G.R. No. 73886 January 31, 1989 this Court in G.R. No. 64334.
this Court in G.R. No. 64334. 9 In the meantime, on November 16, 1981, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow and several
JOHN C. QUIRANTE and DANTE CRUZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MANUEL C. CASASOLA, and ESTRELLITA C.
CASASOLA, respondents.
Quirante & Associates Law Office for petitioners.
R.S. Bernaldo & Associates for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the judgment' 1 of the former Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated on
November 6, 1985 in AC-G.R. No. SP-03640, 2 which found the petition for certiorari therein meritorious, thus:
Firstly, there is still pending in the Supreme Court a petition which may or may not ultimately result in the
granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages given by the respondent Judge. Hence
the award of damages confirmed in the two assailed Orders may be premature. Secondly, assuming that
the grant of damages to the family is eventually ratified, the alleged confirmation of attorney's fees will
not and should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.
WHEREFORE, in view of the grave abuse of discretion (amounting to lack of jurisdiction) committed by
the respondent Judge, We hereby SET ASIDE his questioned orders of March 20, 1984 and May 25, 1984.
The restraining order previously issued is made permanent. 3
The challenged decision of respondent court succinctly sets out the factual origin of this case as follows:
... Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a building contractor named Norman
GUERRERO. The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for short) acted as
bondsman for GUERRERO. In view of GUERRERO'S failure to perform his part of the contract within
the period specified, Dr. Indalecio Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued both GUERRERO
and PHILAMGEN before the Court of first Instance of Manila, now the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila for damages, with PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against GUERRERO for indemnification.
The RTC rendered a decision dated October 16, 1981. ... 4
In said decision, the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering GUERRERO and
PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P129,430.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P40,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00; ordering Guerrero alone to
pay liquidated damages of P300.00 a day from December 15, 1978 to July 16, 1979; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the
plaintiff the amount of the surety bond equivalent to P120,000.00. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by PHILAMGEN was
denied by the trial court on November 4, 1982. 6
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, PHILAMGEN filed a notice of appeal but the same was not given due course
because it was allegedly filed out of time. The trial court thereafter issued a writ of execution. 7
A petition was filed in AC-G.R. No. 00202 with the Intermediate Appellate Court for the quashal of the writ of execution and to
compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal. The petition was dismissed on May 4, 1983 8 so the case was elevated to
1
children as survivors. 10
On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees.
According to him, there was an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which
agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. de Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased,
namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be
computed as follows:
A. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante) shall be
P30,000.00.
B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs
of I. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation in an order dated March 20, 1984, despite an opposition thereto. It also
denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of confirmation in its second order dated May 25, 1984. 11
These are the two orders which are assailed in this case.
Well settled is the rule that counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services in
question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if
its amount were less than the minimum prescribed by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to
recover attorney's fees is but an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered ." 12 It also rests on the
assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services.
The rule against multiplicity of suits will in effect be subserved. 13
What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages
provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the
litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution. 14 Here, the
petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the creditors and the private
respondents as the debtors.
In filing the motion for confirmation of attorney's fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a
proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the confirmation of attorney's fees
is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court (G.R. No.
64834) "may or may not ultimately result in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages" awarded by
the trial court. This especially true in the light of subsequent developments in G.R. No. 64334. In a decision promulgated on
May 21, 1987, the Court rendered judgment setting aside the decision of May 4, 1983 of the Intermediate Appellate Court in
AC-G.R. No. 00202 and ordering the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila to certify the appeal of PHILAMGEN from
said trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 122920 to the Court of Appeal. Said decision of the Court became final and
executory on June 25, 1987.
Since the main case from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the
propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the
rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is
due to the client. Thus, it was ruled that:
... an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of
recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. 15
It is further observed that the supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that the recovery of the
amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies. It is subject to the condition that the fee shall be P30,000.00 in case of
recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, plus an additional amount in case the award is in excess of said P120,000.00 bond, on
the sharing basis hereinbefore stated.
With regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the heirs of the deceased. We are of the
considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the court a
quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of
recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein. The court below will be in a better position, after the entire case shall have
been adjudicated, inclusive of any liability of PHILAMGEN and the respective participations of the heirs of Dr. Casasola in the
award, to determine with evidentiary support such matters like the basis for the entitlement in the fees of petitioner Dante Cruz
and as to whether the agreement allegedly entered into with the late Dr. Casasola would be binding on all his heirs, as contended
by petitioner Quirante.
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds that the alleged
confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual
grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-
emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present recourse is hereby
AFFIRMED.
A.C. No. 528 October 11, 1967
ANGEL ALBANO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the
Philippine Bar. In a letter dated June 20, 1962 addressed to this Court, complainant alleged that during the Japanese occupation
his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147
of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had
been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves
represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her
attorney's fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document
showing that they as well as their co-plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-/3% of whatever could be
recovered whether in land or damages. A copy of such document was attached to the letter. The more serious charge was that the
signature therein appearing, purportedly that of the complainant, and the writing after the name of his mother were not made by
them. It was further stated that the Honorable Delfin B. Flores, then Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte,
submitted the document in question to the National Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as NBI) together with
samples of his genuine signature. A copy of the finding of the NBI was attached, the conclusion being that the questioned
signature "is NOT in the hand of the person whose sample signatures were received."
Complainant stated that being a poor man, he could hardly pay for the services of a lawyer to assist him in the disbarment
proceedings. He added the information that respondent Coloma "is a very influential woman in the province of Ilocos Norte" as
she was then a member of the provincial board. The prayer was for the "kind and generous help regarding this matter in order
that Atty. Perpetua Coloma may be made to stand before the bar of justice and disbarred from the practice of her profession a s a
lawyer."
2
In a resolution dated July 20, 1962, this Court required respondent Perpetua Coloma to answer the complaint. The answer came
in September 4, 1962. There was a specific denial of the allegation that the complainant was "a victim of injustice," respondent
alleging that the same was "untrue, unfounded and imaginary." While admitting that her services were contracted by
complainant and his mother and their co-plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 4147, she stated that there was a contingent fee of one-third
(/3) of whatever land and damages could be obtained for the plaintiffs. She denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing
and termination of such civil case as the record would show that she filed "more than twenty (20) papers and pleadings, went to
trial for several days and with the assistance of her sister, Atty. Oliva D. Coloma, obtained a favorable judgment in the Court of
First Instance for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs and filed with the Honorable Court of Appeals a thirty-five (35) page brief,
finished after careful, conscientious and exhaustive study and preparation." She attached a copy of the favorable decision
rendered by Judge Simeon Ramos of November 10, 1948;1 the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 13,
1950, confirming the above favorable decision, which was penned by the then Justice Gutierrez David; 2 and the dismissal of a
petition for certiorari to review such decision in the resolution of this Court of January 10, 1951. 3 Then came a reference to a
decision by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 10563-R, the complainant as one of the plaintiffs having appealed from an
order of the lower court, sustaining her lien upon the judgment as well as "her share of one-third (/3) of the lands adjudicated"
which according to the lower court however would require that the proper action be filed. In the opinion of the Court of Appeals
penned by Justice Sanchez, now a member of this Court, an evaluation of her service was made thus:
"Appellee served as plaintiffs' counsel for a period of about seven years. The record shows that she was diligent in her work.
That she had rendered valuable services cannot be doubted. In fact, the final decision favorable to plaintiffs is almost wholly the
result of her efforts. Literally, she gambled on the success or failure of the litigation. She was a member of the Bar since 1940.
Gauged by the familiar rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney, . . ., we feel, as did the trial court, that appellee is entitled to one-third of all the lands and damages recoverable by
plaintiffs under the judgment of the Court below."
She likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she served
"faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity." Her dismissal then, according to her, "was
made without cause and without the consent of herein respondent and only on June 18, 1951, when the undersigned had already
won the case for them in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals." In view of the failure of the new lawyers
retained to be at times available in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and as pleadings by opposing counsel were still
sent to her and out of loyalty to her former clients she continued "to render professional legal services to complainant and his
mother." Then came the allegation "that after the case was won in the trial court and in the Court of Appeals, complainant and
his co-plaintiffs stopped seeing the undersigned and even disowned their contract with her in the trial of [her] petition to record
attorney's lien which was granted by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals." Copies of the decisions of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, were submitted together with the answer. 4 She characterized as "false and unjust" the averment
of complainant "that the latter and his mother did not sign Annex 'A' because they really signed the instrument in the presence of
attesting witnesses who testified to and confirmed the signing of the same, which fact (of signing) was found and confirmed by
the trial court after and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, . . . ."
Then came the denial of the allegation of complainant that due to the seriousness of the charge, Judge Delfin B. Flores submitted
the alleged falsified document to the NBI for examination, the truth being that it was complainant who did so. She likewise
"specifically denies the authenticity and veracity of the alleged findings of the National Bureau of Investigation on Annex 'A'
because the signatures therein are genuine and have been found to be so by the trial and appellate courts after hearing the
testimony of the instrumental witnesses and comparing the signatures in Annex 'A' with signatures admitted to be genuine by the
complainant as well as upon the affirmation of complainant's sister and a co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. 4147." She then referred
to a rule which she considered well-settled in this jurisdiction that a question of whether or not a given document is genuine falls
within the general knowledge and competence of a judge who may inquire into its authenticity, the testimony of instrumental
witnesses sufficing, without the court being bound even by real experts. Nor could she agree that the complainant was a poor
man and could hardly afford the services of a lawyer because thru her efforts, he and his co-plaintiffs were richer "by about
P100,000.00 (P85,000.00 in realty and P15,000.00 in cash as damages) by winning Civil Case No. 4147 for them"
notwithstanding, which ingratitude had been her reward. Respondent also denied the insinuation that she was using her influence
as a board member. She stated that from 1944 to 1951, when she rendered her services for complainant, she was in private life,
not having been elected to the provincial board until 1959.
She concluded by saying that "during her practice of law for more than twenty (20) years [she] has strictly adhered to the ethics
of the profession and has always been guided by the principles of justice, fairness and respect for individual rights and that as a
public official, [she] has never used her influence to corrupt public servants or ordinary citizens, and all the people of Ilocos
Norte well know that complainant has no sense of justice, no integrity to preserve, no honor to treasure and no future to build.
On the other hand, the people of said province have faithfully supported [her] in her aspirations, first as councilor and then as
board member with overwhelming majorities. Said support speaks of vindication and means full faith and credit to [her]
integrity, ability and honesty." She further submitted as affirmative defenses the cause of action being barred by (1) prior
judgment and (2) by the statute of limitations. She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against her.
The matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated
September 7, 1962. On September 12, 1967, the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General was submitted. He asked
"that this case be dismissed." We grant such a plea.
In his report, the Solicitor General noted that in the investigation conducted on his behalf by the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte,
"only the complainant appeared."5 No evidence was introduced by him other than the NBI report on the alleged falsified
signatures. He manifested that all his evidence could be found in the records of Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte.6 Respondent on her part, according to the Solicitor General, "merely filed a manifestation to the effect
that the contract for attorney's fees in question had already been declared genuine and authentic by the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, the Court of Appeals, and this Honorable Court, in their respective decisions, copies of which were attached to her
answer; that said Contract was signed by petitioner and the instrumental witnesses thereto in her presence; and that she was
submitting the case on the annexes to her answer and the transcript of the trial of the proceedings on the recording of her
attorney's lien in Civil Case No. 4147. . . ."7
The facts as found by the Solicitor General in so far as the services of respondent as counsel for the complainant and his mother
were concerned reveal the utmost diligence and conscientiousness on her part. What she said in her answer was sustained in all
respects.
The express finding was then made by the Solicitor General that the question of the genuineness and due execution to pay
respondent her attorney's fees "had already been litigated by the parties in the course of the proceedings for the recording and
enforcement of the attorney's lien of respondent in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte; that the
plaintiffs in said case (one of whom is the complainant in this case) denied the genuineness and due execution of said agreement
Exh. 'A'; that they had full opportunity to present evidence in support of their said contention; that after hearing, the trial court
found said document to be genuine (pp. 43-48, rec.); and that on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said court likewise found said
document genuine . . ."8
On this point an extended excerpt from the decision of the Court of Appeals, the opinion being penned as noted by Justice
Sanchez, was quoted. Thus:
1. Exhibit A, the written contract of professional services, shows that appellee, as plaintiffs' attorney, is entitled to
one-third of all the lands and damages which may be awarded plaintiffs; otherwise, if the case is lost, then appellee is
not entitled to compensation.
That Exhibit A was duly executed is a proven fact. A witness to that document, namely, Sergio Manuel, testified that
the cross after the name of Delfina Aquino was placed by her and that the signature of Angel Albano, one of the
plaintiffs, is the genuine signature of the said Angel Albano. It is true that on the witness stand Delfina Aquino denied
that she placed a cross after the typewritten words "Delfina Aquino" in Exhibit A, and that Angel Albano likewise
denied his signature therein. Suffice it to say that this negative testimony will not prevail over the positive testimony
of appellee and her witness aforesaid. People vs. Bueno, 41 Phil. 447, 452; People vs. Ferrer, 44 O.G., No. 1, pp.
112, 115.
Further, appellee's evidence on this point is not limited merely to Exhibit A. The record shows that previous thereto,
there was a verbal agreement regarding said attorney's fee's. On this point, appellee finds corroboration in the
testimony of Rosario Lagasca, a blood relation of plaintiff and Silvina Guillermo.
3
Plaintiffs' evidence that in 1955 appellee undertook to take up the case of plaintiffs for a stipulated contingent fee of
P2,000.00 does not merit serious consideration. It does not seem probable that appellee would take the case on a win-
or-lose basis, i.e., for the sum of P2,000.00 in case the litigation is won and nothing in case of loss, because at that
time P2,000.00 was worth only a few gantas of rice. No lawyer in his right mind would accept such a miserable fee.
The following testimony of Felicidad Albano, one of the plaintiffs, given in an obviously unguarded moment,
stripped plaintiffs naked of the pretense that there was no such contract for one-third share as fees:
"Q Did you not authorize your brother, Angel Albano, or your mother, to give one-third (1/3) of all
the properties and damages?
"A We authorized them." Tr., p. 8, Galapon.
The court below, therefore, is correct in declaring that, after weighing and considering the evidence of both parties,
Exhibit A is genuine. (pp. 61- 62, rec.)9
The Solicitor General thus concluded that the finding of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and of the Court of Appeals
that the questioned document "is genuine, is now res judicata and bars complainant Angel Albano (one of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4147) from raising said question anew in these disbarment proceedings. As repeatedly held, the fundamental principle
of res judicata applied to all cases and proceedings, in whatever form they may be (Brillantes vs. Castro, L-9223, June 30, 1956,
99 Phil. 497; 60 C.J.S. 31, 267), and a party can not escape the bar of a judgment against him in a new suit on the same cause of
action by varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his cage (Wensel v. Surigao Consolidated
Mining Inc., 57 O.G. 6958; Vda. de Padilla vs. Paterno, G.R. No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961; 50 C. J., S. 98)."10
It was noted further that there was no oral testimony as to the alleged falsification, except the report of the NBI, lacking in
persuasive force in that it failed to state the reason or basis for its conclusion. The observation of the Solicitor General here made
is both pertinent and relevant: "The mere conclusion in the aforesaid NBI report that the signature of complainant Angel Albano
on the document Exh. A was not written in the same hand that wrote the genuine specimens of his signature, without any reason
or reasons supporting it, is, therefore, of little or no value in evidence and consequently, it cannot support the present charge of
falsification against respondent, apart from the fact that, as already stated, it is inadmissible on the ground of estoppel by
judgment."11 On the reasonableness of the contingent fee collected by respondent, the Solicitor General adopted the same view
found in the decision of the Court of Appeals, already referred to being part of respondent's answer, that such indeed was the
case.
The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and
his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to
renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she
had already won for them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the
authenticity and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ."12
He was of the opinion then that even if for purposes of said case the findings in judicial cases could not be considered binding "it
is safe to conclude, from a review of the evidence in said court proceedings taken together with the evidence before us in this
case, that respondent may be exonerated herein."13 With such a conclusion of the Solicitor General, this Court, to repeat, is in full
agreement.
Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting
solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy,
he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It
is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get
his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited
by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: "Reputation [in the legal profession] is a plant of tender About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G.
growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This Court, certainly is not averse to having such a risk minimized. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in Civil Case No. 26804. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement dated 22 April
Where, as in this case, the good name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard of the truth, an action 1983, which is partly reproduced hereunder:
prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is called for.

April 22, 1983

Certainly, this is not to say that if a case were presented showing nonfeasance or malfeasance on the part of a lawyer, appropriate
disciplinary action would not be taken. This is not such a case however. Respondent, as has been so clearly shown, was in no
wise culpable; there is no occasion for the corrective power of this Court coming into play. Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.
Mrs. Pacita Javier (as heir to the late Jose de Zuzuarregui)
Mr. Antonio de Zuzuarregui ( as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda. De Zuzuarregui)
WHEREFORE, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine Bar, is hereby dismissed.

Dear Sir and Madam:

G.R. No. 152072 January 31, 2006

This is to confirm in writing our verbal negotiations for us to represent you in the expropriation proceedings filed
ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N. PASTOR, Petitioners, by the National Housing Authority against your goodselves before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now the
vs. Regional Trial Court) and docketed as Civil Case No. 26804. Our representation shall also include the areas taken
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. over by the Ministry of Public Works and Highways which now formed part of the Marcos Highway at Antipolo,
GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and Rizal.
ANTONIO REYES, Respondents.

The areas affected are the following:

x----------------------------------x

xxxx
G.R. No. 152104 January 31, 2006

We shall endeavor to secure the just compensation with the National Housing Authority and other governmental
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ELIZABETH R. agencies at a price of ELEVEN PESOS (P11.00) or more per square meter. Any lower amount shall not entitle us to
GONZALES, JOSEFINA R. DAZA, ELIAS REYES, NATIVIDAD REYES, TERESITA REYES, JOSE REYES and any attorneys fees. At such price of P11.00 per square meter or more our contingent fee[s] is THIRTY PERCENT
ANTONIO REYES, Petitioners, (30%) of the just compensation.
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, JOSE B. H. PEDROSA, ROMEO G. ROXAS and SANTIAGO N.
PASTOR, Respondents. The other terms and conditions of our proposal are:

DECISION xxxx

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: 5. You are willing to accept NHA 5-year bonds as part payment up to 75% of the total compensation. In the event
of your desire to discount the bonds, we shall assist to have them discounted at 75% of its face value.

Before Us are two petitions for review on certiorari1 which were consolidated per Resolution2 of this Court dated 27 November
2002. The petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, seek the reversal and annulment of 6. Our lawyers fees shall be in the proportion of the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation. Likewise our fees
the Decision 3 and Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06 February 2002, respectively. The petitioners in are subject to 10% withholding tax.
G.R. No. 152104, the Zuzuarreguis, on the other hand, pray that the said Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals be
modified. Said Decision and Resolution reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 98, xxxx
Quezon City, dated 03 January 1994.

Should the above proposal be acceptable to your goodselves, kindly signify your formal acceptance as (sic) the
THE ANTECEDENTS space hereunder provided.

The instant cases had their beginnings in 1977 when the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings Very truly yours,
against the Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152104, for parcels of land belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal,
with a total land area of 1,790,570.36 square meters, more or less. This case was lodged before the RTC, Branch 141, (Sgd.) (Sgd.)
Municipality of Makati,5 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 26804 entitled, "National Housing Authority v. Pilar Ibaez Vda. SANTIAGO N. PASTOR ROMEO G. ROXAS
De Zuzuarregui, et al." Lawyer Lawyer
CONFORME:
6
On 25 May 1983, said case was ordered archived by Branch 141. (Sgd.) (Sgd.)

4
 ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR. PACITA JAVIER
In my behalf and
Makati, M. M., Philippines.
as heir to the late Pilar Y. vda. De Zuzuarregui as heir to the late Jose De Zuzuarregui 7

(Sgd.)
A Motion to Set Case for Hearing,8 dated 14 February 1984, was filed by Attys. Roxas and Pastor in Civil Case No. 26804, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.1avvph!l.ne+
praying that the case be revived and be set for hearing by the court at the earliest date available in its calendar.
(Sgd.)
The appropriate proceedings thereafter ensued. On 29 October 1984, a Partial Decision was rendered by Branch 141 in Civil ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI
Case No. 26804 fixing the just compensation to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter.
(Sgd.)
The NHA filed a Motion for Reconsideration 9 dated 23 November 1984 praying that the Partial Decision be reconsidered and set PACITA JAVIER10
aside, and a new one rendered lowering the amount of just compensation in accordance with applicable laws. Pending resolution
thereof, a Joint Special Power of Attorney was executed by Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique De Zuzuarregui and Pacita
Javier, in favor of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, viz:
On 22 November 1985, a Special Power of Attorney was executed by Beatriz Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes in favor of Attys.
Romeo G. Roxas, Santiago Pastor and Basilio H. Toquero, quoted as follows:

JOINT SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY

That We, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA
JAVIER, all of legal age, , do hereby appoint, name and constitute ATTYS. ROMEO G. ROXAS
and SANTIAGO PASTOR, to be our true and lawful attorneys to act in our names and on our
behalves to do and execute all or any of the following acts and deeds subject to our approval:
xxxx
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES, Filipino, of legal age, widow, and a resident
of E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City, Philippines do hereby appoint, name and constitute ATTYS.
ROMEO G. ROXAS, SANTIAGO PASTOR and BASILIO H. TOQUERO, to be my true and
lawful attorneys :

(2) To represent us in the negotiations for a compromise with the National Housing
Authority for our properties subject of the above case;
(3) To negotiate for and in our behalves for the settlement of the just compensation of our
properties payable in cash or in bonds;
(4) To sign and prepare all papers relative to the preparation of a Compromise Agreement
or any papers and communications which shall eventually bear our signatures; and
(5) That this Special Power of Attorney is enforce (sic) as long as ATTYS. ROMEO G.
ROXAS AND SANTIAGO PASTOR are our lawyers in Civil Case No. 26804 before the
Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch CXLI.
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto our said attorneys full power and authority whatsoever
requisite or necessary or proper to be done in or about the premises, as fully to all intents and
purposes as we might or could lawfully do if personally present, and hereby ratifying and confirming
all that our said attorneys shall do or cause to be done under and by virtue of these presents.
1. To represent me in the negotiation for a Compromise with the National Housing
Authority for my properties subject to my approval in CIVIL CASE No. 26804, entitled
"National Housing Authority vs. Pilar Ibaez de Zuzuarregui, et al., before the Regional
Trial Court, Makati, Branch CXLI;
2. To negotiate for and in my behalf for the settlement of the just compensation of my
properties payable in cash or in bond, subject to my approval;
3. To sign and prepare all papers relative to the preparation of a Compromise Agreement
or any papers and communications which shall eventually bear my signature;
4. To accept for and in my behalf payments for my properties after the Compromise
Agreement is duly approved by the Court, the actual receipts of which payments shall be
signed by me.
HEREBY GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said attorneys full power and authority whatsoever
requisite, necessary or proper to be done under and by virtue of these presents.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto set our hands this 26th day of August, 1985, in IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 22nd day of November 1985, in the

5
 CONFORME:

City of Manila, Philippines.

(Sgd.)ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS

(Sgd.)
(Sgd.)ATTY. SANTIAGO PASTOR12
BEATRIZ ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES11

On 10 December 1985, a Letter-Agreement was executed by and between Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., Pacita Javier and Enrique
De Zuzuarregui, on the one hand, and Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago Pastor, on the other. The said Letter-Agreement
reads:
December 10, 1985
Resolution No. 117413 dated 16 December 1985 was issued by the NHA stating that the Zuzuarregui property would be acquired
at a cost of P19.50 per square meter; that the Zuzuarreguis would be paid in NHA Bonds, subject to the availability of funds; and
that the yield on the bonds to be paid to the Zuzuarreguis shall be based on the Central Bank rate at the time of payment.
As a result of the aforesaid NHA Resolution, a Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA in
Civil Case No. 26804. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the
Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the
RTC, Branch 141, Makati, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.

Atty. Romeo G. Roxas On 27 December 1985, the NHA Legal Department, through Atty. Jose B. H. Pedrosa, released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, in
Atty. Santiago Pastor behalf of the Zuzuarreguis, the amount of P20,000,000.00 in NHA Bearer Bonds as "partial payment for several parcels of land
Makati Executive Center with a total area of 1,790,570.36 square meters located in Antipolo, Rizal." 14 On even date, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas delivered
Salcedo Village, Makati NHA Bonds to Antonio De Zuzuarregui in the amount of P15,000,000.00.15 On 04 February 1986, the amount
of P34,500,000.00 in Bearer Bonds was again released by the NHA to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis.16 On
Dear Atty. Roxas & Atty. Pastor: 14 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis issued a receipt 17 for receiving the amount of P30,070,000.00. This receipt included
the P15,000,000.00 given to them last 27 December 1985. Again on 17 February 1986, the Zuzuarreguis, through Beatriz
Zuzuarregui vda. De Reyes, issued another receipt for the amount of P450,000.00 in NHA bonds.18 The total amount in NHA
This will confirm an amendment to our agreement regarding your attorneys fees as our lawyers and counsels for the bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the
Zuzuarreguis properties expropriated by National Housing Authority covering ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE (179) records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas amounted to P30,520,000.00 in NHA bonds.
HECTARES, more or less, covered by TCT Nos. 138340, 85633 and 85634 and filed as Civil Case No. 26804.

Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total
We hereby confirm and agree that we are willing to accept as final and complete settlement for our 179 hectares expropriated by price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is,
NHA a price of SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter, or for a total of THIRTY MILLION FOUR HUNDRED undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
THOUSAND PESOS (P30.4 Million), all payable in NHA Bonds.

On 25 August 1987, a letter19 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor,
We also agree and confirm that for and in consideration of your services as our lawyers and counsels in the said expropriation demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10
case, we commit and bind ourselves to pay to you, your heirs or assignees-in-interest, as your contingent attorneys fees any and days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.
all amount in excess of the SEVENTEEN PESOS (P17.00) per square meter payable in NHA bonds as mentioned above.

Attys. Roxas and Pastor answered via a letter dated 21 September 1987 explaining their side of the story. They stated therein,
This Letter Agreement serves also as your authority to collect directly from NHA the amount pertaining to you as your among other things, that the amount that they got seems huge from the surface, but it just actually passed their hands, as it did
contingent attorneys fees. not really go to them. 20

This Letter Agreement hereby amends and supersedes our previous agreement regarding your attorneys fees as our lawyers and On 29 September 1987, a letter21 was sent by the Zuzuarreguis through Antonio De Zuzuarregui, Jr., to Attys. Romeo G. Roxas
counsels in the above-mentioned expropriation case. and Santiago N. Pastor, informing the latter that their services as counsels of the Zuzuarreguis (except Betty) in the expropriation
proceedings filed by the NHA, docketed as Civil Case No. 26804, was being formally terminated.
Very truly yours,
Apparently unsatisfied with the explanation of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, the Zuzuarreguis filed a civil action for Sum of Money
(Sgd.) ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR. and Damages on 14 November 1989 before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 98, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-4013, against
In my behalf as heir to the late Pilar I. vda. de Zuzuarregui the NHA, Jose B. H. Pedrosa, Atty. Romeo G. Roxas and Atty. Santiago N. Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis demanded that the yield on
the NHA bonds be turned over to them.
(Sgd.)PACITA JAVIER
As heir to the late Jose De Zuzuarregui After due hearing, a Decision 22 in Civil Case No. Q-89-4013 was rendered on 03 January 1994, dismissing the Complaint. The
dispositive portion reads:
(Sgd.)
ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI
6
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration[s], judgment is hereby rendered ordering the dismissal of the complaint II
against all the defendants; and, further ordering plaintiffs, jointly and solidarily, to:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT
1. Pay each of the defendants Romeo G. Roxas, Santiago Pastor and Jose B. H. Perdosa, the amount of P200,000.00, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, HEREIN PETITIONERS, CONCEALED TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, HEREIN
P200,000.00 and P100,000.00, respectively, as moral damages; RESPONDENTS, THE YIELD OF THE NHA BONDS 31

2. Pay each of the defendants Roxas, Pastor and Pedrosa, the amount of P50,000.00, P50,000.00, and P25,000.00, The Zuzuarreguis, petitioners in G.R. No. 152101, on the other hand, assign as errors the following:
respectively as exemplary damages;
I
3. Pay attorneys fees to defendants Roxas and Pastor in the amount of P20,000.00; and
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING TO PETITIONERS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF ONLY
4. Pay the costs of this suit. P12,596,696.425 AND NOT P17,073,122.70 MAKING A DIFFERENCE OF P4,476,426.28

A Notice of Appeal 23 dated 10 February 1994 was filed by the Zuzuarreguis. Subsequently, on 26 April 1995, the Zuzuarreguis II
filed their appeal brief with the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 45732.
THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE
A Decision 24 was eventually promulgated by the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals on 25 June 2001, reversing and COMPLAINT UNTIL FULLY PAID
setting aside the ruling of Branch 98, viz:
III
Therefore, We find that the amount of P4,476,426.275 is, in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the services rendered by
defendants-appellees. This amount has been arrived at by giving to defendants-appellees P2.50 per square meter of the
THE RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE HELD LIABE FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS
1,790,570.51 square meter expropriated properties of herein plaintiffs-appellants.
FEES

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision dated January 3, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, National
IV
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 98, Quezon City in Civil Case No. 89-4013 entitled "Antonio Zuzuarregui, Jr., et al. versus
National Housing Authority, et al." for "Sum of Money and Damages," is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-
Appellees Roxas and Pastor are hereby ordered to return to plaintiffs-appellants the amount of P12,596,696.425, the balance THE RESPONDENTS NHA AND JOSE B.H. PEDROSA ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH
from the P17,073,122.70, received as yield from NHA bonds after deducting the reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of RESPONDENTS ROXAS AND PASTOR32
P4,476,426.275.25
ISSUE FOR RESOLUTION
Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Motion for Reconsideration 26 on 25 July 2001. The Zuzuarreguis also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration27 on 30 July 2001, not having been satisfied with the award, while the NHA and Pedrosa filed their Motions for
Drawn from the above assignment of errors, it is patent that the principal issue that must be addressed by this Court is:
Reconsideration28 on 03 August 2001.

WHETHER OR NOT THE LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED 10 DECEMBER 1985, EXECUTED BY THE

In a Resolution dated 06 February 2002, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit all the Motions for Reconsideration.
ZUZUARREGUIS, AND ATTYS. ROXAS AND PASTOR, FIXING THE EXACT AMOUNT THAT MUST GO TO THE
FORMER, SHOULD STAND AS LAW BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
On 05 March 2002, Attys. Roxas and Pastor filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 29 assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 152072. Likewise, on 21 March 2002, the Zuzuarreguis filed their own Petition for Review on
THE COURTS RULING
Certiorari30 assailing the same Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 152104.1avvph!l.ne+

Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, contend in the main that the Zuzuarreguis are only entitled to the
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
amount of P17.00 per square meter for the 1,790,570.36 square meters expropriated by the government. This was, according to
them, embodied in the Letter-Agreement dated 10 December 1985, wherein the Zuzuarreguis agreed to accept the price
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, assign as errors the following: of P17.00 per square meter. Besides, Attys. Roxas and Pastor contend that the price of P17.00 was even way above the P11.00
that the Zuzuarreguis were willing to accept for their properties under the Letter of Engagement executed by the parties earlier
on 22 April 1983. Computed at P17.00 per square meter, they stress that the amount that should go to the Zuzuarreguis for their
I
1,790,570.36 square meters property should be P30,439,696.10, and that in fact the Zuzuarreguis have received P30,520,000.00.
The Letter-Agreement dated 10 December 1985 should thus stand as law between the parties. Since this Letter-Agreement,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE which was "as plain and simple as can be such that there is no need for any further construction," already fixed the amount that
LETTER-AGREEMENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1985 CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND AS THE LAW BETWEEN would go to the Zuzuarreguis (P17.00 per square meter), then it should be so.
THE PARTIES; and

7
Attys. Roxas and Pastor further assert that the receipts issued by the Zuzuarreguis dated 14 February 1986 and 17 February 1986 The cause is the legal service that was provided by Attys. Roxas and Pastor. In general, cause is the why of the contract or the
indicated that the amounts received by the latter were in "full and final payment" for the subject properties. essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract.40

The NHA, for its part, insists that there was no conspiracy between Attys. Roxas and Pastor on the one hand, and the NHA and It is basic that a contract is the law between the parties. 41 Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
Atty. Pedrosa on the other, on the application of yields from NHA bonds. 33 The Zuzuarreguis, according to the NHA, "miserably contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. Unless the stipulations in a contract are contrary to law, mora ls,
failed to substantiate and establish conspiracy" between them. good customs, public order or public policy, the same are binding as between the parties. 42

The Zuzuarreguis, for their part, though they were triumphant in the Court of Appeals, insist that the amounts awarded them
were not enough. According to them, the P12,596,696.425 awarded by the Court of Appeals was not correct. They should have
been awarded the amount of P17,073,122.70. Quoting the Zuzuarreguis:
Respondents Roxas and Pastor retained for themselves the amount of P3,980,000.00 which represented the agreed attorneys
fees of Roxas and Pastor at P2.50 per square meter. The amount of P20,000,000.00 representing the yield of all the bearer bonds
was, in the words of the Court of Appeals, "deliberately hidden" by respondents Roxas and Pastor from petitioners. By
mathematical computation, the P20,000,000.00 yield should be proportionately divided at the ratio of P17.00 (petitioners) and
P2.50 (share of respondents Roxas and Pastor). Following this ratio of division, of the P20,000,000.00 yield, P17,073,122.70
should pertain to petitioners and the balance of P2,926,877.30 to respondents Roxas and Pastor. Add this amount to the total of
P3,980,000.00 at the agreed rate of P2.50 per square meter, the total attorneys fees of respondents Roxas and Pastor should be
P6,906,877.30, not bad, again in the words of the Court of Appeals, for handling "a simple expropriation case which ended up in
a compromise agreement." It was, therefore, in error to still deduct the amount of P4,476,426.28 from petitioners share in the
yield in the amount of P17,073,122.70 leaving then only P12,596,696.42.
In Licudan v. Court of Appeals,43 we did not allow the Contract for Professional Services between the counsel and his client to
stand as the law between them as the stipulation for the lawyers compensation was unconscionable and unreasonable. We said:
Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio
Licudan for himself and on behalf of his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo Licudan
who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing consent to the said contract, we cannot allow the said
contract to stand as the law between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the presence of a contract for
professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but
admits an exception that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public
order.44
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees 45 for their professional services. It is a
deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, viz:

What was done, however, is that the product of 1,790,570.36 sq m. (area of the expropriated land of petitioners) and P2.50 which
13. Contingent Fees.
is 4,476,426.28 was again deducted from the P17,073,122.70 which is the corresponding share of the petitioners out of the total
yield of P20,000,000.00. If this were a criminal case, petitioners were being sentenced twice for the same offense. 34
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including
the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
The Zuzuarreguis further insist that legal interest on the amount of P17,073,122.70 be imposed from the date of the filing of the
complaint, including moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 46 viz:
We sustain the Court of Appeals, but with modification in the computation.
CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service.35 Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into, Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present.36
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
Under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, there are three essential requisites which must concur in order to give rise to a binding
contract: (1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
obligation which is established. 37

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

All these requisites were present in the execution of the Letter-Agreement.

(d) The skill demanded;

Consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract.38 The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the
Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters which they had (e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-
Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis themselves. 39
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;

The second requisite is the object certain. The objects in this case are twofold. One is the money that will go to the Zuzuarreguis
(P17.00 per square meter), and two, the money that will go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor (any and all amount in excess of P17.00 (g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
per square meter). There was certainty as to the amount that will go to the Zuzuarreguis, and there was likewise certainty as to
what amount will go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor. (h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

8
 (i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the
case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness, 47such that under Canon 20 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the amount of
attorneys fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable. 48 Thus, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court partly states:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for services shall control
the amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. 49 It becomes axiomatic
therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees stipulated by the parties
is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.50
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just
compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to
P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it
did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction
is, therefore, in order. This is in accordance with our ruling in the earlier case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo51, where we reduced the
amount of attorneys fees from sixty percent (60%) to fifteen percent (15%), for being excessive and unreasonable.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this
Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just compensation
paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.1avvph!l.ne+
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on
the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. The amount of P17.00 that should go to
the Zuzuarreguis represents 87.18% of the P19.50 per square meter just compensation, The P2.50 per square meter that was to
go to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, represents 12.82%.
The Zuzuarreguis are entitled to the yield equal to 87.18% of the P19,583,878.00, while Attys. Roxas and Pastor are entitled to
12.82% of said amount. The amount corresponding to 87.17% of P19,583,878.00 is P17,073,224.84. This is the yield that the
Zuzuarreguis are entitled to. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other hand, are entitled to P2,510,653.16.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or
actually earned attorneys fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75 (P4,476,425.59 + P2,510,653.16).
The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor to the Zuzuarreguis. They can take this out
from the yield in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they have appropriated for themselves.
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no direct showing of bad faith on the
part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only necessary that
it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable, which we have already done.
9
We likewise cannot hold the NHA and Atty. Pedrosa jointly and severally liable to the Zuzuarreguis for there is no evidence to
show conspiracy between them.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 25 June
2001 and 06 February 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED but with the MODIFICATION that Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor are hereby ordered to return to the Zuzuarreguis the amount of P17,073,224.84. No costs.
G.R. No. 183385 February 13, 2009
EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. MASMUD), Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) and ATTY. ROLANDO B. GO, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated October 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated
June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmuds (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), filed a
complaint3 against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability
benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. Alexander engaged the
services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel.
In consideration of Atty. Gos legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorneys fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty
percent (20%) of total monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It was likewise
agreed that any award of attorneys fees shall pertain to respondents law firm as compensation.
On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. The dispositive
portion of the decision, as quoted in the CA Decision, reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is rendered finding the [First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas)
S.A.] jointly and severally liable to pay [Alexanders] total permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 and his
sickness allowance of US$2,348.00, both in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment; and to
pay further the amount of 200,000.00 as moral damages, 100,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorneys fees equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.
[Alexanders] claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.4
Alexanders employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). During the pendency of the
proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyers fees to Evangelina, Atty. Go caused
her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered a Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexanders
employer. The employer subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same in an Order dated October
26, 2004.
On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification. The award of moral and exemplary damages
was deleted.5 Alexanders employers filed a petition for certiorari6 before this Court. On February 6, 2006, the Court issued a
Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.
Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go moved for the execution of the NLRC decision,
which was later granted by the LA. The surety bond of the employer was garnished. Upon motion of Atty. Go, the surety
company delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check amounting to 3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty.
Go moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina.
On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of 3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said
amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of 680,000.00.
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorneys lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their
contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the amount of 680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorneys fees,
thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorneys fees.
In response to the motion filed by Atty. Go, Evangelina filed a comment with motion to release the amount deposited with the
NLRC Cashier. In her comment, Evangelina manifested that Atty. Gos claim for attorneys fees of 40% of the total monetary
award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
On February 14, 2005, the LA issued an Order7 granting Atty. Gos motion, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and further considering the substitute complainants initial payment of 20% to movant-
counsel of the monetary claims as paid, let the balance or unpaid twenty (20%) per cent of attorneys fees due movant-counsel
(or the amount of 839,587.39) be recorded as lien upon all the monies that may still be paid to substitute complainant
Evangelina Masmud.
Accordingly, the NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the amount of 677,589.96 which is currently deposited
therein to partially satisfy the lien.
SO ORDERED.8
Evangelina questioned the February 14, 2005 Order of the LA before the NLRC. On January 31, 2006, the NLRC issued a
Resolution 9 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Evangelina then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. 10 On October 31, 2007, the CA rendered a
Decision 11 partially granting the petition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 31, 2006 and July 18, 2006 are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Attorneys fees of respondent Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. is declared fully
compensated by the amount of 1,347,950.11 that he has already received.
SO ORDERED.12
Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on June 6, 2008, the CA issued a Resolution13 denying the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition.
10
Evangelina presented this issue, viz.:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS DECISION DATED 31
OCTOBER 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED 6 JUNE 2008 INSOFAR AS IT UPHOLDS RESPONDENT LAWYERS
CLAIM OF FORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS ATTORNEYS FEES.14
In effect, petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal compensation of a lawyer in a labor proceeding should be
based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees
may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, 15 such that, in any
of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the amount
is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof. 16
Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorneys fees, or the compensation that Atty. Go is entitled to receive for representing
Evangelina, in substitution of her husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court.
Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should govern Atty. Gos compensation as her counsel
and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer contract.
Article 111 of the said Code provides:
ART. 111. Attorney's fees. (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees
equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.1avvphi1.zw+
Contrary to Evangelinas proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees. It
regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It
may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. 17
In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in determining Atty. Gos compensation. The said
Rule provides:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy,
the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable.18
The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The contract shall control in the
determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. 19Attorney's fees are
unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. 20 The decree of unconscionability or
unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by
the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer's services. 21
The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in assessing the proper amount of
compensation that a lawyer should receive.1avvph1.zw+ Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code provides:
CANON 20 A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
Rule 20.01. A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from
unjust charges.22 The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid
for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of
the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.23The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee contract between
Atty. Go and Evangelinas husband. The CA committed no error of law when it awarded the attorneys fees of Atty. Go and
allowed him to receive an equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.
The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of
fact of the CA are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are
absent in the case at bench. The findings of the CA, which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of
review by the Supreme Court.24
Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he should receive adequate compensation for
his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role
in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not
alone to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his
capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and
energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of
his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not
get his due.25
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279 are hereby AFFIRMED.
11
A.C. No. 4863 September 7, 2001
URBAN BANK, INC., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MAGDALENO M. PEA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Urban Bank, Inc., a commercial bank, against
respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea. Complainant charges that respondent is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
in violation of Section 27, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court. The allegations of the Complaint in support of the accusation
are as follows:
"3. Last 1 December 1994, Complainant bought a parcel of land located along Roxas Boulevard from the Isabela
Sugar Company ("ISC" for brevity). One of the conditions of the sale was for ISC to cause the eviction of all the
occupants found in said property. This condition was incorporated in the Contract to Sell and adopted in the
subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between ISC and Complainant dated 15 November 1994 and 29
Novemebr 1994, respectively.
4. To fully implement the abovementioned condition, ISC engaged the services of herein Respondent Atty.
Magdaleno M. Pea. This was communicated by ISC to Respondent in a Memorandum dated 20 November 1994 and
relayed to Complainant in a Letter dated 19 December 1994.
5. Respondent accepted the engagement of his services by ISC and he proceeded to take the necessary steps to evict
the occupants of the property subject of the sale.
6. During the eviction process, Complainant was informed by ISC and Respondent about the necessity of a letter of
authority in favor of the latter, granting him the authority to represent Complainant in maintaining possession of the
aforesaid property and to represent Complainant in any court action that may be instituted in connection with the
exercise of said duty.
7. Complainant acceded to the request and issued a letter-authority dated 15 December 1994, but only after making it
very clear to the Respondent that it was ISC which contracted his services and not Complainant. This clarification
was communicated to Respondent by Atty. Corazon M. Bejasa and Mr. Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., Senior Vice-President
and Vice-President, respectively of Complainant bank in a letter addressed to respondent dated 15 December 1994. A
copy of said letter is attached hereto and made an integral part of this Complaint as Annex "E".
8. Subsequently however, Respondent requested for a modification of said letter of authority by furnishing
Complainant with a draft containing the desired wordings (including the date, i.e., 19 December 1994) and asking
Complainant to modify the previous letter by issuing a new one similarly worded as his draft. A copy of said request
is attached hereto and made an integral part of this Complaint as Annex "F".
9. If only to expedite and facilitate matters, Complainant willingly obliged and re-issued a new letter of authority to
Respondent, this time incorporating some of Respondents suggestions. Thus it came to pass that the actual letter of
authority was dated 19 December 1994, while Complainants clarificatory letter was dated 15 December 1994.
10. Eventually, the eviction of the occupants of the property in question was successfully carried out. After the lapse
of more than thirteen (13) months, Respondent filed a collection suit against herein Complainant and its senior
officers "for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages and attorneys fees", on the strength of the
 letter of authority issued by Atty. Bejasa and Mr. Manuel, Jr. A copy of the complaint filed by herein Respondent
with the Bago City Regional Trial Court is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex "G".
11. The act of Respondent in securing the letter of authority from Complainant, ostensibly for the purpose of
convincing the occupants sought to be evicted that he was duly authorized to take possession of the property and then
using the same letter as basis for claiming agents compensation, expenses and attorneys fees from Complainant,
knowing fully well the circumstances surrounding the issuance of said letter of authority, constitutes deceit,
malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said provision
enumerates the grounds for the suspension and disbarment of lawyers, namely:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court, on what grounds, - A member of the bar may
be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath of which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without any authority to do so. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)"1
In answer to these allegations, respondent submitted with this Court his Comment, wherein he refuted all the charges against
him. Preliminarily, he claimed that the present complaint should be dismissed outright since its filing constitutes forum shopping
and it involves a matter which is sub-judice, in view of the pending civil action involving the same parties. Respondent then
disputed that he was guilty of deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct. He declared that complainant, through its duly authorized
officers, engaged his services to rid the property of tenants and intruders in the course of a telephone conversation. He added that
there was no reason for him to deceive complainant into writing a letter of authority because he knew very well that the verbal
agreement was sufficient to constitute an attorney-client relationship. The request for a letter of authority, according to him, was
"merely to formalize the engagement."2 Lastly, he argued that the complainant accepted the benefits of his service, just as it
never disclaimed that he was acting in its behalf during the period of engagement.
We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. Both parties presented their respective
evidence before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. After only one hearing, and upon agreement of the parties, the
case was submitted for resolution on the basis of their respective pleadings and annexes thereto. The investigating officer,
Commissioner Navarro, required both parties to file their own memoranda. The commissioner made the following findings:
"After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the Undersigned noted that the complainant (plaintiff) in
RTC Bago City Civil Case is the respondent in the present case which only showed that to get even with the
respondent, complainant instituted the present case as leverage for respondents complaint in the civil case. The
complainant in the RTC Bago City Civil case is the respondent in the present case and vice-versa; therefore there was
no institution by the same party for remedies in different fora which negates forum shopping.
The fact remains however that complainant never contested the actuations done by the respondent to rid its property
from tenants and intruders; and even executed a letter of authority in favor of respondent dated December 19, 1994;
otherwise complainant should have engaged the services of other lawyers.
Nevertheless, it is not for this Office to determine who should pay the respondent for this is a matter not within its
jurisdiction but for the proper court to do so.
The only issue for resolution of this Office is whether or not respondent committed malpractice, deceit and gross
misconduct in the practice of his profession as member of the bar.
12
The evidence on record showed that respondent successfully performed his task of evicting the tenants and intruders
in the property in question. More so, no less than Senior Vice-President Corazon Bejasa was very thankful for his job
well done.
Complainant benefited from respondents task and for a period of fifty (50) days no behest or complaint was received
by the respondent from the complainant. It was only when payment for his legal services was demanded that
complainant re-acted when it is incumbent upon the benefactor of services that just compensation should be awarded.
It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just compensation ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is to
institute an action before the proper court and such actuation of the respondent herein did not constitute deceit,
malpractice or gross misconduct.
In view of the foregoing, the Undersigned hereby recommends that the complaint against Atty. Magdaleno Pea be
dismissed for lack of merit."3
Thereafter, IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution DISMISSING the Complaint based on the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Navarro. It appears that on April 26, 2000, the complainant was closed by the Monetary
Board of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas and was placed under receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC). On May 8, 2000, it received a notice of the resolution. With the PDIC now acting as its counsel, it sought
reconsideration of the resolution with the IBP, which was denied there being "no substantive reason to reverse the findings
therein" and because "the pleading is improper as the remedy of the complainant is to file the appropriate Motion with the
Supreme Court within fifteen days from receipt of notice of said Decision pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 139-B."4
On October 5, 2000, we received a Manifestation from the complainant, represented this time by Corazon M. Bejasa, praying
that the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and Board of Governors be ordered to make a more thorough determination of
whether or not respondent committed the acts of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct complained of as grounds for the
latters disbarment. We then resolved to treat this manifestation as an appeal. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public
interest,5 undertaken for public welfare and for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of the
persons unfit to practice them. 6
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether or not respondent should be disbarred on the ground of deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct. We rule in the negative.
From the record and evidence before us, we agree with the commissioners conclusion that respondent cannot be found guilty of
the charges against him. Apart from the allegations it made in various pleadings, complainant has not proferred any proof
tending to show that respondent really induced it, through machination or other deceitful means, to issue the December 19 letter
of authority ostensibly for the purpose of evicting illegal occupants, then using the very same letter for demanding agents
compensation. During the scheduled hearing, it did not introduce a single witness to testify apropos the circumstance under
which the letter was dispatched. Those who signed and issued the letter, Corazon M. Bejasa and Arturo E. Manuel Jr., were
never presented before the investigating commissioner to substantiate its assertion that the letter it gave to the respondent was
only "for show," and for a purpose which is limited in scope. Similarly, not even the sworn statements from these or other vital
witnesses were attached to the memorandum or the other pleadings it submitted. It is one thing to allege deceit, malpractice and
gross misconduct, and another to demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the same.
To be sure, no evidence in respect of the supposed deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct was adduced by the complainant. It is
axiomatic that he who alleges the same has the onus of validating it. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the
complainant and this Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence.7 In this regard, we find that complainant failed to meet the required standard.
In an effort to lend credence to its claim that there was no contractual relation between them, complainant attempted to establish
that the legal services of the respondent was engaged, not by it, but by the seller of the lot, Isabela Sugar Company. This should
presumably settle any doubt that the December 19 letter was only to be used by respondent for the purpose of supervising the
eviction of the occupants of the property and protecting it from intruders, and nothing more. To support this, it submitted DECISION
correspondence coming from people who appear to be responsible officers of ISC (one from Enrique Montilla III, and another
from Julie Abad and Herman Ponce) informing respondent of the engagement of his services by the ISC. These letters, though,
PER CURIAM:
cannot by themselves be accorded strong probative weight in the face of respondents emphatic assertion that he has never seen
any of these documents.8 Likewise, they do not indicate that copies thereof were received by him or by any authorized person in
his behalf. It bears stressing that they do not carry his signature, nor the time or date he took possession of them. It follows that Factual Background
they cannot be used to bind and prejudice the respondent absent any showing that he had actual and ample knowledge of their
contents.
This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 20031 (the subject Motion to Inhibit) in two consolidated petitions
Lastly, complainant seems to belabor under the mistaken assumption that the basis of the respondent in instituting the civil case involving respondent that were pending before the Court.2 This motion is directed against the then ponente of the consolidated
against it was the December 19 letter of authority. Well to point out, the suit was grounded on an oral contract of agency petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and reads in part:
purportedly entered into between him and the complainant, represented by its duly authorized officers. This is evident from the
averments embodied in the Complaint filed with the Bago City Trial Court, the pertinent portions of which state:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEA, pro se, respectfully states:

"7. The defendant URBAN BANK through its president, defendant TEODORO BORLONGAN, and the defendants
1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to hurdle in his quest for justice against Urban Bank and its officials,
Board of Directors as well as its Senior Vice President CORAZON BEJASA and Vice President, ANTONIO
he has remained steadfast in his belief that ultimately, he will be vindicated and the wrongdoers will get their just
MANUEL, JR., entered into an agency agreement with the plaintiff, whereby the latter in behalf of the defendant
deserts [sic]. What respondent is about to relate however has, with all due respect, shaken his faith in the highest
URBAN BANK, shall hold and maintain possession of the aforedescribed property, prevent entry of intruders,
Court of the land. If an anomaly as atrocious as this can happen even in the august halls of the Supreme Court, one
interlopers and squatters therein and finally turn over peaceful possession thereof to defendant URBAN BANK; it
can only wonder if there is still any hope for our justice system.
was further agreed that for the services rendered as its agent, defendant URBAN BANK shall pay plaintiff a fee in an
amount equivalent to 10 % of the the market value of the property prevailing at the time of payment;
2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he is not making a sweeping accusation against all the members of
this Honorable Court. He cannot however remain tight-lipped in the face of the overwhelming evidence that has come
8. The plaintiff accepted the engagement and in a letter dated December 19, 1994, defendant URBAN BANK through
to his knowledge regarding the actuation of the ponente of this Honorable Division.
its authorized officials, namely, defendant CORAZON BEJASA and ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., Senior Vice
President and Vice President respectively, of defendant URBAN BANK, officially confirmed the engagement of the
services of the plaintiff as its Agent-representative for the following specific purposes; x x x to hold and maintain 3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private respondent received a call from the counsel for petitioners, Atty.
possession of our abovecaptioned property and to protect the same from tenants, occupants or any other person who Manuel R. Singson (through his cell phone number 09189137383) who very excitedly bragged that they had been
are threatening to return to the said property and/or to interfere with your possession of the said property for and in able to secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the consolidation of
our behalf. You are likewise authorized to represent Urban Bank in any court action that you may institute to carry ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale. Private respondent was aghast because by
out your aforementioned duties, and to prevent any intruder, squatter or any other person not otherwise authorized in them, more than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period on the various properties had expired. At that
writing by Urban bank from entering or staying in the premises. juncture in fact, Certificates of Final Sale had already been issued to the purchasers of the properties. The only step
that had to be accomplished was the ministerial act of issuance of new titles in favor of the purchasers.
A photocopy of the letter dated December 19, 1994 is hereto attached as Annex "C" and made integral part hereof." 9 (Emphasis
supplied.) 4. Private respondent composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending incident with this Honorable
Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he could not remember any. In an effort to hide his
discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise,
It is clear from the above that what respondent was trying to enforce were the terms and conditions of the contract. The letter,
Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort because
from the his own admission, just served to officially confirm a done deal. It was, hence, utilized solely as documentary evidence
they could not afford to lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank
to buttress respondents assertion regarding the existence of the agency agreement. In fact, the amount of compensation (to the
Plaza in Makati City) as it might again cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank) to close down.
tune of 10% of the market value of the property) he was recovering in the action was never mentioned in the letter, but
apparently settled in the course of an oral conversation. Indeed, respondent, with or without the letter, could have instituted a suit
against the complainant. There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship.10 5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy of the order that Atty. Singson was talking about, he
asked Atty. Singson to fax him the "advance" copy that they had received. The faxed "advance" copy that Atty.
Singson provided him bore the fax number and name of Atty. Singsons law office. A copy thereof is hereto attached
In sum, we find that, under the premises, respondent can hardly be faulted and accused of deceit, malpractice and gross
as Annex "A".
misconduct for invoking the aid of the court in recovering recompense for legal services which he claims he undertook for the
complainant, and which the latter does not deny to have benefited from. Indeed, what he did was a lawful exercise of a right.
6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It appeared that a supposed Motion for Clarification was filed
by petitioners through Atty. Singson dated 6 August 2002, but he was never furnished a copy thereof. He asked a
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISMISSED for lack
messenger to immediately secure a copy of the motion and thereafter confirmed that he was not furnished a copy. His
of merit.
supposed copy as indicated in the last page of the motion was sent to the Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz
(ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA, however, was never respondents counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of
A.C. No. 6332 April 17, 2012 the petitioners. Respondents copy, in other words, was sent to his opponents.

IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS. 145817 AND 145822

13
7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without even giving respondent an opportunity to comment on the In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Pea attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit two copies of the official
same. In contrast, respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 19 November 2001 had been Agenda for 13 November 2002 of the First Division of this Court, which he claimed to have anonymously received through the
pending for almost a year and yet petitioners motions for extension to file comment thereon [were] being granted left mail.3 He also attached a copy of the Courts internal Resolution regarding the transfer of the case from the Third Division to the
and right. First Division, upon the request of Justice Carpio, to establish the latters alleged special interest in the case. 4

8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed on 10 December 2002, an Urgent Omnibus Motion (to In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17 February 2003 to require Atty. Pea and Atty. Manuel R. Singson, counsel of
Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13 November 2002 Resolution). He filed a Supplement to the said Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, to appear before the Court on 03 March 2003 for an Executive Session. 5
motion on 20 December 2002.
The reason for the required appearance of the two lawyers in the Executive Session is explained in the Courts Resolution dated
9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he received sometime last week two 03 March 2003.6 It states:
documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two documents indicate that this Honorable Court has not actually
granted petitioners Motion for Clarification. They indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this
The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally opened the executive session and then
Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
requested Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug stated that the executive session was called because the
Court is perturbed by some statements made by respondent Atty. Magdaleno Pea involving strictly confidential matters which
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda of the First Division of are purely internal to the Court and which the latter cites as grounds in his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion."
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the
ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division had agreed that petitioners Motion for
Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Pea and counsel for petitioner Atty. Manuel R. Singson attended the session.
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated
in the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to obtain copies of the documents he used as annexes in his motion to
Division granting petitioners Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution inhibit, and whether the annexes are authentic.
arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the
two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C."
The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken as entirely different and apart from the merits of the main case.

11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty.
Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three (3) annexes attached to the motion to inhibit, Annexes "B", "C" and
Singson was bragging to him about. The clear and undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this Division agreed
"D," questioned how the latter was able to secure copies of such documents which are confidential to the Court and for the sole
that petitioners Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente responsible for the 13 November
use of the Office of the Clerk of Court, First Division and the Justices concerned.
2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED.

Annex "B" is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental agenda of the First Division for November 13, 2002 (pages 61-62),
12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is CERTAIN that the ponente has a special interest in this case.
with an entry in handwriting reading "10 AC" on the left side and what appear to be marginal notes on the right side of both
Recently, he also found out that the ponente made a special request to bring this case along with him when he
pages. Annex "C" is alleged to be a photocopy of the same supplemental agenda of the First Division for November 13, 2002,
transferred from the Third Division to the First Division. Respondent has a copy of the Resolution of this Honorable
with marginal notes on the right side of pages 61-62. Annex "D" appears to be a photocopy of the resolution dated September 4,
Court granting such request (hereto attached as Annex "D"). Indeed, this circumstance, considered with all the
2002 of the Third Division transferring the instant case to the First Division (an internal resolution).
foregoing circumstance, ineluctably demonstrates that a major anomaly has occurred here.

13. In view of these, private respondent is compelled to move for the inhibition of the ponente from this case. This
matter should be thoroughly investigated and respondent is now carefully considering his legal options for redress. It
has taken him seven years to seek vindication of his rights against petitioners, he is not about to relent at this point. In
the meantime, he can longer expect a fair and impartial resolution of this case if the ponente does not inhibit himself.
14. This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized the importance of impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality on the part of judges and justices. The ponente will do well to heed such pronouncements.
15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon this Honorable Court to clarify its real position on the 19
November 2001 Resolution. It is most respectfully submitted that in order to obviate any further confusion on the
matter, respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002 (as well as the Supplement dated 19
November 2002) should be resolved and this Honorable Court should confirm that the stay order contained in the 19
November 2001 Resolution does not cover properties already sold on execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted.)
Atty. Pea was made to understand that all his statements taken during this executive session were deemed under oath. Atty.
Pea acceded thereto.
Atty. Pea was asked whether he knows any personnel of the Court who could possibly be the source. Atty. Pea replied in the
negative and added that he obtained those documents contained in the annexes through ordinary mail addressed at his residence
in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, sometime in the second or third week of January 2003; but failed to give the exact date of his
receipt. He said Annexes "B" and "C" were contained in one envelope while Annex "D" was mailed in a separate envelope. He
did not bring the envelopes but promised the Court he would do his best to locate them. On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty.
Pea admitted that the envelopes may no longer be found. He was unable to respond to the observation of the Chief Justice that
the Court would be in no position to know whether the envelopes he would later produce would be the same envelopes he
allegedly received. Atty. Pea further admitted that his office did not stamp "Received" on the envelopes and the contents
thereof; neither did he have them recorded in a log book.
When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those annexes as grounds for his motion to inhibit when the same were
coursed only through ordinary mail under unusual circumstances and that respondent did not even bother to take note of the
postal marks nor record the same in a log book, Atty. Pea answered that he was 100% certain that those documents are
authentic and he assumed that they came from Manila because the Supreme Court is in Manila.

14
At this juncture, Atty. Pea was reminded that since he assured the authenticity of Annexes "B", "C" and "D", he should be
willing to accept all the consequences if it turns out that there are no such copies in the Supreme Court or if said annexes turn out
to be forged. Atty. Pea manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences.
When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the original that made him conclude that those photocopies are authentic,
he replied in the negative, but he believed that they are official documents of the Court inasmuch as he also received a copy of
another resolution issued by the Court when the same was faxed to him by Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.
Atty. Pea expressed his disappointment upon receiving the resolution because he was not even furnished with a copy of
petitioners motion for clarification, which was resolved. He found out that his copy was addressed to Abello Concepcion Regala
and Cruz Law Offices, which was never respondents counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of the petitioners.
He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the motion for clarification was acted upon even without comment from him, and
he admitted that under said circumstances, he made imputation of bribery as a joke.
As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of record that Justice Carpio and Justice Azcuna denied that Annex "B" is their
copy of pp. 61 and 62 of the agenda, Justice Carpio also said that per verification, Annex "B" is not Justice Santiagos copy.
Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex "B" does not belong to any of the Justices of the First Division. It was also pointed out
that each of the Justices have their respective copies of the agenda and make their own notations thereon. The official actions of
the Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of the Court.
Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both Atty. Pea and Atty. Singson to paragraphs 3 and 4 of respondents
"Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion, which contain the following allegations:
"(Atty. Singson) very excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending the
redemption period and the consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale. Private
respondent was aghast because by then, more than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period on the various properties
had expired. In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent (Atty. Pea) teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get
such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had to
exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties involved."
For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a copy of the resolution dated November 13, 2002 to Atty. Pea and expressed
his belief that there was nothing wrong with it, as the resolution was officially released and received by his office. He explained
that his staff merely copied the parties in the resolution of February 13, 2002 when the motion for clarification was prepared.
Hence, the respondent was inadvertently not sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to inhibit, reasoning that all he said was
about the suspension of the redemption period which was the subject of the motion for clarification. Atty. Singson branded as
false the allegation of Atty. Pea that he, Atty. Singson, resorted to bribery in order that the suspension of the redemption period
would be granted.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Pea admitted that he was only joking to Atty. Singson when on the cellular phone he
intimated that Justice Carpio could have been bribed because he has a new Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to answer
categorically whether Atty. Singson told him that Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty. Pea could not make any candid or forthright
answer. He was evasive.
After further deliberation whereby Atty. Pea consistently replied that his only source of the documents in the annexes is the
regular mail, the Court Resolved to require Atty. Magdaleno Pea within fifteen (15) days from today to SHOW CAUSE why he
should not be held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if he will not be able to satisfactorily explain
to Court why he made gratuitous allegations and imputations against the Court and some of its members that tend to cast doubt
or aspersion on their integrity.
15
Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within fifteen (15) days from today his response to the allegations of Atty.
Pea, particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of respondents motion to inhibit.
The Court excused Attys. Pea and Singson from the executive session at 11:35 a.m. and resumed its regular session on the
agenda.
In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the Court Resolves to GRANT the motion by counsel for petitioner praying
that intervenor-movant Unimega Properties Holdings Corp. be directed to furnish aforesaid counsel with a copy of the motion
for reconsideration and intervention and that they be granted an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file comment
thereon and require said intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such service within five (5) days from notice.
The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No. 145882, Benjamin de Leon, et al., on the motion for reconsideration
with intervention by Unimega Property Holdings Corp. is NOTED. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Pea duly submitted his Compliance with the Courts Order, where he stated that:7
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEA, pro se, respectfully submits the following explanation in compliance
with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated 3 March 2003:
1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution required respondent to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a result of the allegations he made in his "Urgent Motion
to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion" dated 30 January 2003. As this Honorable Court
stated during the 3 March 2003 hearing, the members of the Court were "perturbed" by some statements respondent
made in the motion.
2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the distress his statements may have caused the members of this
Honorable Court. While such distress may have been the unavoidable consequence of his motion to inhibit the
ponente, it was certainly not his intended result.
3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003 hearing, it appeared that this Honorable Court was most
concerned with how respondent was able to secure Annexes "B" and "C" of his motion (referring to the two copies of
the Supplemental Agenda of the First Division for 13 November 2002) and why respondent used those documents as
basis for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.
4. Respondent had explained that he received the two annexes by ordinary mail at his residence in Brgy. Ubay,
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime during the second week of January. The sender of the document was
unknown to respondent because there was no return address. Despite efforts to locate the envelope in which these
documents came, he was unable to do so.
5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at his residence. Since he is often in Manila on business, it is usually
the househelp who gets to receive the mail. While he had given instructions to be very careful in the handling of
documents which arrive by registered mail, the envelopes for Annexes "A" and "B" may have been misplaced or
disposed by the househelp because it did not bear the stamp "registered mail."
6. When respondent read the documents, he had absolutely no reason to doubt their authenticity. For why would
anyone bother or go to the extent of manufacturing documents for the benefit of someone who does not even know
him? The documents contained a detailed list of the incidents deliberated by this Honorable Court on 13 November
2002. Definitely, not just anyone could have access to such information. Moreover, respondent subsequently received
another mail from apparently the same sender, this time containing a pink copy of this Honorable Courts 4
September 2002 Resolution (Annex "D", Urgent Motion to Inhibit) transferring this case from the Third Division to
the First Division. The receipt of this last document somehow confirmed to respondent that whoever sent him the On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance and Affidavit dated 28 July 2003, 9 categorically denied having
copies of the Supplemental Agenda really had access to the records of this Honorable Court. bragged to Atty. Pea and that he did not employ "extra efforts" to obtain a favorable suspension order from the Court. 10

7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main basis of his motion to inhibit was the information relayed to him by
Atty. Singson during their telephone conversation on 19 November 2002. As stated in respondents Urgent Motion to
Inhibit, while Atty. Singson did not categorically claim that they had bribed the ponente to secure the 13 November
2002 resolution, however, he made no denial when respondent, in order to obtain information, half-seriously
remarked that this was the reason why the ponente had a brand new car. Atty. Singson retorted that obviously, they
had to take extra-ordinary measures to prevent the consolidation of ownership of the properties sold as the bank may
again close down. Indeed, one would normally be indignant upon being accused of bribery but Atty. Singson even
chuckled and instead justified their "extra-ordinary" efforts.
8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion was not enough. An implied admission of bribery on the part of
Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may not have been sufficient basis for a motion to inhibit. However, respondent did not
have to look far for evidence. Atty. Singson in not denying the allegation of bribery is considered an admission by
silence, under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Further, Atty. Singson faxed to him the "advance copy"
of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. To respondent, that was solid evidence and in fact to this day, Atty. Singson
fails to explain exactly when, from whom, and how he was able to secure said advance copy. The records of this
Honorable Court disclosed that Atty. Singsons official copy of the 13 November 2002 Resolution was sent to him by
registered mail only on 20 November 2002 (a copy of the daily mailing report is hereto attached as Annex "A"). Why
then was he able to fax a copy to respondent on 19 November 2002 or a day before the resolution was released for
mailing?
9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to inhibit. He only finally decided to proceed when he
received the copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To emphasize, the Supplemental Agenda merely confirmed what
Atty. Singson had earlier told him. Contrary to the apparent impression of this Honorable Court, respondents motion
is not primarily anchored on anonymously received documents but on the word of petitioners counsel himself. The
copies of the Supplemental Agenda are merely corroborative (albeit extremely convincing) evidence.
10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into possession of the information relayed by Atty. Singson and the
copies of the Supplemental Agenda would bring them to the attention of this Honorable Court. In doing so,
respondent was compelled by a sense of duty to inform this Honorable Court of any apparent irregularity that has
come to his knowledge. It was not done out of spite but a deep sense of respect.
After considering and evaluating the submissions made by the two lawyers, the Court ordered that a formal investigation be
undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions of Atty. Pea. 11 The Courts Resolution dated 28 April 2003
in the consolidated petitions, which is the subject matter of this separate administrative case, reads:
On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Pea filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit the ponente of the instant case.
Respondent Pea attached to his Urgent Motion Annex "B", a copy of pp. 61-62 of the First Divisions Agenda of 13 November
2002. Respondent Pea claimed that Annex "B" bears the recommended actions, in handwritten notations, of a member of the
Court (First Division) on Item No. 175 of the Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent Motion for Clarification filed by
petitioner on 7 August 2002. The purported handwritten notation on Annex "B" for Item No. 175 (f) is "N", or to simply note the
motion. However, the Court issued a Resolution on 13 November 2002 granting the Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his
Urgent Motion to Inhibit, respondent Pea claimed that the Resolution of 13 November 2002 was forged because the
recommended and approved action of the Court was to simply note, and not to approve, the Urgent Motion for Clarification.
Thus, respondent Pea stated in his Urgent motion to Inhibit:
"9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to respond to his motion, he received sometime last week
two documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two documents indicate that this Honorable Court had not actually
granted petitioners Motion for Clarification. They indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of this
Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the official Agenda of the First Division of
this Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the
ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the Division had agreed that petitioners Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated
in the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution
arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the
two Agenda are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C".

11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by well-meaning friends to publicize the incident and take legal
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty.
action against the parties involved. Instead, respondent decided that a motion to inhibit before this Honorable Court
Singson was bragging about. The clear and undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this Division agreed that
was the most appropriate channel to ventilate his concerns. Respondent is not out to cast aspersions on anybody, most
petitioners Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002
especially members of this Honorable Court. He had to file the Urgent Motion to Inhibit because he sincerely
Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED."
believed, and still firmly believes, that he could not get impartial justice if the ponente did not recuse himself.

On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Pea and Atty. Manuel Singson, counsel for petitioner Urban Bank, to a hearing
12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered confidential by this Honorable Court leaked out and
to determine, among others, the authenticity of the annexes to respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit, including Annex "B".
assures this Honorable Court that he had absolutely no hand in securing them. Respondent just found himself in a
In the hearing, respondent Pea affirmed the authenticity of the annexes and even manifested that he was willing to accept the
position where he had to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude enough to brag that their
consequences if the annexes, including Annex "B", turned out to be forgeries.
"extra-ordinary" efforts to secure a stay order from a certain ponente had bore fruit. Respondent has devoted at least
seven years of his life to this cause. He almost lost his life and was nearly driven to penury fighting this battle.
Certainly, he cannot be expected to simply raise his hands in surrender. In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First Division) informed respondent Pea that the handwritten notations on
Annex "B" did not belong to any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to whom the case was assigned and the apparent object of
respondent Peas Urgent Motion to Inhibit as the "ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution," stated that his
13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was confirmed during the 3 March 2003 hearing that Annex "C" of
recommended action on Item No. 175(f) was "a & f, see RES," meaning on Items 175(a) and (f), see proposed resolution. In
his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful reproduction/"replica" of the relevant portions of the Supplemental Agenda
short, the handwritten notations on Annex "B", purportedly belonging to a member of the Court, were forgeries. For ready
(TSN dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on record with the first Division. With this, respondent rests his
reference, attached as Annexes "1" and "2" to this Resolution are a copy of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpios 13 November 2002
case. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpios recommended actions for the entire 13 November 2002 Agenda, respectively.

16
In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Pea to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and subjected to on what he discovered from the internal documents of the Court that he had secured. 24 Moreover, the OBC ruled that respondent
disciplinary action for submitting the annexes to his Motion to Inhibit. In his Compliance dated 3 April 2003, respondent Pea did not make a direct accusation of bribery against Justice Carpio, and the formers remark about the latter having received a
did not give any explanation as to why he attached "B" to his Urgent Motion to Inhibit. In fact, in his Compliance, respondent new Mercedes Benz was not made in the presence of the court, but was uttered in a private mobile phone conversation between
Pea did not mention at all Annex "B". Respondent Pea, however, stated that he "just found himself in a position where he had him and Atty. Singson.25 Respondents profound apologies to the Court were also taken cognizance by the OBC, which suggests
to come out with those documents because his opponent was crude enough to brag that their extra-ordinary efforts to secure a the imposition of a simple warning against any such future conduct.26
stay order from a certain ponente had bore fruit." In petitioners Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson stated
that he "categorically denied that he had bragged to PEA about the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated November 13,
Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the second charge that respondent supposedly submitted falsified documents to
2002 and that extra efforts have been exerted to obtain the same."
this Court as annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit, specifically Annex "B" which appears to be a photocopy of the agenda of
the First Division on 13 November 2002 with some handwritten notes.27 It reasoned that the submission of falsified documents
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS the Office of the Bar Confidant to conduct a formal investigation partakes of the nature of a criminal act, where the required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but respondent Pea is not
of respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea for submitting to the Court a falsified document, Annex "B", allegedly forming part of being charged with a criminal offense in the instant case. The OBC noted the statement of the Clerk of Court during the 03
the confidential records of a member of the Court, in support of his Motion to Inhibit that same member of the Court. The Office March 2003 Executive Session that Annex "B" does not exist in the records. 28
of the Bar Confidant is directed to submit its findings, report and recommendation within 90 days from receipt of this
Resolution. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the third charge for contempt against respondent filed by the De Leon Group and Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel, the
OBC likewise suggests the dismissal of the same. To recall, respondent submitted pleadings in the consolidated petitions where
13 14
During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Pea and Singson duly submitted their respective Affidavits. he allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan of having used his influence over Justice Arturo B. Buena to gain a favorable resolution to
the benefit of his clients.29 The OBC suggests that respondent be acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and disrespectful
language against Members of the Court and his fellow lawyers, but nevertheless recommends that respondent be advised to
While the administrative case was still pending, some of the other parties in the consolidated petitions specifically, Benjamin
refrain from using unnecessary words or statements in the future.30
L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon Group), the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 manifested before
the Court other malicious imputations allegedly made by Atty. Pea during the course of the proceedings in the said petitions.
They moved that these be considered as sufficient and additional basis to cite him for contempt of court. 15 The Court likewise Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth charge of forum-shopping leveled by respondent Pea against
referred this matter to the OBC.16 Urban Bank and the individual bank directors. In his counter-suit, respondent accused the bank and its directors and officers of
having violated the rule against forum-shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and filing three separate petitions to
question the unfavorable decision of the Court of Appeals.31 However, since not all the parties to the consolidated petitions
In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De Leon Group, respondent Pea denied having used abrasive, insulting
participated in the hearings in the instant case, the OBC recommends that separate proceedings be conducted with respect to this
and intemperate language in his pleadings; and argued that his statements therein were privileged and could not be used as a
counter-suit in order to afford Urban Bank and all of the concerned directors and officers, including their respective counsel, to
basis for liability. 17 He also accused Urban Bank and its directors and officers of violating the rule against forum shopping by
defend themselves and present witnesses and/or evidence in support of their cause.32
dividing themselves into separate groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822) against the same
Decision of the Court of Appeals with the same causes of actions and prayers for relief. 18
Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC submitted the following recommendations for approval of this Court:
The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein respondent Pea and Atty. Singson appeared and testified on matters that were
the subject of the administrative cases.19 Several hearings were also held with respect to the additional contempt charges raised RECOMMENDATIONS:
by the De Leon Group. Thereafter, respondent Pea filed his Memorandum. 20
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully recommended the following:
The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant administrative case and made recommendations on the matter (the
OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this Court does not quote at length, nor even disclose the dispositive recommendation of the
A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:
OBC in administrative investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty. Pea, despite the fact that the OBC Report is
confidential and internal, has obtained, without authority, a copy thereof and has formally claimed that this Court should apply to
him the non-penalty of an admonition against him, as recommended by the OBC.21 1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the statements in his Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not
constitute malicious imputations as he was merely expressing his concern of what he has discovered based
on the documents he has obtained. However, let this case serve as his FIRST WARNING, being an officer
Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that the present ponente of the consolidated petitions 22 from which this separate
of the court, to be more cautious, restraint and circumspect with his dealings in the future with the Court
administrative case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, would exclude or suppress material evidence found in the OBC
and its Member.
report from her ponencia in the parent case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that Justice Carpio had given her by allegedly
recommending her to the Supreme Court.23 The specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one Member of the Court to
another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support it, is too undignified to warrant a response in this Decision. To allay his 2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such non-sense and unfounded joke against Honorable Justice
fears that Justice Sereno would participate in any undue attempt to suppress material evidence, the Court shall summarize and Antonio T. Carpio the latter deserves due respect and courtesy from no less than the member of the bar.
quote from the OBC Report the four charges of professional misconduct in connection with the instant administrative case. Likewise, Atty. Singson should also be ADVISED to be more cautious in his dealing with his opposing
counsel to avoid misconception of facts.
On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against members of the Court, the OBC found that respondent Pea gave the
impression that some anomaly or irregularity was committed by the Courts First Division in issuing the questioned 13 B. On the charge of falsification:
November 2002 Resolution. According to respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the consolidated petitions, purportedly
changed the action of the First Division from simply "NOTING" the motion for clarification filed by Urban Bank to
1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified documents on ground of lack of legal basis. A charge of
"GRANTING" it altogether. The OBC opines that although respondent Pea may appear to have been passionate in the subject
submitting falsified documents partakes of the nature of criminal act under Art. 172 of the Revised penal
Motion to Inhibit, the language he used is not to be considered as malicious imputations but mere expressions of concern based
17
 Code, and the quantum of proof required to hold respondent guilty thereof is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. This is to avoid conflicting findings in the criminal case. The administrative proceedings of the
same act must await of the outcome in the criminal case of falsification of document.
C. On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:
Respondent Pea is administratively liable for making gratuitous imputations of bribery and wrongdoing against a member of
the Court, as seen in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, and
his unrelenting obstinacy in hurling effectively the same imputations in his subsequent pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of
a Member of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent Pea, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical standards of the legal
profession.

As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the statements cited by Atty. Pea in his pleadings previously
officers.34 They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court 35 and must refrain from
filed in related cases, while it may appear to be offending on the part of the complainant, but the same do
attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. 36
not categorically contain disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language or intemperate words that may tend
to discredit the name of the complainant. Respondent merely narrated the facts based of his own
knowledge and discoveries which, to him, warranted to be brought to the attention of the court for its While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of foul and
information and consideration. He must be ADVISED however, to refrain from using unnecessary words abusive language.37 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
and statements which may not be material in the resolution of the issued raised therein. derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. 38 A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.39
D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping
In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Pea insinuated that the then ponente of the case had been "bribed" by Atty.
Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, in light of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution,
1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum shopping, as embodied in the Comment dated 22 August
suspending the period of redemption of the levied properties pending appeal. The subject Motion to Inhibit reads in part:
2003 of Atty. Pea, as a separate administrative case against the petitioners and counsels in G.R. 145817,
G.R. No. 145818 and G.R. No. 145822;
4. Private respondent [Pea] composed himself and tried to recall if there was any pending incident with this Honorable Court
regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he could not remember any. In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent
2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a copy of the said comment dated 22 August 2003 for
teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did not even bother to
their information.
deny and in fact explained that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties
involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it might cause the bank (now
3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel, SINGSON VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented by Export Industry Bank) to close down. 40 (Emphasis supplied.)
ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA & CRUZ represented by
ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN, ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S. D. AQUINO and ATTY. HAZEL
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First Division of this Court, respondent Pea explained that his reference to
ROSE B. SEE to comment thereon within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. 33 (Emphasis supplied)
the bribe was merely a "joke" in the course of a telephone conversation between lawyers:

ISSUES
CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:

In these administrative matters, the salient issues for the Courts consideration are limited to the following:
Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Pea on [sic] when you made mention earlier of him saying about Justice Carpio?

