On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of the
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B.
SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA,
Petitioners,
vs.
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA
ALARAS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009 and April 23,
2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
107347, Which affirmed the Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14,
in Civil Case No. 217.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving
several heirs, including his_ children with his first wife,
respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as
several properties including a resort covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an
area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on which
it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located
in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession 5 dated
September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in March
1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedros second wife,
Benita"Tenorio and other children, had sold the subject
properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr.
Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent. When
confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same,
showing respondents a document she believed evidenced receipt
of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort
of sale but to a previous loan obtoiined by Pedro and Benita from
a bank. 6 The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco
Silangan of the amount of 87, 352.62 releasing her and her late
husbands indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the Register
of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record
of any transaction involving the subject properties, giving them
certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents
went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8
cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were not,
however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice
of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late father was
published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties
before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint
praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents
conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and
certificates of title issued pursuant thereto. 8
In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the
complaint on the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and good
faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his
testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further contended
that what they purchased was only the resort. 10 He also
presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation,
Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides,
among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to
the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well
as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for
650, 000.00. 11
subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by
petitioners .as well as the circumstances Surrounding the
execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement
was notarized by a notary public that was not duly commissioned
as such on the date it was executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was
Undated, the date of the acknowledgment therein was left blank,
and the Typewritten name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left
side of the document Was not signed. 13 The trial court also
observed that both documents were Never presented to the
Office of the Register of Deeds for registration and That the titles
to the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and His
second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries and buyers
of the Subject properties were not even presented as witnesses
whom supposedly witnessed the signing and execution of the
documents of conveyance. 14 On The basis thereof, the triaI court
ruled in favor of respondents, in its Judgment, the pertinent
portions of its fallo provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is
Hereby rendered as follows:
xxxx
4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and Sale" (Ex. "l
", Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by Notary Public
Antonio G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190, Page No. 20, Book No.
IXII, Series of 1991. .
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale (Ex.
"2", Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita T. Rifioza
in favor of spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong, purportedly notarized by one Alfredo de
Guzman marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141, and Book.
No. XXX, Series of 1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all improvements
introduced By defendants Francisco Villafria and Maria
Butiong in the properties Covered by TCT No. 40807,
40808, 51354 and 51355 of the Register of Deeds for
Nasugbu, Batangas. .
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons, whose
Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4) parcels of land
described in Par. 4-c above is derived from the rights and interest
of defendant Villafria, to vacate its premises and to deliver
possession thereof, and all improvements existing thereon to
plaintiffs, for and in behalf of the estate of decedent Pedro L.
Rifioza.
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the
Amended Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent Pedro
L. Rifioza, each in the capacity and degree established, as well as
their direct successors-in interest, and ordering the defendant
Registrar of Deeds to issue the co1Tesponding titles in their
names in the proportion established by law, pro in division, in
TCT Nos. 40807, 40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after
restoration) within ten (10) days from finality of this Decision,
4pon payment of lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall
be exempt from all expenses for its restoration.
With no costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts Judgment in its
Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged,
Alfredo de Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary public
from 1989 to July 3, 1991, the date the certification was issued.
Such being the case, the resort deed is not a public document and
the presumption of regularity accorded to public documents will
not apply to the same. As laid down in Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et
al.:
1
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from
the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public docs net
have the capacity to notarize a document, but does so anyway,
then the document should be treated as A. Unnotarized. The rule
may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be
prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the proferred
authority of the notary public or the person pretending to be one.
Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the
elaborate process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer
may receive a notarial commission. Without such a rule,
The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public
will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-
lawyer engaged in pretense. The notarization of a document
carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a private
document converts such document into a public one, and renders
it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.
Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it
engages public interest in a substantial degree and the protection
of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified
or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon the
public and the courts and administrative offices generally.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be
considered a public document. This is because the following cast
doubt on the document's authenticity, to wit: J.
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu,
Batangas for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de Guzman, or
the purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia
Bondoc, were presented as witnesses. Concededly, the absence
of notarization in the resort deed and/or the lacking details in the
settlement/family home deed did not necessarily invalidate the
transactions evidenced by the said documents. However, since
the said deeds are private documents, perforce, their due
execution and authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of
proof under the Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which
provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private.
Document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution a"Q.d. authenticity must be proved either:
(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family home
and the resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon are
forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias who profess the deeds'
enforceability. After the Complaining Heirs presented proofs in
support of their claim that their signatures were forged, the
burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove the ~ame2 or
conversely, to prove the authenticity and due execution of the
said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this regard.
As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a) the
notary public who purportedly notarized the questioned
instrument, (b) the witnesses who appear [Ed] in the instruments
as eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert to prove the
authenticity and genuineness of all the signatures appearing on
the said instruments. Verily, the rule that, proper foundation
must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is,
the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably
established as a pre requisite to its admission, was prudently
observed by the lower court when it refused to admit the
settlement/family home and the resort deeds as their veracity
are doubtful. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel Villafria,
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 24, 2006
raising the trial courts lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that
when the Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title
and Recovery of Possession was filed, there was yet no
settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature
thereof, nor was there an identification of the number of
legitimate heirs. As such, the trial court ruled on the settlement of
the intestate estate of Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the
action filed was for Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant
action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial
court, sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and
ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void and
has no effect for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The
Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied by the
appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's
Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting a verification of
the petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit
of service that failed to comply with the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant' s
identities. 18 In its Resolution 19 dated September 26, 2007, this
Court also denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the
absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification of
the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution became
final and executors on October 31, 2007 as certified by the Entry
of Judgment issued by the Court. 20 On January 16, 2008, the
Court further denied petitioner' s motion for leave to admit a
second motion for reconsideration of its September 26, 2007
Resolution, considering that the same is a prohibited pleading
under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthennore,
petitioner's letter dated December 18, 2007 pleading the Court to
take a second. Look at his petition for review on certiorari and
that a decision thereon be rendered based purely on its merits
was noted without action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008
addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that a
decision on the case be rendered based on the. Merits and not on
formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything his parents
had left him just because the verification against non-forum
shopping is formally defective." However, in view of the Entry of
Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court
likewise noted said letter without action. 22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a Part
Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with respect to
the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the
CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11,
200 a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Order before the
CA assailing October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November
27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. In Decision dated March 13, 2009, however,
the CA dismissed the petition a affirmed the rulings of the trial
court in the following wise: Although the assailed Decision of the
Court a quo has already become final and executory and in fact
entry of judgment was issued on 31 October 2007, supra,
nevertheless, to put the issues to rest,We deem it apropos to
tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of the
Court a quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the
annulment of a judgment may "be based only on grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs of
Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal stressed that: There is
extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, ... or
2
where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept
in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; ... "
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such fraud,
which prevents the aggrieved party from having a trial or
presenting his case to the court, or is used to procure the
judgment without fair submission of the controversy. This refers
to acts intended to keep the unsuccessful party away from the
courts as when there is a false promise of compromise or when
one is kept in ignorance of the suit. The pivotal issues before us
are (1) whether. There was a time during the proceedings below
that the Petitioners ever prevented from exhibiting fully their
case, by fraud or deception, practiced on them by Respondents,
and (2) whether the Petitioners were kept away from the court or
kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We
carefully delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the
instant case as well as the proceedings below as shown in the 36-
page Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners were
given ample time to rebut the allegations of the Respondents and
had in fact addressed every detail of. Respondent's cause of
action against them. Thus, Petitioners' allegation of the Court a
quo s lack of jurisdiction is misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the explicit
ruling of the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v. Sps. Lumbao,
thus: It is elementary that' the active participation of a party in a
case pending against him before a court is tantamount to
recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on
impugning the courts jurisdiction. ' In fine, under the
circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are stopped
from assailing the Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We do
not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra. As
mentioned earlier, entry of judgment had already been made on
the assailed Decision and Order as early as 31 October 2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits certain
equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment. But the I.
Rules are clear. The annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the
Regional Trial Courts is resorted to only where the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the
appropriate remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court, that is
their own look out. The High Tribunal has emphatically pointed
out in Mercado, et al. v. Security Bank Corporation, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for
annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost
remedy ofappeal." A party must have first availed of appeal, a
motion for new trial or a petition for relief before an action for
annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is to prevent the
party from benefiting from his inaction or negligence. Also, the
action for annulment of judgment must be based either on (a)
extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.
Having failed to avail of the remedies and there being 'a Clear
showing that neither of the grounds was present, the petition
must be dismissed. Only a disgruntled litigant would find such
legal disposition unacceptable. 23 When the appellate court
denied Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution
dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the following
ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14,
NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN
ENTERTAINING THE SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF PEDRO RINOZA AND THE CIVIL
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND THIRD
PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents
was captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the
cause of action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent
Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a special
proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited jurisdiction
while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of
general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate
jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition found in the Rules
on the joiner of special civil actions and ordinary civil
actions. 25 Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court
is void and has no effect for having been rendered in without
jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the
appellate court that since the finding of forgery relates only to the
signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs, who assented
to the conveyance, the transaction should be considered valid as
to them. Petitioner also denies the indings of the courts below
that his parents are builders in bad faith for they only took
possession of the subject properties after the execution of the
transfer documents and after they paid the consideration on the
sale.
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that since.
Respondents complaint alleged the following causes of action,
the same is actually one for settlement of estate and not of
judicial partition: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of
Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his death, died
intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy of his death
certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A";
2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants
enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only
known heirs of the above-mentioned decedent. The
plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando, Rafael, Antonio,
Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, and Myrna R.
Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania Belo and Ma.
Theresa R. Demafelix are the decedents legitimate
children with his first wife, while Benita Tenorio Rifioza,
is the decedents widow and Bernadette Rifioza, the
decedent's daughter with said widow. As such, said
parties are co-owners by virtue of an intestate
inheritance from the decedent, of the properties
enumerated in the succeeding paragraph;
3. That the decedent left the following real properties all
located in Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has no
known legal indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date
and it will be to the best interest of all heirs that it be
partitioned judicially. 26.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes
of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent
Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their
interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of
estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would
readily show that, based on the nature of the suit, the llegations
therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action, is clearly one for
udicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:
3
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. -
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age5 or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate
among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If
there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire
estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the register of
deeds. The parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by
public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for
partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with
and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the
affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the
personal property involved as certified to under oath by the
parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just
claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a
petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after
the death of the decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
Published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner
provided in the next succeeding section; but no Extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof. 27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may
do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the
real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property. 28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations
of respondents in their complaint are but customary, in fact,
mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate.
Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died intestate;
(2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal
age, with the exception of one who is represented by a judicial
representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs
enumerated are the only known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is
an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5)
that Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that
respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedents estate, pray for
the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy.
It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the
complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does
not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person
dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will
or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or.
Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of Court, then the
decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the
competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator the order
established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29 An
exception to this rule, however, is found in the aforequoted
Section 1 of Rule 4 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no
will and no debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying for
the appointment of an administrator by the court. 30The reasons
that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there
is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator to
administer the. Estate for hem and to deprive the real owners of
their possession to which they are immediately entitled. 31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not
isputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without
any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioners contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of
intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of
Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does
not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they
do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate
among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to resort to an ordinary
action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to
do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of
action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if
the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for
partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether
of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for
the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and
the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for
judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate as law expressly permits the
same.1avvphi1 That the complaint contained allegations inherent
in an action for settlement of estate does not. Mean that there
was a prohibited joined of causes of action for questions as to the
estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their
status as such, and the nature and extent of their titles to the
estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings
alone.34 In fact, a complete inventory of the estate may likewise
be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the
estate has no debts.~5 Indeed, where the more expeditious
remedy 9f partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be
compelled to submit to administration proceedings, dispensing of
the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated. 36
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed for
the annulment of title and recovery of possession does not strip
the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
Asking for the annulment of certain transfers of property could
very well be achieved in an action for partition, 37 as can be seen
in cases where 1-ourts determine the parties' rights arising from
complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for
the annulment of titles and recovery of ownership and
possession of property. 38 In fact, in Bagayas v.
Bagayas, 39wherein a complaint for annulment of sale and
partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety
of an action for annulment as it constituted a collateral attack on
the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court
found the dismissal to be improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For
partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-
ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not
subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties 'to a
collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The' certificate referred to is that -
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
4
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership, which is,
more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner
c.pparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a
concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate
of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for
annulment of sale on the ground that it constituted a collateral
attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and Orlando's title
to the subject lands and not any Torrens certificate oftitle over
the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement
of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as to the
existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action
for partition, as held in Municipality of Bifzanv. Garcia: 40
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is_ legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties
are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In
that event [,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c] ourt
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the [c] ourt after the. Parties
have been accorded opportunity to be heard Thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. xx x. 41
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or
non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. 42 Unless and
until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would
be premature to effect a partition of an estate. 43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial
court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of
settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding
is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is precisely one for
judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of
possession, filed within the confines of applicable law and
jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA
7691),45 amending Batas Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition
and recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and
documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the trial
court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant
petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title
alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the requirement
of instituting a separate special proceeding for the determination
of the status and rights of the respondents as putative heirs may
be dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and had already
presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. 46 In Portugal
v. Portugal-Beltran, 47 the Court explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that
she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February
15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the
second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an
executor therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property
of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,
to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical;
it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the evil case - subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial
court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being
no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x
x. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the
causes of action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the trial
court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more than ample
opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner cannot now be
permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction just because the judgment
rendered was adverse to them. To repeat, the action filed herein
is one for judicial partition and not for settlement of intestate
estate. Consequently, that respondents also prayed for the
annulment of title and recovery of possession in the same
proceeding does not strip the court off of its jurisdiction for
asking for 'the annulment of certain transfers of property could
very well be achieved in an action for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be considered
valid as to the heirs who assented to the conveyance as well as
their allegation of good faith, this Court does not find any
compelling reason to deviate from the ruling of the appellate
court. As sufficiently found by both courts below, the authenticity
and due execution of the documents on which petitioners claims
are based were inadequately proven. They were undated, forged,
and acknowledged before a notary public who was not
commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They were
never presented to the Register of Deeds for registration. Neither
were the supposed notaries and buyers of the subject properties
presented as witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the
estate, actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the
circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact of
its occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly
executed by Benita undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the
document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt of
her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a
previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate courts
observations as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the
transactions alleged herein are concerned. First, they were
seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the
properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the
impression 'that they bought both the resort and the family
home and yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they only
bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they presented the
subject Extra Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale. 50 Second, they
never presented any other document which w0uld evidence their
actual payment of consideration to the selling heirs. 51 Third, in
spite of the. Blatant legal infirmities of the subject documents of
conveyance, petitioners still took possession of the properties,
demolished several cottages, and introduced permanent
improvements thereon.
