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CORPORATION LAW
INTRODUCTION
A corporation, being a creature of law, "owes its life to the state, its birth being
purely dependent on its will," it is "a creature without any existence until it has received
the imprimatur of the state acting according to law." A corporation will have no rights
and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator and cannot legitimately refuse
to yield obedience to acts of its state organs. (Tanyag v. Benguet Corporation)
Stock Non-Stock
Purpose Primarily to make profits for its May be formed or organized for
shareholders charitable, religious,
educational, professional,
cultural, fraternal, literary,
scientific, social, civic service, or
similar purposes like trade,
industry, agricultural and like
chambers, or any combination
thereof. (88)
Distribution of Profits Profit is distributed to Whatever incidental profit made
shareholders is not distributed among its
members but is used for
furtherance of its purpose. AOI
or by-laws may provide for the
distribution of its assets among
its members upon its
dissolution. Before then, no
profit may be made by
members.
Voting by proxy May be denied by the AOI or Cannot be denied. (Sec. 58)
the by-laws. (Sec. 89)
Election of officers Officers are elected by the Officers may directly elected by
Board of Directors (Sec. 25), the members UNLESS the AOI
except in close corporations or by-laws provide otherwise.
where the stockholders (Sec. 92)
themselves may elect the
officers. (Sec. 97)
Place of meetings Any place within the Philippines,Generally, the meetings must be
if provided for by the by-laws held at the principal office of the
(Sec. 93) corporation, if practicable. If
not, then anyplace in the city or
municipality where the principal
office of the corporation is
located. (Sec. 51)
HELD: The Club was organized to develop and cultivate sports of all class and denomination
for the healthful recreation and entertainment of its stockholders and members. There was in
fact, no cash dividend distribution to its stockholders and whatever was derived on retail from its
bar and restaurants used were to defray its overhead expenses and to improve its golf course.
In the case at bar, nowhere in the AOI or by-laws of Club Filipino could be found an authority
for the distribution of its dividends or surplus profits.
partnerships
Number not less than 5; not more than may be more than 15 for non-
15 stock corp. except educational
corp.
3- Contribute capital/resources
STEPS COMMENTS
c. Filing of articles; payment of AOI & the treasurers affidavit duly signed &
fees. acknowledged
Purpose Clause A corporation can only have one (1) primary purpose.
However, it can have several secondary purposes.
in case the shares are par value shares, the par value
of each,
Other matters Classes of shares into w/c the shares of stock have
been
minimum.
b) stock exchanges;
c) banks;
d) insurance companies;
e) public utilities;
(2) That there has been colorable compliance with the legal
requirements in good faith; and,
(3) That there has been use of corporate powers, i.e., the transaction
of business in some way as if it were a corporation.
No. In the case of Hall v. Piccio (86 Phil. 603; 1950), where the
supposed corporation transacted business as a corporation pending
action by the SEC on its articles of incorporation, the Court held that there
was no de facto corporation on the ground that the corporation cannot
claim to be in good faith to be a corporation when it has not yet obtained
its certificate of incorporation.
WON a corporation organized under a statute subsequently declared void acquires status
as de facto corporation.
No. A corporation organized under a statute subsequently declared invalid cannot acquire
the status of a de facto corporation unless there is some other statute under which the supposed
corporation may be validly organized. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that the
municipality was organized before the statute had been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a
de facto corporation since there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.
The constitutive documents of the proposed corporation were deposited with the Register
of Deeds but not on file in said office. One of the requirements for valid incorporation is the
filing of constitutive documents in the Register of Deeds.
Was there colorable compliance enough to give the supposed corporation at least the
status of a de facto corporation?
No. The filing of the constitutive documents in the Register of Deeds is a condition
precedent to the right to act as a corporate body. As long as an act, required as a condition
precedent, remains undone, no immunity from individual liability is secured.
The constitutive documents were filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals but not with
the clerk of court in the judicial district where the business was located. Arkansas law requires
filing in both offices.
Was there colorable compliance enough to give the supposed corporation at least the
status of a de facto corporation?
No. Neither the hope, the belief, nor the statement by parties that they are incorporated,
nor the signing of the articles of incorporation which are not filed, where filing is requisite to
create the corporation, nor the use of the pretended franchise of the nonexistent corporation, will
constitute such a corporation de facto as will exempt those who actively and knowingly use s
name to incur legal obligations from their individual liability to pay them. There could be no
incorporation or color of it under the law until the articles were filed (requisites for valid
incorporation).
In the case of Hall v. Piccio, where the supposed corporation transacted business as a
corporation pending action by the SEC on its articles of incorporation, the Court held that there
was no de facto corporation on the ground that the corporation cannot claim to be in good
faith to be a corporation when it has not yet obtained its certificate of incorporation.
NOTE: The validity of incorporation cannot be inquired into collaterally in
any private suit
to which such corporation may be a party. Such inquiry must be
through a quo warranto proceeding made by the Solicitor General.
(Sec. 20)
(Sec. 21)
CORPORATION BY ESTOPPEL
The de facto doctrine differs from the estoppel doctrine in that where all the requisites
of a de facto corporation are present, then the defectively organized corporation will have the
status of a de jure corporation in all cases brought by and against it, except only as to the State
in a direct proceeding. On the other hand, if any of the requisites are absent, then the estoppel
doctrine can apply only if under the circumstances of the particular case then before the court,
either the defendant association is estopped from defending on the ground of lack of capacity to
be sued, or the defendant third party had dealt with the plaintiff as a corporation and is deemed to
have admitted its existence.
(De facto has status of de jure corpo, except separate personality against State, provided all requisites
are present)
(2) against third party? Third party cannot deny existence of corporation
if it
Company was sued on a promissory note. Its defense was that at the time of its issuance,
it was defectively organized and therefore could not be sued as such.
The Corporation cannot repudiate the transaction or evade responsibility when sued
thereon by setting up its own mistake affecting the original organization.
Corporation sued a partnership on a promissory note. The latter as defense alleged that
the plaintiff was not a corporation.
One who enters into a contract with a party described therein as a corporation is
precluded, in an action brought thereon by such party under the same designation, from denying
its corporate existence.
ASIA BANKING VS STANDARD PRODUCTS (46 Phil. 145; 1924)
The corporation sued another corporation a promissory note. The defense was that the
plaintiff was not able to prove the corporate existence of both parties.
The defendant is estopped from denying its own corporate existence. It is also estopped
from denying the others corporate existence. The general rule is that in the absence of fraud, a
person who has contracted or otherwise dealt with an association is such a way as to recognize
and in effect admit its legal existence as a corporate body is thereby estopped from denying its
corporate existence.
IBM sued Cranson in his personal capacity regarding a typewriter bought by him as
President of a defectively organized company whose Articles were not yet filed when the
obligation was contracted.
IBM, having dealt with the defectively organized company as if it were properly
organized and having relied on its credit instead of Cransons, is estopped from asserting that it
was not incorporated. It cannot sue Cranson personally.
Salvatierra leased his land to the corporation. He filed a suit for accounting, rescission
and damages against the corporation and its president for his share of the produce. Judgment
against both was obtained. President complains for being held personally liable.
He is liable. An agent who acts for a non-existent principal is himself the principal. In
acting on behalf of a corporation which he knew to be unregistered, he assumed the risk arising
from the transaction.
Mariano Albert entered into a contract with University Publishing Co., Inc. through Jose
M. Aruego, its President, whereby University would pay plaintiff for the exclusive right to
publish his revised Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code. The contract stipulated that
failure to pay one installment would render the rest of the payments due. When University failed
to pay the second installment, Albert sued for collection and won. However, upon execution, it
was found that University was not registered with the SEC. Albert petitioned for a writ of
execution against Jose M. Aruego as the real defendant. University opposed, on the ground that
Aruego was not a party to the case.
The Supreme Court found that Aruego represented a non-existent entity and induced not
only Albert but the court to believe in such representation. Aruego, acting as representative of
such non-existent principal, was the real party to the contract sued upon, and thus assumed such
privileges and obligations and became personally liable for the contract entered into or for other
acts performed as such agent.
The Supreme Court likewise held that the doctrine of corporation by estoppel cannot be
set up against Albert since it was Aruego who had induced him to act upon his (Aruego's) willful
representation that University had been duly organized and was existing under the law.
When adopted:
(a) No later than one (1) month after receipt from SEC of
official notice of issuance of Cert. of
incorporation.
When effective: Only upon the SECs issuance of a certification that the
by-laws
law.
trust companies
insurance companies
public utilities
educational institutions
1) the time, place and manner of calling and conducting regular or special
meetings of the directors or trustees;
2) the time and manner of calling and conducting regular and special
meetings of the stockholders or members;
3) the required quorum in meetings of stockholders or members and the
manner of voting herein;
4) the form for proxies of stockholders and members and the manner of
voting them;
6) the time for holding the annual election of directors or trustees and the
mode or manner of giving notice thereof;
7) the manner of election or appointment and the term of office of all officers
other than directors or trustees;
10) such other matters as may be necessary for the proper or convenient
transaction of its corporate business and affairs.
As a general rule, the by-laws of a corporation are valid if they are reasonable and
calculated to carry into effect the objective of the corporation and are not contradictory to the
general policy of the laws of the land. Under a statute authorizing by-laws for the transfer of
stock, a corp. can do no more than prescribe a general mode of transfer on the corp. books and
cannot justify an restriction upon the right of sale.
Is a provision in the by-laws allowing the BOD, by vote of absolute majority, to cancel shares
valid?
No. It is a patent nullity, being in direct conflict with Sec. 187 of the Corp. Law which
prohibits forced surrender of unmatured stocks except in case of dissolution.
Yes. Since the Corporation Law does not prescribe the rate of compensation, the power
to fix compensation lies with the corporation.
Is a provision requiring persons elected to the Board of Directors to own at least P 5,000 shares
valid?
Yes. The Corporation Law gives the corporation the power to provide qualifications of
its directors.
Where the SEC grants a license to a foreign corporation, it is deemed to have approved
its
foreign-enacted by-laws. Sec. 46 of the Corporation Code which states that by-laws are
not valid without SEC approval applies only to domestic corporations.
A board resolution appointing an attorney-in-fact to represent the corporation during pre-
trial is not necessary where the by-laws authorize an officer of the corporation to make
such appointment.
ISSUE: Whether the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one (1) month from the
date
RULING: No. Failure to file by-laws does not result in the automatic dissolution of the
corporation. It only constitutes a ground for such dissolution. (Cf. Chung Ka Bio v. IAC,
163 SCRA 534) Incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or
omission and remedy the same.
Since corporate property is owned by the corporation as a juridical person, the stockholders have
no claim on it as owners, but have merely an expectancy or inchoate right to the same should any
of it remain upon the dissolution of the corporation after all corporate creditors have been paid.
Conversely, a corporation has no interest in the individual property of its stockholders, unless
transferred to the corporation. Remember that the liability of the stockholders is limited to the
amount of shares.
In this case, the sale of a piece of land belonging to Motorich Corporation by the
corporation treasurer (Gruenberg) was held to be invalid in the absence of evidence that said
corporate treasurer was authorized to enter into the contract of sale, or that the said contract was
ratified by Motorich. Even though Gruenberg and her husband owned 99.866% of Motorich, her
act could not bind the corporation since she was not the sole controlling stockholder.
Properties registered in the name of the corporation are owned by it as an entity separate
and distinct from its members. While shares of stock constitute personal property, they do not
represent property of the corporation. A share of stock only typifies an aliquot part of the
corporation's property or the right to share in its proceeds to that extent when distributed
according to law and equity, but its holder is not the owner of any part of the capital of the
corporation. Nor is he entitled to the possession of any definite portion of its property or assets.
The act of liquidation made by the stockholders of the corp of the latters assets is not and
cannot be considered a partition of community property, but rather a transfer or conveyance of
the title of its assets to the individual stockholders. Since the purpose of the liquidation, as well
as the distribution of the assets, is to transfer their title from the corporation to the stockholders
in proportion to their shareholdings, that transfer cannot be effected without the corresponding
deed of conveyance from the corporation to the stockholders. It is, therefore, fair and logical to
consider the certificate of liquidation as one in the nature of a transfer or conveyance.
The case of the unpaid compensation for the preparation of the project study.
The petitioners were not involved in the initial stages of the organization of the airline.
They were merely among the financiers whose interest was to be invited and who were in fact
persuaded, on the strength of the project study, to invest in the proposed airline.
There was no showing that the Airline was a fictitious corp and did not have a separate
juridical personality to justify making the petitioners, as principal stockholders thereof,
responsible for its obligations. As a bona fide corp, the Airline should alone be liable for its
corporate acts as duly authorized by its officers and directors. Granting that the petitioners
benefited from the services rendered, such is no justification to hold them personally liable
therefor. Otherwise, all the other stockholders of the corporation, including those who came in
late, and regardless of the amount of their shareholdings, would be equally and personally liable
also with the petitioner for the claims of the private respondent.
The case of the reliance on a default provision of the contract granting automatic extra-judicial
rescission.
The court found no badges of fraud on the part of the president of the corporation. The
BOD had literally and mistakenly relied on the default provision of the contract. As president
and controlling stockholder of the corp, no sufficient proof exists on record that he used the corp
to defraud private respondent. He cannot, therefore, be made personally liable because he
appears to be the controlling stockholder. Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient
ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality.
The case of the assignment by Senator Magsaysay of a certain portion of his shareholdings in
SUBIC granting his sisters the right to intervene in a case filed by the widow against SUBIC.
The words "an interest in the subject," to allow petitioners to intervene, mean a direct
interest in the cause of action as pleaded, and which would put the intervenor in a legal position
to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint, without the establishment of which plaintiff could not
recover.
While a share of stock represents a proportionate or aliquot interest in the property of the
corp, it does not vest the owner thereof with any legal right or title to any of the property, his
interest in the corporate property being equitable and beneficial in nature. Shareholders are in no
legal sense the owners of corporate property, which is owned by the corp as a distinct legal
person.
A: That a corporation has a personality distinct from its stockholders, and is not affected by the
personal rights, obligations and transactions of the latter.
A: The veil of corporate fiction may be pierced when it is used as a shield to further an end
subversive of justice, or for purposes that could not have been intended by law that created it or
to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime or to perpetuate fraud
or confuse legitimate issues or to circumvent the law or perpetuate deception or as an alter ego,
adjunct or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders.
(2) Court is not denying corporate existence for all purposes but merely refuses to allow the
corporation to use the corporate privilege for the particular purpose involved.
STATE V. STANDARD OIL (49 Ohio, St., 137, N.E. 279, 15; 1892)
Where the corporation was formed by and consisted of the members of a partnership
whose business and property was conveyed to the corporation for the purpose of continuing its
business, such corporation is presumed to have assumed partnership debts.
shows that other shareholders may be considered dummies of Castro. Hence, corporate veil may
be pierced.
Tan BBC (T) supplies paper to Graphics Publishing Inc (G) but the latter fails to pay. G's
printing machine levied upon to satisfy claim but PADCO, another corpo intercedes, saying it is
the owner of the machine, having leased such to G.
Printing machine was allowed by the Court to satisfy G's liability. Both G and PADCO's
corporate entities pierced because they have: the same board of directors, PADCO owns 50% of
G, PADCO never engaged in the business of printing. Obviously, the board is using PADCO to
shield G from fulfilling liability to T.
NAMARCO v. AFCorp (19 SCRA 962; 1967)
Associated Financing Corp. (AFC), through its pres. F. Sycip (who together with wife,
own 76% of AFC) contracts with NAMARCO for an exchange of sugar (raw v. refined). N
delivers, AFC doesn't since it did not have sugar to supply in the first place. N sues to recover
sum of money plus damages.
Sycip held jointly and severally liable with AFC. AFC's corporate veil was pierced
because it was used as Sycip's alter ego, corpo used merely as an instrumentality, agency or
conduit of another to evade liability.
Jacinto, president/GM and owner of 52% of corpo, owes MetroBank sum of money, signs
trust receipts therefor. Jacinto absconds. Jacinto ordered to jointly and severally pay MetroBank.
Corpo veil pierced because it was used as a shield to perpetuate fraud and/or confuse legitimate
issues. There was no clear cut delimitation between the personality of Jacinto and the
corporation.
Both predecessor and successor were owned and controlled by petitioner and there was
no break in the succession and continuity of the same business. All the assets of the dissolved
Plant were turned over to the emerging corporation. The veil of corporate fiction must be pierced
as it was deliberately and maliciously designed to evade its financial obligation to its employees.
INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILL WORKERS UNION V. CALICA (205 SCRA 698)
Rule: The doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity applies when corporate fiction
is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, or when it is
made as a shield to confuse the legitimate issues or where a corporation is the mere alter ego or
business conduit of a person, or where the corporation is so organized and controlled and its
affairs are so conducted as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of
another corporation.
Case at bar: Union sought to pierce corporate veil alleging that the creation of Acrylic is a devise
to evade the application of the CBA Indophil had with them (or it sought to include the other
union in its bargaining leverage).
SC: Legal corporate entity is disregarded only if it is sought to hold the officers and stockholders
directly liable for a corporate debt or obligation. Union does not seek to impose such claim
against Acrylic. Mere fact that businesses were related, that some of the employees of Indophil
are the same persons manning and providing for auxiliary services to the other company, and that
physical plants, officers and facilities are situated in the same compound - not sufficient to apply
doctrine.