(a) whether respondent Pea made gratuitous allegations and imputations against members of the Court;
ATTY. SINGSON:

(b) whether he can be held administratively liable for submitting allegedly "falsified documents" consisting of
Yes, Your Honor, he said "kaya pala may bagong Mercedez [sic] si Carpio, eh."
internal documents of the court;

CHIEF JUSTICE:
(c) whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for the contempt charges leveled against him in the
Manifestation and Motion filed by the De Leon Group; and
He said to you that?
(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors and officers are guilty of forum shopping.
ATTY. SINGSON:
OUR RULING
Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about bribery.
A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing against a Member of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx
We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on this charge.
ATTY. PEA:

18
First of all I would like to everything that he said, he told me that he got, they got a stay order, it is a stay order from the attributed the modification of the action of the First Division to simply "note" the Motion, one apparently unfavorable to
Supreme Court through Justice Carpio and then I gave that joke. That was just a joke really. He got a new Me[r]cedez [sic] respondent Pea, to Justice Carpio, who had supposedly received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered resolution.
Benz, you see, he was the one who told me they got a stay order from the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio, that was what
happened
However, as pointed out by the Court in the Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each Justice has his own respective copy of the
Agenda, where he can make his own handwritten notations on the action for each item and case, but "[t]he official actions of the
CHIEF JUSTICE: Court are contained in the duly approved minutes and resolutions of the Court."42 Hence, contrary to the insinuations made by
respondent Pea, Justice Carpio had not altered the action of the First Division in granting Urban Banks Motion for
Clarification in the consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the approved resolution agreed upon by the Justices then present.
You mean you made a joke?
The ponente of the case had not recommended that the Motion for Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had referred to a
separate resolution, i.e., "a) & f) See RES.," disposing of the said item (F) including item (A), which is the Motion to Inhibit
ATTY. PEA: Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban. In addition to the official minutes of the 13 November 2002 Session, 43 Justice Carpio
submitted for the record his written recommendation on the agenda item involving the consolidated petitions, to prove that this
was his recommendation, and the minutes confirm the approval of this recommendation. 44
You Honor?

The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the First Division, had indeed adopted the recommended and
CHIEF JUSTICE; proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is
completely wrong for respondent Pea to claim that the action had been issued without any sufficient basis or evidence on
You made a joke after he told you supposedly that he got (interrupted) record, and hence was done so with partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to immediately justify the
imputation of such bias or prejudice as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any verifiable proof of specific
misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are
ATTY. PEA: grave accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be "jokingly" alleged by parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or
motions. These suspicions or insinuations strike not only at the stature or reputation of the individual members of the Court, but
He got a stay order from Justice Carpio. at the integrity of its decisions as well.45

CHIEF JUSTICE: Respondent Pea attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation between Urban Banks failure to furnish him a copy of its
Motion for Clarification, purportedly denying him an opportunity to refute the allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt
means by which the unfavorable Resolution was thereby obtained. This is completely untenable and irresponsible. Had he
And you say that is the reason why he got a new Mercedez [sic] Benz, you made it as a joke? simply confined the issue to an alleged deprivation of due process, then there would hardly be any controversy regarding his
conduct as a lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of notice of the Motion for Clarification filed the bank in the
ATTY. PEA: consolidated petitions could have been raised as a valid concern for judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Pea insinuates ill
motives on the part of Members of the Court imputing the failure of a private party to give him due notice to be, in effect, a
failure of the Court. This merits the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers over him as a member of the Bar. To allege that
Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers. bribery has been committed by members of the judiciary, a complainant especially, a lawyer must go beyond mere
suspicions, speculations, insinuations or even the plain silence of an opposing counsel.
CHIEF JUSTICE;
Based on the two lawyers disclosures during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Pea appears to have been
That is correct, you are making it as a joke? caught by surprise by his telephone conversation with Atty. Singson, who informed him of the suspension of the redemption
period by the Court and its issuance of a Stay Order over the execution pending appeal. The astonishment of respondent would
seem natural, since he was caught unawares of Urban Banks Motion for Clarification, which was the subject matter of the 13
ATTY. PEA: November 2002 Resolution. His supposed joke, which he himself initiated and made without provocation, was disdainful all the
same, as it suggested that the bank had obtained the Order from this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury automobile.
Your Honor, I think, because how they got (interrupted)
Atty. Pea cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory remarks at the expense of the reputation and integrity of members
CHIEF JUSTICE: of this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of investigating
the veracity of Atty. Singsons revelations, respondent read too much into the declarations and the purported silence of opposing
counsel towards his joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to a specific Member of the Court. Such
If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion that it was Atty. Singson who said that Justice Carpio was bribed or the conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and falls utterly short of giving respect to the Court and upholding its
ponente was bribed, is that also another joke?41 (Emphasis supplied.) dignity.

Respondent Pea insinuated ill motives to the then ponente of the consolidated petitions with respect to the issuance of the 13
November 2003 Resolution. To respondents mind and based on his interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda which he
anonymously received, the First Division agreed only to simply note Urban Banks Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, the
questioned Resolution, which Atty. Singson sent to him by facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence, respondent Pea
19
Respondent Peas defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion between Justice Carpio, Atty. Singson and the petitioners
was a "joke" fails to convince, as in fact, he was deadly serious about the charges he raised. Respondent insisted that his alleged
insinuation of ill motives was just a "joke" between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone conversation regarding the case.
Although the courts and judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they are not immune to criticisms nor are they beyond the
subject matter of free speech, especially in the context of a private conversation between two individuals. In this case, though,
respondent himself was responsible for moving the private matter into the realm of public knowledge by citing that same "joke"
in his own Motion for Inhibition filed before this Court. In general, courts will not act as overly sensitive censors of all private
conversations of lawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience to the duty to afford proper respect and deference to the former.
Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away from exercising its disciplinary powers whenever persons who impute bribery to
judicial officers and bring such imputations themselves to the courts attention through their own pleadings or motions.
Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of bribery was only made in jest, respondent has never backed down since he first
made the accusation in January 2003 and continually raises as an issue in the consolidated petitions how Justice Carpio
purportedly changed the agreed action of the First Division when he issued the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, even
after the Court in the 03 March 2003 Executive Session had precisely explained to him that no impropriety had attended the
issuance of the said Resolution. In the Motions to Inhibit dated 21 January 2010 46 and 22 August 2011,47 he repeatedly insists on
the "anomalous/unusual circumstances" surrounding the issuance by Justice Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which
was allegedly contrary to the handwritten notes made in the copies of the Agenda that he received. Respondent Pea most
recently capitalized on the purported alteration or falsification supposedly committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics
complaint against the latter, where he alleged that:
Sometime thereafter, respondent Pea received a copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda 1st Division of this Honorable Court with a
notation in handwriting "10AC" on the left side and marginal notes on the right side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this
Honorable Court took up the matter of the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank, this Honorable Court merely "N"
or "Noted" the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank and did not grant the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a copy of the Motion for Clarification, or required to comment by the Honorable
Justice Carpio and opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, being able to secure an advance copy of the assailed 13 November 2002
Resolution), the matter brought out in the Executive Session and the admission made by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the
Honorable Hilario Davide and the Honorable Justice Vitug with regard to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda 1st Division of
this Honorable Court which was sent to respondent Pea was correct and that the Motion for Clarification was merely "N" or
"NOTED". However, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued a Resolution "Granting" the Motion for Clarification.
Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the 13 November 2002 Resolution in an anomalous/falsified manner and in clear
contravention of this Honorable Courts Decision to merely "Note" the same. A clear judicial administrative
violation. 48 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the bribery "joke" which respondent himself initiated has gotten the better of him. Respondent has convinced himself of
the veracity of his own malicious insinuations by his own repetitious allegations in his subsequent pleadings.
The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual penalties in administrative cases in the presence of mitigating factors, such
as the acknowledgment of the infraction and the feeling of remorse.49 In this case, the "profound" apologies 50 offered by
respondent Pea for his insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and hypocritical, as seen by his later actions. Although
he expressed remorse for having caused the Court distress because of his statements,51 he refuses to acknowledge any unethical
conduct on his part for his unfounded accusations against the actions of Justice Carpio with respect to the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution. Worse, he has persisted in attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio, even after the latter had
recused himself from the case since 2003.
This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating unfounded and vicious attacks against the integrity and impartiality
of Members of this Court. Earlier in the proceedings of the consolidated petitions, respondent assailed how retired Justice Arturo
B. Buena showed bias in favor of the De Leon Group, when the latters petition in G.R. No. 145822 was reinstated on a second
motion for reconsideration:52
It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein respondent that petitioners counsel has been making statement to the effect
that they could get a favorable resolution from the Supreme Court, on their second motion for reconsideration. In short,
20
petitioners counsel is practically saying that they are sure to get the Supreme Court to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration even if it violates the rules.53
1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice Buena because it was he who penned the challenged Resolution,
which granted the second motion for reconsideration in violation of the Rules. It was he who crafted, drafted and finalized the
said Resolution. It was he who tried to justify the violation of the Rules. It was from Justice Buenas office that contents of the
challenged Resolution was apparently "leaked" to the petitioners counsel long before its promulgation. 54
What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what phenomenon transpired? Why are herein petitioners "very special" in the eyes
of Justice Buena?55
It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has been affected by his relationship with Atty. Vinluan, as evidenced by
the above-described facts and circumstances.56
Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente, reinstated the petition without any explanation whatsoever, and in
gross violation of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This was highly irregular by itself. But what made
reinstatement more suspicious was the fact that even before the release of the Resolution reinstating the petition in G. R. No.
145822, the counsel for petitioners, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, was already boasting that he would be able to reinstate their petition.
Obviously, even before the release of the Resolution in question, Atty. Vinluan already knew what Justice Buenas resolution
would be.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In no less than six motions,58 he similarly accused former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban of prejudice based on his
affiliation with the Rotary Club, wherein some of the directors and officers of Urban Bank were also members. He even claimed
that Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank to meet with some of the directors and officers, who consulted him on the legal
issues arising from criminal suits in relation to the facts of the main petitions, citing only an unnamed "reliable source":
The friendship and close relationship of the three (Justice Panganiban and Urban Banks Arsenio Archit Bartolome and
Teodoro Ted Borlongan) went beyond their being Rotarians. As a matter of fact, Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of times
going to Urban Bank to see Archit and/or Ted, before the banks closure. Respondent has also discovered, through a reliable
source, that Justice Panganiban was known to have been consulted, and his legal advice sought, by Borlongan and Bartolome, in
connection with the above-entitled cases, while the same was still pending with the Court of Appeals and in connection with the
four (4) criminal cases filed the with the MTC [Municipal Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against Borlongan, et
al., for "introducing falsified documents in a judicial proceeding". In the latter cases, it was even Justice Panganiban who
furnished a copy of the SC Decision in Doris Ho vs. People (his own ponencia) to Bartolome and Borlongan, for the purpose of
giving his friends a legal basis in questioning the issuance of the warrants of arrest against Borlongan and the rest of his co-
accused in Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC Bago City (now appealed to Supreme Court; see Footnote No. 1
below).59 (Emphasis supplied.)
Lastly, respondent Pea raised the issue of "unmitigated partiality" against retired Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the
ground that the latter resolved a separate case involving related issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing parties:
3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled "Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v. Magdaleno M. Pea, et al", are also the same
petitioners in the above-entitled consolidated cases G. R. Nos. 145817 and 145822; and the respondents in the above-entitled
consolidated case G. R. No. 162562. Under the circumstances, herein private respondent is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the
extreme bias and prejudice of Justice Nachura against him in G. R. No. 143591 would certainly be carried over to the above-
entitled consolidated cases.60 (Emphasis supplied.)
Not only has respondent Pea failed to show sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing against
Justice Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the
Court.61 Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can pardon given certain
mitigating circumstances. Respondent Pea has blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers in
utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 62 the Court chose to indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan Paguia, when the latter imputed devious
motives and questioned the impartiality of members of the Court, despite its earlier warnings:
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-
founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practice law in the
Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded
in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
Respondent Peas actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude towards the Court that cannot be countenanced especially for
those privileged enough to practice law in the country. To be sure, Atty. Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the practice
of law after showing sincere remorse and having renewed his belief and respect for the Court, almost eight years from the time
the penalty was imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Pea be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for his
apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly imputing unfounded motives and partiality against members of the Court.
B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court Documents.
We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with respect to the second charge.
It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03 March 2003 and 28 April 2003, expressed administrative concern
over Atty. Peas behavior on three points: (1) his submission of a falsified court document, (2) his access to Supreme Court
documents that are highly restricted and confidential, and (3) his use of court documents (genuine or false) in his pleadings.
Respondent Pea submitted a falsified internal court document, Annex "B," had illegal access to confidential court documents,
and made improper use of them in the proceedings before this Court. The Court directed the initial investigation by the OBC
based on the charge that respondent Pea had submitted a falsified document to this Court.63 The charge of falsification stems
from his submission of an alleged copy of the Courts Agenda 64 (Annex "B") purportedly belonging to a member of the Division
handling the case. The pertinent portion of the subject Motion to Inhibit reads:
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of the Official Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both copies
(apparently secured from the office of two different members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente himself), it
is clearly indicated that the members of the Division had allegedly agreed that petitioners Motion for Clarification and Urgent
Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002 Resolution
(at least the version that was released to the parties) a falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was issued
by the First Division granting petitioners Motion for Clarification when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution
arrived at by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda
are hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C".65 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Pea expressed his absolute conviction that the document attached as
Annex "B" was an exact copy of the Agenda of the then ponente of the case. 66 It was later discovered, however, that no such
copy existed, either in the latters records or in those of any other member of the Division concerned:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is concerned it was confirmed by the Office of the Clerk of Court of this
Division that the original of that does not appear in the record, is not in the record and that nobody, none of the members of the
21
division has a copy of, that copy of Annex B of your pleading does not come from anyone of the members of the division. That
is the position of the Court now as explained earlier. Specifically Mr. Justice Carpio said that Annex B, specifically with that
capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come from his office, was not based on the document in his office and that is also
true to each of the members of this Division. 67 (Emphasis supplied.)
The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent Pea submitted to the Court a
document he was absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting
the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent misled the Court by presenting a document that was not what he claimed it to be.
Contrary to the assurances made in the same motion 68 he made allegations that were false and submitted documents that were not
borne out by the records of this case. Instead of verifying the contents of Annex "B," which came to him through dubious means,
he unquestioningly accepted their genuineness and veracity. Despite the Courts own explanation that Annex "B" does not exist,
he continues to insist on its existence.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and expected from members of the legal profession.69Thus, lawyers
shall commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. 70 As disciples of truth, their
lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at
correct conclusions.71 Courts are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. 72 In
the instant case, the submission of a document purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of
dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent Pea would argue, however, that falsification as a criminal act under the Revised Penal Code was not judicially
established during the proceedings of the OBC investigation and, thus, he cannot be held liable for falsification. The comparison
of the present administrative and disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of falsification is misplaced.
The subject matter of administrative proceedings is confined to whether there is administrative liability for the submission of a
falsified document namely Annex "B," which respondent Pea claims (albeit mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda
of the ponente. The issue, then, is whether he transgressed the ethical standards demanded of lawyers, by which they should be
truthful in their dealings with and submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly does not include the determination of
criminal liability, which demands a different modicum of proof with respect to the use of falsified documents. At this time, the
Court makes no definitive pronouncement as to the guilt of respondent over his violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code regarding the use of falsified documents.
In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he submitted was a faithful reproduction of the ponentes Agenda, just to
support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was later found to have been inexistent in the courts
records. Regardless of whether or not Annex "B" was criminally falsified or forged is immaterial to the present disposition. What
is now crucial is whether respondent was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect to the genuineness and
authenticity of his submissions.
The assertion of respondent Pea that the typewritten contents of Annexes "B" and "C" appear to be genuine and accurate is
unconvincing and cannot exonerate him from liability. Although Annex "C" was determined to be in the Courts records, 73 the
bare similarity of its typewritten contents with those of Annex "B" will not shield him from disciplinary action. Although the
typewritten contents of the two Agendas appear identical, the handwritten notes located at the right-hand side are different.
Respondent, in fact, claims that the handwritten notes come from two different members of the Division, one of them the then
ponente of the case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of the handwritten remarks not on the printed contents which are
allegedly contrary to the substance of the Courts 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. Respondent
Pea cannot claim the genuineness of Annex "B" (which is not in the records), based on the apparent identity of its printed
contents with those of Annex "C" (which is in the records). The handwritten notes are markedly different and, according to him,
made by two different members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent failed to substantiate his assertion that Annex
"B" and the notes made therein belonged to any member of this Court.
More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Pea has not explained, to the Courts satisfaction, how he managed to obtain
internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Pea would have the Court believe that he happened to obtain the two copies of the Agenda (Annexes "B" and "C")
and the internal Resolution (Annex "D") in two separate envelopes anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly received
them sometime during the second or the third week of January 2002 in his home-cum-office in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental.74 He, however, failed to present the envelopes containing the documents, but explained that these may have already
been thrown away, since he had no system of recording incoming communications in his home/office in the province. The Court
is not persuaded by his account of the receipt of these restricted court documents.
The Agenda, the Courts action thereon, as well as the Resolution (Annex "D"), are internal documents that are accessible only
to court officers,75 who are bound by strict confidentiality. For respondent Pea to have been able to secure originals or
photocopies of the Courts Agenda is disturbing because that ability implies a breach of the rules of strict confidentiality in the
Court. Notably, the Agenda purportedly sent to him did not contain all the items for deliberation by the Courts First Division for
that day; the copies sent were limited to the incidents pertaining to his pending case. This circumstance can hardly be considered
as random, since the exact item (Item No. 175) of concern for him specifically, the Courts action on Urban Banks Motion for
Clarification was what had been sent directly to his provincial home/office, and what he conveniently acquired thereby.
The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court records just coincidentally and anonymously appeared in the provincial
home/office of respondent Pea through ordinary mail. Also incredible is his explanation that the envelopes that contained the
documents, and that could have led to the identification of their source were opportunely misplaced or thrown away, despite the
grave importance he had ascribed to them. It is highly improbable that a personnel of the Court would breach the rules of strict
confidentiality76 to send to litigants or their counsel the Courts Agenda, together with handwritten notes and the internal
resolutions of the Court, without any prodding or consideration, and even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and
administrative penalties.77Respondent Peas account of having lost the envelopes appears too convenient an excuse to assuage
the Courts skepticism towards this breach of confidentiality within its own halls.
Worse, respondent Pea flaunted his continued access as recent as 2010 to other internal and confidential records in the
proceedings of this case. Despite the administrative proceedings leveled against him for having "illicitly" obtained the
confidential Agenda of the Courts First Division, he brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior by surreptiously
acquiring no less than the confidential and still unreleased OBC Report on the very administrative case of which he himself is
the subject.
In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010, 78 respondent Pea prayed that the questioned 13 November 2002
Resolution be recalled on the ground that there was a mistake in its issuance based on the copies of the Agenda he had
mysteriously received. In support of this motion, he casually cited and attached a photocopy of the confidential OBC
Report.79 This OBC Report has not been released to any party, and was then in fact still under deliberation by this Court.
Curiously, the attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to the unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as it actually
appears in the rollo of the administrative case. 80 Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in the said motion how he was able to
obtain a copy thereof.
Regardless of the means employed by respondent, his acquisition of the OBC Report from the Courts own records already
speaks of an appalling pattern of unethical behavior that the Court will no longer ignore. Even as he was the subject of an
administrative case for obtaining confidential court records, he continued to have access to other internal documents of the
Court. His actions have established that he is incorrigible and not likely to change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding
ethical standards and ignoring the rule of confidentiality of court records deserves nothing less than the ultimate penalty of
disbarment from the profession.
Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent Pea even tried to bolster his claim that the then ponente of the case had a
special interest in the case by attaching an internal resolution of the Court. 81 In the said Internal Resolution dated 04 September
2002, the two consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822) were transferred from the Third Division to the First
Division, where Justice Carpio was subsequently assigned.82 How respondent Pea was again able to secure this internal
document is another disturbing mystery in this case, especially since the resolution was sent by the Third Division Clerk of Court
22
to the First Division Clerk of Court, the Raffle Committee and the Judicial Records Office only, and not to any of the parties.
Similar to the copies of the Agenda of the First Division, respondent Pea again purportedly received this Internal Resolution by
mail.83 What is more alarming in this instance is that he received not just any photocopy of the Courts Resolution, but a pink
copy itself, the very same material used for such internal resolutions in the Courts records. As he himself admitted, respondent
Pea could not have gotten hold of the said internal Resolution, which was on its face declared an internal matter, without the
assistance of a person who had access to the records of his case in the Court.
This claimed "major anomaly" of the transfer of the case, which is being decried by respondent in the subject Motion to Inhibit,
stems from his gross misunderstanding of the internal rules of the Court.
Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions due to the retirement of other Justices, the cases already assigned
to a Member-in-Charge are required to be transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge moves.84 Hence, in this
case, Justice Carpio, similar to other members of the Court at that time, did not lose his case assignments but brought them with
him when he transferred to the First Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned cases to the new Division are made by request
from the Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is Member-in-Charge will be retained by a
Division in which he is no longer a member. Thus, the transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division that is
being heavily criticized by respondent Pea was simple compliance with the established internal procedures of the Court, and not
attributable to any undue interest or malicious intention on the part of the then ponente to retain the case for himself. Respondent
had raised "irresponsible suspicions"85 against the integrity of the ponente without any understanding of the Supreme Courts
processes in the transfer of cases.
Respondent Pea had, in fact, previously used this deplorable tactic of obtaining internal court records to call for the inhibition
of Justices of the Court. In previously moving for the inhibition of Justice Buena, he assailed how supposedly the retired Justice
violated the rules with respect to a second motion for reconsideration when the latter reinstated the Petition of the De Leon
Group in G.R. No. 145822. Respondent attributed the special treatment extended by Justice Buena to his supposed association
with the De Leon Groups counsel, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA Law Office. To establish this special treatment, he
attached a complete copy of the Minutes of the Division 86 composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases dismissed by the Court
due to failure to pay the required fees, which Justice Buena allegedly did not reinstate:
10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show that for the past several months alone, seventy-seven petitions were
dismissed by the Supreme Court, mainly for failure to pay the required fees. Out of that number, NONE WERE REINSTATED
upon the filing of a SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice Buena willingly disregarded the Rules by
reinstating petitioners petition (De Leon Group Petition in G. R. No. 145822) upon the filing of a second motion for
reconsideration, then he should have reinstated also the aforesaid 77 cases in order to be fair. At the very least, he should now
reinstate all of said 77 cases if only to show that he is not biased in favor of herein petitioners. He could not and will not do so,
however, because those cases are not favored ones. Photocopies of the case titles and numbers, as well as the resolutions
dismissing the aforesaid seventy-seven cases, consisting of 58 pages, are attached hereto collectively as Annex "A". 87
Respondent Pea was able to attach to this motion for inhibition the portions of the Courts Minutes on 12 April 2000, 07
February 2001, 12 February 2001, 14 February 2001, 26 February 2001, 28 March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April
2001, 16 May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August 2001, 13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August 2001, 05 September 2001, 24
September 2001, 08 October 2001 and others which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed to specific cases which were
dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees, among others. It was unclear if the cases were specifically assigned to Justice
Buena or if respondent Pea represented any of the parties therein.
Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained confidential Minutes of the Court pertaining to other cases, which specifically
dismissed or denied petitions on the failure of the parties to pay necessary fees. This could not have just been mere coincidence
again since it required some legal understanding and familiarity with the cases in order to be able to sift through and identify the
kinds of cases, which were dismissed or denied on such grounds. Although the parties to these cases were notified and given
copies of the Courts resolutions, what respondent Pea obtained were the actual copies of the Minutes that included other items
in the Courts Agenda and that were not released to the public. Under the Courts own Internal Rules, only the Minutes pertinent
to the parties are those that are distributed to the parties concerned. 88 Yet, respondent was able to attach wholesale Minutes of
dozens of cases to his pleading.
Although the above confidential documents that were accessed by respondent totaling 58 pages in all are not the subject of conveniently falling into respondents lap through registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer be
the investigation of the administrative case, his previous receipt or acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as 2000 traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules have been violated over and
confirm in no uncertain terms his access to internal records of the Court, not just of his case, but of other pending cases and that over again by some court personnel, whom respondent Pea now aids and abets by feigning ignorance of how the internal
this access has continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic that respondent Pea would accuse his fellow lawyers of documents could have reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation
allegedly having an "inside track" to members of the Court, when he in turn, on record, had mysteriously easy access to to the Revised Penal Code94 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Pea benefitting from the
confidential court documents. That internal documents of the Court (whether voluminous or in relation to his case or otherwise) same.95 Respondents actions clearly merit no other penalty than disbarment.
would suddenly find themselves in the hands of respondent Pea through registered mail is too incredible for this Court to
attribute any good faith on his part.
This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by the earlier imposition of an indefinite suspension. If taken together,
these two violations already speak of respondent Peas inherent unworthiness to become a member of the Bar. Although an
Even if the Court were to give some modicum of credence to the unlikely story of how respondent Pea came upon these indefinite suspension opens up the possibility of future reinstatement after a clear showing of remorse and a change of ways (as
internal documents, it looks with disapproval upon his actions with respect to those documents, which were supposedly sent to in the case of Atty. Paguia), respondent has shown to be incorrigible and no longer deserves the compassion of the Court. Not
him anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent official judicial records that are confidential in nature and not easily accessible, only has respondent thumbed his nose on the integrity of the persons occupying the Bench by casting grave aspersions of bribery
the ethical recourse for them would be to make a candid and immediate disclosure of the matter to the court concerned for proper and wrongdoing, he has also showed disdain for the sanctity of court procedures and records by his haughty display of illegal
investigation, and not as proof to further the merits of their case. In fact, respondent himself acknowledged that reporting the access to internal Supreme Court documents.
"leaked out" documents was a duty he owed to the Court 89 more so in this case, since the documents were sent anonymously
and through dubious circumstances.
C. Third Charge: Respondent Peas insinuations of wrongdoing and collusion between members of the Court and another
counsel.
No issue would have arisen with respect to his continuing fitness to be a member of the legal profession, if he had simply
reported his receipt of the "leaked" court documents, and nothing more. Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the
Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente, respondent Penas allegations of collusion between previous members of the Court
suspicious circumstances of his having obtained confidential court records; he even had the tenacity to use the documents sent
and the counsel for the De Leon Group are unfounded and contravene the ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his fellow
through suspicious means to support his request for inhibition. As a lawyer, he should have known better than to hinge his
lawyers. His actions reveal a pattern of behavior that is disconcerting and administratively punishable.
motions and pleadings on documents of questionable origins, without even verifying the authenticity of the contents by
comparing them with sources of greater reliability and credibility.
However, considering the ultimate penalty of disbarment earlier imposed on respondent Pea, the Court no longer finds the need
to squarely rule on the third charge, as any possible administrative liability on this matter would be a mere superfluity.
If respondent Pea entertained doubts as to the veracity of the Divisions actions with respect to the pending incidents in his
case, as allegedly embodied in the anonymous Agendas sent to him, then he should have simply checked the records to verify the
genuineness of the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. It is through officially released D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is not the proper subject of the present allegations of administrative
resolutions and decisions that parties and their counsel are informed of and guided by the Courts actions on pending incidents, misconduct.
and not by the confidential and handwritten notes of the individual members of the Court. Respondents wholesale reliance on
copies of the Agenda purported to be those of individual members of the Court and anonymously sent to him is grossly
The counter-charge of forum shopping has been made by respondent Pea against petitioners and their respective counsel in his
misplaced.
defense.96 However, this is already beyond the scope of the subject matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled that he
assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De Leon Group, and the other group of bank officers filed three separate Petitions (G.R.
The Court has already explained that there was in fact no discrepancy between the agreed upon action of the Division and the Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822, respectively) before the Court. They all questioned therein the rulings of the appellate court
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, contrary to the assertions of respondent Pea. He grounded the subject Motion to affirming the grant of execution pending appeal.
Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously sent copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank
should simply be noted, 90 but it was instead granted by the Court. The Court, however, made clear during the 03 March 2003
Considering that this claim is the subject of administrative penalties, and that other interested parties did not participate in the
Executive Session, that there was nothing irregular about annotating the first item with "SEE RES" (See Resolution) and
investigation conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the meantime until
marking the rest of the incidents with "N" (Noted). In fact, these annotations conform with the recommended actions submitted
the subject is fully ventilated and all parties are given an opportunity to argue their cases.
by the ponente for that particular item.91The Resolution identified in the first item governs and contains the actual disposition of
two of the incidents in the pending case.92 To be sure, what governs as the final action of the Court en banc or in Division is the
minutes of the proceedings,93 which lists the dispositions of the items taken up during the session, reviewed by the members, and The charges of forum shopping are hereby dismissed without prejudice to the filing and/or hearing of separate administrative
finally approved by the Chief Justice or the Division chairperson. Contrary to respondents suspicions, the action taken by the complaints97 against petitioners Urban Bank, Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales,
Division in its 13 November 2002 Session was accurately reflected in the questioned Resolution released by the Court. Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel of record. Considering their deaths, petitioners Teodoro
C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no longer be included in any future administrative action in relation to these matters. On
the other hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by respondent Pea and therefore, is not a real and direct party to the
Respondent Pea has no one else to blame but himself, since he "allegedly," blindly and mistakenly relied on "anonymously
case.
sent" unverified photocopies of the Courts Agenda, in order to support his call for the inhibition of a member of the Court.
Neither can he rely on the alleged "bragging" of Atty. Singson which the latter denies to impute ill motive to judicial officers.
Whether Atty. Singson actually exerted "extraordinary efforts" to secure the suspension Order or freely divulged it in their EPILOGUE
telephone conversation, respondent should have been more circumspect in making grave accusations of bribery (jokingly or not)
without any extrinsic evidence or proof to back up his claim.
As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by respondent Peas actions in the administration of justice.
In order to foreclose resort to such abhorrent practice or strategy in the future, the Court finds the need to educate the public and
Respondent Pea is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and internal court records and documents, which he the Bar.
suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal court documents has not been properly explained.
The cavalier explanation of respondent Pea that this Courts confidential documents would simply find themselves
23
Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their professional colleagues.98 They shall not, in
their professional dealings, use language that is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. 99 Lawyers shall use dignified language
in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. 100 The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions
has no place in the dignity of a judicial forum.101
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition,
make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession.
It is the duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are charged. 102
It has not escaped the Courts attention that respondent Pea has manifested a troubling history of praying for the inhibition of
several members of this Court or for the re-raffle of the case to another Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded
accusations of partiality. A sampling of his predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an
apparent bid to shop for a sympathetic ear, includes the following:
1. Peas Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban) dated 12 January 2001;
2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated 20 August 2001;
3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October 2001;
4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18 February 2002;
5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;
6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January 2003;
7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing) dated 08 July 2004;
8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura) dated 17 December 2007;
10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28 December 2004;
11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re: Justice Panganiban);
12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January 2008;
13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio T. Carpio) dated 02 June
2008;
14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J. Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;
15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Dante O. Tinga) dated
04 August 2008;
24
16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco) dated 14 August
2008;
17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices Arturo D. Brion, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated 28 August 2008;
18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January 2010;
19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno) dated 30 March 2011;
20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); and
21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September 2011 (Re: Justices Carpio, Jose Perez and Sereno).
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and sparse relations between the
parties and the members of the Court to wild accusations of partiality on mere conjectures and surmises. For example,
respondent accused former Chief Justice Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the Rotary Club, in which the late
Teodoro Borlongan, then President of Urban Bank, was likewise an officer.103 He moved for the inhibition of Justice Sereno on
the ground that she was "a close judicial ally" of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter, according to respondent, was antagonistic
toward him during the Courts 03 March 2003 Executive Session in this administrative case.104
Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled from the Courts Third Division because Justice Jose Portugal
Perez, a member thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court through the endorsement of former Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita, who was a close ally of the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former President Fidel V. Ramos. 105 He similarly
sought the inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close professional and political ties with former President Ramos.106 He
likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law school classmate and fraternity brother of
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then Presidential Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according to
respondent Pea, "President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most likely exercise his influence over the Honorable Justice
Brion."107
Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of Urban Bank because of his decision
in a related case108 and his prior appointment as Undersecretary of Education during the Ramos presidency, respondent Pea
impliedly prayed that his case be specifically retained in the Courts Third Division.109Respondents peculiar request, which was
not included in his other motions, gives the impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura inhibit himself, respondent
nonetheless did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third Division. If his only intention was to raise the possibility of bias
against Justice Nachura alone, then it would not matter whether his case remained with the Third Division, with another member
being designated to replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division altogether. Respondent Peas odd prayer in his
motion for inhibition bore signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he perceived to be friendly to him, except for one member.
In Chin v. Court of Appeals,110 the Court warned against litigants contumacious practice in successively asking for the inhibition
of judges, in order to shop for one who is more friendly and sympathetic to their cause:
We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the judiciary as an institution worthy of public trust and
confidence. But under the circumstances here, we also agree that unnecessary inhibition of judges in a case would open the
floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the first judge that TAN had asked to be
inhibited on the same allegation of prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners apprehension about
the practice of certain litigants shopping for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.
As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to disqualify themselves need not always be heeded. It is not
always desirable that they should do so. It might amount in certain cases to their being recreant about their duties. It could also
be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his persuasion.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Courts warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple and successive requests for inhibition and re-raffle filed by
respondent Pea. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in no uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a
justice, most especially in the highest tribunal of the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the reasons why this
administrative case has dragged on for years. Not only does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the Court, but it
likewise delays the administration of justice.
Oddly enough, respondent Pea has been less concerned about the inordinate delay in resolving the case than about making sure
that the "wrong" or "unfriendly" Justices in his perception do not sit and rule on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted
interruptions caused by his numerous motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case languishing in this Court for years
and clogging its dockets. Respondent stands out for this disorderly behavior and must be made an example so that litigants be
reminded that they cannot bend or toy with the rules of procedure to favor their causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less
than the rules of basic courtesy in imputing sinister motives against members of the Court.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Pea has violated several canons of professional and ethical conduct
expected from him as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to his cause of
action in this Court, no less tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded
accusations against fellow lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to obtain confidential and internal
court records and to use them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his cause.
In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination towards casually moving for the inhibition of Justices of the
Court based on unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse or contrition for his ways. Atty. Pea has shown and
displayed in these proceedings that he has fallen short of the ethical standards of the noble profession and must be sanctioned
accordingly.1wphi1
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing to give
due respect to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea is hereby DISBARRED from the practice
of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and other copies
thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to secure copies of the following: (a) copies
of the Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of the Courts First Division, attached as Annexes "B" and "C" of respondent Peas
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003; (b) the Internal
Resolution dated 04 September 2002, attached as Annex "D" of the same motion; (c) the Report and Recommendation dated 11
December 2007, issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as Annex "5" of respondent Peas Motion to Vacate/Recall
dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex "A" of the Reply (to
Petitioners Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit) dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Pea. She is further
required to SUBMIT such an investigation report with recommendations on the administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any,
of all court personnel possibly involved therein, as well as suggestions for protecting confidential and internal court documents
of pending cases within NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.
A.M. No. 12-6-11-SC June 13, 2012
RE: LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST HON. JUSTICES ANTONIO T. CARPIO AND MARIA LOURDES P.A.
SERENO DATED SEPTEMBER 16, 2011 FILED BY ATTY. MAGDALENO M. PEA
DECISION
25
PER CURIAM:
In 1996 complainant Magdaleno M. Pea filed an action against Urban Bank and certain members of its Board of Directors
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bago City, Negros Occidental, for recovery of agents compensation and attorneys
fees allegedly for services he rendered in evicting the occupants of a bank property in Pasay City. The RTC rendered judgment
in the case, ordering defendants to pay Pea 28.5 million as compensation, attorneys fees, reimbursement of expenses, and
exemplary damages plus costs of suit.
The bank appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) but Pea succeeded in getting the RTC to allow execution of the
decision in his favor pending appeal. The defendants challenged the advance execution before the CA with the result that the
latter rendered judgment, stopping and annulling the same. On motion, however, the CA amended its decision and allowed
execution pending appeal because the bank in the meantime ran into financial difficulties.
Nevertheless, the CA stayed the execution insofar as three defendant directors were concerned after they posted a 40 million
bond in Peas favor. Because the stay did not cover Urban Bank and the rest of its directors, the sheriff levied on and sold some
of their properties, including the banks club shares in Makati Sports Club, Inc. (MSCI).
In any event, with the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the defendants affected by the execution pending appeal filed
separate petitions for review of the CAs amended decision before this Court in G.R. 145817, 145818,1and 145822, which were
eventually consolidated and assigned to the Courts Member-in-Charge to whom the lower number was raffled, namely, to
Justice Antonio T. Carpio.
Following the lead of the three defendant directors, Urban Bank filed with this Court a motion to approve a 40 million
supersedeas bond for the stay of the execution of the RTC decision pending adjudication of its appeal in the main case. The
Court granted the motion by its resolution of November 19, 2001 that reads:
Considering the motion of petitioner Urban Bank, Inc. in G.R. No. 145817 to approve the attached supersedeas bond issued by
the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. in the amount of 40,000,000.00, posted by petitioner bank to secure the claims of respondent
against petitioner and to stay the execution pending appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Branch 62,
in Civil Case No. 754, entitled "Atty. Magdaleno M. Pea vs. Urban Bank, Inc., et al.," as well as the opposition thereto of
respondent Magdaleno M. Pea, the Court resolves to [1] GRANT the motion; [2] APPROVE the supersedeas bond; and [3]
ORDER the stay of execution pending appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bago City, Branch 62, in Civil Case
No. 754 as against petitioner.
With the issuance of the above resolution, Export and Industry Bank (EIB), Urban Banks successor in interest, requested
MSCIs corporate secretary not to cancel or transfer Urban Banks club shares which were previously sold at public auction.
Because of ensuing disputes between EIB and those who won the bids, on February 4, 2002 MSCI sought clarification from the
Court on whether its November 19, 2001 resolution prohibited MSCI from transferring Urban Banks shares to the winning
bidders. Urban Bank itself filed an identical motion for clarification dated August 6, 2002.
On November 13, 2002 the Court, acting on the two motions, stated that its approval of the supersedeas bond "suspended or
stayed" the running of the one-year period for the Bank to redeem the properties sold at public auction and prohibited the
transfer of Union Banks MSCI club shares to the winning bidders.
On December 10, 2002 Pea filed an urgent omnibus motion to expunge the banks motion for clarification and recall the
Courts November 13, 2002 resolution on the ground that he was neither furnished a copy of that motion nor given an
opportunity to be heard on it.
On January 30, 2003 Pea also filed an urgent motion to Inhibit and to resolve his urgent omnibus motion, enclosing as Annexes
B and C purported photocopies of pages 61 and 62 of the Courts November 13, 2002 supplemental agenda (First Division),
internal documents that are regarded as highly confidential. Both annexes had marginal handwritten notes on the right side which
supposedly recorded the Courts action on the items listed on the agenda. Annex B had on its left margin the handwritten note
that says: "10 AC." AC are the initials of Justice Antonio T. Carpio to whom the corresponding items were assigned as Member- released the resolution for dissemination on November 14, days before Atty. Singson faxed a copy to Pea. Moreover, it was the
in-Charge. Division Clerk of Court, not Justice Carpio, who had the duty to release decisions and resolutions for dissemination. 2

Pea alleged that, based on the handwritten notes on the right hand margin of the November 13, 2002 supplemental agenda, the
Court merely took note of the filing of the motion for clarification, listed as Item 175 (f), and did not act further on it.
Consequently, the resolution bearing that date, which granted the motion, had been falsified.
Bothered by Peas statements involving strictly confidential documents, the First Division of the Court summoned him to
appear before it on March 3, 2003. The purpose of the hearing was to find out where he got his Annexes and if they were
authentic. The members of the Division told him outright that, while his Annex B was a copy of the printed agenda, the
handwritten notations on the same did not belong to any of the Justices of the First Division.
On April 28, 2003 the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) to conduct a formal investigation of Atty. Pea for
submitting a falsified document, Annex B, to the Court and to submit its findings and recommendations. On the basis of the
OBCs initial Report of August 1, 2003 and upon resolution of the Court dated December 10, 2003, a formal charge of
falsification was filed against Pea in A.C. 6332, entitled Re: Supreme Court Resolution dated April 28, 2003.
On September 19, 2011 Pea filed the present complaint against Justices Carpio and Sereno. Pea averred that Justice Carpio, as
Member-in-Charge of the consolidated cases, caused the issuance of the falsified November 13, 2002 resolution which
suspended and stayed the transfer of MSCIs club shares from Urban Bank to those who won them in the bidding. Pea repeated
his claim that the Court merely took note of Urban Banks motion for clarification and did not grant it. Pea also pointed out that
opposing counsel, Atty. Manuel Singson, got an advance copy of the November 13 resolution, and faxed it to him on November
19, 2002, days before the Court released it for mailing.
In the case at bar, complainant also seeks disciplinary action against Justice Carpio for allegedly taking cognizance of Urban
Banks Motion for Clarification of which respondent was allegedly not furnished a copy of, and for issuing the November 13,
2002 clarificatory resolution without first requiring complainant to comment on Urban Banks Motion. Moreover, the November
13, 2002 resolution allegedly caused irreparable damage to complainant and other auction buyers and destroyed the credibility
and sanctity of valid auction sales.
Judicial remedies were available to complainant in the main cases.1wphi1 In fact, the allegations in the present complaint are a
mere rehash of the allegations in complainants Urgent Omnibus Motion (To Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the
13 November 2002 Resolution) dated December 9, 2002 and Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondents Urgent
Omnibus Motion dated January 30, 2003 filed in the main cases, which, in fact, have already been decided on October 19, 2011.
Pea charges Justice Sereno of unfairly refusing to inhibit herself from taking part in the deliberation in the main cases
notwithstanding that Justice Carpios former law office supposedly worked for her appointment in the Supreme Court. But the
Court had already found in its April 17, 2012 per curiam decision in A.C. No. 6332 that this charge has no "extrinsic factual
evidence to support it." The charge is purely conjectural.
WHEREFORE, Magdaleno M. Peas complaint against Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. L-40424 June 30, 1980

With respect to Justice Sereno, Pea alleged that, as Member-in-Charge to whom the main cases were re-raffled, she
R. MARINO CORPUS, petitioner,
unjustifiably refused to inhibit herself from the case notwithstanding that Justice Carpios former law office, the Villaraza Cruz
vs.
Marcelo Angangco Law Office, had a significant role in her appointment to the Supreme Court. Pea said that, because of this,
COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN T. DAVID, respondents
Justice Sereno "will attempt to protect Justice Carpio."

Pending consideration of Peas present complaint, on October 19, 2011 the Second Division rendered a decision in the
consolidated cases (G.R. 145817, 145822, and 162562) respecting the merits of Peas claim for compensation, among others,
against Urban Bank and the execution pending appeal of the RTCs decision. Apart from disposing of the principal actions on MAKASIAR, J.:
their merits, in the per curiam Decision of the Court en banc promulgated on April 17, 2012 in A.C. No. 6332, the Court found
Pea guilty for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to the
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on February 14, 1975 in CA-G.R.
Courts and his fellow lawyers, and meted out to him the penalty of disbarment.
No. 40583-R, affirming the decision of the court of Instance of Manila, Branch V. dated september 4, 1967, in Civil Case no.
61802 entitled "Juan T. David,plaintiff, versus R. Mariano Corpus, defendant', for the recovery of attorneys fees for professional
Pea claimed that Justice Carpio caused the issuance of the Courts November 13, 2002 resolution that granted Union Banks services rendered by the plaintiff, private respondent herein, to defendant, petitioner herein.
motion for clarification when, based on the copy of the supplemental agenda he submitted (his Annex B), the Court merely noted
the motion. But this charge has no basis. The Court did not merely note the motion. The item in the agenda included several
A
matters. The Courts action on the first, as the Division chairman noted on his copy of the agenda, was "SEE RES" which in the
Courts action code meant the approval during its session of the draft resolution that the Member-in-Charge submitted for
consideration. As it happened, the draft resolution granted the motion for clarification. Having been close friends, aside from being membres Civil Liberties Union, petitioner Corpus intimately calls respondent David
by his nickname "Juaning" and the latter addresses the former simply as "Marino".
The Courts action on the other matters in the item, including the motion for clarification, was uniformly "N." Under the code in
use, this meant that the Court was taking note of such other matters. The two actions, approving the submitted draft of a The factual setting of this case is stated in the decision of the lower court, thus:
resolution and noting the other matters are compatible. The Court noted the motion for clarification and granted it as stated in the
draft resolution.
It appears that in March, 1958, the defendant was charged administratively by several employee of the
Central Bank Export Department of which the defendant is the director. The defendant was represented by
Pea also sought to ascribe to Justice Carpio the alleged fact that Atty. Singson, counsel for Urban Bank, got an advance copy of Atty. Rosauro Alvarez. Pending the investigation and effective March 18, 1958, he defendant was
the November 13, 2002 resolution and faxed it to him on November 19, days before the Court released it for mailing. But, Pea suspended from office. After the investigating committee found the administrative charges to be without
has been unable to show that this advance copy came from Justice Carpio. Besides, the record shows that the First Division merit, and subsequently recommended the immediate reinstatement of the defendant, the then Governor of
Central Bank, Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., recommended that the defendant be considered resigned as on the

26
ground that he had lost confidence in him. The Monetary Board, by a resolution of July 20, 1959, declared On November 15, 1960, Judge Lantin denied the motion for reconsideration. On November 19, 1960, the
the defendant as resigned as of the date of suspension. plaintiff perfected the appeal from the order of dismissal dated June 14, 1960. For purposes of said appeal
the plaintiff prepared a 232-page brief and submitted the same before the Supreme Court in Baguio City
on April 20, 1961. The plaintiff was the one who orally argued the case before the Supreme Court. In
On August 18, 1959, the defendant, thru Atty. Alvarez, filed the Court of First Instance of Manila a
connection with the trip to Baguio for the said oral argument, the plaintiff used his car hich broke down
petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto with preliminary mandatory injuction and damages
and necessitated extensive repairs paid for by the plaintiff himself.
against Miguel Cuaderno, Sr., the Central Bank and Mario Marcos who was appointed to the position of
the defendant, said case having been docketed as Civil Case No. 41226 and assigned to Branch VII
presided over by Judge Gregorio T. Lantin. On September 7, 1959, the respondent filed a motion to On March 30, 1962, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision reversing the order of dismissal and
dismiss the petition, alleging among other grounds, the failure of the defendant to exhaust, available remanding the case for further proceedings. On April 18, 1962, after the promulgation of the decision of
administrative remedies (Exh. X). On September 25, 1959, the defendant, thru Atty. Alvarez, filed his the Supreme Court reversing the dismissal of the case the defendant wrote the plaintiff the following
opposition to the said motion. On March 17, 1960, during the course of the presentation of the evidence letter, Exhibit 'Q'. .
for the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, Atty. Alvarez manifested that the defendant
was abandoning his prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and asked for a ruling on the
xxxxxxxxx
motion to dismiss. On June 14, 1960, Judge Lantin dismissed Civil Case No. 41226 for failure to exhaust
she administrative remedies available to the herein defendant.
Dear Juaning
On June 24, 1960, Atty. Alverez received a copy of the order of dismissal It was at this state that the
plaintiff entered into the case under circumstances about which the parties herein have given divergent Will you please accept the attached check in the amount of TWO THOUSAND P2,000.00) PESOS for
versions. legal services in the handling of L-17860 recently decided by the Court? I wish I could give more but as
y u know we were banking on a SC decision reinstating me and reimburse my backstage I had been
wanting to offer some token of my appreciation of your legal fight for and in my behalf, and it was only
According to the plaintiff, six or seven days prior to the expiration of the period for appeal from the order
last week that I received something on account of a pending claim.
of dismissal, he chanced to meet the late Rafael Corpus, father of the defendant, at the Taza de Oro coffee
shop. After they talked about the defendant's having lost his case before Judge Lantin, and knowing that
the plaintiff and the defendant were both members of the Civil Liberties Union, Rafael Corpus requested Looking forward to a continuation of the case in the lower court, I remain
the plaintiff to go over the case and further said that he would send his son, the herein defendant, to the
plaintiff to find out what could be done about the case. The defendant called up the plaintiff the following
Sincerely yours, Illegible
morning for an appointment, and the plaintiff agreed to am him in the latter's office. At said conference,
the defendant requested the plaintiff to handle the case because Atty. Alvarez had already been
disenchanted and wanted to give up the case. Although at first reluctant to handle the case, the plaintiff xxxxxxxxx
finally agreed on condition that he and Atty. Alverez would collaborate in the case.
In a reply letter dated April 25, 1962, the plaintiff returned the check, explaining said act as follows:
The defendant's version of how the plaintiff came into the case is as follows:
April 25, 1962
After the order of dismissal issued by Judge Lantin was published in the newspapers, the plaintiff sought a
conference with the defendant at Taza de Oro, but the defendant told him that he would rather meet the
plaintiff at the Swiss Inn. Even before the case was dismissed the plaintiff had shown interest in the same My dear Marino:
by being present during the hearings of said case in the sala of Judge Lantin When the plaintiff and the
defendant met at the Swiss Inn, the plaintiff handed the defendant a memorandum prepared by him on Yesterday, I received your letter of April 18th with its enclosure. I wished thank you for your kind
how he can secure the reversal of the order of dismissal by means of a formula stated in said thoughts, however, please don't take offense if I have to return the check. I will explain.
memorandum. During the said occasion the plaintiff scribbled some notes on a paper napkin (Exhibit 19).
On June 28, 1960, the defendant wrote the plaintiff, sending with it a copy of the order of Judge Lantin
dated June 14, 1960 (Exhibit S Inasmuch as said letter, Exhibit S already mentions the 'memorandum' of When I decided to render professional services in your case, I was motivated by the value to me of the
the plaintiff, the defendant contends that it was not six or seven days prior to the expiration of the period very intimate relations which you and I have enjoyed during the past many years. It was nor primarily, for
of appeal (which should be on or about July 2 or 3, 1960) but on a date even earlier than June 28, 1960 a professional fee.
that the plaintiff and the defendant met together to discuss the latter's case.
Although we were not fortunate to have obtained a decision in your case which should have put an end to
Laying aside for the moment the true circumstances under which the plaintiff started rendering it. I feel that we have reason to be jubilant over the outcome, because, the final favorable outcome of the
professional services to the defendant, the undisputed evidence shows that on July 7, 1960, the plaintiff case seems certain irrespective of the length of time required to terminate the same.
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal under the joint signatures of the plaintiff and
Atty. Alverez (Exhibit B). The plaintiff argued the said motion during the hearing thereof On August 8, Your appreciation of the efforts I have invested in your case is enough compensation therefor, however,
1960, he file a 13-page 'Memorandum of Authorities in support of said motion for reconsideration when you shall have obtained a decision which would have finally resolved the case in your favor,
(Exhibit C). A 3-page supplemental memorandum of authorities was filed by the plaintiff on September 6, remembering me then will make me happy. In the meantime, you will make me happier by just keeping the
1960 (Exhibit D) check.

27
 Sincerely yours, 2. Assuming that plaintiff is entitled to compensation in holding that he was entitled to attorney's fees
in the amount of P30,000.00 when at most he would be entitled to only P2,500.00;
JUANING
3. In not dismissing plaintiff's complaint; and
xxxxxxxxx
4. In not awarding damages and attorney's fees to the defendant (p. 2, CA Decision, p. 26, rec.)
When the case was remanded for further proceedings before Judge Lantin, the evidence for the defendant
was presented by Atty. 'Alvarez with the plaintiff cooperating in the same-'On June 24, 1963, Judge Lantin Likewise, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David, plaintiff therein, appealed to the Court of Appeals on October 9, 1967
rendered his decision in favor of the defendant declaring illegal the resolution of the Monetary Board of assigning one error, to wit:
July 20, 1959, and ordering the defendant's reinstatement and the payment of his back salaries and
allowances - The respondents in said Civil Case No. 41226 filed a motion for reconsideration which was
The lower court erred in ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff only the sum of P30,000.00 in the
opposed by the herein plaintiff. The said decision was appealed by the respondents, as well as by the
concept of attorney's fees (p. 1, CA Decision, p. 25, rec.).
herein defendant with respect to the award of P5, 000. 00 attorney's feed The plaintiff prepared two briefs
for submission to the Court of Appeals one as appellee (Exhibit H) and the other as appellant (Exhibit H-
1). The Court of Appeal however, certified the case to the Supreme Court in 1964. On February 14, 1975, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the decision of the lower court,
with costs against petitioner Marino Corpus (Annex A, Petition for Certiorari, p. 25, rec.)
On March 31, 1965, the Supreme Court rendered a decision affirming the judgment of the Court of first
Instance of Manila. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari, petitioner contending that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
finding that petitioner accepted private respondent's services "with the understanding of both that he (private respondent) was to
be compensated" in money; and that the fee of private respondent was contingent (pp. 3 & 5, Petition for Certiorari, pp. 17 & 19,
On April 19, 1965 the plaintiffs law office made a formal de command upon the defendant for collection of
rec.).
50% of the amount recovered by the defendant as back salaries and other emoluments from the Central
Bank (Exhibit N). This letter was written after the defendant failed to appear at an appointment with the
plaintiff so that they could go together to the Central Bank to claim the possession of the office to which On October 1, 1975, the case was deemed submitted for decision (p. 177, rec.), after the parties filed their respective
the defendant was reinstated and after a confrontation in the office of the plaintiff wherein the plaintiff memoranda.
was remanding 50% of the back salaries and other emoluments amounting to P203,000.00 recoverable by
the defendant. The defendant demurred to this demand inasmuch as he had plenty of outstanding
B
obligations and that his tax liability for said back salaries was around P90,000.00, and that he expected
to net only around P10,000.00 after deducting all expenses and taxes.
On January 31, 1978, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed a petition to remand the case to the court a quo for execution
of the latter's decision in Civil Case No. 61802, dated September 4, 1967, alleging that said decision is already deemed affirmed
On the same date, April 19,1965 the plaintiff wrote the Governor for of Central Bank requesting that the
pursuant to Section 11(2), Article X of the New Constitution by reason of the failure of this Tribunal to decide the case within 18
amount representing the sack salaries of the defendant be made out in two one in favor of the defendant
months. Then on July 7, 1978, another petition to remand the case to the lower court to execution was filed by herein private
and the other representing the professional fees equivalent to 50% of the said back salaries being claimed
respondent.
by the plaintiff (Exhibit 8). F to obtain the relief from the Governor of Central Bank, the plaintiff
instituted this action before this Court on July 20, 1965 (Emphasis supplied).
Subsequently, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed with The court a quo a motion dated September 13, 1978 for the
issuance of a writ of execution of the lower court's decision in the aforesaid civil case, also invoking Section 11 (2), Article X of
As therein defendant, herein petitioner Marino Corpus filed in August 5, 1965 an answer with counter-claim. On August 30,
the 1973 Constitution. In an order dated September 19, 1978, the lower court, through Judge Jose H. Tecson, directed the
1965, private respondent Atty. Juan T. David, plaintiff therein, filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim of petitioner.
issuance of a writ of execution. The writ of execution was issued on October 2, 1978 and a notice of garnishment was also issued
n October 13, 1978 to garnish the bank deposits of herein petitioner Marino Corpus in the Commercial Bank and Trust
After due trial, the lower court rendered judgment on September 4, 1967, the dispositive portion of which reads: Company, Makati Branch.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of It appears that on October 13, 1978, herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 19, 1978 order. Private
P30,000.00 in the concept of professional fees, and to pay the costs (pp. 112-113, CA Record on Appeal p. respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on October 19, 1978 an opposition to said motion and herein petitioner filed a reply on
54, rec.) October 30, 1978. The lower court denied said motion for reconsideration in its over dated November 7, 1978.

After receipt on September 7, 1967 of a copy of the aforequoted judgment, petitioner Marino Corpus, defendant therein, filed on It appears also that in a letter dated October 18, 1978, herein petitioner Marino Corpus requested this Court to inquire into what
October 7, 1967 a notice of appeal from said judgment to the Court of Appeals. In his appeal, he alleged that the lower court appears to be an irregularity in the issuance of the aforesaid garnishment notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust Company, by
erred: virtue of which his bank deposits were garnished and he was prevented from making withdrawals from his bank account.

1. In not holding that the plaintiff's professional services were offered and rendered gratuitously; In OUR resolution of November 3, 1978, WE required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David and the Commercial Bank and
Trust Company to comment on petitioner's letter, and for the bank to explain why it did not honor petitioner's withdrawals from

28
his bank deposits when no garnishment order has been issued by the Supreme Court. This Court further inquired from the lower
court whether it has issued any garnishment order during the pendency of the present case.
On November 27, 1978, the Commercial Bank and Trust Company filed its comment which was noted in the Court's resolution
of December 4, 1978. In said resolution, the Court also required Judge Jose H. Tecson to comply with the resolution of
November 3, 1978, inquiring as to whether he had issued any garnishment order, and to explain why a writ of execution was
issued despite the pendency of the present case before the Supreme Court.
Further, WE required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David Lo explain his failure to file his comment, and to file the same as
directed by the resolution of the Court dated November 3, 1978. Private respondent's compliance came on December 13, 1978,
requesting to be excused from the filing of his comment because herein petitioner's letter was unverified. Judge Tecson's
compliance was filed on December 15, 1978, to which herein petitioner replied on January 11, 1979.
In OUR resolution dated January 3, 1979, WE set aside the order of Judge Jose H. Tecson dated September 19, 1978, the writ of
execution as well as the notice of garnishment, and required private respondent Atty. Juan T. David to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for his failure to file his comment as directed by the resolution of the Court dated December 4,
1978, and for filing a motion for execution knowing that the case is pending appeal and review before this Court Likewise, the
Court required Judge Jose H. Tecson to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for issuing an order directing the
issuance of a writ of execution and for issuing such writ despite the pendency of the present case in the Supreme Court.
On January 12, 1979, Judge Jose H. Tecson filed his compliance explanation as directed by the aforesaid resolution of January 3,
1979, while private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on January 30, 19 79 his compliance and motion for reconsideration
after the Court has granted him an extension of time to file his compliance.
Private respondent Atty. Juan T. David filed on February 28, 1979, a petition praying that the merits of his compliance be
resolved by the Court en banc. Subsequently, on March 26, 1979, another petition was filed by herein private respondent asking
the Chief
Justice and the members of the First Division to inhibit themselves from participating in the determination of the merits of his
compliance and for its merits to be resolved by the Court en banc.
C P10,000.00 (p. 44, rec.). This admission serves only to further emphasize the fact that petitioner Corpus was aware all the time
The main thrust of this petition for review is whether or not private respondent Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorney's fees.
Petitioner Marino Corpus contends that respondent David is not entitled to attorney's fees because there was no contract to that
effect. On the other hand, respondent David contends that the absence of a formal contract for the payment of the attorney's fees
will not negate the payment thereof because the contract may be express or implied, and there was an implied understanding
between the petitioner and private respondent that the former will pay the latter attorney's fees when a final decision shall have
been rendered in favor of the petitioner reinstating him to -his former position in the Central Bank and paying his back salaries.
I
WE find respondent David's position meritorious. While there was express agreement between petitioner Corpus and respondent
David as regards attorney's fees, the facts of the case support the position of respondent David that there was at least an implied
agreement for the payment of attorney's fees.
Petitioner's act of giving the check for P2,000.00 through his aforestated April 18, 1962 letter to respondent David indicates
petitioner's commitment to pay the former attorney's fees, which is stressed by expressing that "I wish I could give more but as
you know we were banking on a SC decision reinstating me and reimbursing my back salaries This last sentiment constitutes a
promise to pay more upon his reinstatement and payment of his back salaries. Petitioner ended his letter that he was "looking
29
forward to a continuation of the case in the lower court, ... to which the certiorari-mandamus-quo warranto case was remanded
by the Supreme Court for further proceedings.
Moreover, respondent David's letter-reply of April 25, 1962 confirms the promise of petitioner Corpus to pay attorney's fees
upon his reinstatement and payment of back salaries. Said reply states that respondent David decided to be his counsel in the
case because of the value to him of their intimate relationship over the years and "not, primarily, for a professional fee." It is
patent then, that respondent David agreed to render professional services to petitioner Corpus secondarily for a professional fee.
This is stressed by the last paragraph of said reply which states that "however, when you shall have obtained a decision which
would have finally resolved the case in your favor, remembering me then will make me happy. In the meantime, you will make
me happier by just keeping the check." Thereafter, respondent David continued to render legal services to petitioner Corpus, in
collaboration with Atty. Alverez until he and Atty. Alvarez secured the decision directing petitioner's reinstatement with back
salaries, which legal services were undisputedly accepted by, and benefited petitioner.
Moreover, there is no reason to doubt respondent David's assertion that Don Rafael Corpus, the late father of petitioner Corpus,
requested respondent to help his son, whose suit for reinstatement was dismissed by the lower court; that pursuant to such
request, respondent conferred in his office with petitioner, who requested respondent to handle the case as his lawyer, Atty.
Alvarez, was already disenchanted and wanted to give up the case; and that respondent agreed on the case. It would have been
unethical for respondent to even offer his services when petitioner had a competent counsel in the person of Atty. Alvarez, who
has been teaching political, constitutional and administrative law for over twenty years.
Likewise, it appears that after the Supreme Court affirmed on March 31, 1965 the order of the lower court reinstating petitioner
Corpus with back salaries and awarding attorney's fees of P5,000.00, respondent David made a written demand on April 19,
1965 upon petitioner Corpus for the payment of his attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 50% of what was paid as back
salaries (Exh. N p. 75, Folder of Exhibits, Civil Case No. 61802). Petitioner Corpus, in his reply dated May 7, 1965 to the
aforesaid written demand, while disagreeing as to the amount of attorney's fees demanded, did not categorically deny the right of
respondent David to attorney's fees but on the contrary gave the latter the amount of P2,500.00, which is one-half () of the
court-awarded attorney's fees of P5,000.00, thus impliedly admitting the right of respondent David to attorney's fees (Exh. K, p.
57, Folder of Exhibits, Civil Case No. 61802).
It is further shown by the records that in the motion filed on March 5, 1975 by petitioner Corpus before the Court of Appeals for
the reconsideration of its decision the order of the lower court granting P30,000.00 attorney's fee's to respondent David, he
admitted that he was the first to acknowledge that respondent David was entitled to tion for legal services rendered when he sent
the chock for P2,000.00 in his letter of April 18, 1962, and he is still to compensate the respondent but only to the extent of
that he was liable to pay attorney's fees to respondent David which is therefore inconsistent with his position that the services of
respondent David were gratuitous, which did not entitle said respondent to compensation.
It may be advanced that respondent David may be faulted for not reducing the agreement for attorney's fees with petitioner
Corpus in writing. However, this should be viewed from their special relationship. It appears that both have been friends for
several years and were co-members of the Civil Liberties Union. In addition, respondent David and petitioner's father, the late
Rafael Corpus, were also close friends. Thus, the absence of an express contract for attorney's fees between respondent David
and petitioner Corpus is no argument against the payment of attorney's fees, considering their close relationship which signifies
mutual trust and confidence between them.
II
Moreover, the payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may also be justified by virtue of the innominate contract of facio
ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another."
innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article 1307 that such
contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of obligations and contracts,
by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people. The rationale of this article was
stated in the 1903 case of Perez vs. Pomar (2 Phil. 982). In that case, the Court sustained the claim of plaintiff Perez for payment
of services rendered against defendant Pomar despite the absence of an express contract to that effect, thus:
 It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between the parties for the employment of the
plaintiff as interpreter, or that any other innominate contract was entered into but
whethertheplaintiffsservicesweresolicitedorwhethertheywereoffered to the defendant for his assistance,
inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a
tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the obligation upon the
person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render
service as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the service rendered, is thereby
incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code).
xxxxxxxxx
... Whether the service was solicited or offered, the fact remains that Perez rendered to Pomar services as
interpreter. As it does not appear that he did this gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, he
having accepted the benefit of the service, to pay a just compensation therefor, by virtue of the innominate
contract of facio ut des implicitly established.
xxxxxxxxx
... because it is a well-known principle of law that no one should permitted to enrich himself to the
damage of another" (emphasis supplied; see also Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 388, Vol. IV
119621, citing Estate of Reguera vs. Tandra 81 Phil. 404 [1948]; Arroyo vs. Azur 76 Phil. 493119461;
and Perez vs. Pomar. 2 Phil. 682 [1903]).
WE reiterated this rule in Pacific Merchandising Corp. vs. Consolacion Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (73 SCRA 564 [1976])
citing the case of Perez v. Pomar, supra thus:
Where one has rendered services to another, and these services are accepted by the latter, in the absence of
proof that the service was rendered gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a reasonable
remuneration therefor because 'it is a well-known principle of law, that no one should be permitted to
enrich himself to the damage of another (emphasis supplied).
Likewise, under American law, the same rule obtains (7 CJS 1079; FL Still & Co. v. Powell, 114 So 375).
III
There was no contract for contingent fee between Corpus and respondent David. Contingent fees depend on an express contract
therefor. Thus, "an attorney is not entitled to a percentage of the amount recovered by his client in the absence of an express
contract to that effect" (7 C.J.S. 1063 citing Thurston v. Travelers Ins. Co., 258 N.W. 66, 128 Neb. 141).
Where services were rendered without any agreement whatever as to the amount or terms of
compensation, the attorney is not acting under a contract for a contingent fee, and a letter by the attorney
to the client stating that a certain sum would be a reasonable amount to charge for his services and adding
that a rate of not less than five percent nor more than ten would be reasonable and customary does not
convert the original agreement into a contract for a contingent fee (7 C.J.S. 1063 citing Fleming v. Phinizy
134 S.E. 814).
While there was no express contract between the parties for the payment of attorney's fees, the fact remains that respondent
David rendered legal services to petitioner Corpus and therefore as aforestated, is entitled to compensation under the innominate
contract of facio lit des And such being the case, respondent David is entitled to a reasonable compensation.
IV
30
In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to respondent David as compensation for his services, on a quantum meruit basis, it is
proper to consider all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case particularly the following:
The extent of the services rendered by respondent David should be considered together with the extent of the services of
Petitioner's other counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, It is undisputed that Atty. Rosauro Alvarez had rendered legal services as
principal counsel for more shall six (6) years while respondent David has rendered legal services as collaborating counsel for
almost four (4) years. It appears that Atty. Alvarez started to render legal services after the administrative case was filed on
March 7, 1958 against petitioner Corpus. He represented petitioner Corpus in the hearing of said case which was conducted from
May 5, 1958 to October 8, 1958, involving 56 sessions, and this resulted in the complete exoneration by the Investigating
Committee of all the charges against the petitioner. It appears further that after the Monetary Board, in its resolution of July 20,
1959, declared petitioner Corpus as being considered resigned from the service, Atty. Alvarez instituted on August 18, 1958
Civil Case No. 41126 in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the setting aside of the aforestated resolution and for the
reinstatement of petitioner Corpus. Atty. Alvarez actively participated in the proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent David entered his appearance as counsel for petitioner Corpus sometime after the dismissal on
June 14, 1960 of the aforesaid civil case. From the time he entered his appearance, both he and Atty. Alvarez rendered legal
services to petitioner Corpus in connection with the appeals of the aforementioned civil case to the Court of Appeals and to the
Supreme Court. The records disclose that in connection with the appeal from the June 14, 1960 order of dismissal, respondent
David prepared and signed pleadings although the same were made for and on behalf of Atty. Alvarez and himself And it is not
far-fetched to conclude that all appearances were made by both counsels considering that Atty. Alverez was the principal counsel
and respondent David was the collaborating counsel. Thus, when the case was called for oral argument on April 20, 1961 before
the Supreme Court, respondent David and Atty. Alverez appeared for petitioner Corpus although it was David who orally argued
the case.
When the Supreme Court, in its decision of March 30, 1962, remanded the case to the lower court for further it was Atty.
Alverez who conducted the presentation of evidence while respondent David assisted him The records also review that
respondent David prepared and signed for Atty. Alverez and himself. certain pleadings, including a memorandum. Moreover,
after the lower court rendered judgment on June 2 4, 1963 ordering the reinstatement and payment of back salaries to petitioner
Corpus and awarding him P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, both petitioner Corpus and the respondents in said case appealed
the judgment. At that stage, respondent David again prepared and signed for Atty. Alvarez and himself, the necessary pleadings,
including two appeal briefs. And in addition, he made oral arguments in the hearings of motions filed in the lower court before
the records of the case were forwarded to the appellate court. Furthermore, while it appears that it was Atty. Alvarez who laid
down the basic theory and foundation of the case of petitioner Corpus in the administrative case and later in the civil case,
respondent David also advanced legal propositions. Petitioner Corpus contends that said legal propositions were invariably
rejected by the courts. This is, however, of no moment because the fact remains that respondent David faithfully rendered legal
services for the success of petitioner's case.
The benefits secured for petitioner Corpus may also be considered in ascertaining what should be the compensation of
respondent David. It cannot be denied that both Atty. Alvarez and respondent David were instrumental in obtaining substantial
benefits for petitioner Corpus which consisted primarily of his reinstatement, recovery of back salaries and the vindication of his
honor and reputation. But, note should also be taken of the fact that respondent David came at the crucial stage when the case of
petitioner Corpus was dismissed by the lower court.
Atty. Rosauro Alvarez admittedly was paid by petitioner Corpus the sum of P20,000.00 or at most P22,500.00 (T.s.n., Jan. 11,
1967, pp. 34-35; T.s.n., Feb. 10, 1967, pp. 48-49). On the other hand, petitioner Corpus, after WE suggested on August 15, 1975
that they settle the case amicably has, in his September 15, 1975 pleading filed before this Court (p. 166, rec.), manifested his
willingness to pay P10,000.00 for the services of respondent David. However, respondent David has not manifested his intention
to accept the offer.
In his complaint in the instant case, he asked for P75,000.00 as his attorney's fees. The records reveal that petitioner Corpus
actually received only P150,158.50 as back salaries and emoluments after deducting taxes as well as retirement and life
insurance premiums due to the GSIS. The amount thus claimed by respondent David represents 50% of the amount actually
received by petitioner Corpus. The lower court, however, awarded only P30,000.00 and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Considering the aforestated circumstances, WE are of the opinion that the reasonable compensation of respondent David should preferential attention by this Tribunal like habeas corpus cases, labor cases and c cases involving death sentence, let alone cases
be P20,000.00. involving properties and property rights of poor litigants pending decision or resolution long before the New Constitution of
1973. Nobility and exempt forbearance were expected of Atty. David, who is old and experienced in the practice of the legal
profession, from which he has derived a great measure. of economic well-being and independence
V

Consequently, the filing of the motion for immediate tion and the issuance of the writ of execution constitute a defiance and
WE find private respondent Juan T. David and Judge Jose H. Tecson, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
usurpation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As a disciplinary measure for the preservation and vindication of the dignity
Branch V, guilty of contempt of court.
of this Supreme Tribunal respondent Atty. Juan T. David should be REPRIMANDED for his precipitate action of filing a motion
for execution as well as Judge Jose H. Tecson for his improvident issuance of a writ of execution while the case is pending
Respondent David filed on or about September 13, 1978 a motion with the court a quo for the issuance of a writ of execution to appeal before the Supreme Court, and a repetition of said acts would be dealt with more severely.
enforce its decision in Civil Case No 61802, subject of the present petition, knowing fully well that it was then still pending
appeal before this Court. In addition, no certification that the aforesaid decision is already deemed affirmed had as yet been
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER R. MARINO CORPUS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN T.
issued by the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 11, paragraph 2, Article X of the New Constitution; because respondent David's
DAVID THE SUM OF TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.
petitions filed with the Supreme Court on January 31, 1978 and on July 7, 1978 to remand the case to the trial court for
execution and for the issuance of such certification had not yet been acted upon as the same were still pending consideration by
this Court. In fact, this Court has not as of this time made any pronouncement on the aforesaid provision of the New RESPONDENT ATTY. JUAN T. DAVID AND JUDGE JOSE H. TECSON OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
Constitution. MANILA, BRANCH V, ARE HEREBY DECLARED GUILTY OF CONTEMPT AND ARE HEREBY REPRIMANDED,
WITH A WARNING THAT REPETITION TION OF THE SAME OR SIMILAR ACTS WILL BE DEALT WITH MORE
SEVERELY.
This act of respondent David constitutes disrespect to, as well as disregard of, the authority of this Court as the final arbiter of all
cases duly appealed to it, especially constitutional questions. It must be emphasized that as a member of the Philippine Bar he is
required "to observe and maintain the respect due to the court of justice and judicial officers" (Section 20 (b), 138 of the Revised COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
Rules of Court). Likewise, Canon 1 of. the Canons of Professional Ethic expressly provide that: "It is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judgement office, but for
G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949
the maintenance of its supreme importance." And this Court had stressed that "the duty of an attorney to the courts 'can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold'" (Rheem of the
Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967] citing the case of Lualhati v. Albert, 67 Phil. 86, 92 [1932]). BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.
Moreover, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact that herein respondent David, in the previous case of Integrated
Construction Services, Inc. and Engineering Construction, Inc. v. Relova (65 SCRA 638 [1975]), had sent letters addressed to
the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal and later to the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, requesting for the issuance of Delgado, Dizon and Flores for petitioner.
certification on the basis of the aforementioned provision of the New Constitution which were not given due consideration. And Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
knowing this, respondent David should have been more prudent and cautious in g with the court a quo any motion for execution.
TUASON, J.:
Furthermore, there was even a taint of arrogance and defiance on the part of respondent David in not filing his comment to the
letter- complaint dated October 18, 1978 of petitioner Corpus, as required by this Court in its November 3, 1978 and December
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of
4,1978 resolutions which were duly received by him, and instead, he sent on December 13, 1978 a letter requesting to be
several houses and lot executed during the Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilado's now deceased husband.
excused from the filing of his comment on the lame excuse that petitioner's letter-complaint was not verified.