5
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that petitioners
failed to adequately substantiate, with convincing, credible and
independently verifiable proof, their claim that they had, in fact,
purchased the subject properties. The circumstances surrounding
the purported transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took
place. In substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on
the Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly failed
to prove their authenticity and due execution. They cannot,
therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership of the
subject lands based on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for value
and builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of title
builder that the land the latter is building on is one's own without
knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's. Title. 52 However, in
view of .the manifest defects in the instruments conveying their
titles, petitioners should have been placed on guard. Yet, they still
demolished several cottages and constructed improvement on
the properties. Thus, their claim of. Good faith cannot be given
credence.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in
any respect except to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the
issues between the parties being deemed resolved and. laid to
rest. 53 it is a fundamental principle in our judicial system and
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. 54 Exceptions to the immutability of final judgment is
allowed only under the most extraordinary of
circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner is given more than ample
opportunity to be heard, unbridled access to the appellate courts,
as well as unbiased judgments rendered after a consideration of
evidence presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the
Court shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below
in the absence of any showing that the same were rendered with
fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated March 13, 2009 and
April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals for CA-G.R. SP
No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment dated October 1, 2001
of the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in
Civil Case No. 217, insofar as it conce1ns the resort covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title No. 513 54 and No. 51355, and
family home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON,
ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR
YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E.
YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO
CITY, RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial
Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for
review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising
a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27,
20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their
cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against
respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon"
(Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their
complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died
intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos.
2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be
the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned
certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his
name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of
petitioners who are Magdalenos collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of
Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b)
two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true
copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he
claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him;
(b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case
is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as
Magdalenos lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011
Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause
of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs
therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a
previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be
considered as the decedents compulsory heirs. Quite the
contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is
Magdalenos son and hence, his compulsory heir through the
documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a
marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista;
(b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19,
1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which
was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsels
failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through
the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of
whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of
a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the
complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a
sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief
prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis
by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not
6
be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by
the defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among
the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of
Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void
and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latters favor
be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be
true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the
said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In
the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing
several other precedents, held that the determination of who are
the decedents lawful heirs must be made in the proper special
proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the
legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and possession of property.1wphi1 This must take
precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or
right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and
not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in
Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes,
the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights
of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate
court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose
of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang,
this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed
to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special
proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed
with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil
case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,
and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or
when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar
nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the
proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of
the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246.
Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in
determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a
court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship
cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership
and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was
altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudiosos heirship which should, as
herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper
special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case
No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any
subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late
Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.
November 23, 2016
G.R. No. 203770
MANUELA AZUCENA MAYOR, Petitioner
vs.
EDWIN TIU and DAMIANA CHARITO MARTY, Respondents
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the October 5, 20111 and September 24,
20122 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
06256, which dismissed the petition filed by Remedios
Tiu (Remedios) and Manuela Azucena Mayor (Manuela) for
procedural infirmities. The said CA petition challenged the
January 20, 20113 and June 10, 20114 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 6), in Sp. Proc. No. 2008-
05-30, a case for Probate of Last Will and Testament and
Issuance of Letters of Testamentary.
The Antecedents:
On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan (Rosario), the
widow of the late Primo Villasin (Primo), passed away and left a
holographic Last Will and Testament,5 wherein she named her
sister, Remedios Tiu (Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena
Mayor (Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter,
Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of
Rosario's holographic will6 with prayer for the issuance of letters
testamentary (probate proceedings). The petition was raffled to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Tacloban City (RTC-Br. 9) and
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2008-05-30. They averred that
Rosario left properties valued at approximately 2.5 million.
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito
Marty (Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario,
filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC,
Branch 34, Tacloban City (RTC- Br. 34), docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. 2008-05-32, but it was not given due course because
of the probate proceedings. Per records, this dismissal is subject
of a separate proceeding filed by Marty with the CA Cebu City,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04003.7
On June 12, 2008, in its Order,8 the RTC-Br. 9 found the petition
for probate of will filed by Remedios and Manuela as sufficient in
form and substance and set the case for hearing.
7
Consequently, Marty filed her Verified Urgent Manifestation and
Motion,9 dated June 23, 2008, stating that Remedios kept the
decedent Rosario a virtual hostage for the past ten (10) years and
her family was financially dependent on her which led to the
wastage and disposal of the properties owned by her and her
husband, Primo. Marty averred that until the alleged will of the
decedent could be probated and admitted, Remedios and her ten
(10) children had no standing to either possess or control the
properties comprising the estate of the Villasins. She prayed for
the probate court to: 1) order an immediate inventory of all the
properties subject of the proceedings; 2) direct the tenants of the
estate, namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at Primrose
Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court; 3) direct Metro
bank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the accounts in the name of
Rosario, Primrose Development Corporation (Primrose) or
Remedios; and 4) lock up the Primrose Hotel in order to preserve
the property until final disposition by the court.
On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their
Comment/Opposition10 to the urgent manifestation averring that
Marty was not an adopted child of the Villasins based on a
certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of Tacloban
City, attesting that no record of any adoption proceedings
involving Marty existed in their records. They also argued that
the probate court had no jurisdiction over the properties
mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of Rosario's estate because
these properties were actually owned by, and titled in the name
of, Primrose. Anent the prayer to direct the tenants to deposit the
rentals to the probate court, Remedios and Manuela countered
that the probate court had no jurisdiction over properties owned
by third persons, particularly by Primrose, the latter having a
separate and distinct personality from the decedent's estate.
In her Reply,11 dated July 15, 2008, Marty cited an order of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte (CF! Leyte) in SP No.
1239,12 claiming that as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of
corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground that it
was a closed family corporation controlled by Rosario after
Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that "piercing" was proper in
the case of Rosario's estate because the incorporation of
Primrose was founded on a fraudulent consideration, having
been done in contemplation of Primo's death.
Further, on July 22, 2008, in her Opposition to the Petition for the
Approval of the Will of the Late Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin
Casilan,13 Marty impugned the authenticity of her holographic
will.
Meanwhile, Edwin Tiu (Edwin), a son of Remedios, also filed his
Opposition,14 dated June 13, 2008.
After a protracted exchange of pleadings, the parties submitted
their respective memoranda.
The January 14, 2009 Order
In its January 14, 2009 Order,15 the RTC-Br. 9 granted the motion
of Marty and appointed the OIC Clerk of Court as special
administrator of the Estate. The Probate Court also ordered
Mercury Drug and Chowking to deposit the rental income to the
court and Metrobank to freeze the bank accounts mentioned in
the motion of Marty. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil
was applied in the case considering that Rosario had no other
properties that comprised her estate other than Primrose.
According to the probate court, for the best interest of whoever
would be adjudged as the legal heirs of the Estate, it was best to
preserve the properties from dissipation.
On January 22, 2009, Remedios and Manuela filed their Motion
for Inhibition16 on the ground of their loss of trust and confidence
in RTC-Br. 9 Presiding Judge Rogelio C. Sescon (Judge Sescon) to
dispense justice. Later, they also filed their Motion for
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam,17 dated February 3, 2009, arguing
that Rosario's estate consisted only of shares of stock in Primrose
and not the corporation itself. Thus, the probate court could not
order the lessees of the corporation to remit the rentals to the
Estate's administrator. With regard to the appointment of a
special administrator, Remedios and Manuela insisted that it be
recalled. They claimed that if ever there was a need to appoint
one, it should be the two of them because it was the desire of the
decedent in the will subject of the probation proceedings.
In its Order,18 dated March 27, 2009, the RTC-Br. 9 denied the
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed its
January 14, 2009 Order. The presiding judge, Judge Sescon, also
granted the motion for inhibition and ordered that the records of
the case be referred to the RTC Executive Judge for reraffling. The
case was later re-raffled to RTC-Br.6, Judge Alphinor C. Serrano,
presiding judge.
Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for reconsideration,
Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
in Cebu City, docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. No. 04254, assailing the
January 14, 2009 and March 27, 2009 Orders of the RTC-Br. 9.19
Ruling of the CA
In its October 16, 2009 Decision,20 the CA reversed the assailed
orders of the RTC Br. 9, except as to the appointment of a special
administrator insofar as this relates to properties specifically
belonging to the "Estate." It held that Primrose had a
personality separate and distinct from the estate of the
decedent and that the probate court had no jurisdiction to
apply the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
According to the CA, nowhere in the assailed orders of the
probate court was it stated that its determination of the title of
the questioned properties was only for the purpose of
determining whether such properties ought to be included in the
inventory. When the probate court applied the doctrine of
"piercing," in effect, it adjudicated with finality the ownership of
the properties in favor of the Estate. The CA stated that RTC-Br. 9
had no jurisdiction to adjudicate ownership of a property claimed
by another based on adverse title; and that questions like this
must be submitted to a court of general jurisdiction and not to a
probate court.
The CA added that assuming that the probate court's
determination on the issue of ownership was merely intended to
be provisional, Marty's contentions still had no merit. The
properties, which she claimed to be part of the estate of Rosario
and over which she claimed co-ownership, comprised of real
properties registered under the Torrens system. As such,
Primrose was considered the owner until the titles to those
properties were nullified in an appropriate ordinary action. The
CA further stated that the RTC erroneously relied on the order
issued by the CFI Leyte in 1981, in the probate proceedings
involving the estate of Primo. Whatever determination the CFI
made at the time regarding the title of the properties was merely
provisional, hence, not conclusive as to the ownership.
By reason of the favorable decision by the CA, Remedios and
Manuela filed their Motion to Partially Revoke the Writ of
Execution Enforcing the January 14, 2009 Order of the Honorable
Court and Manifestation in Compliance with the October 21, 2009
Order (Ad Cautelam),21 dated October 27, 2009.
8
In its Order,22 dated November 17, 2009, the RTC-Br. 6 partially
granted the motion as it revoked the power of the special
administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of Primrose.
It also revoked the order with respect to Mercury Drug and
Chowking, reasoning out that the said establishments dealt with
Primrose, which had a personality distinct and separate from the
estate of the decedent. In the said order, Atty. Blanche A. Salino
nominated by oppositors Marty and Edwin, was appointed
special administrator to oversee the day-to-day operations of the
estate. The same order also upheld the January 14, 2009 Order, as
to the conduct and inventory of all the properties comprising the
estate.
This order was not questioned or appealed by the parties.
Omnibus Motion
On September 24, 2010, or almost ten (10) months after the
November 17, 2009 Order of the probate court was issued, Marty,
together with her new counsel, filed her Omnibus
Motion,23 praying for the probate court to: 1) order Remedios
and Manuela to render an accounting of all the properties and
assets comprising the estate of the decedent; 2) deposit or
consign all rental payments or other passive income derived from
the properties comprising the estate; and 3) prohibit the
disbursement of funds comprising the estate of the decedent
without formal motion and approval by the probate court.
Ruling of the RTC-Br. 6
In its January 20, 2011 Order, the RTC-Br. 6 granted Marty's
Omnibus Motion. Although it agreed with the October 16, 2009
CA Decision reversing the January 14, 2009 Order of the RTC-Br.
9, nonetheless, it acknowledged the urgency and necessity of
appointing a special administrator. According to the probate
court, considering that there was clear evidence of a significant
decrease of Rosario's shares in the outstanding capital stock of
Primrose,24prudence dictated that an inquiry into the validity of
the transfers should be made. A final determination of this matter
would be outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court, but
it was likewise settled that the power to institute an action for the
recovery of a property claimed to be part of the estate was
normally lodged with the executor or administrator. Thus, the
probate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons aforestated, and so as not to
render moot any action that the special administrator, or the
regular administrator upon the latter's qualification and
appointment, may deem appropriate to take on the matter (i.e.
Whether or not to institute in the name of the estate the
appropriate action for the recovery of the shares of stock), this
Court hereby GRANTS Oppositor Marty's Omnibus Motion, dated
September 24, 2010, and thus hereby:
1. DIRECTS petitioners, either individually or jointly, to: (a)
RENDER AN ACCOUNTING of all the properties and assets
comprising the estate of the decedent that may have come into
their possession; and, (b) DEPOSIT OR CONSIGN all the rentals
payments or such other passive incomes from the properties and
assets registered in the name of Primrose Development
Corporation, including all income derived from the Primrose
Hotel and the lease contracts with Mercury Drug and Chowking
Restaurant, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
Order;
2. DIRECTS the Special Administrator to take possession and
charge of the properties comprising the decedent's estate,
specially those pertaining to the sharesholding of the decedent in
Primrose Development Corporation, to determine whether or not
action for the recovery of the shares of stock supposedly
transferred from the decedent to petitioners Remedios Tiu,
Manuela Azucena Mayor should be instituted in the name of the
estate against the said transferees and to submit a Report on the
foregoing matters to this Court, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Order; and,
3. ORDERS that no funds comprising the estate of the decedent
shall be disbursed without formal Motion therefor, with the
conformity of the Special Administrator, duly approved by this
Court.
SO ORDERED.25 [Underscoring supplied]
The partial motion for reconsideration of the above order filed by
Remedios and Manuela was denied in the other assailed order of
the RTC-Br. 6, dated June 10, 2011.26
Dissatisfied, Remedios and Manuela availed of the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65, and filed a petition before the
CA.
Action by the CA
The CA, however, in its October 5, 2011 Resolution,27 dismissed
the same based on the following infirmities: 1) there was no
proper proof of service of a copy of the petition on the
respondents which was sent by registered mail; 2) petitioners
failed to indicate on the petition the material date when the
motion for reconsideration was filed; 3) the copy of the assailed
order was not certified true and correct by the officer having
custody of the original copy; and 4) the serial number of the
commission of the notary public, the province-city where he was
commissioned, the office address of the notary public and the roll
of attorney's number were not properly indicated on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Remedios and Manuela moved for reconsideration of the assailed
CA resolution, but to no avail, as the appellate court denied the
motion in its September 24, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition before the Court, filed only by Manuela as
Remedios had also passed away, and anchored on the following
GROUNDS
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED
SECTION 13, RULE 13 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND
DECLARED THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER PROOF OF
SERVICE BY REGISTERED MAIL.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT MISAPPLIED
JURISPRUDENCE AND RULE 65 AND IT HELD THAT
PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE MATERIAL
DATE RULE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED
9
THAT PETITIONER MAYOR FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1, RULE 65 FOR FAILING TO
ATTACH CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE
TRIAL COURT.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT DECLARED
THAT PETITIONER MAYOR DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND
THE RULES WARRANTING REVIEW WHEN IT ALLOWED
TECHNICALITIES TO BE USED TO DEFEAT SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHT OF THE PARTIES.