Libra/Dolphin Garments was but an alter ego of Lawman Industrial, therefore, the former
must bear the consequences of the latter's unfair acts. It cannot deny reinstatement of petitioners
simply because of cessation of Lawman's operations, since it was in fact an illegal lock-out, the
company having maintained a run-away shop and transferred its machines and assets there.
Here, the veil of corporate fiction was pierced in order to safeguard the right to self-
organization and certain vested rights which had accrued in favor of the union. Second
corporation sought the protective shield of corporate fiction to achieve an illegal purpose.
ASIONICS PHILS. v. NLRC (290 SCRA 164)
A corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the
persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the
capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate
corporate personality.
Where there is nothing on record to indicate the President and majority stockholder of a
corporation had acted in bad faith or with malice in carrying out the retrenchment program of the
company, he cannot be held solidarily and personally liable with the corporation.
Jose M. Villarama, operator of a bus company, Villa Rey Transit, which was authorized to
operate 32 units from Pangasinan to Manila and vice-versa, sold 2 CPCs to Pantranco. One of
the conditions included in the contract of sale was that the seller (Villarama) "shall not, for a
period of 10 years from the date of the sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing
with the buyer (Pantranco)."
Barely 3 months after the sale, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc. was organized,
with the wife of Jose M. Villarama as one of the incorporators and who was subsequently elected
as treasurer of the Corporation. Barely a month after its registration with the SEC, the
corporation bought 5 CPCs and 49 buses from one Valentin Fernando, and applied with the
Public Service Commission (PSC) for approval of the sale. Before the PSC could take final
action on the said application, however, 2 of the 5 CPCs were levied upon pursuant to a writ of
execution issued by the CFI in favor of EusebioFerrer, judgment creditor, against Valentin
Fernando, judgment debtor. During the public sale conducted, Ferrer was the highest bidder, and
a certificate of sale was issued in his name. Shortly thereafter, he sold the said CPCs to
Pantranco, and they jointly submitted their contract of sale to the PSC for approval.
The PSC issued an order that pending resolution of the applications, Pantranco shall have
the authority to provisionally operate the service under the 2 CPCS that were the subject of the
contract between Ferrer and Pantranco. Villa Rey Transit took issue with this, and filed a
complaint for annulment of the sheriff's sale of the CPCs and prayed that all the orders of the
PSC relative to the dispute over the CPCs in question be annulled. Pantranco filed a third-party
complaint against Jose M. Villarama, alleging that Villarama and Villa Rey Transit are one and
the same, and that Villarama and/or the Corporation is qualified from operating the CPCs by
virtue of the agreement entered into between Villarama and Pantranco.
Given the evidence, the Court found that the finances of Villa-Rey, Inc. were managed as
if they were the private funds of Villarama and in such a way and extent that Villarama appeared
to be the actual owner of the business without regard to the rights of the stockholders. Villarama
even admitted that he mingled the corporate funds with his own money. These circumstances
negate Villarama's claim that he was only a part-time General Manager, and show beyond doubt
that the corporation is his alter ego. Thus, the restrictive clause with Pantranco applies. A seller
may not make use of a corporate entity as a means of evading the obligation of his
covenant. Where the Corporation is substantially the alter ego of one of the parties to the
covenant or the restrictive agreement, it can be enjoined from competing with the
covenantee.
Close Corporations
The Cease plantation was solely composed of the assets and properties of the defunct
Tiaong plantation whose license to operate already expired. The legal fiction of separate
corporate personality was attempted to be used to delay and deprive the respondents of their
succession rights to the estate of their deceased father.
While originally, there were other incorporators of Tiaong, it has developed into a closed
family corporation (Cease). The head of the corporation, Cease, used the Tiaong plantation as his
instrumentality. It was his business conduit and an extension of his personality. There is not even
a showing that his children were subscribers or purchasers of the stocks they own.
The Delpher Trades Corp. is a business conduit of the Pachecos. What they really did was
to invest their properties and change the nature of their ownership from unincorporated to
incorporated form by organizing Delpher and placing the control of their properties under the
corporation. This saved them inheritance taxes.
This is the reverse of Cease; however, it does not modify the other cases. It stands on its
own because of the facts.
Parent-Subsidiary Relationship
A: The mere fact that a corporation owns all or substantially all of the stocks of another
corporation is not alone sufficient to justify their being treated as one entity.
(2) where it was controlled by the parent that its separate identity was hardly
discernible
(3) parent corporations may be held responsible for the contracts as well as the torts
of the subsidiary
Q: What are the criteria by which the subsidiary can be considered a mere
1. the parent corp. owns all or most of the capital stock of the subsidiary.
4. the parent subscribes to all the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes
its incorporation
6. the parent pays the salaries and other expenses or losses of the subsidiary
7. the subsidiary has substantially no business except with the parent corp. or no
assets except those conveyed to or by the parent corp.
8. in the papers of the parent corp. or in the statements of its officers, the subsidiary
is described as a department or division of the parent corp. or its business or
financial responsibility is referred as the parents own
9. the parent uses the property of the subsidiary as its own
10. the directors or the executives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the
interest of the subsidiary but take their orders from the parent corp. in the latters
interest
11. the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary are not observed
(Note: Sir Jack said that we must not stop after weve gone through the 11 points in order to
determine whether or not there is a subsidiary or instrumentality. We must go further and
consider other circumstances which may help determine clearly the true nature of the
relationship. --- Em)
GARRETT VS. SOUTHERN RAILWAY (173 F. Supp. 915, E.D. Tenn. 1959)
The general rule is that stock ownership alone by one corporation of the stock of another
does not thereby render the dominant corporation liable for the torts of the subsidiary, unless the
separate corporate existence of the subsidiary is a mere sham, or unless the control of the
subsidiary is such that it is but an instrumentality or adjunct of the dominant corporation.
In the case, it was found that there were two distinct operations. There was no evidence
that Southern dictated the management of Lenoir. In fact, evidence shows that Marius, the
manager of the subsidiary, was in full control of the operation. He established prices, handled
negotiations in CBAs, etc. Lenoir paid local taxes, had local counsel and maintain a Workmens
Compensation Fund. There was also no evidence that Lenoir was run solely for the benefit of
Southern. In fact, a substantial part of its requirements in the field of operation of Lenoir was
bought elsewhere. Lenoir sold substantial quantities to other companies. Policy decisions
remained in the hands of Marius. Hence, the complaint against Southern Railway was
dismissed.
This case involved a complaint for the recovery of merchant sales tax paid by Koppel
(Philippines), Inc. under protest to the Collector of Internal Revenue. Although the Court of First
Instance did not deny legal personality to Koppel (Philippines), Inc. for any and all purposes, it
dismissed the complaint saying that in the transactions involved in the case, the public interest
and convenience would be defeated and would amount to a perpetration of tax evasion unless
resort was had to the doctrine of "disregard of the corporate fiction."
The facts show that 99.5% of the shares of stocks of K-Phil were owned by K-USA. K-
Phil. acted as a representative of K-USA and not as an agent. K-Phil. also bore alone its own
incidental expenses (e.g. Cable expenses) and also those of its principal. Moreover, K-Phils
share in the profits was left in the hands of K-USA. Clearly, K-Phil was a mere branch or
dummy of K-USA, and was therefore liable for merchant sales tax. To allow otherwise would be
to sanction a circumvention of our tax laws and permit a tax evasion of no mean proportion and
the consequent commission of a grave injustice to the Government. Moreover, it would allow
the taxpayer to do by indirection what the tax laws prohibit to be done directly.
Liddel Motors Inc. was an alter ego of Liddel& Co. At the time of its incorporation,
98% of the Liddel Inc.s stock belonged to Frank Liddel. As to Liddel Motors, Frank supplied
the original capital funds. The bulk of the business of Liddel Inc. was channeled through Liddel
Motors. Also, Liddel Motors pursued no other activities except to secure cars, trucks and spare
parts from Liddel Inc. and then sell them to the general public.
To allow the taxpayer to deny tax liability on the ground that the sales were made through
another and distinct corporation when it is proved that the latter is virtually owned by the former
or that they were practically one and the same is to sanction the circumvention of tax laws.
YUTIVO VS. CTA (1 SCRA 160; 1961)
Southern Motors was actually owned and controlled by Yutivo as to make it a mere
subsidiary or branch of the latter created for the purpose of selling vehicles at retail. Yutivo
financed principally, if not wholly, the business of Southern Motors and actually exceeded the
credit of the latter . At all times, Yutivo, through the officers and directors common to it and the
Southern Motors exercised full control over the cash funds, policies, expenditures and
obligations of the latter. Hence, Southern Motors, being a mere instrumentality or adjunct of
Yutivo, the CTA correctly disregarded the technical defense of separate corporate identity in
order to arrive at the true tax liability of Yutivo.
The La CampanaGaugau Packing and La Campana Coffee Factory were operating under
one single business although with 2 trade names. It is a settled doctrine that the fiction of law of
having the corporate identity separate and distinct from the identity of the persons running it
cannot be invoked to further the end subversive of the purpose for which it was created. In the
case at bar, the attempt to make the two businesses appear as one is but a device to defeat the
ends of the law governing capital and labor relations and should not be permitted to prevail.
McARTHUR V. TIMES PRINTING CO. (48 Minn. 319, 51 N.W. 216; 1892)
The right of agents to adopt an agreement originally made by promoters depends upon
the purposes of the corporation and the nature of the agreement. The agreement must be one
which the corporation itself could make and one which the usual agents of the company have
express or implied authority to enter into.
Whatever may be the proper legal theory by which a corporation may be bound by the
contract (ratification, adoption, novation, a continuing offer to be accepted or rejected by the
corporation), it is necessary in all cases that the corporation should have full knowledge of the
facts, or at least should be put upon such notice as would lead, upon reasonable inquiry, to the
knowledge of the facts.
CAGAYAN FISHING DEV. CO. v. SANDIKO (65 Phil. 223; 1937)
A promoter could not have acted as agent for a corporation that had no legal existence.
A corporation, until organized, has no life therefore no faculties. The corporation had no
juridical personality to enter into a contract.
Should the other contracting party fail to perform its part of the
bargain, the corporation which has adopted or ratified the contract
may either sue for:
BUILDERS DUNTILE CO. v. DUNN (229 Ky. 569, 17 S.W. 2d 715; 1929)
When the corporation was formed, the incorporators took upon themselves the whole
thing, and ratified all that had been done on its behalf. Though there was no formal assignment
of the contract to the corporation, the acts of the incorporators were an adoption of the contract.
Therefore the corporation has the right to sue for damages for the breach of contract.
The incorporation of (Morong) and its acceptance of the franchise as shown by this action
in prosecuting the application filed with the Commission for approval of said franchise, not only
perfected a contract between the municipality and Morong but also cured the deficiency pointed
out by the petition. The fact that Morong did not have a corporate existence on the day the
franchise was granted does not render the franchise invalid, as Morong later obtained its
certificate of incorporation and accepted the franchise.
of a corporation to be formed.
Individual promoters cannot escape liability where they buy machinery, receive them in
their possession and authorize one member to issue a note, in contemplation of organizing a
corporation which was not formed. (see Campos' notes p. 258-259). The agent is personally
liable for contracts if there is no principal. The making of partial payments by the corporation,
when later formed, does not release the promoters here from liability because the corporation
acted as a mere stranger paying the debt of another, the acceptance of which by the creditor does
not release the debtors from liability over the balance. Hence, there is no adoption or ratification.
HOW & ASSOCIATES INC. VS. BOSS (222 F. Supp. 936; 1963)
The rule is that if the contract is partly to be performed before incorporation, the
promoters solely are liable. Even if the promoter signed "on behalf of corporation to be formed,
who will be obligor," there was here an intention of the parties to have a present obligor, because
three-fourths of the payment are to be made at the time the drawings or plans in the architectural
contract are completed, with or without incorporation. A purported adoption by the corporation
of the contract must be expressed in a novation or agreement to that effect. The promoter is liable
unless the contract is to be construed to mean: 1) that the creditor agreed to look solely to the
new corporation for payment; or 2) that the promoter did not have any duty toward the creditor
to form the corporation and give the corporation the opportunity to assume and pay the liability.
QUAKER HILL VS. PARR (148 Colo. 45, 364 P. 2d 1056; 1961)
The promoters here are not liable because the contract imposed no obligation on them to
form a corporation and they were not named there as obligors/promissors. The creditor-plaintiff
was aware of the inexistence of the corporation but insisted on naming it as obligor because the
planting season was fast approaching and he needed to dispose of the seedlings. There was no
intent here by plaintiff-creditor to look to the promoters for the performance of the obligation.
This is an exception to the general rule that promoters are personally liable on their contracts,
though made on behalf of a corporation to be formed.
Fiduciary relationship between corporation and promoter
OLD DOMINION VS. BIGELOW (203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193; 1909)
A promoter, notwithstanding his fiduciary duties to the corporation, may still sell
properties to it, but he must pursue one of four courses to make the contract binding. These are:
1) provide an independent board of officers in no respect directly or indirectly under his control,
and make full disclosure to the corporation through them; 2) make full disclosure of all material
facts to each original subscriber of shares in the corporation; 3) procure a ratification of the
contract after disclosing its circumstances by vote of the stockholders of the completely
established corporation; or 4) be himself the real subscriber of all the shares of the capital stock
contemplated as a part of the promotion scheme. The promoter is liable, even if owning all the
stock of the corporation at the time of the transaction, if further original subscription to capital
stock contemplated as an essential part of the scheme of promotion came in after such
transaction.
CORPORATE POWERS
(NOTE: There are two (2) general restrictions on the power of the
corp. to acquire and hold properties:
To establish pension, retirement and other plans for the benefit of its
directors, trustees, officers and employees; and
Implied Powers
Under Sec. 36, a corporation is given such powers as are essential or necessary
to carry out its purpose or purposes as stated in the articles of incorporation. This
phrase gives rise to such a wide range of implied powers, that it would not be at all
difficult to defend a corporate act versus an allegation that it is ultra vires.
A corporation is presumed to act within its powers and when a contract is not its
face necessarily beyond its authority; it will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
presumed valid.
Ultra vires acts are those acts beyond the scope of the powers of the corporation,
as defined by its charter or laws of state of incorporation. The term has a broad
application and includes not only acts prohibited by the charter, but acts which are in
excess of powers granted and not prohibited, and generally applied either when a
corporation has no power whatever to do an act, or when the corporation has the power
but exercises it irregularly.
Parties to the ultra vires contract will be left as they are, if the contract has been fully
executed on both sides. Neither party can ask for specific performance, if the contract
is executory on both sides. The contract, provided that it is not illegal, will be
enforced, where one party has performed his part, and the other has not with the latter
having benefited from the formers performance.
Ultra vires acts may become binding by the ratification of all the stockholders, unless
third parties are prejudiced thereby, or unless the acts are illegal.
Resolution adopted by the company to open a post office branch at the mining camp and
to assume sole and direct responsibility for any dishonest, careless or negligent act of its
appointed postmaster is NOT ULTRA VIRES because the act covers a subject which concerns
the benefit, convenience, and welfare of the companys employees and their families.
While as a rule an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a
corporation is created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers
conferred upon it by law, there are however certain corporate acts that may be performed outside
of the scope of the powers expressly conferred if they are necessary to promote the interest or
welfare of the corporation.
The BOD of the Phil Trust Co. adopted a resolution which authorized its president to
purchase at par and in the name of the corp. bonds of MSC. These bonds were later resold and
guaranteed by PTC to third persons. PTC paid plaintiff the corresponding interest payments
until July 1, 1928 when it alleged that it is not bound to pay such interest or to redeem the
obligation because the guarantee given for the bonds was illegal and void.
Held: The act of guaranty by PTC was well within its corporate powers. Furthermore, having
received money or property by virtue of the contract which is not illegal, it is estopped from
denying liability. Even if the then prevailing law (Corp. Law) prohibited PTC from guaranteeing
bonds with a total value in excess of its capital, with all the MSC properties transferred to PTC
based on the deed of trust, sufficient assets were made available to secure the payment of the
corresponding liabilities brought about by the bonds.
(This case is an example of how the implied powers concept may be used to justify certain acts of
a corporation.)
A quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Gov't against El Hogar, a building and loan ass'n to
deprive it of its corp. franchise.
1. El Hogar held title to real property for a period in excess of 5 years in good faith, hence this
cause will not prosper.
2. El Hogar owned a lot and bldg. at a business district in Manila allegedly in excess of its
reasonable requirements, held valid bec, it was found to be necessary and legally acquired and
developed.
3. El Hogar leased some office space in its bldg.; it administered and managed properties
belonging to delinquent SHs; and managed properties of its SHs even if such were not
mortgaged to them.
Held: first two valid, but the third is ultra vires bec. the administration of property in that
manner is more befitting of the business of a real estate agent or trust company and not of a
building and loan ass'n.
Held: Court cannot dwell on the issue since the promoter is not a party in the proceeding and
it is the corp. or its SHs who may bring a complaint on such.
5. Issuance of special shares did not affect El Hogar's character as a building and loan ass'n nor
make its loans usurious.
6. Corporate policy of using a depreciation rate of 10 % per annum is not excessive, bec. accdg.
to the SC, the by-laws expressly authorizes the BOD to determine each year the amount to be
written down upon the expenses of installation and the property of the corp.
7. The Corp. Law does not expressly grant the power of maintaining reserve funds but such
power is implied. All business enterprises encounter periods of gains and losses, and its officers
would usually provide for the creation of a reserve to act as a buffer for such circumstances.
8. That loans issued to member borrowers are being used for purposes other than the bldg. of
homes not invalid bec. there is no statute which expressly declares that loans may be made by
these ass'ns solely for the purpose of bldg. homes.