On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys
On the part of Judge Jose H. Tecson, his presumptuous and precipitate act of granting the motion for execution of dent David
Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. On October 5, these attorneys filed
likewise constitutes disrespect to, as well as of, the authority of this Court because he know for a that the case was still pending
an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad as party defendant.
apply as the had not yet been remanded to it and that no certification has been issued by this Court. As a judicial officer, Judge
Tecson is charged with the knowledge of the fact that this Court has yet to make a definite pronouncement on Section 11,
paragraph 2, Article X of the New Constitution. Judge Tecson should know that only the Supreme Court can authoritatively On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of record for the defendant in substitution for
interpret Section 11 (2) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution. Yet, Judge Tecson assumed the role of the Highest Court of the Attorney Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita who had withdrawn from the case.
Land. He should be reminded of what Justice Laurel speaking for the Court, has said in People v. Vera (65 Phil 56, 82 [1937]):
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging him to discontinue representing the
A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in defendants on the ground that their client had consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned
the interrelation and operation of the integrated judged system of the nation. over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not receiving any answer to this suggestion,
Attorney Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case was and is
pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco.
It may also be added that the improvident act of respondent David in firing the motion for execution and the precipitate act of
Judge Tecson in issuing the writ of execution are intriguing as they invite suspicion that there was connivance between the two.
Respondent David would seem to imply that his claim for attorney's fees should be given preference over the other cams now Attorney Francisco's letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, is in full as follows:
pending in this Court. Certainly, such should not be the case because there are cases which by their nature require immediate or

31
 VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
Attorney-at-Law
1462 Estrada, Manila
July 13, 1945.
Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado
Manila, Philippines
My dear Mrs. Hilado:
From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled "Blandina Gamboa Hilado vs. S. J. Assad," I find that the basic facts which brought about the
controversy between you and the defendant therein are as follows:
(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the complaint, as the same was purchased and/or
built with funds exclusively belonging to you, that is to say, the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;
(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband, Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and
(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the aforesaid date of May 3, 1943.
Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will not ordinarily prosper. Mr.
Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the legal right to dispose of the property as the transfer
certificate of title was in his name. Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943,
does not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of the sale. I believe, lastly, that the
transaction cannot be avoided merely because it was made during the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple
allegation that the real purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On his last point, furthermore, I expect that you
will have great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser was other than Mr. Assad, considering that death has
already sealed your husband's lips and he cannot now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advise you that I cannot appear in the proceedings in your behalf. The records of
the case you loaned to me are herewith returned.
Yours very truly,
(Sgd.) VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
VJF/Rag.
In his answer to plaintiff's attorneys' complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that about May, 1945, a real estate broker came to
his office in connection with the legal separation of a woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told him
(Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which
the deceased Serafin Hilado had made to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was willing
to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman that the sales of real property during the Japanese
regime were valid even though it was paid for in Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor he would
have no objection to defending the Syrian;
32
That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had instituted against a certain Syrian to annul the
conveyance of a real estate which her husband had made; that according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys Delgado
and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he had known the plaintiff's deceased husband he did not hesitate to
tell her frankly that hers was a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that the basis of her
action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese military notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive
property; that she requested him to read the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of her suit; that he then asked
Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs.
Hilado that if the property was registered in her husband's favor, her case would not prosper either;
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his
assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in looking for him and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilado's visit concerned
legal matters he attended to her and requested her to leave the "expediente" which she was carrying, and she did; that he told
Attorney Agrava that the firm should not handle Mrs. Hilado's case and he should return the papers, calling Agrava's attention to
what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado;
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed him a letter which had been dictated in
English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "expedients" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon Attorney
Agrava's request that Agrava thought it more proper to explain to Mrs. Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he
forthwith signed the letter without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he never saw Mrs. Hilado
since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case;
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case stating that his American lawyer had gone to the
States and left the case in the hands of other attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, entered his
appearance.
Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his answer.
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the Court of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His
Honor believed that no information other than that already alleged in plaintiff's complaint in the main cause was conveyed to
Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse between the plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of
creating the relation of attorney and client.
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That Attorney Francisco's law firm mailed to the
plaintiff a written opinion over his signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she
had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure Attorney Francisco's
professional services. Granting the facts to be no more than these, we agree with petitioner's counsel that the relation of attorney
and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The following rules accord with the ethics of the legal
profession and meet with our approval:
In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not merely one of principal and
agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in
court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like. (Atkinson vs.
Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364; cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. . . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or
charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the
consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney
in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily
permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. . . . (5
Jones Commentaries on Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
 An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he is
listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he
is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court. (Denver Tramway Co. vs. Owens, 20
Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The contract may be express or implied and it
is sufficient that the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his
profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in behalf of his client
in pursuance of a request by the latter. (7 C. J. S., 848-849; see Hirach Bros. and Co. vs. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A.
L. R., 1.)
Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment;" and
section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms
from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is
necessarily implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the prohibition derives validity
from sources higher than written laws and rules. As has been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378,
"information so received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be used in the interest of another,
or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords
the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."
That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that, this being so, no secret
communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's
statement that other papers, personal and private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the
doctrine that the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's retainer in
the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client from thereafter appearing on
behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a
confidential nature was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii,
553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had formerly represented the adverse party
with respect to the same matter involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the
attorney acquired from his former during that relationship, before refusing to permit the attorney to represent the
adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. 994.)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary that the
ascertain in detail the extent to which the former client's affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the
subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev.,
264.)
This rule has been so strictly that it has been held an attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as
counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he acquired no
knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs.
Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled
relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an
attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that
might only further prejudice the complainant's cause. And the theory would be productive of other un salutary results. To make
the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i.e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and
33
character of the knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would not enhance the freedom of
litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The
condition would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has received and in what way it is or it is
not in conflict with his new position. Litigants would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn
of the proceedings, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorney's inaccurate version of the facts that came to
him. "Now the abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the administration
of justice." (John H. Wigmore's Evidence, 1923, Section 2285, 2290, 2291.)
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for testing
incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct,
but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. (Strong vs. Int. Bldg., etc.; Ass'n,
183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.) It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in another case, the
question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the client's
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
So without impugning respondent's good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the
party who had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but to
keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondents conduct as
dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly in expedient. It had the tendency to bring
the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the integrity of
justice."
There is in legal practice what called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems from the realization that the attorney is disabled
from acting as counsel for the other side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should decline to
perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid
observance of the rule that a separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and authorized. "A
retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act
for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express
understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation
to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it,
would not take the case out of the interdiction. If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney Francisco
and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which,
as heretofore demonstrated, emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and estop him in the same manner and
to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law
firm is information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such
member or assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his
connection with the firm is available to his associates or employers. The rule is all the more to be adhered to where, as in the
present instance, the opinion was actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials intended to convey the
impression that it was dictated by him personally. No progress could be hoped for in "the public policy that the client in
consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition were not
extended to the attorney's partners, employers or assistants.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the date Attorney Francisco first appeared for the
defendants does not operate as a waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the appearance of an
attorney was allowed even on appeal as a ground for reversal of the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct of
the cause in the court below the attorney had been suffered so to act without objection, the court said: "We are all of the one
mind, that the right of the appellee to make his objection has not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner; that professional
confidence once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment." (Nickels vs. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr.,
374, 321 A. L. R. 1316.)
The complaint that petitioner's remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves scant attention. The courts have summary
jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of
the justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected
by them but embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of
attorneys to perform. The courts from the general principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings between
attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they may stand
unequal. The courts acts on the same principles whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer
declaration, etc. (6 C.J., 718 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary remedy against attorneys flows from the facts that they are officers of
the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such subject to
the disciplinary authority of the courts and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to
their clients. (Charest vs. Bishop, 137 Minn., 102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorney stand on the same
footing as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just mentioned.
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.
A.C. No. 4078 July 14, 2003
WILLIAM ONG GENATO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ESSEX L. SILAPAN, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
In this complaint for disbarment filed by William Ong Genato against respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan, complainant alleged
that in July 1992, respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in complainant's building in Quezon City for his law
practice. Complainant acceded and introduced respondent to Atty. Benjamin Dacanay, complainant's retained lawyer, who
accommodated respondent in the building and made him handle some of complainant's cases. Hence, the start of the legal
relationship between complainant and respondent.
The conflict between the parties started when respondent borrowed two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) from
complainant which he intended to use as downpayment for the purchase of a new car. In return, respondent issued to
complainant a postdated check in the amount of P176,528.00 to answer for the six (6) months interest on the loan. He likewise
mortgaged to complainant his house and lot in Quezon City but did not surrender its title claiming that it was the subject of
reconstitution proceedings before the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
With the money borrowed from complainant, respondent purchased a new car. However, the document of sale of the car was
issued in complainant's name and financed through City Trust Company.
In January 1993, respondent introduced to complainant a certain Emmanuel Romero. Romero likewise wanted to borrow money
from complainant. Complainant lent Romero the money and, from this transaction, respondent earned commission in the amount
of P52,289.90. Complainant used the commission to pay respondent's arrears with the car financing firm.
Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization on the car and the financing firm sent demand letters to complainant.
Complainant tried to encash respondent's postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored as respondent's account
therein was already closed.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a criminal case against
respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
In the foreclosure case, respondent made the following allegation in his Answer:
34
xxx xxx xxx
4. That complainant is a businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and sell of
deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and has many cases pending in court;
xxx xxx xxx
Complainant denied respondent's charges and claimed that respondent's allegation is libelous and not privilege as it
was irrelevant to the foreclosure case. Complainant further pointed to paragraph 12 of respondent's Answer, thus:
12. That on January 29, 1993, before paying for the next installment on his car on January 30, 1993, defendant Essex
L. Silapan asked the complainant to execute a Deed of Sale transferring ownership of the car to him but the latter said
that he will only do so after the termination of his criminal case at Branch 138 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila, x x x where he (complainant) wanted Essex L. Silapan, his former counsel in that case, to offer bribe
money to the members of the review committee of the Department of Justice where a petition for review of the
resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor was pending at the time, x x x or, in the event that the said petition for
review is denied, he wanted Essex L. Silapan to offer bribe money to the prosecutor assigned at the above-mentioned
Court, and even to the presiding Judge, for his eventual acquittal, which defendant Essex L. Silapan all refused to do
not only because such acts are immoral and illegal, but also because the complainant confided to him that he was
really involved in the commission of the crime that was charged of in the above-mentioned case. (emphasis supplied)
Complainant gripes that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to
defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this complaint for disbarment, praying
also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check.
When required by the Court to comment, respondent explained 1 that it was complainant who offered him an office space in his
building and retained him as counsel as the latter was impressed with the way he handled a B.P. 22 case 2 filed against
complainant. Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to
complainant and his revelation of complainant's desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He
claimed to have made these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainant's
credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of
breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and
reputation.
Secondly, respondent asserted that he executed the real estate mortgage in favor of complainant without consideration and only
as a "formal requirement" so he could obtain the P200,000.00 loan and for this reason, he did not surrender his title over the
mortgaged property to complainant.
Thirdly, respondent claimed that he issued the postdated check, not for account or for value, but only: (a) to serve as "some kind
of acknowledgment" that he already received in advance a portion of his attorney's fees from the complainant for the legal
services he rendered, and (b) as a form of assurance that he will not abandon the cases he was handling for complainant.
Lastly, respondent denied that he received a P52,289.90 commission from Romero's loan which he allegedly helped facilitate.
He alleged that the amount was paid to him by Romero as attorney's fees, the latter being his client. He used this amount to pay
his arrears with the car financing firm. On January 29, 1993, before paying the next amortization on the car, he asked
complainant to execute a deed of sale transferring ownership of the car to him. Complainant refused and insisted that he would
transfer ownership of the car only after the termination of his criminal case which respondent was handling as his defense
lawyer. Consequently, respondent stopped paying the amortization on the car. Respondent also alleged that he filed a perjury
case against complainant who, in turn, filed a complaint for libel against him.
In a Resolution, dated October 27, 1993, the Court referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
On August 3, 2002, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report of the investigating commissioner finding the
respondent guilty as charged and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
We affirm the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
Prefatorily, we stress that we shall not delve into the merits of the various criminal and civil cases pending between the parties. It
is for the trial courts handling these cases to ascertain the truth or falsity of the allegations made therein. For this reason, it is not
for us to sanction respondent for his issuance of a bouncing check. His liability has yet to be determined by the trial court where
his case is pending.
The only issue in this administrative case is whether respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a
pending case.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. 3 The protection given to the client is perpetual and
does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.4
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only
to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend
to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. 5 If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the
complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the
privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as
to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being
no professional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, respondent's explanation that it was necessary for him to make the disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy
us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper
for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein
and respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself,
especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients
should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.
Thus, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the IBP and finds that respondent's allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure
case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him. However, the
recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension of respondent from the practice of law seems to be disproportionate to his
breach of duty considering that a review of the records of this Court reveals that this is the first administrative complaint against
him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Essex L. Silapan is ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months effective upon receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this order of suspension to all courts in the
country.
A.C. No. 4215 May 21, 2001
35
FELICISIMO M. MONTANO, complainant,
vs.
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES and Atty. JUAN S. DEALCA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a verified complaint filed before this Court on March 9, 1994, complaint Felicisimo M. Montano charged Atty. Juan Dealca
with misconduct and prays that he be "sternly dealt with administratively." The complaint 1 is summarized as follows:
1. On November 14, 1992, the complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty.
Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 3767 wherein the complainant
was the plaintiff-appellant.
2. The parties agreed upon attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon
acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent
the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney's fee.
3. Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary to their agreement that the
remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from complainant
obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.
4. Prior to the filing of the appellant's brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00.
When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer withdraw his appearance as complainant's counsel without his prior
knowledge and/or conformity. Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a Note dated February
28, 1993,2 stating:
28 February 1994
Pepe and Del Montano,
For breaking your promise, since you do not want to fulfill your end of the
bargain, here's your reward:
Henceforth, you lawyer for yourselves. Here are your papers.
Johnny
Complainant claimed that such conduct by respondent counsel exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays
that the latter be sternly dealt with administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the
maximum penalty of disbarment.
After respondent counsel filed his comment on the complaint, the Court in the Resolution of August 1, 1994, referred the case of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be
"severely reprimanded." However, in a Resolution 3 by the IBP Board of Governors on July 26, 1997, it was resolved that the
penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner meted to respondent be amended to "three (3) months suspension from
the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a
lawyer."
Respondent counsel sought reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution of the IBP, alleging that the latter misapprehended
the facts and that, in any case, he did not deserve the penalty imposed. The true facts, according to him, are the following.
 1. Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal; On December 10, 1997, this Court noted the following pleadings filed in the present complaint,

2. Due to the ailment of Atty. Gerona's daughter, he could not prepare and submit complainant's appellant's brief on (a) notice and a copy of Resolution No. XII-97-154 dated July 26, 1997 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
time; amending the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of reprimand to three (3) months suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct which eroded the public confidence
regarding his duty as a lawyer;
3. Complainant wen to the respondent to do just that, i.e., prepare and submit his appellant's brief on time at the
agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and 50% upon its completion;
(a) complainant's motion praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment;
4. Working overtime, respondent was able to finish the appellant's brief ahead of its deadline, so he advised the
complainant about its completion with the request that the remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid (b) motion dated September 15, 1997 of respondent for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution of July 26, 1997;
P4,000.00 only, promising to pay the P3,500.00 "tomorrow" or on "later particular date." Please take note that, at this
juncture, there was already a breach of the agreement on complainant's part.
(c) comment/opposition of respondent praying that the motion for the imposition of the maximum penalty be denied;

5. When that "tomorrow" or on a "later particular date" came, respondent, thru a messenger, requested the
(d) comment of complainant praying that the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the practice of law as
complainant to pay the P3,500.00 as promised but word was sent that he will again pay "tomorrow" or on a "later
recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines pursuant to resolution No. XII-97-154 be raised to a heavier
date." This promise-non-payment cycle went on repeatedly until the last day of the filing of the brief. Please take note
penalty;
again that it was not the respondent but the complainant who sets the date when he will pay, yet he fails to pay as
promised;
(e) comment/manifestation/opposition of complainant praying that the respondent be disbarred; and
6. Even without being paid completely, respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed complainant's brief on time;
(g) rejoinder of respondent praying that this case be dismissed for being baseless. 6
7. After the brief was filed, respondent tried to collect from the complainant the remaining balance of P3,500.00, but
the latter made himself scare. As the records would show, such P3,500.00 remains unpaid until now; and referred the same to the IBP for evaluation and report.

8. Sensing that something was amiss, respondent sent the February 28, 1993 note and case folder to the complainant,
hoping that the latter would see personally the former about it to settle the matter between them;
9. However, instead of seeing the respondent, complainant filed this case;
10. Respondent was constrained to file his withdrawal with the Court of Appeals because of this case to avoid further
misunderstanding since he was the one who signed the appellant's brief although Atty. Gerona was his counsel of
record. Such withdrawal was accordingly granted by the appellate court;
xxx xxx xxx.4
Respondent counsel further averred that complainant's refusal to pay the agreed lawyer's fees, measly as it was, was deliberate
and in bad faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical and proper." Respondent counsel concluded that not only
was the penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly
would punish his family since he was the sole breadwinner with children in school and his wife terminally ill with cancer.
In its Resolution No. XIII-97-129 dated October 25, 1997, the IBP denied Atty. Dealca's motion for reconsideration, to wit:
In compliance therewith, on March 28, 1998, the IBP issued Resolution No. XIII-98-42 referring the above-entitled case to
Commissioner Vibar for evaluation, report and recommendation "in view of the Motion for Reconsideration granted by the
Supreme Court."
The Investigating Commissioner, after referring the case, recommended that his original recommendation of the imposition of
the penalty of reprimand be maintained, noting that respondent counsel had served the IBP well as President of the Sorsogon
Chapter.7 Accordingly, on February 23, 1999, the IBP Board of Governors, issued the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-48
xxx
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the Motion for Reconsideration be granted and that the penalty
of REPRIMAND earlier recommended by the Investigating Commissioner be imposed on Atty. Juan S.
Dealca.8

xxx
Complainant asked the IBP to reconsider the foregoing resolution but the motion was denied. 9

RESOLVED TO DENY Atty. Dealca's Motion For Reconsideration of the Board's Decision in the above-entitled
On April 10, 2000, complainant filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari in connection with Administrative Case
case there being no substantive reason to reverse the finding therein. Moreover, the motion is improperly laid the
No. 4215 against the IBP and respondent counsel averring that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave abuse of discretion
remedy of the respondent is to file the appropriate pleading with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from
when it overturned its earlier resolution and granted respondent counsel's motion for reconsideration on February 23, 1999. He
receipt of notice of said Decision pursuant to Sec. 12 [c] of Rule 139-B.5
claimed that the earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had already become final
and executory; hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void.

36
When the Court issued the resolution of December 10, 1997 treating the several pleadings filed in the present complaint, it
should be noted that the IBP resolution denying respondent's motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. XIII-97-129) dated
October 25, 1997, for some reason, had not yet reached this Court. As of that date, the only IBP resolution attached to the
records of the case was Resolution No. XII-97-54 amending the administrative sanction from reprimand to three months
suspension. Hence, at the time the pleadings were referred back to the IBP in the same resolution, the Court was not aware that
the IBP had already disposed of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent counsel.
Thus, when the IBP was informed of the said Court resolution, it construed the same as granting Atty. Dealca's motion for
reconsideration and as an order for IBP to conduct a re-evaluation of the case. The IBP assumed that its resolution of October 25,
1997 was already considered by this Court when it referred the case back to the IBP. It failed to notice that its resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration was not among those pleadings and resolution referred back to it.
Hence, on the strength of this Court's resolution which it had inadvertently misconstrued, the IBP conducted a re-evaluation of
the case and came up with the assailed resolution now sought to be reversed. The Court holds that the error is not attributable to
the IBP. It is regrettable that the procedural infirmity alleged by complainant actually arose from a mere oversight which w as
attributable to neither party.
Going into the merits, we affirm the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer only
for the preparation and submission of the appellant's brief and the attorney's fees was payable upon the completion and
submission of the appellant's brief and not upon the termination of the case.
There is sufficient evidence which indicates complainant's willingness to pay the attorney's fees. AS agreed upon, complainant
paid half of the fees in the amount of P7,500.00 upon acceptance of the case. And while the remaining balance was not yet due
as it was agreed to be paid only upon the completion and submission of the brief, complainant nonetheless delivered to
respondent lawyer P4,000.00 as the latter demanded. This, notwithstanding, Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply
because of complainant's failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00 which does not appear to be deliberate. The situation
was aggravated by respondent counsel's note to complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and
insulting language.10
Given the above circumstances, was Atty. Dealca's conduct just and proper?
We find Atty. Dealca's conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances.
Although he may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services,11 under the
circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him
the attorney's fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does
not speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4 of Canon 20,
mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only
to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to
act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainant's contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed
on respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be
imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the
end desired. 12 In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca is REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition
of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. 134854 January 18, 2000
37
FELIZARDO S. OBANDO and the ESTATES of JOSE FIGUERAS and DOA ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE
FIGUERAS, petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO F. FIGUERAS and AMIGO REALTY CORPORATION as represented by ANTONIO A. KAW,respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving this appeal, the Court invokes the following principles: (1) a lawyer's standing in a case remains, until a substitute
takes over pursuant to Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (2) a trial court may act upon a motion to dismiss at any time
a ground therefor becomes available, even after a responsive pleading to the complaint has already been filed; (3) a civil case
initiated by an estate administrator may be dismissed upon a showing that the said administrator's appointment as such has been
revoked by the probate court; and (4) the dismissal of an action may be made after the ground therefor becomes known, even if
the trial court has refused to do so earlier when that ground was not yet available.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the July 30, 1998 Decision of the Court
of Appeals1 in CA-GR SP No. 47594, which affirmed the dismissal, without prejudice, of Petitioner Felizardo Obando's action
for annulment of contract and reconveyance earlier ordered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, 2 Branch 218.
The Facts
In 1964, Alegria, Strebel Figueras, together with her stepsons, Eduardo and Francisco, filed a Petition for settlement of the
intestate estate of her deceased husband Jose Figueras. 3 While settlement of the estate was pending, she died and Eduardo
assumed administration of the joint estates of Don Jose and Doa Alegria. Hardly had the proceedings in both intestacies begun
when Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of what purported to be Doa Alegria's Last Will and Testament, filed by
Felizardo S. Obando (herein petitioner), a nephew of Doa Alegria.4
The alleged Will bequeathed to Petitioner Obando and several other members of the Obando clan properties left by the Figueras
couple, including two parcels of land in Gilmore Avenue, New Manila, Quezon City, covered by TCT Nos. 13741 and
17679.5 When the probate case was consolidated with the intestate proceedings, Petitioner Obando was appointed as Eduardo's
co-administrator of the joint estates.6
As Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a forgery, the document was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for examination and comparison of Doa Alegria's alleged signature therein with samples which both parties accepted as
authentic. The NBI found that the questioned and the standard signatures were not made by the same person. 7 This led to the
indictment and the conviction of Petitioner Obando in Criminal Case 90-858198for estafa through falsification of a public
document.
On February 20, 1990, the probate court denied Eduardo's Motion for authority to sell the aforementioned two parcels of land in
New Manila.9 Despite such denial, Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation on the strength of an Order issued by the
probate court on May 15, 1991. New titles were issued for these lots in the name of Amigo Realty. 10
On June 4, 1992, Petitioner Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator and universal heir of Doa Alegria, filed a Complaint
against Eduardo and Amigo Realty (collectively referred to as the respondents) for the nullification of the sale. The proceedings
were docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-12384 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 79.
However, in Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948, the probate court, in its Order dated December 17, 1997, removed
Petitioner Obando from his office as co-administrator of the joint estate of the Figueras spouses.11Consequently, in the civil case,
respondents filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss dated January 27, 1998, after Obando had rested his case. The respondents built their
evidence around the loss of his legal standing to pursue the case.12In its Order dated February 11, 1993, the trial court granted the
Motion and dismissed the civil case without prejudice. 13
Petitioner Obando filed a Motion for Reconsideration to no avail. As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals likewise dismissed his
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and affirmed the dismissal Order of the RTC. 14
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of Obando that he did not lose his legal personality to prosecute the civil case,
since there was no categorical statement that the purported will was a forgery and its probate was still pending.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of the action for reconveyance, because the probate court's Order dated February 5, 1998
"alluded" to the fact that the alleged Will was a forgery. That the probate of the alleged Will had not yet been decided on the
merits did not change the fact that the probate court had removed Petitioner Obando as co-administrator. The dismissal of the
civil case was without prejudice, because the trial judge anticipated that Obando could regain co-administration of the estates on
appeal.
Hence, this Petition.15
Assignment of Errors
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues:16
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE TRIAL
COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF RESPONDENTS' JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT
ONE OF THE LAWYER-MOVANTS THEREIN WAS NO LONGER THE COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR
RESPONDENT FIGUERAS AT THE TIME THE MOTION WAS FILED.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SANCTIONING THE TRIAL
COURT'S RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM THE LAW WHEN IT GRANTED A MOTION TO DISMISS ON
LACK OF CAPACITY TO SUE/LEGAL STANDING AT THE TIME WHEN THE [PETITIONERS] HAVE
ALREADY RESTED THEIR CASE AND THE [RESPONDENTS] HAVE BEGUN PRESENTATION OF THEIR
EVIDENCE.
C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT SANCTIONED THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THE CASE BASED ON ORDERS OF OTHER COURTS THAT HAVE NOT YET
ATTAINED FINALITY.
D. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE TRIAL
COURT'S WHIMSICAL AND CAPRICIOUS DEPARTURE FROM ITS PREVIOUS RULINGS DENYING
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS.
E. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED ITS 30 JULY
1998 DECISION IN CA-G.R. 47594 UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDERS DATED 11 FEBRUARY
1998 AND 12 MARCH 1998.
Simply stated, the following issues are raised by the petitioners: (1) whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a
lawyer who was allegedly no longer Eduardo's counsel of record; (2) whether a motion to dismiss filed after the responsive
pleadings were already made can still be granted; (3) whether the conviction of Petitioner Obando for estafa through falsification
and the revocation of his appointment as administrator, both of which are on appeal, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss the
38
civil case; and (4) whether there was a conflict between the Order dismissing the civil case and the previous actions of the trial
court.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue:
Counsel of Record
Petitioners claim that when Atty. Joaquin Yuseco filed the Motion to Dismiss, he no longer represented the respondents, as
shown by Eduardo's Manifestation and Motion dated January 8, 1998, dispensing with said counsel's services in the proceedings
in view of a Compromise Agreement with Petitioner Obando.17
We disagree. Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. 18 Counsel may be validly substituted only if the following requisites are complied with: (1) new
counsel files a written application for Substitution; (2) the client's written consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the
lawyer to be substituted is secured, if it can still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then the application for
substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required
by the Rules.19
In this case, we are convinced that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco. In fact, the former manifested that he had been
tricked by Petitioner Obando into signing the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion and Compromise Agreement. Besides, the
filing of the Motion to Dismiss was not prejudicial but beneficial to the said respondent; hence, he had no reason to complain. At
the discretion of the court, an attorney who has already been dismissed by the client is allowed to intervene in a case in order to
protect the client's rights. In the present case, had there been any irregularity, it should have been raised by the respondents, not
the petitioners.
Second Issue:
Timeliness of the Motion to Dismiss
The Rules provide that a motion to dismiss may be submitted only before the filing of a responsive pleading. 20 Thus, petitioners
complain that it was already too late for Respondent Eduardo Figueras to file a Motion to Dismiss after Obando had finished
presenting his evidence.
This is not so. The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within the reglementary period for filing a responsive
pleading. Thus, a motion to dismiss alleging improper venue cannot be entertained unless made within that period.21
However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the following
grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, 22 (2) litis pendentia,23 (3) lack of cause of action,24 and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that
would constitute a ground for dismissal.25 Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1
of Rule 16 may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at all within the
reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules. 26
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the respondents did not waive their right to move for the dismissal of the civil case
based Petitioner Obando's lack of legal capacity. It must be pointed out that it was only after he had been convicted of estafa
through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of the Figueras estates. It was only then that this
ground became available to the respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to Dismiss SO ORDERED.
filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to sue during the pendency of the case, as in the
present controversy, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC February 19, 2008
for filing a responsive pleading.

RE: 2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE -

Third Issue:
The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Sub Committee on the Revision of the Rules Governing Notaries Public,
to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:
Removal from Administration
Sirs/Mesdames:
Petitioners aver that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss the civil case because Obando's conviction for estafa through
falsification was still on appeal.
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated February 19, 2008.

We disagree. This argument has no bearing at all on the dismissal of the civil case. Petitioner Obando derived his power to
"A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC-Re: 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the
represent the estate of the deceased couple from his appointment as co-administrator. 27 When the probate court removed him
Sub Committee on the Revision of the Rules Governing Notaries Public, to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the 2004
from office, he lost that authority. Since he lacked the legal capacity to sue on behalf of the Figueras estates, he could not
Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:
continue prosecuting the civil case. 28 Thus the trial court properly granted the Motion to Dismiss on this ground. 29 Whether a
final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is necessary to remove him from his administration is not a proper issue in
this Petition. He should raise the matter in his appeal of the Decision removing him from administration of the Figueras Rule II
estates.1wphi1.nt
DEFINITIONS
The fact that the conviction of Obando and his removal from administration are on appeal only means that his legal standing
could be restored; thus, the civil case was correctly dismissed without prejudice. If his conviction is reversed and his
xxx
appointment restored by the probate court, the case may continue without being barred by res judicata. The lower court's
Decision showed that it was careful in its action. On the other hand, Obando has yet to show that he has regained administration
of the Figueras estates. Noteworthy also is the fact that his removal from office was predicated not only on his conviction for a "Sec. 12. Component Evidence of Identity. The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of
crime, but also on his failure to render an accounting of the rental of a property leased to the Community of Learners. an individual based on:

Fourth Issue:
No Conflicting Rules
Respondent Eduardo Figueras' earlier Motion to Dismiss was denied in the trial court's March 4, 1993 Order which reads:
. . . [I]t is pertinent to note that the criminal case of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document filed against
[petitioner] and the Petition to Remove him as co-administrator are still pending determination. Thus, suffice it to
state that while herein [petitioner] remains as the co-administrator of the estates of the deceased Figueras the Court
will continue to recognize his right to institute the instant case in his capacity as judicial administrator, unless he be
removed as such by the probate Court pursuant to Rule 82 of the Revised Rules of Court. 30
A.C. No. 5838
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual, such as but not limited to, passport, drivers license, Professional Regulations
Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID,
Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System
(SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID,
OFW ID, seamans book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government
office ID, certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP),
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or
(b) xxxx."
January 17, 2005

Thus, petitioners allege that the trial court whimsically and capriciously departed from its previous rulings when, in its
SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants,
Resolution dated February 11, 1993, it granted Eduardo's later Motion to Dismiss.31
vs.
ATTY. EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.
We cannot see any conflict between these trial court rulings. Obviously, they were based on different grounds. The first Motion
to Dismiss was denied because, at the time, Petitioner Obando still had legal capacity to sue as co-administrator of the Figueras
RESOLUTION
estates. On the other hand, the second Motion was granted because the probate court had already removed him from his office as
co-administrator. The change in his legal capacity accounts for the difference in the adjudication of the trial court. We see no
reversible error in the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court. CORONA, J.:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001, 1 spouses Benjamin Santuyo and Editha Santuyo accused respondent
Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.

39
Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered by a deed of sale. The deed of
sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and was entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in
Book No. III, Series of 1991. Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they had a dispute
with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The case was estafathrough falsification of a public document.
During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent denying the authenticity of his
signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his notarial signature on said deed. 2
According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale contained all the legal formalities of a
duly notarized document, including an impression of respondents notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the
technicalities surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature of herein respondent.
They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register, and could not have made any imprint of
respondents seal or signature on the subject deed of sale or elsewhere. 3
In his answer4 to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied having notarized any deed of sale
covering the disputed property. According to respondent, he once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law
Office where he was asked to apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several documents in that
office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of office procedure, documents
underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed
that, in some occasions, the secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on
documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally required the parties to exhibit their
community tax certificates and made them personally acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would have
remembered complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant Editha Santuyo, he
said he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on November 5, 1997, or about six years from the time that he
purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover, respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of
sale revealed that it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild.l^vvphi1.net He suspected that a lady was responsible for
forging his signature.
To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed of sale was supposedly
notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that complainants must have gone to the law office and
enticed one of the secretaries, with the concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim
of a criminal scheme motivated by greed.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In a
report5 it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different
from his signatures in other documents he submitted during the investigation of the present case. 6 However, it ruled that
respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial functions, including the
safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.7 It thus recommended:
WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondents commission as notary public be
revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2)
years upon receipt hereof. 8
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state that they appeared before
respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent
signed the document and that it was not a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were not sure if
respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature appeared thereon. They had no
personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the signature of respondent on the deed.1awphi1.nt
Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he only met complainant Benjamin Santuyo six years after
the alleged notarization of the deed of sale. Respondents assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit
executed on November 17, 20019 wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house on
November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The meeting between complainant
40
Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale
concerning another property that the spouses bought.
In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:
xxx xxx xxx.
Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should have been more discreet and
cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he
should not have been commissioned as notary public.
For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for notarization to the secretary there can be a
possibility that even the respondents signature which is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody
for that matter as had been the case herein.
As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in having allowed the office secretaries
to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have
relied on somebody else.10
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in the performance of his duties as
notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is
commissioned, or if he is not, he is disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of
this resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 5864 April 15, 2005
ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLU TION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint,1 complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged
respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to complainant, respondent made it appear that
Benitez executed the said document on January 4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with J.C. Benitez Architect and
Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and
engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the
consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C.
Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue
of the authority of the SPA notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
by making it appear that certain persons participated in an act or proceeding when in fact they did not.
In his Comment,2 respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the SPA. He claimed that due deceive them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project could not
to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the public a spurious contract all to the
January 4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death, extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he was the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:
on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he notarized it, hence, legally, there
was no public document that existed. Respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since
Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to Article 172 of the
similar charges had been filed with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects
According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the assailed act referred to violations of the
Technical Management for the consultancy services in the conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed
implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594,3 PD 1445,4 RA 71605 and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit
Engineering Design of the Proposed Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the
(COA). He stressed that no criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
contract amount of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious
document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating signature for the purpose of
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, 6 the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit perpetrated against the government resulting to
investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP submitted its investigation report: undue injury. The first and partial payment, in the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required
outputs. x x x15
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 purportedly executed
by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident that respondent cannot feign innocence and We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended by the IBP which we find too light.
claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already dead at the time because respondent, as member of the
Prequalification and Awards Committee of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby DISBARRED from
latter appeared before the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4
the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of
January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money which was
respondent, and brought to the immediate attention of the Ombudsman.
allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney helped said parties succeed in
their plans.7
B.M. No. 1755 June 17, 2008
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's notarial commission be revoked and that he be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of one year.8 RE. CLARIFICATION ON RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE.

After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainant's accusation that he notarized the SPA Sirs/Mesdames:
purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was
already dead. His act was a serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 17, 2008 B.M. No. 1755 (Re. Rules of
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline)
deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of justice, 9 not to corrupt it. Oath-
bound, he was expected to act at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself
and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.10 x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,11 where the respondent notarized certain documents and made it
appear that the deceased father of complainant executed them, the Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon
10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.12 The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries
public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and
personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries
public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the
public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA, purportedly
bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the latter's death. The notarial
acknowledgement of respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free
and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routinary act. 13 It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution. 14
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and prejudiced no one, exonerate
him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal
profession and potentially cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he
should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a public officer as well. A public office is a
public trust. Respondent should not have caused disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governs the investigation of administrative complaints against lawyers by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Section 12 of said rule prescribes the procedure before the IBP, thus:
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in
writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated
within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the
Investigator's report.
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended
from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which,
together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such
sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed
with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders
otherwise.

41
 d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of disciplinary cases against lawyers:
same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.
1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion for reconsideration of the IBP resolution
To implement Rule 139-B, the Court, in Bar Matter No. 1755, approved the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar containing its findings and recommendations within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by the parties thereon;
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP on September 25, 2007. The rules pertinent to pleadings, notices, and appearances are provided in
Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule III which read:
2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an aggrieved party, the IBP must first resolve the same
prior to elevating to this Court the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;
RULE III
3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period provided for, the IBP is directed to forthwith
PLEADINGS, NOTICES AND APPEARANCES transmit to this Court, for final action, the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;

SECTION 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer and verified position papers and 4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IPB may file a petition for review before this Court within
motion for reconsideration of a resolution. fifteen (15) days from notice of said resolution sought to be reviewed; and

SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit: 5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where there exist pending motions for reconsideration filed in
due time before the IBP, the latter is directed to withdraw from this Court the subject resolutions together with the
whole records of the cases, within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter, to act on said motions with reasonable
a. Motion to dismiss the complaint or petition
dispatch.1

b. Motion for a bill of particulars

c. Motion for a new trial
d. Petition for relief from judgment
e. Motion for reconsideration
f. Supplemental pleadings
Upon query of IBP National President Feliciano M. Bautista, the Court issued on February 12, 2008 a Resolution amending Sec.
1, Rule III of the same rules by deleting the phrase "motion for reconsideration of a resolution," to resolve the conflicting
provisions of Secs. 1 and 2 of said Rule III, thus:
Sec. 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer and verified position papers.
Pursuant to the February 12, 2008 Resolution, a party cannot file a motion for reconsideration of any order or resolution with the
Investigating Commissioner of the CBD hearing the case.
In the Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in A.C. No. 7055 entitled Ramientas v. Reyala, the Court held that:
IN CONCURRENCE WITH THE ABOVE, NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved the
accordance with our ruling in Halimao v. Villanueva, pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP, particularly 1 and 2, are hereby deemed
amended. Accordingly, 1 of said rules now reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer, verified position paper
and motion for reconsideration of resolution. x x x
In view of the February 12, 2008 Resolution, the fallo of Ramientas amending Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure
of the CBD is consequently repealed. At present, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading in CBD proceedings
before the Investigating Commissioner. It has to be clarified further that said CBD rules of procedure apply exclusively to
proceedings before said CBD Commissioner and not proceedings before the IBP Board of Governors (BOG) which are governed
by Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. As such, the other dispositions in Ramientas relative to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the IPB BOG are still valid and subsisting. In fact, Ramientas has amplified the rules laid down in Rule
139-B by supplying the procedure for the filing of motions for reconsiderations before the BOG.
Thus, in answer to the query of Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa dated March 17, 2008 on
whether the February 12, 2008 Resolution in Bar Matter No. 1755 has effectively superseded Ramientas, the Court resolved as
follows:
1. On the amendment to Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule III of the CBD Rules of Procedure, the fallo in Ramientas is repealed and
superseded by the February 12, 2008 Resolution. A party can no longer file a motion for reconsideration of any order or
resolution of the Investigating Commissioner, such motion being a prohibited pleading.
2. Regarding the issue of whether a motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the BOG can be entertained, an
aggrieved party can file said motion with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt thereof by said party.
In case a decision is rendered by the BOG that exonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction less than suspension or
disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is
denied, said party can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall become final and
executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished this Court.
If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG within
fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the
entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for reconsideration having been
filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the entire case records for appropriate action.

And in 2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the purview of the class of prohibited pleadings. Let this Resolution be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
42
A.C. No. 7472 March 30, 2010 In the Resolution dated September 12, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. Initially, the OBC directed the complainant to file a supplemental affidavit, stating
therein the exact period of appearances of Atty. De Dios and the particular courts where respondent appeared as counsel in the
LIGAYA MANIAGO, Complainant,
following cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 699-2002; (2) Civil Case No. 355-0-2005; and (3) Sp. Proc. No. M-6153.
vs.
ATTY. LOURDES I. DE DIOS, Respondent.
In compliance therewith, complainant submitted a Supplemental Affidavit in the vernacular, which reads:
RESOLUTION
2. Sa Criminal Case No. 699-2002 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Hiroshi Miyata ay [nagsimulang] mag[-
]appear si Atty. Lourdes de Dios mula April 9, 2003, na [naka-]attach ang Certification mula sa Branch 73[,]
NACHURA, J.:
Regional Trial Court[,] Olongapo City.

The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 2, 2007 filed by Ligaya Maniago, seeking the disbarment of
3. Sa Civil Case No. 355-0-2006 ay [nagsimulang] mag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios noong October 10, 2005, nakasaad
Atty. Lourdes I. de Dios for engaging in the practice of law despite having been suspended by the Court.
din ito sa Certification mula sa Branch 73, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City. At sa Sp. Proc. No. M-6153 ay ito
ay na[-]ifile ni Atty. de Dios noong September 26, 2005 at hanggang ngayon ay pending pa sa Court of Appeals.
Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Olongapo City, Branch 73, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 603, docketed as Criminal Case No. 699-2002. The
4. Bilang karagdagan po ay naka[-]attach ang Certified Xerox Copy ng Minutes of the Session ng Subic Municipal
accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City. Complainant then
Trial Court na kung saan ay nag[-]appear si Atty. de Dios sa Civil Case No. 042-01 entitled Andrea Lorenzo,
learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and
plaintiff, -versus- Simeon Pullido noong December 14, 2001.
was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. Complainant further alleges that there is a civil case (Civil Case No. 355-0-
2005) and another case (Special Proceeding No. M-6153) filed against Miyata before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 134, where
Atty. De Dios appeared as his counsel. Complainant averred that Atty. De Dios ought to be disbarred from the practice of law for 5. At makikita rin po sa Annex A-5 ng Comment ni Atty. de Dios, x x x -
her flagrant violation and deliberate disobedience of a lawful order of the Supreme Court.
5.[a.] Nag file ng kaso si Atty. Lourdes de Dios noong May 17, 2001 entitled Shirley Pagaduan vs. Danilo
In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was Pagaduan[,] Civil Case No. 234-0-2001. Ito ay ginawa ni Atty. de Dios isang (1) araw pa lamang mula magsimula
under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases. ang kanyang suspension noon[g] May 16, 2001.

Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943,
where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts
Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally
informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did.
A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City,
erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial
commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted
from law practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme
Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which "gave
the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years
2007 and 2008 is revoked." Acting on the said motion, the Court issued a resolution on April 23, 2007 in this wise:
A.C. No. 4943 (Diana de Guzman v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios) Respondents Urgent Motion for Clarification dated 14 March
2007 praying that the Court declare her to have served her six (6) months (sic) suspension and her resumption of law practice on
17 November 2001 onwards as proper is NOTED.
Considering the motion for clarification, the Court resolves to DEEM Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios to have SERVED her six (6)
month suspension and her recommencement of law practice on 17 November 2001 as PROPER pursuant to the Resolution dated
30 January 2002.
5.b. Nag file din ng kaso si Atty. de Dios noong May 18, 2001 entitled Filmixco versus Dr. Ma. Perla Tabasondra-
Ramos and Dr. Ricardo Ramos Civil Case No. 236-0-2001. Ito ay dalawang (2) araw mula magsimula ang
suspension ni Atty. de Dios noong May 16, 2001.
5.c. At nag notaryo si Atty. de Dios ng isang (a) affidavit executed by Carolina C. Bautista noong May 16, 2001, (b)
Affidavit executed by Jessica Morales-Mesa on May 17, 2001 at (c) isang Statement of non-liability of Alfredo C.
Diaz on May 16, 2001. Ang mga pag notaryo na ito ay ginawa noong nagsimula na ang suspension ni Atty. de Dios
noong May 16, 2001.
6. Ginawa ko ang Supplemental Affidavit na ito bilang patunay sa mga nakasaad base sa aking personal na
kaalamanan at mga dokumentong hawak ko upang ipakita na nilabag ni Atty. de Dios ang kanyang suspension base
sa sulat ni Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa na may petsang 12 February 2007 at sa
admission ni Atty. de Dios na nagsimula ang kanyang suspension noong May 16, 2001.
A Supplemental Comment was thereafter filed by respondent, stating that there were no new matters raised in the Supplemental
Affidavit, and asserting that "the opinion of Bar Confidant, Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa, as contained in her letter dated 12
February 2007, cannot supersede the Resolution dated April 23, 2007 of this Honorable Court." According to her, the resolution
should be the "final nail to the coffin of this case."
On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Courts consideration.

Respondent averred that for the period stated in the affidavit of complainant Maniago, during which she allegedly practiced law,
The OBC explained that the letter adverted to by complainant in her affidavit was the OBCs reply to an inquiry made by the
she was neither suspended nor in any way prohibited from practice. The complaint, she added, was baseless and malicious, and
Office of the Court Administrator regarding the status of Atty. De Dios.1 Therein, the OBC made it clear that the lifting of the
should be dismissed outright.
suspension order was not automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales
Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., which states:
43
The Statement of the Court that his suspension stands until he would have satisfactorily shown his compliance with the Courts RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
resolution is a caveat that his suspension could thereby extend for more than six months. The lifting of a lawyers suspension is
not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Courts decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the
RESOLUTION
end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. 2

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during
the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to
a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law
without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and
Records show that in the Decision 1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having
conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of
contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his
the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.1avvphi1
first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive portion of the subject Decision reads:
The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found guilty of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from the
It must be remembered that the practice of law is not a right but a mere privilege and, as such, must bow to the inherent practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline and to this
regulatory power of the Supreme Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.3Whenever it is made to Court that he is supporting or has made provisions for the regular support of his two children by complainant.
appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public, it becomes not only the
right but also the duty of the Supreme Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within
Let respondents name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
its Bar, to withdraw that privilege. 4 However, as much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at
the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably.
SO ORDERED.2
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in the matter of the
lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law: Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy3 which the Court denied with
finality in the Resolution 4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For
Extraordinary Mercy)5 seeking
1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a
decision imposing the penalty;
judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit as a second motion for
reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012. 6On December 18, 2012,
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has
the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President 7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look
15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision
into the substantive merits of the case.
final and executory;

In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, 8 the
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through
Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not
appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or
testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as
administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
counsel;

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order of suspension;

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the
put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal
Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013
scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential
for public service.
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. 9 (Citations omitted)
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
44
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the ROAN I. LIBARIOS, complainant,
Court that he is a person of good moral character. 10 vs.
JUDGE ROSARITO F. DABALOS, respondent.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Roan L. Libarios for and on his own behalf.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life.
He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by RESOLUTION
the herein attached pictures.11 Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile,
Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. 12 In 2009, he was
appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment
Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessors Office, which office he continues to serve to date. 13 Moreover, he is a
part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-
2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire PADILLA, J.:
need.
This is an administrative complaint filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano Corvera, Jr. against
The following documents attest to respondents reformed ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality,
Reymar P. Ramirez; 16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4) Certification from the Municipal Local Government Office;18 (5) relative to Criminal Case No. 3464. The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Certification by the Office of the Municipal Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development Officer; 19 (6)
Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile, Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T. Tuddao; 21 (8)
On 10 March 1988, former Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr. was shot by Pablo Macapas inside the courtroom of respondent Judge
Certifications from nine (9) Barangay Chairpersons; 22 (9) Certification from the Office of the Provincial Assessor; 23 (10)
Dabalos, after a hearing in a frustrated murder case against said Pablo Macapas. Corvera, Sr. was the private complainant in the
Certification from the Office of the Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24and (11) Certification of the Office of
aforesaid criminal case, while Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr. was appearing as counsel of Macapas. As a result of the killing of
the Federation of Senior Citizens, Enrile Chapter.25 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also certified that respondent has no
Corvera Sr., a formal charge of murder (I.S. No. 88-138) was filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Butuan City against Pablo
monetary accountabilities in relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human Resource Management Officer attested that he
Macapas, Mayor Tranquilino Calo, Jr., and his driver-bodyguard Belarmino Alloco, and (2) other "John Does". Macapas was a
has no pending administrative case. 27 He is not known to be involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even the
bodyguard of respondent Calo, Jr.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he has no record on file as of May 31, 2011. 28

Furthermore, respondents plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan
Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues.30 His parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he is
faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. 31 He is also observed to be a regular
churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, 33 as in fact, no opposition
to the instant suit was tendered by complainant Teves. He sends regular support 34 to his children in compliance with the Courts
directive in the Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and recognizes his achievement
as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, 35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from
1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of
the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice.36 From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his
transgressions. At 58 37 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even
remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, 38 as in this
case.
On 22 June 1988, Investigating Fiscal Macario Balansag issued a resolution, finding a prima facie case for murder against the
respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.1
On 29 June 1988, the information was signed by the investigating Fiscal; however, a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
was filed by respondent Calo, Jr., which delayed the filing of the Information against Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents.
On 21 July 1988, respondents in I.S. No. 88-138 filed with the RTC Butuan City a petition for prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to enjoin the Investigating Fiscal from acting on their aforementioned
motion for reconsideration. Then Executive Judge Vicente Hidalgo issued a TRO, directing the Investigating Fiscal to refrain
from acting on the said motion for reconsideration and from further proceeding with the preliminary investigation of the murder
charge against respondent Calo, Jr. and his co-respondents. However the TRO expired after the lapse of twenty (20) days,
without a preliminary injunction being issued.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be resolved, Investigating Fiscal Balansag was himself gunned down in cold blood
while on his way to his office. Based on the investigation conducted by the NBI linking the death of Fiscal Balansag to the
killing of Corvera, Sr., another formal complaint for murder was filed against Calo. Jr. and four (4) others.

Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law.1wphi1 He is, however, reminded that such
privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict On 14 September 1988, Acting City Fiscal Brocoy resolved the pending motion for reconsideration, affirming the 22 June 1988
compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements.39 resolution finding a prima facie case for murder against the respondents in I.S. No. 88-138.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered On 29 September 1988, the information earlier signed by Investigating Fiscal Balansag, carrying a NO BAIL recommendation,
REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys. was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch IV, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464. On 14 October 1988,
upon motion of the prosecution and with the approval of the court, the information was withdrawn for being fatally defective in
form, the same having been signed by Fiscal Balansag who was already dead at the time of the filing of said information.
A.M. No. RTJ-89-286 July 11, 1991

45
On 29 November 1988, a new information signed by Acting Fiscal Brocoy carrying also a NO BAIL recommendation, was filed associate. To justify his finding that the evidence of guilt is circumstantial against accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, respondent
with the court without the necessary supporting affidavits and papers. The case was erroneously assigned to Branch IV of the judge stated that
RTC of Butuan City, where the original information prior to its withdrawal was assigned. The accused filed a Motion to Dismiss
and/or Opposition to the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest Without Bail, and in the alternative, accused sought the fixing of bail
Herein respondent has some doubts whether accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. could have done the acts of giving a
for their temporary release. 2 Said motion was set for hearing on 15 December 1988.
revolver to accused Pablo Macapas outside the courtroom and pushed Pablo Macapas into the courtroom to shoot
Mariano Corvera, Sr., which acts were allegedly done in the presence of witness (sic) Pacifico Largonita and
Upon motion of the prosecution, the case was scheduled for raffle on 7 December 1988. On said scheduled date for raffle, Fernando Casinao, who by their own admissions, are security personnel and companions of the late Mayor Corvera.
accused Calo, Jr. and his counsel personally filed an opposition to the holding of the raffle on the ground of lack of notice to the These acts being attributed to accused Calo as the brain behind the killing do not appear to be a natural conduct of
parties. man. These are stupid acts and accused Calo does not impress herein respondent as having that kind of mental
intelligence. Respondent has known accused Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. as a law practitioner and as a person for about
twenty years already.1wphi1 Respondent finds accused Calo to be of above-average intelligence. Thus, when
On 6 and 8 December 1988, Corvera, Jr. and his counsel together with their sympathizers staged a rally demanding the
respondent reviewed the findings of the investigating fiscal regarding the statements of P. Largonita and F. Casinao,
immediate arrest of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3464. After their rally in the afternoon of 8 December 1988, they
respondent entertained some serious doubts. Questions cropped up in respondent's mind. Respondent asked himself
personally went to see respondent judge in his chamber to reiterate their demand.
the questions that if he were the mastermind, would he give, in the presence of some individuals, the gun to the
gunman only at the vicinity where the intended victim was to be shot moments before the appointed time of the
After said meeting between Corvera, Jr., et al. and respondent-judge, the latter issued an order of 8 December 19883 in his killing and pushed the gunman to the place where the victim was? Respondent's answer was that he would not behave
capacity as Executive Judge, directing the raffle of the case with due notice to the parties. Without conducting any prior hearing, in such manner, otherwise he would appear to be an inept mastermind and the gunman was reluctant that the latter
in the same order of 8 December 1988, respondent judge directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused, fixing had to be pushed to execute the plan.6
at the same time the bail for accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod at P50,000.00 each; however, no bail was recommended for the
temporary release of accused Macapas. Respondent judge fixed bail for the temporary release of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod
While it does not form part of the record of the case at bar, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16383 is
on the ground that they were not charged as co-principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt against
quite enlightening. That decision, as already mentioned, declared as null and void the warrants of arrest issued by respondent
them was merely circumstantial.
judge as well as the bail fixed by him for the temporary release of the accused, all accomplished without a hearing. The Court of
Appeals said:
On 14 December 1988, a petition for certiorari was filed by herein complainant with the Court of Appeals, assailing the 8
December 1988 order of respondent judge, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 16383. In response to the urgency of the petition, a
It is conventional wisdom in legal circles that the determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong in
resolution dated 20 December 1988 was issued by the Court of Appeals restraining the execution and implementation of the
a capital offense rests upon the sound judgment and discretion of the court which can only be exercised and reached
assailed order, pending the resolution of the petition on the merits. However, on 26 December 1988, respondent judge and Calo,
after due or summary hearing. (People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522; Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55). In that
Jr. informed the Court of Appeals that accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod had already put up their respective bail bonds of
hearing, the fiscal must be notified and given the opportunity to present his evidence. If the court grants bail without
P50,000.00 as of 9 December 1988 and that both have been released, thus rendering the primary objective of the CA temporary
affording such opportunity to the prosecution, due process is seriously violated. (People vs. San Diego, supra;
restraining order moot and academic.
Mendoza vs. CFI of Quezon, 51 SCRA 373). And even where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the Court may ask the prosecution "questions to ascertain the
On 31 January 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision4 setting aside the questioned 8 December 1988 order as having strength of the state's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail." (Herras Teehankee vs. Director of
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The warrants of arrest as well as the bail Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 789).
bonds filed by the accused in said Criminal Case No. 3464 were declared void and without force and effect; the court of origin
was ordered to immediately issue and serve new warrants of arrest upon the accused. To determine whether or not the evidence
xxx xxx xxx
of guilt against the accused is strong, the trial court was ordered to conduct a heating and thus resolve the motion for fixing the
bald for the temporary release of the two (2) accused, Calo, Jr. and Allocod. The decision of the Court of Appeals became final
and executory on 23 February 1989.5 In the petition at bar, private respondents argue that since they are no longer in custody of the law, the respondent
court having granted and fixed their bail which they did forthwith post, the hearing to determine whether or not their
guilt is strong is no longer necessary. The argument sounds but casuistic because in Our judgment the respondent
In the administrative complaint at bar, complainant claims that the act of respondent judge in granting bail to the accused Calo,
court acted deliberately with precipitate haste and with grave abuse of discretion, when on December 8, 1988 it
Jr. and Allocod without a hearing, is tantamount to gross ignorance and willful, malicious and blatant disregard of the provisions
issued the order granting and fixing the bail without any hearing at all, even as private respondents themselves had
of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which require a hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense
requested their motion to be heard on December 15, 1988 yet, when respondent court in the same order directed the
can be granted bail. The impartiality of respondent judge in issuing the questioned warrants of arrest but allowing bail is also
issuance of warrants of arrest against private respondents, the act was nothing more than a superfluous and useless
questioned on the ground of his "close association" with the accused Calo, Jr.
ceremony because with the grant of bail the accused could and did effectively secure their freedom at once without
even seeing a copy of the warrant of arrest itself. As a matter of fact, there is nothing in the records before Us to show
In his defense, respondent judge argues that Sec. 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which requires a hearing of that warrants of arrest were actually issued against private respondents. 7
an application for admission to bail, filed by any person who is in custody for the commission of a capital offense, is applicable
only to cases where the accused is already in custody, but neither of the three (3) accused in Criminal Case No. 3464 was being
Respondent judge was declared by the Court of Appeals to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the
detained at the time their application for bail was acted upon by respondent judge. In his capacity as Executive Judge, respondent
accused without a hearing. Generally, a judge cannot be held liable to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively,
judge claims that he merely followed the precedents set by his predecessors, in issuing warrants of arrest before the raffle of a
for an erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith.8 However, good faith may be negated by the circumstances
case in order to avoid delay in the arrest of the accused.
on record.

In addition, respondent judge denied the allegation that he was a law partner of accused Calo, Jr., claiming that he was a mere
employee in the business of said accused, and that he appeared with accused Calo, Jr. as co-counsel in a case, but not as an
46
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely
of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic legal
principles.9
In every case, a judge should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.10 Respondent judge should not have allowed himself to be swayed into issuing an
order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without a hearing, which is contrary to
established principles of law. A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to
apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural
rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. 11
The fact that the complainant and his sympathizers had staged a rally demanding the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the
accused is not a sufficient excuse for the unjustified haste of respondent judge's act of fixing bail without a hearing.
It has been an established legal principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must
conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of
bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a
violation of due process.12 Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the evidence of guilt against herein accused is not
strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demanded that a hearing be conducted before bail was fixed for the temporary release
of accused Calo, Jr. and Allocod, if bail was at all justified. Respondent judge's disregard of an established rule of law by
depriving the prosecution of the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong, amounted to
gross ignorance of the law, which is subject to disciplinary action.
Furthermore, considering that respondent judge had a close association with respondent Calo, Jr. as a former employee of the
said accused, prudence and regard for his position as judge demanded that he should have refrained from fixing the bail of said
accused and from concluding that the evidence against him was merely "circumstantial", in order to avoid any doubt as to his
judicial impartiality. Respondent judge should have waited for the raffle of the case and allowed the judge to whom the case was
actually raffled to resolve the issue of fixing the bail of said accused, if he was bailable. A judge should not only render a just,
correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and
integrity.13
ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge is hereby imposed a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and WARNED
to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that the same or similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severally.
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1563 September 8, 2004
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1207-MTJ)
LUCILA TAN, complainant,
vs.
Judge MAXWEL S. ROSETE, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Lucila Tan filed the instant complaint against Judge Maxwel S. Rosete, former Acting Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila,1 for violation of Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019).
47
The complaint alleged that Lucila Tan was the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 59440 and Criminal Case No. 66120,
both entitled People of the Philippines vs. Alfonso Pe Sy and pending before Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,
Metro Manila, then presided by respondent judge. Before the cases were decided, respondent judge allegedly sent a member of
his staff to talk to complainant. They met at Sangkalan Restaurant along Scout Albano, near Timog Avenue in Quezon City. The
staff member told her that respondent was asking for 150,000.00 in exchange for the non-dismissal of the cases. She was shown
copies of respondent judges Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, both still unsigned, dismissing the complaints
against the accused. She was told that respondent judge would reverse the disposition of the cases as soon as she remits the
amount demanded. The staff member allowed complainant to keep the copy of the draft decision in Criminal Case No. 59440.
Complainant, however, did not accede to respondents demand because she believed that she had a very strong case, well
supported by evidence. The criminal cases were eventually dismissed by respondent judge. 2
Respondent judge, in his Comment, denied the allegations of complainant. He instead stated that it was complainant who
attempted to bribe him in exchange for a favorable decision. She even tried to delay and to derail the promulgation of the
decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120. Complainant also sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor, Jinggoy
Estrada, to obtain judgment in her favor. Mayor Estrada allegedly talked to him several times to ask him to help complainant.
The former even called him over the phone when he was in New Zealand, persuading him to hold in abeyance the promulgation
of the Decisions in said cases. But he politely declined, telling him that there was no sufficient evidence to convict the accused,
and moreover, he had already turned over the Decisions to Judge Quilatan for promulgation. Respondent further stated that
complainant kept bragging about her close relations with Mayor Estrada who was her neighbor in Greenhills, San Juan, and even
insinuated that she could help him get appointed to a higher position provided he decides the suits in her favor. Respondent
judge also claimed that complainant offered to give cash for the downpayment of a car he was planning to buy. But he refused
the offer. Finally, respondent judge denied that a member of his staff gave complainant a copy of his draft decision in Criminal
Case No. 59440. He said that he had entrusted to Judge Quilatan his Decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120 before
he left for New Zealand on study leave. Thus, he asserted that it was impossible for him to thereafter change the resolution of the
cases and it was likewise impossible for any member of his staff to give complainant copies of said Decisions. 3
In a resolution dated December 2, 2002, the Court referred the complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City for investigation, report and recommendation.4
First Vice Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several hearings on the administrative case. Only complainant Lucila
Tan testified for her side. She presented as documentary evidence the copy of the unsigned Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440
dated February 23, 2001 which was allegedly handed to her by a member of respondent judges staff. 5 Respondent judge, on the
other hand, presented four (4) witnesses: Josefina Ramos, Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), Fernando B. Espuerta, and Joyce Trinidad
Hernandez. His documentary evidence consists of the affidavits of his witnesses, 6 copy of the Motion for Reconsideration in
Criminal Case No. 59440,7 and various documents composed of the machine copy of the Order of Arrest in Criminal Case No.
117219, machine copy of the letter dated December 29, 1997, machine copy of Certification dated Nov 13, 2000, front and
dorsal sides of Check No. QRH-0211804, Bank Statement dated March 31, 1998, Stop Payment Order dated April 6, 1998,
Current Account Inquiry, and Transaction Record, which documents were allegedly given by complainant to respondents
witness, Fernando B. Espuerta.8
The Investigating Judge summarized the testimonies of the witnesses as follows:
COMPLAINANTS VERSION:
1. LUCILA TAN
Complainant Lucila Tan testified that she knew Respondent Judge because she had a case in Branch 58, MeTC, San
Juan, Metro Manila. She alleged that, in September 1998, she filed two cases involving B.P. 22 and Other Deceits
with the Prosecutors Office in Pasig. After resolution, the cases were filed in the MeTC, San Juan. One case went to
Branch 57 and the other one went to Branch 58, where Respondent Judge Rosete was the Presiding Judge. Judge
Quilatan was the Presiding Judge of Branch 57. Upon advise of a friend, she moved for consolidation and the two
cases were transferred to Judge Quilatan in Branch 57. Subsequently, in view of the Motion for Inhibition filed by
Complainants lawyer, Judge Quilatan inhibited himself and the two cases were transferred to the sala of Respondent
Judge Rosete (TSN, pp. 9-16, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After several hearings, the Clerk of Court, named Joyce,
called up the Complainant and advised her to talk to San Juan Mayor Jinggoy Estrada to seek for (sic) assistance.
Joyce gave her the phone number of the Office of the Mayor (TSN, pages 17-18, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
Complainant then called up the Office of the Mayor but her call was intercepted by Josie, the Mayors Secretary.
When she told Josie why she called, the latter asked her if she wanted to meet the Judge and when Complainant
answered in the affirmative, Josie made arrangements for Complainant to meet the Judge (TSN, pages 19-21,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant called up the Office of the Mayor sometime in November or late October
2000 and she met the Judge on November 10. She, Josie and Respondent Judge met at the Cravings Restaurant in
Wilson, San Juan (TSN, page 22, Hearing of March 3, 2003). During the meeting, Complainant "told the Judge
regarding this matter, how this happened and that he will convince the Accused to pay me as soon as possible" (TSN,
page 23, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When she went to the restroom for a few minutes, Respondent Judge and Josie
were left alone. After she came back, they went home. On the way home, Josie told her to give something to [the]
Judge, "Sabi niya magbigay tayo ng kaunti para bumilis iyong kaso mo" (TSN, page 24, Hearing of March 3,
2003). At first, Josie did not mention any amount but when the Complainant asked her how much, the former
mentioned Fifty Thousand Pesos (50,000.00). Complainant asked for a lesser amount, Twenty Thousand Pesos
(20,000.00) (TSN, page 25, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie agreed, she sent the amount of 20,000.00 to
Josie through her driver after two days (TSN, pages 26-27, Hearing of March 3, 2003). When Josie received the
money, the Clerk of Court, Joyce, also called her (Complainant) on that date. The Clerk of Court asked her if she sent
money. At first, Complainant denied it but the Clerk of Court said that Josie went there and there was money in the
drawer (TSN, pages 28-29, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After that, several hearings were on-going, and before the
resolution, Joyce called up the Complainant again around February 2001. Complainant was in Baguio when Joyce
called saying that she had an important thing to tell to (sic) the Complainant. After Complainant got back to Manila,
Joyce called her again and said that she will show Complainant something. When they were in Complainants car in
San Juan, Joyce showed Complainant two unsigned Decisions of the case[s]. After reading the Decisions,
Complainant saw that the cases were dismissed and that it will be dismissed if she will not accede to Joyces
request (TSN, pages 30-33, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant claimed that Joyce asked for Php 150,000.00
for each case. "Sabi niya it [was] for Judge daw, kailangan daw ni Judge because he is leaving at that time" (TSN,
page 34, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant identified the copy of the Decision in Criminal Case No. 59440
for Other Deceits, dated 23 February 2001, which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the Complainant (TSN, pages 35-
38, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant further alleged "Sabi niya, if I will accede to that request of
150,000.00 for each case then they will (sic) going to reverse the Decision" and "Si Judge daw" will reverse the
Decision. Complainant met with Joyce around February 2001 (TSN, page 39, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
Complainant further claimed that Joyce told her to go to Mayor because he is a friend of the Judge. Complainant went
again to the Office of the Mayor to seek the Mayors help and she met the Mayor at his Office in San Juan. The
Mayor called up the Judge but he was not around so the Clerk of Court, Joyce, was called. Joyce went to the Office of
the Mayor and when she arrived, she said that the Judge was out of the country (TSN, pages 40-41, Hearing of
March 3, 2003). The Mayor asked for the phone number of Respondent Judge Rosete, which Joyce gave. Mayor
Estrada was able to get in touch with the Judge. While the Mayor was talking in (sic) the phone with the Judge,
Complainant was in front of the Mayor (TSN, pages 42-43, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant heard the
Mayor "because his voice is very loud." He said, "Judge, Saan ka? Sabi niya New Zealand. When were you coming
back? I do not know what is the answer and then he said, you help my friend naswindler siya, pabilisin mo ang kaso
niya para matapos na kasi matagal na iyan" (TSN, page 43, Hearing of March 23, 2003). After that they left the
Office of the Mayor and Complainant was not able to approach Mayor Estrada again. Since the Complainant was still
carrying the Decision, and being afraid that it will be promulgated already, she sought the advi[c]e of her friends. The
Complainant showed the decision to the Prosecutor in San Juan at that time (TSN, pages 44-45, Hearing of March
3, 2003). The Prosecutor told the Complainant that she is going to meet with the Judge when he comes back from
New Zealand. Complainant testified that, sometime in April, in Sangkalan, Quezon City, a night life restaurant, she
met Respondent Judge Rosete. She was with two (2) Prosecutors. When she arrived at Sangkalan at about 8:30 in the
evening, Judge Rosete was already in the company of several men whom she got to know as Fernan and
Buboy (TSN, pages 46-48, Hearing of March 3, 2003). After eating and drinking, the Complainant left at around
10:30 in the evening. While they were inside, Complainant claimed that she did not say anything at all and it was the
Prosecutor who talked in her behalf. She was the one who paid all the bills which amounted to Six Thousand Pesos
(6,000.00). When Complainant left, only they, three (3) girls, left while the Judge and his company were still there
drinking. While Complainant was waiting for her car outside, a man came over from behind (TSN, pages 49-50,
Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant did not know him but she asked the Prosecutor later after the man left. The
Complainant said that the man asked if he could have an advance, which she understood as a payment, and she told
the Prosecutor. Complainant heard the Prosecutor say that she already talked to the Judge. The man left and went
48
back inside the restaurant (TSN, page 51, Hearing of March 3, 2003). Complainant said that when she did not give
the money she was still scared because there will already be a promulgation and she did not know whether it will be
in her behalf (sic) or not. Complainant did not give anything aside from the 20,000.00 because her case was very
strong and she had all the papers and evidence and that she promised them that she will give them after she was (sic)
able to collect all the debts. Complainant did not know the actual date of the promulgation but somebody from the
Office of Respondent Judge called her up in her house and told her not to go to the promulgation. When Complainant
asked why, "Sabi niya baka mapaiyak daw ako kasi alam na daw nila ang decision. Sabi niya ako na lang ang
magdedeliver ng case ng promulgation." She received the decision when she sent her driver to pick it up. The caller
said that the decision was unfavorable to her (TSN, pages 52-55, Hearing of March 3, 2003).
RESPONDENTS VERSION:
1. JOSEFINA RAMOS
She testified that she was the Private Secretary of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada, the former Mayor of San Juan, Metro
Manila, since he was Vice Mayor of San Juan. In 2000 and 2001, she was already the Secretary of Mayor
Jinggoy (TSN, page 7, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She met Lucila Tan when the latter went to the Mayors
Office together with Tita Pat, the sister of President Estrada, but she could no longer remember the year. Lucila Tan
went to the Office, together with Tita Pat, and they were seeking the help of Mayor Jinggoy because they have a case.
She did not know the case because they were talking to Mayor Jinggoy. She could no longer remember how many
times Lucila Tan went to the Office of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada. She did not know what Lucila Tan wanted from
Mayor Jinggoy Estrada or how close Lucila Tan was to him (TSN, pages 8-11, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She
denied that she met Lucila Tan at the Cravings Restaurant and that she suggested to Lucila Tan to give Fifty
Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) to Judge Rosete to speed up or facilitate her cases but that Lucila Tan agreed for only
Twenty Thousand Pesos (20,000.00). She claimed that she did not know what Lucila Tan was talking about
regarding the money. There was no occasion that she suggested or even intimated to Lucila Tan the idea of giving
money to Judge Rosete. She denied that she met with Lucila Tan and Respondent Judge at Cravings Restaurant along
Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed on February 5, 2003, which
was marked as Exhibit "1" (TSN, pages 12-16, Hearing of September 9, 2003). She denied that Lucila Tan gave
anything to her (TSN, page 17, Hearing of September 9, 2003).
2. RODOLFO CEA
He testified that his acquaintances usually call him "Buboy" and for about two years or more he had no occupation.
Two years before, he was a Clerk III at Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San Juan. He knows Lucila Tan
because, when he "was still working as Clerk in San Juan, she approached me and asked if I can introduce her to
Judge Rosete and eventually asked for a favorable decision against her case." He could not remember anymore when
that was because "it was a long time ago" (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing of September 22, 2003). It was when he was
still with the MeTC, Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. He met Lucila Tan at the corridor of the Metropolitan Trial
Court when she approached him and asked if he can introduce her to Judge Rosete. He agreed to introduce Lucila Tan
to Judge Rosete but he was not able to actually introduce Lucila Tan to Judge Rosete "because aside from the
introduction, she wants me to ask Judge Rosete for a favorable decision against (sic) her case and I told her that Judge
Rosete dont (sic) like his staff (to) indulge on that kind of transaction" (TSN, pages 8-9, Hearing of September 22,
2003). As far as he knows, the meeting he had with Lucila Tan in the corridor of the Court in San Juan was "the first
and the last time." When asked about the claim of Lucila Tan that he approached her and demanded from her a sum
of money to represent an advance payment for a favorable decision in her cases then pending before Judge Rosete, he
answered "I dont know about that, sir." (TSN, page 10, Hearing of September 22, 2003.) He identified the Sworn
Statement, subscribed on February 6, 2003, and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of the contents of the
Affidavit, which was marked as Exhibit "2" (TSN, pages 11-12, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He denied that he
met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant around 8:30 in the evening of an unspecified date (TSN, page 13,
Hearing of September 22, 2003).
3. FERNANDO B. ESPUERTA
He testified that he is a government employee employed at the Supreme Court with the position Budget Officer III answer(ed) [sic] to him, you were talking and then he said ganun ba? then Mayor Jinggoy said o sige, okay na and
since November 9, 1981. His first job was Casual and he became Budget Officer in 1997 (TSN, page 46, Hearing of then we left the Office." She denied that she gave two advance copies of the Decisions in Complainants two cases
September 22, 2003). He recalled having met Lucila Tan sometime just before Christmas in October or November inside the latters parked car in San Juan, Metro Manila and claimed that Complainant was the one who showed her
2000. The first time he saw Lucila Tan was in a restaurant in Quezon City where she was introduced to him by Fiscal the copy in their Office. She likewise denied the testimony of the Complainant that she allegedly demanded
Reyes. He went to the restaurant alone. He was invited by Judge Rosete because they had not been together for a long Php150,000.00 for each of the two cases then pending before Branch 58, which were decided by Respondent Judge,
time and they were long time friends. They ate at the restaurant. When he arrived, Judge Rosete and Buboy were in return for a favorable decision (TSN, pages 18-21, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She claimed that it was the
already there. They stayed in the restaurant until 11:00 [eleven] oclock in the evening (TSN, pages 47-49, Hearing Complainant who offered to her. She identified her Sworn Statement, subscribed and sworn to on February 5, 2003,
of September 22, 2003). He met Lucila Tan in that restaurant when Fiscal Reyes pointed him to Lucila Tan as which was marked as Exhibit "5," and confirmed and affirmed the truthfulness of all the contents thereof (TSN,
Fernan of the Supreme Court. When he arrived there, Buboy and Judge Rosete were already there. Later, the three (3) pages 22-25, Hearing of September 29, 2003).9
girls arrived, namely: Fiscal Reyes, Lucila Tan and the sister of the Fiscal (TSN, page 50, Hearing of September 22,
2003). They ordered and ate but they were in a separate table. He recalled that Judge Rosete paid for their bill
The Court is now faced with two opposing versions of the story. Complainant claims that respondent judge, through his staff,
because he saw him get a credit card and sign something. He did not know about Mrs. Tan but he saw Judge Rosete
required her to pay the amount of 150,000.00 for him to render judgment in her favor in the two criminal cases she filed against
sign and give to the waiter. The incident where he met Lucila Tan in the restaurant in Quezon City came before the
Alfonso Pe Sy. Respondent judge, on the other hand, asserts that it was complainant who attempted to bribe him by offering to
incident when she went to his Office (TSN, pages 51-52, Hearing of September 22, 2003). He could not remember
pay for the downpayment of the car he was planning to buy, and she even sought the intervention of then San Juan Mayor
the month when Lucila Tan went to his Office but he remembers that it was nearing Christmas in 2000. "Pumunta
Jinggoy Estrada to persuade him to rule for the complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120.
siya sa akin parang may ipinakiusap siya sa akin, katunayan nandito po dala ko." Lucila Tan asked him to help her
in her case with Alfonso Sy. "Meron siyang inalok sa akin. Sabi bibigyan niya ako ng three hundred thousand pesos
(300,000.00) para iabot kay Judge Rosete. Ang sagot ko nga sa kanya, hindi ganun ang aking kaibigan. Matagal na The issue in this administrative case thus boils down to a determination of the credibility of the parties evidence.
kaming magkaibigan niyan noong nagpapractice pa yan. Iyon ang sagot ko sa kanya." He told Judge Rosete about
that and the latter got mad at him. In their second meeting, Lucila Tan gave him papers. He presented a Motion for
After a thorough evaluation of the testimonies of all the witnesses, as well as the documentary evidence presented by both
Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 59440, which was marked as Exhibit "3" (TSN, pages 53-56, Hearing of
parties, we find the complainants version more trustworthy. Not only did she testify with clarity and in full detail, but she also
September 22, 2003). He presented the papers actually given to him by Lucila Tan. He claimed that the xerox copy
presented during the investigation the unsigned copy of the draft decision of respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 59440 given
was the exact same document given to him by Lucila Tan when she went to his Office. The other documents that
to her by a member of his staff. Said documentary evidence supports her allegation that a member of complainants staff met
Lucila Tan gave to him when she went to his Office were marked as Exhibit "4" and submarkings (TSN, pages 57-
with her, showed her copies of respondent judges draft decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 59440 and 66120, and demanded, in
63, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan told him the contents of the documents and how the case against
behalf of respondent judge, that she pays 150,000.00 for the reversal of the disposition of said cases. It would be impossible for
Alfonso Sy came about. When Lucila Tan asked him, he answered her that his friend (Respondent Judge) was not
complainant to obtain a copy of a judges draft decision, it being highly confidential, if not through the judge himself or from the
like that and they had been together for a long time and it is not possible. When he told Judge Rosete about that, the
people in his office. And an ordinary employee in the court cannot promise a litigant the reversal of a cases disposition if not
latter got mad at him. Lucila Tan also mentioned to him that she knew the son of the Chief Justice (TSN, pages 64-
assured by the judge who drafted the decision.
66, Hearing of September 22, 2003). Lucila Tan was insisting that he give Judge Rosete so that her case will win
but he answered that his friend was not like that (TSN, pages 67-68, Hearing of September 22, 2003).
The respondents evidence did not overcome the facts proved by complainant. We note that the testimonies of two of
respondents witnesses contradict each other. Fernando Espuerta confirmed complainants claim that she met respondent judge
4. JOYCE TRINIDAD HERNANDEZ
and his two companions, Espuerta himself and Rodolfo Cea (Buboy), at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City. Rodolfo Cea, on
the other hand, denied that he met complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant and swore that he never went out with respondent judge
She testified that she was a government employee connected with the Judiciary at the Metropolitan Trial Court, in non-office functions. The Investigating Judge observed:
Branch 58, San Juan, Metro Manila. She knew Complainant Lucila Tan because in the year 2000 she had a case in
their court. She first came to know Lucila Tan when the latter went to their Office with Ellen Sorio, the Branch Clerk
Thus, there is an apparent inconsistency in the testimony of the Respondent Judges two witnesses, Rodolfo Cea and
of Court of Branch 57, who introduced Lucila Tan to her. Ellen Sorio said, "may kaso ito sa inyo, pinapasabi ni
Fernando B. Espuerta, regarding the incident at Sangkalan Restaurant in Quezon City where Complainant claimed
Mayor kay Judge" (TSN, pages 7-11, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She did not say anything but Lucila Tan
that she met Respondent Judge, a certain Fernan, and Buboy, while she was with two Prosecutors. Fernando B.
asked "may tumawag na ba sa Mayors Office?" and she said "yes, maam." After that there was a hearing and the
Espuerta testified that he was at Sangkalan Restaurant with Respondent Judge and Buboy (Rodolfo Cea), while the
sister of former President Estrada went to their Office looking for Judge Rosete. She told her that Judge Rosete was
latter (Rodolfo Cea) denied that he met the Complainant at Sangkalan Restaurant.10 (citations omitted)
on a hearing and the former told her to tell Judge Rosete about the case of Lucila "na pinakikiusap ni Mayor" (TSN,
page 12, Hearing of September 29, 2003). She told Judge Rosete about the things that the sister of the former
President told her and that Judge Rosete said nothing. She denied the testimony of Complainant on March 3, 2003 Hence, we are more inclined to believe complainants version that she met with respondent judge and his companions at
that, sometime in November 2000, she (Joyce Hernandez) called up Lucila Tan by telephone and said that she saw Sangkalan Restaurant sometime in April 2001.
money stuffed inside the drawer of the Respondent in his Office and that she asked the Complainant whether the
latter was the one who sent the money stuffed inside the drawer. What she remembers is that Lucila Tan called her
and asked if Josie went to their Office and she told Lucila Tan that Josie never went to their Office. She also denied We have also observed that respondent judge has not been very candid with the Court as regards the dates when he went to New
that she called up Lucila Tan sometime in February 2001 and claimed that Lucila Tan was the one who called her up Zealand and when he came back to the Philippines. Respondent asserts that he was already in New Zealand at the time when
and told her that she (Lucila Tan) was going to show her something. Lucila Tan showed her a copy of the Decision complainant claims that he met with her. However, the evidence he presented only shows his New Zealand visa and the dates
and she was surprised when the former showed her the copy. When she asked where Lucila Tan got the copy, the when he entered said country.11 He did not show to the investigating body the dates when he left and returned to the Philippines.
latter did not answer and said that Mayor Jinggoy wanted to talk to her (TSN, pages 13-16, Hearing of September Apparently, he entered New Zealand on two dates: March 4, 2001 and May 1, 2001. We may therefore infer that complainant
29, 2003). She immediately went to the Office of the Mayor with Lucila Tan and Mayor Jinggoy talked to her. The was in the Philippines before May 1, 2001, which is consistent with complainants testimony, as well as that of Fernando
Mayor asked her where Judge Rosete was and she answered that he was in New Zealand on study leave. When the Espuerta, that she met with respondent judge and his companions, Fernando and Buboy in April 2001.
Mayor asked if she knew the telephone number of the Judge, she gave him the telephone number in New Zealand.
She was present when the Mayor called up Respondent Judge and talked to him (TSN, page 17, Hearing of We have repeatedly admonished our judges to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of
September 29, 2003). "He said Pare ko, ano na itong kaso na pinakikiusap ko sa iyo? I dont know what was your competence, integrity and independence. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. This is not
49
without reason. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the 7361, C-7362, C-7363, C-7364, C-7839, C-7841 and C-7842. Said defendants are the intervenors in Civil Case No. 8682 on
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary because the peoples confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the whose motion respondent judge issued the preliminary injunction.
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity and
moral uprightness they are expected to possess. When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn
The immediate execution of the order of arrest was effected thru a handwritten note of respondent judge addressed to
to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
then superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim. Upon orders of this Court, however, Deputy
impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his duties
Sheriff Ramirez was released from jail on July 2, 1985. Thereafter, the court resolved to treat the petition as an
and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. 12
administrative case 1 and to require respondent judge to comment thereon. 2

Respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of
meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be
observed by members of the Bench. They constitute gross misconduct which is punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Respondent Judge Maxwel S. Rosete is SUSPENDED from office without salary and other benefits
for FOUR (4) MONTHS.
Respondent judge denied having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in causing the arrest of Ramirez. She justified the arrest as a
means of preserving substantial justice so that any decision rendered in Civil Case No. 8682 may not be rendered moot and
academic and as a curative measure to preserve the greater interest of social justice. The handwritten note, on the other hand,
was explained as a means to preserve the integrity of courts of justice in the enforcement of valid and lawful orders. She added
that the writ of preliminary injunction was issued by her in the exercise of her original jurisdiction, while the Order of January
11, 1985 was issued by Judge Liwag in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which the latter should not have done as she should
have remanded the case to the court of origin for execution.

