independent legislative organs,Con-gress and the President of the Philippineswould have been and would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every nature
including those of emergent character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be pregnant
with dangers to peace and order, to the rights and liberties of the people, and to Philippine democracy.

Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a possibility that no one can dispute, the President of the Philippines may take
advantage of the long recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year) to repeal and overrule legislative enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictator-ship,
absolutely repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamental guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially
so, because it permits the admission of many kinds of evidence by which no innocent person can afford to get acquittal, and by which it is impossible to determine whether an
accused is guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulations governing the trial of twelve criminals, issued by General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying, among others, Generals Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our
concurring and dissenting opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-129,1 and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the
resolution of January 23, 1946, in disposing the Homma case, L-244,2 are perfectly applicable to the offen-sive rules of evidence embodied in Executive Order No. 68. Said rules
of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under them no justice can be expected.

For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamasita and Homma cases, we vote to declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant the petition.

Petition denied. [kurada vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil., 171(1949)]

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of
National Defense; HON. ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as
Minister of Public Highways, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Police power construed.The broad and expensive scope of the police power, which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American
Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than, the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v.
Ericta thus: Justice Laurel in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948; Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.
x x x The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

Same; Due process; Letter of Instruction No. 229 requiring the installation of early warning devices to vehicles is not repugnant to the due process clause. Conjectural claims of
petitioner as to number of nighttime vehicular collisions cannot be a basis for setting aside a requirement of law that was promulgated after a careful study by the Executive
Department.Nor did the Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer: The President
certainly had in his possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by
petitioners naked assertion that early warning devices are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the
supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976 involved rearend collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioners statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on
record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here * * *. But even assuming the verity of petitioners statistics, is that not reason
enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean that death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that
could, likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles? It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of
prior, careful study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the
broadest permissible limits of a pleaders well-known penchant for exaggeration.

Same; Same; The early-warning device requirement on vehicles is not expensive redundancy. Said device is universally recognized.The rather wild and fantastic nature of the
charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights
inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being
universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from
this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without
thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or
endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such
confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

Same; Same; There is nothing in Letter of Instruction No. 229 which compels car owners to purchase the prescribed early warning device. Vehicle owners can produce the device
themselves with a little ingenuity.Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General: There is nothing in
the questioned Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning
device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in
question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or
produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly,
the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners as petitioner so sweepingly concludes.

Same; Courts do not pass upon the wisdom of statutes.It does appear clearly that petitioners objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the
justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, to put it at its mildest, is
distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation.

Same; Delegation of Powers; To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of power, the legislature must set defined standards. In the case at bar the clear objective is public
safety.The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support in well-settled legal doctrines. Had
petitioner taken the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An excerpt
from the aforecited decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that
the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be heard to repel. A standard thus
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command
is to be effected, It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may fee carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental roles and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The
standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly, the
legislative objective is public safety.

Same; International Law; The 2968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with the character of generally accepted principles of international law which
under the Constitution the Philippines adopts as part of the law of the land.The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:
[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices: * * *: It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in
the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, * * *: The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of
Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

Teehankee, J., dissenting:

Constitutional law; Land Transportation Law; Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 issued by the Land Transportation Commission is oppressive and
discriminatory because it requires vehicle owners to purchase a specific E.W.D.It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in
and more effective and efficient E.W.D.s such as a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles, b) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers on motor vehicles . . . . to purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have
yet to be demonstrated.
Same; Same; Public necessity for issuance of Administrative Order No. 1 has not been shown.The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid
refutation has been made of petitioners assertion that the E.W.D.s are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000
motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions, as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for
almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country.

Same; Same; The E.W.D. requirement in too burdensome on the public.The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioners assertion that as
of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country requiring E.W.D.s and at the minimum price of P56.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of
P48,451,872.00, or close to P50 million for the questioned E.W.D.s stands unchallenged.

Same; Same; No effort was made to show that there can be other less expensive and practical device.No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less
burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the common petroleum lamps kinke which can be placed just as effectively
in front of stalled vehicles on the highways.

Same; Same; There is no imperative need for imposing such a blanket requirements on all vehicles.There is no imperative need for imposing such a blanket requirement on all
vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and
vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable highway accidents due to stalled vehicles, establishing an honest and foolproof systems of examination and licensing of
motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much
less than the P50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court, Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a Letter of Instruction1 providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional
guarantee of due process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for transgressing the fundamental principle of non-delegation of
legislative power. The Letter of Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner, who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining
order as issued and respondents Romeo F. Edu, Land Transportation Commisioner; Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino, Minister of Public Highways; were required to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza.2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes quite dear that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification. The challenged
Letter of Instruction is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of
legislative power. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos, issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: [Whereas], statistics show that one of the
major causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled, or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate
early warning device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now,
therefore, I, Ferdinand E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways, including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby
direct: 1. That all owners, users or drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device consisting of triangular,
collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle is stalled or disabled or is parked for
thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway, including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause the warning device mentioned
herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front and rear of the motor vehicle stalled, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall cause
Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except motorcycles and trailers, charging
for each piece not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4. All hereby
concerned shall closely coordinate and take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect these instructions.3 Thereafter, on November 15, 1976, it was
amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise: Paragraph 3 of Letter of Instructions No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any source and present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized triangular early
warning device, as described herein, of any brand or make chosen by said motor vehicle owner. The Land Transportation Commissioner shall also promulgate such rules and
regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this order. 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and regulations on December
10, 1976.5 They were not enforced as President Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device as a
preregistration requirement for motor vehicles was concerned.6 Then on June 30, 1978, another Letter of Instruction7 ordered the lifting of such suspension and directed the
immediate implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended.8 It was not until August 29, 1978 that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded
thus: In pursuance of Letter of Instructions No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, directing the implementation of Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions
No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD) on motor vehicles, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative Order No. 1, dated
December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD
specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every motor vehicle, except motorcyles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially
numbered stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The EWD serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and
official receipt of payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This
Order shall take effect immediately.9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of Public Works, Transportation, and
Communications.10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking
lights fore and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the
implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the Land Transportation Commission,11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended,
clearly violates the provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: For him, they are oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society.12 He contended that they are infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the
motoring public;13 are one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car
owners who are compelled to buy a set of the socalled early warning device at the rate of P56.00 to P72.00 per set.14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety
device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWDs.15 He therefore prayed for a judgment declaring both the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular
void and unconstitutional and for a restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: L-49112 (Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.)Considering the allegations
contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with writ of preliminary prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to
[require] the respondents to file an answer thereto within ten (10) days from notice and not to move to dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary
restraining order] effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court.16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then on November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting
the factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car,17 they specifically
deny the allegations in paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of
Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land Transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32 violates the constitutional provisions
on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppessive, arbitrary, confiscatory, one-sided, onerous,
immoral, unreasonable and illegal, the truth being that said allegations are without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of
this Answer.18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional
litigation, the Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu
not susceptible to the charge that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what
respondents believed to be the authoritative decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams,19 Morfe v. Mutuc,20 and Edu v. Ericta.21 Reference
was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a signatory and which was duly
ratified.22 Solicitor General Men-doza took pains to refute in detail, in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner that the
assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission
of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter
point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in
an 1847 decision, as nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus:
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being
referred to as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the peo-ple. The concept was
set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in
the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, the most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,
extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out to all the great public needs. Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of
such salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote
public safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication
of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law,25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v.
Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national
roads * * *.26 As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act,27 with petitioner failing in his
quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioners effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay
the necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila.28 The
ra35 SCRA 481, 487-488. There is no need to repeat where Calalang and Morfe are reported. Primicias v. Fugoso is reported in 80 Phil. 71; Rubi v. Provincial Board, where the
first quotation from Justice Malcolm came, in 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919); and Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad, his other decision cited, in 40 Phil. 136 (1919); Helvering v. Davis, with
Justice Cardozo writing the opinion, in 301 US 619 (1937). tionale was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Brandeis of the American Supreme Court, quoted
in the opinion: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific
method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record in overthrowing the statute.29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General, as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer: The President certainly had in his
possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioners naked
assertion that early warning devices are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000
motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioners statistics is not backed up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly
stated by this Honorable Court: Further: It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless
the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here * * *. But even assuming the verity of petitioners statistics, is that not reason enough to require the
installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could likewise result from
head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?30 It is quite manifest then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study by the
Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible
limits of a pleaders well-known penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: Such early warning
device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles, 2) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, 3) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles, or 4) well-lighted two (2)
petroleum lamps (the Kinke) * * * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a
distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device installed on the roads,
highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or
the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the Answer of the Solicitor General: There is nothing in the questioned Letter of
Instruction No. 229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All
that is required is for motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining
the same from whatever source. In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even personally make or produce this early warning device so
long as the same substantially conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative order. Accordingly, the early warning device
requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous, immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said devices instant millionaires at the
expense of car owners as petitioner so sweepingly concludes * * *. Petitioners fear that with the early warning device requirement a more subtle racket may be committed by
those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an unreasonable manner or to an
unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and implementing order disclose
none of the constitutional defects alleged against it.32

7. It does appear clearly that petitioners objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the
pessimistic, not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest, is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It
bears repeating that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. As expressed by Justice Tuason:
It is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.
There can be no possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and
apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.

For they, according to Justice Labrador, are not supposed to override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law. It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a
statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent, on is wisdom cannot be sustained.33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken
the trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exerpt from the aforecited
decision of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.

Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public
agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be
either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams
is safe transit upon the roads. This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution came into force
and effect that the principle of non-delegation has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of
the principle of subordinate legislation not only in the United States and England but in practicaly all modern governments. He continued: Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing
tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the courts. Consistency with the conceptual approach requires
the reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the
assailed Letter of Instruction: [Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968
Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine
Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * *35 It cannot be disputed then that
this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land,* * *.36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not even elicit any attempt on the part of petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear,
positive, and categorical, why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as the
general rule in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co.,37 namely, that the constitutionality of a law will not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon,
and adequately argued.38 Equal protection is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his ef-
forts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, concur.

Teehankee, J. dissents in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino, J., did not take part.

Concepcion, J., is on leave. Castro, C.J., certifies Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

Petition dismissed.

SEPARATE OPINION

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majoritys peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the
requirement that all motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in
original cases of farreaching consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent, I only wish to state that the petition advances grave and serious grounds of assailing the rules and regulations issued by the
Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter
of Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, may unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of our compassionate New Society, because of the following considerations, inter alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.s such as a) blinking lights in the fore
and aft of said motor vehicles, b) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles . . . . . to
purchase the E.W.D. specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be demonstrated.
2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has been made of petitioners assertion that the E.W.D.s are not too vital to the
prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end
collisions, as to require the purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioners assertion that as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the
country requiring E.W.D.s and at the minimum price of P56.00 per set, this would mean a consumer outlay of P48,451,872.00, or close to P50 million for the questioned
E.W.D.s stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as
the common petroleum lamps kinke which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a blanket requirement on all vehicles. The respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogaties
vested in their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main cause of the deplorable highway accidents due to stalled vehicles,
establishing an honest and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education
campaign to instill safe driving habits and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P50 million burden that would be imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater degree of receptivity and sympathy could be extended to the petitioner for his civicmindedness in having filed the present petition challenging as
capricious and unreasonable the all-pervading police power of the State instead of throwing the case out of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police
power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

Notes.Article 30 of the Warsaw Convention on International Air Transportation does not apply to a case where an airplane refuses to transport a passenger with confirmed
reservation. (KLM Royal Dutch Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 237).

A drivers license which bear the earmarks of a duly issued license is a public document which is presumed genuine. (CCC Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 264).

The Revised Motor Vehicle Law allows the registration and use of motor vehicles with a width of more than 2.5 meters. (Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 19 SCRA 294).

A truck-trailer must be provided either with a helper or a rear-vision mirror. Where there was no factual finding of the Court of Appeals that a Truck-Trailer did not have such a
mirror, it cannot be concluded that it was not equipped with such mirror. (Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., Inc., 19 SCRA 294).

Where the legislation complained of is shown to be an exercise of police power, it does not mean that the invocation of the protection of the non-impairment clause would be
unavailing; otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment, and for that matter both of the equal protection and due process clauses which protect property rights
would be rendered nugatory. (Alalayan vs. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172).

By its nature and scope, police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people; an inherent and plenary power of the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the conform, safety and welfare of society; the power to promote the general
welfare and public interest; the power to enact laws in relation to persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of
each inhabitant, the power to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the State and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. (Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424). [Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195(1979)]
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME
HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila, respondents.

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; POLICE POWER; NATURE AND SCOPE.Police power is far-reaching in scope, and it is almost impossible to limit its sweep. It derives its existence from
the very existence of the State itself, and does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. It is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the
most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands
of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.

2.ID.; GUARANTEES IN SECTION I, ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION; UNIVERSALITY OF APPLICATION.The constitutional guarantees in Section I, Article III, of the Constitution,
which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to
any differences of race, of color, or of nationality (Yiek Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed., 220, 226).

3.ID.; LAW DEPRIVATION OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR PROPERTY; TEST OR STANDARD.The conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of
the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence, or the indispensable means for the"
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty or property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be
classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be
firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if disctinction or classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

4.ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CLAUSE; WHEN NOT DEEMED INFRINGED BY LEGISLATION.The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual
or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.

It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).

5.ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POWER TO MAKE DISTINCTION AND CLASSIFICATION AMONG PERSONS; CITIZENSHIP AS GROUND FOR CLASSIFICATION.The power of the legislature to
make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid ground for
classification.

6.ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; CLASSIFICATION IN REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180 ACTUAL, REAL AND REASONABLE.The classification in the law of retail traders into
nationals and aliens is actual, real and reasonable. All persons of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded.
Hence, it is the duty of this Court to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limits of equal protection
established by the Constitution.

7.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF REASONABLENESS.The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free the national
economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed
legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180 TOLERANT AND REASONABLE.A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant and reasonable the
Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their
lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied only to persons upon conviction of certain offenses.

9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS OF A PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.If political independence is a legitimate
aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none of less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive, if the people are subject to the economic control
and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

10.ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONALISTIC TENDENCY MANIFESTED IN THE CONSTITUTION.Nationalistic tendency is manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution, It cannot therefore be said that
a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid or unconstitutional.

11.ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.The exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial
review. The Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the
necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the
law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power.

12.ID.; TITLES OF BILLS; PROHIBITION AGAINST DUPLICITY; PRESENCE OF DUPLICITY NOT SHOWN IN TlTLE OR PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180.What Section 21(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its
operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297). A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is
true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes
and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term "regulation".

13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF GENERAL TERMS IN TITLE OF BILL.The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; the title need not be an index to the entire
contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345). The above rule was followed when the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".

14.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DIRECTIVE REGARDING SUBJECT OF A BILL.One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received
the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the law, especially
the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibition in the
law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed.

15.ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT VIOLATED BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180; TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT
LAW.The law does not violate international treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Jans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947
guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country". But the nationals of China are not discriminated against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed.
257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed., 539).

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Injunction and Mandamus.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ozaeta, Lichauco & Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar & Associates for petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.

Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.

Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.

Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and the issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The
enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and
country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and
national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing
dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are
allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for
ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the
United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures
and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a
verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of
juridical entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of
liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is basedAnswer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought
this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the
laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru
hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and
5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power.