9. Sec. 173 of the Corp. Law provides that "any person" may become a SH on a bldg. and loan
ass'n. The word "person" is used on a broad sense including not only natural persons but also
artificial persons.
Two railroad corporations contend that they transcended their own powers and violated
their own organic laws. Hence, they should not be held liable for the injury of the plaintiff who
was a passenger in one of their trains.
Held: The contract between the two corporations was an ultra vires act. However, it is not one
tainted with illegality, therefore, the accompanying rights and obligations based on the contract
of carriage between them and the plaintiff cannot be avoided by raising such a defense.
This case involved the issue of whether or not the defendant corporation performed an
ultra vires act by donating the life insurance proceeds to the minor children of Pirovano, the
deceased president of the defendant company under whose management the company grew and
progressed to become a multi-million peso corporation.
Held: NO.
(2) to aid in any other manner any person, association or corporation of which any
obligation or in which any interest is held by this corporation or in the affairs of
prosperity of which this corporation has a lawful interest.
From this, it is obvious that the corporation properly exercised within its chartered
powers the act of availing of insurance proceeds to the heirs of the insured and deceased officer.
A contract between Benguet and Balatoc provided that Benguet will bring in capital,
eqpt. and technical expertise in exchange for capital shares in Balatoc. Harden was a SH of
Balatoc and he contends that this contract violated the Corp.Law which restricts the acquisition
of interest by a
Held: Harden has no standing bec. if any violation has been committed, the same can be enforced
only in a criminal prosecution by an action of quo warranto which may be maintained only by
the Attorney-General.
Board of directors or trustees- responsible for corporate policies and the general management of
the business and affairs of the corporation.
Stockholders or members- have residual power over fundamental corporate changes like
amendments of articles of incorporation.
The BOD is responsible for corporate policies and the general management of the business
affairs of the corporation. (See Citibank v Chua)
(iii) Nationality
The formula for determining the number of shares needed to elect a given number
of directors is as follows:
X = Y x N1 +1
N+1
Removal may be with or without cause. However, removal without cause may
not be used to deprive minority SHs or members of the right of representation to
which they may be entitled under Sec. 24 of the Code.
quorum.
Note: Directors or trustees so elected to fill vacancies shall be elected only for
the unexpired
of the net income before income tax of the corporation during the
preceding year.
In this case, the board of directors, before the financial inability of the corporation to
proceed with the project was revealed, had already recognized the contracts as being in existence
and had proceed with the necessary steps to utilize the films. The subsequent action by the
stockholders in not ratifying the contract must be ignored. The functions of the stockholders are
limited of nature. The theory of a corporation is that the stockholders may have all the profits but
shall return over the complete management of the enterprise to their representatives and agents,
called directors. Accordingly, there is little for the stockholders to do beyond electing directors,
making by-laws, and exercising certain other special powers defined by law. In conformity with
this idea, it is settled that contracts between a corporation and a third person must be made by
directors and not stockholders.
In this case, the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines terminated the ad
interim appointment of Dr. Blanco as Dean of the College of Education by not acting on the
matter. In the transcript of the meeting which was latter agreed to be deleted, it was found out
that the BOR, consisting of 12 members, voted 5 in favor of Dr. Blanco's appointment 3 voted
against, and 4 abstained.
The core of the issue is WON the 4 abstentions will be counted in favor of Dr. Blanco's
appointment or against it. The SC held that such abstentions be counted as negative vote
considering that those who abstained, 3 of which members of the Screening Committee,
intended to reject Dr. Blanco's appointment.
The issue in this case is regarding the validity of the director's meeting at the company's
laboratory on December 8, 1937 wherein Zachary was removed as president of the company.
Zachary that he was not notified of the meeting thus, the action was void. On the other hand, the
defendants contend that the notice requirement was waived by Zachary's presence at the meeting.
The SC held that the validity of the meeting was not affected by the failure to give notice
as required by the by-laws, provided that the parties were personally present. Since all the parties
were present at the meeting of December 8, and understood that the meeting was to be a
directors' meeting, then the action taken is final and may not be voided by any informality in
connection with its being called.
PNB VS. CA (83 SCRA 238; 1978)
The action was brought by the mortgagor (Tapnio) against PNB for damages in
connection with the failure of the latter's board of directors to act expeditiously on the proposed
lease of the former's sugar quota to one Tuazon.
The Supreme Court held that while the PNB has the ultimate authority to approve or
disapprove the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged to PNB, the latter certainly cannot
escape liability for observing, for the protection of the interest of the private respondents, that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand in approving or
disapproving the lease of the said sugar quota.
appointment
Stockholders)
The authority of a corporate officer in dealing with third persons may be actual or
apparent. The doctrine of "apparent authority," with special reference to banks, was laid out in
Prudential Bank v. CA (223 SCRA 350) where it was held that:
A bank is liable for the wrongful acts of its officers done in the
interest of the bank or in the course of dealings of the officers in
their representative capacity but not for acts outside the scope of
their authority. A bank holding out its officers and agents as
worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds
they may thus be enabled to perpetrate in the apparent scope of
their employment; nor will it be permitted to shrink from its
responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue
to the bank therefrom.
Accordingly, a bank is liable to innocent third persons where the representation is made
in the course of its business by its agent acting within the general scope of his authority even
though, in the particular case, the agent is secretly abusing his authority and attempting to
perpetrate a fraud upon his principal or some other person for his own ultimate benefit.
Application of these principles is especially necessary because banks have a fiduciary
relationship with the public and their stability depends on the confidence of the people in their
honesty and efficiency. Such faith will be eroded where banks do not exercise strict care in the
selection and supervision of its employees, resulting in prejudice to their depositors.
YU CHUCK V. KONG LI PO (46 Phil. 608; 1924)
The power to bind a corporation by contract lies with its board of directors or trustees.
Such power may be expressly or impliedly be delegated to other officers and agents of the
corporation. It is also well settled that except where the authority of employing servants or
agents is expressly vested in the board, officers or agents who have general control and
management of the corporation's business, or at least a specific part thereof, may bind the
corporation by the employment of such agents and employees as are usual and necessary in the
conduct of such business. Those contracts of employment should be reasonable. Case at bar:
contract of employment in the printing business was too long and onerous to the business (3-year
employment; shall receive salary even if corp. is insolvent).
THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS V. HEIRS OF MAXIMO KALAW (20 SCRA 987; 1967)
Kalaw was a corporate officer entrusted with general management and control of
NACOCO. He had implied authority to make any contract or do any act which is necessary for
the conduct of the business. He may, without authority from the board, perform acts of ordinary
nature for as long as these redound to the interest of the corporation. Particularly, he contracted
forward sales with business entities. Long before some of these contracts were disputed, he
contracted by himself alone, without board approval. All of the members of the board knew
about this practice and have entrusted fully such decisions with Kalaw. He was never questioned
nor reprimanded nor prevented from this practice. In fact, the board itself, through its acts and
by acquiescence, have laid aside the by-law requirement of prior board approval. Thus, it cannot
now declare that these contracts (failures) are not binding on NACOCO.
A chattel mortgage, although not approved by the board of directors as stipulated in the
by-laws, shall still be valid and binding when the corporation, through the board, tacitly
approved and ratified it. The following acts of the board constitute implied ratification:
1. Erquiaga is one of the largest stockholder, and was the all-in-one officer (he was the
President, GM, Attorney, Auditor, etc.)
2. Two other directors approved his actions and expressed satisfaction with the advantages
obtained by him in securing the chattel mortgage.
3. The corporation took advantage of the benefits of the chattel mortgage. There were even
partial payments made with the knowledge of the three directors.
Acuna entered into an agreement with Verano, manager of PROCOMA, in which the
former would be constituted as the latter's agent in Manila. Acuna diligently went about his
business and even used personal funds for the benefit of the corporation. During the face-to-face
meeting with the board, Acuna was assured that there need not be any board approval for his
constitution as agent for it would only be a mere formality. Later on, the board disapproved the
agency and did not pay him. The SC ruled that the agreement was valid due to the ratification of
the corp. proven by these acts:
2. He delivered P 20,000, performed his work with the knowledge of the board.
Board Committees
(4) the amendment or repeal of any resolution of the board which by its
HAYES V. CANADA, ATLANTIC AND PLANT S.S CO., LTD. (181 F. 289; 1910)
c) amended the by-laws by giving the President the sole authority to call a stockholder's
meeting and a board of directors meeting
Stockholders or Members
Meeting was invalid for lack of notice. By-laws provide for a 5-day notice before
meeting. March 26 posting not enough for March 28 election.
However, the proceedings can be nullified if the walkout was for a reasonable and
justifiable cause. In this case, F. Logan Johnston, who owned and/or represented more than 50%
of the corporation's outstanding shares, was prohibited from voting the shares of the Silos family
(which he had validly purchased) and of the minor children of Albert S. Johnston (of whom he
was guardian) on the ground that such shares must first be registered in the names of the wards,
thereby prompting the walkout. The Court of Appeals held that the walkout was neither
unreasonable nor unjustifiable. It noted however that there was no formal declaration of a
quorum before the withdrawal from the meeting by F. Logan Johnston.
Upon good cause, such as a Chairman of the Board failing to call a meeting, either by his
absence or neglect, the Court may grant a stockholder the authority to call such a meeting.
DETECTIVE AND PROTECTIVE BUREAU VS. CLORIBEL (26 SCRA 225; 1968)
The Corporation Law says that every director must own at least one (1) share of the
capital stock of the corporation.
Section 21 of the Corporation Law provides that a corporation may prescribe in its by-
laws the qualifications, duties, and compensation of its directors.
A stockholder has no vested right to be elected director for he impliedly contracts that the
will of the majority shall govern.
Amended by-laws are valid for the corporation has its inherent right to protect itself.
Under the Law, directors can only be removed from office by a vote of the stockholders
representing 2/3 of subscribed capital stock, while vacancies can be filled by a mere majority.
Generally, stockholders cannot sue on behalf of the corporation. The exception is when
the defendants are in complete control of the corporation.
The stockholders have an implied power to remove a director for cause. Even when there
is cumulative voting, stockholders can still remove directors for cause.
DELA RAMA V. MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO, INC. (27 SCRA 247; 1969)
A corporation may use its funds to invest in another corporation without the approval of
the stockholders if done in pursuance of a corporate purpose. However, if it is purely for
investment, the vote of the stockholders is necessary.
VOTING
- Unless otherwise provided in the proxy, it shall be valid only for the
meeting for which it is intended. No proxy shall be valid and effective for
a period longer than five (5) years at any one time.
- Voting trusts may be voted by proxy unless the agreement provides
otherwise. (Sec. 59)
- As a general rule, voting trusts are valid for a period not exceeding 5
years at any one time, and automatically expire at the end of the
agreed period unless expressly renewed.
However, in the case of a voting trust specifically required as a
condition in a loan agreement, said voting trust may exceed 5 years
but shall automatically expire upon payment of the loan.
Pooling agreement
ITF shares
- Any one of the joint owners can vote said shares or appoint a proxy
thereof.
Proxy Device
Sec 58. Proxies. Stockholders and members may vote in person or by proxy in all meetings of
stockholders or members. Proxies shall be in writing, signed by the stockholder or member and
filed before the scheduled meeting with the corporate secretary. Unless otherwise provided in the
proxy, it shall be valid only for the meeting for which it is intended. No proxy shall be valid and
effective for a period longer than five (5) years at any one time.
Character: agency relationship; revocable at will (by express revocation, by attending the
meeting) and by death, except when coupled with interest or is a security.
Even if stocks are sold, the stockholder of record remains the owner of the stocks and has
the voting right until the by-law requiring recording of transfer in the transfer book is complied
with. Thus, a proxy given by the stockholder of record even if he has already sold the share/s of
stock remains effective.
STATE EX REL EVERETT TRUST V PACIFIC WAXED PAPER, (159 A.L.R. 297; 1945)
The general rule is that a proxy is revocable even though by its express terms it is
irrevocable. The exceptions are: (a) when authority is coupled with interest; (b) where authority
is given as part of a security and is necessary to effectuate such a security. It is coupled with
interest when there is interest in the share themselves (such as a right of first refusal in case of
sale) and the rights inherent in the shares (such as voting rights; capacity to obtain majority).
Where a stockholders meeting was validly convened, the proxies must be deemed
present even if the proxies were not presented, provided: (a) their existence is established; (b) the
agents were so designated to attend and act in SHs behalf; (c) the agents were present in the
meeting.
Q: Is it valid for the corporation to pay the expenses for proxy solicitation?
A: In the case of Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corp. (128 N.E. 2d 291; 1955), it
was held that in a contest over policy (as opposed to a purely personal power contest), corporate
directors have the right to make reasonable and proper expenditures, subject to the scrutiny of the
courts when duly challenged, from the corporate treasury for the purpose of persuading the SHs
of the correctness of their position and soliciting their support for policies which the directors
believe, in all good faith, are in the best interests of the corporation. The SHs, moreover, have
the right to reimburse successful contestants for the reasonable and bona fide expenses incurred
by them in any such policy contest, subject to like court scrutiny.
However, where it is established that such monies have been spent for personal power,
individual gain or private advantage, and not in the belief that such expenditures are in the best
interest of the stockholders and the corporation, or where the fairness and reasonableness of the
amounts allegedly expended are duly and successfully challenged, the courts will not hesitate to
disallow them.
Voting Trust
A Voting Trust Agreement (VTA) is an agreement whereby the real ownership of
the shares is separated from the voting rights, the usual aim being to insure the
retention of incumbent directors and remove from the stockholders the power to change
the management for the duration of the trust.
Advantages
Continuity of management.
Disadvantages
Susceptible to abuse
Rights given up by the shareholder in a VTA in exchange for the fiduciary obligation of
the trustee:
Voting rights
(1) A VTA is prepared in writing, notarized, and filed with the corporation and
SEC.
(2) The certificates of stock covered by the VTA are cancelled and new ones
(voting trust certificates) are issued in the name of the trustee/s stating that
they are issued pursuant to the VTA.
(4) The trustee/s execute and deliver to transferors the voting trust certificates.
(Note that these certificates shall be transferable in the same manner and
with the same effect as certificates of stock.)
(5) At the end of the period of the VTA (or the full payment of the loan to which
the VTA is made a condition, as the case may be), in the absence of any
express renewal, the voting trust certificates as well as the certificates of
stock in the name of the trustee/s shall be deemed cancelled and new
certificates of stock shall be reissued in the name of the transferors.
This case illustrates how VTA can give rise to effective control and how it can be abused.
Original stockholders can set aside the VTA when their rights are trampled upon by the trustee.
Want of consideration
Fraud
A VTA transfers only voting or other rights pertaining to the shares subject of the
agreement, or control over the stock. Stockholders of a corp. that lost all its assets through
foreclosures cannot go after those properties. PNB-NIDC acquired those properties not as
trustees but as creditors.
Pooling and voting agreements
Advantages:
Disadvantages:
What rights does a shareholder give up/ retain with a pooling agreement?
Shareholders retain their right to vote because the parties are not constituted as agents. However,
the will of the parties may not be carried out due to non-compliance with the pooling agreement.
Stockholders control agreements are valid where it is for the benefit of corporation
where it works no fraud upon creditors or other stockholders and where it violates no statute or
recognized public policy.
If the enforcement of a particular contract damages nobody-not even the public, there is
no reason for holding it illegal. Test is WON it causes damage to the corporation and
stockholders.
(one candidate) multiply 100 by five (equals 500) and he can vote the 500
for only one
candidate.
(multiple candidates) wants to vote for two nominees, he can divide 500 votes
between the
X= # of shares required
Y= # of outstanding votes
Z= # of directors to be elected
X = _ Y__ + 1
Z+1
2. Baker & Carys formula (minimum no. of votes needed to elect multiple directors)
X= # of shares required
X= Y x D + 1
D' + 1
NOTES
Levels playing field or at least ensures that the minority can elect at least one
representative to the board of directors (BOD)
Cannot of itself give the minority control of corporate affairs, but may affect
and limit the extent of the majoritys control
Type of shares
NOTES
Even though the right to vote of preferred and redeemable shares may be
restricted, owners of these shares can still vote on certain matter provided for
in Sec. 6.
SEC requires that where no dividends are declared for three consecutive
years, in spite of available profits, preferred stocks will be given the right to
vote until dividends are declared.
Provision granting right to vote to preferred stock previously prohibited from voting,
constitutes diminution of the voting power of common stock.
Provision in the articles of incorporation granting holders of preferred stock right to vote in
case of default in payment of dividends after July 1, 1951 was construed as denial by
necessary implication of the right to vote even prior to July 1, 1951.
This gives to the corporation and/or to its current management the power to
prevent the transfer of shares to persons who they may see as having
interests adverse to theirs.
Prescribing qualifications for directors; founders shares
As long as the qualifications imposed are reasonable and not meant to unjustly
or unfairly deprive the minority of their rightful representation in the BOD, such
provisions are within the power of the majority to provide in the by-laws.
Founders shares
Exception to the rule in sec. 6 that non-voting shares shall be limited to preferred
and redeemable shares
If founders shares enjoy the right to vote, this privilege is limited to 5 years upon
SECs approval, so as to prevent the perpetual disqualification of other
stockholders.
BOD can and usually delegate many of its functions but it cant abdicate its
responsibility to act as a governing body by giving absolute power to officers or
others, by way of a management contract or otherwise. It must retain its control
over such officers so that it may recall the delegation of power whenever the
interests of the corporation are seriously prejudiced thereby.