A.M. No. R-351-RTJ September 26, 1986 II. Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ.
ABRAHAM L. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
On September 28, 1984, complainant Liwayway B. Samson filed before the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint for damages
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.
against Benecio Urgel, Roberto Exequiel, Shigiro Iwata and Remigio Pasion docketed as Civil Case No. 11559 and assigned to
A.M. No. R-359-RTJ September 26, 1986
respondent judge. The summonses were served on the defendants on October 3, 1984. On October 18, 1984, defendants Urgel
LIWAYWAY B. SAMSON, complainant,
and Exequiel filed their answer with cross-claim against their co-defendants Pasion and Iwata They likewise filed a motion for
vs.
leave to file a third party complaint against Imperial Insurance Co. This was granted on October 22, 1984. On November 12,
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.
1984, within the extension given by the court, defendant Iwata filed his answer with compulsory counter-claim and cross-claim
A.M. No. R-621-RTJ September 26, 1986
and answer to cross-claim against defendants Urgel, Exequiel and Pasion. The latter did not file any answer. Thus, on November
VICTORIA TORRES, complainant,
29, 1984, complainant thru counsel moved to declare Pasion in default and to set the case for pre-trial On January 29, 1985,
vs.
counsel for complainant filed an ex-parte motion praying for the resolution of the motion of November 29, 1984. When no
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent.
action was forthcoming, counsel filed another motion on March 26, 1985, reiterating his prayer in the motion of November 29,
A.M. No. R-684-RTJ September 26, 1986
1984. For alleged failure of respondent judge to act on the motions, the instant complaint was filed on June 6, 1985.
ESPERANZA LAZARO, complainant,
vs.
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent. Required to comment, respondent judge stated that the motion of November 29, 1984 was noted for study on December 18, 1984
A.M. No. R-687-RTJ September 26, 1986 and was actually resolved on March 1, 1985, "well within the period even for the court to resolved [sic] the same and prior to the
JESUS ALBA, complainant, receipt ... of the letter-complaint on July 2, 1985; " and that the case could not yet be set for pre-trial on account of the existence
vs. of the third-party complaint. In conclusion, respondent judge said that letter-complaint "is not only malicious but was intended to
HON. ANTONIA CORPUZ-MACANDOG, respondent. malign the undersigned Presiding Judge 3 and should therefore be dismissed.
A.M. No. 86-4-9987-RTC September 26, 1986
DESIGNATION OF AN ACTING JUDGE IN BRANCH CXXI, RTC, CALOOCAN CITY.
Complainant replied to the comment for the purpose of placing in issue respondent judge's allegation that the motion dated
Bognot, Toledano & Associates counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 359-RTJ.
November 29, 1984 was resolved on March 1, 1985. She averred that if this were true, why is it that notice thereof was received
Romulo T. Santos counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. R-684-RTJ.
by her counsel only on June 22, 1985 after the instant complaint had been filed; and why is it that respondent judge failed to
Conrado A. Leao counsel for the complainant in A.M. No. 687-RTC.
resolve the other motions? She concluded that the only reasonable implication is that the order was antedated to show some color
of performance of duties. She likewise cites respondent judge for failure to order the service of summons and copy of the third-
PER CURIAM:
party complaint on the third-party defendant.
Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXX, stands charged in six
separate complaints of various forms of misconduct in the performance of her official duties. The details are as follows:
I. Administrative Matter No. R-351-RTJ. It appears that due to the statement found in respondent's comment that "the letter-complaint is not only malicious but was
This originated as G.R. No. 71179, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on June 29, 1985 by Deputy Sheriff intended to malign the undersigned Presiding Judge complainant moved for respondent's inhibition from Civil Case No. 11559
Abraham L. Ramirez of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to secure his release from the Caloocan City jail. and its re-raffling to another sala. This motion was denied.
Ramirez was ordered arrested on June 27, 1985 by respondent judge for direct contempt of court consisting in his alleged
disobedience to the writ of preliminary injunction dated January 21, 1985 issued in Civil Case No. 8682 enjoining him
from demolishing the improvements of the intervenors in said case. Eventually, as manifested by respondent in her Rejoinder, she inhibited herself from hearing Civil Case No. 11559, which has
since been assigned to another judge and has been set for pre-trial In said rejoinder, respondent judge characterized
complainant's so-called implication respecting the order of March 1, 1985 as being founded on conjectures, assumptions and
Deputy Sheriff Ramirez had previously been directed by Judge Socorro Tirona-Liwag of Branch CXXIII of the same suppositions. Furthermore, she said that after the third party complaint had been admitted, it was not her duty to order service of
court in an order dated January 11, 1985, to demolish the improvements of the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. C-7380, C- the summons on the third-party defendant, but that of the counsel who espouses the cause of the client.

50
 III. Administrative Matter No. R-621-RTJ.
In the sworn letter-complaint dated April 28, 1986, Victoria L. Torres charged respondent judge with ignorance of the law, graft
or deliberate distortion of the law for pecuniary motives. She alleged that respondent judge had indiscriminately issued
restraining orders without conducting hearings on the applications for the issuance of preliminary injunctions and had reiterated
restraining orders after the lapse of the mandatory twenty [20] days; that she issued restraining orders against the enforcement of
the writs of execution in ejectment cases decided by other RTC branches of Caloocan City which are of co-equal jurisdiction;
that she has cited for contempt lawyers and sheriffs of other branches whom she fancies to have offended her, as in the case of
Deputy Sheriff Ramirez [cf. Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ] who was merely complying with the order of Judge Liwag and that
she has been issuing restraining orders in ejectment cases involving the so- called "Maysilo Estate" for undoubtedly suspicious
considerations.
By way of compliance to the court's resolution dated June 19, 1986, respondent submitted her comment on the letter-complaint
on July 16, 1986, branding the allegations found therein as false accusations as it failed to state specific facts on the matters
complained of. She stated that she issued a temporary restraining order in Civil Case No. 10526 entitled, "Arturo Salientes, et. al.
v. Alexander Development Corp., et al." but denied having issued an extension thereof. She claimed having issued a preliminary
prohibitory injunction after due hearing.
With respect to the second allegation, respondent explained the issuance of the restraining orders as a method of maintaining the
status quo so that the cases pending before her involving the issue of ownership may not be rendered moot and academic by the
execution of the decisions in the ejectment cases relating to the same properties.
Respondent reiterated her explanation in Adm. Matter No. R-351-RTJ in connection with the Ramirez arrest-incident and
asserted that she has been acting on the Maysilo estate cases objectively on the basis of the law involved and the evidence on
hand.
It appears that while the instant complaint was pending evaluation by the Court, complainant Victoria Torres, in her capacity as
attorney-in-fact of Alexander Development Co. caused the implementation of the writ of execution issued by the RTC of
Caloocan, Branch CXXX in Civil Case No. 10645, entitled "Alexander Development Co. v. Jose Chan." The writ of execution
was enforced thru the demolition of a shanty being claimed by Francisco Cruz, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 10526.
Because of this, Torres was ordered arrested for contempt of court by respondent judge in an order dated May 15, 1986. To
challenge said arrest order Torres instituted before the IAC a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as AC-
G.R. S.P. No. 09162-SP, wherein respondent judge was likewise required to comment. On June 5, 1986, respondent judge issued
an order recalling the arrest order for being moot and academic. This was manifested in the comment submitted in AC-G.R. No.
09162-S.P.
IV. Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTJ.
The gravamen of the complaint filed before this Court on July 7, 1986 is the alleged failure of respondent judge to decide Civil
Case No. C-9831 entitled, "Federico S. Cruz v. Esperanza Lazaro," despite the case having been submitted for decision for more
than 18 months. Complainant who is the defendant in Civil Case No. C-9831, claims that the case was submitted for decision on
October 2, 1984 with the filing of defendant's memorandum. She further alleges that as respondent judge had been drawing her
salary during the entire time that the case was pending decision, respondent judge is likewise guilty of falsification in view of the
certification required of judges before they could draw their salaries to the effect that they have decided all cases assigned to
them on or before the end of three months counted from the time a case is submitted for decision.
On July 16, 1986, counsel for complainant Romulo T. Santos, filed a manifestation and motion to withdraw the complaint on the
ground that "certain facts and conditions which heretofore were unknown to the complainant and undersigned counsel have
come to [their] knowledge ... which affect their resolution to prosecute the complaint. 4
Said manifestation, notwithstanding, the court by resolution dated July 24, 1986 required respondent judge to answer the
complaint.
51
In her answer filed on August 11, 1986, respondent judge states that nothing on the record shows that the case has been
submitted for decision; that defendant in said case [herein complainant] never appeared in court during the hearing of the case
nor during the series of conferences called by her for the purpose of effecting an amicable settlement between the parties, as per
manifestation of her counsel, complainant and her husband were always abroad; that defendant in fact told the court interpreter
that she did not want to appear in court for the amicable settlement; that it was only after she received a telephone call from an
alleged close relative of an associate of a national official saying " If you don't decide the case in favor of Mrs. Lazaro you will
be removed, but if you decide in her favor then you will stay," that she looked into the records of the case where she found the
motion of Mrs. Lazaro, received by the court on March 12, 1986, praying for the early resolution of the case; that because of the
telephone calls and with the point in mind that "this is a revolutionary government," she had no recourse but to decide the case in
favor of Mrs. Lazaro, which she did in a decision dated July 18, 1986; that in view of complainant's manifestation dated July 7,
1986, the instant complaint is already moot and academic.
V. Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ.
Jesus Alba charges respondent judge with gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust decision.
Complainant is the offended party in Criminal Case No. C-23527 [84] entitled "People v. Cabel" for frustrated murder assigned
to respondent's court. The decision acquitting the accused was promulgated on June 10, 1986, allegedly in the absence of
complainant and his counsel, so that complainant learned about the decision only thru a neighbor. Complainant challenged the
decision as erroneous for the reasons that the testimony of the accused on the alleged self-defense was not convincing,
respondent judge erred in her appreciation of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution as well as in her pronouncement
that Cabel had no motive for stabbing complainant when lack of motive does not preclude conviction.
Upon being required to comment, respondent explained in detail the reasons why she did not give credence to the version of the
prosecution. She ended with the conclusion that the decision in said criminal case is just and in consonance with the evidence
presented by the parties. She views the complaint as a means to harass her in the wake of the judiciary reorganization.
VI. Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC.
Civil Case No. C-12172 entitled, "Manchie Sabile Brozo v. Spouses Esmeraldo Quijano and Adelina Quijano," an appealed case
for an unlawful detainer was pending before Branch CXXI of the RTC of Caloocan City when presiding judge thereof, Judge
Salvador J. Baylen, was transferred to the RTC of Quezon City on November 15,1985. Said judge had previously required the
parties to file their memorandum with. in 30 days from notice of the order dated November 4, 1985, but only the plaintiff had
done so at the time of his transfer.
On January 7, 1986, therein defendants-appellees moved for either the consolidation of Civil Case No. 12172 with Civil Case
No. 11724, entitled "Esmeraldo Quijano, plaintiff versus Manchie Sabile Brozo, Defendant" pending before Branch CXXX of
the same court, or the re-raffle of Civil Case No. C-12172 to another judge to avoid delay in its disposition; or if re-raffle is not
proper, to effect the transfer of said case to the pairing judge of Branch CXXI for further proceedings. Plaintiff-appellant
opposed the motion.
On January 9, 1986, Executive Judge Oscar M. Herrera referred the motion to Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog of Branch
CXX, the pairing judge of Branch CXXI.
On February 19, 1986, Judge Macandog denied the motion of defendants- appellees. However, on March 13, 1986, she issued
another order recalling, rescinding and setting aside the order of February 19, 1986 and considering the case submitted for
decision to her as pairing judge. Counsel for plaintiff-appellant, Atty. Jose V. Marcella moved for a reconsideration of the order
dated March 13, 1986 with a request that the matter be referred to the Court Administrator for determination or ruling as to
which judge-Judge Baylen or Judge Macandog-should decide the case.
Meanwhile, on April 24, 1986, the Court En Banc designated Judge Domingo M. Angeles, RTC, Branch CXXIX, Caloocan City
as Acting Judge of Branch CXXI of the same court "in addition to his regular duties without additional compensation, effective
immediately and to continue until a regular incumbent is appointed or until further orders from this Court." 5
On May 15, 1986, Judge Macandog rendered judgment in Civil Case No. C-12172 dismissing plaintiff's appeal Copies of the
decision and the order denying his motion for referral were received by counsel for plaintiff on May 22, 1986. He forthwith filed
a motion for reconsideration of both the decision and the order. Pending resolution thereof, he wrote the Court Administrator a
letter on June 9, 1985, requesting for a ruling on who, among the three judges; Baylen, Macandog or Angeles, has authority to
decide the case and who, between Judges Macandog and Angeles, should resolve the pending motion for reconsideration.
Acting on said letter, the Court En Banc resolved on July 8, 1986 to: "[a] DIRECT Judge Salvador J. Baylen Regional Trial
Court, Branch 103, Quezon City, to decide Civil Case No. C-12172, considering that before his transfer to another court of equal
jurisdiction said case was already submitted before him for decision and as such all proceedings were totally heard and tried by
him and the greater interest of justice will be better served if he will decide the same; [b] require Judge Antonia C. Macandog to
EXPLAIN within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of notice hereof why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with for taking
cognizance of Civil Case No. C-12172 and deciding the same against the vigorous objection of the plaintiff and [c] SET ASIDE
and declare null and void the decision rendered by Judge Macandog for lack of authority and the pending motion for
reconsideration and to set aside the decision and the order denying plaintiff's motion to refer the case to the Supreme Court be
recalled and withdrawn." 6
In the explanation submitted on July 18, 1986, Judge Macandog stated that she took cognizance of Civil Case No. 12172 by
virtue of the note/order of Executive Judge Oscar Herrera appearing on the face of the "Motion to Consolidate and/or to trans fer
case to the Pairing Judge dated January 7, 1986; which note reads: "Refer to Pairing Judge, Br. 120" and signed, "Oscar M.
Herrera 1/9/86;" that as the thirty-day period granted to the parties within which to file their memorandum under the order dated
November 4, 1985 expired at the earliest only on December 5, 1985, at which date the case would be deemed submitted for
decision, Judge Baylen could not decide the case, the same not having been submitted to him for decision at the time of his
transfer on November 15, 1985; that she has been authorized by this Court on September 16, 1982 to take cognizance of all
kinds of cases in Branch XIV [now Branch CXXI, RTC, Caloocan City] and that the resolution dated April 24, 1986 in A.M.
No. 86-499-87, which impliedly revoked this authority came to her knowledge only during the first week of June, 1986 when
Judge Angeles started taking cognizance of and began hearing cases in Branch CXXI.
Except for the charges of gross incompetence, partiality and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in Administrative Matter
No. R-687-RTJ, which must be dismissed outright for lack of merit, the other charges brought against respondent are indeed
serious. Taken collectively, they cast a heavy shadow on respondent's moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence to remain a
member of the Bench.
The complaint in Administrative Matter No. R-687-RTJ is anchored primarily on respondent having given credence to the
exempting circumstance of self-defense offered by the accused in Criminal Case No. C-23527. In Villa v. Llamas, 84 SCRA 277,
where the complainant placed in issue the wisdom of the respondent judge's decision in a civil case for having believed the
testimony of the plaintiff, an alleged operator and maintainer of houses of ill-repute, this Court ruled that said circumstance was
not an indubitable ground for penalizing a judge administratively. The reason, as previously stated in the case of Dizon vs. de
Borja, 37 SCRA 46, is that "to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.
Similarly, in the case of Vda. de Zabal vs. Pamaram, 39 SCRA 430, this Court had the occasion to pronounce that 11 mere
errors in the appreciation of evidence, unless so gross and patent as to produce an influence of ignorance or bad faith or that the
judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision [which circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar], are irrelevant and
immaterial in an administrative proceeding against him. We further stated: "If in the mind of the respondent the evidence for the
defense was entitled to more weight and credence, he cannot be held to account administratively for the result of ratiocination." 7
Neither could respondent be held administratively liable for failing to notify complainant of the promulgation of the decision in
said criminal case. While it may be the better practice to notify the offended party of such promulgation, the Rules of Court do
not require a judge to do so.
The actuations of respondent judge in Administrative Matters Nos. R-351-RTJ and R-621-RTJ are, however, administratively
censurable. In both cases, she issued preliminary injunctions to stay the implementation of writs of execution issued by courts of
coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction, and issued arrest orders against a deputy sheriff and an attorney-in-fact of a party who
52
proceeded to enforce the writs of execution despite said unjunctions. To effect the immediate execution of the order of arrest
against deputy sheriff Ramirez, respondent wrote a handwritten note to Brig. Gen. Alfredo Lim requesting his assistance on the
matter.
To our mind, both orders of arrest were improvidently issued. Respondent judge should have been aware that forcible entry and
detainer cases do not interfere with a proceeding where ownership is at issue. Thus, in Petargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, it was held
that "the determination of the respective right of rival claimants to public land is different from the determination of who has the
actual physical possession or occupation with a view to protecting the same and preventing disorder and breaches of the peace. A
judgment of the court ordering restitution of the possession of a parcel of land to the actual occupant, who has been deprived
thereof by another through the use of force or in any illegal manner, can never be 'prejudicial interference' with the disposition or
alienation of public land." Besides, in the case of deputy sheriff Ramirez respondent judge should have taken into consideration
that his duty to enforce court orders and processes is ministerial in character and that he has no authority to determine the
validity of the order placed in his hands to implement. Thus, whether Judge Liwag can, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction,
legally issue the writ of execution is of no moment insofar as deputy sheriff Ramirez is concerned, and he should not have been
punished by incarceration for performing his official duty.
Moreover, the handwritten note of respondent judge to Brig. Gen. Lim is, to say the least, highly irregular and improper. Her
over-zealousness in implementing the order of arrest creates the impression that she has taken an interest far and beyond that
ordinarily expected of judicial officers with respect to cases pending before them; which, in turn, puts her impartiality in
question.
Respondent judge is of the impression that the release of Ramirez from jail and the recall of the order of arrest against Victoria
Torres had rendered the administrative cases against her moot and academic. Rather than exonerate her, these facts instead serve
to strengthen the charges against her. For one, the release order issued by this Court only proves the impropriety of her act, while
on the other, the recall order demonstrates the impetuosity by which the arrest order was issued in the first place.
The same attitude is observed in respondent judge in connection with Administrative Matter No. R-684-RTC which she wants
this court to consider moot and academic for the reasons that she has rendered a decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 and that the
complainant had moved for the withdrawal of said complaint.
We said in the case of Vasquez v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10, that a motion to withdraw and/or dismiss the complaint by complainant,
does not, by itself, warrant the dismissal of the administrative case against respondent judge, because "to condition
administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act, is to
strip this Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary."
And seriously blunder, respondent did.
While it appears that the complaint was filed under a misapprehension of facts, in that it was not indubitably established that the
case had been submitted for decision as alleged in the complaint, and dismissal of the charge should have followed as a matter of
course, the case had taken an unexpected twist. In her answer, respondent judge admitted to have succumbed to pressure in
deciding the case in favor of herein complainant, Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro. Thus, "In order to promote peace so nobody would
call me again by telephone telling the same purpose, the respondent, then decided the case with the point in mind that this [sic] a
revolutionary government and she had nor [sic] recourse but to decide the case in favor of Mrs. Esperanza G. Lazaro, [Decision
dated July 18, 1986, see attached.]" 8
Even accepting for the nonce that there was this supposed pressure from a source twice removed from the national official
mentioned earlier, her confessed act of succumbing to this pressure on the telephone is a patent betrayal of the public trust
reposed on respondent as an arbiter of the law and a revelation of her weak moral character. By her appointment to the office, the
public has laid on respondent their confidence that she is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect her to be fearless in her pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person,
interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in her office. Regrettably,
respondent has dismally failed to exhibit these qualities required of those holding such office.
In Administrative Matter No. R-359-RTJ, respondent judge failed to act with reasonable dispatch required of judicial officers.
There is reason to doubt the authenticity of the date shown on the order resolving the motion of complainant to declare therein
defendant Pasion in default. If it were true that the motion was resolved as early as March 1, 1985, We do not think that service
of the order upon counsel for complainant at this office in Espana, Manila would take more than three [3] months, and most
conveniently after the present complaint has been filed.
Delay in the administration of justice is the most common cause of complaint and a judge should endeavor to avoid it. It is thus
incumbent upon a judge to manage his court with a view to the prompt and convenient disposition of its business and he should
not tolerate abuses, indifference or neglect by clerks, sheriffs and other officers of the court. Hence, upon failure of her clerk to
serve summons on the third party defendant, it became incumbent upon her to remind said clerk of such failure.
The explanation given by respondent judge in Administrative Matter No. 86-4-9987-RTC is unsatisfactory. Par. VIII, Circular
No. 7, dated September 23, 1974 of this Court provides:
VIII. PAIRING SYSTEM:
A pairing system shall be established whereby every branch shall be considered as paired with another
branch. In the event of vacancy in any branch, or of the absence or disability of the judge thereof, all
incidental or interlocutory matters pertaining to it may be acted upon by that judge of the other branch
paired with it. The latter may likewise conduct trials or hearings on the merits in criminal cases with
detention prisoners assigned to the other branch, as well as in other kinds of cases, subject to the
conformity of the parties. [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to the above-quoted internal procedure, the referral of Civil Case No. C-12172 to judge Macandog was solely for the
purpose of acting upon the motion to consolidate and/or transfer case to the pairing judge. Such referral did not in any manner
empower or authorize her to decide the case on the merits, particularly in the light of the vigorous objection interposed by
therein plaintiff. The power and authority of one acting as a pairing judge are clearly defined and delineated by said paragraph
and one acting beyond its tenor certainly oversteps his authority.
This Decision is immediately executory.
A.M. No. 97-2-53-RTC July 6, 2001
RE: COMPLAINT OF MRS. ROTILLA A. MARCOS AND HER CHILDREN AGAINST JUDGE FERDINAND J.
MARCOS, RTC, BR. 20, CEBU CITY.
PER CURIAM:
In a hand written letter dated December 9, 1996 1 addressed to the Honorable Andres Narvasa, Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos, the wife of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, and their children Joshua A. Marcos and Hazel Faith
Marcos Barliso complained against Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20 at Cebu City, alleging that
ever since Ferdinand J. Marcos was appointed judge of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City, Branch 20, his family had never
seen nor took hold of his cheques; that they have only been receiving a minimal amount which was insufficient for their
education and for their sustenance; that they were made to believe that he was only receiving a small remuneration as an RTC
Judge; that it was only in August 1996 when they got hold of his RATA, JDF and basic salary cheques; that these were not even
enough to pay his obligations with the CFI Community Cooperative and other private persons; that he was enjoying his extra-
ordinary allowance, local and city allowances, bonuses, amelioration pays, and 14 th month pays; that he even got his second
quincena of November direct in Manila when he was enjoying his one-week leave of absence with his mistress.
Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children Joshua and Hazel prayed that all the remuneration due Judge Marcos from the Supreme
Court be directly released to Mrs. Marcos at the school where she has been serving for 20 years (the Abellana National School)
to prevent his mistress from getting them. They added that Judge Marcos was still receiving local and city allowances and a
salary from the Southwestern University where he teaches in the College of Law. They likewise stated that it would be advisable
for him to resign from the bench, as reassigning him to other judicial regions would eventually deprive them of support for he
will definitely take along his ambitious mistress, or she would follow him and might pressure him to go into graft and corruption.
In the resolution, dated March 18, 1997, the Court required Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos to file his comment on the complaint. 2

Judges are required to observe due care in the performance of their official duties. 9 They are likewise charged with the
knowledge of internal rules and procedures, especially those which relate to the scope of their authority. They are dutybound to
observe and abide by these rules and procedures, designed, as they are, primarily to ensure the orderly administration of justice.
Thus, confronted with a serious challenge to one's authority, an ordinary prudent man would perceive the reasonableness, if not
the wisdom, of the suggestion/request that the question at hand be referred to this Court. The hasty and reckless attitude of
respondent judge in taking cognizance of and deciding Civil Case No. 12172 despite the strong objection against her authority
and the reasonable request for referral of the question to this Court, constitutes misconduct in office warranting disciplinary
sanction.
Anent respondent's averment that she was granted authority by this Court on September 16, 1982 to take cognizance of all kinds
of cases in Branch CXXI, suffice it to say that the same was revoked, not by our resolution of April 26, 1986, but much earlier,
by the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act on January 17, 1983.
Respondent Judge Macandog has shown herself to be mentally and morally unfit to remain in her office. Her removal must
perforce be effected.
In his comment, dated May 15, 1997,3 Judge Marcos denied his failure to support complainants and alleged that during the first
few months of assuming his job on the bench, he faithfully and regularly gave to his wife the total amount of P15,000.00; that he
alone spent for their daily transportation and for the daily miscellaneous expenses of their son, Joshua A. Marcos, a medical
student at the time, notwithstanding the fact that his wife also earns a salary as a public school teacher; that the amount he gave
to his wife was sufficient for her and their family's needs; that the loan contracted with the CFI Community Cooperative did not
pose a serious problem to the financial standing of his family because it was made during his first five (5) months in the judiciary
when he had not yet received his salary; that most of the proceeds of the said loan were for the tuition fee of their son Joshua;
that said loan was payable in affordable monthly installments and that he hoped it would be fully paid before the end of the year
1997; that he was not indebted to any private person, not even when he was still a private law practitioner; that he had no idea
why his wife thought that he would be better off resigning from the judiciary; that even if he were transferred to another sala his
regular support to his family will continue; that the issue of his having a mistress is not true as he has never been linked extra-
maritally with another woman; that his wife and children had already signed a letter withdrawing their letter/complaint against
him; and he had signed a letter of undertaking to give all the checks due him from the Supreme Court to his wife. He prayed
among other things, for the dismissal of the complaint against him as they were living in one roof as a family and as this
administrative case is becoming a wedge of hostility between them.

On July 29, 1997, this Court issued a resolution referring the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
In view of the disclosure by respondent that the decision in Civil Case No. C-9831 was rendered under undue pressure and
report and recommendation. 4
influence, the party aggrieved thereby may take such remedial steps as may be warranted.

In his report dated October 17, 1997, 5 Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis recommended that the complaint be
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Antonia Corpuz-Macandog is hereby ordered dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all
considered closed and terminated, it appearing that the complaint against Judge Ferdinand Marcos was already threshed out and
retirement benefits and pay, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or
there being no more compelling reason to proceed against him. He based his report on the letter-withdrawal dated January 10,
instrumentalities.
1997 submitted by the complainants and the letter of undertaking signed by Judge Marcos.

53
In their letter/withdrawal dated January 10, 1997, 6 the complainants stated that they wanted to withdraw their letter/complaint
against Judge Marcos as he had made an undertaking that Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos shall receive all the checks due him from the
Supreme Court; and that the issue of the alleged mistress grew out of unconfirmed reports and had already been thoroughly
discussed by the family council. They requested that the matter contained in their letter/complaint be treated as a closed matter.
On the other hand, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, in his letter of undertaking, offered no objection to his wife getting all the checks
due him from the Supreme Court and gave her the authority to get them directly from the Supreme Court or from the Clerk of
Court of RTC, Cebu City. He strongly denied having any relationship with any woman when he talked with his wife and
children. His alleged relationship sprung from unconfirmed reports from the media. 7
As the report of DCA Abesamis was not approved by the Court Administrator and the latter did not report the matter to the
Court En Banc, the case remained suspended until the Honorable Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. reported to the Court En
Banc on August 14, 2000, the scandalous incident he witnessed at the Fun Run sponsored by the Philippine Judges Association
held on August 11, 2000. Among the RTC judges who attended and joined the Fun Run was Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos. A
woman who was reported to be his querida accompanied him. Judge Marcos and the querida joined the Judges at the temporary
place reserved for the Judges and during the latter's breakfast thereat were seated near each other.
Chief Justice Davide pulled Judge Marcos aside to validate the facts about the latter's illicit relationship with the woman. Judge
Marcos admitted, among other things, that he had been living with the woman, Mae Tacaldo, for three (3) years already, and that
he was separated from his wife. Judge Marcos was the one who supplied the name of the woman.
In view of this admission, the Chief Justice recommended the referral of the case for investigation to OCA Consultant, Justice
Pedro Ramirez, and the suspension from office of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos.
Adopting the recommendation of the Chief Justice, the Court issued a resolution on August 15, 2000 ordering the suspension of
Judge Marcos from office until further orders from this Court, in view of the confirmed continuing illicit and scandalous
relations between him and a certain Mae Tacaldo and the referral of the case to Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator, for investigation, report and recommendation. But because Justice Ramirez had to leave for the United
States of America, the matter was referred to Justice Romulo S. Quimbo, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator.
Justice Quimbo issued notices to the parties that the case will be heard at the Office of the Executive Judge in Cebu City from
November 13 to 15, 2000.8
On November 13, 2000, the case was called in the private chambers of the Executive Judge of Cebu City. Only the respondent
and his counsel appeared because the notices did not arrive soon enough in Cebu City. For that reason, the Process Server of
RTC, Cebu City, Branch 18, was requested to serve the notices on the complainants.
The next day, November 14, 2000, both parties appeared at the office of the Executive Judge. Complainant Rotilla Marcos came
alone while respondent appeared with his counsel. Complainant manifested that her counsel was unavailable due to previous
commitments. Counsel for the respondent begged to be excused as he also had personal commitments. Thus the case was reset
for the next day.
On November 15, 2000, complainants presented Judge Meinrado Paredes of Branch 13, RTC, Cebu City. After he was
discharged, complainant Rotilla Marcos took the stand herself. Since her testimony (direct examination) was not completed the
hearing was continued the next day. Her direct testimony was completed on November 16, 2000 but her cross-examination was
deferred to December 5, 6, and 7, 2000.
On December 5, 2000, respondent appeared without his counsel and personally cross-examined the complainant. After her
testimony, complainants introduced four other witnesses, namely: Maximo Abing, Orencio Tarongoy, Leoncio M. Balangkig,
and Lerma Eguia, all of whom appeared in obedience to subpoenas issued by the hearing officer-designate. These witnesses
were presented principally to identify certain documents that were marked and later formally offered in writing.
54
Complainants' documentary evidence consisted of Exhibits "A" - picture of Maydelane Tacaldo, the alleged mistress of the
respondent; "B" - the letter/complaint received by the Court on December 12, 1996; 9 "C" - RCPI telegram directing respondent
to attend a PJA stay-in seminar on June 20-22, 1996 in Mandaluyong; "D" - Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996;
"D-1" - address of respondent at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City; "E" - handwritten letter of one Mrs. E. Dandan,
dated October 3, 1995 addressed to respondent demanding payment of the account of May in the sum of P11 ,400; "E-1" - a
portion thereof; "F" - RCPI social telegram addressed to respondent purportedly from Mae Tacaldo; "F-1" - a portion thereof;
"G" - Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 addressed to respondent; "G-1 " - page 2 thereof; "H" - unsigned
Certification of Tenant; "I" - Invoice issued by Paramount General Insurance Corporation (Paramount, for brevity) for a "Toyota
Revo" Model 1999 allegedly owned in common by respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo; "I-1" - portion showing the names and
addresses of the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J. and Tacaldo, Maydelene B. of Rodriguez St., Zosa Compound, Capitol Site,
Cebu City"; "I-2" - particulars of the vehicle insured; "J" - Order issued by respondent on January 24, 2000, in Civil Case No.
CEB-19070; "J-1", "J-2", "J-3", and "J-4" - portions thereof; "K" - October 28, 2000 issue of "THE FREEMAN"; "K-1" and "K-
2" - portions thereof; "L" - October 20, 2000 issue of the "SUN STAR CEBU"; "L-1", "L-2", and "L-3" - portions bracketed;
"M" - SUN STAR SUPER BALITA issue of October 20, 1996; "M-1" and "M-2" - portions thereof; "N" - October 28, 1996
issue of SUN STAR SUPER BALITA; "N-1" and "N-2" - portions thereof; "O" - SUN STAR issue of December 18, 1996; "O-
1" and "O-2" - portions thereof; "P" Affidavit of Bienvenido O. Marcos; "P-1" - paragraph 7 thereof; "Q" - Affidavit of
Anacleta Marcos; "Q-1 ", "Q-2", and "Q-3" - portions thereof; "R" - Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated August 15,
2000 in the present administrative matter10; "R-1" - portion thereof; "S" - Petition filed by respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-
25511 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to complainant Rotilla C. Ares; "T" - Marriage Contract of complainant and
respondent dated December 31, 1971; "U" - Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to PCI Leasing and Finance Inc.; "V" - Certificate of
Registration No. 15676143 issued on August 4, 2000 in the name of respondent and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at Capitol
Site, Cebu City; "V-1" - portion thereof; "W" - copy of Certificate of Registration of a "Toyota Revo" in the name of respondent
and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at B. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; "W-1 " - portion showing owners' names; "X"
- Motor Vehicle Inspection Report re: "Toyota Revo"; "X-1" - portion regarding ownership; "Y" - Deed of Sale of one "Toyota
Revo" executed by one Leticia Cabanes; "Y-1 " - portion showing vendees being respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "Y-2" -
date of execution; "Z" - PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate; "Z-1 " - portion showing purpose of certificate; "AA" -
Subpoena Duces Tecum issued to Paramount; "BB" - Invoice No. 135580 covering a "Toyota Revo"; "BB-1" - name and address
of respondent as insured; "CC"-policy schedule; "CC-1" - name and address of respondent; "CC-2" - Private Car Policy No.
CEB-PC-25687; "CC-3" - signature of Paramount's Cebu Service Office Manager; "DD" - Paramount's Memorandum showing
change of mortgagee; "DD-1 ", "DD-2", and "DD-3" - portions of the same; "EE" - fax message received by Paramount re:
inclusion of Maydelane Tacaldo as one of the insured; "FF" - Chattel Mortgage executed by respondent and Maydelane B.
Tacaldo; "FF-1" - page 2 thereof; "FF-2", "FF-3", "FF-4", "FF-1-A", and "FF-1-B" - portions thereof; "GG" - Motion for
inhibition of respondent in Civil Case No. CEB-19070; "GG-1", "GG-1-A", and "GG-2", - portions bracketed; "HH" - Comment
of Atty. Francis Zosa on the motion for inhibition; "HH-1" and "HH-2" - portions of the same; "II" - Deed of Sale jointly
executed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a "Toyota Revo"; "II-1" and "II-2" - portions thereof; "JJ" -
correction made by Paramount as to who are the assured in CEB-PC-25687; "JJ-1" - the assured were the respondent and
Maydelane B. Tacaldo; "KK" - Counter-Affidavit of complainant on the charge of adultery filed against her by the respondent;
"KK-1" to "KK-10" - pages 2 to 11 thereof; "KK-11 " to "KK- 23" - annexes to Exhibit "KK"; "LL" - opposition to motion to
disqualify Atty. Gloria Lastimosa-Dalawampu as counsel for Mrs. Marcos in Civil Case No. CEB-25511; "LL-1 " -page 2
thereof; "LL-1-A" and "LL-2" - portions of the same.
From the evidence presented it appears that complainant Rotilla A. Marcos is married to the respondent. Their marriage was
celebrated on December 31, 1971 at the First Baptist Church, Cebu City and was officiated by Asclepiades Curro, a Minister of
the Gospel.11 When they got married, Judge Marcos was waiting for the results of the Bar exams and did not have a job. Since
she was already working as a teacher in Catmon she supported Judge Marcos. They stayed in the house of her grandparents.
They have two children: Joshua who is now 28 years old and Hazel Faith who is 26 years old.
When he became a lawyer he did not go into private practice right away so she supported him and the children. In fact, he stayed
home and looked after the children.
Judge Marcos became a member of the Judiciary in June 1993. He was appointed presiding judge of Branch 20 of the Regional
Trial Court at Cebu City. After his appointment, she noticed a change in his conduct towards her. He became cold and no longer
performed the usual acts of a husband, referring to sexual relations, because he was very busy. What's more they no longer slept
in one room. In March 1996, they were living in San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu.
In June 1996 she was informed through an anonymous letter written in the Cebuano dialect, about her husband's infidelity.
While she could no longer produce the letter at the time of the trial, she could still remember its contents. In English it read:
"You are a stupid wife. Until now, you have not learned that your husband has a mistress. If you don't believe me, go to the
office of the RTC, Branch 20, right now. You go there-to Branch 20. Ask the people there if there is a convention in Manila to
be participated in by RTC judges. He already bought two plane tickets."
Immediately she went to Branch 20 to inquire about the judges' convention in Manila. She found a telegram in Judge Marcos'
attach case from a Mario Umali designating respondent as a participant in a "stay-in" seminar sponsored by PJA to be held at
the Mandaluyong Justice Building on June 20 - 27, 1996.12
She inquired from Atty. Monalila Tecson, the Clerk of Court of Branch 20, about the convention (seminar). Atty. Tecson asked
her if she was not informed of the convention to which she replied in the negative. Atty. Tecson told her to ask her husband if he
was going. She asked Judge Marcos that night. He told her that he was going and that it was exclusively for the judges. She told
him not to go, as she was afraid he was going to take along another woman. He replied that he would not go. But, at dawn, he
told her that he must leave as he had to get the supplies and equipment that would be distributed in the Supreme Court.
She never dared to find out if her husband was indeed with a woman when he went to attend the convention but she was sure
there was a woman.
Complainant found other incriminating documents in the office of respondent. Somebody in Branch 20 gave her a Statement of
Account from Islacom.13
The Islacom Statement of Account was dated June 3, 1996. It was addressed to Ferdinand J. Marcos at 615 ZA P. del Rosario
Extension, Cebu City, and not to San Jose Village, Lawaan 3, Talisay, Cebu, where he and his family lived. They have never
resided at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Extension, Cebu City, nor had they any telecommunication facility with Islacom. Judge Marcos
neither has a cell phone nor a telephone line with Islacom.
Complainant searched for the address given in the Statement of Account. It took her two months to find it. She discovered that
Maydelane (Mae) Tacaldo and er parents were living in that house. A Mrs. Jennylind Enriquez gave her the information. Mrs.
Enriquez, one of her co-teachers, lives next door to the Tacaldos.
She confronted her husband in his office over the Islacom bill. He told her to stay for a while in the office, as he will go out for
20 minutes. She wanted to go with him but he refused to take her as the place was only near the office. He would consult
somebody. When he came back, he told her that they would go to Islacom and declare that the cell phone was lost.
She insisted on a confrontation between her, Maydelane Tacaldo and her parents. The confrontation took place in the Social Hall
of the Capitol. Maydelane, her parents, her brother and his wife, Rotilla Marcos, her mother, her brother Jerry and his wife, and
her sister were all present then. Rotilla Marcos asked Maydelane why the cell phone was in the name of Ferdinand J. Marcos but
the billing address was that of the Tacaldos, and why she was using the cell phone of Judge Marcos. The latter said that they
were friends. The latter did not reply when asked why Judge Marcos paid P9,000.00 for the cell phone's bill when they were only
friends.
Complainant found inside respondent's attach case that was in his office a yellow sheet of paper, dated October 3, 1995,
addressed to respondent. It was a bill for the payment of P11,400.00 for "May's Acct."
As she and Judge Marcos were still living together at the time, she kept her discovery a secret because she already had an inkling
that he had a relationship with another woman.
She found a birthday card/social telegram14 addressed to Judge Marcos inserted between the pages of a law book on a table in the
latter's office. It read, among other things, "MT cares a lot, you know," and "It's wonderful to share my life with you." She
55
discovered it two weeks after his birthday, which was July 7, 1996. She kept it with the other evidences. She did not show him
the card, as it would precipitate another quarrel.
Further proof of her husband's infidelity was the Statement of Account issued by Bankard dated September 10, 1997. 15 One of
the credit purchases was made at the Agencia Nina and Jewelry. She never saw the item purchased in the said shop. Neither was
it given to her daughter. One of the "purchases" reflected in the Statement of Account was made at Cafe Laguna. There was no
occasion when she dined at Cafe Laguna with her husband. Another item in the Statement of Account was groceries bought at
Gaisano Metro. The groceries purchased at Gaisano Metro were not for their house, as respondent was no longer going home in
1997. Respondent judge left the conjugal home in 1997 and has not returned since then.
Rotilla Marcos found out where Judge Marcos was staying: at the Zosa compound located at Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol
Site, Cebu City. She went to the apartment he was renting. She saw Maydelane Tacaldo there but not Judge Marcos because she
did not go inside. Maydelane Tacaldo left the apartment, in a car. She drove their (the Marcos) family car and the station wagon,
at times.
She suspected that he lives there because she saw outside one of the rooms respondent's slippers, and empty water dispenser of a
brand similar to what they have at their own place, and the laundered clothes (pants and polo shirts) of Judge Marcos hanging.
She asked the building administrator if her husband was living in the apartment she went to, and the latter replied in the
affirmative. Judge Marcos and Maydelane were using aliases as the room was registered in the name of a Victorino Timol. She
obtained a Certification of Tenant from the Zomer Development Company. 16 It was dated May 18, 1998, and showed that a Mr.
Victorino Timol was an occupant and tenant of Amville-1 Bldg. located at Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol
Site, Cebu City from May 8, 1996 to October 14, 1997. Ma. Theresa Zosa, the General Manager of the said company, refused to
sign it as she wanted to avoid trouble.
The matter of the illicit relationship between Judge Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo was even published in the newspapers.
Complainant offered as exhibits certain clippings from local newspapers (Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N", and "O") where the affair
of respondent with Maydelane Tacaldo was mentioned. In Exhibit "K" (October 28, 2000 issue of The Freeman) former
Executive Judge Priscila Agana was quoted as saying that respondent was not even discreet about his alleged illicit relationship
and that other Judges were complaining of his behavior. In Exhibit "L" (October 28, 2000 issue of the Sun Star Cebu) Judge
Agana was once more quoted as having said that she had warned respondent that his affair was going to destroy him and that the
latter never kept his relations with the law student a secret.
After the complainants wrote a letter to the Supreme Court about Judge Marcos failure to give them support, the latter executed
an authority for them to collect his salary from January 1997 up to January 1998. But he revoked the authority in February 1998.
Since then they no longer received any support from him.
Complainant did not know that the reason why Judge Marcos stopped her authority from getting the checks was because he
allegedly discovered that she had a paramour. She verbally complained to Judge Priscila Agana (former Regional Trial Court
Executive Judge) about the stoppage of the checks. She did not complain to the Supreme Court because he told her that she was
just an ordinary classroom teacher with a small salary and that he would use his power as a judge against her.
Mrs. Rotilla Marcos no longer lives in their conjugal home. The reason why she left was because respondent judge threatened to
kill her.
Judge Meinrado Paredes, when called to testify, admitted knowing Maydelane Tacaldo, upon seeing her picture. He had seen her
twice: the first time during the wake of the late Sandiganbayan Justice German Lee, and the second time at the convention of the
Philippine Judges Association held in a hotel in Manila (Hyatt Regency) sometime in June, 1999. Both times he did not see her
with a companion.
At the hotel lobby of the Hyatt Regency he saw her approaching a gathering of wives of some RTC judges. He knew her to be a Respondent declared that, contrary to complainant's testimony, he was never remiss in the support of his family. He alleged that
law student. He did not think that she was a member of the Judiciary, the wife of a judge, or an employee of the court. he had supported her and their children, except at the time that she abandoned the conjugal home in March 1998; that he was
giving her P22,000.00, more or less, monthly; that the reason why Mrs. Marcos filed the letter/complaint against him was
because she suspected that he was not giving her the correct amount since he did not show her the checks from the Supreme
Complainants presented other witnesses who appeared and identified copies of documents, the originals of which were in their
Court; that he revoked his undertaking to give to his wife all the checks due him from the Supreme Court because he discovered
possession.
that she had a paramour, his cousin Mariano Marcos; that he alone supported their children and her daughter's family from 1998
until the time he was suspended; that he spent for the maintenance of their home by paying their electric and phone bills.
Maximo Abing, an account officer of the PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI, for short), brought a photocopy of the certificate
of registration (Exhibit "V") of a Toyota Revo with Motor No. 7K-0279834 issued by the Land Transportation Office in favor of
He presented evidence regarding the transmittal of funds to his son Joshua who was a medical student (Exhibits "3" to "3- Y").
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo, with residence at Capitol Site, Cebu City as joint owners.
While assigned in Toledo City, he stated that he was remitting to Joshua, a medical student, the sum of P12,000.00 monthly.
When his son found a job in the year 2000, he reduced his monthly support to P4,000.00. To his daughter Hazel Faith, he gave
Orencio Goles Tarongoy, an employee of the Land Transportation Office (LTO, for brevity), Cebu City, brought to the hearing P1,500.00 weekly while he was in Toledo City; but when he was transferred to Cebu City, he increased her weekly support to
and identified the following documents: (1) the office copy of Certificate of Registration No.59442704 (Exhibit "W") issued by P2,000.00.
the LTO in the names of Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo with address at P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu
City; (2) a Motor Vehicle Inspection Report (Exhibit "X") regarding a Toyota Revo owned by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and
He averred that the jewelry he purchased at Agencia Nina in the amount of P5,000.00 was given to his daughter Hazel Faith
Maydelane Tacaldo of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City; (3) a Deed of Sale (Exhibit "Y") executed by one Leticia R.
Marcos as a birthday gift. The groceries bought at Gaisano Metro were bought and brought to their house in Talisay, Cebu,
Cabanes on July 27, 2000 in favor of Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo conveying a Model 1999
especially for his granddaughter. It was his practice, even when he was still a private practitioner, to purchase all the groceries
Toyota Revo; (4) a PNP Motor Vehicle Clearance Certificate (Exhibit "Z") covering a 1999 Toyota Revo owned by Leticia
for the needs of his family.
Cabanes, for the purpose of transferring the ownership thereof to Judge Ferdinand Javier Marcos and Maydelane B. Tacaldo.

He never received any birthday card/social telegram because his Clerk of Court screened all his communications. As to the
Leoncio M. Balangkig, an employee of Paramount General Insurance Corporation brought to the investigation copies of certain
birthday card found tucked between the pages of a law book in his chambers, he denied that it came from Maydelane Tacaldo as
documents which he identified, to wit: Exhibit "BB" as the invoice for the insurance coverage of a Toyota Revo issued in favor
her name did not appear in the card - only the initials M.T. His Clerk of Court, Monalila Tecson also has the initials M.T. but as
of Ferdinand Marcos with residence at P. Rodriguez St., Zosa Comp., Capitol Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "C" as the Policy
his Clerk of Court, he didn't expect Monalila Tecson to send him a card with the dedication "M.T. cares a lot, you know", and
Schedule forming part of the policy which was also issued in favor of the insured Marcos, Ferdinand of P. Rodriguez St., Capitol
"It's wonderful to share my life with you."
Site, Cebu City; Exhibit "DD" as an endorsement (No. 2603748 dated October 4, 2000) of the aforementioned policy No. CEB-
PC-25687 that included the name of Maydelane B. Tacaldo as an insured party. An earlier endorsement (Exhibit "JJ," No.
2603400 dated July 25, 2000), gave the insured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelane B." According to the witness, He disclaimed any knowledge of the note found in his office requesting payment of May's account by a Mrs. Dandan. He replied
this change was made upon the advice of PCI Brokers. On cross-examination the witness reiterated that the change was that he did not know any Mrs. E. Dandan, nor the Bebot to whom the payment should be given. He had never incurred any
occasioned by a verbal order they received from the PCI Brokers. He further admitted that he had no knowledge as to whether unsettled account with anybody when he was still with Branch 20. He believed the note to be spurious and manufactured by his
respondent was notified of the change. complainant-wife, it being undated and because he didn't recognize the penmanship. However, he admitted that the note was not
in his wife's handwriting but surmised that it could have been the penmanship of the person who was asked by complainant-wife
to write it.
The Chattel Mortgage of the same Toyota Revo (Exhibit "FF") executed and signed by respondent and Maydelane B. Tacaldo,
both residing at Zosa Cmpd., P. Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, in favor of PCI Leasing was likewise presented as
evidence. He denied living in Zosa Compound, Don Pedro Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City, as he has always lived in Talisay, Cebu
where his conjugal home was situated. As to the claim that his slippers and empty plastic water container were found outside one
of the rooms in the Zosa Compound, he contended that he usually didn't wear slippers and, if he did, his slippers were always left
Lerma Eguia of PCI Equitable Insurance Broker, formerly PCI Broker, identified the Deed of Sale (Exhibit II) of the same
at home and in his chambers. There were many consumers of mineral water in the province of Cebu: not only in Talisay but also
Toyota Revo in favor of Amina G. Advincula. The same document appeared to have been signed by the respondent and Miss
in Cebu City. He denied having any dealings with Techie (Ma. Teresa) Zosa of the Zosa Compound and using the alias Victorino
Tacaldo, and acknowledged by them before Notary Public Rolando C. Grapa, who entered it in his Notarial Register as
Timol.
Document No.385, Page No.78, Book No.220, Series of 2000. Another document this witness identified was Exhibit " JJ" which
was an endorsement issued by Paramount indicating therein the assured as "Marcos, Ferdinand J., and Tacaldo, Maydelene B".
With regards to the news item 17 wherein Judge Agana was quoted to have said that he was not even discreet about his alleged
illicit relationship, he believed this to be not true because Judge Agana had never investigated him for any wrongdoing.
Upon the other hand, respondent offered his oral testimony and identified and marked Exhibits "1" (affidavit of desistance
executed by the complainants); "2" (letter of respondent directing the Clerk of Court to deliver all his checks to complainant);
"3" to "3-Y" (savings account remittance slips to respondent's son Joshua); "4" (electric bill); "5" (PLDT bill); "6" (credit He denied that he was the one referred to in the news item that came out in the Sun Star Super Balita. 18 He likewise denied that
application submitted to PCI Leasing); "6-A" (address indicated therein); "6-B" (stamp of "closed account"); "7" to "7-TT" he and Maydelane Tacaldo lived together in Toledo City where he was transferred from July 1997 to September 1999. When he
(postdated checks issued by Maydelane Tacaldo ); "8" [representative (sic) complaint for adultery together with affidavits]; "9" had to stay overnight in Toledo City he usually stayed in the house of his Process Server, an Arthur Camonggan.
(reply-affidavit filed with Provincial Prosecutor); "10" (amended complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage); "11" (Order
dated February 22, 2000); "11-A" and "11-B" (portions thereof); "12" (promissory note dated August 22, 2000); "12-A" and "12-
The Tacaldo family purchased the motor vehicle, Toyota Revo, as they wanted to have a "for-hire" motor vehicle plying Cebu
B" (portions thereof); "13" (original complaint for declaration of nullity in Civil Case No CE8-25511 ); "13-A" (portion thereof);
City and Toledo City. The Tacaldos requested him, being a close friend, to have his name included in the registration of the
"14" (letter/complaint to Provincial Prosecutor); "14-A", "14-B", and "14-C" (affidavits supporting his complaint) and "15"
motor vehicle. Since he was a judge in Toledo City, he could help the Tacaldos get a slot in the Coop Multi-Purpose, a
(certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla). These documents, however, were not formally offered nor transmitted to Justice
cooperative that accepts motor vehicle units for plying the Toledo, Balamban, and Cebu City routes.
Quimbo.

56
As the registered owner of a motor vehicle, he was aware that if the vehicle figured in an accident or there was a damage caused He did not see Maydelane Tacaldo at the convention in June 1996. He first met her at a seminar of Judges at the penthouse of the
to a third party, he as the owner would be held responsible. He averred that he felt safe because the vehicle was insured. Though San Miguel Corporation in Mandaue City. She was then the secretary of Judge Vestil.
the car was insured it did not cover damages to third parties. He was likewise aware that if there would be a foreclosure of the
chattel because the chattel mortgage was not sufficient, or if the promissory note was not paid, he would be held liable. He put
He was a friend of Maydelane Tacaldo's father. The Tacaldos lived somewhere near Aznar Coliseum but he had never visited
himself at risk because he wanted to accommodate the Tacaldos because they are very close family friends.
their house.

The down payments for the purchase of the motor vehicle came from the Tacaldos. The address at P. Rodriguez, Zosa
The Islacom Statement of Account was mistakenly sent to him, as it should have been sent to a certain Urgello. He didn't have an
Compound, Cebu City was the address of Miss Tacaldo. In some of the documents, like the credit application submitted before
account with Islacom. Neither did he have a cell phone although he had, at one point, entertained the idea of buying one. When
PCI Leasing and the promissory note he executed with the same company, he gave his address as San Jose Village, Lawaan 3,
he went to the Islacom office regarding the allegedly erroneous billing, he did not ask as to who the real account holder was. All
Talisay, Cebu.
he did was to execute an Affidavit of Loss, per advice of Islacom.

The address in the Deed of Sale over the Toyota Revo, Model 1999, was that of Miss Tacaldo, not his. He and Maydelane
Respondent admitted that a confrontation occurred between him. Maydelane Tacaldo, the parents of Maydelane, his wife, and
Tacaldo did not jointly own the motor vehicle, although it appears on paper that it was registered in both their names but he had
the brothers and sisters of his wife because of the Islacom Statement of Account. He didn't know if Maydelane Tacaldo used the
no hand in the preparation of the insurance policy nor of the policy schedule. Thus, he was not aware that his address was shown
cell phone because during the confrontation, Miss Tacaldo denied she had a cell phone. The father of Maydelane also said he did
to be at Zosa Compound, Capitol Site, Cebu City. He did not have it changed as it was only during the hearing that he first saw
not see his daughter with a cell phone. Miss Tacaldo expressly denied having any relationship with him. He also told the group
the insurance policy.
during the confrontation that he was not related to her, in any way. Complainant-wife instigated the confrontation.

The name of Miss Tacaldo appeared in the documents as a guarantee that the Tacaldos have invested in said motor vehicle. In
He never received the amount of more than P500,000.00 from the sale of the Toyota Revo. The buyer paid P300,000.00 loan to
fact, Miss Tacaldo issued several checks to guarantee payment of the balance of P300,000.00.
PCI and P250,000.00 to the Tacaldos.

The plan to have the motor vehicle unit ply Toledo, Balamban to Cebu City was aborted because after his suspension, the vehicle
We agree with and therefore uphold the findings and conclusions of Justice Romulo Quimbo, as contained in his Report. We
was shown on television. The Tacaldo family was afraid that the motor vehicle might be involved in a case between him and the
find the details of his findings amply supported by the evidence on record leaving us no doubt in our minds that a very special
complainants.
relationship existed between Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos and Maydelane Tacaldo (a.k.a. Mae Tacaldo) -that their illicit
relationship started even before he separated from his wife Rotilla Marcos in 1997.
He denied having an illicit relationship with Miss Tacaldo. He stressed that his wife had a paramour as early as March 1998 and
he had told her that he would file the corresponding adultery cases once he had sufficient evidence against her and her paramour.
Consider the following evidence:
And this he did. He filed 13 counts of adultery cases against his wife with the Municipal Trial Court of Balamban, Cebu and 21
counts of adultery before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. All these cases, including the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, were filed only after the Court suspended him on August 15, 2000. The Islacom Statement of Account dated June 3, 1996 was addressed to Judge Marcos not in his conjugal dwelling at San Jose
village, Lawaan 3, Talisay Cebu, but at 615 ZA P. del Rosario Ext., Cebu City that Mrs. Marcos later discovered to be the
residence of Maydelane Tacaldo. While Judge Marcos denied owning a cell phone there is an improbability that Islacom would
He denied maltreating his wife. If he had beaten her, she would have been hospitalized, as he has a bigger build than her.
send a phone bill to him if he were not the real owner thereof.

He was suffering from Diabetes Mellitus, Type II, and he was already insulin-dependent. He was diagnosed with diabetes in
Service providers like phone companies rely on the information given by the applicant desirous of its services. Islacom would
1992. As a diabetic, most of his vital organs were affected, especially his sexual capacity. He was already sexually impotent as
not have sent Judge Marcos a Statement of Account if he did not apply for a phone line nor sent it to an address he did not
early as 1993, when he was first appointed to the Judiciary. His sexual impotency was complete and he could not have sex
furnish them.
anymore. He was being treated for diabetes and sexual impotency. A medical certificate issued by Dr. Manuel Tornilla, dated
December 6, 2000, stated, among others, that Judge Marcos had been under his (Dr. Tornilla) medical professional care since
September 15, 1995 up to that time, and he has been diabetic since 1992, and was on maintenance medication. If he did not really own the cell phone was it not expected of him, being a judge and all, to have stood his ground and insisted
that as he did not own nor lose a cell phone, it is preposterous of him to execute an Affidavit of Loss.
His wife was upset with his physical condition but he could not do anything about it because his diabetes caused his sexual
impotency. Moreover, we find it hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with an explanation that the bill was erroneously sent to
him without raising hell, so to speak, in finding out the identity of the Islacom employee who was at fault, especially so when
this Statement of Account was the catalyst in the confrontation between him, his wife Rotilla and Ms. Tacaldo.
In Civil Case No. CEB-19725, a motion for inhibition was filed which was denied. In his order dated February 22, 2000, he
denied the motion for reconsideration because it was not true that he was living in the property of Atty. Zosa.
Someone with the initials M.T. sent Judge Marcos for his birthday on July 7, 1996, the social telegram/birthday card, but was
delivered on July 5, 1996. This person could be Maydelane Tacaldo or Monalila Tecson. Although Judge Marcos' Branch Clerk
While Maydelane Tacaldo was present during the Fun Run in Cebu City, she was not with him. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
of Court has these initials we, as well as Judge Marcos, do not believe that she would send Judge Marcos a card with the greeting
Jr. confronted him and asked him whether Maydelane Tacaldo had a job and whether he had a child with her. He replied that he
-"It is wonderful to share my life with you." -and ending it with -"MT cares a lot, you know." Only a person who is truly intimate
didn't know if she had a job and that he didn't have a child with her. The Chief Justice told him, "That is bad for the judiciary."
with Judge Marcos would send such a card.
Before he was able to explain the Chief Justice had already left. The Chief Justice did not ask him whether that woman who
went there was with him.
We do not put any trust in Judge Marcos's denials that he had never seen said card. The book was found tucked between the
pages of a law book lying on top of his office table. He is the most logical person to have inserted said card in the law book.
57
The Bankard Statement of Account dated September 10, 1997 reflected that Judge Marcos bought, presumably, jewelry/ies at the
Agencia Nina & Jewelry, and groceries at the Gaisano Metro, and dined at Cafe Laguna.
Mrs. Marcos denied receiving jewelry/ies and dining out with Judge Marcos at the said restaurant. She testified that her daughter
also did not receive jewelry/ies from her father. They also did not receive any groceries from Judge Marcos, as he was no longer
going home then.
Complainant Mrs. Rotilla Marcos declared that she searched for the apartment where her husband was staying. When she found
it she saw her husband's slippers and laundered clothes outside the place. Having been married to him for about 26 years she
would have known her husband's preferences as to wearing apparel and personal items, and would have been able to recognize
them upon seeing them.
In Civil Case No. 19070, a motion for respondent to inhibit himself was filed based on the fact that he was residing in one of the
units in the Zosa Compound that belonged to Atty. Zosa, counsel for one of the parties. Atty. Zosa, in his comment, did not
categorically deny the allegation. Neither did respondent, in his Order denying the motion, categorically deny the allegation.
Although the Certification of Tenant was unsigned and did not cite Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo as one of the tenants at Zosa
Compound, the fact that they lived together was apparent in the different documents they executed pertaining to the Toyota
Revo, for the address they both gave for these documents was Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City. Zosa Compound, by the
way, is located at Rodriguez St., Capitol Site, Cebu City.
As held in GALANG VS. SANTOS, 19 the personal behavior of a judge should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and
his personal behavior, not only in the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be
beyond reproach.
"The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's official life cannot simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A
judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both
in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion."20
In LEYNES VS. VELOSO,21 it was held that if good moral character is required of a lawyer, with more reason is the
requirement exacted of a member of the judiciary who at all times is expected to observe irreproachable behavior and is bound
not to outrage public decency. 22
Keeping a mistress is certainly not an act one would expect of a judge who is expected to possess the highest standard of
morality and decency. If a judge fails to have high ethical standards, the confidence and high respect for the judiciary diminishes
as he represents the judiciary.

We are not swayed by the denials made by respondent judge that he and Ms. Tacaldo were the owners of a Toyota Revo.
Jurisprudence is rich in cases where the Court has inflicted on judges the punishment of dismissal for immorality especially
when it is committed openly and flagrantly, causing scandal in the place where his court is situated.
Judge Marcos and Ms. Tacaldo jointly bought a motor vehicle - a Toyota Revo - and had it registered in their names as co-
owners. They obtained insurance for the same vehicle with them as joint beneficiaries. They executed a chattel mortgage over
"In Dy Teban Hardware and Auto Supply Co. vs. Tapucar (102 ISCRA 493 [1981]), the Court laid down the rationale
the same in favor of PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. and when they finally sold the same vehicle on September 18, 2000 to Amina
why every judge must possess moral integrity, thusly:
Advincula, they both signed the Deed of Sale as joint owners. These actions clearly indicate that they were the joint owners of
the Toyota Revo.
"The personal and official actuations of every member of the judiciary must be beyond reproach and above suspicion.
The faith and confidence of the people in the administration of justice can not be maintained if a judge who dispenses
We are likewise not persuaded by the averment made by Judge Marcos that he accommodated the Tacaldos in their desire to get
it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity and if he obtusely continues to commit affront to
a slot in the cooperative because they are very close family friends. If they are indeed close, it is surprising to hear that he had
public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary."23
never been to the house of the Tacaldos. In fact, he was not even sure as to the exact location of the Tacaldo residence.

No position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A
Respondent judge wanted us to believe that if his name was put in the motor vehicle's registration, the Tacaldos' entry in the
magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
cooperative's business of running public utility vehicles would be assured. He went to extraordinary lengths to help the Tacaldos
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and justice. 24
by having the vehicle registered in his and Ms. Tacaldo's names.

The Court once again reminds all those who don judicial robes to maintain good moral character and at all times observe
There is nothing in the records to show that it was essential for respondent to be registered as an owner in order that the motor
irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency.25
vehicle could ply the Toledo City -Cebu City routes. A simple phone call/oral request by Judge Marcos to the cooperative
officers would have been sufficient, to our mind, to allow the Tacaldos' entry to the cooperative business of transporting
passengers. Herein respondent cannot find comfort in the "affidavit of desistance" signed by his wife and children.

Respondent's posture that Mrs. Marcos is also guilty of immorality does not excuse nor even mitigate his actions. It is "Generally, the Court attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an
respondent's private action that is being investigated not his wife's. afterthought xxx. As held in People v. Ubina 26: It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly
taken before the courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for
one reason or another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the
We cannot gloss over the incident that happened during the Fun Run as recounted by Chief Justice Davide. Judge Marcos
mercy of unscrupulous witness(es)."27
candidly and frankly admitted to the Chief Justice that he had been living with Ms. Tacaldo for the last three years as he was
already separated from his wife. Bringing Ms. Tacaldo to public functions was not in good taste considering that Judge Marcos
was still very much married even if he and his wife Rotilla were already living separately. He had no right to flaunt Maydelane Again, in the case of IMBING VS. TIONGSON,28 the Court once more held that:
Tacaldo as if she was his wife. This conduct is certainly unbecoming of a judge whose conduct must at all times be beyond
reproach.

58
 "The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent judge will unjustly delay the administration of justice; and 3.] allowing the two accused, Roberto Agana and his live-in partner, Sarah
not necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of Resula, to submit to a drug test thereby postponing the trial of the cases indefinitely.
its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. The Court has an
interesting the conduct of members of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its
The OCA thereafter recommended that the case be referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals or to any OCA
efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainants desistance from further prosecuting the case he or
consultant for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from notice. 2
she initiated."

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the code of Judicial
Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to avoid the
appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
The charge of immorality proven against respondent judge demonstrates his unfitness to remain in office and continue to
discharge the functions and duties of a judge.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanction dismissal
from the service.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City is DISMISSED from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any public office including
government owned or controlled corporations, and forfeiture of his retirement benefits, if he is entitled to any.
This decision is immediately executory.
In a Resolution dated February 16, 2000,3 the Court designated Associate Appellate Court Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis to
conduct an investigation, report and recommendation on charges against the respondent within ninety (90) days from notice.
Pursuant thereto, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thereafter proceeded with the investigation of the case. The complainant did not
appear at the hearing. Despite this, Justice Vidallon-Magtolis, bearing in mind that even a desistance of the complainant is of no
moment in an administrative case such as this, proceeded with the investigation by examining the records of the criminal cases
involved which respondent had brought along. She subsequently submitted a Report containing the following findings and
recommendations:
At this point it must be pointed out that, had the supposed complainant appeared to substantiate his charges, his testimony could
only have been admitted as to the alleged socializing acts of the respondent with the congresswoman-mother of the male accused
granting that he was an eyewitness thereto and was familiar with the judge and the congresswoman as well as the defense
counsel, Atty. Cruz. However, as to the alleged partiality of the respondent in granting postponements, his testimony could only
be in the form of opinions which would have been inadmissible, considering that he is not party to the criminal cases, neither
does he appear to be involved therein in any other capacity. As a matter of fact, his real identity remains to be a question, since
he did not actually furnish his real address in his complaints, both with the Ombudsman and with the Court Administrator.

At any rate, lest the undersigned be perceived as one shirking from responsibility, she opted not to dismiss the case outright, in
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567 July 24, 2000
view of settled rules that only the Supreme Court can dismiss administrative cases against judges,4 and considering further that
the bulk of the allegations in the complaint are verifiable from the records. Thus, she proceeded on with her investigation, giving
FERNANDO DELA CRUZ, complainant, the respondent an opportunity to clear his name
vs.
Judge JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig City, respondent.
From the documentary evidence submitted by the respondent and the record of the three criminal cases as well as the
respondents answers to the clarificatory questionings of this investigator, the following facts appear:
RESOLUTION
1. The arraignment of both accused were postponed for three (3) times, all upon motion of the defense counsel,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: formerly Atty. Joel Aguilar, the reason being:

In a Verified Complaint 1 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by complainant who identified himself as a (a) unexplained absence of the accused in Court 5
"concerned citizen", respondent was charged with the Violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and the Code of Judicial Conduct The
(b) the intended attendance of Atty. Aguilar at the 6th National Convention for Lawyers 6
case stemmed from three (3) criminal cases assigned to respondent, namely:

(c) absence of both accused who were reportedly in Tagbilaran City7

a.] Criminal Case No. 11309 against Roberto Agana y Borja, for violation of Section 16, Article III, R.A. 6425, as
amended;
2. After the arraignment, the accused appeared but once in the three (3) successive settings for trial on the merits.
Their counsel, now Atty. Narciso Cruz, never appeared at all, but only filed motions for postponement which were
b.] Criminal Case No. 4275-D against Roberto Agana y Borja for violation of P.D. No. 1866; and
invariably granted even over the objection of the prosecution. 8

c.] Criminal Case No. 4276-D against Sarah Resula y Puga for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
3. Despite the successive absences of the accused, the respondent never issued a warrant of arrest, nor even asked
as amended.
them to explain their absences. According to the respondent, he considered their absences as waiver of appearance.
Yet, in the two instances that the prosecution was ready,9 he (respondent) did not proceed with the hearing which
The complaint, in sum, alleges that respondent as the presiding judge in whose sala the above-enumerated cases are pending, should have been done if there was a waiver of appearance.
gravely abused his discretion and exhibited evident partiality by: 1.] socializing in posh restaurants particularly in Marios
Restaurant, Quezon City and the Shangri-la EDSA Plaza with then Congresswoman Venice Agana, mother of the accused
Roberto Agana, together with their counsel, Atty. Narciso Cruz; 2.] issuing unreasonable orders for postponement which
59
 4. When the respondent acted on the "Voluntary Submission to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation" of both
accused, he did not give the prosecution an opportunity to file comment or opposition thereto. 10
5. The respondents order of January 26, 1998, allowing the confinement, treatment and rehabilitation of the accused
was not officially sent to the Dangerous Drugs Board. His directive in the second paragraph of the order, to wit: "The
pertinent report must be submitted to the Court soonest"11 is rather vague in that it did not state who should make the
report nor the limit of the period given for its submission.
6. The respondent never checked with the Dangerous Drugs Board whether or not the two accused had indeed
submitted themselves for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation with said office. This gives the impression that
the respondents order of January 26, 1998 was made merely to enable him to suspend the proceedings, including the
case for violation of P.D. [No.] 1866, which is not subject to such suspension under R.A. [No.] 6425, as amended.
7. When the respondent issued the order of September 18, 1998,12 where he appears to have motu proprio set the case
anew for hearing on November 12, 1998, there was already a case filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman13 on January 30, 1998.14 Likewise, this administrative complaint was already filed on February 2, 1998
with the Office of the Court Administrator, and the latter had already directed the respondent on September 9, 1998,
to file his comment to such complaint. 15 Obviously, he was stirred to action by the filing of such complaints and not
because of his diligent performance of his duties and responsibilities.
8. The respondent denied that he knew of the fact that accused Roberto Agana is the son of then Congresswoman
Venice Agana of Bohol. According to him, he learned about it when Atty. Narciso Cruz "entered his appearance and
then he said it was pro bono basis and the accused is the son of a congresswoman". 16 When asked by this investigator
whether that information was made in open court or in chambers, he answered that "he came to my chambers."17
9. Subsequently, after realizing through the statements of this investigator that a judge should not allow lawyers and
parties litigants with pending cases to see him in chambers,18 the respondent tried to redeem himself after resting his
case on May 9, 2000, by explaining that when Atty. Cruz saw him in chambers, the latter had not yet entered his
appearance as defense counsel. He did not, however, ask for the correction of the transcript of stenographic notes of
April 7, 2000.
10. The order of inhibition19 was issued by the respondent long after this administrative case had been filed against
him. Hence, it could not be taken as a voluntary inhibition to show lack of interest on the criminal cases.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis thus found that:
All the foregoing are indications that the respondents official conduct had not been entirely free from the appearance of
impropriety, neither has the respondent remained above suspicion in his official actuations in connection with the criminal cases
involving Agana and Resula. He has fallen short of the requirements of probity and independence.20 A judges conduct should be
above reproach, and in the discharge of his official duties, he should be conscientious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual,
just, impartial.21
Thus, in the case of Garcia vs. Burgood,22 the Supreme Court held:
We deem it important to point out that a judge must preserve the trust and faith reposed on him by the parties as an impartial and
objective administrator of justice. When he exhibits actions that rise fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and
confidence are eroded xxx.
Justice Vidallon-Magtolis recommended that respondent be fined the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos with a stern
warning that a repetition of the acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.
60
The Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondents conduct was hardly exemplary in this case.
The Court in a litany of cases has reminded members of the bench that the unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending
incident is a violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting
magistrate.23 Indeed, the Court has consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously on
the principle that justice delayed is justice denied.24
In the case at bench, the fact that respondent tarried too long in acting on the pending incidents in the Criminal Cases Nos.
11309, 4275-D and 4276-D, hardly becomes open to question. If at all, respondent judges foot-dragging in acting on the
incidents in the said cases, which stopped only when administrative complaints were filed against him with the Ombudsman and
the OCA, is a strong indicia of his lack of diligence in the performance of his official duties and responsibilities.
It must be remembered in this regard that a "speedy trial" is defined as one "conducted according to the law of criminal
procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays."25 The primordial purpose of this
constitutional right is to prevent the oppression of the accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an indefinite period of
time.26 This purpose works both ways, however, because it, likewise, is intended to prevent delays in the administration of justice
by requiring judicial tribunals to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal prosecutions.27
At the risk of sounding trite, it must again be stated that "Judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly and to
decide cases within the required period.28 We have held in numerous cases that failure to decide cases and other matters within
the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions. 29 If they cannot do
so, they should seek extensions from this Court to avoid administrative liability."30 Indeed, judges ought to remember that they
should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to them, for justice delayed is often justice denied.
Certainly, "Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the peoples faith in the judiciary. 31 It is for this reason that this Court has
time and again reminded judges of their duty to decide cases expeditiously. Delay in the disposition of even one case constitutes
gross inefficiency32 which this Court will not tolerate."33
With regard to the charge of partiality, the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa34 that the peoples confidence in the judicial
system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the
highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. 35 It is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring
the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
RULE 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL
ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
CANON 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND
DILIGENCE.
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting standard of morality and
decency. The character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private morals
as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the performance of his
duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. 36 Only recently, in Magarang v.
Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr.,37 the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of
Judicial conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of
justice.38
Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence.39 A judges conduct must be above reproach. 40 Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above
suspicion. 41 A judges private as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be
beyond reproach.42
In Vedana vs. Valencia,43 the Court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to
his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of
morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently
explained, a judges official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
As stated earlier, in Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities.44 A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be impartial.45Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. 46 Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance.47 It was, thus, held that it is improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the
complainant.48 Be that as it may, credence can not be accorded to the indictment that respondent judge had been socializing with
the congresswoman-mother of one of the accused as well as accuseds counsel considering that complainant neither testified nor
produced any witness to corroborate this charge.
Viewed vis--vis the factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent judge violated Rule 1.02,49 as well as Canon
2,50 Rule 2.01 51 and Canon 3.52 He must, thus, be sanctioned.53 In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v.
Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City,54 that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. Jurisprudence
repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of
due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their
fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent,
because they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties. They are the intermediaries between
conflicting interests and the embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.55 1wphi1
A review of past decisions reveals a wide range of penalties for cases of similar nature. These penalties include mere
reprimand,56 withholding of salary,57 fine,58 suspension59 and even dismissal.60
61
This is not the first time respondent has been sanctioned by the Court. In Cecilio Wycoco v. Judge Jesus G.
Bersamira,61 respondent was initially admonished for absenteesim by the Court. Subsequently, in Jose Oscar M. Salazar v. Judge
Jesus G. Bersamira,62 respondent was again sanctioned and fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) with the warning that a repetition
of the same act would be dealt with more severely for violating Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1983. Specifically,
respondent intervened in a case which he could not properly take cognizance of causing the complainant great prejudice
resulting from the delay of the execution of a decision in his favor in Civil Case No. 39608 of the MeTC of Makati.
It appears, however, that being chastised twice has not reformed the respondent with the filing of the instant administrative
complaint against him. Needless to state, such acts of respondent only further erode the peoples faith and confidence in the
judiciary for it is the duty of all members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity
of the judiciary, which in recent times has been the object of criticism and controversy. 63
While the Court agrees with the Investigating Justice that respondents conduct warrants the imposition of sanctions against him,
the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed committed. Given the prevailing facts of the case, a fine of
P10,000.00 accompanied by a reprimand, with a stern warning that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely, is a more appropriate penalty. 64
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00).
Further, he is REPRIMANDED and sternly warned that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA September 9, 2008
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R. SP NO. 103692 [Antonio Rosete,
et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al.]
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Judiciary, which is acclaimed as the firmest pillar of our democratic institutions, is vested by the Constitution with the
power to settle disputes between parties and to determine their rights and obligations under the law. For judicial decisions, which
form part of the law of the land, to be credible instruments in the peaceful and democratic resolution of conflicts, our courts must
be perceived to be and, in fact be, impartial, independent, competent and just. To accomplish this end, it is imperative that
members of the Judiciary from its highest magistrates to its humblest employees adhere to the strictest code of ethics and the
highest standards of propriety and decorum. Indeed, it is unfortunate that one of the countrys second highest courts, the Court of
Appeals, should be presently embroiled in scandal and controversy. It is this Courts bounden duty to determine the culpability
or innocence of the members of the Judiciary involved in the said controversy and to discipline any one whose conduct has failed
to conform to the canons of judicial ethics, which uphold integrity, independence, impartiality, competence and propriety in the
performance of official functions.
The present administrative matter arose from the Letter dated August 1, 2008 of Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. (Presiding Justice Vasquez), referring to this Court for appropriate action the much publicized dispute and charges
of impropriety among the justices of the Court of Appeals (CA) involved in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 entitled "Antonio Rosete, et
al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al."
To assist in its investigation of this sensitive matter, the Court in its Resolution dated August 4, 2008 constituted a three-person
panel (the "Panel of Investigators") composed of retired Justices of the Court; namely, Mme. Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as
Chairperson, Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero and Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as Members. The Panel of
Investigators was tasked to investigate the (a) alleged improprieties of the actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.); and (b) alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed
respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja.
A narration of relevant events and facts, as found by the Investigating Panel, follows: At about 1:30 p.m. also on May 30, 2008, Justice Sabio received a telephone call in his chambers from his older brother,
Chairman Camilo Sabio (Chairman Sabio) of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). 16 Chairman Sabio
informed his brother that he (Justice Sabio) had been named the "third member" of the division to which the MERALCO-GSIS
On April 15, 2008, Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (Justice Reyes), then Chairperson of the Ninth Division of the CA, filed an
case had been raffled. Justice Sabio was surprised as he had not yet been "officially informed" about the matter. Chairman Sabio
application for leave from May 15, 2008 to June 5, 2008.1
likewise informed him that a TRO had been prepared. Chairman Sabio then tried to convince Justice Sabio "of the rightness of
the stand of the GSIS and the SEC," and asked his brother to help the GSIS, which "represents the interest of the poor people."
In Office Order No. 149-08-CMV dated May 14, 2008 issued by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Justice Jose C. Mendoza (Justice Justice Sabio told his brother that he would "vote according to [his] conscience" and that the most that he could do was "to have
Mendoza) was designated by the Raffle Committee as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division during the absence of Justice the issuance of the TRO and the injunctive relief scheduled for oral arguments," at which the respondents "must be able to
Reyes. Apart from his duties as regular senior member of the Fifth Division, Justice Mendoza was authorized "to act on all cases convince" him that the TRO indeed had no legal basis.
submitted to the Ninth Division for final resolution and/or appropriate action, except ponencia, from May 15, 2008 to June 5,
2008 or until Justice Reyes reports back for duty." The said office order likewise applied to the other Division(s) where Justice
In his signed testimony,17 which he read before the Panel of Investigators, Chairman Sabio narrated the circumstances of this call
Reyes had "participated or took part as regular member or in an acting capacity."2
to his brother on May 30, 2008. It appears to have been prompted by a call from a member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. To
quote from Chairman Sabios testimony:
On May 29, 2008, Antonio V. Rosete, Manuel M. Lopez, Felipe B. Alfonso, Jesus P. Francisco, Christian S. Monsod, Elpidio L.
Ibaez, and Francis Giles B. Puno, as officers, directors and/or representatives of the Manila Electric Company (hereinafter to be
Last May 30, 2008 I was in Davao City Airport with my wife, Marlene, waiting for our 1:25 P.M. PAL flight to
collectively referred to as "Meralco"), filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
Manila. xxx xxx xxx.
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Commissioner Jesus Enrique G. Martinez, Commissioner Hubert B. Guevarra, and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). 3 Aside from the application for immediate issuance of a TRO, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a As we were boarding, I received a call from Atty. Jesus I. Santos, a Member of the Board of Trustees of GSIS. We
preliminary injunction that should thereafter be declared permanent, as well as a declaration of nullity of the cease and desist and had known each other and had become friends since before Martial Law because as Chief Counsel of the Federation
show cause orders issued by the SEC through Commissioner Martinez. The petition was received by the CA at 10:49 a.m. on of Free Farmers (FFF) we were opposing counsel in various cases in Bulacan.
May 29, 2008 and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
Attorney Santos informed me that the dispute between the GSIS and MERALCO was now in the Court of Appeals;
On the same day, petitioners simultaneously filed at 10:48 a.m. an urgent motion for a special raffle. Presiding Justice Vasquez and, that as a matter of fact, my brother, Justice Sabio, was chair of the Division to which the case had been assigned.
granted the motion in a handwritten note on the face of the urgent motion, 4and CA-G.R. No. 103692 was raffled to Justice Being a Trustee, Attorney Santos requested me to help. I readily welcomed the request for help and thanked him.
Vicente Q. Roxas (Justice Roxas).5 At 3:10 p.m., the Office of Presiding Justice Vasquez received a letter from Atty. Estrella C. There was no mystery about his having known of the results of the raffle because the lawyers are notified thereof and
Elamparo (Atty. Elamparo), Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS, requesting the re-raffling of the case "in the presence of the are present thereat. As a Trustee, Attorney Santos should be concerned and involved. As such it is his duty to seek
parties in the interest of transparency and fairness."6 At 4:10 p.m. on that day, the GSIS filed an ex-partemotion to defer action assistance for the GSIS where he could legitimately find it. He was right in seeking my assistance.
on any incident in the petition pending the resolution of their motion for the re-raffle of the case.7
I was aware of the controversy between the GSIS and MERALCO. In essence this was in fact a controversy between
Atty. Elamparo, accompanied by Atty. Orlando P. Polinar, also of the GSIS Law Office, personally filed the urgent motion to the long suffering public and the mighty - financially and politically - controlling owners of MERALCO. MERALCO
defer action on the petition pending the resolution of their motion to re-raffle the case. Since the receiving clerk of the Court of is not only a public utility but also a monopoly. Fortunately, GSIS had taken up the cudgels for the long suffering
Appeals could not assure them that the motion would be transmitted to the Court of Appeals Division, Attys. Elamparo and public, who are at the mercy of MERALCO.
Polinar allegedly went to the office of Justice Roxas "for the sole purpose of personally furnishing him a copy" of the
motion.8 They initially talked to a male clerk who referred them to one of the lawyers, who, however, told them that it was not
xxx xxx x x x.
possible for them to personally hand a copy of the motion to Justice Roxas. Thus, Attys. Elamparo and Polinar left a copy of the
motion to the staff but no one wanted to sign and acknowledge receipt of the copy.9
Immediately, I tried to contact Justice Sabio. But due to the noise I could not hear him. So I waited until we would
10 arrive in Manila.
On May 30, 2008, Justice Reyes filed an application for the extension of his leave until June 6, 2008. In the meantime, Justice
Mendoza, who had been designated to replace Justice Reyes during the latters absence, informed Justice Roxas through a letter
that he (Justice Mendoza) was inhibiting from the case on the ground that he used to be a lawyer of the Meralco. 11 Hence, in an As we were leaving the Airport, I again got in touch with Justice Sabio. After, he confirmed that he was in fact in the
"Emergency Request for Raffle," Justice Roxas informed the Raffle Committee about the inhibition. 12 Division to which the petition of MERALCO had been raffled. I impressed upon him the character and essence of the
controversy. I asked him to help GSIS if the legal situation permitted. He said he would decide according to his
conscience. I said: of course.
Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. (Justice Sabio) was assigned as Acting Chairman of the Ninth Division by raffle, "in lieu of Justice
Mendoza."13 At 11:30 a.m., the office of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal (Justice Dimaranan-Vidal) received a notice of
emergency deliberation with the new Acting Chairman of the Special Ninth Division, apparently sent by Justice Roxas, stating xxx xxx x x x.
that her presence and that of Justice Sabio, Jr. were "indispensable" on account of the "national interest" involved in CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692.14
On the same day, May 30, 2008, GSIS filed an urgent ex-parte motion to inhibit Justice Roxas from CA-G.R. No. SP
103692.18 The Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received a copy of the motion at 11:58 a.m. 19
Meanwhile, Atty. Elamparo "received a telephone call from somebody who did not identify herself but (who) said that she had
important information regarding the Meralco case." The unidentified caller told Atty. Elamparo that "a TRO was already being
Claiming that the TRO was issued "to pre-empt the hearing" scheduled in the afternoon of that day before the SEC, the GSIS
prepared and that certain Meralco lawyers had in fact been talking to Justice Roxas." The caller warned Atty. Elamparo against
Law Office, through Atty. Marcial C. Pimentel, Jr., set forth its reason for the motion for inhibition as follows:
Justice Roxas who had "administrative cases and was very notorious," but when prodded, the caller would not disclose more
details.15
62
 3. Unfortunately, reports have reached respondent GSIS that the Honorable ponente has been in contact with certain
lawyers of MERALCO and has in fact already prepared a draft resolution granting the TRO without affording
respondents even a summary hearing. The records of this case was (sic), per information, immediately transmitted to
the Honorable ponente upon his instructions. The worries of the respondent were exacerbated when it learned that
there are supposedly two administrative cases pending against the Honorable ponente, both of which involve
allegations of bias and prejudice.
It turned out, however, that at that time, Justice Roxas had not yet been officially notified by the Raffle Committee that the case
was raffled to him. 20 Moreover, contrary to the allegation of Atty. Elamparo that the raffle was rigged, Justice Roxas had no hand
in the raffle proceeding, which was handled by the Division chaired by Justice Mariano del Castillo with the use of a "fool-proof
Las Vegas tambiolo, like the lotto machine."21
Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Sabio, for the latters signature, the TRO which he had prepared, already signed by
himself and Justice Dimaranan-Vidal. Convinced of the urgency of the TRO, Justice Sabio signed it on condition that the case
will be set for oral arguments.
22
Thus, at 2:08 p.m. on May 30, 2008, the Special Ninth Division composed of Justices Sabio, Roxas, and Dimaranan-Vidal,
issued the Resolution granting the TRO prayed for by the petitioners and directing the respondents to file their respective
comments (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition within ten days from notice, with the petitioners given five days from receipt
of that comment within which to file their reply. The Special Ninth Division also set the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction for 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008. In the same Resolution, parties were
directed to file their respective memorandum of authorities in connection with the application for a writ of preliminary injunction
together with their comments/reply. After the parties had filed their memorandum of authorities relative to the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction, the prayer for the said writ would be considered submitted for resolution "forty five (45) days
from promulgation of this Resolution." The SEC received a copy of the Resolution at 4:03 p.m. on that day. 23
For Justice Roxas, the issuance of the TRO was an implied denial of the motion for inhibition filed against him. There was no
need to put in writing the action on the motion for inhibition. 24
At 3:00 p.m., the Special Cases Section of the Court of Appeals received the Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order
and To Hold Its Enforcement in Abeyance filed by the GSIS. 25 Justice Roxas did not act on the Urgent Motion because he did
not consider it meritorious.26
On May 31, 2008, Justice Sabio received a cellular phone call from Mr. Francis De Borja (Mr. De Borja), a person he had lost
contact with for almost a year already. 27 Mr. De Borja greeted him with: "Mabuhay ka, Justice." When Justice Sabio, Jr. asked
Mr. De Borja why he said that, Mr. De Borja told him that the Makati Business Club was happy with his having signed the TRO,
to which Justice Sabio retorted, "I voted according to my conscience."
On June 5, 2008, the GSIS Law Office received a letter dated June 2, 2008 of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. informing GSIS
Chief Legal Counsel, Atty. Elamparo, that the Court of Appeals could not grant her request for the re-raffling of CA-G.R. SP
No. 103692 "in the presence of the parties in the interest of transparency and fairness," as the case had been raffled in accordance
with the procedure under the IRCA.28
On June 10, 2008, Justice B. L. Reyes reported back to work. 29
On June 11, 2008, at 3:50 p.m.,30 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appearing for the SEC, filed a manifestation and
motion praying for the admission of the comment (to the petition) attached thereto, as well as the advance and additional copies
of the memorandum of authorities.
On June 12, 2008, at 4:53 p.m., the GSIS filed its comment/opposition to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692,31 as well as its
memorandum of authorities.
63
On June 16, 2008, the Division Clerk of Court, Atty. Teresita Custodio (Atty. Custodio), delivered to Justice Reyes
the cartilla of the Meralco case, and informed him that a hearing on the prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction had
been scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on June 23 and 24, 2008.32However, on the same day, the Division Clerk of Court came back to
retrieve the cartilla upon instructions of Justice Sabio. Justice Reyes instructed his staff to return the cartilla and when he asked
the Division Clerk of Court why she was retrieving it, she said that Justice Sabio "demanded" that it be returned back to him.
"Personally affronted" by the "domineering and superior stance" of Justice Sabio, Justice Reyes "read and re-read Secs. 1, 2(d) &
5, Rule VI (Process of Adjudication)" until he was satisfied that he should sit as Division Chairman in the Meralco case. 33
On either June 17 or 18, 2008, Justice Sabio requested the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 from Justice Roxas so that he could
study the case before the hearing. 34 Justice Roxas asked him whether Justice Reyes would preside over the hearing. Justice Sabio
explained the reason why he, not Justice Reyes, should preside. Justice Roxas promised to instruct the Division Clerk of Court to
send the rollo over to Justice Sabio. The next day, the Division Clerk of Court told Justice Sabio that the rollo was with Justice
Reyes. When the rollo was eventually transmitted to Justice Sabio, the Division Clerk of Court asked him whether
the rollo should be with Justice Reyes. Justice Sabio explained why the rollo should be with him.
On June 18, 2008, petitioners filed a motion for an extension of five days or until June 23, 2008 within which to file their
consolidated memoranda of authorities and reply to the comment of the SEC.35
On June 19, 2008, MERALCO filed an ex-parte manifestation together with their reply to the comment of the
GSIS.36 Meanwhile, Justice B. L. Reyes asked Atty. Custodio to report on "what transpired between her and Justice Sabio" when
she returned the cartilla. "Teary-eyed," Atty. Custodio begged off from making a report.37
Justice Reyes decided to consult the Presiding Justice "to avoid an ugly confrontation" with the Justices on the "highly
politicized case involving giants of the Philippine society." He explained to the Presiding Justice his understanding of the
relevant IRCA rules and "the actual practice in similar situations in the past." The Presiding Justice promised to talk with Justice
Sabio and, "for the sake of transparency and future reference," Justice Reyes requested permission to write an inquiry on the
matter.38
On the same day, Justice Reyes wrote Presiding Justice Vasquez a letter 39 calling the attention of Justice Edgardo P. Cruz
("Justice Cruz"), Chairperson of the Committee on Rules, to the "dilemma" as to who between him and Justice Sabio should
"receive" CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. Justice Reyes posed these questions before the Presiding Justice:
Will the case remain with Justice Jose Sabio, Jr. as Acting Chairman of the Special 9th Division and who participated
in the initial Resolution of the case?
Will the case revert to the regular 9th Division with the undersigned as Chairman?
For Justice Reyes, the "dilemma" was engendered by this provision of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA:
(2) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of these actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due
course; (2) granting writ of preliminary injunction; (3) granting new trial; and (4) granting execution pending appeal
have been taken, the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report and the
Justices who participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same station.
The hearing on the application for preliminary injunction having been scheduled for June 23 and 24, 2008, Justice Reyes
considered it "necessary" that the issues be resolved before that date. Moreover, the referral of the controversy to the Presiding
Justice would give him sufficient time to seriously study the case before the hearing. 40
On June 20, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez referred the letter of Justice Reyes to Justice Cruz, Chairperson of the Committee
on Rules, noting "some urgency involved as the hearing of the case is on Monday, June 23, 2008."41
On that same day, Justice Cruz wrote Justice Reyes a letter42 quoting Section 2 (d), Rule VI of the IRCA and stating that the
"[i]ssuance of a TRO is not among the instances where the Justices who participated in the case shall remain therein." Hence,
Justice Cruz opined that "[n]otwithstanding the issuance of the TRO (not writ of preliminary injunction), the case reverted to the
regular Chairman (Justice Reyes) of the Ninth Division upon his return." Justice Reyes received a copy of the letter of Justice
Cruz in the afternoon of that day. 43
case should remain with the Special Ninth Division "regardless of the transfer of the ponente to the Eighth Division because of
the pending motion to lift TRO," which the Special Ninth Division should resolve "following the general rule that when a
decision or resolution is rendered by a division, a motion for reconsideration thereof should be acted upon by all the Members of
that division, whether regular or special, which participated in the rendition of the decision or resolution, except in case of death,
retirement or resignation of such Member."54