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would
be well to bear in mind certain basic and f undamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the .scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is
the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application
to the f acts of the case may be brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the
State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with selfprotection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of
all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations
have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare
have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this
constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or
achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set f orth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power.

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:

"SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in
their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welf are
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it
not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related; the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So
the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is
given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason, The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts ? It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the
constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity,
adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve
public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the
legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover,
courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates,
there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power.. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein.
The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from time immemorial has always been open to
residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and
families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence.
As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which
man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of
articles, goods and commodities needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru
which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and
the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the ,spices
needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly
peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's traits.

The alien retailer must have started plying his trade in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages).
Slowly but gradually he invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers in far away nooks where the beginnings
of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many
communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them
not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes no note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance.

There is a general f eeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to f act, about the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's
economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not
only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of
other goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Accfa, his control over principal foods and products
would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is
charged that the law is merely the result of racialism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors
in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within
the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien
domination and control of the retail trade already

filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point
out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables;

1st table 2nd table

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily
small.

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assets and of gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos
have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assets and gross sales which average between six and seven times
those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains
much more. The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in
minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price
and supply,

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional Convention.

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization law. If
they did not exist as a fact the sweeping remedy of nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; * * *." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twentytwo years ago; and
the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought
under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p, 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:

"But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political
independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy.
Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will,
has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for
political freedom. Thus * * * it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also
against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the economic field." (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming
from alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National Convention of
Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also
believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find
alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly
endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and
concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods
or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national retailers and of the
consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike, can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of
daily use is desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article offers bigger
profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the
producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise
correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by
aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the
part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our
purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to
unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to
establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic
deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that
they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are
believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in
derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft
and corruption in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers
of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens
retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big
centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his
person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the
expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately
been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the
scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a.Objections to alien participation in retail trade.

The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal
convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as
would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country and his
beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his
profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general
distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this
country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter
disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national
which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the
other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail
traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power.
Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limit of
equal protection established by the Constitution. Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied
by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the
classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 55 L.
ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

"* * *. 1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise
of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having
some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When
the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law
was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is
essentially arbitrary.'"

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in
the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition
therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to
aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The Legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate
purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and
all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the
Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process of law clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the
concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
" 'Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is
distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping
of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is
contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been
correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contradistinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud
by foreigners; in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is
projected.'"

The rule in general is as follows:

"Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power." (2 Am. Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is,
or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those
who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs.
State, 99 N.E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race
hatred, or inhospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with 'our institutions and our life as
to enable him to appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social f abric", and was not, theref ore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392,
71 L. ed. 1115 (1926), the U. S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to
aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation
to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be
allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E.
129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura, vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawnbroking was considered as having
tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also
sustained in Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to
have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibition of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card
room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the
licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's finding that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the
morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of
commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public
interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural
resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male
persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification .and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily
wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained.

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for
classification. But in these decisions the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism
and hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared
invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud,
because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no
public benefit would be derived from the operation of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick
Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring power on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared
invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the
law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was
declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for
customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and
allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis
and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between
the alien and the national, thus:

"* * *. It may be judicially known, however, that aliens coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have.
So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the
foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely
different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship,
are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature
was without plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discrimination against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. * * *."

VII The Due Process of Law Limitation

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the United States that:

"* * * And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. * * *."

* * * * * * *

"So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it
is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,
the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. * * *." (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:

"* * *. Too much significance cannot be given to the word 'reasonable' in considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable,
and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. * * *."

* * * * * * *

"* * *. A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must
not be unduly oppressive." (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302, pp. 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, it was also held:

"* * *. To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and -not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. * * *."

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:

"In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the
first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,
oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public."

b. Petitioner's argument considered.

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalize. This argument overlooks fact and reality and rests on
an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien, in an honest
creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature
has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he
now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens
from the retail trade unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged
therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national
economy from alien control and do minance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed
legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into law:

"This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If
the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and
who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our own destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of
other people.

"In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks
to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national
security it respects existing rights.

"The approval of this bill is 'necessary for our national survival."

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the
people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign
economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about
can infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action.

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from
economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they
adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared in their Resolution:

" That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstains from approving the amendment introduced by the
Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade.'" (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum
for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principal objective is the conservation of the
patrimony of the nation and as corollary thereto the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of
the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be
said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measure is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been
recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy
commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the
problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right
and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the
fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and
purposes. Besides, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor
pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in
favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative
power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find he provisions are not
unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands
of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate
replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the
supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill, which
is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which
reads:

"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its
operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is
true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes
and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.
"Under the title of an act to 'regulate', the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors." (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted
in page 41 of Answer.)

"Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the title, the title To regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors,
etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly
included within the subject of regulating the sale." (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

"The word 'regulate' is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While
word regulate' does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in
connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression." (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed when the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize"
or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade, which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so
were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not f alling within the scope of the title which would have made
the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be
adopted in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be
claimed that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the
discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibition in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of Human Rights
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the above contention. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the
rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 2932), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of
Human Rights can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations Organization, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade,
and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated
against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the
retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson,
258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law
to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evidentas a matter of f act it seems not only appropriate but actually necessaryand that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void
for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that more time
should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law
falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the
harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Pars, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcin, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic.
But the rule does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act
assailed as violative of the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations,
partnerships or corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been engaged in the retail business. I
am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who
are and have heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed
and believed in good faith they were entitled to engage in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement f rom the business
or forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations or partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for
a period of ten years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of the term of the existence of the association or partnership or corporation,
whichever event comes first. The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period
of more than ten years from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes first, is valid and lawful, because the
continuance of the existence of such corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent legislation.1 But the prohibition to
engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act, even bef ore the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is
transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their property without due process of law. To my
mind, the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association and partnership, whichever event comes
first, and the sixmonth period granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law, because the
effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to reimburse and
compensate the associates or partners of the association or partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The
stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long
period of effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of
law 1 and that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws 2 would have no meaning as applied to associations or partnerships and alien heirs of an alien engaged
in the retail business if they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and before the end of the term of
the existence of the associations and partnerships as agreed upon by the associates and partners and within six months after the death of their predecessorin-interest.

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, caref ul and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public
domain constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands,3

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations and partnerships referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act,
insofar as it compels the alien heirs of a deceased alien engaged in the retail business in his lifetime, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for they
violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.

Petition denied. [Ichong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, etc., and Sarmiento, 101 Phil. 1155(1957)]
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA,JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General,
CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO, as Secretary of Justice, respondents.

Parties; Real party in interest; Sufficiency of petitioners interest as rice planter and taxpayer to seek restraint of allegedly illegal rice importation.The status of petitioner, as a
planter with a rice land of substantial proportion, entitled him to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad and, as a taxpayer affected by the
purchase of the commodity effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, gives said petitioner sufficient interest to file the instant petition seeking to restrain the
allegedly unlawful disbursement of public funds to import rice from abroad.

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of administrative remedies; Exceptions applicable to case at bar.The principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not applicable: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing
exceptions to the general rule.

Rice and Corn Importation Laws; Illegal importation where conditions for importation not complied with.Since the Rice and Corn Importation Laws (Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452) set conditions for the importation of rice, and in the case at bar conditions have not been complied with, it is held that the proposed importations are illegal.

Same; Importations made by the government itself.The provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any government
agency, apply likewise to importations made by the Government itself, because each and every officer and employee of our Government, is a government agency and/or
agent.

Same; Protection of local planters of rice and corn to foster self-sufficiency in local production.The protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster
and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency.

Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; An executive officer cannot disregard the law even if he believes that compliance mill not benefit the people.Respondents trend of
thought, that, if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it, must be rejectedwe still live
under a rule of law.

Same; Same; President may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Same; Same; Main function of Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress, not to defeat same.Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of the veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws. Statutory Construction; Theory that in a conflict between treaty and statute the latest in point of time shall prevail, not applicable to executive
agreements; Case at Bar.The American theory that in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable
to the case at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts in question are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to
which the United States is a signatory require the advice and consent of the Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as
regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances
which are fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States.

Courts; Jurisdiction; Power to invalidate treaties.The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled the question of whether an international agreement may be invalidated
by our courts in the affirmative, by providing in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify,
or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in (1) all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty,
not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Bautista Angelo, J., concurring:

Rice Importation; Injunction not granted despite illegality of importation where arrangements already concluded with foreign governments; Reasons.Respondents, despite
their lack of compliance with the Rice Importation Law, should not be enjoined from carrying out the importation of the rice which according to the record has been authorized
to be imported on government to government level, it appearing that the arrangement to this effect has already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its
implementation. Had the writ been issued, our government would have been placed in a predicament where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly
formalized agreement to its great embarrassment and loss of face.

Constitutional Law; Executive Powers; Civil authority supreme over the military.The injunction embodied in the National Defense Act (Sec. 2, Com. Act No. 1) that the civil
authority shall always be supreme, can only mean that while all precautions should be taken to in-sure the security and preservation of the State and to this effect the
employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the framework of the civil authority.

Barrera, J., concurring:

Constitutional Law; Supremacy of civil authority; Theory that the military may disregard rice importation laws is dangerous.The theory that rice can be legally imported by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, is a dangerous trend. To adopt this
theory, is to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of three economic groups or classes: the producers, the consumers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more
portentous is the effort to equate the army with the Government itself.

Same; Executive Powers; National Security Council; Function to deliberate on existence of emergency.It is not for the Department of National Defense to unilaterally
determine the existence of a threat of emergency, but for the National Security Council to do so. Otherwise, any change in the political climate in any region of the world is apt
to be taken as an excuse for the military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and, thereupon, attempt to override our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly institute some
kind of martial law on the pretext of precautionary mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state.

Same; Same; Theory of the end justifies the means rejected.Adoption as a government policy of the theory of the end justifies the means brushing aside constitutional and
legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up with the end of freedom.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition with preliminary injunction.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.

Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources,
and created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein1 for the implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or on September 25,
1963, herein petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzalesa rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the
production of rice and cornfiled the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents are
acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No. 3452which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 2207explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency; that petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency of this case and to prevent the
judgment therein from becoming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued
restraining respondents, their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after
due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and petitioners prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing, at which
both parties appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution of said incident
may require some pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the same was set for hearing on the merits soon thereafter. The
parties, however, waived the right to argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

I. Sufficiency of petitioners interest.

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We
find no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency, Republic Act No.
3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that the policy of the Government is to engage in the purchase of these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers,
producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment, x x
x. Pursuant to this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy
abroad. Moreover, since the purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner
must necessarily be a taxpayer, it follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to
unlawfully disburse said funds.

II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondents assail petitioners right to the reliefs prayed for because he has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court. We have
already held, however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one,3 or
where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually disapproved by him,6 or where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention.7 The case at bar falls under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general rule. Respondents contention is, therefore, untenable.

III. Merits of petitioners cause of action.

Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioners cause of action upon the theory that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and
3452, but was authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief for military stock pile purposes in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 1;8 that in cases of necessity, the President or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace; and
that, as Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, the President x x x is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting for any special
authority.

Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner hereinon which our view need not be expressedwe are unanimously
of the opinionassuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in forcethat the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said
laws is such as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, it shall be unlawful for any person,
association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines, although, by way of exception, it adds that the President of the
Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any government agency that he may designate, if the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are
present. Similarly. Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency from importing rice and corn.

Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any government agency, do not apply
to importations made by the Government itself, because the latter is not a government agency. This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and employee of our Government, are government agencies and/or agents. The
applicability of said laws even to importations by the Government, as such, becomes more apparent when we consider that:

1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the President of the Philippines and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines;

2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn Administration and any other government agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds that
the importation of rice and corn is left, to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes, thus indicating that only private parties may import rice under its
provisions; and

3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,-000.00 and imprisonment of not more than five (5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or
any rule and regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that if the offender is a public official and/or employees, he shall be subject to the
additional penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees of instrumentalities of the Government.
Hence, the duly authorized acts of the former are those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality which may have a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government, as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit. Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional
penalty for any officer or employee of the Government who violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision of said Act. Hence, the intent to apply the same to
transactions made by the very government is patent.

Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled An Act to give native products and
domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articles for the Government. Pursuant to Section 1 thereof:

The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the Government
of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including government-owned
companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works shall give
preference to materials x x x produced x x x in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions herein below specified. (Italics
supplied.)
Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the
Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national securitypredicated upon the worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam, and the recent
tension created by the Malaysia problemand the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the
National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-
sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet a possible national emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods
in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from
engaging in the production of rice.

Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purposes of national security and/or national emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly
authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies.
Moreover, it ordains that the buffer stocks held as a national reserve x x x be deposited by the Administration throughout the country under proper dispersal plans x x x and
may be released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies x x x. (Italics supplied.)

Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said
legislation. The means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in
said Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which
resources necessary for our national defense may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only during a national mobilization,9 which does not exist.
Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other laws provide from time to time.
Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work cited10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during war
time11 or when he has placed the country or a part thereof under martial law.12 Since neither condition obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that
respondents theory, if accepted, would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us
perpetually under martial law.

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because it redounds to the
benefit of the people. Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.

If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that
there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Armynot the civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance
with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejectedwe still live under a rule of law.

And then, the people are either producers or consumers. Nowas respondents explicitly admitRepublic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the
benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts. It is not for respondent
executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit importation
but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied with.

IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma

It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2) contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another
with the Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon
the signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on the one hand, and the aforementioned
contracts, on the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must be resolvedunder the American
jurisprudencein favor of the one which is latest in point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to foreign relations in the conduct of
which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines having already paid the price
of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in favor of the sellers of the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said contracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have
regarded the same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null
and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the
American constitutional system, enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in
the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law,
by indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case
at bar, for respondents not only admit, but, also, insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the
United States is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards
executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which
are fundamental in our constitutional setup and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or
validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it
conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma does not render this case academic. Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the conditions prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452
has two (2) main features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from our local planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits
importations of rice by the Government, and leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the proposed importationwhich has not been
consummated as yetis legally feasible.

Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have
contracted with the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied with without importing the commodity into the
Philippines, the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.

V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed
importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his
jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction
prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., concur separately.

Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:

Under Republic Act No. 2207, which took effect on May 15, 1959, it is unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any
point in the Philippines. The exception is if there is an existing or imminent shortage of such commodity of such gravity as to constitute national emergency in which case an
importation may be authorized by the President when so certified by the National Economic Council.

However, on June 14, 1962, Republic Act 3452 was enacted providing that the importation of rice and corn can only be made by private parties thereby prohibiting from doing
so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency. Republic Act 3452 does not expressly repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or modified those parts
thereof that are inconsistent with its provisions. The question that now arises is: Has the enactment of Republic Act 3452 the effect of prohibiting completely the government
from importing rice and corn into the Philippines?

My answer is in the negative. Since this Act does not in any manner provide for the importation of rice and corn in case of national emergency, the provision of the former law
on that matter should stand, for that is not inconsistent with any provision embodied in Republic Act 3452. The Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government agency,
may therefore still import rice and corn into the Philippines as provided in Republic Act 2207 if there is a declared national emergency.

The next question that arises is: Can the government authorize the importation of rice and corn regardless of Republic Act 2207 if that is authorized by the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine Army as a military precautionary measure for military stockpile?