Although corporations may, for a limited period, delegate to a stranger certain duties
usually performed by the officers, there are duties, the performance of which may not be
indefinitely delegated to outsiders.
UNUSUAL VOTING AND QUORUM REQUIREMENTS (Sec. 25, 97 [for close corporations])
A requirement that there shall be no election of directors at all unless every single vote be
cast for the same nominees, is in direct opposition to the statutory rule that the receipt of
plurality of the votes entitles a nominee to election. (See Sec. 24)
Requiring unanimity before the BOD can take action on any corporate matter makes it
impossible for the directors to act on any matter at all. In all acts done by the corporation, the
major number must bind the lesser, or else differences could never be determined nor settled.
The State has decreed that every stock corporation must have a representative government,
with voting conducted conformably to the statutes, and the power of decision lodged in
certain fractions, always more than half, of the stock. This whole concept is destroyed when
the stockholders, by agreement, by-law or certificates of corporation provides for unanimous
action, giving the minority an absolute, permanent and all-inclusive power of veto.
The requirement of unanimous vote to amend by-laws is valid. Once proper by-laws have
been adopted, the matter of amending them is no concern of the State.
Unusual voting and quorum MINORITY: gives them Subject to the limitations in
requirements stronger veto power in certain Sec. 103.
corp. affairs
MEETINGS
SPECIAL: At any time upon call of the president or as provided in the by-
laws.
NOTICE: Must be sent at least 1 day prior to the scheduled meeting, unless otherwise
provided by the by-laws.
WHERE: Anywhere in or outside the Philippines, unless the by-laws provide otherwise.
QUORUM: Generally, a majority of the number of directors or trustees as fixed in the articles
of incorporation shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of corporate
business. (Sec. 25)
Exceptions:
WHO PRESIDES: The president, unless the by-laws provide otherwise. (Sec. 54)
REGULAR: Held annually on a date fixed in the by-laws. If no date is fixed, on any
date in April of every year as determined by the Board of Directors or
trustees.
WHERE: In the city of municipality where the principal office of the corporation is located,
and if practicable in the principal office of the corporation. Metro Manila is
considered a city or municipality. (Sec. 51)
WHO PRESIDES: The president, unless the by-laws provide otherwise. (Sec. 54)
(1) Such proceedings or business are within the powers or authority of the
corporation; and
(2) All the stockholders or members of the corporation were present or duly
represented at the meeting. (Sec. 51)
(1) Diligence
(2) Loyalty
(3) Obedience
Obedience - directors must act only within corporate powers and are liable for damages if they
acted beyond their powers unless in good faith. Assuming that they acted within their powers,
liability may still arise if they have not observed due diligence or have been disloyal to the
corporation.
WHEN DOES LIABILITY ON THE PART OF DIRECTORS, TRUSTEES
OR OFFICERS ARISE?
In such cases, the directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally
for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.
If in the course of management, the directors arrive at a decision for which there is a
reasonable basis and they acted in good faith, as a result of their independent judgment, and
uninfluenced by any consideration other than what they honestly believe to be for the best
interest of the railroad, it is not the function of the court to say that it would have acted
differently and to charge the directors for any loss or expenditures incurred.
In the present case, the bond issue was adequately deliberated and planned, properly
negotiated and executed; there was no lack of good faith; no motivation of personal gain or
profit; there was no lack of diligence, skill or care in selling the issue at the price approved by the
Commission and which resulted in a saving of approximately $9M to the corporation.
The Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. adopted a resolution which granted to its sugar planters
an increase in their share in the net profits in the event that the sugar centrals of Negros
Occidental should have a total annual production exceeding one-third of the production of all
sugar central mills in the province. Later, the company amended its existing milling contract
with its sugar planters, incorporating such resolution. The company, upon demand, refused to
comply with the contract, stating that the stipulations in the resolution were made without
consideration and that such resolution was, therefore, null and void ab initio, being in effect a
donation that was ultra vires and beyond the powers of the corporate directors to adopt. This is
an action by the sugar planters to enforce the contract.
The terms embodied in the resolution were supported by the same cause and
consideration underlying the main amended milling contract; i.e., the premises and obligations
undertaken thereunder by the planters, and particularly, the extension of its operative period for
an additional 15 years over and beyond the thirty years stipulated in the contract.
As the resolution in question was passed in good faith by the board of directors, it is valid
and binding, and whether or not it will cause losses or decrease the profits of the central, the
court has no authority to review them. They hold such office charged with the duty to act for the
corporation according to their best judgment, and in so doing, they cannot be controlled in the
reasonable exercise and performance of such duty. It is a well-known rule of law that questions
of policy or of management are left solely to the honest decision of officers and directors of a
corporation, and the court is without authority to substitute its judgment of the board of directors;
the board is the business manager of the corporation, and so long as it acts in good faith, its
orders are not reviewable by the courts.
FACTS: Alleghany Corp. bought terminals in Kansas City and St. Joseph. It needed to
raise money to pay the balance of the purchase price but could not directly borrow money due to
a borrowing limitation in its charter. Thus, it sold Missouri Pacific bonds to J.P. Morgan and Co.
worth $IOM. J.P. Morgan, in turn, sold $3M worth of the bonds to Guaranty Trust Company.
Under the contract, the seller was given an option to repurchase at same price within six months.
HELD: Option given to seller is invalid. It is against public policy for a bank to sell
securities and buy them back at the same price; similarly, it is against public policy for the bank
to buy securities and give the seller the option to buy them back at the same price because the
bank incurs the entire risk of loss with no possibility of gain other than the interest derived from
the securities during the period that the bank holds them. Here, if the market price of the
securities rise, the holder of the repurchase option would exercise it to recover the securities at a
lower price at which he sold them. If the market price falls, the seller holding the option would
not exercise it and the bank would sustain the loss.
Directors are not in a position of trustees of an express trust who, regardless of good
faith, are personally liable. In this case, the directors are liable for the transaction because the
entire arrangement was improvident, risky, unusual and unnecessary so as to be contrary to
fundamental conceptions of prudent banking practice. Yet, the advice of counsel was not
sought. Absent a showing of exercise of good faith, the directors are thus liable.
WALKER VS. MAN, ET. AL. (253 N.Y.S. 458; 1931)
FACTS: Frederick Southack and Alwyn Ball loaned Avram $20T evidenced by a
promissory note executed by Avram and endorsed by Lacey. The loan was not authorized by any
meeting of the board of directors and was not for the benefit of the corporation. The note was
dishonored but defendant-directors did not protest the note for non-payment; thus, Lacey, the
indorser who was financially capable of meeting the obligation, was subsequently discharged.
HELD: Directors are charged not with misfeasance, but with non-feasance, not only with
doing wrongful acts and committing waste, but with acquiescing and confirming the wrong
doing of others, and with doing nothing to retrieve the waste. Directors have the duty to attempt
to prevent wrongdoing by their co-directors, and if wrong is committed, to rectify it. If the
defendant knew that an unauthorized loan was made and did not take steps to salvage the loan,
he is chargeable with negligence and is accountable for his conduct.
FACTS: The board of directors of Sibuguey Trading Company authorized the purchase of
330 shares of stock of the corporation and declared payment of P3T as dividends to
stockholders. The directors from whom 300 of the stocks were bought resigned before the board
approved the purchase and declared the dividends. At the time of purchase of stocks and
declaration of dividends, the corporation had accounts payable amounting to P9,241 and
accounts receivable amounting to P12,512, but the receiver who made diligent efforts to collect
the amounts receivable was unable to do so.
It has been alleged that the payment of cash dividends to the stockholders was wrongfully
done and in bad faith, and to the injury and fraud of the creditors of the corporation. The
directors are sought to be made personally liable in their capacity as directors.
HELD: Creditors of a corporation have the right to assume that so long as there are
outstanding debts and liabilities, the BOD will not use the assets of the corporation to buy its
own stock, and will not declare dividends to stockholders when the corporation is insolvent.
In this case, it was found that the corporation did not have an actual bona fide surplus
from which dividends could be paid. Moreover, the Court noted that the Board of Directors
purchased the stock from the corporation and declared the dividends on the stock at the same
Board meeting, and that the directors were permitted to resign so that they could sell their stock
to the corporation. Given all of this, it was apparent that the directors did not act in good faith or
were grossly ignorant of their duties. Either way, they are liable for their actions which affected
the financial condition of the corporation and prejudiced creditors.
A complaint was filed against a corporate director for failing to give adequate attention
(he relied solely on the Presidents updates on the status of the corp) to the affairs of a
corporation which suffered depletion of funds.
The director was not liable. The court said that despite being guilty of misprision in his
office, still the plaintiff must clearly show that the performance of the directors duties would
have avoided the losses. When a business fails from general mismanagement, business
incapacity, or bad judgment, it is difficult to conjecture that a single director could turn the
company around, or how much dollars he could have saved had he acted properly.
Cushing, a director and in charge of leasing a roller skating rink of the corp, leased the
same to himself. Minority stockholders filed suit against Bowen, the corporation's President, to
recover for company losses arising out of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty.
Bowen was held to be not liable because: (1) Cushing's acts were not actually dishonest
or fraudulent; (2) Cushing performed personal work such as keeping the facility in repair which
redounded to the benefit of the company and even increased its income; (3) Bowen did not
profit personally through Cushing's lease; and (4) the issue of the possible illegality of the lease
was put before the Board of Directors, but the Board did not act on it but instead moved on to the
next item on the agenda. Absent any bad faith on Bowen's part, and a showing that it was a
reasonable exercise of judgment to take no action on the lease agreement at the time it was
entered into, Bowen was not liable.
Lowell Hoit& Co. V. Detig (50 N.E. 2d 602; 1943)
Lowell Hoit filed action against directors of a cooperative grain company for an alleged
willful conversion by the manager of grain stored in the company facility. The court said that the
directors were not personally liable. There was no evidence that the directors had knowledge of
the transaction between the manager and Lowell Hoit.
The court will treat directors with leniency with respect to a single act of fraud on the part
of a subordinate officer/agent. But directors could be held liable if the act of fraud was habitual
and openly committed as to have been easily detected upon proper supervision. To hold directors
liable, he must have participated in the fraudulent act; or have been guilty of lack of ordinary and
reasonable supervision; or guilty of lack of ordinary care in the selection of the officer/agent.
Coleman, an employee of the bank, was able to divert bank finances for his benefit,
resulting in huge losses to the bank. The receiver sued the president and the other directors for
the loss.
The court said that the directors were not answerable as they relied in good faith on the
cashiers statement of assets and liabilities found correct by the government examiner, and were
also encouraged by the attitude of the president that all was well (the president had a sizable
deposit in the bank). But the president is liable. He was at the bank daily; had direct control of
records; and had knowledge of incidents that ordinarily would have induced scrutiny.
Voidable at the option of the corporation, whether or not it suffered damages. It is possible
that the self-dealing director may have the greatest interest in its welfare and may be willing to
deal with it upon reasonable terms.
In the event that either of or both conditions (1) and (2) are absent
(i.e., the presence of the director/trustee was necessary for a quorum
and/or his vote was necessary for the approval of the contract), the
contract may be ratified by a 2/3 vote of the OCS or all of the members, in
a meeting called for the purpose. Full disclosure of the adverse interest of
the directors or trustees involved must be made at such meeting.
The articles of inc. of respondent included a provision that relieves any director of all
responsibility for which he may otherwise be liable by reason of any contract entered into with
the corp., whether it be for his benefit or for the benefit of any other person, firm, association or
partnership in which he may be interested, except in case of fraud.
SC: This is in direct contravention of the Corp Law, of the traditional fiduciary relationship
between directors and the SH. The implication is that they can do anything short of fraud, even to
their benefit, and with immunity.
Note: This case was decided in 1966 under the Corporation Law, which had no
Issue: validity of sale of corp. property and assets to the directors who approved the same.
Gen Rule: When purely private corporations remain solvent, its directors are agents or trustees
for the SH.
Exception: when the corp. becomes insolvent, its directors are trustees of all the creditors,
whether they are members of the corp. or not, and must manage its property and assets with strict
regard to their interest; and if they are themselves creditors while the insolvent corp is under their
management, they will not be permitted to secure to themselves by purchasing thecorp property
or otherwise any personal advantage over the other creditors.
In the case at bar, the sale was held to be valid and binding. Company was losing. 4
directors present during meeting all voted for the sale. They likewise constitute majority of SH.
Contract was found to be fair and reasonable.
Prime White Cement Corp. (through the President and Chairman of the Board) and
Alejandro Te, a director and auditor of the corporation, entered into a dealership agreement
whereby Te was obligated to act as the corporation's exclusive dealer and/or distributor of its
cement products in the entire Mindanao area for 5 years. Among the conditions in the dealership
agreement were that the corporation would sell to and supply Te with 20,000 bags of white
cement per month, and that Te would purchase the cement from the corporation at a price of P
9.70 per bag.
Relying on the conditions contained in the dealership agreement, Te entered into written
agreements with several hardware stores which would enable him to sell his allocation of 20,000
bags per month. However, the Board of Directors subsequently imposed new conditions,
including the condition that only 8,000 bags of cement would be delivered per month. Te made
several demands on the corporation to comply with the dealership agreement. However, when
the corporation refused to comply with the same, Te was constrained to cancel his agreements
with the hardware stores. Notwithstanding the dealership agreement with Te, the corporation
entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with a certain Napoleon Co for marketing of
corporation's products in Mindanao. The lower court held that Prime White was liable to Te for
actual and moral damages for having been in breach of the agreement which had been validly
entered into.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the dealership agreement is not valid and
enforceable, for not having been fair and reasonable: the agreement protected Te from any
market increases in the price of cement, to the prejudice of the corporation. The dealership
agreement was an attempt on the part of Te to enrich himself at the expense of the corporation.
Absent any showing that the stockholders had ratified the dealership agreement or that they were
fully aware of its provisions, the contract was not valid and Te could not be allowed to reap the
fruits of his disloyalty.
USE OF INSIDE INFORMATION: Do directors and officers of a company owe any duty at all
to stockholders in relation to transactions whereby the officers and directors buy for themselves
shares of stock from the stockholders?
In the case of Gokongwei v. SEC(89 SCRA 336; 1979), the Supreme Court, quoting from
the US case of Pepper v. Litton (308 U.S. 295-313; 1939) stated that a director cannot, "by the
intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient precept against serving two masters He
cannot utilize his inside information and his strategic position for his own preferment. He cannot
violate rules of fair play by doing indirectly through the corporation what he could not do
directly. He cannot use his power for his personal advantage and to the detriment of the
stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that power is at all times subject to the
equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for the aggrandizement, preference, or advantage
of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis."
In this case, it was held that the general allegations in the complaint of conspiracy of the
directors to obtain corporate opportunity were deficient. The complaint should state specific
transactions.
Fiduciary duty applies even if the corporation is unable to enter into transactions itself.
In this case, it was held that the common stock purchased by the defendants wasnt a
business opportunity for the corporation. Having fulfilled their duty to the corporation in
accordance with their best judgment, the defendant directors were not precluded from a
transaction for their own account and risk.
Interlocking directors
In the event that either of or both conditions (1) and (2) are absent
(i.e., the presence of the director/trustee was necessary for a quorum
and/or his vote was necessary for the approval of the contract), the
contract may be ratified by a 2/3 vote of the OCS or all of the members, in
a meeting called for the purpose. Full disclosure of the adverse interest of
the directors or trustees involved must be made at such meeting.
Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric (121 N.E. 378; 1918)
Maynard, president and chief stockholder of Globe but nominal SH in Utica Gas,
obtained a cheap, 10-year contract for Utica to supply power. Maynard did not vote during the
meeting for the approval of the contract.
Can Globe seek to enforce contract? The Supreme Court held that Globe could not
enforce the contract and that said contract was voidable at the election of Utica. It was found
that based on the facts of the case, the contract was clearly one-sided. Maynard, although he did
not vote, exerted a dominating influence to obtain the contract from beginning to end.
The director-trustee has a constant duty not to seek harsh advantage in violation of his
trust.
WHO FIXES THE COMPENSATION? The stockholders only (majority of the OCS)
GOV'T OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EL HOGAR FILIPINO (50 Phil. 399; 1927)
The compensation provided in sec. 92 of the by-laws of El Hogar Filipino which
stipulated that 5% of the net profit shown by the annual balance sheet shall be distributed to the
directors in proportion to the attendance at board meetings is valid. The Corporation Law does
not prescribe the rate of compensation for the directors of a corporation. The power to fix it , if
any is left to the corporation to be determined in its by-laws. In the case at bar, the provision in
question even resulted in extraordinarily good attendance.
This action was brought by the directors of defendant corporation to recover 1% from
each of the plaintiffs of the profits of the corporation for 1929 pursuant to a by-law provision
which grants the directors the right to receive a life gratuity or pension in such amount for the
corporation.
The SC held that the by-law provision is not valid. Such provision is ultra vires for a
mutual loan and building association to make. It is not merely a provision for the compensation
of directors. The authority conferred upon corporations refers only to providing compensation for
the future services of directors, officers, and employees after the adoption of the by-law in
relation thereto. The by-law can't be held to authorize the giving of continuous compensation to
particular directors after their employment has terminated for past services rendered gratuitously
by them to the corporation.