VI.
PETITIONERS HA VE GOOD CAUSE AND A MERITORIOUS
CASE AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENTS AS PARAGRAPH l(B)
OF THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE FIRST ASSAILED
ORDER SHOULD HA VE BEEN REVERSED BECAUSE IT
OVERTURNS THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
DATED 16 OCTOBER 2009 WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL
AND EXECUTORY.28
Petitioner Manuela argued that:
1) There was actual compliance with Section 13, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Court. The CA petition was accompanied by a notarized
affidavit of service and filing of registered mail. At the time the
petition was filed, this was the best evidence of the service. The
other registry receipts for the other parties were also attached to
the petition. Further, the available registry return card was
furnished the CA in the motion for reconsideration.29
2) The failure of the petition to comply with the rule on a
statement of material dates could be excused because the dates
were evident from the records.30
3) The petitioner went to the RTC of Tacloban to secure certified
true copies of the assailed orders. Only the stamped name of the
Clerk of Court, however, appeared thereon, because the
particular branch had no stamp pad which had the phrase for
certification. The branch did not even have a typewriter in order
to affix the phrase on the copies. These inadequacies could not be
attributed to the petitioners.31
4) The lack of information pertaining to the notary public in the
verification and certification against forum-shopping should not
invalidate the same because, again, it was not attributable to the
parties.32
5) Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive
rights of a party.33
In its January 23, 2013 Resolution34 the Court ordered the
respondents to file their respective comments. Marty, in her
Comment, insisted that the petitioner failed to comply with the
procedural requirements as stated by the CA.35
In her Reply to Comment,36 petitioner Manuela clarified that the
affidavit of service was executed on August 31, 2011, which was
after the petition was signed by the lawyers and after it was
verified by the petitioner herself. After contesting Marty's
arguments on the alleged procedural infirmities of the petitions
with the CA and this Court, Manuela asserted that the final and
executory October 16, 2009 Decision of the CA already held that
Primrose had a personality separate and distinct from the estate
of decedent Rosario.
Meanwhile, in his Manifestation,37 dated May 29, 2013, Edwin
affirmed that he and Manuela decided to patch up their
differences and agreed to settle amicably. Accordingly, he
manifested that he was withdrawing from the case pursuant to
their agreement.
On June 18, 2014, Manuela filed her Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction38 on the ground that a flurry of orders had been issued
by the RTC-Br. 6 in the implementation of the assailed January
20, 2011 Order, such as the Order,39 dated May 27, 2013, wherein
the probate court vaguely ordered "the inventory of the exact
extent of the 'decedent's estate."' Then another order was issued
appointing an auditing firm to conduct an inventory/audit of the
Estate including the rentals and earnings derived from the lease
of Mercury Drug and Chowking Restaurant, as tenants of
Primrose.40 According to petitioner Manuela, although an
inventory of the assets of the decedent was proper, the probate
court ordered an inventory of the assets of Primrose, a separate
and distinct entity. Manuela asserts that it was clearly in error.
In her Supplement to the Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction,41dated
June 17, 2013, Manuela informed the Court that the inventory
and accounting of Primrose would already commence on June 19,
2013.
Marty filed her Opposition,42 dated July 3, 2013, stating that the
petition of Manuela had been rendered moot and academic as the
probate court had declared her as the sole heir of Rosario and
appointed her administrator of the estate. She argued that an
injunctive relief would work injustice to the estate because of the
total assimilation by petitioner of the shareholdings of the
decedent in Primrose and her share in the corporation's income
corresponding to her shareholdings.
Finding that the requisites for preliminary injunctive relief were
present,43 the Court issued the TRO44 in favor of Manuela on
October 14, 2013. At the outset, the Court was convinced that the
rights of Primrose sought to be protected by the grant of
injunctive relief were material and substantial and the TRO was
issued in order to prevent any irreparable damage to a corporate
entity that could arise from the conduct of an accounting by the
court-appointed inventory.
The Court's Ruling
The Court now resolves the subject case by the issuance of a
permanent injunction, as prayed for by petitioner Manuela. This
position is supported by law and jurisprudence, as follows:
First. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of
natural persons forming a corporation; and (2) a collection of
property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights
and duties. This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a
limited extent in our law. Example is the estate of a bankrupt or
deceased person.45From this pronouncement, it can be gleaned
that the estate of the deceased person is a juridical person
separate and distinct from the person of the decedent and any
other corporation. This status of an estate comes about by
operation of law. This is in consonance with the basic tenet under
10
corporation law that a corporation has a separate personality
distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to
which it may be connected.46
Second. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no
relevant application in this case. Under this doctrine, the court
looks at the corporation as a mere collection of individuals or an
aggregation of persons undertaking business as a group,
disregarding the separate juridical personality of the corporation
unifying the group. Another formulation of this doctrine is that
when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and
controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when
necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal
fiction that two corporations are distinct entities and treat them
as identical or as one and the same.47 The purpose behind
piercing a corporation's identity is to remove the barrier between
the corporation and the persons comprising it to thwart the
fraudulent and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate
personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed
activities.48
Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the
corporation separately as a stockholder, the situation was
reversed. Instead, the probate court ordered the lessees of the
corporation to remit rentals to the estate's administrator without
taking note of the fact that the decedent was not the absolute
owner of Primrose but only an owner of shares thereof. Mere
ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of
all or nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of
itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.49 Moreover, to disregard the separate
juridical personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing cannot be
presumed, but must be clearly and convincingly established.50
Third. A probate court is not without limits in the determination
of the scope of property covered in probate proceedings. In a
litany of cases, the Court had defined the parameters by which a
probate court may extend its probing arms in the determination
of the question of title in probate proceedings. In Pastor, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals,51 the Court explained that, as a rule, the
question of ownership was an extraneous matter which the
probate court could not resolve with finality. Thus, for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should, or
should not, be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. It is a well-
settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings,
whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be part of the estate but which are
equally claimed to belong to outside parties. It can only
determine whether they should, or should not, be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be overseen by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so.52
In this case, respondent Marty argues that the subject properties
and the parcel of land on which these were erected should be
included in the inventory of Rosario's estate. More so, the arrears
from the rental of these properties were later on ordered to be
remitted to the administrator of the estate grounded on the
allegation that Rosario had no other properties other than her
interests in Primrose. To the Court's mind, this holding of the
probate court was in utter disregard of the undisputed fact the
subject land is registered under the Torrens system in the name
of Primrose, a third person who may be prejudiced by the orders
of the probate court. In Valera vs. Inserto:53 the Court stated:
xxx, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but
limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the
other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
probate court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons
are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being
that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or
of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, land
registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence
of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be
waived.
xxxx
xxx These considerations assume greater cogency where, as
here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the
decedent's names but in others, a situation on which this
Court has already had occasion to rule.54 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
Thus, the probate court should have recognized the
incontestability accorded to the Torrens title of Primrose over
Marty's arguments of possible dissipation of properties. In fact, in
the given setting, even evidence purporting to support a claim of
ownership has to yield to the incontestability of a Torrens title,
until after the same has been set aside in the manner indicated in
the law itself. In other words, the existence of a Torrens title may
not be discounted as a mere incident in special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Put clearly, if a
property covered by Torrens title is involved, "the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in
the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the
holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at
bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in
the title."55
Additionally, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152956 proscribes a
collateral attack on a Torrens title:
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate
of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.1wphi1 It cannot
be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.
In Cuizon vs. Ramolete,57 the property subject of the controversy
was duly registered under the Torrens system. To this, Court
categorically stated:
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of third parties and more important,
covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such
third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
property in question from the inventory of the property of
the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons
of their possession and ownership of the property. 58 xxx
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
A perusal of the records of this case would show that that no
compelling evidence was ever presented to substantiate the
11
position of Marty that Rosario and Primrose were one and the
same, justifying the inclusion of the latter's properties in the
inventory of the decedent's properties. This has remained a
vacant assertion. At most, what Rosario owned were shares of
stock in Primrose. In turn, this boldly underscores the fact that
Primrose is a separate and distinct personality from the estate of
the decedent. Inasmuch as the real properties included in the
inventory of the estate of Rosario are in the possession of, and are
registered in the name of, Primrose, Marty's claims are bereft of
any logical reason and conclusion to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction.
Fourth. The probate court in this case has not acquired
jurisdiction over Primrose and its properties. Piercing the veil of
corporate entity applies to determination of liability not of
jurisdiction; it is basically applied only to determine established
liability. It is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it
has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in
a case.59 This is so because the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction comes to play only during the trial of the case
after the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
corporation. Hence, before this doctrine can be even applied,
based on the evidence presented, it is imperative that the court
must first have jurisdiction over the corporation.60
Hence, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to
the court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction.
Resultantly, any proceedings taken against the corporation and
its properties would infringe on its right to due process.
In the case at bench, the probate court applied the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil ratiocinating that Rosario had no
other properties that comprise her estate other than her shares
in Primrose. Although the probate court's intention to protect the
decedent's shares of stock in Primrose from dissipation is
laudable, it is still an error to order the corporation's tenants to
remit their rental payments to the estate of Rosario.
Considering the above disquisition, the Court holds that a
permanent and final injunction is in order in accordance with
Section 9, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides that "[i]f
after the trial of the action it appears that the applicant is entitled
to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined, the
court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the
party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of
the act or acts or confirming the preliminary mandatory
injunction." Undoubtedly, Primrose stands to suffer an
irreparable injury from the subject order of the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Temporary
Restraining Order, dated June 14, 2013, is hereby
made PERMANENT, effective immediately. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, is ENJOINED from enforcing and
implementing its January 20, 2011 and June 10, 2011 Orders,
insofar as the corporate properties of Primrose Development
Corporation are concerned, to avert irreparable damage to a
corporate entity, separate and distinct from the Estate of Rosario
Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan.
SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE G.R. No. 183053
ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-
SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
Respondent. Promulgated:
June 16, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between
Spain and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the exploration, or
more appropriately, the riches of the New World by issuing
the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with the difficult, albeit, all
too familiar tale of another family imbroglio over the estate of a
decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949,[4] reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95.[5]
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
(Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died
intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of
her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and
they begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel;
Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio
Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled.
Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III
and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
12
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever
since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses
Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and
was likewise brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and
Isabel was annulled.[6] Consequently, respondent and her siblings
Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete
Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal
grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a
petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren: respondent
Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition and
allowed Federico one hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced
to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a
manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her
sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or
on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren,
Emilio III and Nenita.[7]
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor, containing the following
allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the
Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent]
left an estate of real and personal properties, with a probable
gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and
residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1)
Federico C. Suntay, 89 years old, surviving spouse and a resident
of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years old, legitimate
granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-
Suntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x
x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate
grandson and a resident of x x x; and that as far as [respondent]
knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at the time of her
death.[8]
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild,
respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21,
1995, alleging, among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as
its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal
properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference
in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been
alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30)
years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was
incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,]
namely: Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated
to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the
death of his wife[,] he was already the one who managed their
conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as
stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that
Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of
usurpers is untrue.[9]
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the
proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation dated March
13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator
of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be
adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of
administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave
to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case.
Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially
echoed the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging
that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than
respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina. Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications
that: [he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he
was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving
him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which
was established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers father;
the significant work experiences outside the family group are
included in his curriculum vitae; he was employed by the
oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with
management degree at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural
Bank; x x x.[10]
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico
died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and
evidence on their respective allegations were adduced, the trial
court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing
herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent
Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
DENIED and the Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby
appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust
upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true
and complete inventory;
(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all
debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;
(3) To render a true and just account within one (1)
year, and at any other time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of
Administration be issued in his favor.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the
Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision
dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court
to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked.
Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo
Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
13
SO ORDERED.[12]
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied,
he appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES;
and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN
PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER
SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING
APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC
ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both
testimonial and documentary, the court opines that it is to the
best interest of the estate of the decedent and all claimants
thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed
administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special
proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court,
[respondents immediate] family and that of the decedent are
apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is not for this
court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum
to dwell upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of
the estate of the decedent in the light of such unfortunate and
bitter estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would
go against the wishes of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from
infancy in her home in Baguio City as her own child. Certainly, it
would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who
nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter
is accorded preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a),
Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such preference, he
vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner and instead
nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such
nomination, absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be
imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignored, even after the
oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to give effect to
the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the
viewpoint of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s]
intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of the estate and its
claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator should be
one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for the
demands and responsibilities of the position. While [respondent],
a practicing physician, is not unqualified, it is clear to the court
that when it comes to management of real estate and the
processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with
an established track record as a manager has a decided edge and
therefore, is in a position to better handle the preservation of the
estate.[14]
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an
illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred from representing
his deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother,
the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III,
who was merely nominated by Federico, and which nomination
hinged upon the latters appointment as administrator of the
decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the
decedents estate for the following reasons:[15]
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive
condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as administrator of the
estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent.
The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator of
Cristinas estate rendered his nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and
illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son, Emilio I,
respondent is preferred, being the next of kin referred to by
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in
the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992[16] of the
Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from
his grandmother, cannot be preferred over respondent in the
administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent;
and
4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent
as Emilio III to administer and manage the subject estate for she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified in Section
1,[17] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III
and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of the
decedents estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding
Emilio III in the administration of the decedents undivided estate.
Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts and
circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is
to give preference to the wishes and presumed will of the
decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the
iron curtain bar rule,[18] is quite the opposite scenario in the facts
obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the
normal relationship of legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina,
and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their
grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of
the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal
partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still
commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because her
share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her
death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to
share in the distribution of the latters estate as a direct heir, one
degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.
14
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in
excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedents
estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate
of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest
therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that
under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of
the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal
partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a
strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a
suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of
Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of
preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next
of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the
principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it
may be granted to such other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends
on the attendant facts and circumstances of each
case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.[20] In
the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the
appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between
the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was likewise a
creditor of the decedents estate. In the same vein, we declared
in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia Vda. de
Damian[22] that:
[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the
appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which
obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession
other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of
Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise
adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent
Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting
claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal
partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their
respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one
direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that
Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the
legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply
in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary
Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually
treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared
from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and
eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the original
oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and
a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of contention that is
Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice
J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and
998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate
child to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue
of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate
child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall
have to make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue
enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art.
992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be
more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate
children.[23]
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the
deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends, and, finally,
spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then
the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring
those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the
assumption that the deceased would have done so had he
manifested his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to
succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection,
it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be
given to charitable or educational institutions, and thus
contribute to the welfare of humanity.[24]
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the
basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first descends, for the
decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico,
who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an
illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel
for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of
the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels
us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and
distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates
of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who
will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet
to be settled.