Respondents answer this question in the affirmative. They advance the argument that it is the Presidents duty to see to it that the Armed Forces of the Philippines are geared to
the defenses of the country as well as to the fulfillment of our international commitments in Southeast Asia in the event the peace and security of the area are in danger. The
stockpiling of rice, they aver, is an essential requirement of defense preparation in view of the limited local supply and the probable disruption of trade and commerce with
outside countries in the event of armed hostilities, and this military precautionary measure is necessary because of the unsettled conditions in the Southeast Asia bordering on
actual threats of armed conflicts as evaluated by the Intelligence Service of the Military Department of our Government. This advocacy, they contend, finds support in the
national defense policy embodied in Section 2 of our National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), which provides:

(a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of every citizen. The security of the Philippines and the freedom, independence and perpetual neutrality of the Philippine
Republic shall be guaranteed by the employment of all citizens, witho ut distinction of sex or age, and all resources.

(b) The employment of the nations citizens and resources for national defense shall be effected by a national mobilization.

(c) The national mobilization -shall include the execution of all measures necessary to pass from a peace to a war footing.

(d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization
measures are prepared at all times. (Italics supplied)

Indeed, I find in that declaration of policy that the security of the Philippines and its freedom constitutes the core of the preservation of our State which is the basic duty of every
citizen and that to secure which it is enjoined that the President employ all the resources at his command. But over and above all that power and duty, fundamental as they may
seem, there is the injunction that the civil authority shall always be supreme. This injunction can only mean that while all precautions should be taken to insure the security and
preservation of the State and to this effect the employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action must always be taken within the framework of the civil authority.
Military authority should be harmonized and coordinated with civil authority, the only exception being when the law clearly ordains otherwise. Neither Republic Act 2207, nor
Republic Act 3452, contains any exception in favor of military action concerning importation of rice and corn. An exception must be strictly construed.

A distinction is made between the government and government agency in an attempt to take the former out of the operation of Republic Act 2207. I disagree. The Gov-:
ernment of the Republic of the Philippines under the Revised Administrative Code refers to that entity through which the functions of government are exercised, including the
various arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government, whereas a government instrumentality
refers to corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people. A government agency, therefore, must necessarily
refer to the government itself of the Republic, as distinguished from any government instrumentality which has a personality distinct and separate from it (Section 2).

The important point to determine, however, is whether we should enjoin respondents from carrying out the importation of the rice which according to the record has been
authorized to be imported on government to government level, it appearing that the arrangement to this effect has already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its
implementation. This is evident from the manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General wherein it appears that the contract for the purchase of 47,000 tons of rice from
Vietnam had been signed on October 5, 1963, and for the purchase of 20,000 tons from Burma on October 8, 1963, by the authorized representatives of both our government
and the governments of Vietnam and Burma, respectively. If it is true that our government has already made a formal commitment with the selling countries there arises the
question as to whether the act can still be impeded at this stage of the negotiations. Though on this score there is a divergence of opinion, it is gratifying to note that the
majority has expressed itself against it. This is a plausible attitude for, had the writ been issued, our government would have been placed in a predicament where, as a necessary
consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement to its great embarrassment and loss of face. This was avoided by the judicial statesmanship evinced by the
Court.

BARRERA, J., concurring:

Because of possible complications that might be aggravated by misrepresentation of the true nature and scope of the case before this Court, it is well to restate as clearly as
possible, the real and only issue presented by the respondents representing the government.

From the answer filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of respondents, we quote:
 The importation of the rice in question by the Armed Forces of the Philippines is for military stockpiling authorized by the President pursuant to his inherent power as
commander-in-chief and as a military precautionary measure in view of the worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam and, it may be added, the recent, tension created by the
Malaysia problem. (Answer, p. 2; italics supplied.)

During the oral argument, Senator Fernandez, appearing in behalf of the respondents, likewise reiterated that the imported rice was for military stockpiling, and while he
admitted that some of it went to the Rice and Corn Administration, he emphasized again and again that the rice was not intended for the RCA for distribution to the people, as
there was no shortage of rice for that purpose, but it was only exchanged for palay because this could be better preserved.

From the memorandum filed thereafter by the Solicitor General, again the claim was made:

We respectfully reiterate the arguments in our answer dated October 4, 1963 that the importation of rice sought to be enjoined in this petition is in the exercise of the
authority vested in the President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as a measure of military preparedness demanded by a real and actual threat of
emergency in the South East Asian countries, (p. 1, Italics supplied.)

x x x

It (the stressing of the unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia) is merely our intention to show the necessity for the stockpiling of rice for army purposes, which is the very
reason for the importation.

x x x

As it is, the importation in question is being made by the Republic of the Philippines for its own use, and the rice is not supposed to be poured into the open market as to affect
the price to be paid by the public, (p. 4, Italics supplied.)

x x x

What we do contend is that the law, for want of express and clear provision to that effect, does not include in its prohibition importation by the Government of rice for its own
use and not for the consuming public, regardless of whether there is or there is no emergency. (p. 5, Italics supplied.)

From the above, it not only appears but is evident that the respondents were not concerned with the present rice situation confronting the consuming public, but were solely
and exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for the future use of the army. The issue, therefore, in which the Government was interested is not whether rice is imported to give
the people a bigger or greater supply to maintain the price at P.80 per gantafor, to quote again their contention: the rice is not supposed to be poured into the open market
to affect the price to be paid by the public, as it is not for the consuming public, regardless of whether there is or there is no emergency,but whether rice can legally be
imported by the Armed Forces of the Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. The majority
opinion ably sets forth the reasons why this Court can not accept the contention of the respondents that this importation is beyond and outside the operation of these statutes.
I can only emphasize that I see in the theory advanced by the Solicitor General a dangerous trendthat because the policies enunciated in the cited laws are for the protection
of the producers and the consumers, the army is removed from their application. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the existence in the Philippines of three economic groups or
classes: the producers, the consumers, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the effect to equate the army with the Government itself.

Then again, the importation of this rice for military stockpiling is sought to be justified by the alleged threat of emergency in the Southeast Asian countries. But the existence of
this supposed threat was unilaterally determined by the Department of National Defense alone. We recall that there exists a body called the National Security Council in which
are represented the Executive as well as the Legislative department. In it sit not only members of the party in power but of the opposition as well. To our knowledge, this is the
highest consultative body which deliberates precisely in times of emergency threatening to affect the security of the state. The democratic composition of this council is to
guarantee that its deliberations would be non-partisan and only the best interests of the nation will be considered. Being a deliberative body, it insures against precipitate
action. This is as it should be. Otherwise, in these days of ever present cold war, any change or development in the political climate in arty region of the world is apt to be taken
as an excuse for the military to conjure up a crisis or emergency and thereupon attempt to override our laws and legal processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of
martial law on the pretext of precautionary mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state. One need not be too imaginative to perceive a hint of this
in the present case.

The Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion unanimously reached, is fully aware of the difficult and delicate task it had to discharge. Its position is liable to be exploited by
some for their own purposes, by claiming and making it appear that the Court is unmindful of the plight of our people during these days of hardship; that it preferred to give
substance to the niceties of the law than heed the needs of the people. Our answer is that, the Court was left no alternative. It had, in compliance with its duty, to decide the
case upon the facts presented to it. The respondents, representing the administration, steadfastly maintained and insisted that there is no rice shortage; that the imported rice
is not for the consuming public and is not supposed to be placed in the open market to affect the price to be paid by the public; that it is solely for stockpiling of the army for
future use as a measure of mobilization in the face of what the Department of National Defense unilaterally deemed a threatened armed conflict in Southeast Asia. Confronted
with these facts upon which the Government has built and rested its case, we have searched in vain for legal authority or cogent reasons to justify this importation made
admittedly contrary to the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. I say admittedly, because respondents never as much as pretended that the importation fulfills the
conditions specified in these laws, but limited themselves to the contention, which is their sole defense that this importation does not fall within the scope of said laws. In our
view, however, the laws are clear. The laws are comprehensive and their application does not admit of any exception. The laws are adequate. Compliance therewith is not
difficult, much less impossible. The avowed emergency, if at all, is not urgently immediate.

In this connection, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the Supreme Court has a duty to perform under the Constitution. It has to decide, when called upon to do so in an
appropriate proceeding, all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, executive order or regulation is in question. We can not elude this
duty. To do so would be culpable dereliction on our part. While we sympathize with the public that might be adversely affected as a result of this decision, yet our sympathy
does not authorize Us to sanction an act contrary to applicable laws. The fault lies with those who stubbornly contended and represented before this Court that there is no rice
shortage, that the imported rice is not intended for the consuming public, but for stockpiling of the army. And, if as now claimed before the public, contrary to the Governments
stand in this case, that there is need for imported rice to stave off hunger, our Legislature has provided for such a situation. As already stated, the laws are adequate. The
importation of rice under the conditions set forth in the laws may be authorized not only where there is an existing shortage, but also when the shortage is imminent. In other
words, lawful remedy to solve the situation is available, if only those who have the duty to execute the laws perform their duty. If there is really need for the importation of
rice, who adopt some dubious means which necessitates resort to doubtful exercise of the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army? Why not comply with
the mandate of the law? Ours is supposed to be a regime under the rule of law. Adoption as a government policy of the theory of the end justifies the means brushing aside
constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up with the end of freedom.

For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the Court.

Judgment rendered declaring that the Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the importation, that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that
importation is not sanctioned by law; and that, injunction must be denied.

Notes.Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, brought into play in the above Gonzales case, were subsequently construed and applied in Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Assn. v.
Feliciano, et al., L-24022, March 3, 1965. In this later case, it was held that Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation of rice during normal times, but when there is a
national emergency, Republic Act No. 2207 applies. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent with each other.
The Flag Law (CA. No. 138), also involved in the Gonzales case, was subsequently amended by Commonwealth Act No. 541 and Republic Acts Nos. 912, 4858 and 5183. Republic
Act 4858 authorizes the President to allow the procurement of supplies necessary for the rehabilitation of a project as an exception to the restrictions and preferences provided
for in Republic Act No. 912 and Commonwealth Act No. 138 (Cf. C & C Commercial Corp. v. NAWASA, L-27275, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 984). [Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA
230(1963)]
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

August 15, 1961

IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

BARRERA, J.:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified
petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and
finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the
Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to
practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:

(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not
be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this
Treaty, can practice their professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens
of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is
therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by
competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of
the latter. . . ..

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof,
which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar
examinations; and

(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws
and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant and appellant.

[No. 45893. July 13, 1938]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant and appellant.

1.NATIONAL DEFENSE; COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE; VIOLATION OF SECTION 60 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 1, REGARDING FAILURE TO REGISTER IN THE MILITARY
SERVICE.The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against section 2, Article II of the Philippine Constitution but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army
to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.

2.ID.; ID.; IN THE UNITED STATES.In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and
the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army.
This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend
the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U. S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution a
person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks
of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.

3.ID.; ID.; ID.In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense,
there is no right of property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our
case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it
more effective, in case of need.

4.ID. ; ID.; PECUNIARY ALLOWANCE TO ATTEND TO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES.The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them
from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all
events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (sections 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bataan. Araneta Diaz, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Severino P. Izon for appellants.

Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

AVANCEA, C. J.:

In these two cases (G. R. Nos. 45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No.
1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused
to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these
two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service in accordance with law, and
that the said appellants, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother
and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:

"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service."

The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would
be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. In the United States the courts have held in a series of
decisions that the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived
from that granted to Congress to declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a
consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty and property of the citizen. In the case of Jacobson vs Massachusetts (197 U.
S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests,
and even against his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case
of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its just sense, there is no right of
property to an office or employment. The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason of the actual existence of war does not make our case any different,
inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in
case of need.

The circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if
such circumstance exists, they can ask for deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family
responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the appellants. So ordered.

Villa -Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed. [People vs. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13(1938)]

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner, vs. JUAN Ruiz, respondent,

1.PROHIBITION; ISSUANCE OF WRIT FOR ACTS PERFORMED WITHOUT JURISDICTION.While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not
issue to restrain or control the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by
statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to "* * * inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial,
which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)

2.ID.; ID.; DIRECTOR OF POSTS.The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and
include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori
"without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction."

3.ID.; ID.; WRIT NOT CONFINED EXCLUSIVELY TO COURTS OR TRIBUNALS.The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is
not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching upon the
jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not
infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

4.CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES; RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.

5.ID.; ID.; POSTAGE STAMPS ISSUED UNDER ACT No. 4052.The respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of
Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature which appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and' printing of postage stamps with new
designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government."

6.ID.; ID.; ID.Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not
authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or
support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps
were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.

7.ID.; ID.; ID.The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials
concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people." The stamps as
actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the
location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress.

8.ID.; ID.; ID.While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The Government should not be embarrassed
in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide
Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to
prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance -of postage stamps commemorating the celebration
in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In
spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for
printing as follows:

"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by
1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to
this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly
restrain ministerial functions. While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other than
judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to "* * * inferior
tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without of in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person * * *." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to
"functions" in the statute are undoubtedly comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present case, which act
because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiori "without or in excess of * * * jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is
that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from
encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his
authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirtythird International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section
13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:

"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or
leprosarium."

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical
background of this principle in our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance
of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President
McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally
embodied in the Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy
both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the
Constitution, bind themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and recognized
implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human
affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored
"the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they
thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects
and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not
prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by constitutional
mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral
results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the
fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the
Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:

"No. 4052.AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR
TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:

"SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.

208

"SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any
portion of the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.

"SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.

"SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

"Approved, February 21, 1933."

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other
expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the
amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Govvernment". The printing and issuance of the
postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of
the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is
granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to be
sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of
special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. The stamps were not issued and
sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears
from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the
President of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps' as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2),
instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription
as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of
the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with
an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government.
We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by
its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb
any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution, care
should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution, But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of
the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Act No. 4052 grants the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as
may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the
postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality
of the step taken, a gap. exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Petition denied. [Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201(1937)]

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. The provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the
National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly
or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national
roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public
convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such
discretion is the making of the law.

2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom
of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31
Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be
made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into
slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn
from the residuum of liberty which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,
therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the
health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D.
Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications;
Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street,
from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to
11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate
and control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification
that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street;
that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the
recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for
a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused
to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in
the places above-mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets is unconstitutional
because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660,
700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction
therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs.
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts,
final on questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the necessity of the case."

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of
the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain provisions
controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be temporarily closed to
any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action
necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications."

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein
conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out
the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national
roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the
condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the
determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the
traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must
depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to
depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make the law; but it
can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to
stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R.
No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of
modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater powers by
the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain
rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful
interference with legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion. Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of
our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve
the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which
resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the
police power is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace
to the public health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization is bringing
within the police power of the state today things which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization, the rapidly increasing
population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of
the state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not so considered."

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-
being and economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social
justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium
in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should
be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

LEONILA LAUREL ALMEDA and VENANCIO ALMEDA petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EULOGIO GONZALES, respondents.

Agrarian Law; Right of redemption is available to tenants of sugar and coconut lands.In the precedential case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, this right was held applicable to
both leasehold tenants and share tenants. Presently, We are faced with an intricate question: is this right of redemption available to tenants in sugar and coconut
lands? We answer yes. x x x But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in the law denying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption
under the Code. The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of pre-emption
and redemption. In the same manner, coconut lands are exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration and tenancy system prevailing, implying that
in other mattersthe right of pre-emption and redemption which does not refer to the consideration of the tenancythe provision of the Code apply.