CENTRAL COOPERATIVE EXCHANGE INC vs. TIBE (33 SCRA 596; 1970)
The questioned resolutions which appropriated the funds of the corporation for different
expenses of the directors are contrary to the by-laws of the corporation; thus they are not within
the board's power to enact. Sec. 8 of the by-laws explicitly reserved to the stockholders the
power to determine the compensation of members of the board and they did restrict such
compensation to actual transportation expenses plus an additional P30 per diems and actual
expenses while waiting. Hence, all other expenses are excluded. Even without the express
reservation, directors presumptively serve without pay and in the absence of any agreement in
relation thereto, no claim can be asserted therefore.
FOGELSON vs. AMERICAN WOOLEN CO. (170 F. 2d. 660; 1948)
A retirement plan which provides a very large pension to an officer who has served to
within one year of the retirement age without any expectation of receiving a pension would seem
analogous to a gift or bonus. The size of such bonus may raise a justifiable inquiry as to whether
it amounts to wasting of the corporate property. The disparity also between the president's
pension plan and that of even the nearest of the other officers and employees may also be
inquired upon by the courts.
This is an appeal filed to enjoin the California Eastern Airways from putting into effect a
stock option plan and a profit-sharing plan. The SC held that the stock option plan was deficient
as it was not reasonably created to insure that the corporation would receive contemplated
benefits. A validity of a stock option plan depends upon the existence of consideration and the
inclusion of circumstances which may insure that the consideration would pass to the
corporation. The options provided may be exercised in toto immediately upon their issuance
within a 6 month period after the termination of employment. In short, such plan did not insure
that any optionee would remain with the corporation.
With regard to the profit-sharing plan, it was held valid because it was reasonable and
was ratified by the stockholders pending the action.
Close Corporations
Sec. 97 provides that the AOI of a close corp. may specify that it shall be
managed by the stockholders rather than the BoD. So long as this provision continues
in effect:
Further, Sec. 100 provides that for stockholders managing corp. affairs:
They shall be personally liable for corporate torts (unlike ordinary directors
liable only upon finding of negligence)
Persons with management control of corporation hold it in behalf of SHs and can
not regard such as their own personal property to dispose at their whim.
The corp. is suing its former directors to recover damages as a result of the sale of its
control to a group (corporate raiders) who proceeded to rob it of most of its assets mainly
marketable securities.
Are previous directors who sold corp. control liable? Yes, they are under duty not to sell
to raiders.
Owners of corp. control are liable if under the circumstances, the proposed transfer are
such as to awaken a suspicion or put a prudent man on his guard. As in this case, control was
bought for so much aside from being warned of selling to parties they knew little about, and also
from fair notice that such outsiders indeed intended to raid the corp.
Duty to Creditors
General rule: Corporate creditors can run after the corp. itself only, and not the directors
for mismanagement of a solvent corp.
If corp. becomes insolvent, directors are deemed trustees of the creditors and
should therefore manage its assets with due consideration to the creditors interest.
If directors are also creditors themselves, they are prohibited from gaining undue
advantage over other creditors.
III. Agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the
corporation;
In labor cases, particularly, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the
corporation for the termination of employment of corporate employees done with malice or in
bad faith.
In the instant case, there was a showing of bad faith: the Board Resolution retrenching
the respondents on the feigned ground of serious business losses had no basis apart from an
unsigned and unaudited Profit and Loss Statement which had no evidentiary value whatsoever.
AND
The stock and transfer book shall be kept in the principal office of the
corporation or in the office of its stock transfer agent, and shall be open for
inspection by any director or stockholder of the corporation at reasonable
hours on business days.
Ordinary stockholders, the beneficial owners of the corporation, usually have no say on how
business affairs of the corp. are run by the directors. The law therefore gives them the right to know not
only the financial health of the corp. but also how its affairs are managed so that if they find it
unsatisfactory, they can seek the proper remedy to protect their investment.
This includes book of inventories and balances, journal, ledger, book for
copies of letters and telegrams, financial statements, income tax returns,
vouchers, receipts, contracts, papers pertaining to such contracts, voting
trust agreements (sec. 59)
2. By-laws
Sec. 75 of the Code provides that within 10 days from the corporation's
receipt of a written request from any stockholder or member, the
corporation must furnish the requesting party with a copy of its most
recent financial statement, which shall include a balance sheet as of the
end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss statement for said taxable
year.
Note: Under the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, records of bank deposits
of the corporation are NOT open to inspection, EXCEPT under the
following circumstances:
official; and
3. A corp. may regulate time and manner of inspection but provisions in its by-law
which gives directors absolute discretion to allow or disallow inspection are
prohibited.
6. Place of inspection: Principal office of the corp. SH cannot demand that such
records be taken out of the principal office.
7. As to purpose:
Belief in good faith that a corp. is being mismanaged may be given due
course even if later, this is proven unfounded.
(Gokongwei v. SEC)
(2) Injunction
(3) Action for damages against the officer or agent refusing inspection. Also, penal
(1) The person demanding has improperly used any information secured
through any prior examination; or
BOD/Officers may deny inspection when sought at unusual hours or under improper
conditions. But they cannot deprive the stockholders of the right altogether. In CAB, by-law
provided that the inspection be made available only for a few days in a year, chosen by the
directors. This is void.
Gonzales v. PNB (122 SCRA 490; 1983)
There was nothing improper in the secretarys refusal since the minutes of these prior
meetings have to be verified, confirmed and signed by the directors then present. Hence,
Veraguth has to wait until after the next meeting.
The law takes from the SH the burden of showing impropriety of purpose and places
upon the corporation the burden of showing impropriety of purpose and motive.
Considering that the foreign subsidiary is wholly owned by SMC and therefore under its
control, it would be more in accord with equity, good faith and fair dealing to construe the
statutory right of Gokongwei as petitioner as SH to inspect the books and records of such wholly
subsidiary which are in SMCs possession and control.
DERIVATIVE SUITS
A SH can only bring suit for an act that took place when he was
a stockholder; not before. (Bitong v. CA, 292 SCRA 503)
1) Stockholder/ member must have exhausted all remedies within the corp.
3) Any benefit recovered by the stockholder as a result of bringing derivative suit must
be accounted for to the corp. who is the real party in interest.
The injury complained of is against the corporation and thus the action properly belongs
to the corporation rather than the stockholders. It is a derivative suit brought by the stockholder
as a nominal party plaintiff for the benefit of the corporation, which is the real party in interest.
In this case, plaintiffs brought the suit not for the benefit of the corporation's interest, but for
their own. Plaintiffs here asked that the defendant make good the losses occasioned by his
mismanagement and to pay them the value of their respective participation in the corporate assets
on the basis of their respective holdings. Petition dismissed for venue improperly laid.
In a derivative suit, the corporation is the real party in interest, and the stockholder
merely a nominal party. Normally, it is the corp. through the board of directors which should
bring the suit. But as in this case, the members of the board of directors of the bank were the
nominees and creatures of respondent Roman and thus, any demand for an intra-corporate
remedy would be futile, the stockholder is permitted to bring a derivative suit.
Should the corporation be made a party? The English practice is to make the corp. a
party plaintiff while the US practice is to make it a party defendant. What is important though is
that the corporation should be made a party in order to make the court's ruling binding upon it
and thus bar any future re-litigation of the issues. Misjoinder of parties is not a ground to
dismiss the action.
The importation of textiles instead of raw materials, as well as the failure of the board of
directors to take actions against those directly responsible for the misuse of the dollar allocations
constitute fraud, or consent thereto on the part of the directors. Therefore, a breach of trust was
committed which justified the suit by a minority stockholder of the corporation.
The claim that plaintiff Justiniani did not take steps to remedy the illegal importation for
a period of two years is also without merit. During that period of time plaintiff had the right to
assume and expect that the directors would remedy the anomalous situation of the corporation
brought about by their wrong-doing. Only after such period of time had elapsed could plaintiff
conclude that the directors were remiss in their duty to protect the corporation property and
business.
The power to sue and be sued in any court by a corporation even as a stockholder is
lodged in the Board of Directors that exercises its corporate powers and not in the
president or officer thereof.
It was JAKA's Board of Directors, not Senator Enrile, which had the power to
grant Bitong authority to institute a derivative suit for and in its behalf.
The basis of a stockholder's suit is always one in equity. However, it cannot prosper
without first complying with the legal requisites for its institution. The most
important of these is the bona fide ownership by a stockholder of a stock in his own
right at the time of the transaction complained of which invests him with standing to
institute a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation.
Capital Structure
This refers to the aggregate of the securities -- instruments which represent relatively long-term
investment -- issued by the corporation. There are basically 2 kinds of securities: shares of
stock and debt securities.
DEFINITION Stock which Stock which Shares that Shares issued by Special shares
entitles the entitles the have been the corporation whose
owner of holder to some issued and that may be exclusive rights
such stocks preference fully paid but taken up by the and privileges
to an equal either in the subsequently corporation upon are determined
pro rata dividends or reacquired by expiration of a by the AOI.
division of distribution of the issuing fixed period.
profits assets upon corporation by
liquidation, or in lawful means.
both regardless
of the existence
of unrestricted
retained
earnings
VOTING Usually Can vote only Depends if Depends if No voting Usually denied
RIGHTS vested with under certain its common its common rights for as voting rights.
the exclusive circumstances or or preferred. long as such
right to vote preferred. stock remains
in the treasury
(Sec. 57)
* No-par value shares may not be issued by the following entities: banks, trust companies, insurance companies,
public utilities, building & loan association (Sec. 6)
Nature of Subscription Contract
It is any contract for the acquisition of unissued stock in an existing corporation or a corporation
still to be formed. This is notwithstanding the fact that the parties refer to it as a purchase or
some other contract. (Sec. 60)
Subscriptions constitute a fund to which the creditors have a right to look for
satisfaction of their claims.
The assignee in insolvency can maintain an action upon any unpaid stock
subscription in order to realize assets for the payment of its debts.
A subscription contract subsists as a liability from the time that the subscription is
made until such time that the subscription is fully paid.
Garcia v. Lim Chu Sing (59 Phil. 562; 1934)
A share of stock or the certificate thereof is not an indebtedness to the owner nor
evidence of indebtedness and therefore, it is not a credit. Stockholders as such are not creditors
of the corporation.
The capital stock of a corporation is a trust fund to be used more particularly for the
security of the creditors of the corporation who presumably deal with it on the credit of its
capital.
Pre-incorporation subscription
RULE: When a group of persons sign a subscription contract, they are deemed not
only to make a continuing offer to the corporation, but also to have contracted with each
other as well. Thus, no one may revoke the contract even prior to incorporation without
the consent of all the others.
2) After the AOI have been submitted to the SEC (Sec. 61)
Utah Hotel Co v. Madsen (43 utah 285, 134 pac. 557; 1913)
Sec 332 in express terms confers powers upon the stockholders to regulate the mode of
making subscriptions to its capital stock and calling in the same by-laws or by express contract.
Since it may be done by express contract, this shows that it was intended that a contract to that
effect may be entered into even before the corporation is organized, and the contract agreement is
enforced if the corporation is in fact organized.
One who has paid his subscription to the capital stock of the corporation may compel the
issuance of proper certificates therefor.
Post-incorporation subscription
NOTE: Under the Corporation Code, there is no longer any distinction between
a
subscription and a purchase. Thus, a subscriber is liable to pay for the
shares even
To protect existing stockholder equity. If the right is not recognized, the SHs interest in the
corporation will be diluted by the subsequent issuance of shares.
Under the prevailing view in common law, the preemptive right is limited to
shares issued in pursuance of an increase in the authorized capital stock and does not
apply to additional issues of originally authorized shares which form part of the existing
capital stock.
This common law principle which was generally understood to be applicable in
this jurisdiction has now to give way to the express provisions of the Corporation Code
on the matter.
shareholdings.
LIMITATIONS: The pre-emptive right does not extend to: (Sec. 39)
(b) Corporation does not have to shell out money to fulfill its
obligations;
(c) Money that would have otherwise been used for interest
Note: In Nos. (2) and (3), such acts require approval of 2/3 of the OCS or
In Close Corporations
If it appears merely in a waiver agreement and NOT in the AOI, and was
unanimously agreed to by all existing stockholders:
The existing stockholders cannot later complain since they are all bound
to their
private agreement.
Any stockholder who has not exercised his preemptive right within a reasonable
time will be deemed to have waived it.
The issue of shares may still be objectionable if the Directors have acted in
breach of trust and their primary purpose is to perpetuate or shift control of the
corporation, or to freeze out the minority interest.
(1) Injunction;
(2) Mandamus;
(3) Cancellation of the shares (NOTE: but only if no innocent 3rd parties are
prejudiced)
The directors were under the legal obligation to give the SH-plaintiff an opportunity to
purchase at the price fixed before they could sell his property to a third party. By selling to
strangers without first offering to sell to him, the defendant wrongfully deprived him of his
property and is liable for such damages as he actually sustained.
If the issue of shares is reasonably necessary to raise money to be issued in the business
of the corporation rather than the expansion of such business beyond original limits, the original
SHs have no right to count on obtaining and keeping their proportional part of original stock.
But even if preemptive right does not exist, the issue of shares may still be objectionable
if the directors have acted in breach of trust and their primary purpose is to perpetuate or shift
control of the corporation, or to freeze out minority interest.
The doctrine of preemptive right is not affected by the identity of the purchasers. What it
is concerned with is who did not get it. But when officers and directors sell to themselves and
thereby gain an advantage, both in value and in voting power, another situation arises. In the
case at bar, the directors were not able to prove good faith in the purchase and equity of
transaction, since the corp. was a financial success. There was constructive fraud upon the other
SHs.
Debt Securities
Borrowings
Oftentimes, a financial institution will be willing to lend large amounts to private corporations only
on the condition that such institution will have some representation on the Board of Directors. The role of
such representative is to see to it that his institution's investment is protected from mismanagement or
unfavorable corporate policies.
NOTE: Under the SEC rules, stock option must first be approved
by the SEC.
Also, if the stock option is granted to non-stockholders, or to
directors, officers, or managing groups, there must first be
SH approval of 2/3 of the OCS before the matter is
submitted to the SEC for approval.
Of course it goes without saying that the corporation
must set aside enough of the junior securities in case the
holders of the option decide to exercise such option.
Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. vs. New York Trust Co. (184 F. 2d 954; 1950)
If the corporation is allowed to declare stock dividends without taking account of the
warrant holders (who have not yet exercised their warrant), the percentage of interest in the
common stock capital of the corporation which the warrant holders would acquire, should they
choose to do so, could be substantially reduced/diluted. Thus, the corporation is wrong in
contending that a warrant holder must first exercise his warrant before they may be issued stock
dividend.
Hybrid securities
Determining the true nature of the security is crucial for tax purposes. The
American courts use the following criteria:
(1) Is the corporation liable to pay back the investor at a fixed maturity date?
(3) Does the security rank at least equally with the claims of other creditors, or is
it subordinate to them?
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE SECURITY AND THE PAYMENT MADE?
BONDS STOCK
John Kelly vs. CIR Talbot Mills vs. CIR (326 U.S. 521; 1946)
In the Kelly case, the annual payments made were interest on indebtedness (therefore, a
bond is held) because there were sales of the debentures as well as exchanges of preferred stock
for debentures, a promise to pay a certain annual amount if earned, a priority for the debentures
over common stock and a definite maturity date in the reasonable future.
In the Talbot Mills case, the annual payments made were dividends and not interest
(therefore, shares are held), because of the presence of fluctuating annual payments with a 2%
minimum, and the limitation of the issue of notes to stockholders in exchange only for stock.
Besides, it is the Tax Court which has final determination of all tax issues which are not clearly
delineated by law.
The payments made, regardless of what they are called, are in fact dividends (on stocks)
because of the absence of a maturity date and the right to enforce payment of the principal sum
by legal action, among other factors.
The following criteria should be used in determining whether a payment is for interest or
dividends:
(4) uniform rate of interest payable or income payable only out of profits;
It must be noted that these criteria are not of equal importance and cannot be relied upon
individually. E.g. treatment accorded the issuance by the parties cannot be sufficient as this
would allow taxpayers to avoid taxes by merely naming payments as interest.
The trust indenture
(1) debtor-corporation
(2) creditor-bondholder
The rights of bondholders are to be determined by their contract and courts will not make
or remake a contract merely because one of the parties may become dissatisfied with its
provisions. If the contract is legal, the courts will interpret and enforce it.
In the deed of trust and bonds in this case, there are provisions empowering bondholders
of 2/3 of the principal amount or more, by agreement with the company, to modify and extend
the date of payment of the bonds provided such extension affected all bonds alike. When this was
done, the bondholders only followed such provisions in good faith. The company benefited
because of such move, and the bondholders were not necessarily prejudiced, as defendants
Joneses in this case were themselves owners of 72% of the bond issue.
CONSIDERATION FOR ISSUANCE OF SHARES
Form of Consideration
cash;
future services
promissory notes
(2) By the BOD pursuant to authority conferred upon it by the AOI or the by-
laws; or
(3) In the absence of the foregoing, by the SHs representing at least a majority of
the outstanding capital stock at a meeting duly called for the purpose (Sec. 62)
IF THE CONSIDERATION FOR SHARES IS OTHER THAN CASH, HOW IS THE VALUE
THEREOF DETERMINED?
Watered Stocks
NOTE: No-par shares CAN be watered stock: when they are issued for less
than their issued value as fixed by the corp. in accordance with law.
(1) Gratuitously, under an agreement that nothing shall be paid to the corporation;
(2) Upon payment of less than its par value in money or for cost at a discount;
(3) Upon payment with property, labor or services, whose value is less than the par
value of the shares; and
(4) In the guise of stock dividends representing surplus profits or an increase in the
value of property, when there are no sufficient profits or sufficient increases in
value to justify it.