During the hearings of this case, Justice Cruz explained his opinion before the Panel. He opined that the motion to lift the TRO is That morning, Justice Roxas also consulted Justice Villarama. The latter told the former that since there was a motion to lift the
not a motion for reconsideration because Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states that a motion for reconsideration may be filed with TRO, Justice Roxas should first rule on the motion. He also advised Justice Roxas to inhibit himself from the case, as there
respect to a decision or a final resolution. A TRO is not a final resolution but an interlocutory order. Moreover, since the subject might be a problem (mag-inhibit ka baka magka-problema). Justice Roxas told Justice Villarama that he would follow his
of the hearing on June 23, 2008 was on the application for preliminary injunction, Justice Sabio had no right to participate in the "suggestion."55
hearing because as an Acting Chairman, his authority was only to act on the motion to lift the TRO. Under the IRCA, the
position of Justice Sabio invoked the exception to the general rule in the IRCA. However, the settled principle is to construe a
Justice Reyes also went to the office of Justice Villarama to tell him of his "strong conviction that the issuance of a TRO is not
rule strictly against the exception. The participation of Justice Sabio in the hearing on June 23, 2008 was a "passport" to
among the instances provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI when the case shall remain with those Justices who participated in the case
participation in the decision-making process, in violation of the IRCA.44
regardless of their transfer to other division(s)." Justice Villarama told Justice Reyes that per his "understanding and
interpretation of said provision, x x x the case should remain with the Special Ninth Division."56
Justice Reyes having consulted with him, the Presiding Justice referred the matter to Justice Sabio who in turn, opined that "a
temporary restraining order is part of the injunctive relief or at least its initial action such that he should be the one to chair the
At 9:50 a.m., the Office of the Division Clerk of Court called Justice Reyes to inform him that the parties and their counsels
Division." 45 In his office after that consultation with the Presiding Justice, Justice Reyes found that the Division Clerk of Court
were already in the hearing room. Justice Reyes informed the caller that he could not preside as Justice Sabio had "apparently
had given him a copy of the cartilla just in case he would preside over the hearing.In the evening, the Presiding Justice called up
hardened his position" and he wanted to avoid an "ugly spectacle." His name plate was displayed in the hearing room but Justice
Justice Reyes to inform him that Justice Sabio "insisted that he would preside over the hearing of the case," and that the opinion
Sabio moved to another hearing room.57 Allegedly, the removal of the nameplate of Justice Reyes was the talk of the Court of
of Justice Cruz, who was "junior" to Justice Sabio "was no better than his own opinion."46
Appeals for weeks.58

It turned out that, upon receipt of a copy of the letter of Justice Cruz, Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice by telephone that he
Villaraza Cruz Marcelo and Angangco entered its appearance as counsel for Meralco. 59 At the hearing, Justice Sabio presided
disagreed with the opinion of Justice Cruz "because he did not sign in an official capacity as Chairman of the Rules Committee,
with Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal in attendance. Justice Roxas, the ponente, did not ask a single question.60 Not one of
but in his personal capacity" and hence, the opinion of Justice Sabio "was as good as his, as in fact I (Justice Sabio, Jr.) am even
the Justices in attendance brought up the motion for inhibition filed by the GSIS against Justice Roxas. 61 In open court, the
more senior than he."47 Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that he "smelled something fishy" about the move to transfer the
parties in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 agreed to submit, within 15 days, simultaneous memoranda on the injunctive relief prayed for
case to the Ninth Division especially because Justice Reyes did not inform him about it despite the fact that they were seated
by the petitioners, after which the application for preliminary injunction would be deemed submitted for resolution. 62
together on three occasions.

On June 25, 2008, or about two days after the separate conversations of Justice Villaram with Justices Sabio and Reyes, the
Justice Sabio "smelled something fishy" because a couple or so weeks ago, he attended a Chairpersons meeting regarding the
Presiding Justice also consulted Justice Villarama about the letter-queries of Justices Roxas and Reyes on which Division should
leakage of the ponencia of Justice Bato, with Justice Reyes as Chairperson and Justice Jose Mendoza as senior member. The
resolve "the matter of injunctive relief or issue the decision" in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692. 63
meeting was called because prior to the promulgation of the decision of Justice Bato, the losing party already filed a motion for
the inhibition of the ponente. According to Justice Sabio information on the decision could not have been leaked by Justice Bato
but by a member of the Division.48 The Presiding Justice issued Office Order No. 196-08-CMV reconstituting the Committee on Rules and designating Justice Cruz
as the Chairperson, with Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, Reyes, Hakim Abdulwahid, and Noel G. Tijam, as members. 64 The
Committee on Rules was tasked to propose amendments to the IRCA on or before August 15, 2008 "for submission and
The Presiding Justice "did not do anything anymore" to prevent an "unpalatable" situation at the scheduled June 23, 2008
adoption of the Court en banc." (The office order was later amended by Office Order No. 196-08-CMV on August 4, 2008 to
hearing, notwithstanding the "conflicting opinions" of Justices Reyes and Sabio. The "personal view" of the Presiding Justice
include as members Justices Mario L. Guaria III, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.65) The Rules Committee
was at the time "with Justice Cruz" but Justice Sabio had a "different interpretation." Neither did the Presiding Justice suggest
used to be composed of only three members, namely: Justices Cruz, Abdulwahid, and Roberto Barrios, now deceased, as
that the Rules Committee be convened because the Committee then had only two members. He felt that it would be "better" if
members, with Justice Cruz as chairperson. 66
Justices Reyes and Sabio "could settle it between themselves." The Presiding Justice was seeing the Justices "practically"
everyday because he did not want "these things to blow up." However, neither did it enter the mind of the Presiding Justice that
the hearing on June 23 could be reset. Had he known that there was a motion to inhibit Justice Roxas, he would have changed his It was also on June 25, 2008 that Presiding Justice Vasquez issued Office Order No. 200-08-CMV stating that, in view of the
position "that it should be the Sabio group."49 retirement of Justices Enrique Lanzanas, Lucenito N. Tagle, Agustin S. Dizon, and Rodrigo Cosico, and the appointments of
Justices Ruben C. Ayson and Edgardo L. delos Santos, the Divisions would have a new composition effective July 4,
2008.67 Under that office order, Justice Sabio became the Chairman of the Sixth Division, with Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a
Also on June 20, 2008, the GSIS requested permission to conduct a power-point presentation during the hearing. 50 Likewise the
member. Justice Reyes became the Chairman of the Eighth Division, with Justices Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
SEC, through the OSG prayed that it be allowed the use of Microsoft Powerpoint Application at the June 23 and 24, 2008
("Justice Bruselas") as members.
hearings.51 Justice Roxas did not act on the motions.

On June 29, 2008, Justice Reyes went on official leave of absence to use a business class airplane ticket to Sydney, Australia that
On June 21, 2008, Justice Sabio came to know that it was the Division chaired by Justice Reyes that would handle the case on
he had won in an APT Golf Tournament in January 2008. He was still on official leave when the reorganization of the Court of
account of the opinion of Justice Cruz.52
Appeals took place on July 4, 2008. 68

In the morning of June 23, 2008, Justice Sabio consulted with Justice Martin Villarama, Jr. ("Justice Villarama") who advised
him, "in no uncertain terms," that his stand was "correct" and that he should remain in the case.53 Justice Villarama said that the
64
On July 1, 2008, Justice Roxas told Justice Sabio that he did not attend the Access to Courts (sic) summit on June 30 and July 1,
2008 at the Court of Appeals Auditorium because he was busy with the Meralco case. Justice Sabio was taken aback because at
that time the parties had not yet submitted their memoranda.69
That same afternoon, Mr. De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, seeking to meet with him for an "important" matter. Because
Justice Sabio had 6-8 p.m. classes at the Ateneo Law School, they agreed to meet after his classes but not for long because his
wife and his daughter, Atty. Silvia Jo Sabio who is an Attorney VI in the Office of the Chief Justice, 70 would be waiting for
him.71 According to Justice Sabio, the conversation at that meeting with Francis de Borja went as follows:
17. By the time my class was finished at 8 pm, Mr. De Borja was already waiting for me at the Lobby Lounge of the
3rd Floor of the Ateneo Law School. His first words to me were: Alam mo Justice kung sino ang kasama ko sa kotse?
Si Manolo Lopez. Then he said: Noong tinatawagan kita at sinabi kong "Mabuhay ka Justice," si Manolo Lopez ang
katabi ko noon. Nasa Amerika siya, kaya ako na lang ang pumunta dito para makiusap sa yo. Alam mo, itong kaso
na ito is a matter of life and death for the Lopezes. And alam mo naman what the Marcoses did to them, which is
being done now by the Arroyos.
At that point he mentioned the impasse between Justice Bienvenido Reyes and myself. He said: Alam
naming may problema kayo ni Justice Reyes tungkol sa chairmanship.
I was surprised how he came to know about it, as this was an internal matter of the Court of Appeals
which only happened fairly recently and many associate justices of the CA were not even aware of this.
Just the same, I explained my stand and why I could not relinquish the chairmanship to Justice Reyes.
He then replied: Alam mo, Justice ang opinion dito ni Nonong Cruz ay i-challenge ang stand mo. Kaya
lang, mayroon namang nagsabi na it might become messy.
Then he bragged to me: Ako din ang responsible sa pag-recommend at pag-hire ng Villaraza Law Firm.
Then he explained that he was there to offer me a win-win situation.
He said: Justice, mayroon kaming P10 million. Ready. Just give way to Justice Reyes.
Then I said: Bakit ganun. Nakasisiguro sila sa kanya, sa akin hindi?
He said: Mas komportable lang sila sa kanya.
At that point, I was shocked that he had a very low regard for me. He was treating me like there was a
price on my person. I could not describe my feelings. I was stunned. But at the same time, hindi ko rin
magawang bastusin siya because I had known him since 1993 and this was the first time that he had ever
treated me like this, or shown that he believed I could be bought.
So I just told him: Francis, I cannot in conscience agree to that.
His answer was: Sabi ko nga sa kanila, mahirap ka talaga papayag. Kasi may anak iyang Opus Dei.
Numerary pa.
At this point, I just wanted to leave, so I told him I could not stay long. I told him my wife and lawyer
daughter were waiting.
65
Even then, he was already insistent. His parting words before I left were: Just think about it, Justice.72
At that time, Mr. De Borja was carrying a "sealed" brown paper bag, which he was handling "as if something important" was
inside. However, Justice Sabio did not know if the bag contained P10million.73
In his car, Justice Sabio told his wife and his daughter, Silvia Jo, about the offer of Mr. De Borja for Meralco. 74
In his affidavit submitted to the Panel of Investigators, Mr. De Borja describes himself as a businessman, a deal maker, and
project packager. On July 1, 2008, he invited Justice Sabio for dinner "to touch base" and for chismis about the MERALCO-
GSIS case. As the latter would have evening classes at the Ateneo Law School, and his wife and daughter would be waiting in
their car after his classes, they just agreed to meet at the lobby-lounge of the School. What Mr. De Borja knew about the
MERALCO case allegedly came from news reports but he was interested in the news because he is a "confirmed free-
enterpriser." Moreover, De Borja thought that there was "[n]othing like hearing things directly from the horses mouth." 75
When Mr. De Borja and Justice Sabio met, Mr. De Borja averred he was indeed carrying a bag, not an expensive looking
luggage. After parking his car at the Rockwell basement, he took the escalator, intending to walk out of the mall. On his way, he
passed by the Kenneth Cole shop and, since it was still early, he looked in and saw a T-shirt he liked. He bought the T-shirt,
which he brought before the Panel of Investigators in the grey "Kenneth Cole Reaction" bag. The photographs of the bag and the
T-shirt costing P1,650.00 are marked Exhibits "A-De Borja" and "A-1-De Borja" and attached to the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-
CA, while the photograph of the receipt issued by the Kenneth Cole Boutique, marked as Exhibit "A-2-De Borja," shows that the
purchase was made on July 1, 2008 at 19:47. He stressed the bag did not contain P10 million.
Before the Panel, Justice Sabio claimed that the bag Mr. De Borja brought during the hearing was not the bag that Mr. De Borja
was carrying when Justice Sabio saw him on July 1, 2008. What Mr. De Borja allegedly brought with him to the lobby-lounge of
the Ateneo Law School was a brown bag with paper handle "about 2/3 (of the Kenneth Cole bag) in size." Justice Sabio was told
by the Panel that it could be the subject of rebuttal evidence but he did not present such evidence.
According to Mr. De Borja, Manolo Lopez (Mr. Lopez), the owner of MERALCO whose wife was a member of Marthas
Vineyard just like Mr. De Borjas wife, was also an acquaintance of Mr. De Borja at the Ateneo grade school. Mr. Lopez did not
ask him (Mr. De Borja) to contact Justice Sabio. At a party where Mr. De Borja met Mr. Lopez, Mr. De Borja informed him that
he knew Justice Sabio but Mr. Lopez did not say anything.
Mr. De Borja denied having offered P10 million to Justice Sabio. Instead, he claimed that Justice Sabio informed him that the
government has offered him (Justice Sabio) money and a promotion to the Supreme Court to favor GSIS. When Mr. De Borja
asked what would it take for Justice Sabio to resist the governments offer, Justice Sabio allegedly replied: "Fifty Million."76 He
alleged that it was Justice Sabio who called up after that July 1, 2008 meeting to "feel" his reaction to the "P50 million
solicitation." Justice Sabio asked him: "O, ano, kumusta, ano ang nangyayari."
Mr. De Borja admitted having given P300,000 to Justice Sabio, some 15 years ago, as a balatobecause he came to value the
friendship of Justice Sabio that developed while the latter was helping the Roa family in a business transaction. Mr. De Borja
earned "more than P25 million" although he received only P3 million as down payment out of the sale of 100 hectares of the Roa
property. He gave the balato of 10% of the P3 million to Justice Sabio in cash at the Roa-owned bank in Cagayan de Oro. Since
the Roas had a lot of "legal problems," Justice Sabio rendered advice and consultation at the time that he was an RTC judge in
Cagayan de Oro. After the promotion of Justice Sabio to the Court of Appeals, Mr. De Borja invited him for dinner. They would
see each other at get-togethers of the Roas with whom Mr. De Borja is related, even at a gathering in the house of Mr. De
Borjas mother. 77
On July 2, 2008, Justice Sabio that informed Presiding Justice Vasquez that he (Justice Sabio) was offered a bribe (which he
rejected) to have him ousted from the Meralco case. The news allegedly shocked the Presiding Justice. Justice Sabio also went to
Justice Villarama who was both "shocked and amused." Justice Sabio. did not tell them who the "offeror" was. However, a day
or two later, Justice Sabio found out that Mr. De Borja had called their mutual friend, Mrs. Evelyn Clavano, who was also
shocked that Mr. De Borja had "the gall to ask her" to convince Justice Sabio to accept the bribe. 78
Although Justice Sabio told the Presiding Justice that the offer of P10 million to a Justice was, in the words of Justice At around 2:30 p.m., Justice Reyes went to see Justice Sabio. The conversation between them, as recalled by Justice Sabio, was
Sabio, bastusan na ito, and he knew that bribing a Justice is a criminal act, the Presiding Justice did nothing because he could as follows:
not "advise a fellow Justice on what to do" - the Justice would know what he should do. Neither did he think of consulting
Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal on the chairmanship impasse.79
As soon as he came in, I said: "Why did you stab me behind my back?" He said, "Why, what did I do? I asked
him Why is it that you have to resort to that strategy of seeking the opinion of Ed Cruz, in his personal capacity, when
On July 3, 2008, to stop Mr. De Borja from pestering him with phone calls and text messages, Justice Sabio called up Mr. De we could have discussed the matter with the PJ?
Borja who told him: Mabuti naman Justice tumawag ka, kasi malapit na ang deadline ng submission ng memorandum. Pinag-
isipan mo bang mabuti ang offer namin? Kasi sayang din kung di mo tatanggapin, Kasi kahit aabot itong kaso sa Supreme
I reminded him that we were seated three times near each other on different occasions only recently and he never
Court, matatalo ka din. Sayang lang yung P10 million. Baka sisihin ka pa ng mga anak mo. Shocked by what he heard, Justice
mentioned to me about the plan to oust me.
Sabio said "No." Since Mr. De Borja did not seem to understand why he kept saying "No," Justice Sabio explained to him: If I
accept that, my conscience will bother me forever. How can I face my wife and two daughters? One a lawyer and the other a
Numerary member of Opus Dei? And besides, how can I reconcile my being a member of PHILJAs Ethics and Judicial Conduct He said: Perhaps that was my fault. I should have talked to you.
Department; being a lecturer of the MCLE; and being a pre-bar reviewer of the Ateneo Law School on Legal and Judicial
Ethics? Mr. De Borja retorted: Wala naman kaming pinapagawa sa iyo na illegal, eh. Then he added: You know Justice, after
I told him, that all the while I thought we were friends. Why did you have to do these things behind my back and not
two or three weeks, makakalimutan na ito ng mga tao. Meron naman diyang mga Atenista na tumatanggap. Justice Sabio said: I
discuss the matter with me face to face?
dont know about them, but I am different. Mr. De Borja then said: Well, if you will not accept, we will be forced to look for other
ways. To this, Justice Sabio said: But they will have to contend with me. In parting, Mr. De Borja said: Justice, no matter what,
saludo talaga ako sa iyo. Then he said it just came about due to the urgent motion; that he was afraid Meralco would take action against him
for nonfeasance for not doing his job.
Mr. De Borja admitted that Justice Sabio called him up, but denied the above conversation with Justice Sabio.
It was then that I said: Are you aware that I was offered 10M for me to give way to you?
On July 4, 2008, the reorganization of the Court of Appeals became effective and brought Justices Reyes, Roxas and Bruselas to
the Eighth Division. Justice Reyes went to see the Presiding Justice about the urgent motion for him to assume the chairmanship I further asked him the following: In the first place, how was the Meralco emissary able to know that there was an
of the Division, which shows on its face that the Urgent Motion dated July 10, 2008 was received by the Court of Appeals at impasse between you and me when that was supposed to be an internal matter?
2:08 p.m. on July 10, 2008 and by Atty. Teresita C. Custodio on July 9, 2008. Justice Reyes expressed to the Presiding Justice
his apprehension that should he fail to assume the chairmanship, he would face administrative liability for nonfeasance or
dereliction of duty. The Presiding Justice suggested that the respondents in the case be required to comment on the Urgent If you will now insist on assuming the chairmanship after I told you of the 10Million offer, what will I
Motion "in a resolution to be issued by the former 9th Division of Justice J.L. Sabio, Jr. since to allow the new Division of think of you?
Justice B.L. Reyes to issue the resolution x x x would render moot and academic" the same motion. Justice Reyes agreed and
told the Presiding Justice that he would be sending over the records to him so that the Presiding Justice could place a note Are you a Trojan horse? Can you blame me if I think you are part of this whole scheme or shenanigan?
thereon as to what had been agreed upon. However, the records of the case did not reach the Presiding Justice.80
Does not the timing alone stink of corruption? After they failed to convince me of their offer, now they
For Justice Roxas, the July 4, 2008 reorganization was mandatory and the Meralco case followed him as its ponente to the will use you to oust me? Is it because they are certain of your loyalty and they are uncertain with mine?
Eighth Division. By the reorganization, Justice Sabio was moved from the disbanded Special Ninth Division to the Sixth
Division, as the reorganization did not spare any Justice. 81 Moreover, the IRCA does not require that the Justices that issued a
TRO be the same Justices that will render the decision. 82 This is because the TRO does not appear in Section 2 (d), Rule VII of And why did they file this stupid urgent motion to assume? In my nine years in this court, I have never
the IRCA. Accordingly, only the issuance of a preliminary injunction could be an exception to the July 4, 2008 reorganization of seen such an animal as this. This is a cowardly act, and whoever advised this stupid motion is also stupid.
the CA.83 He believes the IRCA does not require that the Justices who heard the case should also decide it because the CA is a Why do you have to dignify such a foolish motion? They should file a motion for me to inhibit or recuse
court of record and Justices may rely on the transcript of stenographic notes. 84 And so, once the three Justices have signed the myself.
decision, the ponente has the "pressing duty" to promulgate the decision. 85
Why is it that Meralco actively participated in the hearing on the 23rd and never raised any question
Since July 4, 2008, Justice Bruselas alleged that he acted "on all the ponencias" of Justices Reyes and Roxas, "just as they had on the alleged irregularity of my having presided over the hearing?
acted" on his ponencias.86
Why do you insist on assuming the case? Are you not aware that several days after the issuance of the
On July 7, 2008, the GSIS filed its memorandum. TRO, respondents filed a motion for inhibition of Justice Vicente Roxas and a motion to lift the TRO. Who
then had the right to resolve such motion?

On or about July 8, 2008, Atty. Silvia Sabio, to help her father, sought the advice of Atty. Jose Midas Marquez ("Atty.
Marquez") regarding the bribery attempt. Atty. Marquez advised that Justice Sabio should write the Chief Justice about the
incident, detailing not only the bribery attempt but all that has transpired relative to the chairmanship issue. Atty. Silvia Sabio
immediately called her father and relayed Atty. Marquezs advice. Later that date, Justice Sabio handed his daughter, Silvia, a
handwritten letter for her to deliver to the Chief Justice. 87 The handwritten letter, in essence, requested permission for Justice
Sabio to "unburden" himself before the Chief Justice on the Meralco case. 88
Under the circumstances, anong iisipin ko sa yo? Ano ang tingin ko ngayon sa iyo?
His feeble answer was: you. He then said he did not know of those pending motions. (Incidentally, these motions
were never resolved.) He also said, wala talaga akong interest dito kundi ayaw ko lang ma charge ng non-feasance
for failing to do my duty.

66
 I answered him: Malayo yung non-feasance. Hindi ito nonfeasance. I taught the subject for many years and this is
not one of them.
So I told him, I have made my decision on the matter.Bahala ka na. Then I stood up to show him to the door. He
was silent after that and before he left, he put his arm around me.
For his part, Justice Reyes kept on repeating: "Wala talaga ako dito, wala akong interest kung di yun lang hindi ako ma non-
feasance. Justice Sabio thought otherwise.
Meanwhile, Justice Roxas brought to the office of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal "the final decision on the MERALCO case" bearing
his signature, which he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for "concurrence/dissent." According to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal,
Justice Roxas explained to her the "rationale for his conclusion." Justice Roxas went out for a while and returned "with an
expensive looking travelling bag" from where he pulled out the "purported final decision." Before the close of office hours,
Justice Roxas returned to the chambers of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to check if he (Justice Roxas) had signed his decision. When
she replied that yes, he had signed it, Justice Roxas said he would pick it up the next day. 89
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the decision notwithstanding that on July 8, 2008 the Court of Appeals had been reorganized
because she believed that the Special Ninth Division was still existing on account of its having issued the TRO. 90 She also
concurred with the portion of the decision recommending administrative sanctions against the GSIS lawyers because she
believed the OSG or the OGCC should have appeared for the GSIS.91
Also late that day, Justice Villarama told Justice Sabio that he had advised Justice Reyes to "lay off the case" and allow Justice
Sabio "to continue" and to resolve the urgent motion for Justice Reyes to assume the chairmanship. Justice Villarama recalled
that Justice Reyes repeatedly said: "Wala talaga ako dito Jun, Wala akong personal interest dito."
After "a careful and judicious study" of the more than 56-page decision of Justice Roxas, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed it.
True to his word, Justice Roxas personally picked up the decision that day "purportedly for the action of the Acting Chairman,
Justice Sabio," who was then on leave of absence until July 11, 200.92 Notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not submitted
their respective memoranda, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal signed the "convincing" ponencia, including three copies of the signature
page, because Justice Roxas was insistent of the urgency of the signing of the decision due to the impending lapse of the TRO on
July 29, 2008.93 Justice Sabio thought otherwise. 94
However, Justice Roxas denied that the decision he gave to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was the final decision. He denied that he
gave it to her for her signature. He said it was only for her to read because she asked to read it. He said it was a mere draft as
"everything was unofficial" - there was no rollo or logbook with it, it was not placed in an envelope, and it did not have the
"special seal" of Justice Roxas. It allegedly "was thrown in the garbage can."
On July 9, 2008, the OSG filed the memorandum for the SEC.
On July 10, 2008, Meralco filed an urgent motion praying that Justice Reyes assume the chairmanship of the Division,95 alleging
the reasons for the urgent motion as follows:
5. At the scheduled oral arguments on 23 June 2008 in the instant case, the parties were first directed to one of the
Hearing Rooms of the Court of Appeals. At the said room, the name plate of Justice Reyes was already placed on the
table for the justices. Thus, petitioners were of the impression that the leave of absence of Justice Reyes was over and
that he would be presiding over the oral arguments as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
6. However, when the parties were directed to transfer to another Room of the Court of Appeals for the oral
arguments in the instant case, petitioners saw that the name plates on the table for the justices included that of Justice
Sabio, Jr., together with that (sic) of Justices Roxas and Dimaranan-Vidal. Thereafter, Justice Sabio presided over the
67
oral arguments as Chairman of the Special Ninth Division of the Honorable Court. Petitioners were, thus, of the
impression that the regular Chairman of the Ninth Division, Justice Reyes, was still on temporary leave of absence.
7. Subsequently, it has come to the attention of the petitioners that Justice Reyes has already returned from his
temporary leave of absence and has resumed his duties as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8. Under the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, Justice Sabio, Jr. should now refrain from acting as the chairman
of the Division hearing the instant case as he is already disqualified from acting as such upon the return of Justice
Reyes.
8.1. With due respect, Justice Reyes cannot shirk from his bounden judicial responsibility of performing
his duties and functions as Chairman of the Ninth Division of the Honorable Court.
8.2. Specifically, under Section 3 (d), Rule IV of the 2002 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, a case
can remain with the justices who participated therein only when any of the following actions have been
taken: (a) giving due course; (b) granting of a writ of preliminary injunction; (c) granting of a new trial; or
(d) granting of execution pending appeal:
xxx xxx x x x.
9. None of the foregoing instances apply with respect to Justice Sabio, Jr.s continuing hold on the case. Although
Justice Sabio, Jr. was one of the Justices who issued the temporary restraining order in favour of the petitioners in the
instant case, this circumstance is not among the grounds as above-quoted, when a justice of the Court of Appeals may
remain in the Division.
10. As above-quoted, the rule is categorical that it is not the grant of a temporary restraining order but rather the grant
of a writ of preliminary injunction that sanctions a justices remaining with the Division. Thus, the continued
participation of Justice Sabio, Jr., in the instant case, considering the clear Rules of the Honorable Court, is not only
irregular but may lead one to conclude that he is exhibiting undue interest in the instant case.
On this day, Justice Reyes reported back to work after his trip to Australia. 96
On July 11, 2008, Justice Sabio was on leave when Justice Roxas called him up for a meeting to discuss the case. Justice Sabio
told him that he needed ample time to read the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas promised to send to Justice Sabio the
memoranda immediately.97
At 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes received from the Eighth Division Clerk of Court a copy of Meralcos Urgent Motion for him to
assume the chairmanship of the Ninth Division.
On Monday, July 14, 2008 at the flag ceremony, Justice Sabio requested Justice Roxas to meet with him as he had by then read
the memoranda of the parties. Justice Roxas initially agreed to the meeting but he later informed Justice Sabio that he had
another matter to attend to; neither was he available in the afternoon. Justice Roxas had become scarce. Justice Sabio learned
that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was also looking for Justice Roxas.98
Justice Sabio prepared a resolution on the motion for the reconsideration of the TRO and informed Justices Roxas and
Dimaranan-Vidal that he wanted to discuss it with them. The resolution he prepared "never saw light."99
At 10 a.m., Justice Roxas, with his messenger, brought the rollo of CA G.R. SP No. 103692 to Justice Reyes, and told the latter
that he and Justice Bruselas would be coming over to deliberate on the case. Ten minutes later, the Eighth Division deliberated
on the case. 100 After a cursory examination of the rollo, Justice Reyes found that the decision had been signed by Justices Roxas
and Bruselas but Justice Reyes asked for more time to study the case.101
A transcript of the "Final Deliberation" on July 14, 2008 is attached to page 1926 of Volume III of the rollo of CA-G.R. SP No.
103692 and marked as Exh. 2- Roxas on page 279 of the rollo of A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA. According to Justice Roxas, it was he
who prepared the transcript from memory to "lend credence" to the certification of Justice Reyes at the end of the decision
pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution. 102 Justice Reyes denied having seen it or having authorized its
transcription. Justice Bruselas did not sign any transcript of the deliberation as he was not aware that a transcript was being
taken. There was no stenographer present, as only the three of them, Justices Reyes, Roxas, and Bruselas were present at the
deliberation. Neither was there a recording machine. Justice Roxas admittedly prepared the transcript "from memory."103
The statement attributed to Justice Reyes in the transcript that there were "previous deliberations" were "really meetings," which
they had twice, in the office of Justice Reyes, according to Justice Roxas. 104
On July 15, 2008, when she felt that the timing was right, Atty. Silvia Sabio testified that she handed her fathers letter to the
Chief Justice through his private secretary, Ms. Jasmin Mateo. 105 A few days later, however, Presiding Justice Vasquez told
Justice Sabio that the Chief Justice would no longer meet with him, as the Presiding Justice had apprised the Chief Justice about
the matter. 106
According to Justice Reyes, at 2:00 p.m. that day, the Office of the Presiding Justice informed him that Justice Sabio was waiting
for him in his office. As soon as Justice Reyes was seated, Justice Sabio "berated" him and accused him of "orchestrating
matters." Justice Sabio told him that an emissary of MERALCO had offered him P10 million to drop off the case, hence, he
asked that if he was offered that much, how much could have been offered "to the principals?"107
On July 17, 2008, Justice Reyes went back to the office of the Presiding Justice and informed him of the episode in the office of
Justice Sabio. He also went to ask Justice Villarama for his opinion as to who was "the rightful claimant" to the chairmanship of
the Division that should decide the Meralco case. Justice Villarama allegedly replied that they "were both correct."
On July 18, 2008, at the pre-launching meeting for the CA-CMIS, Justice Villarama had a "brief chat" with Justice Bruselas. The
former told the latter that "both Justices Sabio and Reyes are correct in the sense that one (1) [of] them can properly assume
chairmanship either under the exception provided in Sec. 2 (d), Rule VI of the 2002 IRCA depending on the final disposition of
the prayer for injunctive relief, or pursuant to the general rule enshrined in Sec. 7 (b), Rule VI."108
On July 21, 2008, Justice Roxas personally filed with the Presiding Justice 109 an "Interpleader Petition"110 praying that Presiding
Justice Vasquez "decide which division Chairman (Justice Sabios Former Special 9th Division or Justice B. L. Reyes 8th
Division) should sign the Preliminary Injunction or Decision."111 Justice Roxas averred that "[t]he impasse between two
Chairmen from two Divisions has to be resolved much earlier than July 30, 2008 because July 30, 2008 is the expiration date of
the TRO issued by the Special 9th Division (signed by Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., Justice Vicente Q. Roxas [ponente] and Justice
Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal)." He opined that the two Chairpersons differed in the interpretation of Sections 1 and 2 (d) in relation
to Section 5 of Rule VI on Process of Adjudication of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA).112 His stand was that
the IRCA "should be strictly applied" because "[w]hen the provisions are clear, there is no room for interpretation."
Justice Roxas endorsed his "Interpleader Petition" to Justice Reyes for his "signature or dissent" to the "finalized MERALCO
Decision," which had been in Justice Reyes possession since July 14, 2008. 113 He also gave the rollo of the case to Justice
Reyes.114
Presiding Justice Vasquez allegedly told Justice Roxas that as Presiding Justice, he had no authority to rule on the Interpleader
Petition, which is not an administrative concern over which the Presiding Justice must intervene. Nevertheless, to avoid further
discussion, the Presiding Justice told Justice Roxas that he would study the matter. 115
On July 22, 2008, Justice Reyes wrote the Presiding Justice a letter on "what was discussed between us last 17 July 2008 at
around 3:30 p.m."116 Apparently the Presiding Justice had suggested "to endorse the case and have the Special Ninth Division
68
direct the respondents to file their simultaneous comments on the petitioners Urgent Motion (For Honorable BIENVENIDO L.
REYES to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in the Instant Case) dated 10 July 2008."
Justice Reyes expressed "doubts" that the suggestion was "most prudent," as the dispute "revolves around the correct
interpretation" of the IRCA. He believed that since the question was "purely internal," the CA should not seek "enlightenment"
from the litigants for it would only be construed against its "competence." He shared Justice Cruzs and Roxas interpretation of
the IRCA. Hence, he urged the Presiding Justice to decide the matter; otherwise, he would interpret the rules according to his
"best lights and act accordingly."
On July 23, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez asked for the rollo of CA G. R. No. SP No. 103692 so he could "properly submit
the requested opinion." It was then that he came across the unresolved motion praying for the inhibition of Justice Roxas and the
pending urgent motion to lift the TRO or to hold its enforcement in abeyance. The Presiding Justice considered the latter as a
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution issuing the TRO. 117
Meanwhile, at noon of that day, as Justice Reyes had not yet received "any reaction" from the Presiding Justice, he signed the
decision as well as the Certification. It was promulgated on the same day.
The decision was promulgated without waiting for the Presiding Justices opinion on whether it was the Eighth or Special Ninth
Division that should decide the case. Justice Roxas alleged that he did not expect the Presiding Justice to "answer" or resolve the
matter anyway.
On July 24, 2008, Presiding Justice Vasquez issued his reply to Justice Reyes letter and Justice Roxas "Interpleader-Petition."
The Presiding Justice claimed having doubts on whether he possessed "the authority to decide the subject conflict" simply
because under the IRCA, the Presiding Justice has control and supervision only over administrative affairs of the Court. The
controversy was certainly not an administrative matter but Section 11 of Rule VIII of the IRCA provides that the Presiding
Justice "has the authority to act on any matter not covered" by the Rules although such action should be reported to the Court en
banc.
The Presiding Justice expressed in his letter the view that "the (Special Ninth) Division that issued the temporary restraining
order should continue resolving the injunctive prayer in the petition" because it was the Division that issued the Resolution
granting the TRO and setting the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, aside from the
fact that the parties did not contest the authority of Justice Sabio as Division Chairman at the time, although Justice Reyes had
reported back to work. Moreover, the motion for inhibition and the urgent motion to lift the TRO "have a bearing" on the
application of Section 2 of Rule VI of the IRCA, especially because Section 7 (b) of Rule VI118 points to the retention of the case
by the Special Ninth Division. Furthermore, the new Division headed by Justice Reyes may not be allowed to resolve the
pending incidents because two of its members, Justices Reyes and Bruselas did not participate in the hearing on June 23, 2008.
He did not believe that Justice Reyes would be charged with dereliction of duty should he not assume the chairmanship. The
Presiding Justice ended his letter with the hope that the matter would be "laid to rest" and that whoever would be dissatisfied
"with its outcome may elevate the matter to the Supreme Court."
At 2:00 p.m. that day, Justice Sabio informed the Presiding Justice that a decision had been promulgated in the Meralco case the
previous day. The Presiding Justice was surprised because Justices Roxas and Reyes had asked him to resolve the impasse on the
Division chairmanship. Upon inquiry, the Presiding Justice found that the decision had indeed been promulgated at 4:10 p.m. on
July 23, 2008.119
It was also on July 24, 2008 that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal received a call from Justice Sabio, informing her that Meralco had
offered him a bribe of P10 million "in exchange for his voluntary stepping out from the Meralco case in order to give way to
Justice B. L. Reyes," and that the decision in the Meralco case had been promulgated by the Eighth Division. 120 Shocked that
Justice Roxas did not inform her "as a matter of judicial courtesy" of the scrapping of the decision which she signed on July 8,
2008, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal wrote a letter to the Presiding Justice dated July 24, 2008, 121bringing to his attention "the
apparent and obvious irregularities in the handing of CA-G.R. SP No. 103692," and complaining about Justice Roxas "lack of
judicial courtesy" in discarding for reasons she would not know, his "purported final Decision" that he had asked her to sign and
which she signed "after a judicious study of the records and rollo thereof." Justice Roxas gave the lame excuse that he had "to In its closed door en banc session on July 31, 2008, "after a torrid discussion of all the issues," the Court of Appeals decided, as
incorporate therein some ten pages which he forgot to include in his Decision." follows:

Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed "surprise and consternation" when she learned "on even date that a Decision" in the case had (1) Refer the propriety of the actions of the Justices concerned to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the
been promulgated on July 23, 2008 by the Eighth Division chaired by Justice Reyes, with Justices Roxas and Bruselas as Court Administrator;
members. She said:
(2) Leave the matter regarding the validity of the decision rendered in the above-entitled case to the parties for them
My deepest regret is that the undersigned who already signed the supposed final draft of the Decision in the instant to take whatever legal steps they may deem appropriate in the usual course of procedure; and
case which bears the signature of the ponente, was not even informed by the latter as a judicial courtesy at least, of
the hurried easing out of the undersigned from the case. This inevitably posed even to an unprejudiced mind the
(3) Refer the conflict in the interpretation of our Internal Rules to the Committee on Rules of the Court of Appeals in
following questions: under what basis was the case suddenly transferred to the 8th Division and why is it that neither
order to prevent the recurrence of a similar situation.126
the undersigned nor the Acting Chairman Justice SABIO, of the Special 9th Division not consulted thereof? and,
foremost, what happened to the Decision which the undersigned signed after devoting her precious time and effort in
carefully and laboriously examining the voluminous records and rollo of the case? After the en banc session, Justice Dimaranan-Vidal expressed in a letter for the Presiding Justice127her "strong reaction" to the
paper of Justice Roxas "falsely" imputing to her "grandstanding before the media or resorting to media-recourse instead of just
filing an administrative complaint before the Supreme Court," and taking exception to "the equally outrageous, revolting and
Sad to say the circumstance obtaining herein constitute a flagrant violation of the provision of Canon 5 particularly
baseless accusation that she is allegedly clinging" to the case. She asserted that she never leaked a copy of her letter to
Sections 2 and 3 thereof of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC).
the Philippine Daily Inquirer, as her letter was only intended to bring to the attention of the Presiding Justice "the impropriety
done by Justice Roxas in the MERALCO case" that resulted in her having been eased out of the case notwithstanding that she
On July 25, 2008, Justice Bruselas wrote the Presiding Justice a letter, 122 which was "prompted by a disturbing telephone call" he "carefully and judiciously" examined the ponencia with more than 50 pages, after devoting her "precious time" to such study,
received from Justice Sabio in the morning of July 24, 2008. Justice Sabio informed Justice Bruselas that, "after the injunction and affixing her concurrence thereto. Justice Dimaranan-Vidal reiterated her prayer for an investigation of the matter.
hearing" on June 23, 2008, Meralco offered him P10 Million "to either favor them or yield the chair" to Justice Reyes. Justice
Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he had informed the Presiding Justice of the "bribery incident" and that he "was disgusted over
Meanwhile, on that day, Mr. De Borja, executed an affidavit admitting that he was the businessman referred to by Justice Sabio,
the turn of events because he should have remained chair of the Special 9th Division that issued the TRO on the case." Justice
Jr. in his letter to Presiding Justice Vasquez. Mr. De Borja publicly claimed having learned "from the news" that Justice Sabio
Bruselas informed Justice Sabio that it was the first time that he heard of the matter and that he had "participated in the
was "one of the justices" in the case arising from the order of the SEC to nullify the proxies issued in favor of the MERALCO
deliberation on the case and concurred with the ponencia" of Justice Roxas "without such information ever being taken up."
management. He also alleged that Justice Sabio told him about the "blandishments coming from the government side," that he
Justice Sabio told Justice Bruselas that he would not leave the matter "as it is" because he would bring it up in the "open, to
was being offered a promotion to the Supreme Court and money to favor the GSIS position. Mr. De Borja asked Justice Sabio,
media, etc." Justice Sabio asked Justice Bruselas that if P10M was offered to him, how much would have been offered to the
Jr., "What would it take for you to resist the governments offer?" and that the response of Justice Sabio, Jr. was "Fifty Million."
"others."

Justice Sabio asked permission from the Presiding Justice to hold a press conference the next day on account of the publicized
Troubled by the information, Justice Bruselas went to the Presiding Justice where Justice Dimaranan-Vidal, who had received
affidavit of Mr. De Borja. The Presiding Justice told Justice Sabio that "this is a matter of self-defense on his part," hence, the
the same call from Justice Sabio, joined them. After that meeting with the Presiding Justice, Justice Bruselas called up Justice
Presiding Justice cannot stop him from doing so.
Reyes who confirmed that he had heard about the "bribe offer" but that he did not reveal the same to Justice Bruselas as it
"escaped" his mind. The effort of Justice Bruselas "to get in touch" with Justice Roxas proved futile.
Justice Sabio issued a signed statement as an "initial response" to the affidavit of Mr. De Borja, "vehemently" denying that Mr.
De Borja asked him what it would take for him to inhibit from the case, and that he "never asked for money" from him. 128
Allegedly prompted by "the manner by which the decision x x x was arrived at, and how the decision was promulgated," and that
unless an "immediate and thorough investigation thereon be undertaken" by the Court of Appeals, "both the individual and
institutional integrity of the justices" and of the Court of Appeals would "undoubtedly be tarnished," Justice Sabio wrote on July On August 1, 2008, Justice Sabio called the press conference to read a signed statement entitled "My Reaction to Mr. Francis De
26, 2008 a letter123 to the Presiding Justice, which precipitated the present investigation. Borjas Affidavit dated July 31, 2008 on the Meralco-SEC Case."

On July 28, 2008, the Philippine Daily Inquirer "carried an account" of the letter of Justice Dimaranan-Vidal to the Presiding Expressing anger at the "filthy lie" of Mr. De Borja, Justice Sabio decided to narrate "almost word for word" his "conversations"
Justice, without her knowing how her confidential letter to the Presiding Justice leaked out. 124 with Mr. De Borja.

Before Justice Bruselas delivered his letter to the Presiding Justice, he received a copy of the letter of Justice Sabio and, through
a telephone call, reiterated his "full agreement with his desired investigation."
The Presiding Justice called the Court of Appeals to an "emergency en banc session at 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2008 at the Session
Hall to elicit the reaction of the Court and on the "possible effect" on the decision rendered. The session was also called in order
that the "predicament experienced in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692" could be deliberated upon by the Committee on Rules with a
view to amending the IRCA on the reorganization of the Court of Appeals. The Executive Justices of Cebu and Cagayan de Oro,
Justices Antonio L. Villamor and Romulo V. Borja, respectively, were instructed to attend the en banc session to report to the
other Justices in their stations what transpired at the session, and to "collect the personal reaction, comment or view" of the
Justices on the matter. 125
In an affidavit dated August 1, 2008, which Evelyn Clavano129 executed in Davao City, she stated that -
Francis de Borja requested me if I have the cell phone number of Justice Jose L. Sabio Jr. He related that because he
was very close to the Lopezes of Meralco, he wanted to call him regarding his possible inhibition in a certain Meralco
case, wherein he was designated as a substitute member of the division vice a justice who was temporarily on leave
by reason of sickness. He further said that the Lopezes desire that the same Justice, with whom the Lopezes are more
comfortable, to sit in the division.
So, I gave Francis de Borja the cell phone number of Justice Jose. L. Sabio, Jr. through business card.

69
 xxx xxx x x x.
On August 4, 2008, the Supreme Court constituted the Panel of Investigators to investigate "(1) alleged improprieties of the
actions of the Justices of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692 (Antonio V. Rosete, et al. v. SEC, et al.) and (2) the
alleged rejected offer or solicitation of bribe disclosed respectively by Mr. Justice Jose Sabio and Mr. Francis de Borja."
The Panel of Investigators held hearings from August 8 to 23, 2008. Affidavits were submitted to the Panel to serve as the
parties direct testimonies upon which they were cross-examined by the Panel and the other parties.
On September 4, 2008, the Panel of Investigators submitted its Report of even date to the Court en banc.
According to the Report, "the investigation has revealed irregularities and improprieties committed by the Court of Appeals
Justices in connection with the MERALCO case, CA-G.R. SP No. 103692, which are detrimental to the proper administration of
justice and damaging to the institutional integrity, independence and public respect for the Judiciary."130
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas
Justice Roxas inexcusably failed to act on a number of motions of the parties prior to the promulgation of the Decision.
As found by the Panel of Investigators, several motions were not resolved or acted upon by Justice Roxas. These were
enumerated in the Report as follows:
(a) The "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Defer Action on any Incident of the Petition Pending Resolution of Re-Raffle"
filed by GSIS on May 29, 2008 soon after this case was filed on that date (Rollo, pp. 185-186).
b) GSIS "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Inhibit" Justice Roxas, which was filed on May 30, 2008. As the motion
raised a prejudicial question, Justice Roxas should have resolved it before issuing the TRO sought by Meralco,
but he never did (Rollo, pp. 220-223).
(c) GSIS Motion to Lift TRO which was filed on May 30, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 187-210)
(d) GSIS Motion filed on June 18, 2008, praying that it be allowed to use Power point at the hearing on June 23,
2008 . On June 20, 2008, the SEC filed a similar motion. Both motions were not acted upon by Justice Roxas
(Rollo, pp. 593-621,)
(e) Meralcos "Motion for Extension of Time to file their Consolidated Memorandum of Authorities and Reply to
Repondent SECs Comment" filed on June 25, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 981- 987).
(f) Meralcos "Urgent Motion for Honorable Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes to Assume Chairmanship of the Division in
the Instant Case," which was filed on July 10, 2008 (Rollo, pp. 1262-1274).131 (emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Panel of Investigators that "by ignoring or refusing to act on the motion for his inhibition, Justice Roxas
violated Rule V, Section 3, third paragraph of the IRCA, which provides that he should resolve such motion in writing with
copies furnished the other members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee, and the Division Clerk of
Court." The pertinent portion of the said provision states:
Sec. 3. Motion to Inhibit a Division or a Justice. - x x x
xxx
70
A motion for voluntary inhibition of a Justice shall be acted upon by him alone in writing, copy furnished the other
members of the Division, the Presiding Justice, the Raffle Committee and the Division Clerk of Court.
This Court cannot agree with Justice Roxas proposition that the issuance of the TRO constitutes an implied denial of the motion
to inhibit since under IRCA the obligation of the Justice to act on such a motion is mandatory.
Furthermore, the Court finds well-taken the Panels finding that "Justice Roxas failure to act on the other motions of the parties
violated Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct (which applies in a suppletory manner to the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary) providing that:
"Rule 3.05. - A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods."
Even Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including
the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness." Thus, it has become well-settled in
jurisprudence that even just undue delay in the resolving pending motions or incidents within the reglamentary period fixed by
law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. 132 With more reason, this Court finds suspicious and reprehensible the
failure of Justice Roxas to act at all on pending motions and incidents in CA-G.R. SP No. 103692.
This is in fact not the first time that Justice Roxas has been cited administratively for failure to resolve pending incidents in cases
assigned to him. In Orocio v. Roxas, A.M. Nos. 07-115-CA-J and CA-08-46-J, this Court imposed a P15,000 fine on Justice
Roxas for unwarranted delay in resolving two motions for reconsideration in another case and sternly warned him that future
commission any act of impropriety will be dealt with more severely.
Justice Roxas is guilty of gross dishonesty.
Apart from Justice Roxas inexcusable inaction on pending incidents in the Meralco case, the Panel of Investigators found that
he had been dishonest and untruthful in relation to the said case. The Court adopts the following findings of the Panel:
2. Justice Roxas was dishonest and untruthful.
(a) Justice Roxas admitted that the "Transcript of Final Decision," which is supposed to be a transcript of the
deliberation on July 14, 2008 of the Eighth Division on the final decision in the Meralco case was not a true
"transcript" of the minutes of the meeting, but purely a "transcript from memory" because no notes were taken, no
stenographer was present, and no tape recorder was used. It was in fact a drama which he composed "from my
recollection" to comply with Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA which requires that "minutes of the meeting, i.e.,
deliberation, shall be kept." The so-called "transcript" is a fabrication designed to deceive that there had been
compliance - when actually there was none -- with the prerequisite of the IRCA that consultation and/or deliberation
among the members of the Division must precede the drafting of a decision.
(b) The statement in the "transcript" that it was a "recap from our previous deliberations" was
another falsehood because there had been no previous deliberations.
(c) The reference in the "transcript" to a "Final Report of Justice Roxas" was also false for Justice Roxas admittedly
did not submit a "report" as ponente, as required by Sec. 9, Rule VI of the IRCA, for deliberation by the Eighth
Division on July 14, 2008. The "Final Report" which he submitted was admittedly the decision itself which he and
Justice Bruselas, Jr. had already signed. The "Final Report" was merely the title of the page that served as the cover
of the decision. Hence, Justice B.L. Reyes supposed closing statement in the "transcript" that -- "We have covered
every angle of the Final Report of Justice Roxas extensively" is also false. Justice B.L. Reyes testified at the
investigation that he had not seen the "transcript" until the copy in the rollo was shown to him by Justice Callejo, Sr.
during his cross-examination of Justice B. L. Reyes on August 26, 2008.
 xxx xxx xxx (g) J. Roxas was disrespectful to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. whose ruling on his "Interpleader Petition" he
sought on July 21, 2008, but he promulgated the Meralco decision two (2) days later, on July 23, 2008, without
waiting for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.s ruling which came out on July 24, 2008, only three (3) days after the
(e) Justice Roxas testimony that when he brought the Meralco decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal on July 8, 2008,
Interpleader Petition was filed by him, and two (2) days after Justice B.L. Reyes also reiterated in writing his request
it was only a draft for her to read, because she asked if she may read it, not for her to sign it, is completely false. This
for Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. to resolve the same chairmanship issue raised in the Interpleader. Presiding Justice
testimony was labelled by Justice Dimaranan-Vidal as a lie, and she called Justice Roxas a liar, because she did not
Vasquez, Jr. was embarrassed and humiliated by Justices B.L. Reyes and Roxas lack of courtesy and respect for
ask to borrow the decision for her reading pleasure, but Justice Roxas personally brought it to her office for her to
his position as head of the Court.
sign as a member of the Special Ninth Division. After poring over it the whole night, she signed it, as well as three
(3) additional signature pages which were to be attached to three (3) other copies of the decision. 133
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
There is an old adage which says to gain respect one must learn to give it. If judges and justices are expected to treat litigants,
counsels and subordinates with respect and fairness, with more reason, that judges and justices should give their fellow
Indeed, the fabrications and falsehoods that Justice Roxas blithely proferred to the Panel in explanation/justification of his
magistrates the courtesy and professional regard due to them as their colleagues in the Judiciary. Thus, in Canon 5, Section 3 of
questioned handling of the Meralco case demonstrated that he lacks the qualification of integrity and honesty expected of a
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are expected to "carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
magistrate and a member of the appellate court.
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties."
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, dishonesty is considered a serious offense that may warrant the penalty of dismissal from
the service. Under the Rule IV, Section 52 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is
This Court cannot view lightly the discourteous manner that Justice Roxas, in his apparent haste to promulgate his decision in
likewise considered a grave offense and warrants the penalty of dismissal even for the first offense. In the past, the Court has had
the Meralco case, treated his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. It behooves the Court to remind all magistrates that their high
the occasion to rule that:
office demands compliance with the most exacting standards of propriety and decorum.

dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon
Justice Roxas questionable handling of the Meralco case demonstrates his undue interest therein.
the commission of the first offense. On numerous occasions, the Court did not hesitate to impose such extreme
punishment on employees found guilty of these offenses.
In the Report, the Panel of Investigators observed that Justice Roxas in fact began drafting his decision even prior to the
submission of the parties memoranda. As discussed in the Report:
Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the
government service. Dishonesty has no place in the judiciary.134 xxx xxx xxx