Same; Constitutional law; Under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with a social function.It is to be noted that under the new Constitution,
property ownership is impressed with social function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State, in the promotion of
social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property . . . . . . ownership and
profits. One governmental policy of recent date projects the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership of the
land they till.

Same; Right of redemption by a tenant of agricultural land must be exercised in accordance with law.In the case before Us, neither prior tender nor judicial
consignation of the redemption price accompanied the filing of the redemption suit. In fact, the Agrarian Court had yet to order, when it rendered its decision on
October 10, 1973 (complaint was filed on March 27, 1971), respondent-tenant to deposit the amount of P24,000.00 as redemption price with the Clerk of Court within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. The absence of such tender or consignation leaves Us, therefore, with no alternative but to declare that respondent-
tenant had failed to exercise his right of redemption in accordance with law.

Same; Jurisdiction; Courts of agrarian relations have jurisdiction over suits for redemption of coconut and sugar lands.Since this case involves a matter, controversy
or dispute arising from agrarian relationswhether respondent-tenant on sugar and coconut lands has the right of redemptionit is definite that the Agrarian
Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the same.

PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Dizon & Vitug and Cornell S. Valdez for petitioners.

Dennis B. Recon, Juanito Hernandez and Oseas A. Martin for private respondent.

MARTIN, J.:

This is an agrarian case. Three questions of consequential effects are raised: first, is there a tenants right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands; second, is prior
tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price a condition precedent for the valid exercise of the right of redemption; and third, does the Court of Agrarian
Relations have jurisdiction over complaints for redemption of sugar and coconut lands.

Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana, Maria, Sebastian, Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed
Angeles, on their 46,529-square land situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and coconuts. On September 30, 1968, the landowners sold the
property to petitioners-spouses Leonila Laurel Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing of the sale. The document of sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan, Batangas on March 27, 1969. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the redemption of the land in a complaint filed on
March 27, 1971, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.

Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state, among other things, that long before the execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar
Angeles first offered the sale of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the latter said that he had no money; that respondent-tenant, instead, went personally to the
house of petitioners-spouses and implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may not be taken in as tenant; that respondent-
tenant is a mere dummy of someone deeply interested in buying the land; that respondent-tenant made to tender of payment or any valid consignation in court at the
time he filed the complaint for redemption.

At the hearing of May 29, 1973 the parties waived their right to present evidence and, instead, agreed to file simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the
court would be based.

On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-tenant, Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00, the
said amount to be deposited by him with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision.

Petitioners-spouses excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian Court and appealed the ease to the Court of Appeals. On January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however,
affirmed the decision of the Agrarian Court. Denied of their motions for reconsideration, petitioners-spouses instituted the present petition for review.

We find the appeal to be impressed with merits.

1. Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844), no right of preference in the sale of the land under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-
farmer. The absence of this right freely opened the way to the landlords to ease out their tenants from the land by ostensible conveyance of said land to another
tenant who, in turn, sues for the ejectment of the first tenant on ground of personal cultivation. While many of these sales were simulated, the tenant is oftenly
evicted from the land because of the formal transfer of ownership in the land.1 On August 8, 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed, impressed with the
policy of the State, among other things, (t)o establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a
dignified existence of the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices; to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and
responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.2 More importantly, a new right was given to the tenants-farmers: the right of pre-
emption and redemption. It bolsters their security of tenure and further encourages them to become owner-cultivators.3 Thus, Section II provides: In case the
agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions. * * *
* The right of pre-emption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner on all
lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform. If the agricultural lessee agrees with the terms and conditions of the sale, he must give notice in writing to
the agricultural lessor of his intention to exercise his right of pre-emption within the balance of one hundred eighty days period still available to him, but in any case
not less than thirty days. He must either tender payment of, or present a certificate from the land bank that it shall, make payment pursuant to section eighty of this
Code on the price of the landholding to the agricultural lessor. If the. latter refuses to accept such tender or presentment, he may consign it with the court. As
protection of this right, Section 12 was inserted: In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. * * * *. The right of redemption under this section may be exercised within one hundred
eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the
sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.4 In the
precedential case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo,5 this right was held applicable to both leasehold tenants and share tenants.

Presently, We are faced with an intricate question: is this right of redemption available to tenants in sugar and coconut lands? We answer yes. Among those exempted
from the automatic conversion to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land Reform Code in 1963 or even after its amendments (Code of
Agrarian Reforms) are sugar lands. Section 4 thereof states: Agricultural share tenancy throughout the country, as herein defined, is hereby declared contrary to
public policy and shall be automatically converted to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. * * * *. Provided, That in order not to jeopardize
international commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation by the President upon
recommendation of the department head that adequate provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives marketing agreement, or similar other workable
arrangements, have been made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with the processing phases of such crops *
* * *. Sugar is, of course, one crop covered by marketing allotments. In other words, this section recognizes share tenancy in sugar lands until after a special
proclamation is made, which proclamation shall have the same effect of an executive proclamation of the operation of the Department of Agrarian Reform in any
region or locality; the share tenants in the lands affected will become agricultural lessees at the beginning of the agricultural year next succeeding the year in which
the proclamation is made.6 But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in the law denying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption
under the Code. The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the other rights conferred by the Code, such as the right of pre-emption
and redemption. In the same manner, coconut lands are exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration and tenancy system prevailing, implying that
in other mattersthe right of pre-emption and redemption which does not refer to the consideration of the tenancythe provisions of the Code apply. Thus, Section
35 states: Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee,
durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of this Code, the consideration, as well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by
the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended.

It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but
of society as well. The State, in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property . . . . . . ownership and profits.7 One governmental policy of recent date projects the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil
and the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till. This is Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers of private
agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estates or not shall be deemed owner of a
portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated.8

2. Nevertheless, while the Code secures to the tenant-farmer this right of redemption, in particular, the exercise thereof must be in accordance with law in order to be
valid. The timely exercise of the right of legal redemption, said the Court in Basbas v. Entena,9 requires either tender of the price or valid consignation thereof.
The statutory periods within which the right must be exercised would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the redemptioner is required to make an
actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed. The existence of the right of redemption operates to
depress the market value of the land until the period expires, and to render that period indefinite by permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either
party unable to foresee when final judgment will terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of two years (180 days under the new law) fixed by the
statute for making the redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize the value of his iand. No buyer can be expected to acquire it without
any certainty as to the amount for which least his investment in case of redemption. In the meantime, the landowners needs and obligations cannot be met. It is
doutful if any such result was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that effect.10 Bona-fide redemption necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender
of the entire repurchase price. The right of a redemptioner to pay a reasonable price does not excuse him from the duty to make proper tender of the price that can
be honestly deemed reasonable under the circumstances, without prejudice to final arbitration by the courts. It is not difficult to discern why the redemption price
should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made
seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to
accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary
prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law. While consignation of the tendered price is not always necessary because legal redemption is
not made to discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias Sugar Central v. Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253), a valid tender is indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of
course, consignation of the price would remove all controversy as to the redemptioners ability to pay at the proper time.11

In the case before Us, neither prior tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption price accompanied the filing of the redemption suit. In fact, the Agrarian Court
had yet to order, when it rendered its decision on October 10, 1973 (complaint was filed on March 27, 1971; respondent-tenant to deposit the amount of P24,000.00
as redemption price with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. The absence of such tender or consignation leaves Us, therefore, with
no alternative but to declare that respondent-tenant had failed to exercise his right of redemption in accordance with law.

3. Reliance cannot be placed upon the case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo12 as excuse for the failure to make the requisite tender or consignation in court, became the Court
did not rule therein that prior tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price is not required for the valid exercise of the right of redemption. In that case, the
spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Rosales were the share tenants of Policarpio Hidalgo on his 22, 876-sqaure meter agricultural land in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas,
while the spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo were his tenants on a 7,688-square meter land. Policarpio Hidalgo sold these lands without notifying his tenants;
and so, the tenants filed petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking the redemption of the lands under Section 12 of the Code. The Agrarian Court
dismissed the petitioners for the reason that the right of redemption is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants. On review, the Court ruled that
while the Agralan Court correctly focused on the sole issue of law-whether the right of redemption granted 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable to share
tenantsit (Agrarian Court) arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold
tenants only but not to share tenants. The Court said that (t)he Code intended * * * * to afford the farmers who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its
enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Codes proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those
other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire
the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. But,
the Court did not rule that tender of payment or consignation of the redemption price in court is not a requisite in the valid exercise of the right of redemption. In fact,
it said that (i)n the absence of any provision in the Code as to the manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code apply in
a suppletory character which, of course, imposes tender of payment or judicial consignation of the repurchase price as condition for valid redemption. Besides, it is
noteworthy that in that case petitioners-tenants possession of funds and compliance with the requirements of redemption were not questioned, the case having
been submitted and decided on the sole legal issue of the right of redemption being available to them as share tenants.

4. As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over suits for redemption, like the present case, of sugar and coconut lands. Section 154 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, states: The Court of Agrarian Relations shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over (1) all cases or actions involving
matter, controversies, disputes, or money claims arising from agrarian relations * * * *. Since this case involves a matter, controversy or dispute arising from
agrarian relationswhether respondent-tenant on sugar and coconut lands has the right of redemptionit is definite that the Agrarian Court has jurisdiction to hear
and decide the same.13 The Court of Agrarian Relations came into being for the enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relations between capital and
labor on all agricultural lands under any system of cultivation with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide and
settle all questions, matters, controversies, or disputes involving or arising from such relationship.14

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is hereby held not to have validly
exercised his right of redemption over his tenanted agricultural land. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Muoz-Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., reserved his vote.

Decision reversed and set aside.

Notes.A tenant can exercise the right of redemption and pre-emption with his own resources, notwithstanding that the National Land Reform Council has not yet
proclaimed that all government machineries and agencies in the region or locality envisioned in the Code are operatingwhich machineries and agencies, particularly,
the Land Bank were precisely created to finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for division and resale to small landholders, as well as the
purchase of the landholding by the agricultural lessee from the landowner. (Spouses Lacson & Basilio vs. Pineda, 40 SCRA 22).

The term agrarian relations embraces every situation where an individual provides his personal labor over a parcel of agricultural land belonging to another for the
purpose principally of agricultural production, and where the former, for his labor input and other sundry contributions, is compensated either in wages or a share in
the produce, or is obliged to pay lease rentals to the land owner. (Bicol Federation of Labor vs. Cuyugan, 65 SCRA 195).

Upon admission by a party of voluntary surrender of his landholding for a consideration in a sworn affidavit, he can no longer be allowed to spurn them or undo what
he had done. (Dequito vs. Llamas, 66 SCRA 504). [Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 194(1977)]
ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner vs. VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or
THE COMPENSATION APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of Labor, respondents.

Labor Law; Workmens Compensation; Controversion; Effect of failure to timely controvert claim for compensation.In La Mallorca v. Workmens Compensation Commission,
this Court explicitly held that the failure to controvert its fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a host of decisions in compliance with the clear
and express language of the Workmens Compensation Act. Any assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. The opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Backrach Motor
Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission. Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmens
Compensation Commission, such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more decisions had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmens
Compensation Commission to Abong v. Workmens Compensation Commission.

Same; Same; Drowning; Claim for compensation due to drowning of the deceased while in the actual performance of his duty is compensable; Reasons.The deceased in this
case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy, there was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was drowned while in the
performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he was lost at sea while in the employ of petitioner. Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained.
Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva was cited with approval Thus: The fact that the employee was found missing while on board the petitioners vessel MV
Caltex Mindanao became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956 when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent
Commission WCC Form No. 3 stating that the employee was lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10, 1956, and that it was controverting the respondents claim. In
the present case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted. Under the circumstances, the failure to grant the claim finds no justification
in law. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the deceased was drowned while in the actual performance of his work with the
shipping enterprise of private respondent.

Same; Same; Presumption of compensability, death of victim having arisen in the course of employment; Leaving of vessel by the deceased for a drinking spree is not a valid
defense against the presumption of compensability.Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of compensability under the Act once it
is shown that the death or disability arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time
again this Court has stressed such statutory provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of this year. An appraisal of the counter-affidavits submitted by
two employees of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard
required to negate the force of the presumption of compensability.

Same; Same; Findings of facts; Findings of facts of administrative agencies accorded weight.Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted
because of the doctrine that the findings of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due weight and consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v.
Workmens Compensation Commission finds pertinence: The claim merits scant consideration for this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not
supported by substantial or credible evidence.

Same; Same; Workmens Compensation Act; Constitutional Law; Constitutional provisions on social justice and protection to labor; Doubts in the interpretation of the
Workmens Compensation Act are resolved in favor of the claimant under the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor.This Court, in recognizing the right
of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the claimants. So it has been since the first
leading case of Francisco v. Conching, decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took effect. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmens Compensation
Commission is not amiss: There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the
Workmens Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor. Further: No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly
expressed legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary
frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy. Lastly, to quote from the opinion therein rendered: To be
more specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized.

PETITION for review of the judgment of the Ministry of Labor.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Felizardo R. Moreno for petitioner.

Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.

E. V. Espaol for public respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by petitioner, the mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ of
private respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that there was no controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was sought
to be minimized by the filing of a motion to dismiss based on the alleged absence of an employment relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that subsequently, in the
hearing of such claim, private respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel that the deceased, a fisherman, was in that ship,
undeniably a member of the working force, but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. The referee summarily ignored
the affidavit of the chief-mate of respondent employer to the effect that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my co-worker, was in the actual performance of his
work with said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty.1 The hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim
for lack of merit.2 A motion for reconsideration was duly filed, but in an order dated August 29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Bias F. Ople, denied such motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit.3 Hence this petition for review.

1. In La Mallorca v. Workmens Compensation Commission,4 this Court explicitly held that the failure to controvert is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we
have held in a host of decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of the Workmens Compensation Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility.5
The opinion noted thirty decisions starting from Bachrach Motor Co. v. Workmens Compensation Commission6 to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation
Commission.7 Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation Commission,8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more decisions
had been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmens Compensation Commission9 to Abong v. Workmens Compensation Commission.10 By the time
respondent Secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host of decisions that speaks to the same effect had been promulgated.11 It clearly, appears, therefore,
that the failure of the referee to grant the award ought to have been remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.

2. The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping Corporation v. Otadoy,12 there was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was
drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he was lost at sea while in the employ of petitioner.13 Nonetheless, the award for
compensation was sustained. Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva14 was cited with approval. Thus: The fact that the employee was found missing while on
board the petitioners vessel MV Caltex Mindanao became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November 1956 when the petitioner
transmitted to the respondent Compensation WCC Form No. 3 stating that the employee was Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10, 1956, and that it was
controverting the respondents claim.15 In the present case, there is evidence of the fact of death due to drowning. That was not controverted. Under the circumstances, the
failure to grant the claim finds no justification in law.
3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical to the effect that the deceased was drowned while in the actual performance of his work with the shipping
enterprise of private respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have relied on the presumption of compensability under the Act once it is shown that the
death or disability arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time again this Court
has stressed such statutory provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of this year.16 An appraisal of the counteraffidavits submitted by two employees
of private respondent and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate
the force of the presumption of compensability.