Directors and officers who consented to the issuance of watered stocks are solidarily liable
with the holder of such stocks to the corp. and its creditors for the difference between the fair
value received at the time of the issuance and the par or issued value of the share.
The liability will be to all creditors, whether they became such prior or subsequent to the
issuance of the watered stock. Reliance by the creditors on the alleged valuation of corporate
capital is immaterial and fraud is not made an element of liability.
PRIVATE Triplex Shoe v. Rice &Hutchinstc \l 1 "Triplex Shoe v. Rice & Hutchins" (72 A.L.R.
932; 1930)
In this case, the stocks issued to the Dillman faction were no par value shares, the
consideration for which were never fixed as required by law. Hence, their issuance was void.
Moreover, the stocks were issued to the Dillmans for services rendered and to be rendered. Future
services are not lawful consideration for the issuance of stock.
McCarty agreed to purchase shares of a corp. with a downpayment of only $20, with the
balance due to be evidenced by a note. McCarty failed to pay a big portion of the balance. The
Court affirmed the judgement against McCarty for the balance due on the contract.
McCarty contends that the contract is void. But the law only prohibits the issuance of stock.
If it is understood that the stock will not be issued to the subscriber until the note is paid, the
contract is valid and not illegal.
If a security such as a note, which is not a valid consideration, is accepted, the law does not
say that such note, or the stock issued for it, shall be void. What is void by express provision of law
is the fictitious increase of stock or indebtedness. The law was designed for the protection of the
corporation and its creditors. It emphasizes the stockholders obligations to make full and lawful
payment in accord with its mandate, rather than furnish him with a defense when he has failed in
that obligation. Its purpose is to give integrity to the corporations capital. None of these objects
would be promoted by declaring a note given by a subscriber for stock uncollectible in the hands of
a bona fide stockholder.
This case involves an action to collect unpaid balances on par value of shares. It was held
that innocent transferees of watered stock cannot be held to answer for the deficiency of the stocks
even at the suit of the creditor of the company. The creditors remedy is against the original owner
of the watered stock.
A subscriber to shares who pays only part of what he agreed to pay is liable to creditors for
the balance.
Holders of watered stock are generally held liable to the corporations creditors for the
difference between the par value of the stock and the amount paid in.
Under the misrepresentation theory, the creditors who rely on the misrepresentation of the
corporations capital stock are entitled to recover the water from holders of the watered stock.
Reliance of creditors on the misrepresentation is material. However, under the statutory
obligation theory, reliance of creditors on the capital stock of the corporation is irrelevant. (It must
be noted that here in the Philippines, it is the statutory obligation theory which is
prevailing.)
Issuance of Certificate
Certificate of stock
2. date of issuance
(1) The certificates must be signed by the President / Vice-President, countersigned by the secretary or
assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation.
There is no issuance of a stock certificate where it is never detached from the stock books
although blanks therein are properly filled up if the person whose name is inserted therein has no
control over the books of the company. (Bitong v. CA, 292 SCRA 503)
(3) Par value of par value shares / Full subscription of no par value shares must be fully paid.
(4) Surrender of the original certificate if the person requesting the issuance of a certificate is a transferee
from a SH.
Stock issued without authority and in violation of law is void and confers no rights on the
person to whom it is issued and subjects him to no liabilities. Where there is an inherent lack of
power in the corporation to issue the stock, neither the corporation nor the person to whom the
stock is issued is estopped to question its validity since an estoppel cannot operate to create stock
which under the law cannot have existence.
Unpaid Subscriptions
Unpaid subscriptions are not due and payable until a call is made by
the corporation for payment. (Sec. 67)
(1) Call for payment as necessary, i.e. the BOD declares the unpaid subscriptions due and
payable (Sec. 67);
Poizat subscribed to 20 shares but only paid for 5. Board made a call for payment
through a resolution. Poizat refused to pay. Corporation became insolvent. Assignee in
insolvency sued Poizat whose defense was that the call was invalid for lack of publication.
It was held that the Board call became immaterial in insolvency which automatically
causes all unpaid subscriptions to become due and demandable.
Lingayen Gulf Electric vsBaltazar (93 Phil. 404; 1953)
Companys president subscribed to shares and paid partially. The Board made a call for
payment through a resolution. However, the president refused to pay, prompting the corporation
to sue. The defense was that the call was invalid for lack of publication.
It was held that the call was void for lack of publication required by law. Such
publication is a condition precedent for the filing of the action. The ruling in Poizat does not
apply since the company here is solvent.
Da Silva subscribed to 650 shares and paid for 200. The company notified him that his
shares will be declared delinquent and sold in a public auction if he does not pay the balance. Da
Silva did not pay. The company advertised a notice of delinquency sale. Da Silva sought an
injunction because the by-laws allegedly provide that unpaid subscriptions will be paid from the
dividends allotted to stockholders.
The Court held that by-laws provide that unpaid subscriptions may be paid from such
dividends. Company has other remedies provided for by law such as a delinquency sale or
specific performance.
Dexter subscribed to 300 shares. The subscription contract provided that the shares will
be paid solely from the dividends. Company became insolvent. Assignee in insolvency sued
Dexter for the balance. Dexter's defense was that under the contract, payment would come from
the dividends. Without dividends, he cannot be obligated to pay.
The Court held that the subscription contract was void since it works a fraud on creditors
who rely on the theoretical capital of the company (subscribed shares). Under the contract, this
theoretical value will never be realized since if there are no dividends, stockholders will not be
compelled to pay the balance of their subscriptions.
Lumanlan had unpaid subscriptions. Companys receiver sued him for the balance and
won. While the case was on appeal, the company and Lumanlan entered into a compromise
whereby Lumanlan would directly pay a creditor of the company. In exchange, the company
would forego whatever balance remained on the unpaid subscription. Lumanlan agreed since he
would be paying less than his unpaid subscription. Afterwards, the corporation still sued him for
the balance because the company still had unpaid creditors. Lumanlansdefense was the
compromise agreement.
The Court held that the agreement cannot prejudice creditors. The subscriptions
constitute a fund to which they have a right to look to for satisfaction of their claims. Therefore,
the corporation has a right to collect all unpaid stock subscriptions and any other amounts which
may be due it, notwithstanding the compromise agreement.
The Court held that payment of half the subscription price does not make the holder of
stock the owner of half the subscribed shares. Plaintiff's rights consist in an equity in 500 shares
and upon payment of the unpaid portion of the subscription price he becomes entitled to the
issuance of certificate for the said 500 shares in his favor.
Baltazar, et al. subscribed to a certain number of shares of Lingayen Gulf Electric Power.
They had made only partial payment of the subscription but the corporation issued them
certificates corresponding to shares covered by the partial payments. Corporation wanted to deny
voting rights to all subscribed shares until total subscription is paid.
The Court held that shares of stock covered by fully paid capital stock shares certificates
are entitled to vote. Corporation may choose to apply payments to subscription either as: (a) full
payment for corresponding number of stock the par value of which is covered by such payment;
or (b) as payment pro-rata to each subscribed share. The corporation chose the first option, and,
having done so, it cannot unilaterally nullify the certificates issued.
Note: The Camposes are of the opinion that 64 of Corporation Code makes
It was held that the transfer is effective only between Co and Nava and does not affect the
corporation. The FuaCun ruling applies. Lingayen Gulf does not apply because, unlike in
Lingayen Gulf, no certificate of stock was issued to Co.
Effect of delinquency
Stock that remains unpaid 30 days after the date specified in the
subscription contract or the date stated in the call made by the
Board.
1. The holder thereof loses all his rights as a stockholder except only the rights to
dividends;
2. Dividends will not be paid to the stockholder but will be applied to the unpaid
balance of his subscription plus costs and expenses. Also, stock dividends will be
withheld until full payment is made.
3. Such stockholder cannot vote at the election of directors or at any meeting on any
matter proper for stockholder action.
Note: The sale shall not be less than 30 days nor more than
60 days from the date the stocks become delinquent.
If there is no bidder at the public auction who offers to pay the full
amount of the balance on the subscription and its attendant costs,
the corporation may bid for the shares, and the total amount due
shall be credited as paid in full in the books of the corporation. Title
to all the shares of stock covered by the subscription shall be
vested in the corporation as treasury shares and may be disposed
of by said corporation in accordance with the Code.
(2) The corporation will publish notice after the affidavit and other
information and evidence have been verified with the books of the
corporation, (Note however that this is not mandatory. The corporation
has the discretion to decide whether to publish or not.)
(3) SLD certificate is removed from the books if after one year from
date of last publication, no contest is presented.
TRANSFER OF SHARES
(1) Delivery;
A corporation, either by its board, its by-laws or the act of its officers, cannot create
restrictions in stock transfers.
A by-law which prohibits a transfer of stock without the consent or approval of all the
SHs or of the President or Board of Directors is illegal as constituting undue limitation on the
right of ownership and in restraint of trade (citing Fleisher v. BoticaNolasco Co., Inc., 47 Phil.
583)
While Sec. 47 (9) of the Corporation Code grants to stock corporations the authority to
determine in the by-laws the "manner of issuing certificates" of shares of stock, however, the
power to regulate is not the power to prohibit, or to impose unreasonable restrictions of the right
of SHs to transfer their shares. To uphold the cancellation of a stock certification as null and
void for lack of delivery of the cancelled "mother" certificate whose endorsement was
deliberately withheld by petitioner, is to prescribe certain restrictions on the transfer of stock in
violation of the Corporation Code as the only law governing transfer of stocks.
There is no dispute that Diosomito was the original owner of said shares, which he sold
to Barcelon. However, Barcelon did not present these certificates to the corporation for
registration until 19 months after the delivery thereof by Barcelon, and 9 months after the
attachment and levy on said shares. The transfer to Jollye was made 5 months after the issuance
of a certificate of stock in Barcelon's name.
Is a bona fide transfer of the shares of corp., not registered or noted on the books of the corp.,
valid as against a subsequent lawful attachment of said shares, regardless of whether the
attaching creditor had actual notice of said transfer or not.
NO, it is not valid. The transfer of the 75 shares in the North Electric Co., Inc made by
the defendant Diosomito as to the defendant Barcelon was not valid as to the plaintiff.
ToribiaUson, on 18 Jan. 1932, the date on which she obtained her attachment lien on said shares
of stock which still stood in the name of Diosomito on the books of the corp. Sec. 35 says that
No transfer, however, is valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is entered and
noted upon the books of the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the transaction,
the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate, and the number of shares transferred.
All transfers of shares not so entered are invalid as to attaching or execution creditors of
the assignors, as well as to the corporation and to subsequent purchasers in good faith, and
indeed, as to all persons interested, except the parties to such transfers.
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of
the corporation. (Sec. 63)
Remedy if registration refused
It is the corporate secretary's duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks and
if said corporate officer refuses to comply, the transferor SH may rightfully bring suit to compel
performance.
Note: In this case, Judge Torres had no right to enter the assignments (conveyances) of
his shares himself in the corporation's stock and transfer book since he was not
corporate secretary.
Rivera v. Florendo (144 SCRA 647; 1986)
Isamu Akasako, a Japanese national who was allegedly the real owner of the shares of
stock in the name of one Aquilino Rivera, a registered SH of Fujuyama Hotel and Restaurant,
Inc., sold 2550 shares of the same to Milagros Tsuchiya along with the assurance that Tsuchiya
would be made President of the corporation after the purchase. Rivera assured her that he would
sign the stock certificates because Akasako was the real owner. However, after the sale was
consummated and the consideration paid, Rivera refused to make the indorsement unless he is
also paid.
Tsuchiya, et al. attempted several times to have the shares registered but were refused
compliance by the corp. They filed a special action for mandamus and damages.
The Supreme Court held that mandamus was improper in this case since the shares of
stock were not even indorsed by the registered owner who was specifically resisting the
registration thereof in the books of the corporation. The rights of the parties would have to be
threshed out in an ordinary action.
Exception: In close corporations, restrictions may be placed on the transfer of shares. Such
restrictions must appear in the AOI and in the by-laws, as well as in the
certificate of stock. Otherwise, the restriction shall not be binding on any
purchaser thereof in good faith.
The restrictions imposed shall be no more onerous than granting the existing
stockholders or the corporation the option to purchase the shares of the
transferring stockholder with such reasonable terms, conditions or period stated
therein. If this option is not exercised upon the expiration of the period, the
transferring stockholder may sell his shares to any third person. (Sec. 98)
The corporation may, at its option, refuse to register the transfer of stock in the name of the
transferee. (Sec. 99.4) However, this shall not be applicable if the transfer, though otherwise contrary to
subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Sec. 99, has been consented to by all the stockholders of the close
corporation, or if the close corporation has amended its AOI in accordance with Title XII of the Code.
For his part, the transferee may rescind the transfer or recover from the transferor under any
applicable warranty, whether express or implied.
UNAUTHORIZED TRANSFERS
Forged Transfers
Santamaria secured her order for a number of shares with Campos Co. with her stock
certificate representing her shares with Batangas Minerals. The said certificate was originally
issued in the name of her broker and endorsed in blank by the latter. As Campos failed to make
good on the order, Santamaria demanded the return of the certificate. However, she was informed
that Hongkong Bank had acquired possession of it inasmuch as it was covered by the pledge
made by Campos with the bank. Thereafter, she instituted an action against Hongkong Bank for
the recovery of the certificate. Trial court decided in her favor. The bank appealed.
Issues: 1) WON Santamaria was chargeable with negligence which gave rise to the case
2) WON the Bank was obligated to inquire into the ownership of the certificate
(1) The facts of the case justify the conclusion that she was negligent. She delivered the
certificate, which was endorsed in blank, to Campos without having taken any precaution. She
did not ask the Batangas Minerals to cancel it and instead, issue another in her name. In failing to
do so, she clothed Campos with apparent title to the shares represented by the certificate. By her
misplaced confidence in Campos, she made possible the wrong done. She was therefore estopped
from asserting title thereto for it is well-settled that where one of the innocent parties must
suffer by reason of a wrongful or unauthorized act, the loss must fall on the one who first trusted
the wrongdoer.
(2) The subject certificate is what is known as a street certificate. Upon its face, the
holder is entitled to demand its transfer into his name from the issuing corporation. The bank is
not obligated to look beyond the certificate to ascertain the ownership of the stock. A certificate
of stock, endorsed in blank, is deemed quasi-negotiable, and as such, the transferee thereof is
justified in believing that it belongs to the transferor.
De los Santos filed a claim with the Alien Property Custodian for a number of shares of
the Lepanto corporation. He contended that said shares were bought from one Campos and Hess,
both of them dead. The Philippine Alien Property Administrator rejected the claim. He instituted
the present action to establish title to the aforementioned shares of stock.
The US Attorney General, the successor of the Alien Property Administrator, opposed the
action on the ground that the said shares of stock were bought by one Madrigal, in trust for the
true owner, Matsui, and then delivered to the latter indorsed in blank.
De los Santos sole evidence that he purchased the said shares was his own unverified
testimony. The alleged vendors of the stocks who could have verified the allegation, were
already dead. Further, the receipt that might have proven the sale, was said to have been lost in a
fire. On the other hand, it was shown that the shares of stock were registered in the records of
Lepanto in the name of Madrigal, the trustee of Matsui; that Matsui was subsequently given
possession of the corresponding stock certificates, though endorsed in blank; and, that Matsui
had neither sold, conveyed nor alienated these to anybody.
It is the rule that if the owner of the certificate has endorsed it in blank, and is stolen, no
title is acquired by an innocent purchaser of value. This is so because even though a stock
certificate is regarded as quasi-negotiable, in the sense that it may be transferred by endorsement,
coupled with delivery, the holder thereof takes it without prejudice to such rights or defenses as
the registered owner or credit may have under the law, except in so far as such rights or defenses
are subject to the limitations imposed by the principles governing estoppel.
Collateral Transfers
Shares of stock are personal property. Thus, they can either be pledged or
mortgaged. However, such pledge or mortgage cannot have any legal effect if it is
registered only in the corporate books.
In a situation where, the chattel mortgage having been registered, the stock
certificate was not delivered to the creditor but transferred to a bona fide purchaser for
value, it is the rule that the bona fide purchaser for value is bound by the registration in
the chattel mortgage registry. It is said that such a rule tends to impair the commercial
value of stock certificates.
Did the chattel mortgage in the registry of deeds of Manila gave constructive notice to the
attaching creditors?
The Chattel Mortgage Law provides two ways of executing a valid chattel mortgage: 1)
the possession of mortgaged property is delivered and retained by the mortgagee; and, 2) without
delivery, the mortgage is recorded in the register of deeds. But if chattel mortgage of shares may
be made validly, the next question then becomes: where should such mortgage be properly
registered?
It is the general rule that the situs of shares is the domicile of the owner. It is also
generally held that for the purpose of execution, attachment, and garnishment, it is the domicile
of the corporation that is decisive. Going by these principles, it is deemed reasonable that chattel
mortgage of shares be registered both at the owners domicile and in the province where the
corporation has its principal office. It should be understood that the property mortgaged is not the
certificate but the participation and share of the owner in the assets of the corporation.
Note: The provision of the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508)
providing for delivery of mortgaged property to the mortgagee as a mode
of constituting a chattel mortgage is no longer valid in view of the Civil
Code provision defining such as a pledge.
NON-TRANSFERABILITY
IN NON-STOCK CORPORATIONS
1. Cash
2. Property
3. Stock dividends
Can this be issued by No. (Sec. 35) No, since this requires SH
Executive approval. (Sec. 35)
Committee?