Justice Roxas showed a lack of courtesy and respect for his colleagues in the Court of Appeals. (d) Although the parties were given 15 days after the hearing on June 23, 2008, or up to July 8, 2008, to
simultaneously submit their memoranda and memoranda of authorities, and actually submitted:
The Panel of Investigators reported on this matter in this wise:
On July 7, 2008 - GSISs 39 page- memorandum
xxx xxx xxx
On July 9, 2008 - SECs 62 page-memorandum
(f) Justice Roxas was thoughtlessly disrespectful to a colleague and a lady at that, when he unceremoniously
discarded, shredded, and burned the decision that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal had signed, because he allegedly forgot On July 10, 2008 - MERALCOs 555 page- memorandum (by messenger) with memorandum of
that Justice Dimaranan-Vidal and Justice Sabio, Jr. had already been "reorganized out" of the Special Ninth Division authorities
as of July 4, 2008, hence, out of the Meralco case. Out of courtesy, he should have explained to Justice Dimaranan-
Vidal the reason why he was not promulgating the decision which she had signed.
Justice Roxas prepared the decision before the parties had filed their memoranda in the case and submitted it to
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature on July 8, 2008. His "rush to judgment" was indicative of "undue interest
The truth, it seems, is that Justice Roxas, who had consulted Justice Villarama, Jr. on which Division should decide and unseemly haste," according to J.Romero.
the Meralco case, may have been convinced that it should be the Special Ninth Division. That is why he brought his
decision to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal for her signature. However, somehow, somewhere, during the night, while
He cheated the parties counsel of the time, effort, and energy that they invested in the preparation of their ponderous
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal was patiently poring over his decision, Justice Roxas was persuaded to bring his decision to
memoranda which, as it turned out, neither he nor the other members of the Eighth Division bothered to read before
the Eighth Division (to which he and Justice B.L. Reyes belong after the July 4, 2008 reorganization of the Court), it
signing his decision. He made a mockery of his own order for the parties to submit memoranda, and rendered their
may have dawned on him that if the case remained in the Special Ninth Division, Justice Sabio, Jr. might dissent,
compliance a futile exercise.
requiring the Presiding Justice to constitute a special division of five. If he (Justice Roxas) should fail to obtain a
majority of the Division on his side, he would lose his ponencia; someone else would become the ponente (perhaps
Justice Sabio, Jr.). That may be the reason why he junked Justices Sabio, Jr. and Dimaranan-Vidal (even if the latter xxx xxx xxx
concurred with his decision) because he was unsure of Justice Sabio, Jr. He chose to cast his lot with his companions
in the Eighth Division -- Justices B. L. Reyes and Bruselas, Jr. -- with whom he and Meralco were "comfortable".
(underscoring supplied)
71
We agree with Mme. Justice Romeros observation that the "rush to judgment" (even before the filing of the parties
memoranda) was indicative of Justice Roxas undue interest and unseemly haste, especially when taken together with other
circumstances. This inexplicable haste in resolving the case on the merits is likewise apparent in Justice Roxas failure to resolve
the several pending incidents and instead jumping ahead to deciding the case on the merits; his "rushing" of Justice Dimaranan-
Vidal into signing his draft Decision on July 8, 2008 when the parties memoranda have not yet all been filed with the CA; his
precipitate transfer of the case to the Eighth Division for promulgation of decision, without notice to Justice Dimaranan-Vidal of
the Special Ninth Division who had already signed his draft Decision and despite the unresolved Chairmanship dispute between
Justice Reyes and Justice Sabio which he (Justice Roxas) even submitted to the Presiding Justice for appropriate action, just a
few days before the promulgation.
We reiterate here that as the visible representation of the law and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner
that would enhance respect and confidence of the people in the judicial system. The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must
also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. This standard applies
not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.135 This Court will not hesitate to sanction
with the highest penalty magistrates who exhibit manifest undue interest in their assigned cases. 136
In sum, this Court finds that Justice Roxas multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitute grave
misconduct, compounded by dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which warrant
his DISMISSAL from the service.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
In the Report, the Panel found that Justice Sabio likewise committed improprieties in relation to the Meralco case.
The circumstances of the telephone call of Chairman Sabio to his brother Justice Sabio showed that Justice Sabio failed to
uphold the standard of independence and propriety expected of him as a magistrate of the appellate court.
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in
response to a resquest for help from a member of the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman
Sabio called to relay to Justice Sabio the "rightness" of the GSIS cause and asked him "to help GSIS" and that Justice Sabio
allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13
of the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
"A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the Court."
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the brothers can justify their improper
conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos effort to influence his younger brothers action
in the Meralco case, because both believe that our Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the
purpose of one is to influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.137
For the Panel, Justice Sabio violated Sections 1, 4, and 5, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, which provide that -
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently x x x free from extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
xxx xxx xxx
72
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and
legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
In the Investigators mind, although Justice Sabio signed the TRO in favour of Meralco contrary to his brothers advice, Justice
Sabios "unusual interest in holding on to the Meralco case," seemed to indicate that he may have been actually influenced by his
brother "to help GSIS." In arriving at this conclusion, the Panel noted the following circumstances: (1) Justice Sabio adamantly
refused to yield the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division although the regular chairman, Justice Reyes had returned to
duty on June 10, 2008; and, (2) Justice Sabio officiously prepared and signed a resolution (a chore for the ponente Justice V.
Roxas to perform), requiring the GSIS and the SEC to comment on Meralcos "Motion for Justice B. Reyes to Assume the
Chairmanship of the 9th Division," which he probably intended to delay the decision on the preliminary injunction beyond the
life of the TRO to the prejudice of Meralco and the advantage of the GSIS.
Based on the facts on record, the Court is wary of declaring that Justice Sabio had been influenced by his brother by speculating
that he would have favored GSIS had he been a part of the division which rendered the decision in the Meralco case. However,
we do find that it was improper for Justice Sabio to hold on to the chairmanship of the Ninth Division the despite the return of
Justice Reyes, when Justice Sabios designation as acting chairman was clearly only for the duration of Justice Reyes leave of
absence. We likewise note with disfavor his stubborn insistence on his own interpretation of the IRCA and hostile, dismissive
attitude towards equally well-reasoned positions of his colleagues on the proper interpretation of their rules. Such conduct on the
part of Justice Sabio did nothing to aid in the swift and amicable resolution of his dispute with Justice Reyes but rather fanned
the flames of resentment between them. We deem this sort of behavior unbecoming for a magistrate of his stature.
Justice Sabios conversations with Mr. De Borja were improper and indiscreet.
On this matter, the Court accepts the following findings in the Report:
Knowing the nature of De Borjas profession, Justice Sabio, Jr. should have been wary of the former. He should have
foreseen that De Borja had the Meralco case on his mind when he called Justice Sabio, Jr. True enough, De Borja
mentioned the Meralco case and congratulated Justice Sabio, Jr. for having signed the TRO in favour of Meralco.
But that was not the last time Justice Sabio, Jr. would hear from De Borja. A month later, after Justice Sabio, Jr. had
presided at the hearing of Meralcos prayer for preliminary injunction on June 23, 2008, and the case was ripening for
decision or resolution, De Borja again called up Justice Sabio, Jr. and asked to meet him over dinner to "chit chat"
about the Meralco case.
Instead of telling off De Borja that he could not, and would not, talk about the Meralco case, Justice Sabio, Jr. agreed
to meet De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School after his evening class in Legal Ethics in said school.
Justice Sabio Jr.s action of discussing the Meralco case with De Borja was highly inappropriate and
indiscreet. First, in talks with his brother; the second time in conversation with De Borja, Justice Sabio, Jr. broke the
shield of confidentiality that covers the disposition of cases in the Court in order to preserve and protect the integrity
and independence of the Court itself. He ignored the injunction in Canon 1, Section 8 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary that: "Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct
(and discretion) in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial independence."
It was during that meeting with De Borja in the lobby-lounge of the Ateneo Law School, that De Borja allegedly
offered him P10 million, in behalf of Meralco, to step out of the case and allow Justice Bienvenido Reyes to assume
 the chairmanship of the Special Ninth Division because Meralco was "not comfortable" with him (Justice Sabio, Jr.).
He rejected the bribe offer because he "could not in conscience accept it."
Justice Sabio, Jr. was allegedly shocked and insulted that De Borja would think that he (Justice Sabio, Jr.) could be
bribed or bought. The Panel is, however, honestly perplexed why in spite of his outraged respectability, Justice Sabio,
Jr. called up De Borja two (2) days later (on July 3, 2008), to tell De Borja to stop "pestering" him with his calls. The
Panel is nonplussed because, normally, a person who has been insulted would never want to see, much less speak
again, to the person who had disrespected him. He could have just shut off his cell phone to De Borjas calls. De
Borja denied that he reiterated his offer of P10 million to Justice Sabio, Jr. He denied saying that even if the case
should go up to the Supreme Court, GSIS would still lose, hence, "saying lang yung P10 million; baka sisihin ka pa
ng mga anak mo." He testified that his reply to Justice Sabio, Jr.s call was "deadma" or indifference. Justice Sabio,
Jr. blamed that call of his to a "lapse in judgment" on his part.
Be that as it may, the Investigating Panel finds more credible Justice Sabio, Jr.s story about De Borjas P10 million-
bribe-offer on behalf of Meralco, than De Borjas denial that he made such an offer. Why does the Panel believe him,
and not De Borja?
First, because Justice Sabio, Jr. verbally reported the rejected bribe offer to CA Presiding Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. the next day - a fact admitted by Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.
Second, even though Justice Sabio, Jr. did not mention the bribe-offerors name in both his verbal and written reports
to Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr., De Borja identified himself to the media as the person alluded to.
Third, De Borjas allegation, that Justice Sabio, Jr. wanted P50 million, not P10 million, is not believable, for, if
Justice Sabio, Jr. quoted P50 million as his price, he would not have reported the P10 million bribe offer to Presiding
Justice Vasquez, Jr. He would have waited for Meralcos reply to his counter-offer.138
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the Court agrees with the Panel that the allegation of solicitation on the part of Justice Sabio is not credible.
Nevertheless, the continued communications between Justice Sabio and Mr. De Borja even after the latters rejected bribery
attempt is highly inappropriate and shows poor judgment on the part of Justice Sabio who should have acted in preservation of
the dignity of his judicial office and the institution to which he belongs.
Premises considered, this Court is of the view that Justice Sabios indiscreet and imprudent conversations regarding the Meralco
case with his brother and Mr. De Borja and his actuations in the chairmanship dispute with Justice Reyes constitute simple
misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of the Court of Appeals which warrant the penalty of two (2) months
suspension without pay.
Findings regarding the conduct of Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes.
As previously discussed, Justice Reyes appealed to Presiding Justice Vazquez in a letter dated July 22, 2008, reiterating his
(Justice Reyes) request that the Presiding Justice render an opinion which Division of the Court of Appeals - the Eighth
Division with him as chairman, or the Special Ninth Division chaired by Justice Sabio should resolve the Meralco case. This was
in conjunction with an Interpleader filed by Justice Roxas on the same issue with the Presiding Justice. Yet, despite the fact that
the Presiding Justice informed Justices Reyes and Roxas that he would study the matter, Justices Reyes and Justice Roxas,
together with Justice Bruselas, promulgated the decision in the Meralco case on July 23, 2008. Justice Reyes and Justice Roxas
did not withdraw their request for a ruling nor did either of them advise the Presiding Justice beforehand of their intention to
proceed with the resolution of the Meralco case. Thus, when the Presiding Justice issued his ruling on the chairmanship dispute
on July 24, 2008, he was unaware of the promulgation of the Meralco decision on July 23, 2008, under the aegis of Justice
Reyes Eighth Division. As found by the Panel, "Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. was completely taken aback when he learned
73
about it on July 24, 2008, the same day that he issued his opinion on the chairmanship issue which by then had become functus
oficio. He felt belittled and humiliated by the discourtesy of the two justices to him."
It bears repeating here that under Canon 5, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are mandated to show the
appropriate consideration and respect for their colleagues in the Judiciary.
Thus, we adopt the finding of the Panel on this point and find Justice Reyes guilty of simple misconduct, which is mitigated by
the fact that he repeatedly asked Presiding Justice Vasquez to act on his request to rule on the conflicting interpretation of the
IRCA. However, Justice Reyes should be reprimanded for taking part in the decision of the subject case without awaiting the
ruling of the Presiding Justice.
Findings regarding the conduct of Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal
The Court finds well-taken and adopts the findings of the Panel of Investigators, to wit:
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal deviated from the IRCA when she allowed herself to be rushed by Justice Roxas to sign the
Meralco decision on July 8, 2008, without reading the parties memoranda and without the deliberation among
members of the Division required by the IRCA. She knew that the TRO would not expire until July 30, 2008 - some
three (3) weeks away from July 8, 2008 - yet she allowed herself to believe Justice Roxas misrepresentation that
signing the decision was urgent. Her compliance with certain dissembling practices of other justices of the Court, in
violation of the IRCA, showed weakness and lack of independence on her part.139
The following sections of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct are instructive in this regard:
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in
accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure,
threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect of decisions
which the judge is obliged to make independently.
Allowing a fellow justice to induce her to deviate from established procedure constitutes conduct unbecoming a justice for which
Justice Dimaranan-Vidal should be ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of her judicial duties.
Findings regarding the conduct of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez
It is the view of the Panel of Investigators that Presiding Justice Vasquez failed to provide the leadership expected of him as
head of the Court of Appeals. The following quote from the Report summarizes the perceived lapses on the part of the Presiding
Justice:
Clearly, Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr. had been indecisive in dealing with the turmoil arising from the Meralco case.
He vacillated and temporized on resolving the impasse between Justice Sabio, Jr. and Justice B. L. Reyes over the
chairmanship of the Division that should hear and decide the Meralco case. He failed to take action on the reported
bribe-offer by Meralco to J. Sabio, Jr. He hesitated to assert his leadership of the Court even when the parties
repeatedly urged him to lay down the rule for them to follow. Was he hampered by the fact that he has relatives - two
daughters - employed in the GSIS, and a sister who is a consultant thereof? He pleaded lack of authority. Was he not
aware then, or did he discover too late, that under Section 11, Rule VIII of the IRCA, he is in fact authorized to act
"on any matter"involving the Court and its members? That Rule provides:
 Sec. 11. x xx the Presiding Justice or any one acting in his place is authorized to act on any matter
not covered by these Rules. Such action shall, however, be reported to the Court en banc.
He should have convened the Court en banc as soon asthe alleged bribery attempt on Justice Sabio, Jr. was reported
to him, for it was an attempt to corrupt a member of the Court, calling for the "protection and preservation of the
integrity of the judicial processes" of the Court, hence, an administrative matter cognizable by the Court en banc.
Section 5 (c), Rule I of the IRCA, provides:
Sec. 5. Matters cognizable by the Court en banc.- The Court en banc
shall, inter alia:
(a) x x x
(b) Adopt uniform administrative measures, procedures, and policies for the protection and
preservation of the integrity of the judicial processes, x x x.
Presiding Justice Vasquez admitted his "lapses in judgment."140
In the light of the foregoing observations of the Panel, this Court is of the view that much of the trouble now being faced by the
Court of Appeals could have been averted by timely, judicious and decisive action on the part of the Presiding Justice. Certainly,
this unpleasant and trying episode in failure to act in the early part of his tenure as Presiding Justice has indelibly impressed
upon him what is required of him as leader of the second highest court in the land. Nevertheless, Presiding Justice Vasquez is
hereby severely reprimanded for his failure to act promptly and decisively on the controversy as required of him by the IRCA.
Findings regarding other personalities involved in the Meralco case
Although the Presiding Justice in his letter dated August 1, 2008 only referred to this Court "the propriety of the actions of the
Justices concerned" in the Meralco case, we cannot simply turn a blind eye to the facts brought to light during the investigation
that relate to potential liabilities of other personalities in the Meralco case.
With respect to Chairman Sabio, this Court has the power to discipline members of the Bar and his attempt to influence a
member of the Judiciary, his brother at that, should be referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action.
With respect to Mr. De Borja, the present investigation has given this Court reason to believe that Mr. De Borja may be
criminally liable for his attempt to bribe a magistrate of the Court of Appeals. This matter should be referred to the Department
of Justice for appropriate action.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam decision was reached after deliberation of the Court en
banc. At the outset, the offer of three (3) members of the Court to recuse themselves was denied by the Court. Except for two
members of the Court who were allowed to inhibit themselves from the case, the Justices voted as follows: Twelve Justices
voted for the dismissal from service of Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas and one (1) voted for his suspension from the service
for six (6) months. Ten (10) Justices voted for two (2) month suspension from service without pay of Associate Justice Jose L.
Sabio, one (1) voted for six-month suspension, one (1) for reprimand only as he should be credited for being a "whistle blower"
and one (1) for his dismissal from the service. Eight (8) Justices voted to reprimand Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and
five (5) for his suspension from the service for one (1) month. As to the rest, the voting was unanimous.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES as follows:
74
(1) Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas is found guilty of multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
is DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits if any, with
prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government including government-owned and
controlled corporations;
(2) Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. is found guilty of simple misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a justice of
the Court of Appeals and is SUSPENDED for two (2) months without pay, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(3) Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. is SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for his failure to act promptly and
decisively in order to avert the incidents that damaged the image of the Court of Appeals, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe penalty;
(4) Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes is found guilty of simple misconduct with mitigating circumstance and is
REPRIMANDED, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will warrant a more severe
penalty;
(5) Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a Justice of the Court of
Appeals and is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial duties.
(6) PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabios act to influence the judgment of a member of the Judiciary in a pending case
is hereby referred to the Bar Confidant for appropriate action;
(7) Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr.s charge against Mr. Francis R. De Borja for attempted bribery of a member of the
Judiciary is hereby referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC February 24, 2009
IN RE: UNDATED LETTER OF MR. LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, PETITIONER IN BIRAOGO V. NOGRALES AND
LIMKAICHONG, G.R. No. 179120.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is the Report of the Investigating Committee created under the Resolution dated December 10, 2008, to
investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the consolidated cases of
Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, to determine who are responsible for the leakage of a
confidential internal document of the En Banc.
The investigating committee, composed of Mr. Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing as Chairperson and Mme. Justice Conchita
Carpio Morales and Mr. Justice Renato C. Corona as Members, submitted the following report:
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE CREATED UNDER THE
EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008
 MEMORANDUM FOR:
HON. REYNATO S. PUNO, Chief Justice
HON. CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Associate Justice
HON. MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Associate Justice
HON. DANTE O. TINGA, Associate Justice
HON. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, Associate Justice
HON. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR., Associate Justice
HON. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA, Associate Justice
HON. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, Associate Justice
HON. ARTURO D. BRION, Associate Justice
HON. DIOSDADO M. PERALTA, Associate Justice
RE: Report on the Investigation of the Unauthorized Release of the Unpromulgated Ponencia of Justice Ruben T. Reyes
in the Consolidated Cases of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Villando v. COMELEC, Biraogo v. Nograles and
Limkaichong, and Paras v. Nograles, Docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, Respectively, to
Determine Who are Responsible for the Leakage of a Confidential Internal Document of the En Banc
Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court the
following report on the results of the investigation of the committee created under the En Banc Resolution dated December 10,
2008.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
During its session on July 15, 2008, the Court En Banc continued its deliberations on the draft of Justice Ruben T. Reyes in the
consolidated cases of Limkaichong v. Comelec, Villando v. Comelec, Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, and Paras v.
Nograles, docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179240-41, 179120 and 179132-33, respectively, (Limkaichong case) which was
used by this Court as a working basis for its deliberations. Since no one raised any further objections to the draft, the En Banc
approved it. It having been already printed on Gilbert paper, albeit a number of Justices manifested that they were concurring "in
the result," Justice Reyes immediately circulated the ponencia during the same session.
After the session and during lunch, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno noted that seven of the 13 Justices (excluding Justice Reyes)
concurred "in the result" with the ponencia of Justice Reyes (hereafter Gilbert copy or Justice Reyess ponencia or ponencia or
unpromulgated ponencia). Justices Minita Chico-Nazario and Teresita Leonardo-De Castro then informed the Chief Justice that
they too wanted to concur only "in the result." Since nine Justices, not counting the Chief Justice, would concur only "in the
result," the Justices unanimously decided to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy. It was noted that if a majority
concurred only "in the result," the ponencia would have no doctrinal value. More importantly, any decision ousting a sitting
member of the House of Representatives should spell out clearly the legal basis relied upon by the majority for such extreme
75
measure. Justice Antonio T. Carpio then volunteered to write his Reflections on Justice Reyess ponencia for discussion in the
following weeks En Banc session.
During its session on July 22, 2008, the En Banc deliberated on Justice Carpios Reflections which had in the meantime been
circulated to the members of the Court. As a result, the En Banc unanimously decided to push through and set the date for
holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong case on August 26, 2008.
On the request of Justice Reyes, however, the Limkaichong case was included in the agenda of July 29, 2008 where it was listed
as Item No. 66. The decision to hold oral arguments remained, however.
On December 9, 2008, Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No. 179120, held a press
conference at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant in Maria Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila, and circulated to the media an undated letter
signed by him, together with what appeared to be a xerox copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. In his letter, Biraogo insinuated
that the Court, at the instance of the Chief Justice and with the implied consent of the other Justices, unlawfully and with
improper motives withheld the promulgation of the ponencia.
Noting that the unauthorized release of a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia infringed on the confidential internal deliberations
of the Court and constituted contempt of court, the Court, in a Resolution dated December 10, 2008, directed
1. The creation of an Investigating Committee, chaired by Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, with
Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Third Division and Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
Working Chairperson, First Division, as Members to investigate the unauthorized release of the unpromulgated
ponencia of Justice Reyes to determine who are responsible for this leakage of a confidential internal document of the
En Banc, and to recommend to the En Banc the appropriate actions thereon;
2. Mr. Louis C. Biraogo to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, why he should not
be punished for contempt for writing the undated letter and circulating the same together with the unpromulgated
ponencia of Justice Reyes.
As directed, the committee, composed of the aforementioned three senior Justices, conducted initial hearings on December 15
and 16, 2008.
In the meantime, in compliance with the Courts above-quoted Resolution dated December 10, 2008, Biraogo submitted to the
Court his Compliance dated December 22, 2008 to which he attached the following annexes: (1) an undated photocopy of a 3-
page printed letter addressed to "Dear Mr. Biraogo" which purportedly was sent by a "Concerned Employee" as Annex "A"; (2)
a June 12, 2008 note handwritten on a memo pad of Justice Reyes reading:
Re: G.R. Nos. 178831-32, etc. [the comma and "etc." are
handwritten]
Dear Colleagues,
I am circulating a revised draft of the ponencia.
(Sgd.)
RUBEN T. REYES,
together with a copy of Justice Reyess Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda as Annex "B"; (3) a photocopy of
the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices as Annex "C"; and (4) a photocopy of Justice
Carpios Reflections as Annex "D".
Justice Ynares-Santiago later inhibited herself upon motion of Justice Ruben T. Reyes while Justice Carpio voluntarily inhibited
himself. They were respectively replaced by Justice Renato C. Corona and Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, by authority of the
Chief Justice based on seniority. Additional hearings were then held by the reconstituted committee on January 14, 16, 19, 20, 21
and 22, 2009.
The following witnesses/resource persons were heard:
1. Armando A. Del Rosario, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
2. Rodrigo E. Manabat, Jr., PET Judicial Staff Officer II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
3. Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
4. Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
5. Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
6. Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
7. ACA Jose Midas P. Marquez, Chief, Public Information Office
8. Ramon B. Gatdula, Executive Assistant II, Office of the Chief Justice
9. Atty. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, Clerk of Court En Banc
10. Major Eduardo V. Escala, Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Security Division, Office of Administrative Services
11. Atty. Felipa B. Anama, Assistant Clerk of Court
12. Willie Desamero, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court
13. Glorivy Nysa Tolentino, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
14. Onofre C. Cuento, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court
15. Chester George P. Del Castillo, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
16. Conrado B. Bayanin, Jr., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes
17. Fermin L. Segotier, Judicial Staff Assistant II, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
18. Retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes
SUMMARIES OF TESTIMONIES
Below are the summaries of their testimonies:
76
1. ARMANDO A. DEL ROSARIO, Court Stenographer III, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as follows:
He was in charge of circulating ponencias for the signatures of the Justices and of forwarding signed (by all the Associate
Justices who are not on leave) ponencias to the Office of the Chief Justice (OCJ).
On July 15, 2008, after the En Banc session, he received from Justice Reyes the original of the unpromulgated ponencia (Gilbert
copy). Because he was busy at that time, he instructed his co-employee Rodrigo Manabat, Jr. to bring the Gilbert copy to the
Office of Justice Nachura for signature and to wait for it. He instructed Manabat to rush to Justice Nachuras office because the
latter was going out for lunch. After more than 30 minutes, Manabat returned with the Gilbert copy already signed by Justice
Nachura, who was the last to sign.1 Del Rosario then transmitted the Gilbert copy together with the rollo, temporary rollos, and
diskettes to the OCJ pursuant to standard operating procedures for the promulgation of decisions. The documents were received
by Ramon Gatdula on the same day at around 3:00 p.m.
The following day, on July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes instructed him to retrieve the Gilbert copy and the
accompanying documents and diskettes as he was told that the promulgation of the ponencia had been placed on hold. He
brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. He then placed the Gilbert copy in a sealed envelope and
placed it inside his unlocked drawer and wrote a note in his logbook when he retrieved the Gilbert copy that its promulgation
was on hold and would be called again on July 29, 2008.2
The Gilbert copy was in his sole custody from July 16, 2008 until December 15, 2008 (when the investigating committee held its
first hearing). 3 He never opened the envelope from the day he sealed it on July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008, when Justice
Reyes told everybody in their office that the Gilbert copy had been photocopied and leaked. He did not have any news of any
leakage before then. And he also did not photocopy the Gilbert copy. The seal placed on the envelope was still intact when he
opened it on December 10, 2008. 4 Although the lawyers in their office knew that he kept original copies of drafts in his unlocked
drawer, he believed that nobody in his office was interested in photocopying the Gilbert copy. He was solely responsible for
keeping the Gilbert copy. He did not know any of the parties to the case and none of them ever called him. And he did not know
what Gatdula did after receiving the Gilbert copy. 5
The Limkaichong case was called again on July 29, 2008 as Item No. 66. The Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc
agenda for the said date on July 25, 2008. Upon receipt of the said En Banc agenda and the new item number, their office
prepared a new cover page and attached it to the Gilbert copy. The original cover page of the Gilbert copy for the agenda of July
15, 2008 showing the case as item number 52 was thrown away.6
On being recalled on January 20, 2009, Del Rosario further testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008 when the Justices were about to leave the En Banc session room after the adjournment of the session, he
entered the room just like the rest of the aides.7 He carried the folders of Justice Reyes, returned them to the office, and went
back to, and waited for Justice Reyes until Justice Reyes finished lunch at the En Banc dining room. 8 The Gilbert copy was left
with Justice Reyes. 9 Before 1:00 p.m., after the Justices had taken lunch,10 Justice Reyes, who was then carrying an orange
envelope, handed to him the Gilbert copy and instructed him to speed up the ponencias signing by Justice Nachura (who was
not taking part in the oral arguments of a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day) since the latter might be leaving.11 He heard
Justice Reyes say "Ihabol mo ito Ihabol na ipapirma kay Justice Nachura" in the presence of Judicial Staff Head, Atty.
Rosendo Evangelista, as the three of them were going down the stairs to their office from the session room.12
He was not the one who brought the ponencia to the Office of Justice Nachura because he gave the task to Manabat to whom he
relayed the instruction. 13 There were already signatures on page 36 of the ponencia when he gave it to Manabat and only the
signature of Justice Nachura was missing.14 He pointed this to Manabat saying, "ito na lang ang walang pirma, dalhin mo doon."
Manabat obliged him. 15
After a few minutes, Manabat returned to their office bearing the Gilbert copy. He went to Atty. Evangelista, showing him that
the ponencia had already been signed by Justice Nachura. Atty. Evangelista then instructed him to have the ponencia
promulgated by delivering the same to the OCJ. He (Del Rosario) complied, personally handing the Gilbert copy with the rollo,
records and diskettes to Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ at 3:30 p.m., also of July 15, 2008. 16The ponencia stayed at the OCJ until the
afternoon of the following day, July 16, 2008. 17
He was not told that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold until the afternoon of July 16, 2008, when Justice Reyes
called him to his chambers and instructed him to retrieve the ponencia. He also stated that someone from the OCJ called their
office and requested them to retrieve the ponencia because its promulgation was on hold. 18 At 4:00 p.m. that day, he retrieved the
ponencia etc. from the OCJ19 and gave the ponencia to Justice Reyes.20
He merely showed the ponencia to Justice Reyes who ordered him to keep it ("tabi mo muna yan"). 21 He then placed a note
"Hold, reset July 29" in his logbook after being informed by Atty. Evangelista of such date of resetting.22 He reiterated that he
placed the Gilbert copy in a brown envelope, sealed it with the officially issued blue and white seal provided by the Printing
Office, and placed the envelope inside his unlocked drawer. The envelope was still sealed when he checked it on December 10,
2008.23 He admitted that from the time he kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer until the Special En Banc meeting on December
10, 2008, he and no one else was in possession of the Gilbert copy. But he denied that he ever opened the envelope or photocopy
the Gilbert copy. In fact, he did not mind it. 24 And nobody inquired about it since July 16, 2008 until December 10, 2008. 25 He
likewise denied that he knew Congressman Paras or Biraogo or that the two ever called his office. 26
When asked if he could produce the envelope into which he placed the Gilbert copy, he replied that Justice Reyes had taken
it.27 He also informed that what was placed on the face of the brown envelope was a computer print-out containing the title of the
case, the names of the ponente and the other Justices, and the manner they voted. 28
When he was asked by Justice Carpio Morales whether it was possible for him to recognize any tampering if, for instance, the
envelope and the seal were replaced with a similar envelope and blue and white seal with a similar print-out information on the
face of the envelope, he answered in the negative. 29 (At that point, Justice Carpio Morales remarked that Del Rosario, therefore,
could not have been certain when he said that the envelope remained sealed from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.) 30
Nobody else knew where he put the Gilbert copyin the same place as the other drafts. It was possible for someone to take the
Gilbert copy from his drawer and photocopy it on a weekend or after office hours. 31 Nobody told him to guard the Gilbert copy.32
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine. 33 He drew a sketch of the layout of the desks inside the office
of Justice Reyes, illustrating that his location was two desks away from the table of April Candelaria, a secretary in the office,
and that the xerox machine was situated at the back of the long table of the receiving clerks. 34
He stayed in the office as long as Justice Reyes was still there but he could not say for sure that nobody photocopied the Gilbert
copy after office hours as he also went out of the office to smoke in the nearby garden area or repair to the toilet. 35
He never reported to office on Saturdays and there was one time Justice Reyes went to office on a Saturday as he was also asked
to report but he refused. 36 Justice Reyes sometimes dropped by the office on Sundays after attending services at the United
Methodist Church along Kalaw Street, as told to him by the driver. 37
He also circulated copies of the Revised Draft of the decision to the other Justices but he never received a copy of Justice
Carpios Reflections.38 He did not offer an explanation why the Gilbert copy, which was in his possession, and the Revised
Draft, were leaked. 39 No information was supplied by his officemates, friends or relatives to help explain the leakage. 40 Among
his relatives working in the Court are his mother-in-law, Jasmin P. Mateo of the OCJ, sister of former Court Administrator
Ernani Pano, and Mrs. Mateos sibling, who works at the Hall of Justice Committee. 41
He and the driver of Justice Reyes were given keys to the main door of the Office of Justice Reyes but he could not say that only
the two of them held keys to the main door. 42 April Candelaria and Atty. Ferdinand Juan asked for and got duplicates of the key,
but could not remember exactly when. Atty. Juan got a duplicate of the key because the lawyers sometimes went out for dinner
and needed to go back to the office to retrieve their personal belongings.43
77
April Candelarias secretarial functions included recording of the social activities of Justice Reyes and delivering door-to-door
papers to his chambers.44 Candelaria and the driver were in the staff of Justice Reyes since the latters stint at the Court of
Appeals, while Atty. Juan was employed ahead of him. 45
Everybody in the office knew how to operate the xerox machine because all of them photocopied personal documents and were
too ashamed to ask other officemates to do it for them. 46
When news of the leakage came out, Justice Reyes called all his legal staff and him to a meeting. In a tone that was both angry
and sad, Justice Reyes asked them if they knew anything about the leakage. 47 A meeting among Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista,
Manabat and him took place on December 15, 2008, before the initial hearing by the investigating committee. 48 Justice Reyes
also talked to him one-on-one and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and other
documents when they were sent to the OCJ. He replied that there was none and that he just kept the Gilbert copy in his drawer
and had in fact forgotten all about it until Justice Reyes inquired about it in December. 49 He was not able to read Jarius Bondocs
column about the leakage of the Gilbert copy (which came out in the Inquirer in October 2008 about the Gilbert copy) nor had
Justice Reyes confronted him about said column before December 2008. 50
During the initial hearing in December 15, 2008, nobody talked to him or knew that he was testifying as he was even surprised
that he was called to testify. 51 When confronted with the testimony of his officemate, Chester Del Castillo, who testified that
Justice Reyes called only one meeting, he opined that Del Castillo might not have known about the meeting with the lawyers
since Del Castillo was frequently absent. 52
2. RODRIGO E. MANABAT, JR., PET Judicial Staff Employee II, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as
follows:
He was the personal aide of Justice Reyes. On July 15, 2008, he brought the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura for
signature upon the instruction of Del Rosario and Atty. Evangelista. 53 He gave the Gilbert copy to the receptionist and waited
outside the said office. After ten minutes, the document was returned to him. 54 He then immediately gave it to Del Rosario. It
took him not more than 15 minutes to return the document to Del Rosario. 55He averred that he did not photocopy the Gilbert
copy nor did he notice if anybody from the Office of Justice Nachura photocopied it. 56 He also did not know if Del Rosario
placed the document in a sealed envelope or photocopied it. 57 After returning the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario, he went back
to Justice Reyes who asked him if Justice Nachura had already signed the ponencia. He answered yes and told Justice Reyes that
the ponencia was already with Del Rosario. 58
3. ATTY. ROSENDO B. EVANGELISTA, Judicial Staff Head, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified that as
follows:
Around 1:00 p.m. on July 15, 2008, Justice Reyes instructed him to have signature page 36 of the ponencia reprinted and
circulated for signing allegedly because Justice Minita Chico-Nazario wanted to change her qualified concurrence thereon"in
the result"to an unqualified concurrence. He thus instructed Jean Yabut, the stenographer in charge of finalizing drafts, to
reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy. Then he ordered the reprinted page circulated for signatures together with the other pages of
the ponencia. He assumed that the original page 36 was discarded as it was no longer in their files. He likewise assumed that the
signatures were completed on the reprinted page 36 as the Gilbert copy was forwarded around 3:00 p.m. to the OCJ per standard
operating procedure.59 He was not informed then by Justice Reyes or anybody that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy had been
put on hold per agreement of the Justices.60 He came to know that it was on hold only on July 17, 2008, when Del Rosario
informed him upon his arrival at the office. Because the information was unusual and because it was his duty to make sure that
signed decisions were promulgated, he asked Justice Reyes. Justice Reyes then confirmed that the promulgation of the ponencia
was on hold.61 After that, he just assumed that the Gilbert copy was in their office with Del Rosario who was assigned to keep
such documents. However, he did not know exactly where in his work area Del Rosario kept it.62 He did not make a photocopy
of the Gilbert copy nor did he order Del Rosario and Manabat to make photocopies. Neither did he know how the Gilbert copy
was photocopied. He only came to know about the leakage last December 10, 2008. 63
When, on January 22, 2009, he was recalled by the committee, he further testified as follows:
He occupied the last cubicle in the lawyers room and the xerox machine was located outside the lawyers room. 64 It was upon Only a few persons were authorized to operate the xerox machine in their office, namely, Conrado Bayanin, Jr., Armando Del
the instruction of Justice Reyes that their office reprint page 36 of the Gilbert copy and circulate it for signature. The instruction Rosario, Chester Del Castillo, a certain Leonard and a certain Ramon.91 He could not recall who among the five had been
to circulate the reprinted page, which was circulated together with the other pages of the Gilbert copy, was given by him to either directed to photocopy the July 15, 2008 draft. 92 He ventured a guess that the top page of the Gilbert copy might have been
Manabat or Del Rosario. 65 He saw the original page 36 where Justice Chico-Nazario (supposedly) wrote the phrase "in the reprinted but could not impute any motive to any person. 93 Even if he was the staff head, he was not privy to the preparation of
result" on top of her signature. 66 Aside from him, Court Attorney VI Czar Calabazaron, who principally researched on the case, the first page nor of the top cover bearing the date "July 29, 2008" copy. 94
also saw the qualification in Justice Chico-Nazarios signature while the Gilbert copy lay on top of Justice Reyess coffee table
inside his chambers. He recalled that at about 12:30 p.m. or before 1:00 p.m. right after the En Banc session on July 15, 2008,
Finally, he manifested that from the time the Gilbert copy was signed by 14 Justices until December 15, 2008, he did not acquire
Justice Reyes called the him and Atty. Calabazaron to his chambers.67 In that meeting, Justice Reyes phoned Justice Chico-
exclusive control or possession of the Gilbert copy because Del Rosario was the custodian thereof.95He reiterated that he did not
Nazario after noticing that Justice Chico-Nazarios signature bore the notation "in the result."68 He, however, did not hear what
know where, exactly, Del Rosario kept the documents. He admitted that he was remiss in his duties as staff head for not
they talked about since the less-than-five-minute phone conversation was inaudible, even though he was just approximately one
knowing.96 It was their practice not to lock drawers.97 He was aware that Justice Reyes eventually prepared another draft of a
meter away.69 Justice Reyes thereafter instructed him to reprint the second signature page (page 36). He assumed from the
ponencia changing his position in the Limkaichong case because he helped in the research in November 2008. 98 He never
context of the instruction that it was due to the change in Justice Chico-Nazarios concurrence, without asking Justice Reyes the
consulted the Gilbert copy because he had a softcopy thereof in his computer. 99 He did not ask why Justice Reyes was departing
reason therefor. 70 He then directed the stenographer to, as she did, reprint the second signature page, page 36, which was brought
from his original position.100 He denied that he knew Biraogo, Limkaichong, Jerome Paras, Olive Paras or any party to the
in to Justice Reyes in his chambers.71
case.101

He attended the oral arguments on a case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. on that day (July 15, 2008) and arrived at the session hall before
He winded up his testimony by manifesting that the investigation was an experience that he hoped would not happen again and
that time.72 As far as he could recall, he went down to the Office of Justice Reyes about 3:00 p.m. to retrieve a material needed
that he would not have to undergo again.102
for the oral arguments. He denied having testified that he went down purposely to check if the ponencia had been circulated and
the second signature page signed anew and to make sure that the ponencia had already been transmitted to the OCJ. 73 When
confronted with the transcript of stenographic notes, he maintained that it was part of his duties to see to it that every ponencia of 4. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO testified as follows:
Justice Reyes was promulgated. 74 He was sure that he went down to their office at around 3:30 p.m., although he could not recall
his purpose for doing so. It was probably to get some materials related to the oral arguments, and that it just so happened that Del
She signed the Gilbert copy only once, in the En Banc conference room before going to the En Banc dining hall.103Justice Reyes
Rosario saw him and informed him that the Gilbert copy had already been transmitted to the OCJ. 75
was beside her, looking on, when she affixed her signature. Immediately after signing, she returned the Gilbert copy to Justice
Reyes who circulated it for the signatures of the other Justices. She remembered that Justice Reyes was holding the document
When asked as to the whereabouts of the original signature page 36, he surmised that it must have been shredded since it was not even when the Justices were already at the dining hall. She did not photocopy the ponencia nor was there any opportunity for her
made part of the official documents submitted to the OCJ. 76 While he searched for it in his cubicle, it could no longer be to do so as there was only one Gilbert copy and the only time she held it was when she affixed her signature. She added that her
located.77 He did not inquire from Justice Reyes or from Del Rosario who also had access to that page, because he assumed that concurrence to the ponencia was without qualification but when it was noted during lunch that most of the Justices had simply
it could not be located since what was submitted to the OCJ was the one where Justice Chico-Nazarios concurrence was no concurred "in the result," she and Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro signified their intention to qualify their concurrence and
longer qualified by the phrase "in the result."78 As he was attending the oral arguments, he had no opportunity to see the concur likewise only "in the result."104 However, she was no longer able to indicate the change on the document as she and the
reprinted signature page 36 with the affixed signatures prior to the transmittal to the OCJ. 79 other Justices had decided to put on hold the promulgation of the decision until after holding oral arguments on the Limkaichong
case. No reprinted signature page was ever sent to her office for her signature and she did not affix her signature on any other
copy of the ponencia. She was not the last to sign the ponencia. 105
He came to know that the Gilbert copy was retrieved on July 16, 2008. 80 It was Del Rosario who informed him on July 17, 2008
that the promulgation of the ponencia was on hold and was returned to their office. 81 Justice Reyes did not advise them earlier
that the promulgation was on hold.82 After learning about it, he inquired from Justice Reyes who confirmed that the 5. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO testified as follows:
promulgation was indeed on hold. He never asked for the reason even though that was their first "on hold" incident because he
thought that the case would be called again at another session. 83 He read the newspaper reports about the unpromulgated
She signed the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session and Justice Reyes was right beside her when she signed the
ponencia but did not validate them with Justice Reyes.84
ponencia.106 No reprinted signature page 36 was ever sent to her office for signature and she did not affix her signature on any
other copy of the ponencia. She did not photocopy the ponencia and there could have been no opportunity to do so right after she
He assumed that Del Rosario, being the custodian, kept the Gilbert copy in their office.85 Their office reprinted the second signed it.107
signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy.86 When shown page 36 of the Gilbert copy by the committee, he assumed that it was the
reprinted page since Justice Chico-Nazarios signature no longer contained any qualification. 87 He stated that it was the practice
6. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA testified as follows:
of their office to photocopy drafts signed by Justice Reyes and to furnish the other Justices with advance copies for their review
before the session. Only such drafts were photocopied. Ponencias, which had already been signed by the other Justices and
printed on Gilbert paper, were never photocopied. Del Rosario only logged them in his logbook and prepared soft copies for He believed that he signed the ponencia in the En Banc conference room just before he went to the En Banc dining hall for
submission to the Division Chair or the Chief Justice.88 He assured the committee that this practice was 100% complied with lunch. He believed he was never sent a reprinted signature page. He either returned the ponencia to Justice Reyes right after
despite the fact that he was not one of those assigned to photocopy, but later yielded to given situations by Justice Carpio signing it or passed it on to the other Justices for them to sign. He could not recall if he was the last to sign the ponencia. Asked
Morales.89 whether he leaked the decision, Justice Nachura replied that he did not. Nor did he order any of his staff to photocopy it. In fact,
there was no opportunity to photocopy the ponencia as he was not in custody thereof. 108 Although he knew the husband of one of
the petitioners, Olivia Paras, neither she nor her husband ever asked for a copy of the ponencia. 109
When directed to compare the front page of the photocopy Biraogo submitted as Annex "C" to his Compliance to the Show
Cause Order with the original Gilbert copy submitted to the committee by Justice Reyes, Atty. Evangelista noticed the difference
in the dates of the agenda. He noted that Biraogos copy, which was the copy allegedly leaked to him, bore the agenda date "July 7. ASSISTANT COURT ADMINISTRATOR JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ, Chief, Public Information Office (PIO),
15, 2008," while the Gilbert copy submitted by Justice Reyes to the committee bore the agenda date "July 29, 2008." He also testified as follows:
noted that the item numbers were also different because the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 52 in the photocopy
submitted by Biraogo, whereas in the Gilbert copy, the case was listed as Item No. 66. 90 To him, it was probable that Biraogo got
his copy from another source but it was not probable that Biraogo photocopied a copy in the office.
78
The copy of Biraogos undated letter with the attached copy of the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes, which he furnished
the En Banc, came from a member of the media. Around 3:00 p.m. on December 9, 2008, a reporter called him on the phone,
asking if he would like to give a statement because Biraogo was going to hold a press conference about the Limkaichong case
later that day at Barrio Fiesta Restaurant, in front of the Court of Appeals. He requested the reporter to inform him of what was
going to be taken up during the press conference. The reporter went to his office around 5:00 p.m. the same day, and furnished
him a copy of Biraogos undated letter. Attached to the letter was a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia. The reporter informed
him that Biraogo distributed to the media during the press conference copies of the letter and the attachment. 110
Sometime in October 2008, months before Biraogo held the press conference, Jarius Bondoc had published a blind item column
on the Limkaichong case. On November 8, 2008, another column, this time by columnist Fel Maragay, came out in the Manila
Standard. The words used in both columns were the same so he thought that there was really an effort to report the story in the
media. Knowing Jarius Bondoc to be a respectable journalist, he met with him to clarify matters as many of the statements in the
news item were false or inaccurate. He provided Bondoc with the surrounding circumstances on the matter so that Bondoc would
have the proper context in case he was again requested to publish the story. Bondoc offered to write about what he had said, but
he told Bondoc that there was no need because there was no truth to the story given to the media anyway. He left it to Bondoc
whether he would use the new information if he was again asked to publish the story. 111
The leak could not have come from the PIO as they were never given a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the
signatures of 14 Justices. He also did not bring drafts from the OCJ to the PIO. It is only after a case has been promulgated that
the Clerk of Court gives the PIO copies. But in this case, the Clerk of Court did not even have a copy as the decision had not
been signed by the Chief Justice.112
8. RAMON B. GATDULA, Executive Assistant III, Office of the Chief Justice, testified as follows:
On July 15, 2008, at 3:30 p.m., he received from Armando Del Rosario the Gilbert copy of the ponencia together with the rollos
and two diskettes. He kept the Gilbert copy in his locked cabinet overnight and gave it to the Chief Justices secretary the
following day. In the afternoon of July 16, 2008, an employee from the Office of Justice Reyes retrieved the Gilbert copy. He
did not inquire anymore about the reason why they were retrieving it as it was common practice for the offices of the ponentes to
retrieve drafts whenever there were corrections. When asked whether he photocopied the ponencia, Gatdula said that he does not
photocopy the decisions he receives. Their office also never photocopies decisions. They forward such decisions straight to the
Clerk of Court for promulgation and they receive copies thereof only after the Clerk of Court has affixed her signature thereon
and indicated the date of promulgation.113
9. ATTY. MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA, the En Banc Clerk of Court, testified on the procedure for promulgation of
ponencias.
After the Chief Justice affixes his signature on a decision, the decision is brought together with the rollo to the En Banc Clerk of
Court to be logged, recorded and checked. If the necessary requirements for promulgation are present, she signs the decision. It
is at this time that the decision is considered as promulgated. The Office of the Clerk of Court distributes copies to the parties to
the case. The date of promulgation is then encoded in the case monitoring system and a copy of the decision is given to the
PIO.114 Decisions reaching their office usually come with the rollos except where a particular decision is considered rush. 115
She denied having seen the unpromulgated ponencia of Justice Reyes and stated that the same never reached their office during
the period from July 16, 2008 to December 10, 2008.116 She and her staff only learned of the draft decision after it was circulated
by the media.117 In her office, decisions for promulgation are always brought to Verna Albano for recording, then to her for
signature.118 If Verna is absent, it is Atty. Felipa Anama, the assistant clerk of court, who receives the ponencias and
rollos.119 She further stated that in her more than 10 years of work in the Court, she never heard any incident of a draft ponencia
being leaked except this one. 120
10. MAJOR EDUARDO V. ESCALA, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Security Division, Office of Administrative Services,
testified as follows:
79
Security personnel inspect all offices everyday at 5:00 p.m. 121 Security personnel used to inspect even the offices of the Justices,
but they stopped doing so since last year.122 As far as photocopiers are concerned, security personnel only make sure that these
are unplugged after office hours.123 His office has nothing to do with the operation of the machines.124 They always check if
employees bring out papers from the Court. But they encounter problems especially from the offices of Justices because
employees from these offices always claim that they have been allowed or instructed by their Justice to bring papers home with
them, and there is no way to check the veracity of those claims. 125 Since he assumed office on July 14, 2008, he is not aware of
any record of a leak.126 He suggested that the memory cards of the machines be checked.127
11. ATTY. FELIPA B. ANAMA, Assistant Clerk of Court, testified as follows:
She acts as Clerk of Court in the absence of Atty. Villarama.128 Their office never releases unpromulgated ponencias 129 and they
ascertain that every decision or resolution to be promulgated is complete. 130 She remembered that their office released the Show
Cause Resolution dated December 10, 2008 and had it delivered personally to Biraogo as it was an urgent resolution. 131 Willie
Desamero was the employee who personally served the resolution on Biraogo.132
She indicated that it was very difficult to serve something at Biraogos residence for by the account of Desamero, he was
stopped at the guard house and was made to wait in the clubhouse until Biraogo was notified of his presence; and that it took
Desamero two hours to serve the December 10, 2008 resolution on Biraogo.133
She has been with the Supreme Court for 29 years and she never encountered a leak nor did she ever issue a resolution or
decision without the signature of the Chief Justice.134
12. WILLIE DESAMERO, Records Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as follows:
He served the December 10, 2008 Resolution on Biraogo on December 12, 2008.135 It was difficult to serve the Resolution. It
took him six rides to get to Biraogos subdivision in Laguna and when he got there, he was stopped by the security guards at the
entrance of the subdivision. They asked him to wait at the clubhouse and it took Biraogo two hours to arrive. 136 When Biraogo
saw him, Biraogo commented, "Ang bilis naman"137 and "bakit ka lang naka-tricycle? Meron naman kayong
sasakyan"?138 Birago read the Resolution before he signed to receive the document. 139 Biraogo arrived in a car and had a back-up
car.140 Biraogo was in his early 50s, was wearing short pants, and had a sarcastic smile at that time. 141
An officemate of his had also been to Biraogos house to serve some Resolutions. 142 While it was not his usual duty to serve
court processes, Atty. Anama and Atty. Villarama requested him to serve the resolution on Biraogo since the regular process
servers in their office were not then available and he is the only one in their office who resides in Laguna.143 In his years of
service with the Court, he knew of no case which involved leakage of court documents. 144
13. GLORIVY NYSA TOLENTINO, Executive Assistant I, Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, testified
as follows:
She is responsible for communications, drafts and door-to-door papers that come in at the Office of Justice Nachura. 145 She
presented page 267 of her logbook, to which Justice Reyes had earlier invited the committees attention. According to the
logbook entry, the Gilbert copy was brought to their office on July 15, 2008 and that Justice Nachura signed the copy. However,
since it is not office practice to record the time of receipt or release, she could not remember what time the Gilbert copy was
brought to their office for signature. 146 Nonetheless, the Gilbert copy did not stay long in their office because it was a door-to-
door paper and was accordingly given preferential treatment. Justice Nachura immediately signed the ponencia when she gave it
to him.147 However, she could not recall if Justice Nachura was the last to sign the Gilbert copy. 148 She added that their office did
not have a copy of the unpromulgated ponencia bearing the signatures of 14 Justices. They only had the advance copies
circulated for concurrence.149
14. ONOFRE C. CUENTO, Process Server, Office of the Clerk of Court En Banc, testified as follows:
He personally served two resolutions on Biraogo at his residence last August 6, 2008, together with driver Mateo Bihag. 150 On
the day he served the resolutions, they were stopped at the guardhouse and were escorted by a barong-clad security officer to
Biraogos house. 151 They had a hard time getting to the residence of Biraogo whom he does not personally know. 152 Biraogo did
not mention or send his regards to any member of the Court. 153
15. CHESTER GEORGE P. DEL CASTILLO, Utility Worker, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, testified as
follows:
He joined the staff of Justice Reyes in September 2007 upon the recommendation of Court of Appeals Justice Mariano Del
Castillo and Retired Justice Cancio Garcia.154
He was the most proficient in the use of the photocopiers in the office of Justice Reyes so it was to him that the task of
photocopying documents was usually given by Del Rosario and the lawyers. 155 He, however, never photocopied any paper
bearing the signatures of the Justices.156 He did not handle ponencias in Gilbert paper nor ever photocopy any ponencia in
Gilbert paper. 157
He usually left the office at 4:30 p.m. He sometimes saw members of the staff photocopying papers even beyond 4:30 p.m. It
was Del Rosario who often gave orders to photocopy drafts and who was the most trusted member of the staff as demonstrated
by the fact that he could go in and out of Justice Reyess chambers. 158 Del Rosario never left the office before Justice Reyes and
he (Del Rosario) often left late.159
returned the Gilbert copy because in the Office of Justice Reyes, Del Rosario was the one in charge of circulating ponencias in
Gilbert form for signature. 183 He could not recall handing a Gilbert paper to Manabat.184 The ponencia stayed only for a short
time (about 5 minutes) in their office because it was a door-to-door paper. After it was signed by Justice Nachura, it was handed
back to the staff of Justice Reyes, so there was no chance for them to photocopy the ponencia. 185 It was not their standard
operating procedure to leave any Gilbert paper in their office if it could not be signed right away. 186
18. RETIRED JUSTICE RUBEN T. REYES, for his part, submitted during the hearing on January 22, 2009, a written
statement entitled "Notes/Observations" (Notes) consisting of 12 paragraphs. In his Notes, Justice Reyes stressed the following:
Biraogo did not point to him as the source of the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia; 187 in Biraogos December 22, 2008
Compliance with the Courts Show Cause Order, Biraogo stated that his informant was allegedly a "SC concerned employee"
who left a brown envelope with a letter and some documents in his Bian, Laguna home; it could be seen from the attachments
to Biraogos Compliance that it was not only the unpromulgated ponencia or Gilbert copy that was leaked but also two other
confidential documents: his Revised Draft ponencia for the June 17, 2008 agenda (attached as Annex "B" to the Compliance)
and Justice Carpios Reflections (attached as Annex "D"); and since these other documents were circulated to all Justices, the
investigation should not only focus on the leak of the unpromulgated ponencia but also on the leak of the two other confidential
and internal documents of the Court.188
Justice Reyes also pointed out in his Notes as follows: the committee should not only look into his office but also the offices of
Justice Carpio and the other Justices. He, however, reiterated that he had said in his media interviews that he believed that none
of the Justices themselves, much less the Chief Justice, leaked the ponencia or authorized its leakage.

He had never been to Barangay Malamig although he had been to Bian, Laguna. 160 He does not know Biraogo or his
Justice Reyes pointed out that Biraogos informant mentioned a certain Atty. Rosel, who was allegedly a close friend and former
wife.161 Neither does he know Paras.162 He did not know where Gilbert copies were kept. 163 When he was asked who would leave
partner of Justice Carpio. Justice Reyes said that Atty. Rosel allegedly asked a favor from Justice Carpio before the latter wrote
the office first, Justice Reyes or Del Rosario, he said he did not know. Del Rosario was tasked to lock the main door of the
his Reflections.189 Thus, he said, the committee should also question Atty. Rosel and even Justice Carpio himself.
office.164

The office staff knew of the leaked decision on the Limkaichong case, but the staff remained apathetic and did not talk about
it.165 The apathy was probably because the staff thought that the matter had already been settled since Del Rosario and Atty.
Evangelista had already been interviewed.166 He was not sure if anyone from their office was involved in the leakage. 167 He was
not part of the meeting called by Justice Reyes before the start of the investigation. 168 Only Atty. Evangelista, Del Rosario, and
Manabat were called to the meeting.169 He surmised that the meeting was about the leakage.170
16. CONRADO B. BAYANIN, JR., Messenger, Office of Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, who was called by the committee
upon Justice Reyess suggestion, testified as follows:
Part of his duties in the Office of Justice Reyes was to receive and release papers and rollos as he was seated near the door. 171 It
was not his duty to handle or receive ponencias in Gilbert form.172 He could not remember if he had ever received any paper in
connection with the Limkaichong case.173 While he knew how to operate the xerox machine, just like all the other utility workers
in the office, 174 he had never photocopied anything signed by the Justices, especially those on Gilbert paper. 175
When asked who handled photocopies ordered by Justice Reyes, he replied that he did not know. 176 He did not know and had no
opinion on how the ponencia was leaked.177 He only knew that his officemates talked about the leak, 178 but he did not know
specifically what his officemates talked about.179 Before Justice Reyess retirement ceremony, Justice Reyes called him to his
chambers and very calmly asked him if he knew if anybody had photocopied the unpromulgated ponencia. 180
17. FERMIN L. SEGOTIER, Judicial Staff Assistant II and receptionist at the Office of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura, testified as follows:
On why he did not lift a finger when Biraogo got hold of the decision, despite reports regarding the leak, Justice Reyes stated
that he was on a sabbatical leave with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education research in four States in the United States
from October 10, 2008 to November 1, 2008.
He had nothing to do with the leak and he even prepared a second draft decision (deviating from his prior disposition) after oral
arguments were held on the case.
Thus, in his Notes, he posed: "If he leaked it, why would he prepare a second different decision?" He willingly obliged to the
holding of oral arguments. He had no commitment to anybody and had no reason to leak the unpromulgated ponencia. 190 He
added, "[I]f he had a hand in the leak, why would it include Justice Carpios Reflections which was contrary to the
unpromulgated decision?"
Justice Reyes, still in his Notes, stated that no Justice in his right mind would leak the unpromulgated ponencia or other
confidential documents, such as the Revised Draft and Justice Carpios Reflections.
He went on to refer to Biraogos Compliance that the informant was purportedly "an old hand in the Supreme Court who was
accustomed to the practices of the Justices" and had a "circle" or group in the Supreme Court. Since all his office staff, except
two stenographers, one utility worker and one messenger, were all new in the Court, then the "old hand" referred to could not
have come from his office. But if it could be proven by evidence that one of his staff was the source of the leak, Justice Reyes
argued that only that staff should be made liable, for he had publicly declared that he did not and would never allow nor tolerate
such leakage.191

More on Justice Reyess Notes: He suggested that Newsbreak writers Marites Vitug and Aries Rufo be cited for contempt of
His duty is to receive communications, but only Glorivy Nysa Tolentino keeps a logbook for the door-to-door papers that come
court, for obtaining, without lawful authority, confidential information and documents from the Court, officials or employees,
to their office.181 He does not remember any details pertaining to the July 15, 2008 signing of the Limkaichong Ponencia, aside
and for writing false, malicious articles which tended to influence the investigation of the committee and to degrade, impede and
from the fact that it was to Justice Reyess staff to whom he gave it back. 182 He assumed that it was to Del Rosario to whom he
obstruct the administration of justice. 192
80
Aside from submitting his Notes, Justice Reyes also testified as follows: attend to photocopying of decisions.212 He stressed that his initials on page 34 of the new copy differed from the initials
appearing on page 34 of Biraogos copy.213 He also pointed out that in Biraogos copy, particularly on page 3, there was a
handwritten correction superimposed over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such handwritten correction appeared
While he was first heard on January 16, 2009, after he presented a 9-paragraph written statement, he noticed that it needed
on page 3 of both the committees copy and the new copy. 214 He added that he did not know who made the handwritten
refinement and revision so he requested for time to edit it. Hence, he submitted his above-mentioned Notes on January 22, 2009.
correction in Biraogos copy and that the new copy he was presenting to the committee was furnished to him by the committee.
Said copy was allegedly the xerox copy of the Gilbert copy.215
Justice Reyes identified the Gilbert copy, which he submitted earlier to the committee for safekeeping, and his Notes." 193 He
clarified that the Compliance he was referring to in his Notes was Biraogos December 22, 2008 Compliance with the Courts
Justice Reyes professed that he had nothing to do with the leak as he would not leak, authorize, allow, or tolerate any leak of his
Show Cause Order. 194
decision or revised draft. He dispelled any pecuniary profit from such leakage, especially since he was about to retire when the
leak happened. He could not, however, say the same of his office staff since he did not want to speculate, so he was giving the
His desire to include Justice Carpio in the investigation, per number 4 of his Notes, came about because it appeared from committee the broadest latitude in calling any of his staff.216
Biraogos Compliance and from the alleged informants letter that it was not only the unpromulgated ponencia signed by 14
Justices that was leaked but also the Revised Draft ponencia and Justice Carpios Reflections.195 He suggested that what should
Upon Justice Carpio Moraless interrogation, Justice Reyes stated that he found the new copy in his files just the week before the
be investigated was the source of the three documents.196 Justice Quisumbing replied that the matter seemed settled because
January 22, 2009 hearing.217 Justice Carpio Morales then invited his attention to the fact that page 1 of the new copy, like page 1
Justice Reyes also mentioned in Paragraph No. 6 of his Notes that he believed that none of the Justices, much less the Chief
of Biraogos copy, did not contain the footnotes and asterisks appearing in the committees copy. She also noted that the copy of
Justice, caused or authorized the leak.197 Justice Reyes stressed that he thought it was only fair that the Committee also call
Biraogo and the new copy presented by Justice Reyes matched to a T. 218 Justice Reyes only replied that he did not pay particular
Justice Carpio to shed light on the matter in the same way that he was asked to shed light thereon.198
attention nor personally attend to the photocopying.219

Justice Carpio Morales pointed out that Justice Reyess ponencia as signed by 14 Justices did not come into the possession of the
Justice Reyes stated that there should only be one copy of the Gilbert copy, 220 but it appeared that he supplied the committee
other Justices but only of Justice Reyes. 199 She added that if logic were followed, then all of the Justices should be investigated
with two apparently different copies (the Gilbert copy and the new copy). 221 Justice Reyes noted that the new copy and Biraogos
because copies of Justice Carpios Reflections were circulated to all. She declared that she was willing to be investigated and
copy did not match exactly as regards pages 3 and 34. He stressed that there appeared on page 3 of Biraogos copy a handwritten
that she was volunteering to be investigated.200 However, she pointed out that the logic of Justice Reyes was misplaced,
correction over the misspelled name of Jerome Paras while no such correction was made on the new copy. Additionally, on page
considering that the documents attached to Biraogos Compliance were allegedly received at the same time. If Biraogo received
34 of Biraogos copy, his initial appeared to have a smudge while on page 34 of the new copy, there was no smudge. 222
the documents at the same time and one Justice never took hold of the ponencia as signed, said Justice could not have made the
leak to Biraogo.201
When asked to explain why the new copy, which he claimed to have been photocopied from the committees copy, did not
match the committees copy on page 1 but matched page 1 of Biraogos copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation.223 Justice
Justice Reyes went on to testify as follows: The Gilbert copy which he submitted to the committee was given to him by Del
Reyes also refused to submit the new copy to the committee ("Why should I?") and questioned the committees request that he
Rosario.202 He did not photocopy the Gilbert copy nor provide Biraogo a copy thereof or instruct any of his staff to photocopy
initial the controversial pages of the new copy. 224 Thus, the committee members decided to affix their signatures on the first five
the same. 203
pages of the new copy and then drew a rectangle around their signatures and the dateJanuary 22, 2009. 225 The committee then
had the new copy photocopied. 226Justice Corona soon noticed that Justice Reyes was trying to hide the new copy between his
The xerox copy of the Gilbert copy attached to the Compliance of Biraogo appeared to be the same as the committees copy files. At that point, Justice Corona pulled out the new copy from Justice Reyess files. Justice Reyes then repeatedly said that he
because he (Justice Reyes) looked at the initials on each page and found them to be similar. 204Justice Quisumbing thereupon was not submitting it to the committee.227 The committee proceeded to discuss the other matters contained in Justice Reyess
invited Justice Reyess attention to the cover page of the Gilbert copy which had been submitted to and in custody of the Notes.
committee (committees copy). 205 Upon perusal thereof, Justice Reyes stated that the cover page of the committees copy did not
appear to be the same as the cover page of Biraogos copy. He observed that the cover page of the committees copy showed
Justice Reyes at that point then stated that he had not withdrawn his standing motion for inhibition against Justice Carpio
the agenda date "July 29, 2008," and that the Limkaichong case was listed as Item No. 66, whereas the cover page of Biraogos
Morales, to which Justice Carpio Morales replied that she would remain impartial. Justice Carpio Morales likewise stressed that
copy showed the agenda date "July 15, 2008," and that the same case was listed as Item No. 52.206 Justice Reyes then qualified
the committee would decide according to the evidence.228
his earlier statement and said that he was only referring to those pages of the decision itself which bore his initials, when he
spoke of similarity, and said that the cover page did not bear his initials.207
Upon being asked by the committee, Justice Reyes said that he could not recall if he was holding the Gilbert copy after the En
Banc session and while having lunch.229 He stated that per standard arrangement, his staff would usually get his folders and bring
Justice Corona pointed out, and Justice Reyes confirmed, that page 1 of the committees copy also differed from page 1 of
them to his office. 230 As far as he could recall, before the Court adjourned, the members already knew that many concurred only
Biraogos copy. Justice Corona pointed that in the committees copy, there were asterisks after the names of Justice Azcuna and
in the result.231 He could not recall, however, if the Chief Justice learned about it only at the dining room. 232
Justice Tinga and footnotes that the two were on official leave, whereas no such asterisks and footnotes appeared on page 1 of
Biraogos copy.208 Justice Corona also pointed out and Justice Reyes once again confirmed that there was a slight variance
between the initials on page 34 of the committees copy and the initials on page 34 of Biraogos copy. 209 Justice Reyes denied having given Atty. Evangelista the instruction to reprint signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy and stated
that it must have been Atty. Evangelistas sole decision. What Justice Reyes remembered telling Atty. Evangelista after the En
Banc session was that many concurred only "in the result" and that Justice Chico-Nazario wanted to change her
Justice Quisumbing then posed the question whether Justice Reyes would admit that there were at least two sources.210 At this
concurrence.233 Justice Carpio Morales confronted him with certain portions of the December 15, 2008 TSN where he clearly
juncture, Justice Reyes brought out another photocopy (new copy or Justice Reyess new copy) of the Gilbert copy to which new
volunteered the information that he was the one who instructed Atty. Evangelista to reprint page 36 which is the second
copy the left top corner of the top cover was stapled a 1"x1" piece of thick paper bearing the initials "RTR" and on the right top
signature page.234 Justice Reyes replied that maybe Atty. Evangelista was under the mistaken impression that the change of the
corner of the same cover appeared a handwritten notation reading "Gilbert copy." Justice Reyes repeatedly stated that his new
said page pushed through because, as it turned out, there was no qualification in the concurrence of Justice Chico-Nazario. He
copy was a facsimile of the committees copy. He pointed out that the initials on page 34 of the new copy and that of the
also insisted that he did not volunteer the information that he was the one who ordered the reprinting of page 36. He contended
committees copy matched. He concluded, however, that page 34 of Biraogos copy was not a faithful reproduction of the
that he was in fact questioning Atty. Evangelista when the latter said that the instruction came from him. 235
committees copy.211 Justice Reyes avoided the question of whether he or his staff kept more than one xerox copy of the Gilbert
copy that had been signed by majority or 14 members of the Court, saying that he could not say so because he did not personally
81
With regard to the "re-signing" by Justice Nachura, 236 Justice Reyes declared that it was difficult to speculate and rely on
inaccurate recollection, especially since several months had passed. Justice Corona replied that the testimonies could not be
inaccurate since there were entries in the logbook, showing that Justice Nachura indeed signed in his chambers.237 Justice Reyes
stated that the changing of the original signature page 36 was not carried out 238 and that Atty. Evangelistas recollection of the
event was inaccurate. Justice Reyes also stated he could not recall calling Justice Chico-Nazario on the phone after the En Banc
session on July 15, 2008. 239
Justice Reyes stated that Del Rosario was assigned to keep and take care of the circulated drafts and ponencias printed on Gilbert
paper, and from time to time Atty. Evangelista would have access to them since the latter was the judicial staff head. 240 Justice
Reyess staff members in October were the same until he retired on December 18, 2008. 241 Justice Reyess impression of
Biraogos letter was that somebody who had an axe to grind against the Chief Justice or who wanted to discredit him could have
done it.242
Justice Reyes said that he never had any personal interest in the case and argued that the best proof of this was that he did not
stick to his original decision after the case was heard on oral arguments on August 26, 2008, just to prove that he was not
beholden to any party.243
Justice Reyes could not offer a straight answer to the question of what his undue interest was in still trying to have the signature
of all the Justices after he had taken his lunch and to forward the Gilbert copy and the rollo etc. to the OCJ even after the
decision to put the promulgation of the ponencia on hold was arrived at, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008. He simply dismissed the
recollections of his staff and preferred to believe Del Rosarios over those of Evangelistas or Manabats. He insisted that he
never had the chance to talk to Del Rosario or to Atty. Evangelista right after the En Banc session, and claimed that he never
gave the instruction to bring the Gilbert copy to the Office of Justice Nachura. He likewise insisted that the testimony of Atty.
Evangelista was incorrect and that he would rather believe Del Rosarios testimony.244
THE INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES FINDINGS OF FACT
From the testimonies of the witnesses, the committee finds the following facts established.
On July 15, 2008, even after the Justices had agreed at lunchtime to withhold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy in the
Limkaichong case, Justice Reyes, under his misimpression that Justice Nazario had "concurred in the result" and that she would
finally remove such qualification, instructed his Judicial Staff Head, Atty. Evangelista, and Del Rosario to have the signature
page 36 (where the names of Justices Nazario, Nachura and three others appeared) reprinted and to bring the Gilbert copy to the
Office of Justice Nachura for signature as Justice Nachura, who was not participating in the oral arguments on the case
scheduled at 1:30 that afternoon, might be going out. Jean Yabut was tasked by Atty. Evangelista to reprint the second signature
page (page 36) on Gilbert paper.
The reprinted signature page 36, together with the rest of the pages of the Gilbert copy, was then given by Atty. Evangelista to
Del Rosario. Del Rosario, in turn, gave the Gilbert copy, together with the reprinted signature page 36, to Manabat whom he
instructed to go to the Office of Justice Nachura for him to affix his signature thereon.
Manabat immediately went to the Office of Justice Nachura and handed the Gilbert copy to Fermin Segotier, the receptionist at
Justice Nachuras office. As the Gilbert copy was a door-to-door document, Segotier immediately gave it to Glorivy Nysa
Tolentino who recorded it in her logbook. She then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Nachura. When the reprinted page 36 of
the Gilbert copy was brought out from Justice Nachuras chambers and returned to Tolentino, she recorded it in her logbook that
it was already signed. The whole process took not more than five minutes. The Gilbert copy was returned to Manabat, who had
waited outside the office of Justice Nachura.
Manabat then repaired to the chambers of Justice Reyes who inquired from him if Justice Nachura had signed the reprinted page
36 to which he answered in the affirmative. Manabat thereafter handed the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario.
82
When Atty. Evangelista, who was attending the oral arguments on a case scheduled that afternoon, went down the Office of
Justice Reyes at about 3:30 p.m., he and/or Del Rosario must have eventually noticed that Justice Nazario did not, after all,
qualify her concurrence on the original signature page 36 of the Gilbert copy with the words "in the result." Since neither Atty.
Evangelista nor Del Rosario was advised by Justice Reyes that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold, Del Rosario
brought the Gilbert copy, together with the rollo, records and diskettes to the OCJ to be promulgated and gave it at 3:30 p.m. to
Ramon Gatdula of the OCJ. Gatdula later transmitted the Gilbert copy to the secretary of the Chief Justice.
The following day, July 16, 2008, at around 4:00 p.m., Justice Reyes called Del Rosario to his chambers and instructed him to
retrieve the Gilbert copy, etc. from the OCJ, informing him for the first time that the promulgation of the ponencia had been put
on hold. Around that same time, the OCJ phoned the Office of Justice Reyes and told them to retrieve the ponencia for the same
reason.
Thus, Del Rosario went to the OCJ and asked for the return of the Gilbert copy. As Gatdula had already forwarded the same to
the Chief Justices secretary for the Chief Justices signature, Gatdula retrieved it from the secretary. Del Rosario retrieved all
that he submitted the previous day, except the rollo which had, in the meantime, been borrowed by Justice Carpio.
Del Rosario then brought the Gilbert copy to Justice Reyes who told him to keep it. Del Rosario informed Atty. Evangelista the
following day, July 17, 2008, that the promulgation of the Gilbert copy was on hold. After Atty. Evangelista verified the matter
from Justice Reyes, he (Atty. Evangelista) told Del Rosario that the case would be called again on July 29, 2008. Del Rosario
made a note in his logbook to that effect.
On July 25, 2008, the Office of Justice Reyes received the En Banc agenda for July 29, 2008 where the Limkaichong case was
listed as Item No. 66. A new cover page reflecting the case as Item No. 66 was thus prepared and attached to the Gilbert copy
bearing only 14 signatures.
After the Gilbert copy was retrieved from the OCJ on July 16, 2008, it remained in the sole custody of Del Rosario until
December 15, 2008, the initial hearing conducted by the investigating committee. The Gilbert copy remained inside his unlocked
drawer, in a brown envelope, which he had sealed with the blue and white seal used by all Justices. He opened it only on
December 10, 2008, after Justice Reyes informed his staff that there was a leak of the ponencia.
When news of Biraogos conduct of a press conference on December 9, 2008 bearing on the leakage came out, Justice Reyes
immediately called his legal staff and Del Rosario to a meeting and asked them if they knew anything about the leakage. He
called for a second meeting among Atty. Evangelista, Manabat and Del Rosario on December 15, 2008, before the hearing by
the investigating committee took place in the afternoon of that day. Justice Reyes likewise had a one-on-one talk with Del
Rosario and asked him if a copy of Justice Carpios Reflections was attached to the Gilbert copy and related documents when
they were sent to the OCJ, to which he (Del Rosario) answered in the negative.
EVALUATION
The committee finds that the photocopying of the Gilbert copy occurred between July 15, 2008, before it was brought to the
OCJ or after it was retrieved on July 16, 2008 from the OCJ, and July 25, 2008, when the Office of Justice Reyes caused the
preparation of the new cover page of the Gilbert copy to reflect that it was agendaed as Item No. 66 in the July 29, 2008 En Banc
session, because the cover page of the photocopy in the possession of Biraogo, as well as the cover page of Justice Reyess new
copy, still bore the agenda date "July 15, 2008" and Item No. 52.
The committee likewise finds that the leakage was intentionally done. It was not the result of a copy being misplaced and
inadvertently picked up by Biraogo or someone in his behalf. The committee notes that none of the offices to which the Gilbert
copy was brought (OCJ and the Office of Justice Nachura) and which acquired control over it photocopied ponencias in Gilbert
form and released photocopies thereof to party litigants. In any event, as earlier reflected, page 1 of the Gilbert copy that was
sent to the OCJ and Justice Nachuras Office and page 1 of Biraogos photocopy differ.
To reiterate, the Gilbert copy bearing the signatures of 14 Justices was photocopied and that a copy thereof was intentionally
leaked directly or indirectly to Biraogo. As will be discussed below, the committee FINDS that the leak came from the Office of
Justice Reyes.
It bears reiterating that the leak did not come from the OCJ even if the Gilbert copy stayed therein from 3:30 p.m. on July 15,
2008 up to 4:00 p.m. on July 16, 2008. This is clear from the fact that page 1 of the copy in Biraogos possession differs from
page 1 of the Gilbert copy which was forwarded to the OCJ. Thus, on page 1 of the Gilbert copy which contains the names of the
Justices of the Court, there appear asterisks after the names of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna and Justice Dante O. Tinga. These
asterisks have corresponding footnotes stating that Justice Azcuna was on official leave per Special Order No. 510 dated July 15,
2008 and Justice Tinga was likewise on official leave per Special Order No. 512 dated July 16, 2008. In contrast, page 1 of
Biraogos copy and Justice Reyess new copy, glaringly contain no such asterisks and footnotes, which indicates that page 1 of
Biraogos copy was photocopied from page 1 of the draft prepared by Justice Reyes before it was finalized on Gilbert paper.
The leak also could not have come from the offices of the other associate justices, contrary to Justice Reyess insinuation. Justice
Reyes insinuated that because all the Justices were furnished with advance copies of the draftponencia before the session of July
15, 2008, anyone from those offices could have leaked the decision. An examination of the copy in Biraogos possession readily
shows that every page thereof pages 1 to 36 contained Justice Reyess authenticating initials while none of the advance
copies furnished to the Justices was similarly authenticated.
Advance copies of a draft given to the justices as a working basis for deliberations are not initialed by the justice who prepares it.
And they do not contain the signature of any of the Justices, except the one who prepared the draft, precisely because the Justices
have yet to go over it and deliberate on it. As standard procedure, it is only after a draft decision has been adopted by the Court
that it is finalized-printed on Gilbert paper and every page thereof is authenticated by the ponente, and circulated for signature by
the other Justices.
It need not be underlined that there was no opportunity for anyone from the offices of the Associate Justices to photocopy the
ponencia as none of said offices acquired possession of the document, except the Office of Justice Reyes and the Office of
Justice Nachura. But based on testimony, the unpromulgated ponencia stayed in the Office of Justice Nachura only for less than
five minutes, which did not suffice for it to be signed by Justice Nachura and to be photocopied. Again, and in any event, page 1
of the photocopy in Biraogos possession does not match the same page of the Gilbert copy.
Furthermore, except for Justice Reyes, the Associate Justices took hold of the Gilbert copy only briefly when they signed it at the
En Banc conference room. At no other time did any of them hold the document long enough to photocopy it. Pursuant to
standard procedure, only the ponente, Justice Reyes in this case, and his staff, took custody of the ponencia bearing the
signatures of 14 Justices before it was sent to the OCJ.
But who from the Office of Justice Reyes leaked the unpromulgated ponencia? While the evidence shows that the chain of
custody could not rule out the possibility that the Gilbert copy was photocopied by Del Rosario who had control and possession
of it, and while there is no direct evidence as to the identity of the perpetrator of the leakage, the committee FINDS that based on
the circumstantial evidence reflected above, particularly the evident undue interest of Justice Reyes to circulate a draft ponencia
of the case soonest even before the memoranda of all the parties fell due, and to withhold the information to Atty. Evangelista
and Del Rosario that the promulgation of the ponencia was put on hold and, instead, allow the immediate promulgation after
lunch despite his admission that the decision to hold the promulgation was arrived at at lunchtime, it was Justice Reyes himself
who leaked a photocopy thereof.
Recall that the Court gave due course to the petition on April 8, 2008 and the first memorandum was filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General only on June 16, 2008. The other parties, namely, Olivia Paras, Speaker Nograles, et al., and Biraogo
subsequently filed their respective memoranda only on July 1, 2, and 24, 2008. Even before the En Banc session of June 10,
2008, however, Justice Reyes had already circulated a draft decision.
Further, still later or on June 12, 2008, Justice Reyes circulated, via transmittal letter of even date printed on his memo pad and
signed by him, a Revised Draft, copy of which transmittal letter, as well as the Revised Draft, also came into the possession of
Biraogo (Annex "B" to Biraogos Compliance).
83
Furthermore, even after the Justices had, at lunchtime of July 15, 2008, unanimously decided that the promulgation of the Gilbert
copy would be put on hold--and this was, it bears repeating, admitted by Justice Reyes--, Justice Reyes, after partaking lunch at
the dining room and before 1:00 p.m., instead of advising his Chief of Staff Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario that the
promulgation was put on hold, still instructed them to reprint the second signature page (page 36) and to have the reprinted page
immediately brought to the Office of Justice Nachura for signature; and before Justice Reyes left for the session hall for the oral
arguments of that case scheduled at 1:30 p.m. that day, Justice Reyes still followed up the case by asking Manabat if Justice
Nachura had already signed the Gilbert copy.245
When confronted with the incontrovertible evidence of his undue interest in the case and haste in having the Gilbert copy
promulgated, Justice Reyes was notably evasive. On January 16, 2009, Justice Carpio Morales asked Justice Reyes if he would
admit that he prepared a draft of the decision even before the first memorandum was submitted on June 16, 2008. Justice Reyes
stated that he could not admit that fact.246 Such fact is documented, however, and it would not have escaped him as the records of
the Limkaichong case were with him and yet he already prepared and caused the circulation of a draft of the decision on June 12,
2008.
Justice Reyes also gave conflicting accounts on when he gave the Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the En Banc session of July
15, 2008 was adjourned. During the proceedings of the committee on December 15, 2008, Justice Reyes categorically stated that
pursuant to standard operating procedures, he gave the signed Gilbert copy to Del Rosario after the Chief Justice noted that
seven Justices had concurred "in the result."247 It bears recalling that the Chief Justice confirmed noting such fact during
lunchtime. However, the following day, during the December 16, 2008 proceedings, Justice Reyes implied that pursuant to
standard operating procedures, his staff got his folders including the Gilbert copy right after the En Banc session. Hence, so he
reasoned, as the agreement to put on hold the promulgation of the Gilbert copy and to hold oral arguments on the case was
arrived at only after lunch which followed the adjournment of the En Banc session, his staff did not know about such
agreement.248 But even Del Rosario, whose testimony he credits more than any of the other members of his staff, categorically
stated that Justice Reyes gave him the Gilbert copy after he (Justice Reyes) had taken his lunch and while he (Del Rosario),
Justice Reyes and Atty. Evangelista were, before 1:00 p.m., on their way to Justice Reyess office, and that, at that instant,
Justice Reyes instructed Atty. Evangelista to have the signature page 36 reprinted and have Justice Nachura (who was not
participating in the oral arguments scheduled that afternoon) sign.
During the January 22, 2009 hearing, when asked to explain why the top cover of the new copy which he brought with him and
which he claimed to have been photocopied from the committees copy, did not match the top cover of the committees copy (or
the original Gilbert copy) but matched the top cover of Biraogos copy, Justice Reyes offered no explanation. Neither did he
account for the other dissimilarities between page 1 of his new copy and the same page 1 of Biraogo on one hand, and page 1 of
the Gilbert copy , viz: page 1 of the new copy, like page 1 of Biraogos copy, does not have asterisks after the names of
Justices Tinga and Azcuna and the corresponding footnotes, which the Gilbert copy has.
Justice Reyes, despite his professed desire to bring out the truth, refused to submit his new copy to the committeeand questioned
the committees request that he place his initials on the questioned pages of his new copy. Later, while the committee was
discussing other points in his Notes, Justice Reyes tried to hide his new copy. Justice Corona had to pry it out of Justice Reyess
files.1avvphi1 As Justice Reyes repeatedly said that he was not submitting his new copy to the committee ("Why should I"), the
committee members were prompted to photocopy his new copy, but only after they affixed their signatures and date (January 22,
2009) on the first 5 pages thereof.
To the members of the committee, the foregoing proven facts and circumstances constitute more than substantial evidence which
reasonably points to Justice Reyes, despite his protestations of innocence, 249 as THE source of the leak. He must, therefore, be
held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT.
Effect of Justice Reyess Retirement
The subsequent retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he is answerable.250
A case becomes moot and academic only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
be served in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite Justice Reyess retirement. independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise judicial power.257

Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions may no longer be imposed, there are other penalties which may be imposed if
one is later found guilty of the administrative offenses charged, including the disqualification to hold any government
office and the forfeiture of benefits.251
The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce a respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him/her guilty thereof.
A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. For, what remedy would
the people have against a civil servant who resorts to wrongful and illegal conduct during his/her last days in office? What would
prevent a corrupt and unscrupulous government employee from committing abuses and other condemnable acts knowing fully
well that he/she would soon be beyond the pale of the law and immune from all administrative penalties?
If only for reasons of public policy, this Court must assert and maintain its jurisdiction over members of the judiciary and other
officials under its supervision and control for acts performed in office which are inimical to the service and prejudicial to the
interests of litigants and the general public. If innocent, a respondent official merits vindication of his/her name and integrity as
he leaves the government which he/she served well and faithfully; if guilty, he/she deserves to receive the corresponding censure
and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.252
In Mirasol v. De La Torre, Jr.,258 the Court stated that "[c]ourt documents are confidential documents. They must not be taken
out of the court without proper authority and without the necessary safeguards to ensure their confidentiality and integrity."
Thus, the Court found the clerk of court guilty of gross misconduct. Moreover, the case enunciates that acts of gross misconduct
destroy the good image of the judiciary so the Court cannot countenance them nor allow the perpetrators to remain in office.
This same pronouncement was reiterated in Betguen v. Masangcay. 259 Though both cases involve indiscretions of clerks of court,
it is but logical that a higher standard of care be imposed upon magistrates of the Court.
PAGCOR v. Rilloza,260 in fact, commands persons who routinely handle confidential matters to be confidential employees. They
are thus expected to be more careful than an ordinary employee in their day to day business. They are reposed such trust and
confidence that a breach of their duty would mean breach of trust. As applied to the case of Justice Reyes, the breach of duty
amounts to breach of public trust as the committee believes that the leak was motivated by self-interest.
The fact that Justice Reyes was not formally charged is of no moment. It is settled that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence,
ignorance of the law or misconduct.261

The Court cannot over-emphasize the importance of the task of preserving the confidentiality and integrity of court records. A
number of rules and internal procedures are in place to ensure the observance of this task by court personnel.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct 253 provides that confidential information acquired by justices and judges in their judicial
capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties. 254 The Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel likewise devotes one whole canon on confidentiality, to wit:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not disclose to any unauthorized person any confidential information acquired by them while
employed in the judiciary, whether such information came from authorized or unauthorized sources.
In People v. Valenzuela,262 which deals with the administrative aspect of a case brought on certiorari, the Court dispensed with
the conduct of further hearings under the principle of res ipsa loquitur and proceeded to consider critical factors in deducing
malice and bad faith on the part of the judge, after it did not accept at face value the judges mere denial. In that case, the judge
ordered the return of the peso equivalent of the foreign currency to the accused despite its forfeiture as dutiable goods and even
after the finding that the accused had nothing to do with the mailing thereof.
In Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Romillo, Jr.,263 where the Court took into account glaring circumstances in the proceedings of
the case in concluding that the judge acted with bad faith, the judge was similarly found guilty of grave and serious misconduct
when he unjustly declared the defendant in default and awarded outrageously exorbitant damages. l

Prudential Bank v. Castro264 was an administrative case spawned by a partys complaint, wherein the Court, in light of the
Confidential information means information not yet made a matter of public record relating to pending cases, as well
surrounding circumstances, found that the judge committed serious and grave misfeasance because the issuance of the orders and
as information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge relating to pending cases, including
ill-conceived summary judgment showed the judges partiality to, or confabulation with the plaintiff and its lawyers.
notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and similar
papers.
In Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation v. Capistrano,265 the Court proceeded in adjudging the attendant circumstances as
tainted with bad faith and questionable integrity to call for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers over members of the
The notes, drafts, research papers, internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations and
judiciary. In that case, the Court found the submissions of the judge unacceptable and clearly inadequate to overcome the
similar papers that a justice or judge uses in preparing a decision, resolution or order shall remain confidential even
cumulative effect of the highly questionable actuations taking cognizance of a claim for damages arising from an attachment,
after the decision, resolution or order is made public.
instead of having it litigated in the same action where the writ was issued as evincing gross ignorance of the law and active
bias or partiality.
SEC. 2. Confidential information available to specific individuals by reason of statute, court rule or administrative policy shall
be disclosed only by persons authorized to do so.
The Court, in Cruz v. Yaneza,266 perceived the judges persistent pattern of approving bail bonds and issuing release orders
beyond its territorial jurisdiction as evincing a modus operandi that flagrantly flaunts fundamental rules.
SEC. 3. Unless expressly authorized by the designated authority, court personnel shall not disclose confidential information
given by litigants, witnesses or attorneys to justices, judges or any other person.
In De Los Santos v. Magsino,267 the Court again applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur when a judge irregularly approved a
bail bond and issued a release order of an accused whose case was pending in another province, in palpable disregard and gross
SEC. 4. Former court personnel shall not disclose confidential information acquired by them during their employment in the ignorance of the procedural law on bail.
Judiciary when disclosed by current court personnel of the same information would constitute a breach of confidentiality. Any
disclosure in violation of this provisions shall constitute indirect contempt of court.255(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The principle was also applied to discipline court personnel and suspend members of the Bar from the practice of law.

Ineluctably, any release of a copy to the public, or to the parties, of an unpromulgated ponencia infringes on the confidential
internal deliberations of the Court. It is settled that the internal deliberations of the Court are confidential. 256 A frank exchange of

84
The Court, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Pardo,268 found the clerk of court guilty of gross discourtesy in the course of
official duties when he failed to accord respect for the person and rights of a judge as can be gleaned from a mere reading of his
letter to the Executive Judge.
In Sy v. Moncupa,269 the Court found the evidence against the clerk for malversation of public funds eloquently speaks of her
criminal misdeed to justify the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The clerk admitted the shortage in the court funds
in her custody and pleaded for time to pay the amount she had failed to account for.
In maintaining an earlier Resolution,270 the Court, in In re Wenceslao Laureta,271 also declared that nothing more was needed to
be said or proven and the necessity to conduct any further evidentiary hearing was obviated. In that case, the Court found that the
letters and charges leveled against the Justices were, of themselves and by themselves, malicious and contemptuous, and
undermined the independence of the judiciary.
Meanwhile, in Emiliano Court Townhouses Homeowners Association v. Dioneda,272 it was held that it was reasonable to
conclude that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the respondent committed an infringement of ethical standards by his act of
receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in a case and subsequently failing to render such service. The Court found
the respondent liable for disloyalty to his client and inexcusable negligence in legal matters entrusted to him.
The Court, in Dizon, clarified the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, viz:
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of any
redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to wreak an
injustice against a hapless party. The facts themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a character as to give rise to
a strong inference that evil intent was present. Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from what was already of record.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the inference of evil
intent is based. It merely expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that when such facts are admitted or are already
shown by the record, and no credible explanation that would negative the strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no
further hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the culpability of a respondent is necessary. 273 (Underscoring and
emphasis supplied.)
The apparent toning down of the application of the res ipsa loquitur rule was further amplified in at least two cases. In Louis
Vuitton S.A. v. Villanueva,274 the Court ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to cases of knowingly rendering
a manifestly unjust judgment, and even if the doctrine is appreciable, complainant still has to present proof of malice or bad
faith.
Then came Fernandez v. Verzola,275 where it was held that failure to substantiate a claim of corruption and bribery and mere
reliance on conjectures and suppositions cannot sustain an administrative complaint. In dismissing the complaint, the Court
rejected as untenable the reasoning that the decision itself is evidence of corruption per doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It upheld
the rule that rendering an erroneous or baseless judgment, in itself, is not sufficient to justify the judges dismissal from the
service.
The supposed tempering of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in Dizon only bolstered and solidified the application of the doctrine
in cases not only of gross negligence but of serious misconduct as well, since it speaks of "inference of evil intent."
As explained in Louis Vuitton, the familiar rule in administrative cases is that the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action, and that he cannot be subjected to civil, criminal or administrative liability for any of
his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith.The rule adds that the proper remedy is via judicial
recourse and not through an administrative action.1avvphi1
It must be pointed out that Louis Vuitton involves gross ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. In
cases of leakage or breach of confidentiality, however, the familiar rule obviously does not apply. While the injured party is the
Court itself, there is no judicial remedy available to undo the disclosure. Moreover, the premature disclosure does not spring
85
from the four corners of the assailed decision or resolution nor can it gleaned on the face of the issuance itself. Indeed, one need
not dwell on the substance of the decision since that in itself is inherently insufficient. In unearthing the misdeed, it becomes not
only desirable but also necessary to trace the attendant circumstances, apparent pattern and critical factors surrounding the entire
scenario.
In Macalintal v. Teh,276 the Court pronounced:
When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his
duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight
or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is
in order.1avvphi1 After all, faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is assured that occupants of the
bench cannot justly be accused of deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.277 (Underscoring supplied.)
The same norm equally applies in the breach of the basic and essential rule of confidentiality that, as described in one case, "[a]ll
conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only after deliberation [and c]ourt
personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any
one of them being present. 278
As Dizon declared, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not dispense with the necessity of proving the facts on which the
inference of evil intent is based. It merely expresses that absent a credible explanation, it is clearly sound and reasonable to
conclude a strong inference of evil intent on the basis of facts duly admitted or shown by the record. In fine, jurisprudence
allows the reception of circumstantial evidence to prove not only gross negligence but also serious misconduct.
Justice Reyes is Likewise Liable for Violating his Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
For leaking a confidential internal document of the En Banc, the committee likewise finds Justice Reyes administratively liable
for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he may be
disbarred or suspended per Section 27, 279 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires a lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. It is
likewise provided in Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the said canon that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct and that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system. Here, the act of Justice Reyes not only violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, it also infringed on the internal deliberations of the Court and
impeded and degraded the administration of justice. The act is rendered all the more pernicious considering that it was
committed by no less than a justice of the Supreme Court who was supposed to serve as example to the bench and bar.
That Justice Reyes was an impeachable officer when the investigation started is of no moment. The rule prohibiting the
institution of disbarment proceedings against an impeachable officer who is required by the Constitution to be a member of the
bar as a qualification in office applies only during his or her tenure and does not create immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other supposed violations. 280 Once the said impeachable
officer is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, retirement or permanent disability, the Court may proceed
against him or her and impose the corresponding sanctions for misconduct committed during his tenure, pursuant to the Courts
power of administrative supervision over members of the bar. Provided that the requirements of due process are met, the Court
may penalize retired members of the Judiciary for misconduct committed during their incumbency. Thus, in Caada v.
Suerte,281 this Court ordered the disbarment of a retired judge for misconduct committed during his incumbency as a judge.
However, pernicious as Justice Reyess infractions may have been, the committee finds the imposition of the supreme penalty of
disbarment unwarranted. In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, the Court takes
into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that
those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence. While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to the Courts sound
discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it
should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar. Thus, the
supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of (3) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario be held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and
the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Under the circumstances of this case, the committee finds the be FINED in the amount of 10,000 and 5,000, respectively.
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law sufficient and proper.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Liability of Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista
(Sgd.)
The Committee finds that Atty. Evangelista, Justice Reyes Judicial Staff Head, was remiss in his duties, which includes the LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
supervision of the operations of the office, particularly with respect to the promulgation of decisions. While it is incumbent upon Chairman
him to devise ways and means to secure the integrity of confidential documents, his actuations reflected above evinced "a
disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference."282
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Atty. Evangelista was admittedly unmindful of the responsible safekeeping of draft ponencias in an unlocked drawer of a Member Member
member of the staff. He failed to make sure that the unused portion of confidential documents like the second signatory page of
the ponencia in Gilbert form had been properly disposed of or shredded. He was not on top of things that concerned the
promulgation of ponencias, for he failed to ascertain the status and procedural implication of an "on hold" order after having The Court finds the above-quoted report well taken. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, this per curiam
been apprised thereof by his subordinate, Del Rosario, on July 17, 2008. Despite his awareness that the Limkaichong case would decision was reached after deliberation of the Court En Banc by a unanimous decision of all the members of the Court except for
eventually be called again, he admitted that he was not privy to the preparation of the copy of the ponencia for the subsequent two (2) Justices who are on official leave.
session on July 29, 2008.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court ADOPTS the findings and APPROVES WITH MODIFICATIONthe
With these findings, the Court finds him liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY. Recommendations of the Investigating Committee as follows:

Liability of Armando Del Rosario (1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) is held liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal
document of the Court and he is FINED 500,000.00, to be charged against his retirement benefits, and disqualified
to hold any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or
The committee likewise finds Del Rosario administratively liable for failing to exercise the required degree of care in the
controlled corporations; furthermore, Justice Ruben T. Reyes is directed to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from
custody of the Gilbert copy. Del Rosario admittedly kept the Gilbert copy in an unlocked drawer from July 16, 2008 to
receipt of a copy of this Decision why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar in light of the
December 10, 2008 when he should have known that, by the nature of the document in his custody, he should have kept it more
aforementioned findings.
securely. His carelessness renders him administratively liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY, defined as the failure to
give proper attention to a task expected of an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. 283
(2) Atty. Rosendo B. Evangelista and Armando Del Rosario are held liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTYand
are ordered to pay the FINE in the amount of 10,000.00 and 5,000.00, respectively.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the heavy burden and responsibility which court officials and employees are
mandated to carry. They are constantly reminded that any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance
of official functions must be avoided. The Court will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those This Decision shall take effect immediately.
involved in the administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish the peoples faith in
the judiciary.
G.R. Nos. 119987-88 October 12, 1995

Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, (simple) neglect of duty is punishable by
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
suspension of one month and one day to six months for the first offense. Under Sec. 19, Rule XIV of the same Rules, the penalty
vs.
of fine (instead of suspension) may also be imposed in the alternative. 284 Following the Court's ruling in several cases involving
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
(simple) neglect of duty, 285 we find the penalty of fine on Atty. Evangelista and Del Rosario in the amount of 10,000 and
Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
P5,000, respectively, just and reasonable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

KAPUNAN, J.:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Investigating Committee respectfully recommends that

The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in a criminal case has, on
(1) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) be found liable for GROSS MISCONDUCT for violating his oath as a member of
the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion
the Bar and the Code of Professional Responsibility and be meted the penalty of INDEFINITE SUSPENSION as a
Perpetua or Death?
member of the Bar;

The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1 involve the perpetration of acts so bizarre and
(2) Justice Ruben T. Reyes (Ret.) also be found liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT for leaking a confidential internal
devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:
document of the Court and be FINED in the amount of 500,000, to be charged against his retirement benefits; and
86
 On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by
yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen floating police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12, 1994),
along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila. pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.