15
 Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue
remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature,
although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to
succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially
opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance
is liquidated.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the
foregoing admonition:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be
fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio
A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon
payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-
M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is
likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the
heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other
persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further
directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
April 20, 2016
G.R. No. 200302
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the
Decision2 promulgated on 31May2011 by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA affirmed the
Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584.
The RTC found appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC also
ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno
(Cueno).4
The Facts
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an
Information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two
(2) other persons whose true names, identities and definite
whereabouts have not as
yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, and
taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of
one RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing
him repeatedly with bladed weapons, hitting him on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno
y Bonifacio.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea
of not guilty to the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated
on 26 October 2005, and trial on the merits ensued.
The CA summarized the parties evidence as follows:
The Prosecution[s] Evidence
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno,
testified that on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was
in her house located in [sic] Lot 34, Block 4, Sipna Compound,
Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to leave the house
to go to the market when she saw appellant, his brother Larry
Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly
stabbing him. She was at a distance of more or less ten (10)
meters from the incident. Shocked at what she had just
witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to
stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account, she
recalled that the assailants, including appellant, used a tres
cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse
[bottle]. At one point, the victim managed to take the knife away
from appellant and brandished the same at his attackers.
Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. Upon seeing the victim
fall, appellant and the other assailants left the scene. Through the
help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the victim to a
hospital but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she
saw appellant together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab]
her father to death in front of their house. She recounted that
upon arriving at home from work on September 1, 2005 at
around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the house of
her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block
away from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves.
Upon coming home from her aunts house, the victim was
attacked by the Lipatas which prompted the victim to run away.
Thinking that his assailants were no longer around, the victim
proceeded to their [sic] house but then the Lipatas stabbed him
to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8) meters away
from the scene. She further testified that she had no knowledge of
any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her fathers
16
death brought her pain and sadness and anger against the
perpetrators of her fathers killing.
The Defense[s] Evidence
The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant
himself. According to appellant, he was resting in his house in
Sipna Compound, Brgy. Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on
September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when two children,
namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called him and told
him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to
his brother and upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the
victim. He instantaneously assisted his brother but the victim
continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall to the ground.
Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim
and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime]
because he was wounded. Appellants sister-in-law, a certain
Lenlen, brought him to the Amang Medical Center for treatment
of his stab wound where he was apprehended by police officers.6
The RTCs Ruling
The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying
circumstance of defense of a relative, he hypothetically admitted
the commission of the crime. Hence, the burden of proving his
innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that the defense
failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression
on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to
the life of appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the
three Lipata brothers (appellant, Larry, and Rudy) 7 employed
treachery and took advantage of their superior strength when
they attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his sister-in-
law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on his trunk from the Lipata
brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of
the unarmed Cueno is inconsistent with appellants theory of
defense of a relative. The RTC, however, ruled that the
prosecution failed to show conclusive proof of evident
premeditation.
The dispositive portion of the RTCs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the
Court here[b]y renders judgment finding the accused GERRY
LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years.
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando
Cueno the following amounts:
(a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the
accused;
(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by
the heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12%
interest per annum computed from 6 September 2005 until fully
paid;
(c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and
emotional anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death of
Rolando Cueno; and
(d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
The accused shall be credited with the full period of his
preventive imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant, through the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a
notice of appeal9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellants
notice in an Order10 dated 19 April 2010.
The CAs Ruling
The CA dismissed appellants appeal and affirmed the decision of
the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTCs ruling that appellants
claim of defense of a relative must fail. There was no actual or
imminent threat on the life of appellant or of his brother Larry.
There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno was
outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The
requirement of lack of provocation on the part of appellant is
negated by the multiple stab wounds that Cueno sustained.
The CA disagreed with appellants contention that the
prosecution failed to establish treachery. The CA pointed out that
Cueno was not forewarned of any impending threat to his life.
Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-laws house to
gather malunggay leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand,
were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken
piece of glass from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata
brothers attack made it impossible for Cueno to retaliate.
The CA also disagreed with appellants contention that there was
no abuse of superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all
armed with bladed weapons when they attacked the unarmed
Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused to stop stabbing Cueno until
they saw him unconscious.
The dispositive portion of the CAs decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is
hereby DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court
convicting appellant of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.11
The PAO filed a notice of appeal12 on behalf of appellant on 10
June 2011. The CA ordered the immediate elevation of the
records to this Court in its 30 June 2011 Resolution.13
Appellants Death Prior to Final Judgment
This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the
records forwarded by the CA and required the Bureau of
Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the confinement of appellant. The
BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed this Court that
there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a
Resolution dated 10 September 2012,15this Court required the
Quezon City Jail Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid
Prison and to report compliance within ten days from notice. The
Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 October
2012,16 informed this Court that appellant passed away on 13
February 2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the
RTC about appellants demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011.
Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter were photocopies of
appellants death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the
former Quezon City Jail Wardens letter.17 In a Resolution dated 7
January 2013,18 this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from
the Quezon City Jail Warden, and required the parties to submit
their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so
desire.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18
March 2013,19 which stated that it had already exhaustively
17
argued the relevant issues in its appellees brief. The PAO, on the
other hand, filed a supplemental brief on 26 March 2013.20
In view of appellants death prior to the promulgation of the CAs
decision, this Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013
which ordered the PAO "(1) to SUBSTITUTE the legal
representatives of the estate of the deceased appellant as party;
and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Resolution."21
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil
Liability of the Deceased Appellant on 29 November
2013.22 According to the Public Attorneys Office-Special and
Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased appellant
have not communicated with it since the case was assigned to its
office on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4
November 2013 to Lilia Lipata, who was appellants next of kin
per official records. Despite receipt of the letter, the relatives of
appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:
xxxx
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from
and is based solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the same
does not survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line
with the abovecited ruling [People v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No.
175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People v. Rogelio
Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239], the
death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon.
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to
substitute the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased
as party does not arise.23
On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared
that "the [PAO] shall continue as the legal representative of the
estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing
the estate in the civil aspect of this case."24
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, we declare that because of appellants death prior
to the promulgation of the CAs decision, there is no further need
to determine appellants criminal liability. Appellants death has
the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellants
death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court,
in People v. Bayotas,25 reconciled the differing doctrines on the
issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that
"[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."26
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction
of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from
the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section
1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced."27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different
causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises from
quasidelict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person
or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.28 On the other hand, if
the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the
accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumeratesthese other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations
on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a
possible deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases
supplied)
18
The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in
2000 provided for the effect of the death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action to
reflect our ruling in Bayotas:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused
after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action
shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However,
the independent civil action instituted under Section 3 of this
Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising
from other sources of obligation may be continued against the
estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs
of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.1wphi1
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party
may file against the estate of the deceased.
Contrary to the PAOs Manifestation with Comment on the Civil
Liability of the Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of
appellants fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through
deliberate acts.32 Appellants civil liability ex quasi delicto may
now be pursued because appellants death on 13 February 2011,
before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto.
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for
claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as
well as from sources of obligation other than delict in both
jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of
the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of the deceased
[appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil
aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our
pronouncement in
Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this
case, to institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims
against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent
civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from
sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted
with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation.35 The separate civil
action proceeds independently of the criminal proceedings and
requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action
which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or legal
representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions
of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting
claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that
there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal
case. Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil
case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the
present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case
in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a
separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict
leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cuenos death, his
heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded
by the CA.
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court for study and
recommendation to the Court En Banc appropriate amendments
to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive resolution of such
similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private
offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after
conviction by the trial court but pending appeal.
In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law
recognizes that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the
guilt of the accused does not exempt the accused from civil
liability ex delicto which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence. This Courts pronouncement in Lumantas is based on
Article 29 of the Civil Code:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
We also turn to the Code Commissions justification of its
recognition of the possibility of miscarriage of justice in these
cases:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious
flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court
as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal
offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to
unfortunate and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to
draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and
civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the
distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct from each
other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights.
One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the
other is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved
party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other
that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus:
"There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a
crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty
shall not thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for
the purpose of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the
offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why should the
offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person
any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our
19
law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause
for disillusionment on the part of innumerable persons injured or
wronged.40
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be
recommended by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of
Court shall aim to provide the aggrieved parties relief, as well as
recognition of their right to indemnity. This reform is of course
subject to the policy against double recovery.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31
May 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461.
The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry
Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to
final judgment.
Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
March 8, 2016
G.R. No. 221697
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS
AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent
application for an ex parte issuance of temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December
2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December
2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23
December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No.
15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found
abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo
by a certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968.
Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by
Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and
registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate
and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name
"Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe
(a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974,
the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar"
to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling
certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption,2 the petitioner's
adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of
2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to
secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth
indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an
affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted
to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new
Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner
registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan
City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine
Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she
renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured
Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in
Development Studies at the University of the Philippines8 but she
opted to continue her studies abroad and left for the United
States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991
from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she
earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and
the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan
City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based
in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the
wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child
Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters
Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both
born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004,
respectively. 13
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American
citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19
December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines
together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections. It was during this time that
she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to
the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner
rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's
deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma
and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until
3 February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral
arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate.18
20
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father
was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be
with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided
to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in
the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their
resettlement including notification of their children's schools that
they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation
of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the
Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the
proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the
country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in
the U.S.23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May
200524 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number
from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children
immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in
the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange the
sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's
place until she and her husband purchased a condominium unit
with a parking slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan
City in the second half of 2005.27 The corresponding
Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking
slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to
petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile,
her children of school age began attending Philippine private
schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S.
to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining
household belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on
11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the
U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of
their address in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold
on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in
the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and
started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square
meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their
family home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their
children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title
covering said property was issued in the couple's name by the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on
behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be
gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on
petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have
reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are
considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI
issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in
the names of her three (3) children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia,
San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA
a new Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This
passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed
petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post,
petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October
2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of
R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner
submitted the said affidavit to the BI46 and took her oath of office
as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped
using her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of
the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation
of Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she
accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul
wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others,
of relinquishing her American citizenship.50 In the same
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside
of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968
to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a
"Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective
21 October 2010.52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections
wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question
"Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was
proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic
Passport No. DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency
for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The
petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming
elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against
her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella
Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or
cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and
raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that
the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially,
Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up
to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner
cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the
fact that she was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that
international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning,
petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
21
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost
that status when she became a naturalized American
citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must
be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out
that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in
her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated that she had
resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months
as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that
assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her
natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the
ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her
residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006,
when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act.
Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire
lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she
failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered
that:
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's
petition as it was actually a petition for quo warranto which could
only be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and
that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to
revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not
contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make
false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC
regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that
foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been
born of citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship
prior to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016
Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not
been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not
possess natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired
natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC
for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give
way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign
right of the Filipino people to decide a purely political question,
that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the
petition was deemed submitted for resolution.
On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division
promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for
the purpose of running for the President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections,
contained material representations which are false. The fallo of
the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the
instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution
was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in
its 23 December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by
Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and
Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC
which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002
(DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the requisite residency
and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage,
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born
Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of
natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred
that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the
framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on
petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international
conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have
a nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and
treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are
necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by
the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state
practice that automatically confers natural-born status to
foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner
cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to former natural-
born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that
she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency
requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her
domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her
American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of
intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that
her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
22
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of
petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that
her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the
status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that
former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said
Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not
revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for
Senator that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at
least six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013
Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim
that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the
Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10)
year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner,
Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited
the attack to the residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's
2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that
she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for
said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when
she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's
residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date
when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was
approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid
evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was
then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to
state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper
for a disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and
68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely
relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of
petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the
disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions
for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for
the Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a
presumption in her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this
country.
Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are
entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the
country where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is
considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every
right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to
reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of
the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity,
to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring
her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and
the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She
believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005,
she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the
Philippines as demonstrated by her children's resettlement and
schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San
Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian
Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her
domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced
her American citizenship as long as the three determinants for a
change of domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out that
there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship
is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency
portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good
faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the
COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-
born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10) year
residency requirement, and that she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she
has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9
May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not
qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of
the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of
the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015,
the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner
instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer
for the issuance of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status
quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the
Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from
implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further
orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation
of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these
cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-
Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its
Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its
First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
23
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En
Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En
Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned
Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED
CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of
petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the
exclusive ground" that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the
discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the
issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as
in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the
proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic,
particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction
over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay
officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to
this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections constitute interference in national
affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the
cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize
election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience
to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive
report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the
exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same
basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides
that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and
the Members of the House of Representatives was made clear by
the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for
these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v.
Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in
the En Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The
citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended
its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 1, the
following:
24
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is
equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a
substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rule-making power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot
do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the
COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to
vote, which essentially involves an inquiry
into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters. [Art. IX, C, 2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the
evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but
also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility."
"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on
grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose
of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand,
refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is
to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a
public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from
becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public
office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the
qualifications prescribed in 2 of the Law does not imply that he
does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in 4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the
consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of
the opinion is in its statement that "the lack of provision for
declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-
Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed
elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the
office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as
a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a
prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins
because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being
sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for
disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for;
if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted;
and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set
aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates'
eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may
take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the
term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion
case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the
COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary
to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of
candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of
candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The
law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of
candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek
to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made
after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in
cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-
proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President,
Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No.
7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other
Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of
the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to
the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993
version of Rule 25, which states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess
all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared
by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified
from continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of,
or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a
Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition
to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination
thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the
reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such
that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must
be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the
candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by
law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25
and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not
allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for
the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The
facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior
proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction.
The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or
tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that
he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or
25
the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a
prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such
prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity
of the representation can be found. The only exception that can
be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the
falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a
proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged
false representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and
residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens
under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As
the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner admitted
that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry.
Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it
cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is
indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden
to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino
parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino
citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding
paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law.
The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient
evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did
not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their
identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos.
Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
no-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the
probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine
Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total
number of foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while
the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278.
The statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in
that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part,
petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960
and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532
Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the
population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669
Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were
figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were
230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males
and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299
Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That
same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only
1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these
figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the
oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the
majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's
parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a
Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1wphi1 She also has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair,
almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with
typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a
municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a
99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability
and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule
128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually
impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not
come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their
newborn babies behind. We do not face a situation where the
probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance
of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We
need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that
the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of
anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to
2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in
the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children
in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period,
the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children
is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is
99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in
the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-
Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines on that decade
would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch
the numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical
probability that a child born in the Philippines would be a natural
born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents
are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a
Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos
abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do
not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the
Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic
opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise
suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt
whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess
baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one
26
among the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of Sr. Rafols:
not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, The amendment should read thus:
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."
Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. Sr. Briones:
There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines
improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political of unknown parentage.
rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are Sr. Rafols:
not separate disciplines. The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does
not recognize the child, is not unknown.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to President:
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is Sr. Rafols:
a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that: exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not
recognize the child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter]
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the does not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in President:
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from
the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly Sr. Busion:
by the explanation offered by the framers.115 Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this
matter in the hands of the Legislature?
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that Sr. Roxas:
the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and
enumeration. The following exchange is recorded: far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or people born in a
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is
the following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father recognized, and it is not necessary to include a provision on the
and a Filipino mother not recognized by the father. subject exhaustively.116

xxxx Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
President: "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only because their
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law
any kind of illegitimate children? author Jose Aruego who said:

Sr. Rafols: During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate
natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of
children of unknown parents. the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was
defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the
Sr. Montinola: cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory
Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of
Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown parentage born in international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the children followed the citizenship of the mother, and
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the
unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Constitution of the proposed amendment.
Filipino, and there is no need ...
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor
Sr. Rafols: General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are
[required] to be Filipino. We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that
what was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit
Sr. Montinola: recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of
[more] need for amendment. Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need
to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.
27
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views
were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are imperfect
or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is
basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able
to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because
they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in
terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy.
The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as
Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution.
This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he
was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is
not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers
"worked to create a just and humane society," that "they were
reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that,
given the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are
not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of
the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention
to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those
who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against
foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take
this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination
against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All
exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration
are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11
which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII,
Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to
the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings
on account of their unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must
be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of
such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a
Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the
adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by
an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This
Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in
rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not
only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but
also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well
as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to
the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is
determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen
of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who
are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-
6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who
may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is
a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate
under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the
foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under
Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the
first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination
of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the
citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not
analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution,
which is an act to perfect it.
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute
that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling
Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued
on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa
Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to
Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents,"
hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under
the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of
the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the
other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of
the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law
include international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial
logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems
generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the
general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general
principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
28
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination
in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are the
same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution
itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Bill of Rights.129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been
interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted
principles of international law and binding on the State. 130 Article
15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor
denied the right to change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the
following obligations on our country:
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall
have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a
nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared
for by his or her parents.
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights
in accordance with their national law and their obligations under
the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular
where the child would otherwise be stateless.
In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof
provide for the right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"
Article 24
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race,
colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property
or birth, the right, to such measures of protection as are required
by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the
State.
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and
shall have a name.
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate
the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no
child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of
birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our
present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant
to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by
the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international
law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of
the country of birth," to wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have
the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is
established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules
applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have
been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.
(Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of
the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been
born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of
that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention
nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the
Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article
15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article
15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that
the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a
generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not
even come into force and which needed the ratification of a
minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out,
the Court was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America,
and State Practice in the United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not
determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries
had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The
Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the
European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on
recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of
fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was
pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was
widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account
the fact that "generally accepted principles of international law"
are based not only on international custom, but also on "general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is
understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute.
Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination,
which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights
and which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the
notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the
recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
"generally accepted principles of international law" under the
incorporation clause.
29
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia,
North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation
recognizing foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those
countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-
three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness;
twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the
Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out
that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances,
including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a
generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to
this generally accepted principle of international law. In
particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on
Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them,
foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted.
Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the
DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention
and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and
reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our
Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the
PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual
certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments
on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to
address the plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a
misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as
to their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized
and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor
General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this
Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were
drafted because the world community is concerned that the
situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be
tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
international instruments which seek to protect and uplift
foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them
second-class citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July
2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned
that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired
is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine
citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent
jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general
and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was
explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as
such in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v.
COMELEC141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino
citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said
that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on
Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino
citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-
born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition
of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship
must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous
from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with
Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be
lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born
citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is
not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status
must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v.
HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at
the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof."
Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's
citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that
there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution:
natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third
category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born
Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by
law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be
elected as member of the House of Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is
reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a
doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be
retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation
doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also
said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's
error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected."148
30
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments
that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces
for "born to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No.
9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to
presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been
contended that the data required were the names of her
biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was
legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal
ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when
the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A.
No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth
certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation
that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the
files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or institution participating in
the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that
her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what
would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the
policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was
not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner,
which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it
resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The
whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave
abuse of discretion.
On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of
whether or not petitioner committed false material
representation when she stated in her COC that she has before
and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016
elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten
(10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the
elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May
2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines
prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the
requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines
up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11
months" which according to her pleadings in these cases
corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she
returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her
original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three
requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily
presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3.
an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words,
there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and
her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the
Philippines for good. These evidence include petitioner's former
U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return
to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail
correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with
a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household
items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail
with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to
ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children
showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and
for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued
on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in
February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in
April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation
Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service
confirming request for change of address; final statement from
the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire
submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that
she had been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May
2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the
condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's
husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate
to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S.
only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even
listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's
domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral
arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the
presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence
and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-
revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the
evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that
the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in
the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A.
No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied
on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v.
COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents
also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these
cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be
counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or
reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under
a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an
American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7
July 2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are
very different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the
only evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured
by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in
the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate
who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is
distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the
candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish
residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted
that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during
his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was
found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her
U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
31
residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this
Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-
year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in
the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice
but to hold that residence could be counted only from acquisition
of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is
overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion
that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence
(selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting
quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of
the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess
items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her
residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her
children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing
a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips
abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship
and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over
the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May
2005 it was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner
that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A
closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the
"An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no
overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who
must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino
who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to
enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant
members of society upon their return to the country"164in line
with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of
a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be an
unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that
the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is
obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the
necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that
is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by
enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's
evidence of change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming,
has as yet been decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of
residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that
comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no
indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by
the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there
apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the
case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of
residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's
claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9
May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6)
years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13,
2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the
COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in
November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically
assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC
as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she
misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period
of residence as of the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She
said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was
the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband
returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by
her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May
2005.
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in
2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring
about residence as of the time she submitted the COC, is
bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in
the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC
would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that
the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier
than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is
plausible given the evidence that she had returned a year before.
Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the
school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the
2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against
petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a
candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was
overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the
candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of
residence where the required period was a minimum of one year.
We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have
looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling
the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had
the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC
and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of
residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence
that petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May
2005 not because it was false, but only because COMELEC took
the position that domicile could be established only from
petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006.
However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner
had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on
24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to
hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had
been filed against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The
event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of
residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No.
9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6)
months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first
brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of
32
the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents
have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that
time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the
stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances
that surrounded the statement were already matters of public
record and were not hidden.
Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought
up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer,
which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a
mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six (
6) months as she misunderstood the question and could have
truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case
was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could
not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous
statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly
mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even
hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it
covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on
her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office
does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which
is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for the
cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the
candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a
material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but
should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must
be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications to run for public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism,
virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which
can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non
revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the
events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's
"sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC
said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that
her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in
November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration,
[petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the
standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the
statement of the person that determines residence for purposes
of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency
for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter
that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably
for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in
number, weight and substance than that presented by
petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a
primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her
declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not
even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for
Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for
Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years
and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she
naturally had as reference the residency requirements for
election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of
residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before
us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made,
petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the
Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never made
aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for
President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-
residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are
facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the
COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been
proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.
(petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish
pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in
San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in
Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati
City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San
Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired
Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan.
[Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction
of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother
discovered that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's]
adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating
[petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald
Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order
to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining
household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the
Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United
States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their
address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in
the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began
working for a Philippine company in July 2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot
in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family
home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its
intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by
petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of
petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the
questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En
Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of
discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC
Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed
by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is
hereby GRANTED.
33
2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC
First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding
the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating
that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of
the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding
the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE
NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED
QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the National and
Local Elections of 9 May 2016.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR,
FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39
Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:
A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus
is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law,
remained undiminished up to the present. The respondents'
contention that the petition has become moot and academic must
necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have been released
from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary
release, however, preclude freedom of action and under
the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry into
the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of
such restraints as may be illegal.
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested
on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street
and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was
brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was
detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a
National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8)
other persons.
After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant
Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa
Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado
Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the petitioner was
not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal
possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive
documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the
petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court
of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33
before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused,
however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as
amended. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the
charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the
pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment
and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the
petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity
of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of the
writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on
August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss
stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily
released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of
National Defense with the approval of the President. The
respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer
under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for
habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar
cases.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has
become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary
release.
It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary
release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that
petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside
Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change
his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he
should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local
or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release
or information that is inimical to the interest of national
security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their
representatives.
The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary
release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the
restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an
involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
34
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render
the instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely
shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the
legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents."
We agree with the petitioner.
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions
attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute
restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit
the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical
restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas
corpus.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally
seized and transported against their will to Davao were no longer
under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were
free to change their domicile without asking for official
permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila.
Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by
the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the
hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of
an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty
from Megal encroachment."
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas
corpus has not become moot and academic. Other precedents for
such a conclusion are not wanting.
The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance
to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to
curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does
not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of
movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, from
to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to external
moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous
belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another,
the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much
as the individual who is illigally deprived of liberty by deprived
or physical coercion.
In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court
ruled:
Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did
not signify that petitioners could once again enjoy their full
freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it could
be withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a purely
voluntary act. When the hearing was held on September 7, 1978,
it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could
have academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the above
allegations in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney
Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners, while conceding
that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged that
it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as labor
union leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the
Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in Macaraig as
well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting was to take place in
the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever
efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the
prohibition against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty
was undeniable. If so, the moot and academic character of the
petition was far from clear.
More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or
not a temporary release from detention renders the petition for
writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of
Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et
al, G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released
from detention. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioners had
been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become
moot and academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their
case may be considered moot and academic only "if their release
would be permanent." In ruling for the petitioners, we said:
Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and
academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is
lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a
number of cases. But the instant case presents a different
situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can
reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a
court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense.
An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents
because the release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary' it
follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their
acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a
reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of
men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is
acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-
arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and
elementary that it needs no elaboration.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is
free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms,
where there is present a denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid
has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary,
the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still
avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue
and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement
should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions
attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared
null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared
ABSOLUTE. No costs,
SO ORDERED.
THE SECRETARY OF G.R. No. 180906
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
35

CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
RAYMOND MANALO and LEONARDO-DE
REYNALDO MANALO, and
Respondents. BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 7, 2008
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the
rest of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from
the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The
constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its
protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and
security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this
Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court in relation to Section 19[1] of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of
fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in
C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled Raymond Manalo and
Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
respondents.
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[2] filed before this Court by
herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to
stop herein petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their
officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty
and other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary
remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal
and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)[3] of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary
of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their
stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2)
enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or
otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of
their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed
under Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith,
therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting
Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They
prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue
the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified
return within the period provided by law and containing the
specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim
reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed
for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the
Court, after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 [7] of
the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.[8]
CASTRO,
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23,
2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further
resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents
requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified
written return within five (5) working days from service of the
writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the
Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the
summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00
p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.[9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the
dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five
days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports
of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case,
except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
within five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports,
records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14,
2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this
decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the
signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly
authorized deputy, the latters authority to be express and made
apparent on the face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the
facts as alleged by herein respondents:
36
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two
weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed
soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all
the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not
informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers
when he passed by the barangay hall.[11]
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several
armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army
boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked him if he
was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was
Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both
cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed,
brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face
down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to
the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother
to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to
stay.[12]
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized
brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz,
and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout.They were all
members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was being
forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa,
with some soldiers and armed men.[13]
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he
was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the
soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he
learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario
alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of
age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house and
abducted him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit
old. Another one of his abductors was George who was tall, thin,
white-skinned and about 30 years old.[14]
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought
inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them
were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the
person beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van stopped
several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and
Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors
of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other
parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15
minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymonds)
room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten up in the other
room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New
Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the
butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were,
how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members
he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.[15]
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high
officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call
them sir, and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when
interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when
they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that
the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the
other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white
pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in
Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and
a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents
abduction.[16] While these officials interrogated him, Raymond
was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards
beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled
respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night,
usually with left-over and rotten food.[17]
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived
while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him
with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood,
slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the
mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning
wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could
hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to
the same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they
warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and
kill him.[18]
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for
the guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on
him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to
check on him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and
jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and
firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to
break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came
near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some
women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the
road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He
reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him
to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with
him. They brought him to another place near the entrance of
what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly,
kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured
gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly
called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was
killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned
inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.[20]
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the
torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were
almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when
respondents guards got drunk.[21]
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was
detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time
in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything
there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating
and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people[22] had been
detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and
himself.[23]
For about three and a half months, the respondents were
detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with
two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into
the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and
mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They
were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
DTU.[24]
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He
checked their body and eyes, took their urine samples and
marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied
that they had a hard time urinating, their stomachs were aching,
and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in
white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them
medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic
acid. They brought with them the results of respondents urine
test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their
medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter,
medicines were sent through the master of the DTU, Master Del
Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the
37
DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named
Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and
take care of them.[25]
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo
vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men
wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two
weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with
them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men.[26]
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang,
San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a
big unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan for about
three months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked
to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court
in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was
already waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already,
to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond
if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked
Raymond if he would be scared if he were made to face Gen.
Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he
did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.[27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his
affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di
ka ba natatakot sa akin?
Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang
pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng
sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga
rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko
lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag
paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na
sa gobyerno.[28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt
they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning,
Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that
abducted them - brought them to their parents house. Raymond
was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo
because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and
other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen.
Palparan told him. As they were afraid, Raymonds parents
acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if they
continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their
children again. The respondents were then brought back to
Sapang.[29]
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was
about to leave. He was talking with the four masters who were
there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.[30] When Gen.
Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white
vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told
him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the
medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was
expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He
also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the
military and warned that they would not be given another
chance.[31] During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen.
