Renato Cayetano vs Christian

Monsod
Legal Ethics Practice of Law
In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed as the Chairman of the Commission on
Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Monsods appointment was opposed by Renato Cayetano on the ground that he does
not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional requirement which provides that the
chairman of the COMELEC should have been engaged in the practice law for at least
ten years.
Monsods track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his fathers law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics
and held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various
local corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC. What

constitutes practice of law?
HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts,
and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do
both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what is loosely described as business
counseling than in trying cases. In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually
perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means will most of
this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work
will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of
client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

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Justice Padilla dissenting:
Monsod did not practice law. Justice Padilla emphasized the following criteria in
determining what constitutes practice of law:
1. Habituality. The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding
ones self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing
State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular
announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v.
Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a
notary public, and files a manifestation with the Supreme Court informing it of his
intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise
(People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be
in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or
in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge
and skill is within the term practice of law (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and
Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. Peoples Stockyards State Bank, 176
N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing
Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with
the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R.
356-359)
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term practice of law. (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the
existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity
which requires knowledge of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the
practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).
Monsod did not habitually practice law. It may be granted that he performed activities
which are related to the practice of law like drafting legal documents and giving legal
advice, but he only did so as isolated incidents.

Justice Gutierrez dissenting:

Monsod did not practice law save for the one year he spent in his fathers law office.
The Chairman of the COMELEC should have engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is
active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental,
seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires
committed participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It
means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged
to carry it out with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real
estate, managing a business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in
media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in
Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past,
they happened to pass the bar examinations?
There is nothing in Monsods track record which will show that he Monsod has
given the law enough attention or a certain degree of commitment and participation as
would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for
at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the one adviced
and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

In re: Cunanan
Resolution Cunanan, et. al

18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE:

In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to
1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
R.A. 972 popularly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. Generally a candidate is deemed
passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject,
although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70%
1949-74%, 1950-1953 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by
the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress
for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given
advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372
embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21,
1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations.
By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who
had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in
the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the
administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.

An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that
should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.

The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending,
disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.

The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which
the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.

Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to cure are not the rules set
in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is
not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the
judiciary.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality:

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme

Court.

2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or
alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on
admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and
those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)

4. It is a class legislation

5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of
art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.

2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law
(1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed
the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953
obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered
as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA

22, January 9, 1973]

FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the earnest
recommendation on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative
Case No. 526 of the Court, and consistently with the views and counsel received from its
[the Commissions] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment
of the Philippine Bench and Bar that (the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of
an appropriate Court Rule. The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to
order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.

ISSUES:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

HELD:

YES. On all issues.

RATIO:

[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning x x x the
admission to the practice of law.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration
of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable, within the context
of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
ordained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

Petition for Leave to Reclaim Practice of Law of

Benjamin Dacanay Case Digest
540 SCRA 424 Civil Law Private International Law Nationality Theory Practice
of Law is Reserved for Filipinos
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In order for
him to take advantage of Canadas free medical aid program he became a Canadian
citizen in 2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the
same year, he returned to the Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice
of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are
reserved and limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he
ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA
9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to
have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship in
accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his Filipino
citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed to have never
been terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after
reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his
practice of law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of
Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that
day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now
intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner
Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines,
at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court)
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust
and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise
of his professional privilege. 4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of
this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing
is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that
an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the
Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar
examinations; 8 taking the lawyers oath 9 and signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual
professional tax; 12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and
being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice
law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship
is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In
other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners. 16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall
be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225]. 17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 18 Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225
can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of
such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a
member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching

Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on
April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the
1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following
documents as proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter
of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La
Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on
May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission
to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon
reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to
elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it
would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a
reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from
"upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship
14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within the reasonable time.
Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is an
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry

Brion v Brillantes
A petition for disbarment was filed by complainant Marciano Brion, Jr.,
againstrespondent lawyer Francisco Brillantes, Jr., for having willfully violated a lawful
order ofthe Court in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitledLupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge
Francisco F.Brillantes Jr. Respondent's dismissal in the aforesaid case was ordered
after he wasfound guilty of Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety during
his incumbencyas presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Petitioner averredthat respondent violated the Court's decree of perpetual
disquali/cation imposed uponhim from assuming any post in government service,
including any posts in government-owned and controlled corporations, when he
accepted a legal consultancy post at theLocal Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
from 1998 to 2000.The Supreme Court found respondent liable for having willfully
violated a lawfulorder of the Court. According to the Court, by performing duties and
functions, whichclearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the guise of an
advisor or consultant,respondent has transgressed both letter and spirit of the Court's
decree inA.M. No.MTJ-92-706. The Court emphasized that a lawyer's primary duty as
enunciated in theAttorney's Oath is to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promoterespect for law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible
minimum entailsobedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondent's
disobedience to the Court'sorder prohibiting his reappointment to any branch,
instrumentality, or agency ofgovernment, including government owned and controlled
corporations, cannot becamou aged by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy
contract. By performingduties and functions of a contractual employee of LWUA, by
way of a consultancy, andreceiving compensation and perquisites as such, he
displayed acts of open de/ance ofthe Court's authority, and a deliberate rejection of
his oath as an of/cer of the court.Respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year and ordered topay a fine of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos

BELLEZA V. MACASA

FACTS

On November 10, 2004, complainant went to see respondent on referral of their

mutual friend, Joe Chua. Complainant wanted to avail of respondents legal services in
connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who was arrested by policemen of
Bacolod City earlier that day for alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165. Respondent
agreed to handle the case for P30,000.

The following day, complainant made a partial payment of P15,000 to respondent thru
their mutual friend Chua. On November 17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She
paid the P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were also made thru Chua.
On all three occasions, respondent did not issue any receipt.
 On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from complainant for the
purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again,
respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went to the court the next day, she
found out that respondent did not remit the amount to the court.

Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from respondent on several

occasions but respondent ignored her. Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of
complainants son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the Public Attorneys
Office for her sons defense.

Thereafter, complainant filed a verified complaint for disbarment against respondent in

the Negros Occidental chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

In an order dated July 13, 2005, the CBD required respondent to submit his answer
within 15 days from receipt thereof. Respondent, in an urgent motion for extension of time to
file an answer dated August 10, 2005, simply brushed aside the complaint for being "baseless,
groundless and malicious" without, however, offering any explanation. He also prayed that he
be given until September 4, 2005 to submit his answer.

Respondent subsequently filed urgent motions for second and third extensions of time
praying to be given until November 4, 2005 to submit his answer. He never did.

HELD

Respondent Grossly Neglected The Cause of His Client, Atty. Macasa is

disbarred

Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. Such
undertaking imposed upon him the following duties:

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND

HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN

THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

A lawyer who accepts the cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his
time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He must be ever mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof. Accordingly, he owes full
devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied.

A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his
client with competence and diligence. He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from
such relationship. He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the
following representations: that he possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability
other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution
or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence
in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause; and that he
will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest.

A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship
of counsel and client may cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights
of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of the ethics of the legal
profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is both unprofessional and
unethical.

If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively represent his
client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and assiduously attending the
scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer who represents an accused in a
criminal case.

The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this right can
only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his lawyer:

The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which
basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed
with or performed perfunctorily.

The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom
or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means
that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits
himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active
involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing
constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and
his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence.

The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. Without

counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through counsel that
the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.

The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer
of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective, efficient and truly
decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.

In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his
attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and efficient legal
assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client.
Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction, complainant was compelled to seek
the services of the Public Attorneys Office. Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the
case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it
also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the
amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client,
respondent unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.