A Research on the

EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE

Submitted by:
Michelle Alen Callo
Eleanor Marie Rojas
Block C
 Contents

Overview

Definition

Persons Protected

Classification

Requirements

Digested Cases

The Philippine Judges Association v Prado

Villegas v Hiu Chiong

People v. Vera

Sources
OVERVIEW

The Philippine Constitution provides in Article IV, Sec 1 nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws. This provision mirrors the American Constitution,
Amendment XIV, Section 1: No State shalldeny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Although it could be described as the last resort of constitutional arguments, the

guarantee is today nothing less than the single most important concept in the
constitution for the protection of individual rights.

Equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
embodied in a separate clause in Article III, Sec.1 of the constitution to provide for more
guaranties against undue favouritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in
general may be challenged on the basis of due process clause. Stated otherwise, if act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it
down is the equal protection clause.

Like the due process clause, the equal protection clause is also couched in indefinite
language. This is because the guaranty is also dynamic. The purpose of the intentional
ambiguity is the same as in due process to wit: to provide for more adjustability to the
swiftly moving facts of our changing society.

DEFINITION

Equal protection clause was simply stating that the states must apply the law equally and
cannot give preference to one person or class of persons over another.

According to a long line of decision, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

Substantive equality is not enough. It is also required that the law be enforce and applied
equally. Even if the law be fair and impartial on its face, it will still violate equal
protection if it is administered with an evil eye and uneven hands, so as to unjustly
benefit some and prejudice others.
PERSONS PROTECTED

Equal protection clause is available to all persons, natural as well as juridical. Artificial
persons, however, are entitled to the protection only as far as their properties are
concerned.

By constitutional reservation, certain rights are enjoyable only by citizens, such as the
rights to vote, hold public office, exploit natural resources, and operate public utilities,
although aliens are comprehended in the guaranty. Even ordinary statutes can validly
distinguish between citizens and aliens or, for that matter, even between or among
citizens only.

CLASSIFICATION

How does the court determine the existence of classification? Firstly, the law may
establish the classification on its face, i.e., by its own terms, it classifies persons for
different treatment. Secondly, the law may establish the classification in its application.
i.e., the government officials who administer the law are applying it with different degrees
of severity to different groups of persons who are described by some suspect trait.
Thirdly, the law may establish the classification in its purpose and effect, i.e., in reality,
it constitutes a device designed to impose different burdens on different classes of
persons.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws, that is,
that it operates on all the people without distinction. The law, in other words, is not
required to provide for equality among all persons if they are not similarly situated. What
the Constitution requires is equality among equals.

Accordingly, the legislature is allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the

classification is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all the people
without violating the equal protection clause.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other
in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.

REQUIREMENTS

The classification, to be reasonable, must conform to the following requirements:

A.) It must be based upon substantial distinctions.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. The distinction, to be
valid, must be substantial.
Example:
Weaker women may be treated tenderly by the law than men in specifying
work condition.
Citizens vis-a-vis Aliens upon entering a contract in our territory.
B.) It must be relevant to purpose of law.
The classification, even if based on substantial distinctions, will still be invalid if it
is not germane to the purpose of law.
Example:
Imported cars may be taxed at a higher rate than locally assembled
automobile for the protection of the national economy, but their
difference in origin is no justification for treating them differently when it
comes to punishing violations of traffic regulations.
C.) It must be limited to existing conditions only.
This is meant that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but
as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist.
Example:
The Supreme Court sustained the classification of non-christian tribes
prohibited from drinking liquor as it was intended to apply so long as the
difference between the two groups continued to exist. (people v cayat)
D.) It must apply to all the members of the class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally.
Example:
A sterile woman would still be entitled to the benefits of a law protecting
the reproductive functions of her sex, such as one prohibiting women
from work requiring them to be continuously on their feet.
DIGESTED CASES

The Philippine Judges Association v Prado

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

FACTS:

The target of the petition is Republic Act 7354 which was passed into law and thereby
stirred commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28, the franking privileges of the Supreme
Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from
them. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official
functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures.

In addition to this, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods
adopted prior it becoming a law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7354 is unconstitutional on the following grounds:

a. Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

b. Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.

c. Violative of the Equal protection clause

HELD:

a. The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that
it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not
required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every
single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to
mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.

b. While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences

between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question.
It may propose an entirely new provision. The court also added that said the bill in
question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President and Speaker of the House
of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by the President. Under the
doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress.

An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look
into the petitioners' charges. Both the bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government.

c. There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should be treated
alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not require
universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might
in fact result in unequal protection. What the law requires is equality among equals
according to valid classification. The postal service office claims that the expense from
judiciary with regards frank mails amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total.
The respondents are in effect saying that franking privilege should be extended only to
those who do not need it much at all but not to those who need it badly. The problem is
not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others especially where
theres no substantial distinction. The distinction made is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the judiciary and the grantees
of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Villegas v Hiu Chiong
L-29646, November 10, 1978

FACTS:
Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27
March 1968, then Manila mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said
ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to be employed within the City of Manila or to be
engaged in any kind of trade business without first securing a permit from the Mayor of
Manila.
On May 4, 1968, Pao Ho filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order for the prohibition of the enforcement of the said ordinance.
Judge Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being
null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 violates due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.

HELD:
The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any
criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held
that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayors action, expresses no purpose to be attained by
requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks
standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or
deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void and unconstitutional because it does not contain or suggest
any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been
granted to him by the ordinance. Also, it is tantamount to denial of the basic human right
of the people in the Philippines to be engaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true
that the State of the Philippines is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an
alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law, which includes
the means of his livelihood. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and
equal protection rule of the Constitution.
People v. Vera
G.R. No. L-45685 , November 16, 1937

FACTS:

Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration which was elevated to the Supreme Court which remanded the appeal to
the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation
alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office which denied the
application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition
to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to
place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a
system of probation to convicted person.

Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is
only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by
the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the
islands. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also
constitutes undue delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting
freedom, as in pardon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Probation Law violated the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.

HELD:

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:

This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.
This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer
may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that
convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right
to probation. Hence, it is in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

SOURCES:

Primary:

Constitutional Law

-Isagani Cruz, 2007 Updated Edition

Journal Article

- The New Equal Protection Clause, Santiago

Legal Dictionary

Secondary:

The Philippine Judges Association v Prado, 227 SCRA 703

Villegas v Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 270

People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56