When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light
colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left ear,
lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report of the victim, Abundio
Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288 Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila
were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071, reads:
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered a decision 2on January 31,
1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories
provided for by law."3 Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" against respondents
Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua). Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10, 1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portion reads:

The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied with
That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this Court
confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose true names, identifies and
cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their
superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking
ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein
head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and accused is hereby reiterated.
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven
(7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases, together with
LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her
the notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the Revised
death immediately thereafter.
Rules of Criminal Procedure.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
SO ORDERED.

Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo,
Hence, the instant petition.
Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard
Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y
Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape with The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's determination of guilt and its
Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of
committed as follows: events to those cold facts antecedent to the instant case relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e., whether
or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed and/or refused to
impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
Homicide.
the said accused conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO
LAGUNDAY Alias "JR," JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who
have already been charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same We find for petitioner.
offense under Criminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another, with
treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy,
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs
and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y
were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those
warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick
acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without
piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
fear or favor,"4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties,5 or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y
LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent and
on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates ABUNDIO In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the defendant at trial found the
LAGARTO y PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the
death immediately thereafter. commission of the crime for which respondent judge found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its
provisions.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided
over by respondent Judge. Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
87
 Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a amendment, modification, or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it and give it
woman under any of the following circumstances: effect as decreed by the law-making body.8

1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the proper penalty and civil
liability provided for by the law on the accused."9 This is not a case of a magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a
judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing,
respondent judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of Death.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent judge's
finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the
decision imposing the death penalty.

SO ORDERED.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . . .6

Separate Opinions
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion Perpetua but Death. While
Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion
depending on the existence of circumstances modifying the offense committed to impose the penalty of either Reclusion
Perpetua only in the three instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly
and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
NARVASA, C.J., concurring:
be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the
circumstances described, other than a sentence of death.
I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I draw up this separate opinion
merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to the appeal taken by the accused from the judgment of conviction
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious convictions. While this
rendered by respondent Judge. It will be recalled that respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for
Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that a court of law is no place for a protracted
reconsideration filed by the prosecution praying that his decision sentencing both accused to suffer reclusion perpetua be
debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific
"modified in that the penalty of death be imposed" for the reason that since the accused had already "complied with the legal
and well-defined instances. The discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a
requirements for the perfection of an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It was precisely that refusal that
matter upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. In People
prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of certiorari at bar.
vs. Limaco 7 we held that:

[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in arriving
at a conclusion and determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and reversible
error, then we are constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the guidance of the
courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as to the wisdom or
folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme
penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the
statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule
that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls
exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who
approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in
disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of the judiciary we
feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a certain law as
harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department concerned, its
88
It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the court rendering the judgment;
and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal. This proposition considered, and following respondent Judge's
reasoning, this Court's directive for the remand of the case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death
upon private respondents," might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial Court to act in cases over which
it had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.
The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because rendered "without or in excess of . .
. jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts
found to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment
being void, the appeal attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not be deemed to have thereby lost
jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said that it is being required by this Court to act in cases over which it has already lost
jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it and its modification of the judgment so that it may
comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a quo impose the correct penalty of death
as provided by law and consequent to its findings of guilt on the part of private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which
explicates my conformity with the procedure adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary were it not for the
contrary observations that the petition herein should either have been dismissed or consolidated with the criminal case elevated
on appeal by private respondents.
Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty of death and he thereafter
withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall nonetheless proceed, albeit without the benefit of briefs or
arguments from the accused. 8 The automatic review of the case shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an
exception to the provisions of Section 8, Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be waived. 10 The aforementioned
beneficial effects are not provided for and may not be availed of by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.

Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court does not impress me as being The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to procedural due process on appeal, and
concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is before us in the case at bar is an original civil action invoking the safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the corresponding penal sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge Court in this case subserves the ends of these fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.
refused to comply with in grave abuse of his judicial discretion.1 On the other hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to
be consolidated is an appellate recourse wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of guilt and the
VITUG, J., dissenting:
absolution of private respondents.

The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal before this Court. Thus, the instant
Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special civil action are entirely different
petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal brings the case wide open for review and consideration. A ruling on
from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment desired in the appealed criminal case. The basic rule in
the petition would be precipitate and might be so perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.
consolidation of cases in civil procedure2 requires, among others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common
question of law or fact. This is essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal procedure 3 which contemplates
charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character. With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition, it should at the very least be
consolidated with the appealed case.
Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or criminal actions, and not
a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of the latter situation is specially underscored where the Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
resolution of the controversy in the special civil action is a pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These
considerations apply to both the trial courts in the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the
Davide, Jr., J. concurs.
implementation of revisory power.

The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of respondent judge erroneous A.M. No. RTJ-91-712 July 9, 1996
because he imposed the wrong penalty corrected on that score in the first instance. After such correction shall have been
effected, then the appeal from his judgment shall proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or innocence BEN D. MARCES, SR., complainant,
of appellants. The corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended judgment containing the proper penalty shall be vs.
the basis for the review as to whether appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that ultimate penalty. To have JUDGE PAUL T. ARCANGEL, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court Davao City, respondent.
the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the appellate proceeding strikes me as an aberrant
procedure. While it does not exactly square with the figurative posture of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the
same absurdity of both the horse and the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.

It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the appellate review be conducted with MENDOZA, J.:p
the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the basis therefor, with this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake.
This time the cart precedes the horse. True, an appeal throws the judgment a quoopen for review and the Court may raise the Respondents was, at the time material to this case, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Brach 12, at Davao City. 1 He
penalty to the appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes, what is there to prevent appellants from is charged with serious misconduct, grave abuse of authority, harassment, and immorality.
withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the arguments that, instead of the acquittal or reduced penalty aspired for, the
ultimate denouement would be the death sentence?
The complaint alleges the following:

Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw his appeal in the appellate
court.4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee's brief in this Court is permitted. 5 Assuming that
the Court denies the withdrawal of the appeal in order that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment
of the case on the merits,6 why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject to such contingencies
with the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of alternative theories in two sets of pleadings by both parties
when with the decisive sweep of the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and the real areas of contention are laid bare?
Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of error from a judgment of the trial
court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence
being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic review.
That provision calling for automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7serves equally the interests of both the defense
and the prosecution through protective features established by case law.
(1) Complaint is a 61-year old retiree, married to Ruth Jovellar, by whom he has five children, namely, Farley, Lydia, Ben Jr.,
Nikki and Allan. Complainant and the members of his family are residents of the BRC Village, Catalunan Penqueo, Davao
City.
In 1984 the spouses Wilfredo and Flordeliza Caas moved into complaint's neighborhood. They became the nearest neighbors of
the complainant, their houses being only 45 meters apart. In that year, a domestic helper of the Caases sought complainant's
help for alleged maltreatment she had received from her employers. Complainant, who was the incumbent Purok leader, referred
the matter to the barangay authorities. The dispute was resolved, but the relation of the Marces and the Caas families became
strained.

89
On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Caas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Ruth Marces and the latter's daughter,
Lydia, during which they hurled invectives at each other. The incident was triggered by a relatively minor matter involving a
fight between the turkeys owned by the two families but which, because of the bad blood between them, became a major issue.
The following day, September 28, Mrs. Caas, together with her sister and a neighbor, boarded a passenger jeepney despite the
fact that there were no more seats available because complainant was riding on that vehicle. It turned out that Mrs. Caas had
intended to cause the complainant's arrest, because as the jeepney neared the police station, Mrs. Caas asked the driver to stop
the vehicle. Mrs. Caas then got off and called a policeman and had the complainant Ben D. Marces arrested.
The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed to the policeman by Mrs. Caas. The warrants had been
issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases against the herein complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. Complainant was detained for one night without the knowledge of his family, a fact of which Mrs. Caas allegedly
boasted in the neighborhood.
The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the criminal cases against him, in connection with which
the alias warrants were issued, had long been amicably settled. Judge Sarabia told the complainant that he really did not know
anything about the cases and that he had only been requested by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the warrants.
(2) As a result of the September 27, 1990 shouting incident, Mrs. Caas also filed a complaint with the Barangay Captain against
complainant's wife and daughter, Lydia. Mediation conferences between the two families were conducted on October 27, 1990
and on November 3, 1990. Although he had not been asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the conferences. It is alleged
that respondent judge
disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall where the conferences were being held;
introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt to influence the Barangay
Officials; and
accompanied Mrs. Caas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latter's daughter.
During the October 27, 1990 conference, respondent judge allegedly confronted the complainant, accusing him of sending the
judge a death threat by means of a letter which purported to have been sent by the New People's Army.
The barangay officials failed to amicably settle the dispute. It is averred that Mrs. Caas showed "arrogance and callousness at
all times as if to prove that she is protected by a hard rock and impregnable when she is with the judge."
(3) The feud between the Marces and Caas families worsened. On December 29, 1990, there was a violent confrontation
between members of the two families. Some of the parties were injured as a result of hacking. Investigations were conducted by
the police during which, according to complainant, he saw respondent Judge Arcangel talking to the policemen.
(4) On the night of January 2, 1991, armed men in uniform arrived in two military vehicles and arrested members of the
complainant's family and took them to the Davao Metrodiscom Headquarters. The arrests were made on orders of a certain Col.
Nelson Estares. A summary inquest was conducted which complainant laments to be irregular as the arrests were pre-arranged
and the complaint sheet was fabricated. Complainant avers that the illegal issuance and service of the "warrant" (i.e., so-called
Arrest Orders) by the Commander of the Davao Metrodiscom "can only be done by a person with a strong connection, power
and influence," such as respondent judge, considering his high position in the government and close relations with the Caas
family.
(5) In a resolution dated May 11, 1991 the investigating prosecutor, Albert Axalan, found probable cause and filed charges of
attempted murder against complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife and his son, Farley. Complaint's countercharges were dropped.
Three days after, warrants of arrest were issued by the RTC against complainant, his wife Ruth and son Farley respectively.
90
Complainant alleges that respondent Judge Arcangel, taking advantage of his position, influenced the conduct of the preliminary
investigation.
(6) Subsequently, complainant's son, Farley, was arrested. He was handcuffed and taken to the Ma-a City Jail. It is alleged that
respondent's Toyota car, with plate number LBT 555, followed the car of the arresting policemen "as if to make sure that the evil
plan" allegedly "authored by Judge Arcangel is well followed and executed." "To add insult to injury," it is alleged that while the
applications for bail bond of complainant, his wife and Farley were being processed at Branch 8 of RTC of Davao City,
respondent Judge Arcangel arrived and questioned the validity of the bond posted, telling the representative of the bonding
company, "Hindi puwede ito, who gave you the authority to issue?" He then removed the receipts and arrogantly left with the
receipts.
(7) Because of these events, complainant started asking why a judge should have a special interest in his family's feud with the
Caas family. All he knew before was that the judge's car was often parked in front of the house of Mrs. Caas, especially when
Mr. Caas was away working overtime.
In his Comment submitted in compliance with the resolution of this Court, respondent judge alleges (1) that the charges against
him are not only false and malicious but utterly baseless; (2) that the same were filed merely to gratify complainant's personal
spite and animosity against him; and (3) that the complaint was filed in anticipation of the cases which the respondent intends to
file against the complainant for slander and threats.
Respondent judge further avers:
Anent the charge of causing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the complainant and the handling of the same to Mrs.
Caas for enforcement, it was Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and Mrs. Flordeliza Caas who obtained the warrants. He only
requested judge Sarabia of the MTCC of Davao City to issue them. 2 Respondent judge claims the warrants were valid, having
been issued in connection with pending cases and that there were other warrants against complainant which could not be served
because of complainant's close connection with the officers of the warrant section. 3
As to the allegation that he disturbed the barangay conciliation proceedings in the case between the Mares and Caas families
and allegedly acted as "an escort" of Mrs. Caas and "baby-sitter" of her daughter, respondent judge denies he acted as escort
and baby-sitter and claims that he could not have disturbed the proceedings because none were held on November 3, 1990. He
claims that he went to the barangay hall because he filed his own complaint against Ruth Marces and her daughter Lydia.
Apparently, respondent judge is referring to the incident on September 27, 1990 during which Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia
allegedly called Mrs. Caas "KABIT, KABIT, KABIT SA ABOGADO" ("PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR, PARAMOUR OF A
LAWYER").4 The judge probably felt alluded to.
Respondent judge likewise denies that he pressured the police officers and the prosecutors to file charges in court as a result of
the December 29, 1990 hacking incident.
Respondent vehemently denies having illicit relations with Mrs. Caas and that he went to the house of the Caas family
whenever Mr. Wilfredo Caas was away. Respondent claims that he has known the Caas family since 1983, when he was still a
City Judge. According to him, in 1989 he used to go to the Caas residence on request by Mrs. Caas to mediate in the latter's
family problem. After this was settled, he continued going there because he and Mr. Caas had business interests in the
manufacture of appliance protectors.
Finally, it is alleged that complainant is actually a fugitive from justice, who has a string of criminal cases 5 and is notorious in
the community. Respondent further discusses the merits of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident pointing to complainant, his
wife and son as the felons and the guilty parties.
On February 27, 1992, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. A Reply was subsequently filed by the complainant, alleging harassment by respondent judge, as follows: (a)
respondent judge wrote the Administrator of the Social Security System, pretending to be interested in purchasing an acquired
asset consisting of a house and lot, which happens to be the residence of the complainant; (b) the management of the Philippine
Airlines was asked by a fictitious person to revive the criminal cases against the complainant; (c) the respondent judge, together
with a certain Fiscal Dumlao, had been visiting witnesses to the December 29, 1990 hacking incident; (d) the respondent judge
filed an administrative case with the Professional Regulations Commission against Nikki Marces; daughter of the complainant
who had just passed the Nursing Board Examinations; and (e) respondent still visited the house of Mr. and Mrs. Caas.
Complainant further avers that the criminal cases against him are all business-related, being cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and for estafa arising from the issuance of bouncing checks. He calls attention to the fact that respondent
judge discussed in his pleadings the merits of the December 29, 1990 hacking incident and contends that this is improper and
unethical.
On May 26, 1992, the Court referred the case to Associate Justice Luis Javellana of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report
and recommendation. Unfortunately, Associate Justice Javellana suddenly died on August 25, 1993. The case was thereafter
reassigned to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima, but the reception of the evidence was assigned to Executive Judge Romeo D.
Marasigan of Branch XVI, RTC-Davao City. On September 18, 1993, Judge Marasigan forwarded the records of the case,
together with the evidence adduced before him, to this Court. The records were later transmitted to Justice Purisima.
In his Report and Recommendation dated May 30, 1994, Associate Justice Purisima recommends dismissal of the charges
against respondents judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the charge that respondent judge attended mediation conferences
between the feuding families and tried to intervene. As to this charge the Investigating Justice finds that the evidence establishes
the same. Justice Purisima recommends that respondent judge be admonished and sternly warned that repetition of the acts of
impropriety by respondent will be dealt with more severely. The pertinent portions of Justice Purisima's report states:
The charge concerning the frequent visits by respondents Judge at the residence of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas
in Barangay Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and allusion that the former has illicit relation with the latter
are utterly devoid of sufficient substantiation. The mere suspicion on the part of the complainant and
members of his family that the respondent Judge has an affair with Mrs. Flordeliza Caas has been
completely effaced and reduced to nothing reprehensible or censurable by the unequivocal and
straightforward testimonies of Flordeliza's husband and parents that the respondent Judge is just a family
friend whose visits did not have any immoral implication. According to these knowledgeable witnesses,
the latter was their frequent visitor in 1990, when respondent Judge and Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, were
engaged in the manufacture of appliance protectors.
Obviously, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas, the lifetime partner of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, day and night, should
be in the best position to observe her. Whether or not his wife is unfaithful to him is a matter within the
sphere of the husband to detect. Here, Engr. Wilfredo B. Caas having given his wife clean slate, We an
do no less. A different conclusion and ruling could ruin families, which society cherishes and protects
(Article 215, New Civil Code; Article 149, Family Code).
xxx xxx xxx
So also, respondent Judge cannot be held administratively liable for the handcapping [sic] of a son of
complainant, who was allegedly handcapped [sic] and brought to the Ma-a jail, while working at the
Davao Light and Power company. Absent any admissible evidence that the respondent Judge was the one
who caused such malfeasance to happen, he is not answerable therefor.
xxx xxx xxx
But the charge that the respondent Judge was present during the mediation conference between the Marces
family and Caas family on October 27 and November 3, 1990, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of
Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, and that during such conference, respondent Judge was in and out of the
conference room, trying to interfere with the proceedings, and to wield influence as Regional Trial Court
91
Judge, is firmly anchored on Complainant's evidence, which has not been effectively traversed and
negated by respondent's evidence.
From the evidence on hand, it is clear that on October 27, 1990, the respondent Judge arrived at the
Barangay Hall of Catalunan Pequeo, Davao City, in the company of Mrs. Flordeliza Caas, and the
latter's small child. During the said mediation conference between the Marces family and Caas family,
respondent Judge entered the conference room and made it known to all and sundry that he is the
Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao. Such actuation was indiscreet and
improper because the disputes and controversies between the two warring families could develop into a
litigation before any of the courts of Davao.
All things studiedly considered, with due regard to the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced,
pro and con, before Honorable Executive Judge Romeo D. Marasigan of the Regional Trial Court, Davao
City; the ineluctable conclusion is that on October 27, and November 3, 1990, the respondent Judge
intruded into the conference room, and interfered with a mediation conference then being held between
the family of the herein complainant and the Caas family, before the Lupon Tagapayapa of Catalunan
Pequeo, Davao City, and while inside said room, tried to influence barangay officials thereat, by
identifying himself as the Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Davao Regional Trial Court; a misbehavior
and an improper actuation under the premises.
Equally anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the respondent Judge influenced the prosecutors
and police authorities of Davao City to harass the family of complainant.
The Court finds the conclusions of the investigator that respondent judge is guilty of improper conduct to be fully supported by
the evidence in the record. It only needs to be added that the claim of respondent judge that he was at the mediation conference
held on October 27, 1990 because he had himself filed a complaint against Ruth Marces and the latter's daughter, Lydia, is belied
by the fact that respondent judge's complaint was filed only on November 3, 1990.
The report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious allegations in the complaint, of which there is also sufficient
evidence in the record, to wit:
(1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another judge, before whom the case
against the complainant was pending, to issue the warrants; and
(2) That the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991 would not have been made without the intervention
of respondent judge.
These charges have not only been proven by substantial and convincing evidence, but have actually been admitted by respondent
judge. Thus, complainant alleges that he was informed by Judge Sarabia that the warrants had been issued by him upon the
request of respondent judge. This allegation is supported by a handwritten not (Exh. E) of respondent judge, which reads:
Judge Edipolo Sarabia
Br. 3, City Trial Court
Davao City
Dear Ed:
If these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending, please issue
another aliaswarrants as the accused is now in town.
 Respondent judge justifies his intervention
T on the ground that complainant Ben D. Marces had been able to evade service of the
warrants because of connections with hthe warrant officers of Davao City. Even if this had been the case it would not excuse
respondent judge in using his own influence.
a
n
k
Indeed this is the same excuse given for respondent judge's interceding with the Metrodiscom authorities for the issuance of a so-
s
called order of arrest as a result of which complainant Ben D. Marces, his wife Ruth and his children Farley, Lydia, Nikki and
.
Allan were arrested on January 2, 1991. Respondent's own witness, Wilfredo Caas, stated that he was accompanied by
respondent to Col. Nelson Estares. It was Col. Estares who ordered the arrest of complainant and members of his family. Thus,
in his affidavit dated August 23, 1991, Wilfredo
( Caas, stated:
S
g
13. That when my wife and mother-in-law were attacked and hacked by Ben Marces and his family within
d
the premises of our house on December 29, 1990, I called Judge Arcangel for assistance because Ben
.
Marces was trying to manipulate the case by making it appear that they were the victims. . .
)

P
14. That when I followed up the case at the Talomo Police Station and at the Tugbok Police Station, I was
a by the police authorities and I sensed that a ranking police officer was interceding in
given a run around
u
behalf of Ben Marces and his family;
l
15. That when the A police authorities could not come up with a report of the incident after more than three
days, I sought ther assistance of Judge Arcangel, who accompanied me to Metrodiscom Chief Col. Nelson
Estares, to whom c I explained the entire incident and treatment I received from the police who was
investigating the acase;
n
In addition, Wilfredo Caas testified in gthe investigation and affirmed that it was because of the help of respondent judge that he
was able to talk with Col. Estares, thus:e9
l
[JUDGE ARCANGEL conducting examination:]
In addition, complainant presented a certification by the Clerk of Court6 of the MTCC-Davao City, Branch 3, stating
the following:
Q: In connection with the hacking of your wife and mother-in-law, what action did
you take?
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
A: I tried to follow up the complaint to the police station about the hacking incident.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY, that according to the records of this Court, the three (3) Estafa Cases against MR. I even went to the Tugbok police station.
BEN MARCES under Criminal Cases Nos. 9-CM, 10-CM and 11-CM has been in archive since
December 28, 1983 due to non-arrest of the accused and an alias warrant of arrest was issued against the
accused. Q: What action was taken at the police station?

That its discovery and revival was made possible upon the request for verification of its status and A: The police station did not entertain my complaint and they tried to pass me
information by Judge Paul T. Arcangel that accused is back in town and that ultimately resulted to the around.
dismissal of the three (3) cases on March 11, 1991, without which verification the said cases would have
remained pending to date. Q: When no action was taken in your complaint by the police station, what did you
do?
Instead of being delivered to the warrant officer, the warrants were actually given to Mrs. Caas. The entry in the Daily Record
of Events of the Ulas Police Substation 7 stated that "[e]lements of this unit led by P/Cpl. VA Secretaria arrested A: Sensing that there is no hope (to go to the) police, I asked Judge Arcangel to
with alias warrant of arrest one BEN MARCES Y DOMANILLO. . .who was charge[d] with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. accompany me to Col. Estares.
22 with Criminal Case No[s]. 9-CM, 11CM duly signed by Judge Edipolo Sarabia this 28th of September 1990 at Davao City.
The warrant was given by one FLORDELIZA CAAS Y Pelegrino, 26 years old, married, housewife. . . ."
Q: When Judge Arcangel accompanied you to the Office of Col. Estares, what did
you do?
To cap it all, respondent judge himself admitted in his Comment, dated December 27, 1991, that Mrs. Esperanza Deiparine and
Mrs. Flordeliza Caas requested him "to have the warrants renewed, thus, he requested Judge Sarabia for the issuance of the new
warrants"8 against the complainant. A: He introduced me to Col. Estares and I told Col. Estares that my wife and my
mother-in-law were attacked by the Marces family and they were hacked and I
92
 requested Col. Estares to help me because the police did not take any action and I
even sensed that somebody was supporting the Marces family.
With the above-cited charges having been duly proven, in addition to the factual findings of Justice Purisima, it is clear that (1)
respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainant's family and the Caas family and (2) such interference was
not limited to the barangay mediation proceedings but extended as well to the various stages of the conflict. These acts of
respondent judge must be viewed not as single, isolated actuations but in their totality and in the context of the enmity between
the two feuding families. Thus viewed we find the actuations of respondent judge improper and censurable.
Respondent is, as we have so often said, the visible representation of the law, 10 the intermediary between conflicting
interests,11 and the embodiment of the people's sense of justice.12 Unless it was a case filed with his court, it was improper for
him to intervene in a dispute or controversy. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
imposed on the erring judges were dismissal, there were in those cases other grounds warranting the imposition of such drastic
disciplinary penalty. For example, in Ubarra v. Mapalad,17 respondent, aside from pressuring complainants to drop criminal
charges against the accused, likewise refused to inhibit herself when she knew it was improper to decide the case, and was guilty
of delay in deciding the case. On the other hand, in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor18 the respondent was found guilty of attempting to
influence another judge to acquit the accused in a criminal case and, in addition, of making untruthful statements in the
certificate of service.
In the case at bar, there is no other charge against respondent judge. This is his first administrative case. On the other hand his
record as City Judge of Davao City, from 1975 to 1983, and as Regional Trial Court Judge in the same city since 1983 is
otherwise exemplary. In the circumstances of this case, the penalty of reprimand with warning that commission of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely, should suffice to accomplish the purpose of disciplining an erring
member of the judiciary who has not shown himself to be beyond correction. As the Book of Proverbs says, "A single reprimand
does more for a man of intelligence than a hundred lashes for a fool." (17:10)

The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on his
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
part in the future will be dealt with more severely. All other charges are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
judge.13

SO ORDERED.
He should not suffer his conduct to create the impression that any person can unduly influence him or
enjoy his favor.14
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely private matter between feuding families. In
attending, at the request of Mrs. Caas, the barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing himself there as the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of support for Mrs. Caas, respondent lent Melo and Puno, JJ., took no part.
the prestige of his office to a party in a case.

Respondent's request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants of arrest against the complainant is no less censurable. As
the Court had occasion to state in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor:15

Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in
mandating that a Judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04). Interference by members of the bench in pending
suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not only subvert the Separate Opinions
independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people's faith in its integrity and impartiality.

Respondent judge also acted improperly in accompanying Wilfredo Caas to Col. Nelson Estares who ordered the arrest of
complainant and members of the latter's family. It would have been impossible for the Caas family to procure the arrest of
BELLOSILLO, J., dissenting:
complainant and of members of his family by the Davao Metrodiscom were it not for the intervention of respondent judge.

After reviewing the records, I am inclined to sustain the findings and conclusion of Mr. Justice Fedil P. Purisima, Senior
Wilfredo Caas' claim that he had to seek the help of respondent judge because even after three days the police still had not
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, who recommends that except for the charge that respondent Judge interfered in the
made a report on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot justify respondent's intervention in the quarrel. The possibility that
mediation conference between the Marces and Caas families before the Lupon Tagapayapa all other charges against respondent
the incident could become the subject of litigation in his court should have deterred him from getting involved in the feud.
should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, if not for lack of merit. Mr. Justice Purisima recommends that respondent be
only admonished but sternly warned that a petition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Nothing can bring courts into disrepute more than the failure of the occupants thereof to be ever scrupulous in their conduct.
Canon 30 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics cautions judges "in pending or prospective litigation before him [to] be scrupulously
The majority concludes that "[t]he report of the Investigating Justice fails to consider other serious allegations in the complaint,
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships
of which there is also sufficient evidence in the record, to wit: (1) That respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of
constitute an element in determining his judicial course." It cannot be overemphasized that "a judge's official conduct should be
arrest by requesting another judge, before whom the case against the complaint was pending, to issue the warrants; and (2) That
free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of official
the arrest of the members of the Marces family on January 2, 1991 would not have been made without the intervention of
duties but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach."16
respondent judge."1

For the foregoing reasons, we find respondent judge guilty of improper conduct. We do not agree with complainant, however,
With due respect, I find nothing irregular in the letter of respondent to Judge Edipolo Sarabia of the Municipal Trial Court in the
that respondent's misconduct justifies his dismissal from the service. While in some cases involving similar acts the penalties
Cities (MTCC) of Davao City, Br. 3, for the issuance of an alias warrant against herein complainant. We cannot ignore the fact
93
that the accused was the subject of a lapsed warrant of arrest because he made himself scarce and could not be located. It was A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983 December 14, 2007
only when he was spotted in the vicinity after his unexplained absence that respondent, in a manner of speaking, reminded Judge (Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
Sarabia in a letter that "[i]f these cases (Cr. Cases Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M & 11-C-M) are still pending, please issue
another alias warrants as the accused is now in town." Respondent was the Executive Judge of Davao City exercising
JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, complainant,
administrative supervision over the MTCC judge. The letter then of respondent Executive Judge could neither be considered an
vs.
order much less a command to issue the alias warrants. Certainly, as the highest judicial official in the area, it was his duty not
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
only to remind Judge Sarabia to exercise his official function but also to inform the proper authorities of the presence in town of
a fugitive from justice against whom warrants had been issued but could not earlier be served. Respondent judge thus was so
minded to preface his letter with "[i]f these cases (Cr. Case Nos. 9-C-M, 10-C-M, & 11-C-M) are still pending." Indeed it was up x---------------------x
to Judge Sarabia to study the situation and issue the corresponding alias warrants if justified. Quite apparently, respondent Judge
under the circumstances was merely alerting Judge Sarabia of the presence of the accused. There is nothing in the record which
ANONYMOUS LETTER-WRITERS, complainant,
shows that respondent commanded Judge Sarabia to issue the aliaswarrants.
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
Likewise do I find it difficult to ascribe fault on respondent judge for the supposed illegal arrest of the members of the family of
the complainant on 2 January 1991. The record indicates that respondent judge merely introduced Mr. Caas to Metrodiscom
Commander Col. Nelson Estares who ordered and effected the arrest of the members of the Marces family. Thus it was Col. DECISION
Estares who caused the arrest, not respondent Judge. As borne by the records, which the majority quotes, the only participation
of respondent Judge was that he introduced Mr. Caas to Col. Estares. Nothing more. Whether respondent judge threatened, PER CURIAM, J.:
persuaded, or merely requested Col. Estares to order the arrest of the Marceses is simply belied by the records.
These consolidated-complaints filed against Executive Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot (Judge Pacuribot) of the Regional Trial Court
The majority gives considerable weight to the allegation of complainant that "it would have been impossible for the Caas (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, consist of the following:
family to procure complainant's arrest and that of members of the family by the Davao Metrodiscom were it not for the
intervention of respondent judge."2 The allegation however is self-serving.
1. Affidavit-Complaint1 dated 4 December 2005 filed by Sherlita O. Tan (Ms. Tan), Court Stenographer of RTC, Branch 27,
Gingoog City, and affidavit-complaint2 dated 20 December 2005 filed by Johanna M. Villafranca (Ms. Villafranca), Clerk II,
Indeed, the claim of Wilfredo Caas that he had to seek the help of respondent judge because even after three (3) days the police Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office, charging Judge Pacuribot with sexual harassment;
still had not made a report on the incident on December 29, 1990 cannot justify the intervention of respondent in the quarrel
between the members of the family of complainant and members of the Caas family. However, still there is nothing on record
which shows that respondent caused the arrest of the Marces family and in fact intervened in the quarrel between the two (2) 2. Letter3 dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned citizens," asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot on the grounds that he has been
families. terrorizing and harassing most of the employees, both casual and contractual, of the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City; and

True "a judge's official conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the
bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in everyday life, should be beyond reproach." 3 But, "while this Court
may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also step
forward and take the lead to defend him against unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only the magistrate
on trial but the entire judicial system as well."4 Let us not shatter his hopes and dreams of attaining a respectable place in the
judicial hierarchy. We must be deliberate and circumspect in imposing sanctions against judges lest we penalize them for
upholding the law and rendering justice to all.
In fine, I affirm the conclusion of Mr. Justice Purisima that "[e]qually anemic of evidentiary support is the charge that the
respondent judge influenced the prosecutors and police authorities of Davao City to harass the family of complainant."5
Accordingly, I can only vote for the admonition of respondent Judge with a stern warning however that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
3. An undated letter4 from "concerned citizens" also asking the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to investigate the illicit
relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a certain Sheryl Gamulo. They informed the OCA that Sheryl Gamulo bore two
acknowledged children of Judge Pacuribot, the eldest of whom named Rexell Pacuribot was born on 15 October 2004, and the
second child was born on 2 September 2005, both at Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City.
On 14 December 2005, OCA issued a Memorandum 5 recommending that:
1. The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the Committee on Decorum and Investigation of the Regional
Trial Court of Gingoog City for investigation;
2. the complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancia be docketed as a regular administrative matter
3. Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint of Ms. Villafranca; and

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007

(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC) 4. Judge Pacurribot be suspended immediately until further orders from this Court. 6

SHERLITA O. TAN, complainant, On 7 March 2006, we issued a resolution amending Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC, approving all the other
vs. recommendations of OCA and suspending Judge Pacuribot, thus:
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA, finding them to be in accord with existing laws, the same
x---------------------x are hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is immediately SUSPENDED until further notice from
this Court. He is likewise DIRECTED to comment on the complaints of Mesdames Tan and Villafranca within ten
94
 days. The complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed as a regular administrative matter to be
consolidated with that of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancas for proper disposition in line with the foregoing discussions.7
On 25 October 2006, the court referred the case to Justice Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan De Oro
City Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice thereof.
On 8 October 2007, Investigating Justice Dy Liacco Flores submitted her Report 8 with the following findings:
Tans story
Ms. Tans nightmare as an underling of respondent judge started on 20 October 2004 a Wednesday. Having
officially filed a half-day leave, she went to Cagayan de Oro City to attend a wedding ceremony at six oclock in the
evening at Pryce Plaza Hotel. She stood as one of the principal sponsors to a couple named Kimberly Castillon and
Thomas Elliot. At around 8:00 oclock in the evening, while relishing the "gala" portion during the wedding reception
(when the newly weds dance and guests pin peso bills on their attire), she received from [Judge Pacuribot] a call
through her mobile phone, asking when is she going back to Gingoog City. She said she intends to go back right after
the wedding reception. [Judge Pacuribot] offered to bring her to Agora Bus Terminal but she politely refused the
offer saying that she will just take a taxi in going there. Taking her answer as declining his offer, he ordered her to
come out, displaying short temper, saying he was already waiting outside the hotel. To hint at urgency, he told her
that he just slipped out from the Masonic Meeting he was attending and will immediately return to it right after he
will have shuttled her there. Aware that he has the tendency to humiliate anyone in public when he is angry, she
decided to abruptly leave the wedding reception and comply.
xxxx
Coming out into the lobby of the hotel, Ms. Tan saw respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] inside his car, alone. When
she came near, he opened the car door for her and she took her seat. Then, angrily he asked: "What took you so
long?" She kept mum. She saw in between their seats his clutch bag with his short firearm. That sight frightened her
although she was consoled by the thought that she would soon get rid of him at the bus terminal. Pryce Plaza Hotel to
the bus terminal would be about twenty (20) minutes ride, traffic considered.
[Judge Pacuribot] ordered her to lie down on the bed. She yielded out of fear. He pulled her bra and panty, kissed her
neck and lips, and sucked her tongue and breasts. Minutes after, he inserted his penis to her vagina. While he did a
push and pull motion, she was complaining: "You are so rude, Sir! We work in the same office yet you disgrace me!"
He told her angrily: "Shut up! Concentrate! See! Its softening...." She recalled that he tried several times to stiffen
his penis but he seemingly has some erection problem. At his attempt for coitus, she felt the penetration was just
slight. Later, he was getting exhausted and was breathing hard. He would rest each time he failed to have full
enjoyment. While he rested, she would ask him to let her go, but angrily he refused. Instead, he would forcibly ride
on top of her again and make more attempts at coitus until he finally gave up. He said to her: "It wont stiffen because
I have been forbidden to eat many kinds of food such as meat which gives energy."
After a while, Ms. Tan saw [Judge Pacuribot] got up from bed, took his gun, and peeped through the window of the
motel. This time, she once again implored him, "Sir, Ill just take a taxi to Agora." He answered: "Ill bring you
there." At the time, she was so confused that she cannot recall whether he made payment in the motel. She could not
concentrate anymore.
The two left the motel in his car. However, instead of conducting her to the bus terminal, again [Judge Pacuribot]
brought Ms. Tan to another place . . . this time to Discovery Hotel adjacent to Limketkai Center, Cagayan de Oro
City. When she protested, he told her that it would be safer for her to sleep there instead of traveling alone. It was
around 10 oclock in the evening. Still unrelieved of her fright which Ms. Tan calls "shock," or "rattled," she failed to
ask for help, nor did she think of escaping. She was not even able to call her husband. She was even wondering
whether anyone will help her if the judge will do anything to her. After he partially settled the rooms bill, he warned
her not to leave until his return the following morning saying he was returning to the Masonic Conference. After he
left, she asked a bellboy if she could leave, but the bellboy told her that she should first settle the hotel bill before she
can check out. Unfortunately, she had no money enough to pay the balance of the hotel bill. Meantime, through his
cell phone, he kept calling her that night and threatening her to watch out in the office if she would disobey. She was
crying in the hotel. She was terrified of what he will do to her and her family, and what reaction her husband would
make once he learns of what happened to her. She was scared that her husband might kill [Judge Pacuribot] and her
husband would be harmed in turn.
At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, [Judge Pacuribot] arrived. He came panting and rested in bed while Ms.
Tan just stood by. She saw him put his gun near the bed. She recounted the events that happened after, as follows:

Q: What did he do, if any?

Unfortunately, [Judge Pacuribot] had other ideas. Along the way to the bus terminal, he drove in to what looked like a
compound. She unexpectedly saw that his car entered a small garage, and when it stopped, the roll down shutter
quickly locked up from behind. She was brought not to the bus terminal but to a motel whose name she came to A: He ordered me again saying: "Make Love to me!"
recognize only after the incident as the City Lodge Motel in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. She felt deceived.
Knowing the implications, she protested: "Why did you bring me here, sir? Didnt I tell you that I will just take a
Q: What was your reaction, if any?
taxicab to the Agora Terminal?" He rudely told her: "Shut up! As if you are still a virgin!" Respondent judge [Judge
Pacuribot] then directed her to get down the car. Timorously, she obeyed. As soon as she went down his car, she
looked for a possible exit and found none. All she saw was a door which opened. He ushered her into the room, A: I refused.
walking closely from behind her. He locked the door.
Q: What was his reaction, if any?
Ms. Tan, scared and confused, walked to the comfort room, where she pretended to relieve herself. There, she again
looked for a possible exit. Again, she found none. After a short while, she heard [Judge Pacuribot] asking: "What are
A: He angrily shouted at me: "My goodness! Why are you so slow? As if you are a virgin!"
you doing there? Whats taking you so long?" Remembering, that he has a gun, she came out of the comfort room. To
her dismay, she found him nude in bed and fear overcame her more.
Q: What did you feel, if any?
[Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Her reluctance made her move slowly. He let out more impatience
asking: "Whats taking you so long to undress? Excite me!" She refused at first, but he became furious. At that A: I was terrified of him.
moment too, she saw his gun on what seemed to her was headboard of the bed. Frightened, she undressed, retaining
her bra and panty. He asked her to kiss him and she obeyed half-heartedly. While she was kissing his neck, he
Q: What did you do, if any?
expressed dissatisfaction by asking: "You dont know how to kiss! How do you do it with Ramon? Get into sex right
away without any preliminaries?" Ramon is her husband. She was quiet.

95
A: I was forced to go near him, kissed his neck, but [I] stopped. A: I stayed in the bathroom for a while because I was not feeling well.

Q: Why did you stop? Q: What was his reaction, if any?

A: I was disgusted with what I was doing and with him. A: He angrily ordered me to go to him and lie beside him and I obeyed.

Q: What was his reaction, if any? Q: What happened next, if any?

A: He angrily told me: "You dont know how to make love! How do you do it with Ramon? You simply have sex A: He rode on top of me again and tried to insert his penis into my vagina.
without foreplay? Kayati ba sab?"
Q: What happened next, if any?
Q: What was your reaction, if any?
A: His penis could hardly stiffen.
A: I felt helpless and kept quiet.
Q: What was his reaction, if any?
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: He got angry saying: "It cant enter! Your vaginas too small.
A: He ordered me saying: "Suck it!"
Q: What did he do next, if any?
Q: What did he want you to suck on him?
A: He spread my two (2) legs wide apart and tried to insert his penis but it did not stiffen.
A: His penis.
Q: What happened next, if any?
Q: What did you do, if any?
A: He pulled my head towards him by pulling my hair.
A: I refused.
Q: What was your reaction, if any?
Q: What was his reaction, if any?
A: I told him: "Dont pull my hair, sir! Its very painful! What a sadist you are!"
A: He got angry, pulled my hair and pushed my face to his penis saying: "suck it! Let it in till deep your throat! Let
my penis reach your throat!"
Q: What was his reaction, if any?

Q: What did you do, if any?

A: He just kissed my lips, neck, sucked my nipple and mashed my breast by saying: "This is the breast of a lustful
woman" while continuing to suck my neck and breast.
A: I gasped for breath so that when I opened my mouth, his penis entered my mouth.
Q: What happened next, if any?
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: He said: "Im going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let the people know that you passed through my hands."
A: He tightened his hold on me so I was forced to suck his penis afraid that he might break my neck.
Q: What was he referring to as "here"?
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: My neck.
A: His penis reached my throat and I felt nauseated so I ran to the bathroom and vomited.
Q: What was your reaction, if any?
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: I cried.
96
Q: What happened after that, if any?
A: He rested while I went crying to the bathroom, washed my body then dressed up.
Ms. Tan again pleaded for [Judge Pacuribot] to let her go. This time, [Judge Pacuribot] assented, but he offered to
bring her to the bus terminal. Traumatized, she refused the offer. She told him that she will just take a taxi and will
have breakfast at the Ororama. Still he insisted to shuttle her there. Thus, at about past 8:00 oclock in the morning,
he left her at Ororama Cogon, Cagayan de Oro City.
Ms. Tan did not report to the office the next working day, that was 22 October 2004 a Friday. She absented herself
from her work because she still had noticeable number of kiss marks on her neck. She only reported on Monday and
covered her kiss marks with her hair. At the office, [Judge Pacuribot] told her not to file anymore her leave for
October 20 and 21, 2004 while bragging, "Ako na gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail against
me?)
Ms. Tan told no one of her traumatic experience and carried on as if nothing happened. But from then on, [Judge
Pacuribots] advances on her went on unabated even in the office. Whenever she would go inside his chamber, at
times, he would grab her blouse, mash her breast, and kiss her neck saying that she smells so sweet. At times, he
would touch the crotch of her pants or pull the string of her panty. On 13 October 2005, he did the same indignities to
her in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latter just pretended to see nothing by turning his
back. Every time she would resist and/or evade his sexual advances, he would shame her before her officemates at a
later time. He also told her to send him text messages of endearment. She was warned that her failure to comply, or to
receive his call, or reply to his text messages will have an adverse effect on her performance rating.
The situation got worse for Ms. Tan when respondent judge [ Judge Pacuribot] indicated his interest in renting a room
in her house which she used as her home office. Ms. Tans house is near the Police Station and the courthouse.
Initially, she candidly told him that the said room is not for rent. She even refused him in the presence of her
officemates who cannot comprehend why she should not allow him to rent the room considering that it would be an
additional income for her. At that time, they were unaware what she was going through.
Ms. Tan brought her commercial calendar to their office. It has her picture. Having seen it, [Judge Pacuribot], in the
presence of Ms. Tan, instructed Placido Abellana, the court aide, to mount her calendar at the door of his chamber,
saying: "Whoever removes the calendar would take a scolding from me. Dont remove Shirleys calendar. I like that
hot babes." Then, pointing to her picture, he added: "Thats my idol, the hot babes Kikay!" As he was still trying to
persuade her then to let him rent a room in her house, he said in jest to Placido Abellana: "If I rent the room, I will
call Shirly she will massage me and step on my back and I will feel good because Shirley is sexy."
With the pressure on her to rent him a room being kept, Ms. Tan eventually yielded, but she erected a wall between
his rented room and her house, and provided for him a separate ingress and egress. Nonetheless, when her husband is
not around, she would find him knocking on her window and ordering her to go to his room.
Ms. Tan claims that if [Judge Pacuribot] could not have his way with her because she resists, he would scold her in
his chamber and would also humiliate her in the presence of her officemates. She would also receive threats from him
as regards her performance rating. In fact, her "Very Satisfactory" rating in the previous years of her service went
down to "Satisfactory" for the period of January to June 2005, the first and only time that she was given such a rating.
Because of the very oppressive ways of [Judge Pacuribot], Ms. Tan eventually suffered from what doctors call
"chronic fatigue syndrome" and was hospitalized in December 2005. Dr. Virgilio Lim of Lipunan Hospital of
Gingoog City treated her. Dr. Lim testified that emotional stresses of a patient could lead to chronic fatigue
syndrome.
97
Ms. Tans helplessness against the sexual abuses and advances of her judge was gnawing on her. She found it
revolting. She finally mustered enough courage to come out in the open to free herself. She executed an Affidavit
Complaint sworn before a woman Clerk of Court of Cagayan de Oro City on 06 December 2005. She flew to Manila
and went to the Supreme Court on 08 December 2005 to file her administrative case against her superior. In February
2006, she filed criminal charges of rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual harassments against [Judge Pacuribot]
before the City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. At the onset, no lawyer in Gingoog City would even want to accept her
case. The criminal cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. She re-filed the case with the Prosecutors Office of
Cagayan de Oro City. They were also dismissed.
Villafrancas Story
Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] sometime in November 2004 at the lobby near the
Probation Office at the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City where she holds office. When [Judge Pacuribot] passed by,
she was then talking to a certain Dondi Palugna, her childhood friend who at that time was [Judge Pacuribots] driver.
Short introductions followed.
On 18 December 2004, Ms. Villafranca received a call through her cell phone from [Judge Pacuribot]. To Ms.
Villafranca, the call was unexpected. After their talk, he asked her if he could call again for chitchat. She answered
"Ok lang." She asked him how he got her mobile number. He said he got it from Dondi Palugna. Later, she began to
receive text messages from him, telling her how beautiful and sexy she is, how the mini skirt suited her, etc. She
courteously acknowledged his praises and said "thank you" to him. Then, he started inviting her for dinner. Knowing
him to be married and the fact that she is married, she declined these invitations citing an inoffensive excuse which is
her evening teaching sessions at Bukidnon State College, Gingoog City. But she found him persistent. One time, he
took offense at her refusal, saying "Why dont you come with me? I AM A JUDGE! Why should you refuse me?
Why do you go with Dondi and not with me when I AM A JUDGE?" At another instance, he even asked her why she
goes with Dondi Pallugna, a drug addict, and not him a judge. Although scared of his outbursts, which by reputation
he was known, she politely explained to him that his driver Dondi Pallugna was her childhood friend. Still, she had to
dodge his persistence.
In avoidance, Ms. Villafranca requested for a transfer to Probation Office, Cagayan de Oro City. This was in
February 2005. She was asked to make a written request which she failed to file due to heavy work load. At that time,
the Regional Office of the Probation Office for Region X was about to hold a Timestral Conference. Venue of the
Conference was Gingoog City and so the host office for that conference was the Gingoog City Parole Office where
Ms. Villafranca works. She was assigned to take charge of the hotel accommodations of participants in the
conference. For that reason, she was too busy attending to her assigned task that she failed to prepare the written
request. Accordingly, nothing materialized out of her intended transfer.
Although calls of [Judge Pacuribots] were unwanted, but Ms. Villafranca wanted to be polite to him for two (2)
reasons: his status as a judge and his reputation, in the Hall of Justice, as "terror" which caused most people to fear
him. So, she took his calls politely, gave him respect, and when she had to turn down his call, she had to do it
courteously like: "Ok, sir, I still have work to do, I cannot talk long."
In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call from [Judge Pacuribot] who was fuming mad because
she refused his dinner invitations. Scared, she finally relented. It was scheduled on 22 February 2005 which turned
out to be her worst nightmare.
February 22, 2005 came. [Judge Pacuribot] asked Ms. Villafranca to choose a restaurant. She singled out The
Mansion in Gingoog City for good reasons. The Mansion is owned by her relative. On that account, she thought that
in the place she will be safe. She planned to invite one of her relatives in that restaurant during the dinner. By
arrangement, she was to be picked up at 7 p.m. at the school gate.
A few minutes past 7 p.m., on the appointed date, [Judge Pacuribot], driving his car, fetched Ms. Villafranca. He
opened the car door to her and she took her seat. While she was talking to him, she saw him brought out his clutch
bag, took out his gun, cocked it and put it in between them. Frightened that it may blow off anytime, she voiced out
her fears of guns. He quickly replied that guns are for the safety of judges who are prone to ambushes.
Noticing that [Judge Pacuribot] was driving towards the opposite direction of The Mansion, she told him they are
driving the wrong way. But she was told that they are going to Butuan City as he knew a great dining place there.
While driving with his left hand, [Judge Pacuribot] would hold his gun with his right hand and put it down every now
and then when he had to change gear. This scared her even more and she started shaking in fear. She observed that he
was over speeding and would honk his horn furiously so the other drivers would allow him to overtake. She started
having frightening thoughts like imagining being killed if she resists and be left along the road. She feared for her
life, and of her children.
After about an hour, Ms. Villafranca noticed that [Judge Pacuribot] turned right from the national highway, and a
little farther, he honked his horn, entered a garage which then immediately closed as soon as his car entered. It was
late for her to realize that he brought her to a motel in Butuan City. She became numbed with fear. He alighted from
the car carrying his gun, and opened the door on her side. She asked him: "Why are you taking me here? You told me
we were going to a restaurant." He ignored her. He told her to get out of the car. Sensing she was uncooperative
because she would not get down, he grabbed her from the car. She tried to resist but she was numbed with fear. She
wanted to get away but she could not seem to move. He pushed her in the room. She attempted to go out of the room
but he locked the door and blocked it with his body. She pleaded to him to let her go because her children and family
are looking for her. Then, [Judge Pacuribot] grabbed Ms. Villafranca by her shoulders and tried to kiss her. She
evaded by backing out from him and turning her face away. As she continued to back away from him, she fell on the
bed while he immediately laid on top of her. She felt his hands groping all over her body, as he tried to kiss her. She
kept on pleading to him to let her go; that she wants to go home because her kids are looking for her. He lifted her
blouse, unbuttoned and unzipped her pants while she was pushing him away. But he was too strong and big for her.
She tried to get up when he took off his pants and brief, but he was fast and was soon on top of her. As he pinned her
down on the bed, she could hardly move and found him too heavy. All along she was trembling in fear and was
crying while pleading to him for mercy. But he could not be dissuaded. On cross examination, [Judge Pacuribots]
counsel asked her some details on this incident, as follows:
Atty. Kho:
Q: You said you were brought to Butuan City in a motel. Do you remember the name of the motel?
A: No, I dont.
Q: Could you remember the size of the room that you were in on that day which you claim on February 22, 2004?
A: Im sorry, Attorney, everything seems to be so blurred during that time. All I could really remember was asking
him to take me home because it was not agreed that I go with him in a motel but in a restaurant at Mansion by the sea
at Gingoog City.
Q: So you dont remember really anything else?
A: I remember what happened to me.
Q: Why, what happened to you?
A: When he forced himself to me.
Q: When you say he forced himself to you, what do you mean?
98
A: When he was on top of me and he was kissing me. God, I can feel and I can remember how heavily he was
breathing in my face and he was kissing me all over and he was trying to position himself inside of me. Those are
what I can remember and I kept on telling him: "No! I want to go home to my children." I wanted to go home because
my family will be looking for me. What? Did he listen to me? No, he kept on telling me I am emancipated. Nobody
will look for me.
Q: What were you wearing at that time on February 22?
A: I was wearing pants and a blouse.
Q: Were you undressed at that time?
A: I am sorry?
Q: Were you undressed?
A: Undressed? He undressed me.
Q: He undressed you?
A: Yes.
Q: Nothing left?
(No reply).
Ms. Villafranca felt that her legs were being parted as [Judge Pacuribot] tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but
she could sense he had difficulty with erection. She felt penetration was slight. She recalled that he tried penetration
more than three times, but was unsuccessful. She felt his heavy breathing while he planted vile kisses on her neck and
chest. Her repeated pleas for mercy had not done her any good. Not long after, he rolled over with her and she found
herself on top of him. He grabbed her hair and pushed down her face to his penis, and forced her to do oral sex on
him instead. She resisted, but he insisted saying that it was what he wanted, otherwise she would be put to harm. She
took it to mean that he will kill her if she refuses him. Scared, she relented and had oral sex on him. She felt shamed
as she sucked his limp penis. She was disgusted with him, with herself and the very act itself. Still not having an
erection, he released his grip on her. While she was physically and emotionally exhausted, she continued crying for
mercy, but [Judge Pacuribot] was boasting that nobody in his right mind would refuse his demands as he could easily
cause damage to anybodys honor if he wanted to.
Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and pants. [Judge Pacuribot] also got up and took his cell
phone. She pulled the sheets to cover herself because her blouse was on the opposite side of the bed. However, he
pulled the sheets from her and pushed her to the bed half naked. She braced herself with her arms so that the she
would not be pinned down on the bed again. But to her surprise, he took a picture of her, using his cell phone. She
was petrified. He then looked at the picture commenting that it was no good because she was not smiling, so he
ordered her to smile as he will take another picture of her. Although she defied him, yet he did take another picture of
her. She the hurriedly put on her blouse while he dressed up, fixed himself and tucked his shirt and his gun.
After [Judge Pacuribot] settled the bill, he led her out of the room. Ms. Villafranca shrugged him off. At the garage,
she was ushered to the front seat of the car. She was dying to go home. He drove back to Gingoog City. On their way
back, she turned her back on him, closed her eyes, covered her face with hand, and pretended to be asleep. Later, he
informed her of their approach to Gingoog City. She asked him to drop her off at the old Caltex gasoline station along
the national highway. From there, she hailed a motorela, went home, took a long bath to wash his marks of her. At Q: And?
about 11 p.m., she fetched her children from her fathers house. When asked where she had been, she gave her father
a lame excuse that she went out with her friends.
A: And what? How would I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am I going to? I dont
know. I just wanted to protect my family from any shame, from any scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold to
Ms. Villafranca reported to work the next day. There had been some phone calls in their office. Like any other office, me. And he knew that I would be very careful with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly
whoever has the convenience to answer at the time would pick up the phone. [Judge Pacuribot] had called twice their threatening me with such same arguments, you know. "Ikaw and madaot ani. Imo ning kuan tana."
office already and when her officemates answer the phone, he would just hang the line. When the phone rung again,
she picked it up. It was [Judge Pacuribot] on the other end. After recognizing her voice, he belittled her yelling:
Atty. Ignes:
"Prostitute! Devil! Animal! Why dont you pick up the phone?" She was consumed with fear, and meekly told him
that she was just busy. Days passed as he continued to threaten her with the publication of her half naked picture. She
tried to pacify him sensing that he could make real his threats. Being married to an overseas worker with two kids, "You will be destroyed because of this."
she was so scared of figuring in a scandal. Her fright of him was burdensome. He would send her text messages
telling her of sweet nothings, but every time she would ignore them, he would burst in anger and would renew his
Atty. Kho:
threats. At times, she made excuses, like having no cell phone load, but he would insist that she should secure a load,
otherwise he would shame her. He was far too wise to accept excuses. Her constant fear made her succumb to his
blackmails. Q: So, you admit that you sent him a lot of text messages?

[Judge Pacuribot] was always demanding that Ms. Villafranca send him text messages and letters expressing
nonsense, a matter she could not understand then. She thought it was only to feed his ego. On cross examination,
[Judge Pacuribots] counsel asked why she complied with these orders. She answered:
Atty. Kho:
A: I did not deny it in my affidavit. I had it in my affidavit, that there were text messages and forced notes written for
him.
[Judge Pacuribot] also asked her to send him cards with amorous messages. On these, she was also grilled on cross
examination. It went as follows:

Q: In your affidavit, do you remember having said that the respondent is forcing you to send to him text messages? Atty. Kho:

A: Yes. Q: You mean you often wrote some notes?

Q: And you complied with the sending of these text messages? A: Yes. I may even have some drafts there wherein he even edited it.

A: Yes, because one day when I was not able to text he called me and he screamed at me over the phone and then he Q: What kind of notes were they?
said: "Burikat, animal ka, yawa ka, imo gibuhat dili ko nimo i-ignore. This will be the last time na imo ko i-ignore
sa text or sa tawag nako. Otherwise, you will pay for it."
A: Love notes and there was a time he made me write a letter to my mother-in-law which the very next day I was
posting myself at the Post Office awaiting for that letter to come so that I could intercept it.
Atty. Ignes translating:
xxxx
"You whore, you devil, you animal, dont you dare! This will be the last time you will ignore me in my
call, otherwise you will pay for it."
Q: Also attached to the Comment of respondent are some notes already marked as Annex 9. Could you go over some
of these notes and tell us if this is your handwriting? Annexes 9 and 9B.
Atty. Kho:
A: I will not deny that I wrote these letters but they were under his supervision just like the ones he made to my
Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you? mother-in-law and to my husband.

A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my mother-in-law and then he Q: You mean to say you were writing the letters?
will destroy me and he will create scandal in Gingoog City.
A: Yes. He will dictate to me what to do, what to say.
Q: Is it not that you are well-connected? Your grandmother is the mayor. Did you not report it to her?
xxxx
A: My husband is not around, Attorney.
Q: So you were acting like a stenographer who writes down his dictation?

99
A: I did not act like a stenographer who wrote down his dictation. But I acted like a victim who is under threat by A: I did not send your client. He gave it to himself.
some
Q: I am going to show you one last card. Tell me, is this one of the cards that you said you signed? Im going to give
Q: The words here in Annexes 9-A and 9-B, you mean to say all of these are his words, the respondent? this to you. For submission.

A: As I said Attorney, yes, under his dictation, under his supervision. Do you know what is this? A: Yes.

Atty. Kho: Q: This is one of the cards that you signed?

No. Do not ask me a question. You are not allowed to do that. A: One of those cards that I signed.

Witness (continuing) xxxx

While I was doing those writing, I felt that all my limbs were so tired. I felt so heavy writing those letters. Q: Miss Witness, the handwriting on this card now marked as Exhibit 6, on the second line of the handwriting are the
words "Love you, Bi." Could you tell us what is the meaning of the word "Bi", if you know?
Atty. Kho:
A: It has no significance with me because your client dictated it to me.
Q: So you admit sending the respondent a lot more letters that the ones Ive presented you?
Q: So, it was dictated only.
A: I admit that I wrote those letters under his supervision, yes.
A: As I said, he dictated words to me.
Q: All of the letters that you sent were all under his supervision?
Ms. Villafrancas resistance would always be met with a threat to divulge the incident in the motel. Although she
yielded to these promptings of sending him text messages or cards or notes, she never understood why [Judge
A: As I said, yes, under his supervision. There were times that he would even call me to his chamber to have some
Pacuribot] behaved so. It was late in the day when enlightenment came to her that all his orders to her to send him
cards signed.
amorous text messages, letters and cards were not to feed his ego but to prepare for his defense even while she was as
submissive as a lamb. In his Comment to the administrative charge against him, he cited the text messages, letters and
Q: So, aside from notes, you also sent him cards? cards he induced her to send to him to deflect her charges of rape and unprofessional conduct and prove them untrue.
He cited them in his Comment as her manifestation of "fatal attraction" to him.
A: Yes, I recall signing them because he would ask me to do so.
xxxx
xxxx
There had been occasions when [Judge Pacuribot] summoned Ms. Villfranca to his chambers on the pretext of
discussing probation matters, but once inside his chamber, he would lock the door, grab her, kiss her, put kiss marks
Justice Flores: on her neck and chest. He would pull her hair and push her down to his crotch and demand that she performs oral sex
on him. Her overpowering fear of him and the scandal he can inflict on her family made her yield to him. When she
Q: When you said that the judge would even call you to his chamber to sign cards, what kinds of cards? would disobey him he would call her cell phone with lots of insults like calling her "burikat" or with his threats.

A: Greeting cards, Your Honor. Also, [Judge Pacuribot] demanded food from Ms. Villafranca which the latter had to bring to his room in Ms. Tans
house. Her fear of dire consequences of her resistance absorbed her. When demanded to bring food, she would
comply out of fear. In her words, "Yes, I went because he would put me under pressure and under fire." She went not
Atty. Kho: only because of his constant threat of making public his cell phone picture of her, half naked, but also because of "his
added threat that he is going to tell my mother-in-law; that he is going to destroy me; that I am nobody; that my
Q: Hallmark? family is no good and he would call me burikat, burikat (whore). He would call me that name yawa ka, animal ka.
Sumunod ka nako." She was angst-ridden with the set up. She was fearful that somebody might see her in his rented
room or on her way to it or back. She was made to go there about eight (8) times. All these instances, she saw him
A: I dont recall. I would just easily sign them, do whatever he wanted and then after he is done touching me I would display his gun. She found him too selfish and an ingrate. Once, on his demand to bring food, she brought him
ask myself to leave. only pansit and lumpia which was no longer crisp. Unappreciative, he furiously stabbed his plate with fork, breaking
it and carped that she served him food which is not fit for a judge, and suited only to her seaman husband. He also
Q: So, you also sent him lots of greeting cards?
100
made her eat with him on occasions which she abhorred so much because according to her "he ate like a pig eating
fast with shoulders hunched, elbows on the table, mouth noisily chewing the food."
When grilled on those eight (8) times, the following exchanges between [Judge Pacuribots] counsel and Ms.
Villafranca took place:
Atty. Kho:
Q: In all of these times, 8 times which you said, you did not care to offer any resistance?
A: I had offered a lot of resistance, Attorney, but your client would make it a point that I should not refuse him.
Q: You tried to resist?
A: I had evaded him many times, many times but he would always point out that I should not refuse him, otherwise
he will destroy me and he did eventually when I finally had the courage to put up with him, you know.
(The witness is crying at the witness stand)
Q: During those 8 times which you said you went to the room of respondent at Sherlita Tans place which is near the
police station and the LTO, was there a time that you shouted?
A: I could not shout, Im scared.
Q: You were scared of what?
A: Scared of your client.
Q: Of the person?
A: Yes and how intimidating he could be and how evil he could be.
After eating, Ms. Villafranca would be ordered to take off her clothes; then, [Judge Pacuribot] would lay on top of her
for his sexual pleasures. But penetration would be slight because, as usual, he had difficulty with erection. As a
consequence, he would push her down to his organ and order her to do oral sex on him. She detested his routine of
putting kiss marks on her neck and chest which he intentionally used so that, as he told her, people would know that
he owned her. At times, she left his rented room wearing a hooded jacket in order o hide her face fearful that certain
people might recognize her along the way. There were times she also left his room without underwear because he
would not give it to her. She hated his sexual abuses, but she was more afraid of causing scandal to her family.
In April 2005, after having dinner with [Judge Pacuribot] in his rented room, Ms. Villafranca was pulled by her hair
and was asked, "[w]ho owns you now?" She answered in fear "you." He looked very pleased. Then, he told her to
leave her husband and promised to help her file a marriage annulment complaint in Gingoog City. She did not say a
word. He went on top of her and pulled her hair demanding for an answer. Terrified, she said "opo". Then, she was
forced to have sex with him.
[Judge Pacuribot] wanted to destroy the relationship Ms. Villafranca has with her husband and his family. He forced
her to write a letter, asking for a break up of marriage from her husband which [Judge Pacuribot] edited. He also
ordered her to write to her mother-in-law with whom she had some difficulty in their in-law relationship, to say she
101
wanted a marriage break-up. She told him she does "not need to write letters to her mother-in-law. What for?" But he
insisted. Her hands felt heavy writing them, in fact it took her three drafts to write as shown in Exhibits "B", "C" and
"D" of Ms. Villafranca. Discontented with her drafts, he took away the last from her, edited it, and told her he will
mail it to her mother-in-law. Thinking he will make good of his threat, the following day she posted herself outside
the Gingoog City Post Office for a long time and waited for the mailing of said letter so that she can intercept it. No
one came. She instructed the postal clerk that if there is a letter intended for her mother-in-law, she should not give it
to her mother-in-law but to her instead.
Meantime, Ms. Villafrancas morbid fear of [Judge Pacuribot], his threat to mire her and her family in scandal and
her guilt toward her family had been sucking her into a vortex of emotional and physical collapse. She bore the
immense pain of yielding to him. She seemingly could not withstand the humiliation for being involved in forced
sordid incidents with [Judge Pacuribot] whom she detested.
On 9 May 2005, seemingly depressed for her accumulated frustrations for not being able to see her way out of her
predicament, Ms. Villafranca, sent a text message to her husband who was then working aboard a foreign vessel. Her
text message went this way: "Whatever will happen to me, you take care of the kids." He asked: "Whats wrong?"
She answered: "I cannot fully disclose to you everything but in due time I will. Whatever happens to me, just take
care of the kids and that I love them." Her disturbing message constrained her husband to pre-terminate his
employment contract and rushed home to Gingoog City on 15 May 2005. She then personally told [Judge Pacuribot]
to stop calling her or asking for food, but he grabbed her hair, twisted her head and planted a kiss mark on her neck,
telling her that it would send a message to her husband that he, not her husband, owned her. Still, she was not
prepared to make her revelations to her husband.
In the third week of May 2005, Ms. Villafranca was persistently instigated by [Judge Pacuribot] to file an annulment
case against her husband. Later, he asked her to sign what Ms. Villafranca calls a "ridiculous document" he drafted
wherein it purported to show that she and her husband agreed that each of them may freely cohabit with a third
person. She signed it in the face of his threats. Worse, he asked her to ask her husband to sign the same document.
On 25 May 2005, at the Hall of Justice in Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca was summoned to [Judge Pacuribots]
chamber. Once inside, he slapped her for not filing her petition for annulment of marriage and hit her head with
clenched fist. Then, he planted on her neck kiss marks which he said he wanted her husband to see. Indeed, when her
husband found her with kiss marks, she suffered from her husbands beating.
Citing her husbands beating her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to [Judge Pacuribot] to stop molesting her. He countered
with an unusual suggestion File a rape case against him. When she refused, the threat of the dire consequences of
her refusal came again. She still kept from her husband what she was going through.
But [JudgePacuribot] seized another incident to destroy her more. On 15 June 2005, he reported in writing to the
superiors of Ms. Villafranca superiors in local office and superiors in Manila alleging her negligence allegedly
committed on 6 June 2005 in forgetting to shut off the air-con unit in their Probation Office. Her local superior in the
Probation Office referred to her the letter of [Judge Pacuribot]. She prepared an explanation which her local superior
used as letter to the judge. Thinking that because she authored that letter, the explanation there covered already her
side, she did not write nor see the judge anymore. This further infuriated him.
xxxx
In July 2006, Ms. Villafrancas request for transfer was granted and she started working in Cagayan de Oro City on
17 July 2006. The transfer of assignment resulted in her constant separation from her nine (9) year old son and four
(4) year old daughter, plus the great inconvenience of a 2 hours bus ride from Gingoog City one way, and
transportation expenses. She would usually go home to Gingoog City to be with her family and children on
weekends, or every now and then, and sometimes late at night.
 After her transfer to the Probation Office in Cagayan de Oro City on 17 July 2006, Ms. Villafranca was able to tell
her husband what she went through. Before that, she just could not find the courage to tell him because she was
scared. When she was twitted on cross examination on how so long that she was scared, she said:
Atty. Kho:
Q: So, what you told him at that time was that you were scared?
A: Attorney, I was walking in fear most of those times and even up to now when I came home I am walking in fear. I
dont know if Im safe. I dont know if the next day I will be dead. I dont know. Those were the times when I asked
my husband to accompany me because Im always scared all the time. Even if I just go out of the gate ask my
husband to accompany me.
(At this juncture, witness is sobbing)
Ms. Villafranca decided to fight back with this administrative charge. She subscribed her Affidavit-Complaint before
State Prosecutor Roberto A. Escaro on 13 December 2005. In Ms. Villafrancas Complaint she prayed that [Judge
Pacuribot] be found guilty of gross violation of the Judicial Code Of Professional Responsibility (Code of Judicial
Conduct) for being totally unfit to stay in the Judiciary and she prayed that he be ordered immediately dismissed from
service. She also prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be immediately ordered to cease and desist from causing any further
assault on her person, in her personal and professional capacity.
On the same day, Ms. Villafranca submitted her Affidavit-Complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator. [Judge
Pacuribot] filed his Comment. Among others, he cited that Ms. Villafranca was "fatally attracted to him" and that he
refused to reciprocate because "he is a judge and happily married," and for the reason that Ms. Villafrancas
"misdirected adoration is atrociously immoral." Ms. Villafranca filed a Rejoinder refuting point by point the defenses
of [Judge Pacuribot] and calling them lies. Ms. Villafranca said his defenses are presumptuous and revolting because
in the Hall of Justice, female personnel "invariably veer away from his path in trepidation." She asserts that [Judge
Pacuribots] extramarital indiscretions are well known, if not well documented, in Gingoog City, that it is common
knowledge that his mistress Sheryl Gamulo, whom [Judge Pacuribot] housed in Motomull St., Gingoog City, gave
birth to two (2) children by [Judge Pacuribot] on 16 October 2004 and 02 September 2005 at the Maternity Hospital,
Cagayan de Oro City; that the eldest child was baptized in Opol, Misamis Oriental with Atty. Wilfredo Bibera, his
clerk of Court, and Dondi Pallugna, his driver, as baptismal sponsors. Ms. Villafranca claims therein that respondent
judge is also known to have sired a daughter in Ozamiz City now about ten (10) years old whose picture has been
circulated in the Hall of Justice and that [Judge Pacuribots] immorality most probably inflicted on victimized women
is a sick source of scandal and gossip in the city.
To be able to put behind her harrowing experience, Ms. Villafranca applied for leave of absence with their office to
work abroad knowing that [Judge Pacuribots] order in People v. Anude and his letter to her superiors have
effectively made her lose that desired promotion. Eventually she left the country on 2 October 2006 for Dubai, UAE
to work and forget her past even if her leave of absence in their office was not yet approved. On 18 March 2007, she
returned to testify in this case after struggling against employment restrictions and financial constraints, she not
having been half a year yet abroad. On 22 March 2007, when asked on the witness stand when she will leave again
for Dubai, she said: "I want to leave the country as much as possible and stay out of here. I dont want to be reminded
of what happened to me." At the time she testified in March 2007 in this case, her leave of absence in the Probation
Office was not yet granted.
In his Comment,9 Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms. Tan and Villafranca for "lack of factual and legal bases"; and
opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were motivated by revenge and were part of a comprehensive and sinister
plan to drive him out of service.
102
Judge Pacuribot made total denial of Ms. Tans charges against him and claimed that the alleged incidents on 20 and 21 October
2004 were "big lie[s], a fraud, a hoax and deception." He insisted that he could not have committed the acts complained of by
Ms. Tan because in his first five months in office, he was busy planning what to do and how to quickly dispose of the almost 500
cases he inherited, including the new ones raffled to him.
In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape incidents on 20-21 October 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and interposed
the defense of alibi. He contended that he was in faraway Gingoog City, which is 120 kilometers away from Cagayan de Oro
City. He stated that on Mondays, he reports for his duties in Gingoog City, and goes home to Cagayan de Oro City only on
Fridays. He maintained that on 20 October 2004, a Wednesday, at 7:00 p.m., he went out of his chambers with his court aide
Placido Abellana, Jr., and his security officer SPO1 Ronald Espejon. They proceeded to Garahe Sugbahan Grill for dinner. After
dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted him back to his boarding house. Abellana left him at 9:00 p.m. while Espejon went home
at about 11:00 p.m.
Judge Pacuribot admitted that he did not hold trial on 21 October 2004, a Thursday, because the scheduled settings were all
cancelled that day which cancellation was made a week before. He averred that on the same day, he was writing decisions in his
chambers. In the evening, he asked Abellana to buy food and they ate supper with Espejon. Abellana left him about 8:00 p.m.
while Espejon left at about 10:00 p.m.
He, thus, concluded that it was impossible for him to be with Ms. Tan on 20 and 21 October 2004, a Wednesday and a Thursday,
respectively. He argued that no proof existed to show his physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City on those dates; hence, the
presumption of his continuing physical presence in his station during the inclusive period alluded to ran in his favor.
Judge Pacuribot also cited several factors which made Ms. Tans allegations unbelievable:
1. Ms. Tans behavior was not reflective of a rape victim. Ms. Tan did not immediately report the incident to the authorities. As a
43-year-old lady who is no longer nave and having assisted as stenographer in countless rape cases, she should know how
important it is to immediately report the incident.
2. Judge Pacuribot pointed to Ms. Tans admission that she did not put up a struggle when he allegedly brought her to City
Lodge Motel and Discovery Hotel. Had she wanted to catch the attention of employees, she could have done so. He also stressed
that what Ms. Tan called a headboard where he allegedly put his gun in the motel room was merely less than one inch in width,
too narrow for a .45 cal. gun to rest.
3. On 25 November 2004, a month and three days after the alleged rape, Ms. Tan invited all her officemates, including him, to
her birthday party held at her home, where she sang and danced. She displayed her dancing skills then. She even taught him how
to dance the swing. Again, during the Courts Christmas Party in December 2004, she socialized with her fellow workers,
including him, and even performed the "kikay dance" during the program.
4. On 1 Septemeber 2005, all the staff of Judge Pacuribot, including Ms. Tan, attended his birthday party at his house in Cagayan
de Oro City, where she merrily danced with dance instructors and posed with Judge Pacuribots wife.
5. On May 2006, five months after she filed the administrative charge against Judge Pacuribot, Ms. Tan joined the Search for
Mrs. Gingoog City Contest as one of the candidates and she paraded in the gymnasium, all smiles, while attired in an elegant
gown.
6. Judge Pacuribot alleged that Ms. Tan and her husband were publicly known to be putting up a faade that all was well with
them, although they constantly quarreled and had been sleeping in separate rooms already.
Judge Pacuribot disputed Ms. Tans version of how he became the lessee of a room at Ms. Tans house. He claimed that in
January 2005, she came to know that he was looking for a new boarding house and she offered two small rooms at her house
available for rent. He chose the one facing the Police Station of Gingoog City, which he claimed to be only about five meters
more or less from the room he rented. He paid an advance rental of P5,000.00.
Judge Pacuribot denied sexually harassing Ms. Tan. In refuting her claim that he sexually harassed her in his chambers, he
countered that this could not have happened as his court aide, Placido Abellana, was always in his chamber with him. If
Abellana was out on an errand, his security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, temporarily took over. There had never been any
moment in his chambers that he was without companion. There was always either his court aide or his security officer with him.
Even when he had visitors, his court aide was still in his chambers to maintain transparency and avoid unwarranted talk. Once in
a while, his branch clerk of court, Atty. Willfredo Bibera, Jr., would go to his chambers to confer with him regarding cases.
Sometimes, too, his security officer Espejon would take his blood pressure in his chambers. Under these circumstances, Judge
Pacuribot argued that no sexual harassment could have occurred. He also called attention to the fact that Ms. Tans affidavit and
testimony presented the dates of the alleged sexual harassments as follows:
27 October 2004 06 January 2005
03 November 2004 08 August 2005
25 November 2004 03 October 2005
08 December 2004 04 October 2005
09 December 2004 11 October 2005
05 January 2005 13 October 200510
The 6 January 2005 alleged incidents were followed only on 8 August 2005, thus, belying Ms. Tans claim that the sexual
harassments were done regularly. Also, Ms. Tans allegation that he sexually harassed her on 25 November 2005 was incredible,
because on that date she was on her birthday leave, and was busy preparing the dishes she was going to serve them during her
party. He emphasized that the criminal complaints for rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual harassments filed by Ms. Tan
against him with the City Prosecutors Office in Gingoog City and Cagayan de Oro City were all dismissed.
Judge Pacuribot explained that these administrative and criminal charges filed against him by Tan and Villafranca were part and
parcel of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie Waniwan, a radio commentator, to oust him from office. He claimed that Waniwan was
then facing four counts of libel in his sala. The City Prosecutor recommended P50,000.00 bail for each. When Waniwan filed a
motion to reduce bail bond, respondent denied it for several reasons, i.e., (1) there was a previous conviction, (2) he was not
from Gingoog City, and (3) when a warrant for his arrest was issued, he went into hiding instead of surrendering. Waniwan filed
a motion for respondent to inhibit himself, which the latter denied. As a consequence, Waniwan spent 13 days in jail for failure
to put up a bail bond. Judge Pacuribot learned that Waniwan had contacted the NPA for Judge Pacuribots "liquidation" as
revealed in the affidavits of two captured NPA sparrow unit members. He discovered that Waniwan with Mesdames Tan and
Villafranca plotted and conspired to destroy him after his personal talk with other media men including Jonas Bustamante, Jerry
Orcullo and Jessie Mongcal.
Judge Pacuribot believed that Ms. Tan succumbed to the egging of Waniwan to jump the gun on him. Ms. Tan knew that her job
was in danger because of her growing inefficiency, a subject of his several warnings, since her inefficiency would essentially
affect the performance of his court, a scenario which he abhorred, having been a consistent performer in the disposal of cases
during his days as labor arbiter. In fact, he considered Ms. Tan the most inefficient among the four stenographers he had. She
was allegedly lazy, inarticulate in the English language, and flawed in spelling, which hampered her effectiveness in preparing
transcriptions. Worse, due to her moonlighting as manager of the Tan-Hoegee Internet Caf, she would usually go home during
office hours to catch some sleep. He believed that his good relationship with her soured when he asked Ms. Tan to be more
focused on the job; that he was going to move to a new house; and when he did not let her borrow P200,000.00, or at least be a
guarantor of her loan.
Anent the written charges of Ms. Villafranca, Judge Pacuribot specifically denied all material allegations therein for being
untrue. In particular, he denied the alleged rape incident on 22 February 2005 in Butuan City. He asserted that he never went out
alone at night in Gingoog City, knowing the place to be dangerous, and the fact that PNP confirmed to him that he was in the list
of those slated for "liquidation" by the NPA. Hence, he insisted that he neither invited Ms. Villafranca for dinner, nor did he
travel from Gingoog City to Butuan City during night time.
103
Judge Pacuribot claimed that on 22 February 2005, at 5:00 oclock more or less in the afternoon, he asked a certain Fil Sumaylo
to buy and cook a big fish and ten pieces of small octopus because they would have dinner at the latters house. At about 6:30
p.m., respondent went with his security officer Espejon and court aide Abellana to Sumaylos house. His branch clerk of court,
Atty. Bibera, was also there. After dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted him back to his boarding house at about 11:00 p.m.
Abellana left ahead, while Espejon left at about 11:30 p.m.
Also, Judge Pacuribot gave several reasons why he would not venture at all to go to Butuan City alone. He said he was security
conscious, considering that he handled drug cases and other high-profile cases. He had also received NPA threats on his life. He
claimed that Butuan City was about 80 kilometers from Gingoog City and he would not go there and risk his life for a woman he
barely knew.
In denying Ms. Villafrancas allegations of sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness, Judge Pacuribot pointed out that the
acts of grabbing, kissing and performing oral sex in his chambers could not have happened as his court aide, Abellana, who is
the uncle of Ms. Villafranca, was always present in his chambers, aside from the fact that his chamber was just beside the room
of the staff.
Judge Pacuribot contended that Ms. Villafrancas charges were improbable. He assessed her to be a very intelligent woman with
a strong personality. Ms. Villafranca is well connected, because she is a recognized illegitimate daughter of a certain Polkem
Motomull, a one-time member of the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental and nephew of Mrs. Ruthie Guingona, incumbent
City Mayor of Gingoog City. A sister of her father is the Assistant City Auditor of Gingoog City, while Judge Pacuribots
predecessor, Judge Potenciano de los Reyes, is her fathers first cousin-in-law. RTC Judge Downey Valdevilla of Cagayan de
Oro City is also her uncle; and even Judge Pacuribots court aide, Abellana, is her fathers first cousin. Considering the big
family of Ms. Villafranca, anyone will think, not just twice, but several times, before doing anything against her. Ms. Villafranca
will not just allow herself to be raped and beaten by a stranger like him in Gingoog City. He found out that, as indicated in the
police blotter of Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca reported that she was raped and mauled by Mr. Ricky Lee Villfranca, her
husband, who carted away important belongings at about 2:00 a.m. of 26 May 2005. He claimed that if Ms. Villafranca could
report her husband to the police for said offense, then she should have reported him also to the police if her allegations were true.
Judge Pacuribot denied calling Ms. Villafranca through her cellphone. On the contrary, it was she who was calling him. She also
sent him adoring or alluring text messages including seductive notes and poems. He claimed that being a happily married man,
he ignored the flirtatious and seductive advances of Ms. Villafranca, to her consternation and bewilderment. He claimed that her
adulation of him came to an abrupt end and metamorphosed into an intense hatred and dislike after he issued the 6 June 2005
Order in Criminal Case No. 2004-2879 entitled, "People v. Anunde" pointing out her incompetence, inexperience and
unprofessional attitude toward her work. He opined that the charges of Ms. Villafranca are typical under the adage, "Hell hath no
fury than a woman scorned."
Judge Pacuribot further complained that Ms. Villafranca would follow up cases of her relatives in his sala.
After weighing the evidences and arguments of all the parties, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores found:
FATHERHOOD UNPROVEN
On the Anonymous Letters about [Judge Pacuribots] illegitimate fatherhood, the Investigator finds the claim
unsupported by any documentary evidence. Although the certification of the hospitals administrative officer proves
correct the claim in the anonymous letter as to (1) the hospital; (2) the identity of the mother; (3) the number of
children delivered; and (4) the date of birth of the two children, but it did not shed light on the identity of the
childrens father. In this case, the certificates of birth of the two (2) children mentioned in the anonymous letter
showing [Judge Pacuribots] fatherhood would be the best evidence adequate to prove the claim. With no-record-of-
birth-certifications issued by the local civil city registrar and the office of the Civil Registrar General, no finding of
guilt can be made.
RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENTS PROVEN BEYOND REASONBLE DOUBT
Ms. Villafrancas story of rape and repeated sexual harassments is credible. [Judge Pacuribots] defense of denial and lineage? Further, if he committed sexual abuses on Ms. Villafranca at his rented room which was very near the police
alibi failed to overcome complainants evidence. station, why did she not shout or report to the police?