Stock dividends are issued only to SHs This is so because only stockholders are entitled
to dividends. A stock dividend really adds nothing to the interest of each stockholder; the
proportional interest of each stockholder remains the same. If a stockholder is deprived of his
stock dividends - and this happens if the shares of stock forming part of the stock dividends are
issued to a non-stockholder - then the proportion of the stockholder's interest changes radically.
Stock dividends are civil fruits of the original investment, and to the owners of the shares belong
the civil fruits.
If subscribed shares have not been fully paid, the unpaid portion of
subscribed capital stock is an asset, and as long as the net capital asset
(after payment of liabilities) including this unpaid portion is at least equal to
the total par value of the subscribed shares, any excess would be surplus
or earnings from which dividends may be declared. However, if a deficit
exists, subsequent profits must first be applied to cover the deficit.
Dividends can only be declared only from the surplus, i.e. the excess in the value of the
assets over the liabilities and the issued capital stock. To do otherwise would be illegal The
object of the prohibition is to protect the creditors in view of the limited liability of the SHs and
also to protect the SHs by preserving the capital so that the purposes of the corp. may be
performed.
Surplus must be bona fide i.e. founded upon actual earnings or profits and not to be
dependent for its existence upon a theoretical estimate of an appreciation in the value of the
companys assets.
The prohibition does not apply, however, to stock dividends because creditors and SHs
will not be affected by their declaration since they do not decrease the companys assets.
Dividends on non-cumulative preferred stock are payable only out of net profits and for
the years in which said net profits are actually earned.
The right to dividends is conditional upon: (1) accrual of net profits, and (2) retention in
the business.
If the annual net earnings of a corp. are justifiably applied to legitimate corp. purposes,
such as payment of debts, reduction of deficits and restoration of impaired capital, the right of
non-cumulative preferred stockholders to the payments of dividends is lost. If they are applied
against prior losses and thereby completely absorbed, there are no net profits from which
dividends may be lawfully paid.
Exceptions:
The mere fact that a large corporate surplus exists is not enough to warrant equitable
intervention; the test is good faith and reasonableness of the policy of retaining the profits.
However, where dividends are withheld for an unlawful purpose to deprive a SH of his right to
a just proportion of the corporation's profit, the court may compel the corporation to declare
dividends.
This case involves an action against the Ford Motor Company to compel declaration of
dividends. At the time this complaint was made, Ford had concluded its most prosperous year of
business, and the demand for its cars at the price of the previous year continued. While it had
been the practice, under similar circumstances, to declare larger dividends, the corporation
refused to declare any special dividends. The Board justified its refusal to declare larger
dividends on the expansion plans of the company by erecting a smelting plant, but maintaining
the selling price of its cars (instead of reducing it as had been the practice in previous years).
The plaintiffs contend that such a proposal would be tantamount to the business being conducted
as a semi-eleemosynary (or charitable) institution instead of a business institution.
The court pointed out that a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of SHs. The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end and does not extend to a change in the end itself reduction of profits or to devote
profits to another purpose. While the Court noted the capable management of the affairs of the
corporation and therefore was not convinced that the motives of the directors were prejudicial to
the company's interests, it likewise noted that the annual dividends paid were very small in
relation to the profits that the company had been making. It therefore affirmed the amount fixed
by the lower court to be distributed to the stockholders.
Note: Prof. Jacinto is of the opinion that what happened in this case is
possible under the present Code, even without changing the AOI.
Preference as to Dividends
In the AOI and the certificate of stock of Stock A, it was stated that the holders of said
stocks are entitled to receive to receive preferential dividends of 5% per fiscal year, non-
cumulative, before dividends are paid to other stocks. From 1915 to 1926, no dividends were
declared. The net earnings were instead used for the improvements and additions to property and
equipment. Due to this, the corporation became prosperous and proposed to pay dividends to A
& B common stock. Plaintiffs filed this case in order to collect the dividends for fiscal years
1915-1926 before the other classes of stock are paid.
No, they were not. By the plain meaning of the words in the AOI and the certificates of
stock, the holders are not entitled to dividends unless directors declare so. It is likewise
generally understood that in cases where the company's net earnings are applied for
improvements and no dividend is declared, the claim for such year is gone in case of non-
cumulative stock, and cannot be later asserted.
Burk v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co. (123 Pac. 875; 1912)
An action was brought by the preferred SHs of Ottawa against the directors of Ottawa to
(1) require the directors to account for all the property and assets of the corporation, (2) declare
such dividends from the net profits of the business of such co. as should have been declared since
1 Jan. 1906, and (3) restrain the officers and directors during the pendency of the action from
paying out any of the money or disposing of the assets of the company except such amounts as
should be necessary to pay the actual necessary current expenses of conducting the business of
the corporation.
The BOD maintained that the corporation's funds were exhausted by expenditures for the
extension of the cosplant, hence it was unable to declare dividends. Expenditures were said to
be necessary and for the betterment of the plant.
Were the corp funds were wrongfully diverted, and were preferred SHs entitled to dividends?
The case was remanded to the trial court, with instructions to make further findings to
protect the preferred SHs in their rights.
The fair interpretation of the contract between Ottawa and its SHS is that if in any year
net profits are earned, a dividend is to be declared. To hold otherwise, meaning if the BOD had
absolute discretion when to declare dividends and when not to, when the corporation has funds
for such dividends, would result in temptation to unfair dealing, giving one party the option to
pay the other or not. In the case at bar, the accumulated profits would be lost forever since the
dividends were non-cumulative.
Preferred SHs, however, are not generally creditors until dividends are declared. In the
case at bar, if dividends should have been declared to such SHs, they are considered creditors
from that time.
When Right to Dividends Vests; Rights of Transferee
As soon as the BoD has declared dividends. From this time, it becomes a debt owed by the
corporation, and therefore can no longer be revoked (McLaran v. Crescent Planning).
EXCEPTION: If the declaration has not yet been announced or communicated to the
stockholders.
NOTE: When no dividends are declared for 3 consecutive years, preferred SHs
are given the right to vote for directors until dividends are declared.
NOTE: The extent of the SHs share in the dividends will depend on the capital
contribution; NOT the number of shares he has.
CPM Corp., having a surplus of $29,000, declared a 6% cash dividend payable in four
installments. The first installment was paid by the Board after which an error was discovered in
the computation of the assets: from the initial recognized surplus of $29,000 to $6,000. Mainly
for this reason, the Board adopted a resolution rescinding the dividends payable on the three
other installments despite the solvency of the corp and the existence of ample funds to pay said
dividends. The original P was Humber, a SH, and was substituted by McLaran, the administrator
of his estate when he died. The defendant corp maintained that there was no valid declaration of
dividends because the corporation failed to set aside funds to pay for the same.
A cash dividend, properly declared, cannot be revoked by the subsequent action of the
corp. for by its declaration, the corp had become the debtor of the SH and it goes without saying
that the debtor cannot revoke, recall or rescind the debt or otherwise absolve itself from its
payment by a unilateral action or without the consent of the creditor. Thus, the rescission by the
BOD of the subsequent installments was of no force.
Dividends are defined as portions of profits/surplus funds of the corp. which have been
actually set apart by a valid board resolution or by the SH at a corp. mtg. for distribution among
SH according to their respective interests. The mere declaration of the dividend, without more,
by competent authority under proper circumstances, creates a debt against the corporation in
favor of the stockholders the same as any other general creditor of the corporation. By the mere
declaration, the dividend becomes immediately fixed and absolute in the stockholder and from
henceforth the right of each individual stockholder is changed by the act of declaration from that
of partner and part owner of the corporate property to a status absolutely, adverse to every other
stockholder and to the corporation itself, insofar as his pro rata proportion of the dividend is
concerned.
(1) If the directors acted wilfully, or with negligence or in bad faith, they will be
liable to the corporation. If the corporation has become insolvent, they are liable
to the corporation's creditors for the amount of dividends based out of capital.
(Based on Sec. 31)
(2) If the directors cannot be held liable because they acted with due diligence and
in good faith, in the absence of an express provision of law, an innocent
stockholder is not liable to return the dividends received by him out of capital,
unless the corporation was insolvent at the time of payment. (Majority view;
Campos)
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR ACQUISITION BY THE CORPORATION OF ITS OWN
SHARES? (Sec. 41)
FOR WHAT PURPOSES CAN A CORPORATION ACQUIRE ITS OWN SHARES? (Sec. 41)
The appraisal right refers to the right of a stockholder who dissented and voted against a
proposed fundamental corporate action to get out of the corporation by demanding payment of
the fair value of his shares.
(1) In case any amendment to the AOI has the effect of changing or restricting
the rights of any SH or class of shares, or of authorizing preferences in any
respect superior to those of outstanding shares of any class, or of extending or
shortening the term of corporate existence (Sec. 81);
(4) In case the corporation invests its funds in any other corporation or business
or for any purpose other than the primary purpose for which it was organized
(Sec. 42)
WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE APPRAISAL RIGHT? (Sec.
82)
(2) Written demand on the corporation for payment of the fair value of his shares;
(3) Such demand must have been made within 30 days after the date on which the
vote was taken;
(5) Unrestricted retained earnings in the books of the corporation to cover such
payment.
All rights accruing to the shares, including voting and dividend rights, are suspended in
accordance with the Corporation Code, except for the right of the SH to receive payment of the
fair value thereof.
Such suspension shall be from the time of demand until either:
The charter of a private corporation consists of its articles of incorporation as well as the
Corporation Code and such other law under which it is organized.
Amendment by Legislature
Amendment by Stockholders
(3) A copy of the amended articles should be filed with the SEC,
and with the proper governmental agencies, as appropriate (e.g.,
in the case of banks, public utilities, etc.)
The same grounds as for the disapproval of the original articles (Sec. 17):
Not substantially in accordance with the form prescribed by the
Code;
The Board of Directors gave notice to SH that among the matters to be acted upon in its
annual meeting would be a proposal to amend certificate of incorporation to add to the rights of
preferred stockholders, voting rights equal to those of common stockholders. Marcus, objected
and demanded payment for the common stock owned by her.
The Court held that Marcus may invoke her appraisal right. The aggregate number of
shares having voting rights equal to those of common shares was substantially increased and
thereby the voting power of each common share outstanding prior to the meeting was altered or
limited by the resulting pro rata diminution of its potential worth as a factor in the management
of the corporate affairs. Considering that she held diminished voting power; that she notified the
corpo of her objection; that her shares were voted against the amendmentthese were sufficient
to qualify her to invoke her statutory appraisal right.
Effectivity of amendment
Special amendments
A corporation has no power to release an original subscriber to its capital stock from the
obligation of paying for his shares, without valuable consideration for such release; and as
against creditors a reduction of the capital stock can take place only in the manner and under the
conditions prescribed by the statute or charter or the articles of incorporation.
DISSOLUTION
Modes of Dissolution
Before the date fixed by the SEC, the SEC order shall
be published and posted accordingly.
(b) Quo Warranto proceedings (See Sec. 5b, PD 902-A and Rule
66, Rules of
Court. Previously, the SEC had exclusive jurisdiction over
quo warranto proceedings involving corporation. Under the
Securities Regulation Code or RA 8799, however, the
jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under
Sec. 5 of PD 902-A have been transferred to the Regional
Trial Courts.
to expire.
Illegal;
Fraudulent;
Dishonest;
Oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the corporation
or any other SH;
Plaintiff National Abaca Corporation filed a complaint against Pore for the recovery of a
sum of money advanced to her for the purchase of hemp. She moved to dismiss the complaint
by citing the fact that National Abaca had been abolished by EO 372 dated Nov. 24, 1950.
Plaintiff objected to such by saying that it shall nevertheless be continued as a corporate body for
a period of 3 years from the effective date of said order for the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and to enable the Board of Liquidators to close its affairs.
Can an action commenced within 3 years after the abolition of plaintiff corporation be continued
by the same after the expiration of said period?
The Corp. Law allows a corporation to continue as a body for 3 years after the time when
it would have been dissolved for the purposes of prosecuting and defending suits by or against
it. But at any time during the 3 years, the corporation should convey all its property to trustees so
that the latter may be the ones to continue on with such prosecution, with no time limit on its
hands. Since the case against Pore was strong, the corp.'s amended complaint was admitted and
the case was remanded to the lower court.
The termination of the life of a juridical entity does not by itself cause the extinction or
diminution of the right and liabilities of such entity nor those of its owners and creditors. If the
3-year extended life has expired without a trustee or receiver having been expressly designated
by the corporation itself within that period, the board of directors or trustees itself may be
permitted to so continue as "trustees" by legal implication to complete the corporate liquidation.
In the absence of a board of directors or trustees, those having any pecuniary interest in the
assets, including not only the shareholders but likewise the creditors of the corporation, acting
for and in its behalf, might make proper representations with the SEC, which has primary and
sufficiently broad jurisdiction in matters of this nature, for working out a final settlement of the
corporate concerns.
Executory contracts
Liquidation
Liquidation, or winding up, refers to the collection of all assets of the corporation, payment
of all its creditors, and the distribution of the remaining assets, if any, among the stockholders
thereof in accordance with their contracts, or if there be no special contract, on the basis of their
respective interests.
WHAT ARE THE METHODS OF LIQUIDATING A CORPORATION? AND WHO MAY
UNDERTAKE THE LIQUIDATION OF A CORPORATION?
Generally, a corporation may be continued as a body corporate for the purpose of liquidation
for 3 years after the time when it would have so dissolved. (Sec. 122) However, it was held in
the case of Clemente v. CA (supra) that if the 3-year period has expired without a trustee or
receiver having been expressly designated by the corporation itself within that period, the BOD
itself may be permitted to so continue as "trustees" by legal implication to complete the corporate
liquidation.
WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE DURING THE PERIOD OF LIQUIDATION?
(Sec. 122)
(2) Conveyance of all corporate property to trustees for the benefit of SHs,
members, creditors, and other persons in interest;
Any asset distributable to any creditor or stockholder or member who is unknown or cannot
be found shall be escheated to the city or municipality where such assets are located. (Sec. 122)
The appointment of a receiver by the court to wind up the affairs of the corporation upon
petition of voluntary dissolution does not empower the court to hear and pass on the claims of
the creditors of the corporation at first hand. In such cases, the receiver does not act as a receiver
of an insolvent corporation. Since "liquidation" as applied to the settlement of the affairs of a
corporation consists of adjusting the debts and claims, that is, of collecting all that is due the
corporation, the settlement and adjustment of claims against it and the payment of its just debts,
all claims must be presented for allowance to the receiver or trustees or other proper persons
during the winding-up proceedings within the 3 years provided by the Corporation Law as the
term for the corporate existence of the corporation, and if a claim is disputed so that the receiver
cannot safely allow the same, it should be transferred to the proper court for trial and allowance,
and the amount so allowed then presented to the receiver or trustee for payment. The rulings of
the receiver on the validity of claims submitted are subject to review by the court appointing
such receiver though no appeal is taken to the latter ruling, and during the winding-up
proceedings after dissolution, no creditor will be permitted by legal process or otherwise to
acquire priority, or to enforce his claim against the property held for distribution as against the
rights of other creditors.
Although Marsman was extrajudicially dissolved, with the 3-year rule, nothing however
bars an action for recovery of corporate debts against the liquidators. In fact, the 1st assessment
was given before dissolution, while the 2nd and 3rd assessments were given just 6 months after
dissolution (within the 3-year rule). Such facts definitely established that the Government was a
creditor of the corp. for whom the liquidator was supposed to hold assets of the corp.
Tan Tiong Bio v. CIR (G.R. No. L-15778; April 23, 1962)
The creditor of a dissolved corp. may follow its assets, as in the nature of a trust fund,
once they pass into the hands of the stockholders. The dissolution of a corp. does not extinguish
the debts due or owing to it.
An indebtedness of a corp. to the government for income and excess profit taxes is not
extinguished by the dissolution of the corp. The hands of government cannot, of course, collect
taxes from a defunct corporation, it loses thereby none of its rights to assess taxes which had
been due from the corporation, and to collect them from persons, who by reason of transactions
with the corporation hold property against which the tax can be enforced and that the legal death
of the corporation no more prevents such action than would the physical death of an individual
prevent the government from assessing taxes against him and collecting them from his
administrator, who holds the property which the decedent had formerly possessed. Thus,
petitioners can be held personally liable for the corporation's taxes, being successors-in-interest
of the defunct corporation.
CORPORATE COMBINATIONS
(1) Merger (A + B = A)
(2) Consolidation (A + B = C)
Consolidation becomes effective not upon mere agreement of the members but only upon
issuance of the certificate of consolidation by the SEC. There can be no intra-corporate nor
partnership relation between 2 jeepney drivers' and operators' associations whose plans to
consolidate into a single common association is still a proposal.
If by the sale the corporation would be rendered incapable of continuing the business
or accomplishing the purpose for which it was incorporated. (Sec. 40)
(1) Majority vote of BOD + 2/3 vote of OCS or members at a meeting duly
called for the purpose;
Note, however, that after such approval by the SHs, the BOD may nevertheless, in its
discretion, abandon such sale or other disposition without further action or approval by the SHs.
This, of course, is subject to the rights of third parties under any contract relating thereto.