4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because of the doctrine that the findings of facts of an administrative agency must be
accorded due weight and consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmens Compensation Commission17 finds pertinence: The claim merits scant
consideration for this Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported by substantial or credible evidence.18

5. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the
claimant. So it has been since the first leading case of Francisco v. Conching,19 decided a year after the 1935 Constitution took effect. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc.
v. Workmens Compensation Commission20 is not amiss: There is need, it seems, even at this late date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the
high estate accorded the Workmens Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor.21 Further: No other judicial attitude may be
expected in the face of a clearly expressed legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice and protection to labor. It is easily
understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines, which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy.22 Lastly, to quote from
the opinion therein rendered: To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v.
Workmens Compensation Commission: As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason
to demand from the latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection. 23

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrella B. Ondoy is awarded the sum of P6,000.00 as compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00
for burial expenses; and P600.00 as attorneys fees. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against private respondent Virgilio Ignacio.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., is on official leave.

Petition granted.

Notes.The rule that only final orders and judgments of the Workmens Compensation Commission are reviewable by the Supreme Court may be relaxed where to do so would
be consistent with substantial justice. (Castro vs. Workmens Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 173).

An evaluation report not presented during the trial should not prevail over substantial evidence established during the hearing of the case. (Monsale vs. Republic, 80 SCRA 448).

The Bureau of Public School is considered the employer that must controvert the claim for workmens compensation. (Evangelista vs. Workmens Compensation Commission, 77
SCRA 497).

Acting on an employees sick leave application is tantamount to notice to employer of employees sickness. (Gallemit vs. Republic, 75 SCRA 382).

See annotations on Workmens Compensation Law, 32 SCRA 560; Significant Factors in the Adjudication of Workmens Compensation Cases, 48 SCRA 206; Workmens
Compensation Cases and the Requirements of Due Process, 51 SCRA 401; Employers Failure to Controvert Claim, 20 SCRA 195; Attorneys Fees in Workmens Compensation
Cases, 10 SCRA 701; Death Claim Prescriptive Period and Employers Right to Controvert, 75 SCRA 415; Vital Issues to be Resolved as to the Compensability or Non-
compensability of claims, 76 SCRA 163; The Presumption of Compensability, 76 SCRA 498; Physical Disability of Claimant Must be Service-Connected, 47 SCRA 509; and Wrong
Workmens Compensation Commission Decisions Inflict Suffering, 81 SCRA 688. [Ondoy vs. Ignacio, 97 SCRA 611(1980)]
Syllabus

A state law forbidding, under penalty, the teaching in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, of any modern language, other than English, to any child who has
not attained and successfully passed the eighth grade, invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State. P. 262 U. S. 399.

So held where the statute was applied in punishment of an instructor who taught reading in German, to a child of ten years, in a parochial school.

107 Neb. 657, reversed.

ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirming a conviction for infraction of a statute against teaching of foreign languages to young children in schools.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Due process does not allow a state to prohibit teaching children any language other than English.

Facts

Meyer, a teacher, taught German to a 10-year-old child. He was convicted of violating a Nebraska law that prohibited teaching any language other than English.

Opinions

Majority

James Clark McReynolds (Author)

William Howard Taft

Joseph McKenna

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Willis Van Devanter

Louis Dembitz Brandeis

Pierce Butler

Edward Terry Sanford

George Sutherland

The Fourteenth Amendment vision of liberty includes the right of a teacher to teach German and the right of parents to control the upbringing of their children as they see fit.
While the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging the growth of a homogenous population that can engage in discussions of civic matters, the means that it has chosen to
pursue this objective is excessive.

Case Commentary

This law probably derived from the First World War, when nationalist sentiment ran high. It could be constitutional during wartime or emergency to ban teaching foreign
languages in the interest of protecting American ideals.

U.S. Supreme Court Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)

Meyer v. State of Nebraska No. 325

Argued February 23, 1923

Decided June 4, 1923

262 U.S. 390

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

Syllabus

A state law forbidding, under penalty, the teaching in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, of any modern language, other than English, to any child who has
not attained and successfully

passed the eighth grade, invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and exceeds the power of the State.

So held where the statute was applied in punishment of an instructor who taught reading in German, to a child of ten years, in a parochial school.

107 Neb. 657, reversed.

ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirming a conviction for infraction of a statute against teaching of foreign languages to young children in schools.

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the District Court for Hamilton County, Nebraska, under an information which charged that, on May 25, 1920, while an instructor in
Zion Parochial School, he unlawfully taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond Parpart, a child of ten years, who had not attained

and successfully passed the eighth grade. The information is based upon "An act relating to the teaching of foreign languages in the State of Nebraska," approved April 9, 1919,
which follows [Laws 1919, c. 249.]:
"Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in any language other than
the English language."

"Sec. 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the eighth grade as evidenced by a
certificate of graduation issued by the county superintendent of the county in which the child resides."

"Sec. 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-
five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding thirty days for each offense."

"Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after its passage and approval."

The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the judgment of conviction. 107 Neb. 657. It declared the offense charged and established was "the direct and intentional teaching of
the German language as a distinct subject to a child who had not passed the eighth grade," in the parochial school maintained by Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congregation, a
collection of Biblical stories being used therefor. And it held that the statute forbidding this did not conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, but was a valid exercise of the
police power. The following excerpts from the opinion sufficiently indicate the reasons advanced to support the conclusion.

"The salutary purpose of the statute is clear. The legislature had seen the baneful effects of permitting foreigners,

who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their children in the language of their native land. The result of that condition was found to be inimical to our own
safety. To allow the children of foreigners, who had emigrated here, to be taught from early childhood the language of the country of their parents was to rear them with that
language as their mother tongue. It was to educate them so that they must always think in that language, and, as a consequence, naturally inculcate in them the ideas and
sentiments foreign to the best interests of this country. The statute, therefore, was intended not only to require that the education of all children be conducted in the English
language, but that, until they had grown into that language and until it had become a part of them, they should not in the schools be taught any other language. The obvious
purpose of this statute was that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state. The enactment of such a statute comes
reasonably within the police power of the state. Pohl v. State, 132 N.E. (Ohio) 20; State v. Bartels, 181 N.W. (Ia.) 508."

"It is suggested that the law is an unwarranted restriction, in that it applies to all citizens of the state and arbitrarily interferes with the rights of citizens who are not of foreign
ancestry, and prevents them, without reason, from having their children taught foreign languages in school. That argument is not well taken, for it assumes that every citizen
finds himself restrained by the statute. The hours which a child is able to devote to study in the confinement of school are limited. It must have ample time for exercise or play.
Its daily capacity for learning is comparatively small. A selection of subjects for its education, therefore, from among the many that might be taught, is obviously necessary. The
legislature no doubt had in mind the practical operation of the law. The law affects few citizens, except those of foreign lineage.

Other citizens, in their selection of studies, except perhaps in rare instances, have never deemed it of importance to teach their children foreign languages before such children
have reached the eighth grade. In the legislative mind, the salutary effect of the statute no doubt outweighed the restriction upon the citizens generally, which, it appears, was a
restriction of no real consequence."

The problem for our determination is whether the statute, as construed and applied, unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth
Amendment. "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been
definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36;Butchers' Union Co. v.
Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313;Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525; Wyeth v. Cambridge Board of Health, 200 Mass. 474. The
established doctrine is that this liberty may not be interfered

with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State
to effect. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to supervision by the courts. Lawton v.
Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 152 U. S. 137.

The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of
1787 declares,

"Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."

Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life, and nearly all the States, including
Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws.

Practically, education of the young is only possible in schools conducted by especially qualified persons who devote themselves thereto. The calling always has been regarded as
useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the public welfare. Mere knowledge of the German language cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful. Heretofore it has been
commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable. Plaintiff in error taught this language in school as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of parents to
engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the liberty of the Amendment.

The challenged statute forbids the teaching in school of any subject except in English; also the teaching of any other language until the pupil has attained and successfully passed
the eighth grade, which is not usually accomplished before the age of twelve. The Supreme Court of the State has held that "the so-called ancient or dead languages" are not
"within the spirit or the purpose of

the act." Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 187 N.W. 927. Latin, Greek, Hebrew are not proscribed; but German, French, Spanish, Italian and every
other alien speech are within the ban. Evidently the legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of
pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own.

It is said the purpose of the legislation was to promote civic development by inhibiting training and education of the immature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could
learn English and acquire American ideals, and "that the English language should be and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this State." It is also affirmed that
the foreign born population is very large, that certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are
thereby hindered from becoming citizens of the most useful type, and the public safety is imperiled.

That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain
fundamental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the
tongue. Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the
Constitution -- a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
For the welfare of his Ideal Commonwealth, Plato suggested a law which should provide:

"That the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child,

nor any child his parent. . . . The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a
separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be."

In order to submerge the individual. and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to
official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were wholly
different from those upon which our institutions rest, and it hardly will be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a State without doing
violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.

The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate.
Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every characteristic of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means
adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the State and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain enough, and no adequate
reason therefor in time of peace and domestic tranquility has been shown.

The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in
English, is not questioned. Nor has challenge been made of the State's power to prescribe a curriculum for institutions which it supports. Those matters are not within the
present controversy. Our concern is with the prohibition approved by the Supreme Court. Adams v.

Tanner, supra, p. 244 U. S. 594, pointed out that mere abuse incident to an occupation ordinarily useful is not enough to justify its abolition, although regulation may be entirely
proper. No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed. We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the
competency of the State.

As the statute undertakes to interfere only with teaching which involves a modern language, leaving complete freedom as to other matters, there seems no adequate
foundation for the suggestion that the purpose was to protect the child's health by limiting his mental activities. It is well known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom
comes to one not instructed at an early age, and experience shows that this is not injurious to the health, morals or understanding of the ordinary child.

The judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed. [See the separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, concurred in by MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND, in the next case, at p.262 U. S. 412, infra.]
U.S. Supreme Court

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

Pierce v. Society of Sisters

Nos. 583, 584

Argued March 16, 17, 1925

Decided June 1, 1925

268 U.S. 510

APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

Syllabus

1. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this Union rest excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.

2. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act (Oreg. Ls., 5259) which, with certain exemptions, requires every parent, guardian or other person having control of a child between
the ages of eight and sixteen years to send him to the public school in the district where he resides, for the period during which the school is held for the current year, is an
unreasonable interference with the liberty of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing of the children, and in that respect violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

3. In a proper sense, it is true that corporations cannot claim for themselves the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and, in general, no person in any business
has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power by the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage;

4. But where corporations owning and conducting schools are threatened with destruction of their business and property through the improper and unconstitutional compulsion
exercised by this statute upon parents and guardians, their interest is direct and immediate, and entitles them to protection by injunction. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33. P. 268 U.
S. 535.

5. The Act, being intended to have general application, cannot be construed in its application to such corporations as an exercise of power to amend their charters. Berea College
v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. P. 268 U. S. 535.

6. Where the injury threatened by an unconstitutional statute is present and real before the statute is to be effective, and will

become irreparable if relief be postponed to that time, a suit to restrain future enforcement of the statute is not premature.

296 Fed. 928, affirmed.

APPEALS from decrees of the District Court granting preliminary injunctions restraining the Governor, and other officials, of the State of Oregon from threatening or attempting
to enforce an amendment to the school law -- an initiative measure adopted by the people November 7, 1922, to become effective in 1926 -- requiring parents and others
having control of young children to send them to the primary schools of the State. The plaintiffs were two Oregon corporations owning and conducting schools.

MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

These appeals are from decrees, based upon undenied allegations, which granted preliminary orders restraining appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce the
Compulsory Education Act * adopted November 7, 1922, under the initiative provision of her Constitution by the voters of Oregon. Jud.Code, 266. They present the same
points of law; there are no controverted questions of fact. Rights said to be guaranteed by the federal Constitution were specially set up, and appropriate prayers asked for their
protection.

The challenged Act, effective September 1, 1926, requires every parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years
to send him "to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year" in the district where the child resides, and failure so to do is declared
a misdemeanor. There are exemptions not specially important here -- for children who are not normal, or who have completed he eighth grade, or who reside at considerable
distances from any public school, or whose parents or guardians hold special permits from the County Superintendent. The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at
public schools by normal children, between eight and sixteen, who have not completed the eighth grade. And without doubt enforcement of the statute would seriously impair,
perhaps destroy, the profitable features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value of their property.

Appellee, the Society of Sisters, is an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with power to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies
or schools, and acquire necessary real and personal property. It has long devoted its property and effort to the secular and religious education and care of children, and has
acquired the valuable good will of many parents and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and high schools and junior colleges, and maintains orphanages for the
custody and control of children between eight and sixteen. In its primary schools, many children between those ages are taught the subjects usually pursued in Oregon public
schools during the first eight years. Systematic religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church are also regularly provided. All
courses of study, both temporal and religious, contemplate continuity of training under appellee's charge; the primary schools are essential to the system and the most
profitable. It owns valuable buildings, especially constructed and equipped for school purposes. The business is remunerative -- the annual income from primary schools exceeds
thirty thousand dollars -- and the successful conduct of this requires long-time contracts with teachers and parents. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused
the withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise continue, and their income has steadily declined. The appellants, public officers, have proclaimed their purpose
strictly to enforce the statute.

After setting out the above facts, the Society's bill alleges that the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate
mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or
profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. And, further, that, unless enforcement of the measure is enjoined the corporation's business and property
will suffer irreparable injury.

Appellee, Hill Military Academy, is a private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged in owning, operating and conducting for profit an elementary,
college preparatory and military training school for boys between the ages of five and twenty-one years. The average attendance is one hundred, and the annual fees received
for each student amount to some eight hundred dollars. The elementary department is divided into eight grades, as in the public schools; the college preparatory department
has four grades, similar to those of the public high schools; the courses of study conform to the requirements of the State Board of Education. Military instruction and training
are also given, under the supervision of an Army officer. It owns considerable real and personal property, some useful only for school purposes. The business and incident good
will are very valuable. In order to conduct its affairs, long time contracts must be made for supplies, equipment, teachers and pupils. Appellants, law officers of the State and
County, have publicly announced that the Act of November 7, 1922, is valid, and have declared their intention to enforce it. By reason of the statute and threat of enforcement,
appellee's business is being destroyed and its property depreciated; parents and guardians are refusing to make contracts for the future instruction of their sons, and some are
being withdrawn.

The Academy's bill states the foregoing facts and then alleges that the challenged Act contravenes the corporation's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that,
unless appellants are restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening to enforce it, irreparable injury will result. The prayer is for an appropriate injunction.

No answer was interposed in either cause, and, after proper notices, they were heard by three judges (Jud.Code 266) on motions for preliminary injunctions upon the
specifically alleged facts. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed appellees against thedeprivation of their property without due process of law consequent
upon the unlawful interference by appellants with the free choice of patrons, present and prospective. It declared the right to conduct schools was property, and that parents
and guardians, as a part of their liberty, might direct the education of children by selecting reputable teachers and places. Also, that these schools were not unfit or harmful to
the public, and that enforcement of the challenged statute would unlawfully deprive them of patronage, and thereby destroy their owners' business and property. Finally, that
the threats to enforce the Act would continue to cause irreparable injury, and the suits were not premature.

No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must
be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.

The inevitable practical result of enforcing the Act under consideration would be destruction of appellees' primary schools, and perhaps all other private primary schools for
normal children within the State of Oregon. These parties are engaged in a kind of undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful and meritorious. Certainly
there is nothing in the present records to indicate that they have failed to discharge their obligations to patrons, students or the State. And there are no peculiar circumstances
or present emergencies which demand extraordinary measures relative to primary education.

Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of childrenunder their control: as often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has
no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.

Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense,
this is true. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243, 203 U. S. 255; Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 204 U. S. 363. But they have business and
property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and
prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S.
312; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197.

The courts of the State have not construed the Act, and we must determine its meaning for ourselves. Evidently it was expected to have general application, and cannot be
construed as though merely intended to amend the charters of certain private corporations, as in Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45. No argument in favor of such view has
been advanced.

Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no person in any business has such an interest in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power
of the State upon the ground that he will be deprived of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not against the exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protection
against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property. Their interest is clear and
immediate, within the rule approved in Truax v. Raich, Truax v. Corrigan and Terrace v. Thompson, supra,and many other cases where injunctions have issued to protect
business enterprises against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184; Nebraska District v. McKelvie, 262 U. S. 404; Truax v. Corrigan, supra, and cases
there cited.

The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future. If no relief had been possible prior to the effective
date of the Act, the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of impending injury by unlawful action is a well recognized function of courts of equity. The decrees below
are

Affirmed.

*"Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:"

"Section 1. That Section 5259, Oregon Laws, be and the same is hereby amended so as to read as follows:"

"Sec. 5259. Children Between the Ages of Eight and Sixteen Years -- Any parent, guardian or other person in the State of Oregon, having control or charge or custody of a child
under the age of sixteen years and of the age of eight years or over at the commencement of a term of public school of the district in which said child resides, who shall fail or
neglect or refuse to send such child to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year in said district, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and each day's failure to send such child to a public school shall constitute a separate offense; provided, that, in the following cases, children shall not be required to attend
public schools:"

"(a) Children Physically Unable -- Any child who is abnormal, subnormal or physically unable to attend school."

"(b) Children Who Have Completed the Eighth Grade -- Any child who has completed the eighth grade, in accordance with the provisions of the state course of study."

"(c) Distance from school -- Children between the ages of eight and ten years, inclusive, whose place of residence is more than one and one-half miles, and children over ten
years of age whose place of residence is more than three miles, by the nearest traveled road, from public school; provided, however, that, if transportation to and from school is
furnished by the school district, this exemption shall not apply."

"(d) Private Instruction -- Any child who is being taught for a like period of time by the parent or private teacher such subjects as are usually taught in the first eight years in the
public school; but before such child can be taught by a parent or a private teacher, such parent or private teacher must receive written permission from the county
superintendent, and such permission shall not extend longer than the end of the current school year. Such child must report to the county school superintendent or some
person designated by him at least once every three months and take an examination in the work covered. If, after such examination, the county superintendent shall determine
that such child is not being properly taught, then the county superintendent shall order the parent, guardian or other person, to send such child to the public school the
remainder of the school year."

"If any parent, guardian or other person having control or charge or custody of any child between the ages of eight and sixteen years shall fail to comply with any provision of
this section, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof, be subject to a fine of not less than $5, nor more than $100, or to imprisonment in the county
jail not less than two nor more than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court."
"This Act shall take effect and be and remain in force from and after the first day of September, 1926."
FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner, vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF POLICE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, respondents.

Habeas corpus; Youthful offenders; Who are included in the term youthful offender; A person charged with an offense but found to be a youthful offender could be
provisionally released on recognizance at courts discretion; courts whenever appropriate should give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code to implement the
constitutional mandate recognizing the vital role of the youth in nationbuilding.Petitioners counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the case on March 15,
1978. In the course of intensive questioning by the members of this Court, especially Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeenyear
old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, a youthful offender being defined as one who is over nine years but under eighteen
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. As such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of a court. x x x This Court, should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual and social well-being.

Same; Constitutional Law; Excessive Bail; Judges duty to protect the constitutional rights of the accused and to observe the constitutional ban against the requirement of
excessive bail upon an accused; Under martial law, immunities of the individuals are given much more importance.It must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that
they should always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the economic or social standing of the alleged offended party, as was intimated in this petition, the
rights of an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There is much more importance attached to the immunities of an individual during a period of martial law,
which in itself is a creature of the Constitution as a mode of coping with grave emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that there should be fealty to the
constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this excerpt from De la Camara v. Enage: Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes
meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States
Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the
accuseds presence at trial, and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive under the Eighth Amendment.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on February 23, 1973, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the
preliminary examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan,1 failed to meet
the strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause.2 He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted
the procedure followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive.3 It was in the amount of P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being
imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March 8,
1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character
of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the
amount to P8,000.00.

Petitioners counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15, 1978. In the course of intensive questioning by the members of this Court, especially
Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code.4 a youthful offender being defined therein as one who is over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.5 As such, he
could be provisionally released on recognizance in the discretion of a court.6 Accordingly, after the hearing, the Court issued the following resolution: Acting on the verbal
petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603, petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to
[order] the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B. Bandonil, who, in open
court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law.7 This Court should,
whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: The State recognizes the vital
role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being.8

Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause
was constitutionally deficient. Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the bench that they should always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to
the economic or social standing of the alleged offended party, as was intimated in this petition, the rights of an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There is
much more importance attached to the immunities of an individual during a period of martial law, which in itself is a creature of the Constitution as a mode of coping with grave
emergency situations. It is equally pertinent to state that there should be fealty to the constitutional ban against excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this excerpt
from De la Camara v. Enage:9 rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost
sight of that that United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, the sole permissible function of
money bail is to assure the accuseds presence at trial, and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive
under the Eighth Amendment. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this Court of March 15, 1978 as set forth above.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Notes.The reduction of the bail bond by the trial court will be justified when the accused is only of tender age. (Balantakbo vs. Tengco, 57 SCRA 489).

Any irregularity in the issuance of the order of arrest is waived by the posting of a bail bond. (Bermejo vs. Barrios, 31 SCRA 764).

The authority to order the release on bail or recognizance of an accused springs from the jurisdiction of the court over the accused and over the party detaining him. (Galang vs.
Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 234).

The trial court cannot require the accused to post a cash bond. (Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38).

o0o [Virtuoso, Jr. vs. Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, 82 SCRA 191(1978)]
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro,
Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista,
Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z.
Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara
Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho &
Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses
David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas
and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and
NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF
CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by
Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd.,
ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education
and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN
A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas,
Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C.
Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government,
HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life,
and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known
as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary
of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL
A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A.
RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and
unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem
that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general
welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws
and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within
the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing
stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-
a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically
opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political
activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals
has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the
sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as
presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:

(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and
on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and several others8 in their
personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and
several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers
(Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of
those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its
associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their
capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would
authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.35

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of
public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners
1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and
service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as,
but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the
"compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since
the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45

The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is
vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to
decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to
conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own
preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer
their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health
education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and
impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child
who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50

The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty.
Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted
leave to intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual
case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are
essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the
assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the
sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument.
On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on
some contentions of the parties.64

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the
country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and
devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under
Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug
Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal
element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth. 67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and for Other
Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or
limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made
"family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be
adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country
enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women,
including family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in
1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were
still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of
modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law
made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception
program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays
that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH
Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made
to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of
family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods,
devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the
compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The
OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the
constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern
Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that
the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating
measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of
judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a
fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of
the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their
functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a
harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of
competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the
executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be
subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort,
then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases
supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This
ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence
is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the
questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing
that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.
The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102

In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that
could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not
negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a
duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for
vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at
least, be heard on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure.105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are
but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of
Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of
government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper
as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.112

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights.
The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as
the prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency
Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect and general
interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s
tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a
constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion,
waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence
on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all.
After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to
life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of
either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that
most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65. 121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, 122 prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier,
the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning products
and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information
and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which
are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed,
remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as
skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it
was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the
overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.

The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in
the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum
which already has life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an
affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an
abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law
does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be
made accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due
consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford
deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins
from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not
prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or
belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act
To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which
prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the
need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of
contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No.
4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this
paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-
coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly
provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without
proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it
is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who
have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On the other side of the spectrum
are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v.
Judicial Bar Council:144

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life
begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of
developing into a being like its parents.145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival
and maturation under normal conditions.146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S.
Montano,147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation
thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a
legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From
their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:

Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes,
the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there
is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23
chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in
human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life.
Its nature is human.151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but
rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension
of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So,
Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it
has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact
that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel
towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take
the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the
provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of
the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a
question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the
millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the
unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to
ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives
which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been
fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be
unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation,
vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of
pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the
moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental
stages that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process
known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with
the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a
large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under
ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46
chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that
conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the
continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of
conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of
human embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is,
upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. 165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are
two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm
that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The
fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for
convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It
would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a
measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:

The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage,
when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is
replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing
reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health
care include the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.
2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of
their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the
highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule
or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or
amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any
drug or device that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that
the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does
not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation,
as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be
protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the
moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that
life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point
of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from
the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise,
cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply
will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded,
should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same
section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such
purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines
"abortifacient" as follows:

SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents
pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as
determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore,
be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive
will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an
abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL
will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is
sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR
should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive
would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.

2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing
various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared
to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of
myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it
were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research,
responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of
society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should
be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
(Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status
quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good
law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed
physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act
Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the
provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug
or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not
less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded,
dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance
with the provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole
country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget
allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices
will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health
must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination
which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption.
Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to
the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first
sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have
been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is
safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL
supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact
safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.

3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious
education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their
beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that
"contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and
denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious
freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee
is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical
practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he
refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in
Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2),
i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health
facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section
14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a
compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality.
Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex
education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's
freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief
may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that
endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education,
information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are
not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a
certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As
the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to
provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither
imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive
health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the
law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed
choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious
freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the
petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced
compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to
information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under
Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have
access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various
studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the
benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has
shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution
reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and
aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under
the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles
of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions
towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of
Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1wphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the
religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down
the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs
among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is
prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion
within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good.
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its
power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the
state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and
449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the
establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended
to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the
freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without
bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy
or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in
Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework
underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's
favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but
an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free
exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then
pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the
"immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to
accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag
then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test
in the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in
one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious
freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the
test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger"
tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the
benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The
"compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be
immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free
Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus
the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one,
for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's
interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording
protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state
interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood
only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does
have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to
violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State
shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved
by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also
provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their
religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of
women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into
consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and
communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and
the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility
between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives
is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government.
They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in
simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by
the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State demands that
one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221

The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same
conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately
refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of
the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective.
Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-
war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean
conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH
Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he
has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the
respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of
an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty
if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn
includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs
to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is
not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information
on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is
of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle
of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that
the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on
their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or '
indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or
will.

Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it
must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination
of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction,
a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform
reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue
of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers.
There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should
equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual
and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the
secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more
permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and
respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
RH Bill?

Congressman Lagman:

Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal
health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious
objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state
interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least
intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that
would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained
the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so
because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:

What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech
matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated
when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the
timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information,
product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive
use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate
"the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not
presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that
the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom,
it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious
objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and
motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A .
No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater
to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact,
reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive
health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the
provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through
programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education
on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an
atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of
unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although
there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a
denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced
referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm
on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided
that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable.
Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the
medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be
able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by
the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses
to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the
seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family
life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it
cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;

The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over
their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following
persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision
between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend
the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate
in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other
spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all
for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect
their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs
exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State,
which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in
all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of
the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy
guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc, 243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held
that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje
adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of
the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of
the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making
process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population
growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father
when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very
well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be
dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the
special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.

First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section
23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her
own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child.
Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited
to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life
of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical
procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above,
and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To
deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education
under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to
teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and
statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of
families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to
formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to
educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this
particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State
recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance
of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but
also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other
forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior;
gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed
provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it
becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of
the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a
"private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion
further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern
family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as
to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover,
in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of
the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts
and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a
"public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation
of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the
delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders
primarily health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the
Department of Health (DOH) .

Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the
obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods,
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and
exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily includes
exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to
include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect
information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive
health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the
requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is
intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in
accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs
and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary
target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in
the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The
test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with
absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as
to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in
addressing the health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore,
no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated
above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the
petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its
provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health
care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere
fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision.
On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the
academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the
assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually
amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care
service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the
government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves
the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the
public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right
altogether.264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render
pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly,
therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of
a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious
beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs
List (EDL).266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods.
It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said
Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:

"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and
fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with
regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health products, as
determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA
any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health
products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or
is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the
issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it
effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that
are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let
alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the
Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities.

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They
shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise
such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities enumerated herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on
the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National
Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied
as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the
training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed
as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national
government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.
Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH
Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the
powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would
benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the
notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.275

11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law.
Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent
rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the
past or present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case
cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law.
Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population
control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and
quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled
upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem
society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist
alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the
country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty
will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago ,
are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant
human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling.
For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied
workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would
be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious
objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying
what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the
policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for
the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the
delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive
measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-
abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions
which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive
health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector
in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null
and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354
which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their
parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE
PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents
FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MABILIN, MARIO, JR. and
MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by
their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Actions; Class Suit; The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines; All the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The
original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter
of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in
the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit.
Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generation to come.Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology.The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental
law.

Same; Same; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs duty to protect and advance the said right.Thus, the right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs dutyunder its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987to protect and advance the said right.

Same; Political Question; The political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies
already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review.

Same; Contracts; Non-impairment Clause; A timber license is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.Needless to
say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.A license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment
clause, cannot be invoked.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state.

FELICIANO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law; The protection of the environment including the forest cover of our territory is of extreme importance for the country.I vote to grant the Petition for
Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari of the dismissal order of the RTC of Makati, Br. 66.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of
inter-generational responsibility and inter-generational justice. Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth.

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial
Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff
is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared
for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion
by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the countrys virgin tropical rainforests. The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court. The minors further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn.4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs x x x such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000.00) hectares and is endowed with
rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool
which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals
that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the countrys land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-
six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the aquifer, as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu
and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at
one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annumapproximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the countrys unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipinos indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of
rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as
is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands and
agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earths capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which had led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the greenhouse effect.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film
evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the countrys land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the countrys land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about
3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that defendants predecessors have granted timber license agreements (TLAs) to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex A.

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hournighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays includedthe Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestration to the plaintiff minors generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffsespecially
plaintiff minors and their successorswho may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendants office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex B.

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLAs, to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLAs is an act violative to the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that
is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendants refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLAs is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendants continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLAs is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of

the State to

a. effect a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth and make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic). (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. protect the nations marine wealth. (Section 2, ibid);

c. conserve and promote the nations cultural heritage and resources (sic). (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);

d. protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. (Section 16, Article II. id.)

21. Finally, defendants act is contrary to the highest law of humankindthe natural lawand violative of plaintiffs right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the countrys vital life-support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendants abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendants claimthat the complaint
states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political questionsustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have
also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based
on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of mans inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on
the respondents correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the peoples right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretarys alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging
than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitutions non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public
interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an environmental right which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the
protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae. Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the
question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners recourse is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective
for a certain period of timeusually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due
notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled
without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to
bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned
interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant
petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers the rhythm and harmony of nature. Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not
hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judges challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order read as follows:

xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) feel short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In
fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of Separation of Powers of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to impairment of contracts abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.11

We do not agree with the trial courts conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed,
and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nations constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it
is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less
than self-preservation and self-perpetuationaptly and fittingly stressed by the petitionersthe advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to comegenerations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored
the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollutionair, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be prov
ided for impairment of environmental balance.12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the countrys forests..