Palparan by his picture.[32]
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the
medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named Alive, was
green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box
of this medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman
checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The Alive
made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon
waking up.[33]
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left
Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in
Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee
from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw
again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house,
and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.[34]
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought
to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched
by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle.Efren went with
them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his
blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept
in the barracks.[35]
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was
ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that
he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many
soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also ordered to
clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met
Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a
student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in
Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to
severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home
and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were
removed and she was made to do the laundry.[36]
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two
days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and
Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room
with Allan whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas,
called master or commander by his men in the 24th Infantry
Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining
room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and
Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were
removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened
that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.[37]
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He
told the detainees that they should be thankful they were still
alive and should continue along their renewed life.Before the
hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to
their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However,
their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were
brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from
September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was
instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding himself
out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the
24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated
in his affidavit.[38]
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen,
and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry
Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the
camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers
of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers
whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up and hit him
in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered
enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook,
and help in raising livestock.[39]
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched,
Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with
them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA.They were
38
brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed
the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was
killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and he
coddled NPA members in his house.[40] Another time, in another
Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a
house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old
man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and
killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes.[41]
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel
were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas
and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier
was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were
made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from
May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.[42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in
Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring
food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what
he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na
kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at
nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man
kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan,
nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa
kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at itoy
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga
unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng
kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang
mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na
dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at
labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at
binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi
nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3;
sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa
kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang
mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong
mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama
niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa
Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si
Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si
Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga
sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal,
narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang
haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena
mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong
kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag
na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil
magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni
Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang
trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought
to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald
(Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in
exchange for which, he would take care of the food of their
family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put
in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for
Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as
cousins from Rizal, Laguna.[44]
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the
highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining
lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they
saved their earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each,
Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as
he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived
nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did
not use it. They earned some more until they had saved
Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and
Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards lived in
the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the
head of the guards. Respondents house did not have
electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they
had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his
cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond
turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the guards
awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded
towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and
barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were
thus freed from captivity.[45]
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of
Raymonds affidavit insofar as they related to matters they
witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken
from their house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his
abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also
named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he
was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told
that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond
escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back
and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and
Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from
Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in
the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a mountainous
area. He was instructed to use the name Rodel and to represent
himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his
trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del
Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was
buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario
delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In these trips, Hilario
drove a black and red vehicle.Reynaldo was blindfolded while
still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside
the province. In one of their trips, they passed
by Fort Magsaysay and CampTecson where Reynaldo saw the
sign board, Welcome to Camp Tecson.[46]
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino
specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the
Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of human
39
rights violations, particularly cases where torture was
involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical
examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first
asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical
examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by
respondents were consistent with their account of physical
injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted
on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents escape, and the
results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took
photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the
Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.[47]
Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged
abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25,
2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ
of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement
therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any
time arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado,
disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled
issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by
petitioners parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of
the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General
of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz,
Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted
a return of the writ On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped
as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September
19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort
Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no
evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement
in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27,
2007, it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for
lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in
the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that
the remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo
brothers and ordered them to release the latter.[48]
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein
respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense,
which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and
was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers alleged abduction. He
also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual
military directional operations, neither does he undertake
command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way
micromanage the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of
the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing strategic
policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies)
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the
Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of
Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with
Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such
compliance Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also
dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive
addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP should adopt the
following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued
by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may
aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them
concerning the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death
or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in
the death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent
court.[49]
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he
received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of
National Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the
following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the
units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of
the result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the
immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the
concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05,
2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine Army
(Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the
Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to
the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as
the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units
relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No.
179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and
Empeo pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert
earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the
disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or
had complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the
bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent
evidence that may be gathered in the process.[50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col.
Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994,
another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and
Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the
24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I
immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and
found no untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the
name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino
being held captive;
40
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino
in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further
inquiries with the Philippine National Police,
Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and
were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1 st Lt. Romeo Publico to
inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged
to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and
Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no
such beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have
been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeo and
Merino.[51]
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of
sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.),
M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons
implicated by therein petitioners could not be secured in time for
the submission of the Return and would be subsequently
submitted.[52]
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary
hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7 th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, based in FortMagsaysay, Palayan City,
Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers
Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a
portion of Pangasinan.[53] The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the
7th Infantry Division.[54]
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the
Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palaran,[55] through his Assistant Chief of Staff,[56]to investigate
the alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries
under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la
Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy
Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian
named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the
veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by
the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez
testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a
complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the
Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the
Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about
what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.[58]
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of
having them execute sworn statements and conducting an
investigation on May 29, 2006.[59] The investigation started
at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the
evening.[60] The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo
Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on
that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even
of the Manalo family, nor were there other witnesses summoned
and investigated[61] as according to Jimenez, the directive to him
was only to investigate the six persons.[62]
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the
statements.[63] The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it
was in fact his first time to meet them.[64] During the entire time
that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the
Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to
the six persons.[65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29,
2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back
the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their
statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified
that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their
statements indicated that they were signed on May 29,
2006.[66] When the Sworn Statements were turned over to
Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report. He began
writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June
1, 2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.[68]
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report
dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein
substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their
respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed men and
thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident,
relatives of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court
against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela
Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz,
aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit B) states that he was at
Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing
the concrete building of a church located nearby his residence,
together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15
February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo
Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the
suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because he was
a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the
Manalo brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject
vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the
abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti
dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit C) states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his
neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and
he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being
an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to
be one of the suspects, he claims that on February 14, 2006, he
was one of those working at the concrete chapel being
constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just
came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06)
when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That
subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the
incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is
a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29
May 2006 in (Exhibit O) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based
at Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very
much aware about the background of the two (2) brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in
their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother KUMANDER
BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San
Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only
about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims
41
further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to
the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their
brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA
Commander who killed his father and for that reason they
implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA
vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said
Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29,
2006 in (Exhibit E) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko,
Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
are familiar to him being his barriomate when he was still
unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his
residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he
was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not
aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The
only reason he knows why they implicated him was because
there are those people who are angry with their family
particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their
brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He
claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed
his father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject
civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of
the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit F) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a
former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims
that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being
their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active
supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @
KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims
that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he
vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of
the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when
rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his
implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to
Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit G) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon,
Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy.
Tanod and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment,
San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for
having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged
further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the
CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA
BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of
the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the
construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he
learned only about the incident which is the abduction of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad
in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the
matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the
allegation against him as being one of the abductors and he
considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that
remains loyal to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this
particular case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction
and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that
transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged
involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful,
hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in
the past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy
Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not
suffice to establish a fact that they were the ones who did the
abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the
testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also
mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance
with the abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of
CAFGUs, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their village from
any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village,
they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is
concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the
alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named
respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence,
it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative punishment
and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they are
innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman
dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela
Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.[69]
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate
courts assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the
December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND
OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND
MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A)
FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE
INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B)
CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL
ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND
DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND
CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR
RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE
MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL
PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO
THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]
42
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its
beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring
proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-
day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and
Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17,
2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide a broad and fact-
based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances,[71] hence representatives from all sides
of the political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders
in the justice system[72] participated in mapping out ways to
resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in
light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances.[73] It was an exercise for the first time of the
Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance
in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime.[74] As the Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal
killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.[75] On the other
hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.[76]
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means
protection in Spanish.[77] In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in
America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its
description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed
to many Mexican jurists.[78] One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn,
drafted a constitutional provision for his native
state, Yucatan,[79] which granted judges the power to protect all
persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal
rights. This idea was incorporated into the national constitution
in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in
the exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by
this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against
attacks by the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or
state governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in
the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the
violation.[80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.[81] If, after hearing, the judge determines that a
constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders
the official, or the officials superiors, to cease the violation and to
take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full
enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the
principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law
tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce
the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular
cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for
the entire nation.[82]
The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western
Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response
to the particular needs of each country.[83] It became, in the
words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one
piece of Mexicos self-attributed task of conveying to the worlds
legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity,
her own painful history conceived.[84] What began as a protection
against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes:
(1) amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom,
equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for
the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo
agrario for the protection of peasants rights derived from the
agrarian reform process.[85]
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has
been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights
abuses especially committed in countries under military
juntas. In general, these countries adopted an all-encompassing
writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including
socio-economic rights.[86] Other countries
like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen
to limit the protection of the writ of amparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.[87]
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly
provide for the writ of amparo, several of the
above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The
second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The
Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights
extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo casacion,
and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.[88] The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law
tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison.[89]
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave
Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas
corpus under Rule 102,[90] these remedies may not be adequate to
address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve
a petition for a writ of amparo through summary proceedings and
the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
under the AmparoRule, this hybrid writ of the common law and
civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and
Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better
remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and
threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.[91]
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in
43
that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it
will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and
curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order[92] to
stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving
the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic rights on
August 23, 2007,[93] prior to the promulgation of
the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies including
Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner,
Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable
remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they
moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it
would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the
Manalo brothers enforced disappearance. The Court granted
their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the
petitioner. Petitioners first argument in disputing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing
and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated,
contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.[94]
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and
refine the ore of petitioners cause of action, to determine
whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the
degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the
following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security
is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of
proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases
supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[95]
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the
findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted
from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously
detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction,
detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated
by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of
respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape,
captured through his different senses and etched in his
memory. A few examples are the following: Sumilip ako sa isang
haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si
Manuel.[96] (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa
istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel.[97] May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila
ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang
bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko
ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena.[99] Tinanong ko sa isang
kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko
gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na
lugar.[100]
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based
on respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were
sufficiently identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to
be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled
that the six armed men who barged into his house through the
rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants
and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la
Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all
members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza,
also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the
abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men
were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove
the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity,
as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the
participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the
suspicion that the petitioners were either members or
sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were
looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother
of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the
abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of
the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the
one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-
sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall
could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but
even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from
outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily
investigated
Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also
established. At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his
command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen.
Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told
them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be
doing. Gen. Palparans direct and personal role in the abduction
might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire
situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the
hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his
indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and
not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due
process of law and without probable cause.
44
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special
Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr.,
member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no
clear and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the
detention. Hilarios involvement could not, indeed, be then
established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario
drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried
following the abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the
habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the
white L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away
from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested
that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents during the
captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario
fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and
conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong
materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with
Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the
Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound
of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three months.
(Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came
face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the
petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to
relay the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore
rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they
would not again see their sons should they join any rallies to
denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-
206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others
being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan
conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required
Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p.
206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that
Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the
abduction and forced disappearance of the petitioners was
established. The participation of other military personnel like
Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly
established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them
personally involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the
evidence of their participation is overwhelming.[101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond
Manalos statements were not corroborated by other independent
and credible pieces of evidence.[102] Raymonds affidavit and
testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent
Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared
by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left
by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also
corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they endured
while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity
with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in
his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division
Training Unit,[104] firms up respondents story that they were
detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered
similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister
Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by agents of the
Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped
and tortured in early November 1989. The Commissions findings
of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible
statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her
ordeal.[106] These statements were supported by her recognition
of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out
of the military installation where she was detained.[107] She was
also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that
the 111 circular second degree burns on her back and abrasions
on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and
torture she suffered while in detention.[108]
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the
torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically
holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal
will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their
account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their
written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by
the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the
places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and
testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of
the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced
disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and
surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in
detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not
free in every sense of the word[109] as their movements continue
to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their
Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond)
are still at large and have not been held accountable in any
way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten
respondents rights to life, liberty and security.[110] (emphasis
supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being
once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
constitute a direct violation of their right to security of
person.[111]
Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents
point out that this right is often associated with liberty; it is also
seen as an expansion of rights based on the prohibition against
torture and cruel and unusual punishment. Conceding that there
is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the
1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights to be kept free
from torture and from incommunicado detention and solitary
detention places[112] fall under the general coverage of the right
to security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that
the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to
security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of
the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal interpretation of the
right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching
in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may be made
more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State
on the exercise of that liberty[114] such as a requirement to report
under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation
of liberty[115] or being put under monitoring and surveillance.[116]
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in
the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of
their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if
it has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right
to security or the right to security of person finds a textual
45
hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person,
including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and
effects against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the
states power over a persons home and possessions, but more
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.[117] The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the
Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful invasion
of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858;
Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is
an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the
peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home
or of persons and correspondence. (Taada and Carreon,
Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The
constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against
unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute
as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his
privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any
interference allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons.[119] (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1[120] guarantees
essentially the right to be alive[121] - upon which the enjoyment of
all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person
is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: The life to
which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his
person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the
security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life
and property pervades the whole history of man. It touches every
aspect of mans existence.[122] In a broad sense, the right to
security of person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to
the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual.[123]
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield
various permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In
its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of
the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate
that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right.[124] It is the
right to security of person as the word security itself means
freedom from fear.[125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.[126] (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of
person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law.
(emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear
is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by
the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded
as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say
that the right to security is actually the freedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause
in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of
violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of
the provision.[127]
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general
rule, ones body cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a
search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree
of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a
crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily
integrity or security of a person.[129]
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of
bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to
force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and
psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person
includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and
psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any
other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him
(any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense).Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that
vitiate the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily
integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to
security in the sense of freedom from threat as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing
abuses of persons under investigation for the commission of an
offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even
under such investigation should all the more be protected from
these degradations.
46
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person
as a right against torture was made by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov
v. Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant, who was lawfully
detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused
him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human
Rights provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law ... (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other
hand, provides that (n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Although the
application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was
found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security
in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of
domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably
have been expected to take measures in order to ensure
his security and to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to
comply with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an
effective investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women has also made a statement that the protection of the
bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to
security and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment
by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under
general international law or under specific human rights
conventions is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of
the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms
include . . . the right to liberty and security of person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
protection of ones rights by the government. In the context of
the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom
from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity)
under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees
full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.[133] As the government is the chief guarantor
of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if
government does not afford protection to these rights especially
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or
enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be
ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and
be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of
the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an
effective search for the truth by the government.[135]
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee
of government protection has been interpreted by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee[136] in not a few cases involving
Article 9[137] of the ICCPR. While the right to security of person
appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9,
the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can
exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words,
there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right
to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v.