Exchange of stocks
In this method, all or substantially all the stockholders of the "acquired" corporation are
made stockholders of the acquiring corporation. With the exchange, the acquired corporation
becomes a subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. Although this method does not combine the 2
businesses under a single corporation as in merger and sale of assets, from the point of view of
the acquiring (parent) corporation, there is hardly any difference between owing the acquired
corporation's business directly and operating it through a controlled subsidiary. In fact, the
parent corporation would have the power to buy all the subsidiary's assets and dissolve it,
achieving the same result as in the other methods of combination. (Campos & Campos)
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Cooperatives
Small-scale mining
Private recruitment
Contracts for construction and repair of locally-funded
public
works
The BOI certificate is issued upon a finding of the Board of Investments that the
business operations of the foreign corp. will contribute to the sound and balanced
development of the national economy on a self-sustaining basis. (See Omnibus
Investments Code, Sec. 48-49)
NOTE: Applications, if not acted upon within 10 days from official acceptance
thereof, shall be considered automatically approved!(Art. 53, Omnibus
Investments Code)
Application under oath setting forth the information specified in Sec. 125;
Statement under oath of the president or any other person authorized by the
corporation showing that the applicant is solvent and in good financial condition, and
setting forth the assets and liabilities of the corporation within 1 year immediately
prior to the application.
Within 60 days after the issuance of the license, the licensee shall deposit with the SEC securities
with an actual market value of at least P 100,000.00. These securities are for the benefit of present and
future creditors, and shall consist of any of the following:
Once the licensee ceases to do business in the Philippines, these deposited securities shall be returned, upon the
licensee's application and proof to the satisfaction of the SEC that the licensee has no liability to Philippine residents
or the Philippine government.
Note: Foreign banking and insurance corporations are the exceptions to this
requirement.
Foreign corporations lawfully doing business in the Philippines are bound by all
laws, rules and regulations applicable to domestic corporations of the same class.
Isolated transactions
Marshall Wells, a corporation organized under the State of Oregon, sued a domestic corp.
for the unpaid balance on a bill of goods. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground
that it did not show that plaintiff had complied with the law regarding corp. desiring to do
business in the Phil., nor that the plaintiff was authorized to do business in the Phil.
The Supreme Court, in ruling for Marshall Wells, stated that the object of the statute was
to subject the foreign corp. doing business in the Phil. to the jurisdiction of its courts. The object
of the statute was not to prevent it from performing single acts but to prevent it from acquiring a
domicile for the purpose without taking the steps necessary to render it amenable to suit in the
local courts. The implication of the law is that it was never the purpose of the Legislature to
exclude a foreign corp. which happens to obtain an isolated order for business from the Phil.,
from securing redress in Phil. Courts, and thus, in effect to permit persons to avoid their contract
made with such foreign corporation.
ATLANTIC MUTUAL V. CEBU STEVEDORING (G.R. No. 18961; Aug. 31, 1966)
A foreign corp. engaged in business in the Phil. can maintain suit in this jurisdiction if it
is duly licensed. If a foreign corp. is not engaged in business in the Phil., it can maintain such
suit if the transaction sued upon is singular and isolated, in which no license is required. In either
case, the fact of compliance with the requirement of license, or the fact that the suing corp. is
exempt therefrom, as the case may be, cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the party suing
is a foreign corp. The qualifying circumstance, being an essential part of the element of the
plaintiffs capacity to sue, must be affirmatively pleaded. In short, facts showing foreign
corporations capacity to sue should be pleaded.
Curing of defect
A contract entered into by a foreign insurance corp. not licensed to do business in the
Phil. is not necessarily void and the lack of capacity to sue at the time of execution of the
contract is cured by its subsequent registration.
The Supreme Court held that a foreign corp. which does not do business in the Phil. and
is unlicensed but is widely known in the Phil. through the use of its products here has legal right
to maintain an action to protect its reputation, corporate name and goodwill. The right to use the
corporate name is a property right which the corp. may assert and protect in any of the courts of
the world.
A foreign corporation not doing business in the Phil. needs no license to sue in the Phil.
for trademark violations.
Where a violation of our unfair trade laws which provide a penal sanction is alleged, lack
of capacity to sue of injured foreign corp. becomes immaterial (because a criminal offence is
essentially an act against the State).
Whether or not there is continuity of transactions which are in pursuance of the normal
business of the corporation. (Metholatum v. Mangaliman)
The true test as to whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines
seems to be whether the foreign corp. is continuing the body or substance of the business for
which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and turned it over to
another. The term implies a continuity of dealings and arrangements and contemplates
performance of acts/works or the exercise of the functions normally incident to and in
progressive prosecution of the purpose and object of its organization.
Sec. 14. Service upon private foreign corp. - If the defendant is a foreign corp.,
or a non-resident joint stock corporation or association, doing business in the
Phil., service may be made on its resident agent, on the government official
designated by law to the effect, or to an y of its officers or agents within the
Philippines.
FMC had appointed Jaime Catuira as its agent with authority to execute Employment
Contracts and receive, on behalf of the corp., legal services from, and be bound by processes of
the Phil. Courts, for as long as he remains an employee of FMS. If a foreign corp. not engaged
in business in the Phil., through an Agent, is not barred from seeking redress from courts in the
Phil., that same corp. cannot claim exemption done against a person or persons in the Phil..
NOTE: Under Sec. 12, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the term
"doing business" has been replaced with the phrase "has transacted
business," thereby allowing suits based on isolated transactions.
Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc. (MLF) filed a complaint against the spouses Lara for the
recovery of a debt. MLF is a non-resident foreign corp. not doing business in the Phil.,
organized under the laws of Delaware, USA. It is a futures commission merchant duly licensed
to act as such in the futures markets and exchanges in the US, essentially functioning as a broker
executing orders to buy and sell futures contract received from its customers on US futures
exchanges. (Futures contract is a contractual commitment to buy and sell a standardized
quantity of a particular item at a specified future settlement date and at a price agreed upon with
the purchase or sale being executed on a regulated futures exchange.)
The spouses refused to pay and moved to dismiss the case alleging that plaintiff had no
legal capacity to sue because (1) MLF is doing business in the country without a license; and (2)
the transactions were made with Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner and Smith and not with plaintiff
MLF.
Issue: Can MLF sue in Philippine courts to establish and enforce its rights against spouses in
light of the undeniable fact that it had transacted business without a license?
Legal capacity to sue may be understood in two senses: (1) That the plaintiff is
prohibited or otherwise incapacitated by law to institute suit in the Phil. Courts, or (2) although
not otherwise incapacitated in the sense just stated, that it is not a real party in interest.
The Court finds that the Laras were transacting with MLF fully aware of its lack of
license to do business in the Phils., and in relation to those transactions had made payments and
the spouses are estopped to impugn MLF's capacity to sue them. The rule is that a party is
estopped to challenge the personality of a corp after having acknowledged the same by entering
into a contract with it. The principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign
corporation from later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases
where such person has received the benefits of the contract.
Pacific Vegetable Oil v. Singson (G.R. No. 7917; April 29, 1955)
This is an action instituted by the plaintiff, a foreign corporation, against the defendant to
recover a sum of money for damages suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the failure of
the defendant to deliver copra which he sold and bound himself to deliver to the plaintiff.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff failed to obtain a license to
transact business in the Phil and, consequently, it had no personality to file an action.
Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the copra in question was actually sold by the
defendant to the plaintiff in the US, the agreed price to be covered by an irrevocable letter of
credit to be opened at the Bank of California, and delivery to be made at the port of destination.
It follows that the appellant corporation has not transacted business in the Phil in contemplation
of Sec. 68 and 69 which require any foreign corporation to obtain a license before it could
transact business, or before it could have personality to file a suit in the Phil.. It was never the
purpose of the Legislature to exclude a foreign corporation which happens to obtain an isolated
order of business from the Phil., from securing redress in the Phil. Courts, and thus, in effect, to
permit persons to avoid their contracts made with such foreign corp.. The lower court erred in
holding that the appellant corporation has no personality to maintain the present action.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. vs. Pacific Star Line (80 SCRA 635; 1977)
Aetna as subrogee of I. Shalom sued Pacific Star Line (PSL), the common carrier for the
loss of Linen & Cotton piece goods due to pilferage and damage amounting to US$2,300.00.
PSL contends that Aetna has no license to transact insurance business in the Philippines as
gathered from the Insurance Commission and SEC . It also argues that since said company has
filed 13 other civil suits, they should be considered as doing business here and not merely having
entered into an isolated transaction.
Based on rulings in Mentholatum and Eastboard Navigation, the Supreme Court held that
Aetna is not transacting business in the Philippines for which it needs to have a license. The
contract was entered into in New York and payment was made to the consignee in the New York
branch. Moreover, Aetna was not engaged in the business of insurance in the Philippines but was
merely collecting a claim assigned to it by consignee. Because it was not doing business in the
Philippines, it was not subject to Sec. 68-69 of the Corporation Law and therefore was not barred
from filing the instant case although it had not secured a license to transact insurance business in
the Philippines.
Topweld entered into 2 separate contracts with foreign entities: a license and technical
assistance agreement with IRTI, and a distributor agreement with ECED, SA. When Topweld
found out that the foreign corporations were looking into replacing Topweld as licensee and
distributor, the latter went to court to ask for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
foreign corporations from negotiating with 3rd parties as violative of RA 5445 (4).
Although IRTI and ECED were doing business in the Philippines, since they had not
secured a license from BOI, the foreign corporations were not bound by the requirement on
termination and Topweld could not invoke the same against the former. Moreover, it was
incumbent upon Topweld to know whether or not IRTI and ECED were properly authorized to
engage in such agreements. The Supreme Court held that both parties were guilty of violating
RA 5445. Being in pari delicto, Topweld was not entitled to the relief prayed for.
Stokely Van Camp Inc. filed a complaint against Banahaw, Antam, Tambunting and
Unicorn for the collection of a sum of money for failure to deliver 500 tons of crude coconut oil.
Antam et al asked for dismissal of case on ground that Stokely was a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines and therefore had no personality to maintain the suit.
The SC held that the transactions entered into by Stokely with Antam et al (3
transactions, either as buyer or seller) were not a series of commercial dealings which signify an
intent on the part of the respondent to do business in Philippines but constitute an isolated
transaction. The records show that the 2 nd and 3rd transactions were entered into because Antam
wanted to recover the loss it sustained from the failure of the petitioners to deliver the crude oil
under the first transaction and in order to give the latter a chance to make good on their
obligation. There was only one agreement between the parties, and that was the delivery of the
500 tons of crude coconut oil.
As a rule, jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is acquired by the courts through service of summons on its
resident agent.
If there is no assigned resident agent, the government official designated by law can
receive the summons on their behalf and transmit the same to them by registered mail
within 10 days. This will complete the service of the summons. Summons can also be
served on any of the corporation's officers or agents within the Philippines. (See Sec.
128; Rule 14, Sec. 12, Rules of Court. Note that while Sec. 128 presupposes that the
foreign corporation has a license, Rule 14 does not make such an assumption.)
Note that if there is a designated agent, summons served upon the government
official is not deemed a valid process.
General Corporation of the Philippines vs Union Insurance (87 Phil. 313; 1950)
General Corporation and Mayon investment sued Union Insurance and Firemens Fund
Insurance (FFI) for the payment of 12 marine insurance policies. The summons was served on
Union which was then acting as FFIs settling agent in the country. At that time, it was not yet
registered and authorized to transact business in the Philippines.
Issue: Did the trial court acquire valid jurisdiction over FFI?
Yes. The service of summons for FFI on its settling agent was legal and gave the court
jurisdiction upon FFI. Section 14, Rule 7 of ROC embraces Union in the phrase, or agents
within the Philippines. The law does not make distinctions as to corporations with or without
authority to do business in the Philippines. The test is whether a foreign corporation was actually
doing business here. Otherwise, a foreign corporation doing business illegally because of its
refusal or neglect to obtain the corresponding authority to do business may successfully though
unfairly plead such neglect or illegal act so as to avoid service and thereby impugn the
jurisdiction of the courts.
(Sec. 136)
Withdrawal of Foreign Corporation
(1) All claims which have accrued in the Philippines have been paid, compromised and
settled;
(2) All taxes, imposts, assessments, and penalties, if any, lawfully due to the Philippine
Government or any of its agencies or political subdivisions have been paid; and
(3) The petition for withdrawal of license has been published once a week for 3
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
(Sec. 134)
Revocation and Suspension of License
(1) Failure to file its annual report or pay any fees as required by the Corporation
Code;
(2) Failure to appoint and maintain a resident agent in the Philippines as required;
(3) Failure, after change of resident agent or of his address, to submit to the SEC a
statement of such change;
(4) Failure to submit to the SEC an authenticated copy of any amendment to its AOI
or by-laws or of any articles of merger or consolidation within the time prescribed
by the Code;
(6) Failure to pay any and all taxes, imposts, assessments or penalties, if any, lawfully
due to the Philippine government or any of its agencies or political subdivisions;
(7) Transacting business in the Philippines outside of the purpose/s for which such
corporation is authorized under its license;
(8) Transacting business in the Philippine as agent of or acting for and in behalf of any
foreign corporation or entity not duly licensed to do business in the Philippines; or
(9) Any other ground as would render it unfit to transact business in the Philippines.
(Sec. 106-108)
Educational corporations
(Sec. 109-116)
Religious corporations
Religious corporations are governed by Title XIII, Chapter II of the Corporation Code and by the
general provisions of the Code on non-stock corporations insofar as they may be applicable. (Sec. 109)
A corporation sole is an incorporated office, composed of a single individual who may be a bishop,
priest, minister or presiding officer of a religious sect, denomination or church. Its purpose is to administer
and manage as trustee the property and affairs of such religious sect, denomination or church, within the
territorial jurisdiction of such office. (Sec. 110; Sec. 111 (3))
In case of death, resignation, transfer or removal of the person in office, his successor replaces him
and continues the corporation sole. The property is not owned but is merely administered by the
corporation sole, and ownership pertains to the church or congregation he represents. On the other hand, he
is the person authorized by law as the administrator thereof and the court may take judicial notice of such
fact and of the fact that the parish priests have no control over such property.
In determining whether the constitutional provision requiring 60% Filipino capital for corporation
ownership of private agricultural lands, the Supreme Court has held that it is the nationality of the
constituents of the diocese, and not the nationality of the actual incumbent of the office, which must be
taken into consideration. Thus, where at least 60% of the constituents are Filipinos, land may be registered
in the name of the corporation sole, although the holder of the office is an alien. This ruling is based on the
fact that the corporation sole is not the owner but merely the administrator of the property, and that he holds
it in trust for the faithful of the diocese concerned. (See Gana v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 43
O.G. No. 8, 3225; 1947)
Religious societies (Sec. 116)
In contrast to a corporation sole, religious societies are composed of more than one person. The
requirements for incorporation of such societies are set forth in Sec. 116 of the Code.
(Sec. 96-105)
Close Corporations
A close corporation, within the meaning of the Corporation Code, is one whose articles of
incorporation provide that:
(1) All the corporation's issued stock of all classes, exclusive of treasury
shares, shall be held of record by not more than a specified number of
persons not exceeding 20;
(2) All the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to one or more
specified restrictions on transfer permitted by Title XII of the Code; and
(3) The corporation shall not list in any stock exchange or make any
public offering of any of its stock of any class.
Notes:
A corporation shall not be deemed a close corporation when at least 2/3 of its
voting stock or voting rights is owned or controlled by another corporation
which is not a close corporation.
YES, provided that said corporation owns less than 2/3 of voting stock or voting
rights.
Meetings May be dispensed with (Sec. 101) Actual meetings are required.
Pre-emptive right Extends to all stock, including treasury Does not extend to treasury shares.
shares (Sec. 102)
Buy-back of shares Must be > par value (Sec. 105) May be < par value
A provisional director is an impartial person who is neither a stockholder nor a creditor of the
corporation or of any subsidiary or affiliate of the corporation, and whose qualifications, if any, may be
determined by the SEC. He is not a receiver of the corporation and does not have the title and powers of a
custodian or receiver. However, he has all the rights and powers of a duly-elected director of the
corporation, including the right to notice of and to vote at meetings of directors, until such time as he shall
be removed by order of the SEC or by all the stockholders. (Sec. 104)
COMPARE APPRAISAL RIGHT AND WITHDRAWAL RIGHT IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS. (Sec. 105)
When availed of For any reason (Sec. 105) Only the grounds
enumerated in Sec. 81
and Sec. 42
Fair value of shares Must be > par or issued value (Sec. May be < par or issued value
105)
(Sec. 137-149)
Miscellaneous Provisions
The SEC has the power to issue rules and regulations reasonably necessary to enable it to
perform its duties under the Code, particularly in the prevention of fraud and abuses on the
part of the controlling stockholders, members, directors, trustees or officers. (Sec. 143)
Whenever the SEC conducts any examination of the operations, books and records of any
corporation, the results thereof must be kept strictly confidential, unless the law requires them
to be made public or where they are necessary evidence before any court. (Sec. 142)
All domestic and foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines must submit an
annual report to the SEC of its operations, with a financial statement of its assets and
liabilities and such other requirements as the SEC may impose. (Sec. 141)
No right or remedy in favor of or against, nor any liability incurred by, any corporation, its
stockholders, members, directors, trustees or officers, may be removed or impaired by the
subsequent dissolution of said corporation or by any subsequent amendment or repeal of the
Code. (Sec. 145)
Violations of the Corporation Code not otherwise specifically penalized therein are
punishable by a fine of not less than P 1,000.00 but not more than P 10,000.00 or by
imprisonment for not less than 30 days but not more than 5 years, or both, in the discretion of
the court. If the violation is committed by a corporation, the same may be dissolved in
appropriate proceedings before the SEC. (Sec. 144)