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the countrys natural resources,13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192,14 Section 4 of
which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos. Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
countrys forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and use of the countrys natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It
is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy.(1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with
the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment. Section 2 of the same Title,
on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agencys being subject to law and higher authority.
Said section provides:

SEC. 2. Mandate.(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the States constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the countrys natural resources.

Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions
of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the environmental right of the
present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being.16 As its goal, it speaks of the responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations.17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENRs dutyunder its mandate and by virtue of its powers
and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that
the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,19 the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano,21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation
of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law
itself stands in disrepute.

After a careful examination of the petitioners complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-
heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly,
the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must,
nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the
authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of grave abuse of
discretion, which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson,23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: x x x.

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to impairment of contracts abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for
obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing
undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

x x x Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein x x x.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,25 this Court held:

x x x A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). x x x

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:26

x x x Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree
No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

SEC. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.27 cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a
law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp.,28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall
be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with
respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-
777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa (C.J.), No part; related to one of the parties.

Feliciano, J., Please see separate opinion concurring in the result.

Puno, J., No part in the deliberations.

Vitug, J., No part; I was not yet with the Court when the case was deliberated upon.

FELICIANO, J.: Concurring in the result

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the
last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the
environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what
the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a
function of petitioners claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject
matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of class here involvedmembership in this class appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the futureit appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take,
is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries
right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be
shown (prior exhaustion of administrative remedies), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate ca se.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon one specific fundamental legal rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Decision, p.
14). There is no question that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is fundamental and that, accordingly, it has been constitutionalized. But although it is
fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as specific, without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult
to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The list of particular claims which can be
subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of
oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and
inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after stripmining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of
fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy
in Article II, Sections 16 (the rightto a balanced and healthful ecology) and 15 (the right to health).

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled The Philippine Environment Code, is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more specific environment
management policies and environment quality standards (fourth Whereas clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management:

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine
Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the
particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned
above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that
Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to
be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal righta right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than
Article II (15) of the Constitutionthat is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly
render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court
should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory
policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well
be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge considerationwhere a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. x x x

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphases
supplied)

When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology and the right to health are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departmentsthe legislative and
executive departmentsmust be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLAs petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must
be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber
companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate
about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus
between petitioners specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The
doctrines set out in the Courts decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

Petition granted. Challenged order set aside. [Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792(1993)]
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO
A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN, respondents.

Administrative Law; Sec. 16 E.O. 192; A Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the office of DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution
Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not
prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of
Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, has assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931.
Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution
Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.

Same; Same; Adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the PAB except where the special law provides for another forum; LLDA as a special charter has responsibility
to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas.As a
general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum. It
must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry
out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces
of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant of
power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects
of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among others, to
pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations, and private
persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.

Same; Same; LLDA has the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under RA. 4850 and its amendatory laws.Having thus resolved the threshold question, the
inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. The irresistible answer is in
the affirmative.

Same; Same; Same.The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found
by the LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws, cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the
LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to make,
alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. (Italics for emphasis) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; The power to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is also expressly bestowed upon LLDA by E.O. No. 927, series of 1983.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan,
similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O.
No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power to
make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Same; While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a cease and desist order were not
expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental rule that
an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are
necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to
pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order is, perforce, implied Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a toothless
paper agency.

Same; Same; PAB has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the
anti-pollution laws of the country.In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al., the Court ruled that the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards
set by the anti-pollution laws of the country.

Same; Same; The relevant Pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive sovereign power to protect
the safety, health and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life commonly designated as the police power.Ex parte cease
and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders
has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control
statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. x x x

Same; International Law; The Philippines is a party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a
fundamental human right.As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared
policy of the state to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.

Same; The issuance of cease and desist order by the LLDA is the proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws.The issuance, therefore,
of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the. circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its
charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no
further legal steps would have been necessary.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the City Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:
The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose of the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a
pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy
elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R. No. 107542 against the City
Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition. Docketed
therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and
desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint2 with the Laguna Lake
Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the
health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test sampling of the leachate3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a
tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586,4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850,5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and
the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have
contaminated the sample during collection or handling.7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan,
Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of garbage and other waste matter at
the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan. However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting
held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau
Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991 order and issued an Alias
Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump
trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its
complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in
Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction.9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and
desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984,
otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts
of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court.10

On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite entitled Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio. The LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other,
should have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued in the consolidated cases an order11 denying LLDAs motion to dismiss and granting
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist
order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until further orders of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542,
seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution12 on November 10, 1992 referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without
giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the
meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn.
Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity of the cease and
desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary
restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that . . . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to
collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of a dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to
find alternative solutions to this garbage problem.

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution13 directing the Court of Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not
the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be
maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals.14 After the oral
argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 oclock in the morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or
his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its study and review of respondents technical plan with respect to the dumping of its
garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondents technical plan or a failure of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda
on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution.15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for
annulment of LLDAs cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is
within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has
no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of the LLDA was likewise
set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the
Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the
procedure and protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by
reference and made an integral part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the proper Court upon LLDAs institution of the
necessary legal proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining
order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA
under its enabling law.

On July 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order16 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the
Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code,17 to
determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from
the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law,
authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive
Order No. 927, series of 1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required to institute the
necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region
without previous clearance from the Authority.

The LLDA now assails, in this petition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory
and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested
with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:

SECTION 4. Additional Powers and Functions.The Authority shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the discharge of sewage,
industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof: x x x

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary to prevent or abate
pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing
rules and regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted
administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies
implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive,
necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to
entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly
endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by exposure to pollution caused by
such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially
addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987,18 has assumed the powers
and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB)
under the Office of the DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases.19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another
forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws
to carry out and make effective the declared national policy20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan21 with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant of power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region
from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is
mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region.22
In the instant case, when complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA,
the latters jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in
Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive
Order No. 927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the DENR, the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at
the meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
reopening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin,
Caloocan City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have
been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment laws,23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive
powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to make, alter or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution.24 (Italics for emphasis) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the
exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan,
similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O.
No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power to
make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a cease and desist order were not expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting
such authority need not necessarily be express.25 While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is
likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.26 In the exercise, therefore, of its
express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a cease
and desist order is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a toothless paper agency.

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, et al.,27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power
to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the
country. The ponente, Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive
and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of
such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general
welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. x x x

The immediate response to the demands of the necessities of protecting vital public interests gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies of the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state to
protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right.29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and
authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the
first instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d)
the power to institute necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the
Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA.

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the
government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or
orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudable objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs
of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell
further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government
of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano (Chairman), Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Note.The ex-parte cease and desist orders issued by the Pollution Adjudication Board are permitted under the Police Power of the State (Pollution Adjudication Board vs.
Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 112). [Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 292(1994)]
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIP-PINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ, GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO
RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA
J. PRESTOSA, EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. APRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310. July 14, 1989.*

ARSENIO AL. ACUA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FER-RARIS, DENNIS JEREZA, HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias
Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners, vs. JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744. July 14, 1989.*

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner, vs. HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCEA, and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777. July 14, 1989.*

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Constitutional Law; Elements of judicial inquiry.In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc. And as established by
judge-made doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are
first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.

Same; Agrarian Law; Powers of the President; Power of President Aquino to promulgate Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same authorized under Section 6
of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been
sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O Nos. 228
and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.

Same; Same; Pres. Aquinos loss of legislative powers did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when she possessed it; Reasons.The said
measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are
not midnight enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229,
were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be
in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the dissolution of
the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquinos loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and
as long as she possessed it.

Same; Same; Same; Appropriation Law, defined; Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure; Reasons.That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground
that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it
does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release
of public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

Same; Same; Same; Section 6 of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of 1988 (R.A. No. 6657) provides for retention limits.The argument of some of the petitioners that
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer
tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares: Retention Limits.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to
factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject
to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate
said homestead.

Same; Same; Same; Rule that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents.The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a
bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and
will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.

Same; Same; Same; Mandamus; Rule that mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R.
No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as a
general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the dischrage of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is
imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the
extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts by
mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the
great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction, mandamus will issue, in the first case to
require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause.

Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain; Police Power; Property condemned under Police Power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose is not compensable.There are
traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject.
In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of
equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety,
or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the
power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Cases at bar: The extent, retention limits, police power, deprivation, excess of the maximum area under power of eminent domain.The cases before
us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention
limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation,
it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the
title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the
police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Classification defined; Requisites of a valid classification.Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be
based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the
members of the class. The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of Equal Protection.Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment
of the Bill of Rights.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and method.It is worth remarking at
this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of
the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the Constitutional
goal.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Eminent Domain, defined.Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in
which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by
the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must
then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme
law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements for a proper exercise of power of eminent domain.But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means
absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are:
(1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Concept of political question.A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is
known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco: The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Just Compensation, defined.Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It
has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements of compensable taking.As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, there is compensable taking when the following conditions
concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal
authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must
be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Determination of Just Compensation, addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch.To be sure, the determination
of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay resolved a
challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be either the assessment of the
property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.With
these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative
of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution
removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said
section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmers hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in
the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money; Other modes of payment.Accepting the theory
that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value
constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the
land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and
other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are negotiable at any time. The other modes, which
are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits,
and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law repeats the requisites of registration but does not provide that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall
be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax purposes.The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable
any more as it appears that Setion 4 of the Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier
measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for
tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner
provided for in Section 16.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Recognized rule that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation.The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than those granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits; Case at bar.In connection with these retained rights, it
does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level,
especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition. Obviously, the Court
cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.

PETITIONS to review the decisions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

CRUZ, J.:

In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled
mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules
increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was
touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.

Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus, need the
sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.

Land for the Landless is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the
brooding centuries, it has become a battlecry dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people,1 especially the less
privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal, adding specifically that the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of
private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.2 Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to formulate and implement an agrarian reform
program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil.3

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights,
containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively
the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity
considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further
provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line
with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial law, to
provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners.

The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O.
No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.

Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from the President and started its own deliberations, including
extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.4

The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures
mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution. The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will
first be explained hereunder.

G.R. No. 79777

Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid
appropriation. In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President
of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v. Dulay5 and Manotok v. National Food Authority.6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights
is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal
protection clause is also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed
on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and
so violated due process. Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases of Chavez v. Zobel,7 Gonzales v. Estrella,8 and Association of Rice and
Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. the National Land Reform council.9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities conformably to the formula
prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge
to the order is premature because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners are also not proper parties
because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class
suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a final
ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was
the validity of the imposition of martial law.

In the amended petition dated November 22, 1988, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No.
6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.

A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1.83-hectare land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the
implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April
10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above-men-tioned enactments have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.

G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President.
Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the
transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be
annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection.

They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:

Agrarian Reform Fund.There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to
cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset
Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may
deem appropriate. The amounts collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Proclamation.

the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at
this time.

Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such
payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines shall compensate the landowner in
an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owners declaration of current fair market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to
certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council. This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several modes that
may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the
landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by the PARC.

The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters situation. There is no tenancy problem in
the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although
they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated.

A motion for intervention was filed on August 27, 1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar
planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987, another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland
owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.

NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the
amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the minimum
rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually
available.

Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent
domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own property.

The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for an amount equal to the government assessors valuation of
the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the landowner declares his own valuation, he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the land, in
violation of the uniformity rule.

In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for
the expropriation as explained in the whereas clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioners contention, a pilot project to determine the feasibility
of CARP and a general survey on the peoples opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its promulgation.

On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently treated. The
Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this
viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that
only money already in existence can be the subject of an appropriation law.

Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word initial
simply means that additional amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already
raised, Serrano contends that the measure is unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;

(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;

(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and

(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of Representatives.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding
under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to
him.

On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the
Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he
filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.

The petitioner now argues that:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.

(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.O Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of
powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of
the police power.

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under
Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring that:

Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment for the land.

is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small landowners in the program along with other landowners with
lands consisting of seven hectares or more is undemocratic.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still
unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution which reads:

The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.

On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21, 1972, the tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of
the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after that date should therefore be considered amortization payments.

In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be
useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondents acts.

G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or
intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-
farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of
more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And
even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975
(Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation
Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29, 1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners),
and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings
under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred
from invoking this right.

The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines.
Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of
mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.

In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover,
assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law
and the ruling of this Court in Taada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the
presidential decree.

I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to
annul the acts of either the legislative or the executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the doctrine of
judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a
blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the
President, or both, to insure that the Constitution would not be breached.

In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and voted on the issue during their session en banc.11 And as established by judge-made doctrine, the Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisities of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party,
and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.12

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of
them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by
the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases,14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were invoking only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and
ruled that the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. We have since then applied this exception in many other cases.15

The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a
law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the light to
probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation.

For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to make the hammer fall, and heavily, to use Justice Laurels pithy language, where
the acts of these departments, or of any public official, betray the peoples will as expressed in the Constitution.

It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that

x x x when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an
act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and
to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
judicial supremacy which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.16

The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we shall.

II

We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures involved in these
petitions.

The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to
modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.

The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was formally convened and took over legislative power from her.
They are not midnight enactments intended to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O.
No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they
continue to be in force unless modified or repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative simply because of the
dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquinos loss of legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by
her when and as long as she possessed it.

Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall
be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with its provisions.17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion fund in Section 2
of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in the CARP Law.18

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly,
however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the
primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury.19 The creation of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.

It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24,
this obviously could not have been complied with for the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation
measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it
were, both houses of Congress.

The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions.
This section declares:

Retention Limits.Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.

The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is
settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred
from the title.20

The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was called, had the force and effect of law because it came from
President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27 because the
former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos, whose word was law during that time.

But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement for publication as this Court held in Taada v. Tuvera.21
Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those enactments
successfully challenged in that case. (LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated November 29, 1976.)

Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially
by a specific department of the government. That is true as a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that
mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action
only but not specific action.

Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts
will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is purely
discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide
a particular question to the great detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave it jurisdiction, mandamus
will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken of the cause.22

And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to
the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a question of law.23

III

There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the
same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA,24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its
assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use.
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public
safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property
under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous aphorism: The general rule at least is that while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. The regulation that went too far was a law prohibiting mining which might
cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over
its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without
compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid exercise of the police power. He said:

Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an
abridgment by the State of rights in property without making compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is
not a taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The state does not
appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited
ceases to be noxiousas it may because of further changes in local or social conditionsthe restriction will have to be removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his
property as heretofore.

Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of
the former like the power of taxation. The employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted.26 As for the power of expropriation, Prof. John
J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police
power) makes the following significant remarks:

Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the police and eminent domain powers on different planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as
encompassing public acquisition of private property for improvements that would be available for public use, literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand, they
assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities, a point reflected in the Euclid opinions reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of
zoning. So long as suppression of a privately authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate public purpose, the pertinent measure need have afforded no
compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of governments involvement in land use, the distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today
government often employs eminent domain interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police powera trend expressly approved in the Supreme Courts 1954
decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domains public use test to match that of the police powers standard of public purpose.27

The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of
eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas declared:

If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nations Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the
way.

Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.

For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.28

In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court sustained the respondents Landmarks Preservation Law under
which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic
landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however, was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of
the right to use the airspace above it although other landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the Court
nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would undoubtedly mitigate the loss caused by the regulation. This fair
compensation, as he called it, was explained by Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights
accruing to the site prior to the Terminals designation as a landmarkthe rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to countenance
atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed, theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by
constructing or selling to others the right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites.30

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry
out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the
surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses.

The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that
although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being
questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of
the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an
objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted
to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars.31 To be
valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.33 The petitioners
have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to
those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put
otherwise, the interests of the public generally as distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means employed
are reasonbly necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform
have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to
achieve the constitutional goal.

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a
valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is
no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individuals
rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who
would deny him that right.

That right covers the persons life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added
protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.

IV

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties.35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain
will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the
public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle.
Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.

Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform
instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be
covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for the just distribution of all agricultural lands. In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner
prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence
of a clear showing that it has been abused.

A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice
Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco:36

The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which now includes the authority of the courts to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.37 Even
so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of private landholdings (even as the distribution of public
agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority,
which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be so.

In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company,38 it was held:

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3, 1909 that the entire St. Marys river between the American bank and the international line, as well as all of the
upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its entire length, was necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith, that
determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress x x
x.

As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself. No less than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the
reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131
and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injuction that the State adopt the necessary measures to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all
agricultural lands to enable farmers who are landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till. That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law itself, must be
binding on us.

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the
measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss.40 The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.41

It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands under the police power. We deal here
with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them to
the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.

As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi,42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entry must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial
enjoyment of the property. All these requisites are envisioned in the measures before us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as the compensation is a public
charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount.43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the
CARP Law provides that:

Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries.

Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives.
Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land

x x x the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to
submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed
submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.

To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.
EPZA v. Dulay44 resolved a challenge to several decrees promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be
either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the
Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court
inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it for final determination.

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the applicable
decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is
seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the proceedings
would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always
limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the
judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.

xxx

In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the same provision on just
compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to
appoint commissioners for such purpose.

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

xxx

It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of
justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert commissioners
have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.

A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable.
Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value
of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other
interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.

The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality
the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation.The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in
accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for
the land.

The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:

(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:

(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concernedTwenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.

(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectaresThirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and belowThirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by
the PARC;

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the
tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;

(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his successors-in-interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the
following:

(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the Asset Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial
institutions in the same province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;

(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by the government in private corporations;

(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bonds;

(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and
medium-scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding
balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;

(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools, and other institutions; (vii) Payment for fees
of the immediate family of the original bondholder in goverment hospitals; and

(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.

The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just
compensation therefor in less than money, which is the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:

The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.45 (Emphasis supplied.)

In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration,46 this Court held:

It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is
less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled, the market value being that sum of
money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such
property. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is also to the effect that just compensation for property
expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus

The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or
require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes.
When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in
cash.47 (Emphasis supplied.)

Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant standard of compensation.48
Just compensation for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not
within the power of the Legislature tosubstitute for such payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage.49 (Emphasis supplied.)

It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation
been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose.

What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed
their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation,
from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in
time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are as involved
in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness
today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for a just distribution among the
farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least to their deliverance.

Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our
present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this
assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way
but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial limitations of the government and had no illusions that there
would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to allow
such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire
amount of the just compensation, with other things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D. No.
27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they presumably agreed in principle.

The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorial agreement among the members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to fine tune the requirement to suit the demands of
the project even as it was also felt that they should leave it to Congress to determine how payment should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the
farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as progressive compensation and State-subsidized compensation were also proposed. In the end, however, no special definition of
the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission.50

On the other hand, there is nohing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the general sentiments and intention of the members on the
content and manner of the payment to be made to the landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.

With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not
violative of the constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered
institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the
goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of
the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmers hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.

Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other
things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that
the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance
in bonds and other things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are negotiable at any time. The other
modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.

Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided.
Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not begrudge us their
indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.

The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any more as

it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but
does not provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city assessor for tax
purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided
for in Section 16.

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain.

The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation.
Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:

Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnors title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioners report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.51

x x x although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually
made.52 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Kennedy v. Indianapolis,53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been
made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure,54 it was held that actual payment to the owner of the condemned
property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State albeit not to the appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v. Knight,55 the
Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the
authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that both on principle and authority the rule is x x x that the right to
enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the
owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him.
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,56 that:

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction
is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land
consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)

it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after
October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the land-owner.57 No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.

Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.

It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No.
6657. This should counterbalance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be
allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners with the

Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to
judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474 because
they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.

Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court
holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask
that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be sharper
instruments for the better protection of the farmers rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on
terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice Holmess words, it is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment, and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive
for it by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for so long, fettered his soul to the soil.

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We
may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and
helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only
the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last
can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and rebuild in it the music and the dream.

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant-farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein
prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings, all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Petitions dismissed.

Notes.Action for recognition as a lessee and to fix rentals not similar to action to determine if lessee had not been given his full share of harvest (Calderon vs. de la Cruz, 138
SCRA 173).

Denial of referral of case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform is in violation of the express mandate of P.D. No. 316. (Erfe vs. Fortun, 136 SCRA 552). [Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343(1989)]
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), respondent.

Constitutional Law; Taxation; Municipal Corporations; Municipal corporations have no inherent power to tax; their power to tax must always yield to a legislative act.The City
of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v.
Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it (Medina v. City of
Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent
power to tax (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power of control over local governments; if Congress can grant a municipal corporation the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are
mere creatures of Congress (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general
legislative powers (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over local governments (Hebron v. Reyes,
G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

Same; Same; Same; License Fees; The power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771, it is now
vested exclusively on the National Government.The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local
governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of franchise, licenses or permits was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. xxx
xxx Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue licenses or permits for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license
fees which is a consequence of the issuance of licenses or permits is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government; PAGCOR, being an instrumentality of the Government, is
therefore exempt from local taxes.Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. xxx xxx PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government. The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress
to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579) This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the
National Government over local governments. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to
touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can
regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them.
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics supplied). Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as a tool for regulation (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was
called by Justice Marshall as the power to destroy (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the
inherent power to wield it.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law.The power of local
government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until amended,
repealed or revoked (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes
and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The principle of local autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the state, it simply means decentralization.Besides,
the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas,
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio.
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an
imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (italics supplied)

Same; Equal Protection Clause; The equal protection clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as
the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because it legalized
PAGCORconducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices (p. 82, Rollo). We, likewise, find no valid ground
to sustain this contention. The petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law
does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21,
1989). The equal protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa,
43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA
827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some
gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized
under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. If the law presumably hits the evil where it is
most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) The equal protection clause of
the 14 th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as
evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically
exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 U.S. 2651).

Same; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, for a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA
30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to
declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore,
inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state
principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values being raised, is up for Congress to determine.

PADILLA, J., Concurring

Constitutional Law; Legislative Department; The legislative department must outlaw all forms of gambling, as a fundamental policy.Gambling is reprehensible whether
maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by the government out of legalized gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated by the
irreparable damage to the peoples moral values. Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against illegal gambling is fatally flawed and becomes
untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate. One can go through the Courts decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein as
gambling, which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known as prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible
were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and regulated by the government, in return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable
projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling,
as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be for the nation.

H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.

Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.

Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS, J.:

A TV ad proudly announces:

The new PAGCORresponding through responsible gaming.

But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) CharterPD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because

A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City governments right to impose taxes and license fees,
which is recognized by law;

B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local governments right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;

C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCORconducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;

C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p.
7, Rollo)

In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the new restored democracy and the peoples will as
expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a gambling objective and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and
Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).

The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of
Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D 1067-B also
dated January 1, 1977 to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Its operation was originally
conducted in the well known floating casino Philippine Tourist. The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure
and socioeconomic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.

Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise
or permitted by law, under the following declared policy

Section 1 . Declaration of Policy.It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:

(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the
Government.

(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of
amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of
additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers,
Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the countrys
existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of
gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)

To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charters repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.

It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned
P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, governments income share, the Presidents Social Fund and Host
Cities share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other sociocultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private
associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31,
1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D No. 1869. They allege that the same is null and void for being contrary to morals, public policy and public order,
monopolistic and tends toward crony economy, and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies
enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational
Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.

This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has
been described as the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government. (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146
SCRA 323).

As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle,
deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We
approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the
constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the
x x x thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are
indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis;
that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality
of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2 and 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA
734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer
Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)

Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.

Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other
branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has
brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each
of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by
the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.

In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino
although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and
ruled that the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of
procedure. We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.

Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of
its police power.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order
to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).

Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response
to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very
fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state to govern its citizens. (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power
of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the law of overwhelming necessity. (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It
is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of the
winds of change.

What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise
or permitted by law (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entitythe PAGCOR, was
beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social
impact projects and subjected gambling to close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR
and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at
the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.

Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the
principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local.

(2)Income and other taxes.(a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or
Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except
a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable
quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by
any municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).

Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:

(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337;
Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it (Medina v.
City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the
inherent power to tax (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress (Unson v. Lacson, G.R.
No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67;
Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(c) The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant
of franchise, licenses or permits was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:

Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise
to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Section 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national
government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant x x x.

Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue licenses or permits for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees
which is a consequence of the issuance of licenses or permits is no longer vested in the City of Manila.

(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter,
PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II,PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers, thus:

Sec. 9. Regulatory Power.The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the
Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation
and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of
the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
subjected to control by a mere Local government.

The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)

This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments.

Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the
instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a
way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accmplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p.
140, italics supplied)

Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the
power to tax as a tool for regulation (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the power to destroy (Mc Culloch v. Maryland,
supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.

(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on
Local Autonomy) provides:

Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation
as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (italics supplied)

The power of local government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an operative law until
amended, repealed or revoked (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its exemption clause remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to
impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited
in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an imperium in
imperio.

Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an
imperium in imperio . Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (italics supplied)

As to what state powers should be decentralized and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a
political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).

What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or
delegate it to local governments.

As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. x
x x In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107
So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 ibid, p. 548,
italics supplied)

Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because it legalized PAGCORconducted gambling, while most gambling are
outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices (p. 82, Rollo).

We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause equal protection of the laws. The clause
does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San
Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).

The equal protection clause does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G.
2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).

Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by

PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306
as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render
the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.

If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar,
25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can
to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid
down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651).

Anent petitioners claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and
privatization suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the governments policies then it is for the
Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.

The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within
the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).

On the issue of monopoly, however, the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII,
National Economy and Patrimony)

It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands
that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.

On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and
Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such, they are
basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to
the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate
could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v.
Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and
equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or
parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge
the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to
whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice,
role of youth and educational values being raised, is upfor Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521

Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte
and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This
Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in
this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to
this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and the
Congress.

Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends
not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have
lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may
have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and
even sex.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in the result with Justice Padilla.

Padilla, J., See separate Concurring Opinion.

CONCURRING IN THE RESULT

PADILLA, J.:

I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control,
and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to state policy. It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and
the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy.

The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall
within their authority, except only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This case does not involve such a factual
situation.

However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans the human personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates ones self-
respect, which in the long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and homes; it is an
antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national development. Gambling is
reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by the government out of legalized gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset
and negated by the irreparable damage to the peoples moral values.

Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against illegal gambling is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it
seeks to eradicate.
One can go through the Courts decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein as gambling, which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the
government, with the activity known as prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and regulated by the
government, in return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question,
I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive
implements such policy, the better it will be for the nation.

Petition dismissed.

Note.It is presumed that an act of the law-making body is valid and constitutional. (National Housing Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245.) [Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and
Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52(1991)]
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ,
ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Due Process in Administrative Proceedings; Access to Judicial Remedies; No one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts, unless the recourse
amounts to malicious prosecution.In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblyman against the petitioner arising
from what the former perceive to be obduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme
Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyan act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their
integrity and character as representative of the people, an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless
the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

Same; Autonomous Regions; Administrative Law; The autonomous governments of Mindanao are subject to the jurisdiction of our national courts.An examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which
the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that [t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. x x
x Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioners removal as Speaker.

Same; Same; Same; Decentralization; Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivision in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to
ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Decentralization of power involves an abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.

PETITION to review the decision of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII, Cotabato City.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner.

Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII,
representing Lanao del Sur.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission
on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid
election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook
Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:

The Committee on Muslim Affairs will undertake consultations and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent
and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.

The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to
constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines.
Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in
November as our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook x x x.

6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WIRE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioners advice, with the following assemblymen present:

1. Sali, Salic

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus

7. Palomares, Diego

8. Sinsuat, Bimbo

9. Tomawis, Acmad

10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.

8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen ContePresiding Officer

2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu

4. Aratuc, Malik

5. Cajelo, Rene

6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

7. Dagalangit, Rakil

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

9. Ortiz, Jesus

10. Palamares, Diego

11. Quijano, Jesus

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, Jerry

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names
of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the
designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelista as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in todays
session.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? The chair hears none and the said motions are approved. x x x.

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against.1

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that

(a) This Petition be given due course;

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987,
and on any day thereafter;

(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;

(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting; and

(e) Making the injunction permanent.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.2

Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, EXPELLING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner had caused to be prepared and signed
by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of
Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections . . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . .4 and that
such action of Mr. Limbona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,5
that the petitioner had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some
Assembly [sic],6 and that he had filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the
confines of the Assembly,7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become moot and academic.8

The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioners expulsion was done
purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.

On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the
Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the
opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that since November, 1987 up to this writing,
the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook.9 To be sure, the private respondents aver that [t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come
to Cotabato City,10 but that was so that their differences could be threshed out and settled.11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter
how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law.

While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be
heard,12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It
cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot
warrant expulsion.

In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be
abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyan act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of
the people,13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded,
to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian
to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are autonomous, the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their
acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national
courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 161815 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the
Decree established internal autonomy16 in the two regions [w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and
its Constitution,17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilites18 specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments
to undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions,19 except to act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government,20 which include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) National defense and security;

(2) Foreign relations;

(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing;

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;

(6) Air and sea transport;

(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;

(9) Immigration and deportation;

(10) Citizenship and naturalization;

(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and

(12) General auditing.21

In relation to the central government, it provides that [t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions xxx.22

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and
accountable,23 and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress.24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises general supervision25 over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgments with his own.27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.28

But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere
administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution.
Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.30
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.31

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of autonomy. On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government).32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter
sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction.
But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.

An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that [t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge
chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook.The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national
development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:

(1) Organization of regional administrative system;

(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;

(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;

(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;

(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;

(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law, including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in
the Autonomous Region.

The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in
compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs.

The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioners removal as Speaker.

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of
declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was
valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, [s]essions shall
not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,35 but it provides likewise that the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of
short intervals.36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is
the recess of short intervals referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that recess as
used by their Rules only refers to a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and
disunity.37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of short intervals. Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could
not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules.38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak
of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the recess, it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the recess called on the ground of good faith.

It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid recess in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not
apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.

In holding that the recess in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session
having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to
prevent the lawful meetings thereof.

Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the
event that he petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them.39

In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang
Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Corts, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., no part in the deliberations.

Petition granted.

Note.Due process is also required in administrative proceedings. (Doruelo vs. Commission on Elections, 133 SCRA 376.) [Limbona vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786(1989)]