On the rape in Butuan City motel, [Judge Pacuribot] insists on the improbability of his presence at the scene of the
crime because he alleges that he does not go out at night in Gingoog City without company for two (2) reasons that
he is security conscious and that there is an NPA threat on his person.
Firstly, [Judge Pacuribots] being security conscious is no proof of improbability in going to Butuan City. So many
criminals are security conscious yet they go out alone at night to commit a crime. Hence, his being security conscious
could not have deterred him to go out.
The fact that Ms. Villafranca is well connected in Gingoog City was actually not a boon but a bane. It was on that
account that she wanted to protect at all costs their family from any scandal. [Judge Pacuribot] capitalized on it with
his constant threat that he will bring scandal to them by making public her half naked picture taken in the motel. Her
wanting to protect her family from shame cowed her into silence and submission. Her testimony demonstrates that. It
reads:
Atty. Kho:

Secondly, his claim of an NPA threat on his person is suspect. He claims that he learned he was marked for NPA Q: A cellphone picture that is what you are afraid of?
liquidation when he was given a copy of the affidavits of two (2) captured NPAs named Marvin Lumod and Rico
Roselem marked as Exhibits "22" and "23" respectively. Unfortunately, these two (2) affidavits will not help [Judge
A: No, also his added threats that he is going to tell my mother-in-law, that he is going to destroy me, that I am
Pacuribot]. Marvin E. Lumods Affidavit is dated 20 June 2006 while Rico A. Roselems Affidavit is dated 19 June
nobody, that my family is no good, and that he would call me "burikat, burikat." He would call me that name. "Yawa
2006. The incident in Butuan City occurred on 22 February 2005. The reason, therefore, in not wanting to go out at
ka. Animal ka. Sumunod ka nako."
night without company on 22 February 2005 was still absent. [Judge Pacuribots] alibi that he was in Gingoog City
on 22 February 2005 is backed up by the testimonies of SPO1 Ronald Espejon and Placido Abellana. But these two
are his loyals aside from the fact that Abellana, as his court aide, is also one whose employment is under control and (Atty. Ignes Div. Clerk of Court interpreting:)
supervision of [Judge Pacuribot]. Thus, on that account, their testimony must be taken with grain of salt. Their
testimony cannot discredit the straightforward testimony of Ms. Villafranca on how [Judge Pacuribot] deceived her
"Burikat" means a whore. "You lewd devil, and you have to follow me."
twice on the purpose and on the place. He invited her for dinner but ravished her instead. They agreed on The
Mansion in Gingoog City for the dinner, yet drove her to a Butuan City motel.
xxxx
[Judge Pacuribot] asks: Why did Ms. Villafranca not report to the authorities that he sexually assaulted her, if true,
when she even reported to the police that her husband raped her on 26 May 2005? [Judge Pacuribot], to prove that Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?
Ms. Villafranca reported to the Police, presented Annex "3", a certified copy of an entry in the Police Blotter of
Gingoog City. [Judge Pacuribot] should have noted that in that certified copy, it is shown that it was his security
officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, not Ms. Villafranca, who had the report entered in the police blotter. The certification A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that picture, he will show that to my mother-in-law and then he
did not say that Ms. Villafranca appeared at all in the Police Station and had the incident blottered. All that Ms. will destroy me and he will create a scandal in Gingoog City.
Villafranca did was to ask Espejon for assistance because he was beaten by her husband.
Q: Is it not that you are well-connected?
[Judge Pacuribot] claims that the administrative charge is Ms. Villafrancas reprisal against him. He claims that Ms.
Villafranca appears to be "fatally attracted to him" and that he "remains steadfast in his refusal to reciprocate he A: My husband is not around, Attorney.
atrociously immoral and misdirected adoration to him." He claims the administrative charge is proof of the fury of a
woman scorned. On the "fatal attraction" [Judge Pacuribot] cited the text messages, notes and cards he claims Ms.
Villfranca sent him. Ms. Villaffranca explained how he has always demanded of her to send him those, the reason for Q: And?
which she could not fathom then. He would even have cards in his chamber and then summon her to sign them. When
she resists, he would let out a barge of insults and threats. [Judge Pacuribots] possession of those letters, cards, and A: And what? How could I explain to them that I was there? How he took my picture? How am I going to? I dont
text messages was adequately explained by Ms. Villafranca. know. I just wanted to protect my family from my shame, from any scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold to
me. And he knew that I would be very careful with the name that my family had, that is why he is constantly
[Judge Pacuribots] theory of Ms. Villafrancas "fatal attraction" and "misdirected adoration" of him is funny. He threatening me with such same argument, you know: "Ikaw and madaot ani. Ino ning huan tanan."
never disputed the testimony of the two (2) complainants that [Judge Pacuribot] is reputed in the Hall of Justice as
"terror", that he is fond of humiliating people in public, using excoriating language on his victim, that female (Atty. Ignes:)
employees avoid him and veer away from him when they meet in the Hall of Justice. He also failed to specifically
deny the claim of Ms. Villafranca that he housed his mistress, Sheryl Gamulo, in Motomul St., Gingoog City. He also
failed to specifically deny her claim that he sired a ten (10) year old daughter in Ozamis City. Will all the dark side of "You will be destroyed because of this."
his character publicly known, hardly would a twenty-nine (29) year-old, very pretty married woman who [Judge
Pacuribot] claims is very intelligent fall for such character. Thus, [Judge Pacuribots] claim of Ms. Villafrancas Ms. Villafranca said she was scared of [Judge Pacuribots] person and "how intimidating he could be and how evil he
"fatal attraction" and "misdirected adoration" of him becomes incredible. could be." She feared him because when she resists him he would tell her "madaot ka ani." (You will be destroyed
because of this.) So she had to yield to him because she knew he could do what he threatens to do to destroy her.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks why did Ms. Villafranca allow herself to be raped and victimized over a prolonged period of She points to the Order dated 6 June 2005 in People v. Anude of how indeed he had destroyed her.
time when there were people capable of helping or protecting her considering her illustrious, although illegitimate,

104
[Judge Pacuribot] claims in his Comment and Consolidated Memorandum that Ms. Villafranca is a very intelligent [Judge Pacuribots] claim that her administrative charge is a fabrication is unacceptable against the avalanche of Ms.
girl and with strong personality, reasons why it is improbable to make her a victim of rape and sexual harassments. Villafrancas evidence. The Investigator cannot find any valid reason to sustain [Judge Pacuribots] denial and alibi
And yet, when he issued the Anude Order, he made her look like she is an irredeemable incompetent who "cannot as a defense.
spell", who "uses high falutin words in her Post Sentence Investigation Report which she herself may not have
understood," whose sentence construction is horrendous," "her proper noun is written with small letter" and that "her
[Judge Pacuribot] is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of rape in Butuan City and guilty of multiple sexual
adjectives or adverbs do not fit the things or persons described." [Judge Pacuribot] engages in double talk.
harassment committed inside respondent judges chamber and in his rented room in Gingoog City. His claim that Ms.
Villafrancas charge is a fabrication is unacceptable considering the avalanche of evidence against him.
In the three paged Anude Order, [Judge Pacuribot] tried to show that Ms. Villafrancas incompetence is toxically
mixed with acute haughtiness because Ms. Villafranca refuses to consult the judge or see him or refused to come to
While [Judge Pacuribot] committed physical assault on Ms. Villafranca on 25 May 2005 when after summoning her
him even when summoned repeatedly. [Judge Pacuribot] should not gripe. He summoned Ms. Villafranca to his
to his chamber, he slapped her for not filing the petition to annul her marriage and hit her head with his clenched fist,
chamber on 25 May 2005. Once inside, [Judge Pacuribot] slapped her for not filing her petition for annulment of
the same is deemed absorbed by the offense of sexual harassment considering that brute force and intimidation had
marriage and her head with his clenched fist. He planted on her neck kiss marks which he said he wanted her husband
always been used by [Judge Pacuribot] to commit said offenses.
to see. When Ms. Villafrancas husband saw them later, he beat her. At 2:00 am of 26 May 2005, SPO1 Ronald
Espejon claims that Ms. Villafranca called him for assistance. It was the start of Ms. Villafrancas growing defiance
to [Judge Pacuribot], a fact that roiled him to point of issuing the Anude Order eleven (11) days later. On the eight (8) occasions that [Judge Pacuribot] had carnal knowledge of Ms. Villafranca in his rented room while
[Judge Pacuribots] gun was always displayed on the table, implying the commission of rape, the same are treated as
sexual harassments only for Ms. Villafrancas failure to state when they were committed and to provide details on
[Judge Pacuribot] also belittled Ms. Villafranca repeatedly in said Order by referring to here as "MERE Clerk
those occasions.
II/understudy Johanna M. Villafranca of Gingoog City Parole and Probation Office," calling her "visibly
inexperienced mere clerk," "very raw," and that her report was atrocious. He ordered her Post Sentence Investigation
Report returned "OFFICIALLY" to the superior of Ms. Villafranca for proper corrections. [Judge Pacuribot] stated Ms. Tans agony started with [Judge Pacuribots] deception. He made her believe he will bring her in his car to the
therein that Ms. Villafranca cannot be located in her office as she is always absent per information in her office. He bus terminal from Pryce Plaza Hotel, only to surprise her after riding with him by bringing her to the City Lodge
stated that she should not be allowed to practice making post sentence investigation in preparation for a desired Motel to ravish her. Again, while about to leave City Lodge Motel, he deceived her again by telling her that he will
promotion. bring her now to the bus terminal, only to bring her to the Discovery Hotel, so that he can ravish her some more later.
Aside from deception, [Judge Pacuribot] uses extravagantly another tool intimidation. Immediately after Ms. Tan
settled herself on the front seat on that infelicitous night of 20 October 2004, he immediately had his bag between
The Anude Order is the classic proof of how Ms. Villafrancas disobedience to [Judge Pacuribot] ended up in her
them, the bag Ms. Tan knows contains [Judge Pacuribots] gun. Also, he used on her an uncouth language in a loud
destruction "Madaut ka ani." The Order destroyed her person and her career. Therein, he has beaten Ms.
voice, an irrational temper, a fake message of urgency to rattle Ms. Tan and make her jump to obedience without
Villafrancas career to a pulp. Any superior of Ms. Villafranca who will read the Anude Order will block any desire
thinking. By the time Ms. Tan realized [Judge Pacuribots] repulsive intentions, it was too late to fight back because
of Ms. Villafranca for promotion which the latter was aiming for at the time. She rued with tears how the Anude
she had been trapped in the motel.
Order displaced her from her job.

His repeated intimidating warnings on Ms. Tan that she could harm her if she disobeys were indeed proven true. On
[Judge Pacuribots] repeated harping in said Order about Ms. Villafrancas failure to consult him and to come to him
24 November 2004, Ms. Tan was severely and publicly scolded before her office mates, a fact that was affirmed by
even when summoned, rendered more believable Ms. Villafrancas claim that [Judge Pacuribot] would summon her
Atty. Wilfredo Bibera. Her performance rating from "Very Satisfactory" slipped down to "Satisfactory" in 2005.
to his chamber on the pretext of official matters and thereafter subject her to his lasciviousness conduct.

[Judge Pacuribot] uses force and cruelty on his hapless victims. When he ordered her to do oral sex on him and she
[Judge Pacuribots] claim that Ms. Villafranca was part of Ms. Waniwans conspiracy was unproven. All the Sun Star
refused, he pulled her hair and pushed her face to his penis with an order: "Suck it. Let it in till deep your throat. Let
pictures of Ms. Tans filing of the criminal complaint before the City Prosecutors Office did not show at any
my penis reach your throat." He tightened his hold on her that she was frightened he might break her neck. In pain,
instance the face of Ms. Villafranca. Also, she made it clear in her testimony that sometime in February 2006, when
she had to plead: "Dont pull my hair, sir. Its very painful. What a sadist you are." While he was sucking her nipple
Ms. Tan filed her criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor, two other media men called her up to see
and mashing her breasts, he was telling her: "This is the breast of a lustful woman." While he was planting vile kisses
if they can get a copy of her Affidavit-Complaint. But she refused to prevent the public from knowing what she went
on her neck to produce "chiquinini" on her, he told her: "I am going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let the people
through.
know that you passed through my hands." Upon hearing it, Ms. Tan cried. Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot] is a sadist
beyond description capable of declaring his unconcealed intention to parade her to the public as his victim.
Indubitably, Ms. Villafrancas testimony and the anguish that came with it can only come from a very sad experience.
Even on the very delicate matters where [Judge Pacuribot] had stripped her mercilessly of her dignity and
At the trial, when issues would touch on her tender feelings towards her family or when it would recall [Judge
womanhood, Ms. Villafranca was frank and straightforward, proof of how outraged she was when [Judge Pacuribot]
Pacuribots] cruelty that crushed her respectability or the delicateness of her womanhood, she would invariably sob
had raped her and had sexually harassed her repeatedly.
on the witness stand. The way he ravished her and sexually harassed her showed how irrationally lewd or unbearably
cruel he was.
Her spontaneity in answering the cross examination questions, the anguish she revealed in court, her very natural and
coherent way of telling how she was ravished and abused repeatedly as an underling leaves no room to doubt her
Even when Ms. Tan was already abused, still the thought that he is her superior had never been lost to her. Ms. Tan
testimony and the things she said under oath in her Affidavit Complaint, her Rejoinder, and her Sworn Statement.
has always addressed him "Sir."
Her tears could only be the clues to her righteous indignation against the indignities she suffered from [Judge
Pacuribot]. Indeed, the conviction to reveal the truth must have been so strong that she had to come back to the
country hurdling employment restrictions and the difficulty of not having saved enough yet for her trip back just to "Why did you bring me here, Sir? Didnt I tell you I will just take a taxi to Agora Terminal?
testify in this case.

105
 "Dont pull my hair, Sir. It is very painful. What a sadist you are."
"You are so rude, Sir, we work in the same office yet you disgrace me."
"Sir, I just take a taxi to Agora."
[Judge Pacuribots] moral ascendancy over Ms. Tan was an undeniable factor to her blind submission to his
depravity.
[Judge Pacuribot] pointed to Ms. Tans inefficiency, her not being a happily married woman, that her husband is a
wife beater and a violent man, that she is in financial straits who even run to him for help. It is precisely these
weaknesses, personal problems, and economic difficulties which added to Ms. Tans inability to fight back and made
her so submissive. She was the ideal prey. As she was made to admit during her cross examination, she is the lone
breadwinner in the family with two (2) children to support.
[Judge Pacuribot] challenges Ms. Tans claim of rape and repeated sexual harassments by arguing, to wit:
"Why did she not refuse to go with respondent when he allegedly fetch her at Pryce Plaza Hotel on 20
October 2004 and instead go voluntarily with him?"
"At the Discovery Hotel, if indeed she stayed and slept there all by herself, why did she not escape or call
for help and instead wait for respondent to arrive the next morning? So that he can sexually assault her
again? Or why did she fail to ask for help from any of the hotel staff or from anybody while in the
Discovery Hotel?"
"If she immediately reported to the police authorities the maltreatment of her son by her husband, why did
she not complain of the alleged incidents of sexual harassments and acts of lasciviousness she experienced
from the respondent?"
Despite her claims of having been subjected to rape, sexual harassment and acts of lasciviousness, why did she
gleefully socialize with respondent during their Christmas party and respondents birthday celebration?"
Ms. Tan had only two (2) options
"Lose her job by promptly fighting back at [Judge Pacuribot]; or
"Keep her job tolerating him with muffled defiance.
Ms. Tan had correctly assessed the far reaches of his influence. When she was looking for a lawyer to help her file
the administrative charge, no lawyer in Gingoog City would like to accept her case. She had to look for one in
Cagayan de Oro City. She was thus correct to wonder while she was in Discovery Hotel whether anyone there would
come her aid if [Judge Pacuribot] will start harming her.
Ms. Tan as a victim cannot be put in the same footing as other rape victims where the offender holds no control on
the victims survival and has no moral ascendancy over her. Fighting back immediately against the offender is a
rational move. In the case at bench, [Judge Pacuribots] moral ascendancy and influence over her was a given. It was
that together with his flair to humiliate people and his blackmails which made her succumb to his sexual abuses. Ms.
Tan values her job; in fact, she consciously keeps track of her performance ratings. An underling who believes that
her immediate superior wields control over her continued employment or sudden separation from service will cower
106
in fear to the point of tolerating the indignities committed on her. As [Judge Pacuribot] impressed on her, looking for
a new job at her age is not easy.
At the time that [Judge Pacuribot] was taking advantage of Ms. Tan, [Judge Pacuribots] proverbial explosives
temper and short fuse were being put to good use to terrorize her with remarkable frequency. That dark spot in his
character which has been brought up front in other peoples consciousness in the months following his arrival in the
Hall of Justice as a "terror" is enough intimidation. To Ms. Tan, to "submit now and complain later" is a good, albeit
temporary, shelter against immediate public humiliation or job separation. Thus, Ms. Tans failure to report to the
police is understandable.
Also, [Judge Pacuribot] seems to have a masterful skill on how to exploit his victims weaknesses. Ms. Tan is a
stenographer, a position she has difficulty coping with because as [Judge Pacuribot] noted, her spelling, her grammar
and her knowledge of the English language are not at par with the demands of her job. He has warned her of her
"inefficiency" and of staying late in the evening as manager of the internet caf. He pointed to her joining without
prior SC permission a trip to Hongkong on a weekend in a packaged tour for stenographers in Cagayan de Oro City.
Thus, with such faults and difficulties, she is the ideal prey. Her fear of losing a source of livelihood has made her
behave submissive to him.
[Judge Pacuribots] alibi that on October 20 and 21, 2004, he was in Gingoog City and it was impossible for him to
be in Cagayan de Oro City on those days does not impress. It fails to establish the impossibility of his presence at the
scene of the crime. With the convenience of his car, [Judge Pacuribot] could travel and be in different places, one
after another in a short time. After all, the incidents on October 20 and 21, 2004 were all beyond office hours.
To support [Judge Pacuribots] claim that he was present on those days in Gingoog City, he presented his Certificate
of Service for the month which shows that he was only on leave on October 4 to 7, 2004.
Noteworthy is the testimony of Ms. Tan stating that when she met [Judge Pacuribot] on Monday in their office after
the rape incident, the latter told her not to file anymore her leave for October 20 and 21, 2004 and bragging, "Ako na
gud ni, kinsay magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail against me). If he can forego the filing of application for
leave for his subordinates, much more is there reason for him not to submit an application for leave for his own
absence reason why his Certificate of Service for the month of October is not reliable.
On 21 October 2004 a Thursday, all schedule of hearing were cancelled and [Judge Pacuribot] said that they were
cancelled the week before. Was the cancellation the week before due to the fact that [Judge Pacuribot] received the
notice of their Masonic Conference scheduled on October 20 in Cagayan de Oro City? It was [Judge Pacuribot] who
informed Ms. Tan of that Masonic Conference that evening of October 20. Ms. Tan could not just have invented that
idea of a Masonic Conference. That is the reason why the cancellation of hearing on October 21 casts doubt on
[Judge Pacuribots] alibi.
Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial, like alibi, is a self-serving
negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
[Judge Pacuribot] cites Ms. Tans merry behavior during the Christmas Party and his Birthday Party in Cagayan de
Oro City as hardly the behavior of a rape victim or a victim or repeated sexual harassments. Normally, such a victim
is expected to behave with animosity and grievance toward the offender. Unfortunately for her, she cannot afford to
display such animosity and grievance unless it is at the cost of her job. If she cannot defy his demands when he
victimizes her, shouldnt her economic realities prompt her to win her war with friendship? [Judge Pacuribot] should
be reminded that in sexual harassments under Section 3 of RA No. 7877, an offense is committed regardless of
whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the subject of said act.
Ms. Tans testimony was clear, frank and consistent. Her candid and clear-cut account of how respondent judge had
been deceitful and intimidating in his dealings with her that evening has inspired belief. And throughout her
testimony, she succeeded in revealing how [Judge Pacuribot] took full advantage of his moral ascendancy over her as
his underling, destroying whatever resistance she could put up by belittling her, outwitting her and insulting her to
reduce her to submission.
There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. In fact, not every victim of rape can be expected to act in
conformity with the expectations of anyone who has not been subjected to the same danger at any time. The workings
of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people react differently.
Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charges of rape committed on
October 20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and guilty of sexual harassments committed in respondent judges
chamber in RTC, Branch 27, Hall of Justice, Gingoog City against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.
One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by [Judge Pacuribot] in achieving his vile purposes. He used
deceit on Ms. Tan. He used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He used intimidation on Ms. Tan and he used it on Ms.
Villafranca. He makes use of a substantial blackmail against both.
In the case of People v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court had occasion to instruct us on the effects of intimidation, thus:
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim
submits herself to her attackers because of fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a
woman involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer
strong resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is
strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient to bring her
into submission. Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant the burden of proving resistance.
[Judge Pacuribot] computed nine (9) months, twenty-one (21) days as interval from the time Ms. Villafranca claimed
she was raped on 22 February 2005 to 13 December 2005 when she filed the complaint. Ms. Tan also filed her
administratively charge only thirteen (13) months of being his superiors prey. Did delay cast doubt on the
truthfulness of their claim?
In the case of People v. Aguero, Jr., where there was a two (2) years delay in the filing of the complaint for rape, the
Supreme Court said:
As to the alleged two-year delay in the filing of the complaint, suffice it to say, that complainants failure to promptly
report the incident does not sufficiently detract from her credibility and cannot be taken against her. It has been held
that a rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the complaint and is not an
indication of deceit as it is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear for her aggressor and lack of courage to
face the public stigma of having been sexually abused.
In the case of People v. Espinosa, where the criminal complaint was filed about one and a half years from
commission of the offense, the Supreme Court said:
x x x Delay in reavealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape
never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain,
rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders making good on his threats. This is understandable,
considering the inbred modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public disclosure of matters affecting their
honor.
Delay in the filing of the charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of witnesses.
107
The Supreme Court has deemed delay as justified when there is fear of reprisal, social humiliation, familial
considerations and economic reasons. In the case of Ms. Tan, her tormentor is her superior who constantly dangles
his influence and power over her and her job. As regards Ms. Villafranca, the threat to destroy her, her family and her
familys good name was ever present; thus, haunting her emotionally and psychologically. The delay in reporting the
rape cases committed by [Judge Pacuribot] has been justified.
On the repeated sexual harassments and violence committed separately on the persons of Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca within the chamber of [Judge Pacuribot], the latter deems them improbable because of the situation in his
chamber. He points out that outside his chamber is the staff room and there is a glassed window that divides them.
Ms. Villafranca cited the incident on 13 October 2005 where [Judge Pacuribot] did lascivious acts on her inside the
chamber in the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latters just turned his back and pretended to see
nothing.
In the case of People v. Lavador, the rapist-appellant argued that rape was impossible due to the presence of the
victims son on her side. The Supreme Court said:
Nor can we accept the argument that the rape was improbable due to the presence of Nonilunas sons by her side.
This Court has repeatedly declared that lust is no respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even in
places where people congregate: in parks, along the roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where
there are several occupants and even in the same room where other members of the family are sleeping. x x x.
[Judge Pacuribots] defense of "improbability" cannot, therefore, be accepted.
[Judge Pacuribot] declares that the charges against him are complainants tools of revenge against him. He cites
his Order in People v. Anude and his letter reporting Ms. Villafrancas negligence as reasons from Ms. Villafrancas
anger and resentment. Against Ms. Tan, he cites his warning against her inefficiency as stenographer, her
moonlighting in her internet cafhis refusal to grant her a loan of P200,000.00 or being her guarantor.
In the case of Simbajon v. Esteban, the Supreme Court in believing the testimony of the complainant saying:
"The investigating judge correctly disregarded the respondents imputation of ill motive on the part of
complainant. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and
humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood.
Indeed, it is against human nature for a married woman to fabricate a story that would not only expose herself to a
lifetime of dishonor, but destry her family as well. Besides, there is no sufficient evidence of any ill-motive imputable
to Mesdames Tan and Villafranca to narrate anything other than their respective desire to tell the truth and seek
redress for the wrong inflicted on each of them. For the kind of reputation [Judge Pacuribot] has in the Hall of Justice
and by his behavior where he projects himself as full of influence and power, these two women will be the last to
even cross the path of respondent judge without just cause. Thus, the presumption applies that, one will not act and
prevaricate "and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or injury.
[Judge Pacuribots] theory that all these charges are part of the sinister plan to oust [Judge Pacuribot] from office at
the instigation of Ms. Waniwan is far fetched.
On 8 December 205, or earlier, when Ms. Tan filed her complaint, there was no Mr. Waniwan to speak of. Mr.
Waniwan only materialized in February 2006 when she filed the same charges against [Judge Pacuribot] before the
City Prosecutor of Gingoog City. Media men at the slightest clue of a "scoop" hound without let up those who could
be sources of information. When the media men became nosey, it was already in February 2006 when Ms. Tan filed
the case in the Prosecutors Office. By then, the filing of the administrative charge of Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca
was fait accompli. In the case of Ms. Villafranca, the Waniwan theory is patently absurd. Two media men were eager
in February 2006 to take hold of Ms. Villafrancas affidavit but she refused them staunchly. It is incredible that two
(2) married women would prevaricate against a person who has power and control over their jobs at the mere urging
of Mr. Waniwan is irrelevant. In People v. Mortales, the Supreme Court, speaking through now Chief Justice Renato
Puno, appositely said:
No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny and humiliation to foist a false charge of rape. Neither
would she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her family. The fact that the victim resolved to face
the ordeal and relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept secret evinces that she did so to obtain
justice. Her willingness and courage to face the authorities as well as to submit to medical examination are mute but
eloquent confirmation of her sincere resolve.
Finally, it may be true there are minor and trivial discrepancies in Ms. Tans testimony, but they neither impair the
integrity of the victims evidence as a whole nor reflect negatively on the witness honesty. Such inconsistencies,
which might have been caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the
credibility of the witness, for they shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended:
In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively liable for the charges against him in A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-
1982 and RTJ-06-1983.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean "soundness or moral principle and character." It is said to be
synonymous with "probity," "honesty," and "uprightness." The evidence adduced indubitably show that [Judge
Pacuribot] lacks the honesty in dealing with his two subordinates herein. Not only did he fail to live up to the high
moral standard expected of a member of the Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms of morality expected of
every person.
[Judge Pacuribots] offenses in raping his victims and sexually harassing them were committed with aggravation. He
knew they were married but instead of helping strengthen or protect their marriage, he tried his best to destroy their
marital bonds.
Indeed, [Judge Pacuribots] reprehensible acts amount to gross misconduct, and immorality the depravity of which is
quite rare. They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. They are classified as severe charges under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 22 of the same Rules, any of the following sanctions may be imposed if the respondent is guilty of a
serious charge:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
Herein [Judge Pacuribots] conduct is far worse that those of Judge Esteban. [Judge Pacuribots] acts indubitably
went far beyond the bounds of decency and morality. He raped and repeatedly sexually assaulted, not only one, but
two female, married subordinates. He did not only violate his victims womanhood and their dignities as persons but
he aimed to weaken, then eventually destroy two families. By such act, [Judge Pacuribot] disgraced his noble office,
as well as the judiciary, in the eyes of the public. He has shown himself unworthy of the judicial robe.
When the fading sobs of two tearful women finally died down and their copious tears dried in the numerous hankies
that absorbed them what emerges is a figure that unmistakably exudes the abominable torpedo of marital bonds, a
practicing deceiver and a merciless pervert whose face is unrecognizable as he is hooded with a judicial robe that
helps conceal his dark side. His family, wife and children may have all been innocently kept away from knowing this
dark side and to spare them from the afflictive and crushing humiliation of having a husband and father of such a
character, may the foregoing description be a "for your eyes only" to the members of the highest court and the court
administrator.
This finding is made with full awareness of the recent Supreme Court ruling on quantum of evidence required in the
cases at bench. In the 7 August 2007 case of Alquizar v. Carpio, et al., the Supreme Court pronounced that:
x x x. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint
rests on the complainant. While substantial evidence would ordinarily suffice to support a finding of guilt,
the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave offense. Administrative
proceedings against judges are, by nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules
applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof required to support the administrative charges or to
establish the ground/s for the removal of a judicial officer should thus be more than substantial; they must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:
Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if
proven, would entail dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a degree of
proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence adduced here overwhelmingly
established moral certainty that respondent judge raped and sexually harassed complainant Mesdames Tan and
Villafranca on separate and repeated occasions.
xxxx

Having found [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses of rape and repeated sexual
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more that three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months;
harassments, the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits
or
is hereby recommended. 11

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

We agree in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.

In Simbajon v. Esteban, the respondent Judge Esteban, for his sexual advances on one of his female subordinates
We have reviewed the record of this case and are thereby satisfied that the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
which consisted of "grabbing her, kissing her all over her face, embracing her and touching her right breast" was
Justice are in truth adequately supported by the evidence and are in accord with applicable legal principles. We therefore resolve
preventively suspended for the duration of the investigation until further notice AND was subsequently dismissed
to adopt such findings and recommendations relative to the administrative liability of the respondent judge for grave misconduct
from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except leave credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any
and immorality.
branch or instrumentality of the government, including government owned or controlled corporations.

108
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice, but also upon the perception and
confidence of the community that the people who run the system have administered justice. At times, the strict manner by which
we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, has
been served. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must
not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the
highest integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private lives. Only then can the
people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial
system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct has the following provisions:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.
We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion, and to
be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties but also in
their everyday lives. For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary. Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and are at all times expected to observe
irreproachable behavior so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered to and set forth the exacting standards of morality
and decency, which every member of the judiciary must observe. 12 A magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also
by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are externalized. 13 He should not only possess proficiency in law but
should likewise possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
We explained the rationale for requiring judges to possess impeccable moral integrity, thus:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the Bench must be beyond reproach and above suspicion.
The faith and confidence of the public in the administration of justice cannot be maintained if a judge who dispenses
it is not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront
to public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it is a necessity in the judiciary. 14
We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr. 15 that:
The code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not
only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judges official life can not simply be
detached or separated from his personal experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
109
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge,
both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion."
Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He behaved in a manner unbecoming a judge and
model of moral uprightness. He betrayed the people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they hold the
Judiciary in general.
It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 16 In the cases at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca were able to adequately
substantiate their allegations.
We find totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge Pacuribot in subjecting the complainants, both his subordinates, to his
unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Over long periods of time, he persistently solicited sexual favors from
Ms.Tan and Ms. Villafranca. When they refused, he made their working conditions so unbearable that Ms. Tan was eventually
forced to transfer to another office and Ms. Villafranca to seek employment abroad. Certainly, no judge has a right to solicit
sexual favors from any court employee, even from a woman of loose morals.17 Judge Pacuribots conduct indubitably bears the
marks of impropriety and immorality. Not only do his actions fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary;
they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts,
which are an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily "x x x result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee[s]."18
We need not detail again all the lewd and lustful acts committed by Judge Pacuribot in order to conclude that he is indeed
unworthy to remain in office. The narration of the Investigating Justice was sufficiently thorough and complete. The audacity
under which the sexual violation of the complainants were committed and the seeming impunity with which they were
perpetrated by Judge Pacuribot shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion that Judge Pacuribot has failed to
behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the Judiciary. His actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the
Judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no less than the severest form of disciplinary sanction --
dismissal from the service.
On his part, Judge Pacuribot put up the defense of denial, attributing ill feelings and bad motives to Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca.
Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that mere denial does not overturn the relative weight and probative value of an
affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with no evidentiary value. Like the defense of alibi, denial
crumbles in the light of positive declarations.19 Denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the
witnesses who had no ill motive to testify falsely. Moreover, in the case at bar, there is utter lack of basis to sustain the purported
ill motives attributed by Judge Pacuribot to the complainants. The Investigating Justice correctly disregarded Judge Pacuribots
imputation. No married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and
strain her marriage in order to perpetrate a falsehood. 20 The only plausible and satisfactory explanation for us is that the charges
against respondent are true.
Judge Pacuribot and his witnesses failed to overcome the evidence presented by the complainants.
Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the
court of which he is an officer. His actuations are aggravated by the fact that complainants are his subordinates over whom he
exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry
out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of acting in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, he was even the one who
preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position.21
In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding that complainants were able to muster the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove their charges against Judge Pacuribot. By having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms. Villafranca, his
subordinates, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and completely failed to live up to the noble ideals and On March 14, 2006, the Court referred the case to Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
strict standards of morality required of members of the Judiciary. report and recommendation.

Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, we hold, without any hesitation, that Judge Pacuribot be meted out the severest On July 13, 2006, Justice Salvador set the case for preliminary conference. Only complainant Guanzon and respondent judge
form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the service for the charges of sexual harassment against him. appeared. Because of the distance between Bacolod and Manila, the parties found it quite difficult and expensive to attend
subsequent hearings of the case. Respondent submitted a pre-trial brief proposing stipulation of facts. Complainant Guanzon, for
herself and in representation of complainant Montesino, filed a preliminary conference brief enumerating the charges in their
We, however, find the complaints of the Anonymous Letter Writers without merit. Beyond the bare allegations that Judge
complaint and the probable witnesses and documentary evidence they intended to present in support thereof. Later, complainant
Pacuribot maintained an illicit relationship with a certain Sheryl Gamulo and fathered two children with her, there is nothing in
Guanzon submitted an affidavit of complainant Toledano, who was then a resident of the United States, imputing bias and abuse
the records that would indicate that he, indeed, committed the crime charged. We have stressed time and again that allegations
of authority to respondent for granting bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-24800 and 03-24801. Complainant Caldit executed a letter
must be proven by sufficient evidence. Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. 22 The letter dated 4 April
withdrawing her complaint against respondent.
2005 from "concerned citizens" asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot on the grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing
most of the employees has been rendered moot by the disposition of these cases.
In view of the parties failure to attend the proceedings, Justice Salvador resolved the case on the bases of the pleadings and
documents filed by the parties.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their minds the exhortation that "[T]he administration of justice is a
mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights looked
upon as the embodiments of all that is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and oppression. The On March 5, 2007, Justice Salvador submitted her Report and Recommendation reproduced hereunder:
Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and defend at all costs. This
should not come to pass."23
The Issue

WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct and immorality
WHETHER OR NOT SUFFICIENT CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENT ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR
prejudicial to the best interests of the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in
VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDGES AND THE RULE ON GENDER-FAIR LANGUAGE, USE OF
any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except the money value of accrued
FOUL OR OBSCENE AND DISCRIMINATORY LANGUAGE, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN LAWYERS AND
earned leave credits. Respondent judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from rendering any order or
LITIGANTS AS WELL AS UNETHICAL CONDUCT.
decision; or from continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision. Lastly,
respondent judge is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disbarred as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Findings and Conclusions
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of Justice for appropriate action.
A careful scrutiny of the record shows sufficient ground for a reprimand and an admonition to respondent to act with utmost
temperance, sensitivity and circumspection in the discharge of his functions.
This Decision is immediately executory. The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this resolution be
immediately served on respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2038 October 19, 2007
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2250-RTJ) Concededly, complainants in administrative proceedings have the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
their complaint (Araos v. Luna-Pison, 378 SCRA 246). The fact that, owing to the unavailability of the parties, no hearings were
conducted in the case to thresh out the issues presented by their various pleadings and incidents did not, however, totally
Attys. ROWENA V. GUANZON and PEARL R. MONTESINO of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City
discount the existence of factual bases for the charges leveled against respondent. In her November 8, 2006 affidavit (pp. 169-
Prosecutor ROSANNA SARIL-TOLEDANO, Bacolod City, and Atty. ERFE DEL CASTILLO-CALDIT,Complainants,
170, Rollo), Cynthia Bagtas-Serios significantly gave the following account of respondents deportment which goes into the
vs.
heart of the complaint, viz.:
Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON, Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Bacolod City, Respondent.

xxx xxx xxx

DECISION

In one of the first hearings of my case, when Atty. Rowena Guanzon was not assisting me but another counsel, I was shocked
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
when Judge Anastacio Rufon, inside the court with so many people present, said to me "next time you see your husband, open
your arms and legs." I felt humiliated and insulted, and was glad that the hearing did not proceed because the respondent was not
For our resolution is the February 11, 2005 letter-complaint1 filed by complainants Atty. Rowena V. Guanzon and Atty. Pearl R. present.
Montesino of the Gender Watch Coalition, Assistant City Prosecutor Rosanna Saril-Toledano, Bacolod City, and Atty. Erfe del
Castillo-Caldit against respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, same city, for violations of
The following day, I called Atty. Rowena Guanzon and reported Judge Rufons foul language and intolerable conduct to her (p.
the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Rule on Gender-Fair Language, use of foul, or obscene and discriminatory language,
170, ibid.).
discrimination against women lawyers and litigants and unethical conduct.

xxx xxx xxx

In his comment2 dated January 20, 2006, respondent judge vehemently denied the charges.

110
Respondent had, of course, taken great pains to refute the foregoing allegations (pp. 215-219, ibid.), complete with transcript of
stenographic notes taken in Civil Case No. 99-10985 (pp. 220-240, ibid.) as well as the orders issued in the case (pp. 241-243,
ibid.). In denying the charges leveled against him, however, appropriate note may be taken of the fact that respondents January
20, 2006 comment admitted his use of "frank language" in court when exhorting litigants to settle their differences and his resort
to "strong and colorful" words whenever he has had a drink or two, albeit after office hours (pp. 81-82, ibid.). Even more
significantly, the July 12, 2006 letter of complainant Caldit which was attached as Annex "4" to respondents own Pre-Trial
Brief contains the following tell-tale assertions, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent should bear in mind that a judge holds a position in the community that is looked up to with honor and privilege
(Ramos v. Barot 420 SCRA 406). Although judges are subject to human limitations (Misajon v. Feranil, 440 SCRA 298), it
cannot be over-emphasized that no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual
than a seat on the Bench (Resngit-Marquez v. Llamas, Jr., 385 SCRA 6). Because a judge is always looked upon as being the
visible representation of law and, from him, the people draw much of their will and awareness to obey legal mandates (Garcia v.
Bueser, 425 SCRA 93), it has been rightfully ruled that moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue in the judiciary; it is a
necessity (Office of the Court Administrator v. Sayo, Jr., 381 SCRA 659).
In closing, it would be remiss not to remind respondent of the fact that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility
(Fineza v. Aruelo, 385 SCRA 339) and also be temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language (Fidel v. Caraos,
394 SCRA 47), especially to those appearing before him (Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Yrastorsa, Sr. 422 SCRA 26). The exacting
standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary (Imbang v. Del Rosario, 421 SCRA 523). In view of the fact that public confidence in the judiciary is very easily
eroded by irresponsible and improper conduct of judges (Navarro v. Tormis, 428 SCRA 37), respondent should remember to
avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in all of his activities (Veloso v. Caminade, 434 SCRA 7).
Recommendation
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the REPRIMAND of respondent is recommended alongside a stern admonition that he
should, henceforth, take care to act with utmost temperance, sensitivity and circumspection in the discharge of his functions.
We sustain the finding of Justice Salvador that respondent judge uttered in open court intemperate and obscene language
injurious to the sensitivity and feelings of complainants who are all women.
Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times temperate in his language, 3 refraining from inflammatory or excessive
rhetoric or from resorting "to language of vilification."4 It is very essential that they live up to the high standards demanded by
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary5 which provides:
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. x x x
In Fidel v. Caraos,6 we held that although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his noble
position in the bench nevertheless demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to be
always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and in language.7
Thus, we declare respondent judge guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct considered a light charge under Section 10(1), Rule
140 of the Revised Rules of Court, punishable under Section 11(C) of the same Rule, by:
1. A fine of not less than 1,000.00, but not exceeding 10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure
111
3. Reprimand
4. Admonition with warning
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Anastacio C. Rufon is found guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct and is FINED in
the amount of 5,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Recently, I was informed of having attributed certain undesirable utterances to Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON which was the
basis for the filing of the instant administrative case against him. While Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON may have indeed
uttered some improper words, the letter was written in such a manner that aggravated its import. Besides, as stated earlier, I
never intended to file any complaint, much less, an administrative case against Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON. I feel that I am
duty bound to inform the Honorable Court that I was made to understand by Atty. ROWENA V. GUANZON that what I was
signing was simply a letter requesting for the relief of Judge ANASTACIO C. RUFON as Family Court judge in Bacolod City
(p. 138, ibid.). (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Although ostensibly written to withdraw respondent Caldits support for the complaint against respondent, the foregoing letter is
replete with intimations that cast respondents claim of innocence in dubious light. Moreover, the rule is settled that withdrawal
of a complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action (Aranes v. Occiano,
380 SCRA 402). This is attributable to the ineluctable fact that administrative cases involving misconduct, nonfeasance,
misfeasance or malfeasance in the judiciary are of paramount public interest as the respondents are involved in the
administration of justice, a sacred and solemn task (Manonggiring v. Ibrahim, 391 SCRA 673).
As to the proper sanction on respondent judge, our ruling in Negros Grace Pharmacy, Inc. v. Judge Alfredo P. Hilario 8 is
pertinent. Here, respondent judge was declared guilty of vulgar and unbecoming conduct, classified as a light charge under
Section 10(1), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court. Thus, we admonished him under Section 11(C) 4.
Further, in Turqueza v. Hernando, 9 we admonished the respondent judge who failed "to exercise proper care and restraint in his
language" which "betrays a lack of judicial decorum x x x."
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses,
and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are
made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
A.M. No. 1237-CAR August 21, 1980
FELICIDAD CASTRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ARTURO MALAZO, respondent.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Felicidad Castro against respondent Arturo Malazo, Presiding Judge of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, Tayug, Pangasinan, for undue delay in deciding CAR Case No. 1794-TP'72, entitled "Bonifacio Castro and
Felicidad Torio-Castro vs. Alfonso Cruz, Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz and Romeo Tibay.
Briefly. the facts are:
On July 11, 1972, Romeo Tibay filed a complaint for reliquidation, leasehold, and fixing of rental with damages with The Court
of Agrarian Relations, Tayug. Pangasinan, docketed as CAR Case No. 1822-TP'72 (hereinafter referred to as the Tibay case)
against Felicidad Castro, (the complainant herein), and Enriqueta Salcedo-Cruz, the owner of the piece of land situated in
Pozzorubio, Pangasinan. Alleging that he was a tenant or agricultural lessee of the said landholding, Tibay prayed that Castro be (6) That in the Tibay case, on January 31, 1975 an order was issued, the paragraph of which reads as
restrained from dispossessing him of his tenancy. follows:
Upon joint motion of counsel of the parties, you are also given 15 days from receipt of the transcript of the
proceedings within which to file their respective memorandum.
On August 14, 1972, the spouses Felicidad Torio-Castro and Bonifacio Castro instituted CAR Case No. 1794-TP'72 (hereinafter
(7) That on August 25, 1915, a lawyer for Castro filed a memorandum in both cases, the original copy
called the Castro case) against Romeo Tibay, Alfonso Cruz and Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz also before the Court of Agrarian
being attached to the Castro case and a carbon copy attached to the Tibay case.
Relations, alleging that they were the lessees of Francisca Quinto, the deceased mother of Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz, and that
Atty. Artiaga:
Tibay had forcibly entered the premises. They prayed for reinstatement as tenants or lessees of the landholding, and for fixing of
Yes, your Honor.
rental and damages.
Judge Malazo:
Yes, your Honor.
On January 31, 1975, the parties in both Tibay and Castro cases were given fifteen days from receipt of the transcript of Investigator:
stenographic notes within which to file their respective memoranda. That terminates stipulation of facts. (TSN, 3/15/78, pp. 14-16).
The fact that the decision in the Castro case was prepared on September 15, 1975 finds corroboration in the report for
September, 1975 submitted by respondent to the Court of Agrarian Relations Executive Judge. That report has the nature of res
On August 25, 1975, the Castros filed their memoranda in the two cases. Tibay failed to submit his memorandum and the cases gestae.
were deemed submitted for decision on September 9, 1975.

The facts are as above stated. In the light of the entirety thereof, it is believed that respondent need not be found culpable for not
On January 29, 1976, complainant herein addressed a letter to this Court complaining and charging respondent with delay in definitely resolving the Castro case within thirty (30) days after its submission for decision on September 9, 1975. The
deciding CAR Case No. 1794-TP'72 (the Castro case). The said letter was referred to the respondent on February 12, 1976, for considerations in support of that conclusion may be stated as follows:
comment and in the latter's 2nd Indorsement dated February 26, 1976, he submits "the information that CAR Case No. 1794-
TP'72 entitled "Bonifacio Castro, et al., versus Alfonso Cruz, et al." had been decided on September 15, 1975, but the decision
was not immediately released because I wanted the same be released simultaneously with the decision, promulgated today, in 1. The complaint in this case is on the allegation that the Castro case was not decided within the time
CAR Case No. 1822-TP'72, entitled "Romeo Tibay versus Felicidad Castro and Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz," a case closely provided for in Section 151 of RA 3844. The complaint does not charge respondent with not having
interrelated with the subject case." (p. 4, Records) decided the Tibay case within the statutory-indicated period of time. The complaint, in a way, is penal in
nature: and all presumptions should be in favor of respondent.
Replying to the explanation and/or comment of respondent Judge, complainant filed the following letter:
Santuejan, Pozzorrubio Pangasinan March 24,1976 2. In the purely technical sense, the Castro case decided on September 15, 1975.
The Executive Officer
Administrative Supervision of Courts
3. There was justification for respondent's desire to release the decision in the Castro case simultaneously
Supreme Court of the Philippines
with the decision in the Tibay case. There was close relationship between the two cases. There could have
Manila
been a finding in the Tibay case which could call for a modification in the decision in the Castro case.
Sir:
I have read the explanation of the Honorable Judge Arturo Malazo but I am afraid that he is not telling the
truth. According to Judge Malazo he did not release immediately the decision because he likes to release 4. If respondent had issued an order in the Castro case, stating that it would be decided simultaneously
the decision in the other case at the same time. Although I am not intelligent and almost cannot read and with the Tibay case, the present charge against him would be plainly without basis; that is unless it was
write, his reason for not releasing immediately the decision is not good. specifically pleaded that respondent had unjustifiably delayed the resolution of the Tibay case.
I want that Justice be done to tenant like us who were removed by the landowner of the land which we are
working. Judge Malazo only made the decision in our case after reporting him to the Supreme Court. This
5. While it is true that the decision in the Tibay case was promulgated tardily, the fact should be
is the one true. Sir, I reported him sir because he did not decide our case for more than one year our case
considered that respondent had been made to bear an overload of cases.
in finished in the trial. We suffered damage. After reporting he made a decision against us and our
landowner of the land are now laughing at us. So, please help us, Sir, Thank you respectfully.
(SGD.) FELICIDAD T. CASTRO Further, there was the complication of third parties filing a motion to intervene in the Castro case on November 25, 1974.
In Our Resolution of October 7, 1977, this case was referred to Justice Corazon Agrava of the Court of Appeals, for Resolution of that motion was deferred by respondent until after the two cases were decided. The thought was that the rights, if
investigation, report and recommendation. On August 9, 1978, Justice Agrava submitted to the Court her Report and any, of the intervenors could be assessed only after the two pending cases were decided. The Castro and Tibay cases may not
Recommendation, the gist of which is as follows: have been easy cases.
Complainant has claimed that the decision in the Castro case was prepared after, but antedated to,
September 15, 1975. The undersigned is finding that said decision was in fact prepared and signed on
In view of the foregoing, and based mainly on the appreciation of the situation, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
September 15, 1975. It was so stipulated in the agreed statement of facts. The transcript of stenographic
be exonerated.
notes taken at the hearing of March 15, 1978 read as follows:
Investigator:
Anything else. We will summarize the stipulation of facts: We do not agree with the recommendation that the respondent Judge be exonerated. While the records support the claim of
(1) That the parties agreed that a joint hearing be held in both Castro and Tibay cases; respondent that he signed the decision on September 15, 1975 and that consequently, the charge of ante-dating the questioned
(2) That in the Castro case a decision was rendered on September 15. 1975; decision in CAR Case No. 1794-TP'72 (Castro case) is devoid of merit, nevertheless, by respondent's own admission he
(3) That the decision in Castro case was released on February, 26, 1976 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon: deliberately, deferred the promulgation of the same. Respondent did not file the decision with the Clerk of Court, which filing is
(4) That on February 26, 1976 a separate decision was rendered in the Tibay case; the essential act that constitutes rendition of the decision and gives it validity and binding effect, for otherwise, the Judge can
(5) That this decision in the Tibay case was released also on February 26, 1976; readily change, alter, revise, or modify his decision while the same is under his personal control and custody. The rule is well

112
established that the filing of the derision, judgment or order with the Clerk of Court, not the date of the writing of the decision or
judgment, nor the signing thereof or even the promulgation thereof, that constitutes rendition thereof. (Ago vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., L-17898, October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 530; People vs. Soria, L-25175, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 948; Comia, et al. vs.
Nicolas, et al., L-26079, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 492).
Since there is no dispute that the Castro case was declared submitted for decision together with the Tibay case on September 9,
1975, and the decisions in both cases were rendered only on February 26, 1976, a clear violation of Section 151, Republic Act
No. 3844, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, has been committed by respondent Judge, which section provides as follows:
Secretary of Justice vs. Bullecer, Administrative Case No. 190-J, March 21, 1974, 56 SCRA 24; Raval vs. Romero, Adm. Case
No. 129J, July 30. 1976, 72 SCRA 172; Escabillas vs. Martinez, Adm. Matter No. 127-MJ, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 367).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent is hereby reprimanded for having failed to comply with the provisions of Section
151, Republic Act No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code. He is admonished and enjoined to comply strictly with the law
and a repetition of the offense may be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Resolution be spread in his record.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31, 2006

Sec. 151. Judge's Certification as to Work Completed.-The judges of the Courts of Agrarian Relations
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
shall certify at the end of each month that all petitions and motions in all cases pending decision or
vs.
resolution for a period of thirty days from submission by the parties have been determined and decided
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
before the date of the making of the certificate. No leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid
without such certificate.
x--------------x
We must once more impress upon the members of the Judiciary their sworn duty of administering justice without undue delay
under the time-honored precept that justice delayed, is justice denied. The present clogged condition of the courts' docket in all A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC March 31, 2006
levels of our judicial system cannot be cleared unless each and every judge earnestly and painstakingly takes it upon himself to
comply faithfully with the mandate of the law. No less important than the speedy termination of hearings and trials of cases is
the promptness and dispatch in the making of decisions and judgment, the signing thereof and filing the same with the Clerk of Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
Court. The Judiciary Act of 1948 explicitly commands in Section 5 thereof the following duty as follows:
x--------------x
Sec. 5. Judge's certificate as to work completed. District judges, judges of city courts, and municipal
judges shall certify on their applications for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 March 31, 2006
payment, or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or
determination for a period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date
of making the certificate, and no leave shall be granted and no salary shall be paid without such certificate. LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
In case any special proceeding, application, petition, motion, civil or criminal case is resubmitted upon the voluntary application
or consent in writing of all the parties to the case, cause, or proceeding, and not otherwise, the ninety days herein prescribed
within which a decision should be made shall begin to run from the date of such resubmission." DECISION

It may be true that respondent had an overload of cases in Branch II-A in Urdaneta, Pangasinan and Branch I in Lingayen, aside CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
from his regular duties as Presiding Judge in Branch III, Tayug, Pangasinan, but this is no valid reason for him to defer and delay
the filing of the questioned decision with the Clerk of Court after said decision had been signed by him on September 15, 1975, "Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran 1
for the act of filing is merely a ministerial act of delivering the signed decision with the Clerk Of Court. Neither can We excuse
the respondent by reason of the claim that the two cases were closely interrelated with each other, and that respondent suspended
the release of the decision in the Castro case because there were common issues in both cases where the resolution in one case THE CASES
will in effect divulge the resolution of the same issues existing in the other case. Respondent's contention is belied by his own
admission that although the two cases were closely interrelated with each other (2nd Indorsement, February 26, 1976) the cause The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
of action in one case is different from the other (TSN, March 15, 1978, p. 23; see Report and Recommendation, p. 144,
Records). It matters not whether the resolution of any issue common to both cases may be divulged to either party, for after all,
the decision may be appealed by the losing party. It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then
by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic
process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological
At any rate, it is apparent that from the time the Castro case was submitted for decision on September 9, 1975 up to September evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
15, 1975 when respondent signed the decision, the interval was 6 days and up to February 26, 1976 when respondent actually suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
filed with the Clerk of Court the said decision, the interval was 170 days, which is obviously beyond the 30-day period required
by the statute. (Sec. 151, Republic Act 3844). To absolve the respondent because he actually decided the Castro case within the
30- day period from September 9, 1975 by making the decision and signing the same on September 15, 1975, although he filed Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a
the same with the Clerk of Court only on February 26, 1976, would render useless and impotent the injunction of the statute and second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floros
allow Ourselves to place obstacles to the speedy pace of justice which this Court has always exhorted. More than that, We have appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998.
always taken to task respondent judges for failure to act with dispatch on the cases assigned to their respective salas. (The

113
Upon Judge Floros personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2
to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court
Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint against
Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator
Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation
against him.
4
In a Resolution dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by the audit team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications and for
announcing in open court during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial
Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2,
Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from
engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the
presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the
accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-
MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private
complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical
examination of the accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and
the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings;
114
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant,
OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within
ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be
conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same
breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the
administrative charges against him." He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative defenses 6 while
he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute. 7However, on 21
March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez. 8 Subsequently, on 7 July
2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator 9 which was denied by
Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge Floros motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27
July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirezs inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August
2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floros motion to
dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a "Partial Report"
recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform
the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch
73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez came out with his
report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he perceived to
have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive suspension follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team,
Office of the Court Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr. 20
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda
G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon 21
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) against former Court Administrator Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.)
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator 22
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23
7. A.C. No. 6050 against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed. 25 On 14 February 2006, the
Court granted the motion to dismiss.26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460: "(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral
ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the
civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence
of the trial prosecutor." The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001,
Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge
Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October 2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a
Memorandum in this case. 27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding
Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The resolution
disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order denying the petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S. Narvasa, the petitioners counsel. 28 The
OCA, through Court Administrator Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition and declared it as null and void. However,
he ordered the raffling of the case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei, will have
a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have continued hearing and taking cognizance of
the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1
(Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the interested party who seeks issuance of
a provisional remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted,
irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a
multiple-sala station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a case since such is only allowed upon a
verified application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judges finding that if a
special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage. Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.s order is contrary to the
above-mentioned Administrative Circular.
115
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr.
is his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a "padrino" (who helped
him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious
impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and expression of feelings must be suppressed by the judges
concerned. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule
2.03, Code of Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which
this Office has no authority to review. The remedy is judicial, not administrative. 29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in violation of
Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped
undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA. 30 Judge Floro, through his
counsel, filed his Comment on 22 October 1999 31 which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11 January 2000,
Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice
Ramirez for inclusion in his report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this case as well as in the second case (i.e.,
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the other
parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-
273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On 20 February 2006, the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., manifested its willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings and the
evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated
28 February 2006, her willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already submitted and on the evidence
previously offered and marked. On the other hand, on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well a
consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge Floros alleged mental illness and its effects on
his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically impaired
and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving
as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who
interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in
order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him. If the evidence makes out a case
against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or because of a psychological or mental
incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges the applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j", "e" and "f") will be jointly discussed as they
had likewise been jointly discussed by the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat them separately will be
superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for announcing in
open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch
73, Malabon City, and indicating therein that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with "full second honors" from the
Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise reported that: "(b)efore the start of court session, Judge
Floro is introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a bar
topnotcher during the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%. Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible,
particularly the Book of Revelation according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the opportunity
to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were asked; hence the session commenced."33
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of professional cards containing the name of
the lawyer, his title, his office and residence is not improper" and that the word "title" should be broad enough to include a
Judges legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their
calling cards their former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so where then does one draw
the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards were not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or
by reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not allowed by law to seek other professional
employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was his branch clerk
of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce his
appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the
introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that "a judge should not seek publicity for
personal vainglory." A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means that lawyers and judges alike,
being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking
their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or
permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-
glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule
2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permitted and
that the card "may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone
number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot be considered as simple and
ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro
breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just given by him as tokens and/or only to a few
who requested the same. 37 The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness from the
OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse, Judge Floros very own witness, a researcher from an
adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. 39
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its amendment,
automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a
less serious charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
116
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes something "out of all measure; beyond
allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be
corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules. 41
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge
Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable
thirst for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon
donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they
are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his qualifications, we
find that this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity.
Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and
litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion
of justice confident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities
that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week, Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct
only.
(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floros chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the right corner of
the room. A man, who was later identified as Judge Floros driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team, the driver
immediately went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw "sleeping" on his folding bed,
J. Torralba, was Judge Floros aide or "alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and especially
during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time that the audit team was in Branch
73 as he immediately left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge Floro having allowed another person to use
his folding bed for short periods of time during office hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation would have
been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of
Presado v. Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service when he and his family used his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the
electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip
as what had apparently happened in this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff
who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding
bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the
presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded
with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442
entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino", and "People vs. John
Richie Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of direct
examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially,
Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions.
However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused
had pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused
that they are qualified to apply for probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application in
behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will immediately be heard and be consequently granted. As
appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians of the accused are either a
barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for
release on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither rules nor circular mandates the
issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the
session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN are
hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro, Jr. granted a similar motion without
issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by
the Audit Team, asserting that
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to final and not interlocutory orders. Only
final orders and judgments are promulgated, rendered and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein respondent faithfully complied with the
requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON
RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its
face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in
Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 almost 14 years), [and especially the practice of
former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers,
regarding his being a responsible member of the community where the accused reside/resides; the questions
propounded are in the form of direct and even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since there is no such requirement. All that is
required, is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as whether he was sentenced
previously by a Court, whether or not he has had previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on application for release on recognizance,
respondent, for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing on the applications for release on
117
recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held
in the chambers.45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules on probation under Presidential Decree No.
968 (Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails more than a
cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law, 46and as we explained in Poso v. Judge
Mijares,47 it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a "disqualified
offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request
for provisional liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floros explanations, it would seem that he completely did away with the requirement for an investigation
report by the probation officer. Under the Probation Law, the accuseds temporary liberty is warranted only during the period for
awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application for probation and the resolution thereon. 48 As we explained
in Poso v. Judge Mijares49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on application for
release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty envisioned under
the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective no longer than the period
for awaiting the submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, which the law mandates as no more than
sixty (60) days to finish the case study and report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial
judge to resolve the application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit
the case study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the detriment of
the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these
are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals 50wherein we held that "no
judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and
promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation." Obviously,
then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance
of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito Beltran," "People v. Emma
Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written
orders are not necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to
ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on
recognizance of the accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said
release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and
investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into
writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was already
a done deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff
to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that
Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the
requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in
fact, this is a salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case, however, we cannot countenance what
Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and the private
complainants of their right to due process." 52
Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously. 54When the equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has been said is not merely a
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross matter of judicial ethics. It is impressed with constitutional significance.
ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not
warrant administrative sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN
impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 57 This rule, however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of
(for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in
good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01,
Canons of Judicial Conduct
The memorandum report states:
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused"
particularly concerning detention prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: "People vs. Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr., in
during the pendency of their cases. the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not being represented by a private
prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant to settle and eventually cause the
dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private complainants and the accused sign the
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA
settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as Annex "8").
to remedy his predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried due to the
lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention
prisoners languishing in the Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala from February xxxx
1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or
private complainant that he sided with the accused.
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the
"manifestations" of the private complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of the case. In
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floros Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his
meeting, admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer that he is comment. However, per report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid order was actually a revised one or a deviation
pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by from the original order given in open court. Actually, the said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the
his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses. 60 public prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability of the accused but the criminal
liability as well. It was further reported that the private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or
persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially since it is corroborated by independent
revised order (signed). Copies of the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes "8", "13", and
evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floros unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on recognizance as previously
"14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the case).
discussed.

In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the
case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint 67dated 9 August 1999, she
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice "should
alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughters case against the accused therein despite the
not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as
absence of the trial prosecutor. When the parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical
well. 62 Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and
expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be given time to study the matter and consult a
the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint
lawyer to which Judge Floro replied that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover, Judge
dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and
Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the accused against the complaining witness would likewise
unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language, both
be dismissed, so they agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge did not reflect the
written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued." 65
agreement entered into by the parties in open court.

On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And by
professing his bias for the accused, Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in serious
doubt, necessarily eroding the publics trust in his ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less
than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding
to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays
himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies
and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication
requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It
is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing
on said case was not only in accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as they openly
manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties
suggested that they would file the necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the TSN-
dictated Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation between Judge Floro and Court
Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in
criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the
hearing on even date was superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventuras stance that he has no power to revise an Order, courts have plenary
power to recall and amend or revise any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.

118
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we declared: e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of
the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of
Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang pick-
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing,
up";
signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation,
and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by
any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even
after promulgation (i.e., filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an order or judgment, the
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that "the court may order a physical or MENTAL
Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or
examination of a party where his physical or mental condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf. MARTIN,
even motu proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
p. 107, id.). 71

In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court ostensibly a judicial approval of a
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the suspension of the
compromise agreement which was amended or revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order merely
arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72 As reflected in the Order
stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement
for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused
after the public prosecutor shall have submitted its comments thereto. 69
is "mahina ang pick-up."

Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling and factoring
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and "over the strong objection of the
in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph "j" of the
trial prosecutor." It must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999 when the applicable rule
complaint).
was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to
sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The
controversial settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially approved as reflected in the revised Order of 8 March 1999, (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination
the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this agreement was reached under duress at the and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
instance of Judge Floro.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination of the 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made "upon motion by
accused based on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up" the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu
proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the
proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio
People v. Alcalde 75 :
ordered the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition of insanity or
imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused could
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused
to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the
manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor,
xxxx
Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:

a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and he appeared trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that accused is "nauutal", has difficulty of reasoning,
of speaking, and very nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty
and to not guilty, and so forth;
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill of Rights carries with
it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his
defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the
part of the accused is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully satisfied that the accused
would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accuseds mental fitness for trial is already beside the
point. If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable wrong.

119
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83,
Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the
private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and without filing the
corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted
that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.)
acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an
application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing
and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding
Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In
this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial
Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73,
Malabon, Metro Manila. Court stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this information.
Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid
pleading. Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to appear as
counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court unequivocally states that: "No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel
in his personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For
Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission") jointly with his counsel of record in connection
with a habeas corpus case he filed against his brothers for the custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He explained,
however, that he prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that
case.78 He likewise explained that the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same
by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally, during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that
he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention
120
to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to
promote the public interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by "private practice" is more than an isolated
court appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does
not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with
his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge Floros act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an
isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Floro is
obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming
conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for
appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for such
acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a
judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain
from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency." By
doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal
cases without filing for leave of absence. As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon the
OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal
rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental
requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With
the assistance of the court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached
is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the court proceedings is also submitted along with this
report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty.
Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding
Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic
kinopya lang sa law of California on Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema,
masyadong maraming eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan but ginawa ko lang yon Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain
kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi alam yan talo na sa akin except na hindi papayag kasi marami diyang "
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case
involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the
system. Thus, he said:
"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako
walang pera."
He continued:
"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my
brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun ganun Sabi ko paano ko
makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa
ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera.
Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi
naka-record eto (laughs) baka ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk
of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their consistent
tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro contends
that this recording was done clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No. 4200) and,
to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof. They also made it appear that the conversation took place in
a court proceeding when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were submitted to the OCA sans the "yellow notes"
and the official transcribed copy thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit team as Annex
"15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the
case, the two tapes, without concrete proof that they were taken officially during a court proceeding, cannot be used against
Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a private conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with only Judge Floros word against that of
Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who testified under oath as to Judge Floros alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary and to
use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would therefore depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules of
Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the alleged "kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and again
he said the Rules of Court is of no use. He said that since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules of Court
does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us
. . . and I quote "Dyan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang
lagayan diyan."
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his respect to the court,
to the bar and to the bench? How can he uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice system?
xxxx
121
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a
Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he
said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even not during court session, but during office hours our
Court Interpreter "malandi, luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not surprise us one time when during a pre-trial conference
in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow
judge. Take the transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator. It was the content of the
tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open
Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the defendants in the case, we were in
quandary whether or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual transcription of the proceedings because
it contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude
Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable
settlement between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion
whether or not to advise the stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record because it contained
offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng
kamatayan, etcetera, etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in
the light of confirming proofs from Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances are consistent with Judge Floros claims of
intellectual superiority for having graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed 13th in the
bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account of his perception of injustice in the disposition
of his brothers case are not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed against him by the
OCA and by the persons who were either in charge of the cases against him or had some sort of participation therein.
Consequently, although there is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless, evidence that
he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that
it is more likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct.
Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In this case, there is ample and competent
proof of violation on Judge Floros part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule
3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly judge generates disorderly
work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to maintain order and proper decorum in court. When
the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings in court must be
conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and
importance of a judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this atmosphere must be avoided.
And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987 provides that trial of cases should be conducted
efficiently and expeditiously. Judges should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind that he is
the visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain
and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" are manifestations of his psychological
instability and therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to
subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in
the administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the charge
of mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his office.
This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that
he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in determining the
transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges
discussed above. To recapitulate, we have found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges against
him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge "d" unbecoming conduct
4) Charge "e" unbecoming conduct
5) Charges "k" and "l" unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge may
be dismissed from the service, suspended from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P 40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In
herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with these charges, his relative
inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And, considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or
with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00,
as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the
mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the
charge of mental illness against Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental or
psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true,
renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had
been no finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter applied for judgeship (which application
he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D.
(Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
122
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He was argumentative and over solicitous of
questions asked, giving the impressions of marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila
graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive and compulsive
method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors all the
time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his
achievements, tend to be a perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he
related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest secret of the
universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in psychic phenomenon" as when his bar
results was to be released, he saw lights in the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the 13th place. He has been practicing
"parapsychology" seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview
(conscious) and psychological test results. (unconscious level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when he applied
anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and
Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this. During the interview, he was quite
reluctant to reveal information about his family background and would rather talk about his work and academic achievements.
However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with the various tasks that he
undertakes. This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with decision-making. He also has a low self-
esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private
practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and showed
discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others motives as well as perceptual distortions
were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floros current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected cognitive
efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his
primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle
the responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to preside over a
regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate
psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified that the "appropriate psychological or mental
examination" being adverted to in the Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby
directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental examination, within ten (10) days from
notice." 95 Judge Floro sought reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic was reiterated by the Court on 17 October
2000 with the admonition that Judge Floros failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions. 97
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000 Resolution with a conjunctive special motion 1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday demands. He is able to
for him to undergo psychiatric examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. 98 This was denied by the handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details, he has a logical approach in
Court on 14 November 2000. 99 evaluating the relationship between things and ideas.

On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic 2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at
doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before the concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and details so as to get things
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association (PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged gross done correctly and on schedule. He uses conventional standards to determine personal progress. Set in his
incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103 views, he may not readily accept others ideas and contributions especially if these oppose his own.

On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be 3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to
sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According to control his emotions and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and decisions.
Justice Ramirez, Judge Floros filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr. Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the
latters intention to disregard and disobey the legal orders of the Court. 104The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to psychological and mental examination within 10 days from receipt,
otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high
106 personal standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these standards. When things do not develop
Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. He likewise sought the services of a private
along desired lines, he may become restless and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be
practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001. 107
expected to comply with conventional social demands. 109

Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December 2000, this time in connection with A.M.
Testifying as one of Judge Floros witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that "psychologically speaking,"
No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that "(o)ver all data
Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:
strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of the proceedings,
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. Would you consider
compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence. xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his test protocol is characterized by disabling
A: Yes, Sir.
indicators. There is impairment in reality testing which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective
xxxx
assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were cross-examining Mr.
distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic and paranormal
Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell you
phenomena and divine gifts of healing have become incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it
about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his psychological outlook?
has interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in performing his court duties as
xxxx
a judge. 108
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, A: Yes, Sir.
M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported by evidence. Based on the three[3] A: He did not.
psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2] psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that xxxx
Judge Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately. Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making pronouncement concerning
his psychic powers. Is this not correct?
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological evaluations conducted by xxxx
several mental health professionals which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with his A: Yes sir.
application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having "failed" the examination given by the Supreme Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of his private
Court Clinic. The report dated 04 September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical Psychologist, activities and even in the course of the performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?
Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological Corporation (MPC), states in part: A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman "na ako
ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng ibat iba pang bagay at the same
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge.
xxxx
123
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking.
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir. 110
Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the Makati Medical Center, stated in her
report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the interview Judge Floro
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics intelligently
without hesitation. His thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally stable,
with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological disturbances. 111
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his report that
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he was
somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and
articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There
was pressure of speech with tendency to be argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought blocking,
looseness of associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious.
There were no abnormal involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact. Judgment, insight, and
other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination
and appointment to the post he is seeking. 112
On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floros witness, Dr. Jurilla clarified that the interview had its
limitations 113 and he might have missed out certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following exchange is thus
instructive:
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little unseen, unheard friends known as
duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
xxxx
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five psychic in the
country?
xxxx
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?
A: He did not.
xxxx
Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big
white or whatever it is, horse?
A: Not during our interview.
xxxx
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or it is possible that
our clients or patients might not [have] told us everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the course
of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little?
xxxx
A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any corroborative
contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired after the
interview, would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the number five
psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?
xxxx
Q: Would it be really more altered?
A: I would say so.
xxxx
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell you
during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is capable or possessed
of the power of bilocation?
124
xxxx
A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floros mental and psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your evaluation favorable to Judge Floro
drastically altered if I tell you that based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a letter?
xxxx
A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered. 115
Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001, the relevant
portions of which state:
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought did not reveal delusional thought. He was proud
of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are
handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or
abnormal perceptual distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-
making capacity were adequately functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26, 2000. He talked about his family and academic
achievements. He claimed to possess a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a "covenant" made
during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is
to cast illness and/or disease and the second part is to heal and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28, 2000. The battery of test consisted of the
following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sacks Sentence
Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an individual with an Above Average
Intelligence. Projective data, showed an obsessive-compulsive person who is meticulous to details and strive for perfection in
tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed capable of making day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as
professional decisions. Confusion with regard to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found
to be a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is not deluded
nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is
culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge Floro was unfit to be a judge. 117 The relevant
exchanges between Dr. Maaba and Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed with power of
[bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in this very case
that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another person, another character unseen who is with him at the same
time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?
xxxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters would turn out to be
fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an organic mental
disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this symptom
might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings particularly in
the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound syndrome and it
could also be an indication Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental disorder. It is also
common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or situations
so that a person or a judge hearing a case in court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony of
witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this
difficulty in manners of attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience trance as in the case of Judge
Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well as
physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on October 10, 2000,
afternoon session, page 30 we start with the question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in
trance at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance, but I distinguished not the trance
that you see the nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas. Thats a trance that is created by the so called Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao,
multi awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas,
the mind projection or the hypnosis do come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my case I
never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat will penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So
at this very moment, Mr. witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO: Yes, they are
here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be seen but ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them?" To
point to us where are they in this room?", Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro himself admitted
that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as this claim of
his to be a normal person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript of
stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a socalled counter part, his other side, other self,
what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President Estrada would not finish his term as
President. It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar
topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a
coup detat attempt. So is it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the cases assigned
to his court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is
conducting and for him to say that he is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been appointed. It is
abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda. One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer,
amusing, irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a
125
trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to
determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or insane and should not be allowed to continue
discharging the duties and functions of a judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge
are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue discharging
the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the
duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73,
respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of mental impairment
that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor this Court is
qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due to "insanity," he was apparently using
the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general laymans term, a catchall word referring to various mental disorders. Psychosis
is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of
note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of the people. 121 An honorable, competent
and independent judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government, and the well-being of the
people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside
over courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it has been said, courts will
only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges
against him, we have not found him guilty of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the
mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of foreseeing the future because of his power in
"psychic phenomenon." He believes in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel." He
believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been in two places at the same
time. He has likened himself to the "angel of death" who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived as
corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during court sessions, switching only to black on
Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his
psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his break time. All these things validate
the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floros uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on
them, are so at odds with the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its
absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to psychic phenomena in the
decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro
discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or a "fantastic
story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic phenomena" was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the
testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floros decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecutions PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is
full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of
fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other public officials. Judges are seen as
the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than legislators or
scene that is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion: executives. 132

a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were "sinalubong" by Lando/accused on June 21,
1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the "nagpambuno" between Raul and Ando,
and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE
IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit false
testimony); for how could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following day?
(TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN was incorrect due to typographical error, or
maybe the Court Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the testimony, so that the
word DAY should have been corrected to another word SUITABLE to Normandys FAIRY TALE, still, the Court
had synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no reason that the seeming error DAY
should be corrected; the Courts sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES cooperated
by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY
INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127
we held that
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some abstract ideas of right and justice, but
according to the rules laid down by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is
primarily adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call it legislative or not,
which requires great ability and objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of the Justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline
and self-criticism, incertitude that ones own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But these are
precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from those
entrusted with judicial power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice and is not to be based upon the
idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134

In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental requirements of competence and objectivity expected of
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific
all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a
disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits
critical and impartial judiciary.
include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. 128

Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3) years.
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at
will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129 assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such major and unfortunate faux
pas.
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for judicial tasks leaves much to be desired. As
reported by the Supreme Court Clinic: Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of
tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having failed the
psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with
Floros submission of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from the private sector and which were
decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic
favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.
phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. x x x 130
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a second opinion of his mental and
psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes that
Judge Floros belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as RTC judge, indubitably shows his
members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven competence, integrity, probity and
inability to function with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
independence. 135 It was only on 18 October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council,"
that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had previously used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus: the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof
states:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of the judges role.
Especially if he has aspired to a judges status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the fashion SECTION 1. Good health. Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play
of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have displayed the kinds of behavior that the judges role a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x
demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic
elements of investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing appearance of some court
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the
buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former ambulance chaser who owes
Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
his position to a thoroughly corrupt political organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a
judge. 131

126
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist
not accredited by the JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of mental health
professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floros appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly
overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floros almost seven years of
suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power through the admonition that such rules "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase,
or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140
does not detail the steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending investigation. This is the state of
things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on 1 October 2001.
The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over all courts
and the personnel thereof. 139 This power -- consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other
things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2)
REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and
recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for
appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floros suspension, albeit indefinite, was for the duration of the
investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of the
records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation
within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant" 141 and,
"(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of his investigation
which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating
judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final
decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her. 143 This is because
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive
suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may
preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a strong
likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any further
damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the erring judge. It is also intended to
protect the courts image as temples of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly
dispensed.
127
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants,
a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the
embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge of mental unfitness
aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90 days. And the
reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not
only did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet with respect to the
order to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him
ballooned into 10 cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro
filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he filed
on 19 May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case considering that the rules on preventive
suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled similarly
in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive suspension pending investigation
is not entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive
suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a
judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13 months, during which period he was not paid his salaries,
allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the
administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus incurred several loans to provide for his familys
basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire
period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal
investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety
(90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified. Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries,
allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-
day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such may not be entirely
unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other economic
benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case was not due to his
fault. Upon being found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the ninety-day (90) period
actually becomes without basis and would indeed be nothing short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent
acquittal completely removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its
effects on just and equitable grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise entitled to the payment of back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves preventively
suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the duration of the investigation." Judge Iturraldes suspension
of 13 months even pales in comparison to Judge Floros suspension of 81 months, more or less. During this entire excruciating
period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brothers largesse.
And, though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss of
income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of suspension exceeding 90 days should be the
basis for the payment of back salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries, allowances and
other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in
Gloria that any suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge Floros
propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived
connived to oust him out of office. In Judge Iturraldes case, the investigation was not delayed through any fault of his. More
importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in
excess of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely because, being innocent, he
cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of his
cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment against Judge
Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do not require him to dispense
justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floros favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they
deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floros assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor
modification of work environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self- organization." 149

b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice
lawyer in private practice." 150
Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:

c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena not
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete justice where courts of law, through the
detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151
inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent so to
do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is
variously expressed by different courts. 148 d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency . His concern for the details
that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in the resolution of his case, equitable
considerations constrain us to award him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153
three years. This is because Judge Floros separation from the service is not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to
mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be
him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his office.
successful in other areas of endeavor.

The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances. As discussed, if we were to give him more
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floros current administrative and medical problems are
than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution of
not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with
these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14 February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other
the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a
hand, if we were to peg the period at less than three years then the same would only be a pittance compared to the seven years
medically disabling condition.
suspension he had to live through with Damocles sword hanging over his head and with his hands bound as he could not
practice his profession.
Finally, if Judge Floros mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately,
such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment
Judge Floros separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution
factors they have no control over.
Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.),
on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven
of the 13 charges against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floros separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As
it is, even the most favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Courts decision to separate Judge Floro
from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and academic. 2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73,
Malabon City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition of the mind
that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office, effective immediately;
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other economic
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is without basis,
benefits corresponding to three (3) years;
this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.

4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF
Judge Floros separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor
MERIT; and
disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.

5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V.
As Judge Floros separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry with it the forfeiture
Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

128