Colombia,[138] a case involving death threats to a religion teacher
at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views
differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the
Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate
paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to
the view that the right to security arises only in the context of
arrest and detention. The travaux prparatoires indicate that the
discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt
with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right
to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the
person. These elements have been dealt with in separate
clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only
reference to the right of security of person is to be found in
article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow
the concept of the right to security only to situations of
formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties
have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant.It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States
can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their
jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to
take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect
them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a
State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-
detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally
ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.[139] (emphasis
supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v.
Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and prisoner of
conscience who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and
restricted in his movements following his release from
detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of
a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial
Guinea,[141] involving discrimination, intimidation and
persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that
state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the
complainants husband who was a supporter of democratic
reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,[143] involving the murder of
the complainants partner and the harassment he (complainant)
suffered because of his investigation of the murder;
and Chongwe v. Zambia,[144] involving an assassination attempt
on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
interpreted the right to security not only as prohibiting the State
from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on
the State to afford protection of the right to liberty.[145] The ECHR
interpreted the right to security of person under Article 5(1) of
the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case,
the claimants son had been arrested by state authorities and had
not been seen since. The familys requests for information and
investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The
claimant suggested that this was a violation of her sons right to
security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
47
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national
law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of
Article 5, namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness...
Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts.For this
reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to
take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been
taken into custody and has not been seen since.[147] (emphasis
supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person
to the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a
continuing violation of respondents right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from
threat to respondents life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if
they escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In
Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline
after he was caught the first time he attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who wanted to
see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the
threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that
they are now free from captivity not because they were released
by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their
abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their
ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained
in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them
that they were still deciding whether they should be
executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his
affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena
mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.[148]
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the
eye while they were in detention. With their escape, this
continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they
have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not
only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other
persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the
threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their
free will as they are forced to limit their movements or
activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are being shielded
from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected
to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face
intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and
security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a
petition for a writ of amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by
the government. Apart from the failure of military elements to
provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating
the abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed
in conducting an effective investigation of respondents abduction
as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of
petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall
of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very
limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn
Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and
civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He
was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad
was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a
single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or
their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the
alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or
neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested
that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he
issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that
the AFP should adopt rules of action in the event the writ
of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of
the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the
identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of
relevant evidence; identification of witnesses and securing
statements from them; determination of the cause, manner,
location and time of death or disappearance; identification and
apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a
competent court.[150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted
his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this
directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the
units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
respondents, and undertook to provide results of the
investigations to respondents.[151] To this day, however, almost a
year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary
of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not
been furnished the results of the investigation which they now
seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to
warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as
freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat to their
life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by
the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the
military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals,
which petitioners question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already in file with the
court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places
of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of
Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and reports
of any treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of
48
medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue
that the production order sought by respondents partakes of the
characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied
with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the
application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one
specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.[152] In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out
that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made
by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are
only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting
details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be
produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the present
case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not
been shown.
Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order
under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search
warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of
the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government,
not a protection of the government from the demand of the
people such as respondents.
Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the
court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to
produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in
the action and which are in his possession, custody or control
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,[153] the
respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena
duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others,
the books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The
company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground
that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck
down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a
civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with
unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself
undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted or
to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as
the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert
that the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the
submission of a list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper,
immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a
writ of amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise
and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of
military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose
them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as
perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of
territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure
that these military officers can be served with notices and court
processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation
of the respondents rights. The list of medical personnel is also
relevant in securing information to create the medical history of
respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when
applicable and necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and
security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool
that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind
secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16779 March 30, 1921
LEE YICK HON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Feria for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This is an appeal by the Insular Collector of Customs from the
action of the Court of First Instance of Manila in imposing upon
him a fine of P50 for an alleged contempt of court. The
circumstances connected with the incident which gave rise to the
proceeding are these:
It appears that on July 23, 1920, a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila by one
Lee Yick Hon, alleging he had lately arrived from China at the port
of Manila with a view to entering the Philippine Islands, but was
presented from so doing by the Insular Collector of Customs, who
was detaining him for deportation. Upon the presiding in Sala IV
of said court, cited the collector to appear and show cause in
writing why the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued as
prayed. This citation was served at about 11 a.m., at which house
arrangement had already been perfected for the deportation of
Lee Yick Hon on a boat scheduled to leave Manila for Hongkong at
noon on the same day; and either by oversight or design the
Insular Collector failed to contermand the order for his
embarcation on that boat. The result was that Lee Yick Hon was
deported within two or three hours after the Insular Collector
had been served with the citation to show cause in the habeas
corpus proceeding. Thereupon contempt proceedings were
instituted against the Insular Collector, with the result already
stated.
49
We are of the opinion that the action of the lower court in
imposing fine on the appellant cannot be sustained; and the
judgment must accordingly be reserved.
The conditions under which a person can be punished for
contempt are precisely defined in sections 231 and 232 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and unless the reprobated conduct
legitimately falls under those provisions, it cannot be punished as
for contempt. The first of these sections contemplates
misbehavior in the presence of the court or so near the court of
judge as to obstruct the administration of justice. With this
situation we are not here concerned, as the act which constitutes
the alleged contempt was committed away from the presence of
the court and if punishable at all, it falls under subsection (1) of
section 232, wherein it is declared that nay person may be
punished as for contempt who is guilty of "disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command
of the court or injunction granted by a court or judge."
In this case before us, if it be asked what lawful writ, process,
order, judgment or command of the court or judge below was
disobeyed or resisted by the appellant, the answer must be: None
whatever. The citation that was served upon the appellant
required him to appear at a stated time in the Court of First
Instance of Manila and show cause if any there might be, why the
writ prayed for should not issue. That citation was literally
complied with when, on July 30, 1920, the Attorney-General, on
behalf of the Insular Collector, filed his answer, wherein it was in
effect stated that the case of Lee Yick Hon had been regularly
passed upon by the special Board of Inquiry, and that it had been
found that he had entered the Philippine Islands in contravention
of the Immigration and Exclusion Acts, wherefore the Insular
Collector had ordered his deportation. That answer, so far as
appears in this case, has not been found to be false or insufficient;
and the sole ground relied upon to sustain the judgment finding
the appellant guilty to contempt is that by allowing Lee Yick Hon
to be deported under the conditions stated he has frustrated the
possible issuance of the writ of habeas corpus for which
application had been made.
At this point attention should be directed to the fact that the
order to show cause, a copy of which was served on the Insular
Collector of Customs on July 23, 1920, is not the peremptory writ
of habeas corpus, unconditionally commanding the respondent to
have the body of the detained person before the court at a time
and place therein specified. The requisites of the peremptory writ
of habeas corpus are stated in section 533 of the Code of Civil
Procedure; and appropriate forms are supplied in section 534 of
said Code and in section 82 of General Orders, No. 58. The order
served in the case before us was merely a preliminary citation
requiring the respondent to appear and show cause why the
peremptory writ should not be granted. The practice of issuing a
preliminary citation of this character, upon applications for the
writ of habeas corpus, has, as all legal practitioners are aware,
become common in our courts; and upon considerations of
practical convenience, the usage has must be commend it, in
cases where the necessity for the immediate issuance of the
peremptory writ is not manifest. Nevertheless in a case like that
now before us, it is necessary to take account of the difference
between the preliminary citation and the real writ of habeas
corpus; and when advertence is had to this point, and the actual
terms of the citation are considered, it is at one obvious that the
appellant did not put himself in contempt by allowing Lee Yick
Hon to be deported.
Of course if the judge issuing the citation had his attention
directed to the fact that the deportation of Lee Yick Hon was
imminent, and there had been any reason to fear that the
Collector of Customs might proceed with his deportation
notwithstanding the service of the bare citation, his Honor could
have penned a few additional words, adding to the citation an
admonition to the effect that the petitioner should not be
deported until his application for the writ of habeas
corpus should be heard. If a temporary restraining order of that
kind had been issued, it would no doubt have been respected.
In proceeding against a person alleged to be guilty of contempt of
court, it is not to be forgotten that such proceedings are
commonly treated as criminal in their nature even when the acts
complained of are incidents of civil actions. For this reason the
mode of procedure and rules of evidence in contempt
proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted
to criminal prosecutions. (6 R. C. L., p. 530.) Moreover, it is well
settled that a person cannot be held liable for contempt in the
violation of an injunction or in fact of any judicial order unless the
act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and
exactly defined, so as to leave no reasonable doubt or uncertainty
as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.
(U.S. vs. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 146 Fed., 176, 183.) A party cannot
be punished for contempt in failing to do something not specified
in the order. (13 C. J., 15.) In the case before us, the deportation of
the petitioner was not forbidden by any order of the court, and
hence that act cannot be considered as disobedience to the court.
Upon principle the point is clear; and although no case exactly
identical with the present one has been called to our attention
from the decisions of American courts, something very similar is
found in Ex parte Lake (37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 656; 66 Am. St. Rep.
848). The facts involved in that case were these: One Edwards
had been charged with the commission of a criminal offense in
Oklahoma, but he fled to the State of Texas; and upon requisition
from the Governor of Oklahoma, a warrant was issued by the
Governor of Texas for his arrest in that State. Upon his being
arrested, application was made in his behalf before on of the
Texas courts for the writ of habeas corpus to secure his release.
During the period when the propriety of granting the writ was
under consideration in said court, one Lake, the legally appointed
extradition agent, acting under the authority of a proper warrant
issued by the Governor of Texas, obtained the custody of
Edwards from the sheriff who had him in charge and hurriedly
departed with the prisoner for Oklahoma. The result was that the
proceedings upon the application for the writ habeas corpus were
frustrated and the writ was in fact never issued as occurred in
the case now before us. The judge before whom the application
for the writ of habeas corpus was pending thereupon caused Lake
to be arrested and fined him 50 dollars for the supposed
contempt. It was held by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that
his action could not be sustained and the judgment was reversed.
Among the reasons stated for this decision was the fact that the
alleged contemner has disobeyed no order issued by the judge,
for there was none of any character made in the case, "and there
was no order, decree, writ, or any other process in existence,
forbidding him form doing just what he did". Speaking further of
this aspect of the case, the court said: "We have found no case
authorizing punishment by contempt for such conduct as is
attributed to Lake, and we believe none can be found. The
authorities have been closely and exhaustively examined, and the
rule deducible therefrom, is that unless the court has jurisdiction
of the supposed contemner, or some order, decree, or process has
been resisted or disobeyed, the court has no jurisdiction to
punish for contempt. Jurisdiction over the party will not confer
power to punish for contempt unless some order, decree, or
process has been disobeyed or the party is guilty of some act of
the nature of malpractice in the case, or has disobeyed the
reasonable rules of the court". (Ex parte Lake, supra.)
50
The considerations found in that decision are applicable to the
case now before us and corroborate the conclusion to be
inevitably drawn form our own provisions relative to contempt,
namely, that the deportation of Lee Yick Hon by the Insular
Collector under the circumstances stated was not a contempt of
court.
Judgment is reversed and the defendant absolved, with costs de
oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX,
BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY AND
ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF AND/OR
HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG
SALIBO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of
liberty due to mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not
under any lawful process and is continuously being illegally
detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals
Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 153, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan
Malang Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang
Salibo (Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia
for the Hajj Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited
and prayed in the cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and
Jeddah."5 He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu
Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of
murder for allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009
Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest
issued by the trial court in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal
Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name. There, he explained that he was
not Butukan S. Malang and that he could not have participated in
the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre because he was
in Saudi Arabia at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police
"pertinent portions of his passport, boarding passes and other
documents"10 tending to prove that a certain Datukan Malang
Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December 19,
2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not
arrest him because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and
tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for
Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at
the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was
detained for another 10 days. While in Cotabato City, the Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made him sign and
affix his thumbprint on documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon
City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently
detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals
the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus16questioning the legality of
his detention and deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that
he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of
Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ
returnable to the Second Vice Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The Court of
Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file
a Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and
produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on
September 27, 2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail
Annex brought Salibo before the trial court. The Warden,
however, failed to file a Return one day before the hearing. He
also appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to
September 29, 2010 at 2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ.
However, during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return,
the Warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal
Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on
behalf of the Warden and argued that only the Office of the
Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a
respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The
trial court reset the hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at
9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant
Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the
Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since Salibo was
charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a
petition for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information,
Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the
Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang
Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang
and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao
Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from
detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially
charged"29 under any resolution, information, or amended
51
information. The Resolution, Information, and Amended
Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang
Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there
was no Warrant of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against
Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the trial court ruled, was not
restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the
Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in connection with the
Maguindanao Massacre. The National Bureau of Investigation
Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed that Salibo has not been
charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.31 A
Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name
"Datukan Malang Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he]
was out of the country"33 from November 7, 2009 to December
19, 2009. This fact was supported by a Certification 34 from Saudi
Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's departure from and arrival
in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight Manifest issued by the
Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No.
0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court
granted Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his
immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the trial court's Decision.38 Through its
Decision dated April 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found
that Salibo's arrest and subsequent detention were made under a
valid Information and Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that
Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant
of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly course of
trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before
the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"40 According to the
Court of Appeals, Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of
Appeals denied in the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the
Petition for Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of
Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a
Comment,45 after which petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang
charged with 57 counts of murder before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus, contrary to the Court of
Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not duly
charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and,
therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in
appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153,
Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of
Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear
respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's Decision
should be deemed a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore,
respondent Warden should have directly filed his appeal before
this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo
was duly charged in court. Even assuming that he is not the
Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest,
petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a
Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus
was appealable to the Court of Appeals; and Second, whether
petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
I
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden
correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through
a petition filed before this court or any of its members,50 the
Court of Appeals or any of its members in instances authorized by
law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any of its presiding
judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly
restrained of liberty to file a return of the writ.53A hearing on the
return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that
which issued the writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ
designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the
lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of habeas corpus.
By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the
power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for
habeas corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a
decision appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction
over decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was
filed before this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B. Saulo
[(Saulo)]."59 This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and
ordered respondent Commanding General of the Philippine
Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the
Writ returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court
of First Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First
Instance heard the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of
its original jurisdiction but merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently,
"this Court should have the final say regarding the issues raised
in the petition, and only [this court's decision] . . . should be
regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is
more apparent than real."64 It ruled that when a superior court
issues a writ of habeas corpus, the superior court only resolves
whether the respondent should be ordered to show cause why
the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was filed
was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty.65 However,
once the superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower
court as allowed by the Rules of Court, the lower court designated
52
"does not thereby become merely a recommendatory body,
whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of effect[.]"66 The
decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the
lower court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before
this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the merits, the Court
of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus and
ordered that Medina be released from detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before
the Court of Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of
Appeals a "Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme
Court." The Court of Appeals, however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the
"Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court,"
citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus, "acquired the
power and authority to determine the merits of the
case[.]"72Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal on Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable
to the Court of Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, making it returnable to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court then heard respondent
Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired
the power and authority to determine the merits"74 of petitioner
Salibo's Petition. The decision on the Petition for Habeas Corpus,
therefore, was the decision of the trial court, not of the Court of
Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,75 respondent Warden
correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus
"was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom."77 The remedy of habeas
corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature, consistent
with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus "shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished
from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will preclude freedom
of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any
offense so as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas
corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy84 or
when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of abode.85 In
other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied
autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to
liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas
corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must
apply a conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the
substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the
labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario
Gumabon (Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio
Agapito (Agapito), Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares
(Palmares) were convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
murder. They commenced serving their respective sentences
of reclusion perpetua.89
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were
serving their sentences, this court promulgated People v.
Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that the complex crime of rebellion
with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito,
Padua, and Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They
prayed for their release from incarceration and argued that the
Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and
Palmares properly availed of a petition for habeas
corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this court said:
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless
state action. . . . The scope and flexibility of the writ its capacity
to reach all manner of illegal detention its ability to cut
through barriers of form and procedural mazes have always
been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be
administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure
that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.95cralawlawlibrary
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of
Mindoro issued Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution
ordered the Mangyans removed from their native habitat and
compelled them to permanently settle in an 800-hectare
reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who
refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were
imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on
behalf of Rubi and all the other Mangyans being held in the
reservation.98 Since the application questioned the legality of
deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other Mangyans, this court
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial Board
of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v.
Lukban.100 "[T]o exterminate vice,"101Mayor Justo Lukban of
Manila ordered the brothels in Manila closed. The female sex
workers previously employed by these brothels were rounded up
and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were expelled
from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported
women, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered
Mayor Justo Lukban, among others, to make a Return of the Writ.
Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to make a Return, arguing
that he did not have custody of the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for
failure to make a Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of his
acts, this court ruled that Mayor Justo Lukban illegally deprived
the women he had deported to Davao of their liberty, specifically,
of their privilege of domicile.105 It said that the women, "despite
their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not
53
chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens[.]"106 The women
had the right "to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on
the petition for the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that
commands the production of the body of the person allegedly
restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in the final
decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the
petition for its issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is
essential. The issuance of the writ sets in motion the speedy
judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of liberty.
Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the
petition for its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of
merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when the
public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be
suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if
the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a
lawful process or order of the court.111 The restraint then has
become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered
moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or
if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente
C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by virtue of a Mission Order allegedly
issued by then Minister of National Defense, Juan Ponce Enrile
(Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest,115from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty.
Ilagan in Camp Catitipan, where he was detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty.
Arellano). Atty. Arellano, however, no longer left Camp Catitipan
as the military detained and arrested him based on an unsigned
Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the
military informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao
Chapter of the impending arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty.
Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar went to Camp
Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty.
Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order
signed by General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance
Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity
and Nationalism filed before this court a Petition for Habeas
Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister
Enrile, Armed Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff
Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (General Ramos), and
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police Regional
Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-
Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court set the hearing
on the Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-
Gatue contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
was suspended as to Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue
of Proclamation No. 2045-A.121 The lawyers, according to
respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing mass
actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the
temporary release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the
recognizance of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and retired Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however,
Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a
Motion for Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent
Manifestation/Motion stating that Informations for rebellion
were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar. They
prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for
being moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance
Group, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity
and Nationalism opposed the motion. According to them, no
preliminary investigation was conducted before the filing of the
Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived of
their right to due process. Consequently, the Information was
void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it
became moot and academic with the filing of the Information
against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar in court:127
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an
Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special
proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by
virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases
subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ
had served its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus
in Umil v. Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato
Villanueva, Amelia Roque, Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya, Deogracias Espiritu,
and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a warrant for
their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however,
Informations against them were filed before this court. The filing
of the Informations, according to this court, rendered the
Petitions for habeas corpus moot and academic, thus:131
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal
charges have been filed in the proper courts against the
petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of
54
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be
allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary
remedy of a petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under
a lawful process or order of the court must pursue the orderly
course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.133 This ordinary
remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or the
warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a
motion to quash complaint or information based on any of the
grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Grounds.The accused may move to quash the complaint
or information on any of the following
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
person of the accused;.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to
do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a
legal excuse or justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted
of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a
criminal complaint or information filed against him [or her] for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information."136 If the accused avails
himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused
"hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the
information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the
information are not to be considered."138
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the
complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order [the] amendment [of the complaint or
information]."139 If the motion to quash is based on the ground
that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not
constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If after
amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the
same defect, the trial court shall quash the complaint or
information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner
Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of
an offense. He was not restrained under a lawful process or an
order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the
Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. charged and accused
Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, of 57 counts of
murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a
warrant. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the
instances when a warrantless arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on- personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed
it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before
the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to prove that
he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo
was in the presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an
offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any
offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also
not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest
petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his
right to liberty without due process of law, for which a petition
for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty.
Risonar in the "disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner
Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to Camp Catitipan to verify and contest
any arrest papers against him. Then and there, Atty. Risonar was
arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion
in Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of
preliminary investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with
Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of his right to due process of law a
ground for the grant of a petition for habeas corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information
without preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of
Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise. The fiscal
misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not
persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal could not
55
rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To require petitioner
Otherwise, the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him
needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at one's whim and of his liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his
caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its favor given the strong evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.
imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President
himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither
which authorizes arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a his guilt nor his innocence. However, between a citizen who has
police officer who witnessed the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. shown that he was illegally deprived of his liberty without due
in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the arrest process of law and the government that has all the "manpower
was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante and the resources at [its] command"157 to properly indict a
delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the
rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that an offense Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it
"has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in must pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in our
point of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an Rules. Until then, we rule that petitioner Salibo is illegally
offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago. deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas Corpus must be
Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of granted.
factsindicating that the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead of
just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information The Court of Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011
could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden, Quezon City
and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis in the original, Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building,
citation omitted) Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to
immediately RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash detention.
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for
filing a Motion to Quash Information apply to him. Even if The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the
petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he alleged case to this court is hereby NOTED.
could not have been cured by mere amendment of the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the SO ORDERED.
accused appearing in the Information and/or Warrant of Arrest
from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" will not G.R. No. 210759 June 23, 2015
cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of Chairperson1 of Bureau of Immigration and
preliminary investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Deportation,2 Petitioner,
Arrest were issued on the premise that Butukan S. Malang and vs.
Datukan Malang Salibo are the same person. There is evidence, HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his capacity as Presiding
however, that the person detained by virtue of these processes is Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and JA
not Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan HOON KU, Respondents.
Malang Salibo.
x-----------------------x
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine
passport,148 his identification card from the Office on Muslim G.R. No. 211403
Affairs,149 his Tax Identification Number card,150 and clearance
from the National Bureau of Investigation151 all bearing his CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of
picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,Petitioner,
of these government-issued documents showed that petitioner vs.
Salibo used the alias "Butukan S. Malang." HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the JAHOONKU, Respondents.
country on November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre
occurred. x-----------------------x

A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that G.R. No. 211590
petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009
and arrived in the Philippines only on December 20, 2009. A CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the
Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests that petitioner Chairperson of Bureau of Immigration and
Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines Deportation, Petitioner,
Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the vs.
Philippines on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December JA HOON KU, Respondent.
20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary
DECISION
V
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is PEREZ, J.:
probably the most complex case pending in our courts. The case
involves 57 victims154 and 197 accused, two (2) of which have The privilege of the writ of amparo is .an extraordinary remedy
become state witnesses.155 As of November 23, 2014, 111 of the adopted to address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and
accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be
56
resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate
filing of Amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to
secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.3
For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated
petitions assailing the Orders dated 28 January 2014,4 29 January
2014,5 and 18 February 2014,6 as well as the Resolution dated 14
March 2014,7 all issued by respondent Presiding Judge Paulino
Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-Manila,
Branch 47 in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282.
The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International
Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of
Korea sent a Notice8 to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in
the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for
arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip
Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea wrote a Letter-Request9 to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison,
Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate
arrest and deportatio n of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable
alien.
Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Kus visa expired.10
On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-
Mangrobang charged Ku for being a risk to public interest
pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No. 2711.11This finding was approved by
the BI Board of Commissioners which, on 16 January 2014, issued
a Summary Deportation Order.12
On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance
of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section,
arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was
detained.13
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Kus
passport.14
Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies, docketed as SP PROC. No.
14- 131282.15 On 22 January 2014, he also filed a Supplemental
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.16
Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014,
issued a Writ of Amparo.17 On 24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion
for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).18 Judge
Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on 27 January 2014 at
8:30 a.m.,19 while he set the hearing on the petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo on 29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.20
In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of
the Writ.21 He was then notified that a hearing on the TPO was
held earlier in the morning and that the same was already
submitted for resolution.22
Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of
TPO on 28 January 2014.23
On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed
Order granting the motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Kus
custody to the Philippine National Red Cross and/or its Chairman
CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine National
Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to
protect Ku and his immediate family.24 On 29 January 2014, Judge
Gallegos issued the second assailed Order directing the transfer
of custody and protection of Ku to the PNP-PSPG.25 Petitioner
challenged these orders before the Court via a Petition for
Certiorari26 docketed as G.R. No. 210759.
On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No.
210759 issuing a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining
the enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and
directing the BI to retain custody of Ku, as well as requiring Ku to
comment on the petition.27 In issuing this resolution, the Court
intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo
given that he was validly arrested and placed under the
jurisdiction and custody of the BI; thus the case cannot be
categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance.28
Owing to the Courts Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the
hearing set on 11 February 2014 before the trial court, petitioner
verbally moved for the dismissal of the amparo petition.29On 18
February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued the third assailed
order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.30Thus,
petitioner appealed the matter to the Court via the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition31 docketed as G.R. No. 211403.
On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his
deportation order addressed to the Office of the President (OP).32
On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution
granting the privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby
GRANTED. [Ku] is ordered immediately released from
[petitioners] custody without prejudice to the institution of the
proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner] and/or
agents are ordered to cease and desist from further violating the
right to liberty of [Ku] and the members of his family by filing
cases to legitimize his detention.33
Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No.
211403, the Court issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing
the Order dated 18 February 2014 and from further proceeding
with the case.34
On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only
until 31 August 2014 or until his appeal was resolved, whichever
came first.35Ku then moved for the release of his passport before
the RTC, which petitioner opposed and to which he filed a
counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport to the BI,
given that such was one of the conditions for the OPs grant of
provisional liberty to Ku.36 In the Order dated 26 March 2014,
however, Judge Gallegos merely noted petitioners motion for
being moot, considering that he already released Kus passport
on 20 March 2014, upon the personal request of Ku.37
Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for
Review on Certiorari in G.R. No. 211590, essentially assailing the
Resolution dated 14 March 2014.
Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions,38 we
come to the central question of whether or not the privilege of
the writ of amparo was properly granted in the case at bar.
We rule in the negative.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo
Rule)39 provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
57
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule
"in light of the prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances." It was an exercise for the first time of the
Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our
people s constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino
experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal
killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. "Extralegal killings" are killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or where about s of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
such persons outside the protection of law."40
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further
cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-
Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the
writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what
constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v.
Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting "enforced
disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g)
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851,43 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.44
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the
Amparo Rule is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete
statutory definition as well of what an enforced or involuntary
disappearance is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs reference to
enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the
enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated
in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced
disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to R.A. No. 9851.45
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily
discern that Kus circumstance does not come under the statutory
definition of an enforced or involuntary disappearance. Indeed,
Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on
the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any
refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can
it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the
protection of the law for a prolonged time.
Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained
by agents of the BI, that he was not read his rights under the
constitution and was not informed of the reason for hi s arrest,
nor provided a copy of any document leading to his arrest and
detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in testifying
that, upon Kus arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of
the BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed
him of his constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his
visa.47
More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to
conceal Ku or his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Kus arrest
and the fact that he was in their custody was not obscured as, in
fact, these were well-documented as evidenced by the Return of
Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 201448 and the After-
Mission Report dated 17 January 2014.49
More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily
disclosed to the trial court that Ku was in the custody of the BI
pursuant to a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary
Deportation Order.50
These documents and pleading show that there was never any
intention on the part of the BI to re move Ku from the protection
of the law for a prolonged time. Besides, when Ku was arrested at
9:30 p.m. on 16 January 2014, and received at the BI Detention
Center at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014,51 the following day
or on 17 January 2014, Kus counsel was immediately able to file
his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration before
the BI,52 thereby showing that Kus legal rights were amply
guarded and that he was never removed from the protection of
the law.
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo
petition should contain, among which is the right to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, to wit:
SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. The petition shall be signed and
verified and shall allege the following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the
identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
and
58
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs.
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of
being detained for a long period of time without any cause, and
that he fears that the BI will fabricate criminal cases against him
to hold him under detention.53
According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo
petition is the protection it will give to his person against the
actions of some government officials who will likely take
advantage of their positions and use the power of the
government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays
in confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening
situations and the further the violation of his guaranteed rights. 54
The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that
the Amparo Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by
substantial evidence.55 Other than making unfounded claims,
however, Ku was not able to present evidence that he was
exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the BI
Detention Center. On the contrary, the records show that he is
afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.
Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the
amparo petition, was that the BI would trump up charges against
him so as to justify his detention. The fact remains, however, that
even before his arrest, deportation charges against him were
already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTCs grant of the
privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku
and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged
threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental
function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details
concerning the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance
of an aggrieved party. As Ku and his whereabouts were never
hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege of the
writ of amparo in the case at bar.
It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum
shopping. Being the subject of a Warrant of Deportation and a
Summary Deportation Order, Kus proper recourse is with the BI
and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.56
Ku knows this and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration
before the BI and an Appeal before the OP. When Ku, however,
injudiciously filed a Petition and a Supplemental Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, he committed forum shopping by
seeking a remedy which he had already solicited from another
tribunal.
In Kiani v. BID,57 where petitioner therein file d before the trial
court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have the
detention of her husband declared as illegal and to order the
latters release, and where her husband filed before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) an omnibus motion seeking
to question the summary deportation order issued against him,
the Court held that petitioner indulged in forum shopping.
The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book
III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is
vested in the President of the Philippines, subject to the
requirements of due process. The Immigration Commissioner is
vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party
aggrieved by a Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed
from assailing said Order in the RTC even via a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus . Conformably with ruling of the Court in
Domingo v. Scheer , such party may file a motion for the
reconsideration thereof before the BOC.58
Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court held that there is
forum shopping when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an
action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other
courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. While a party
may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of Court, such
party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her
pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present
simultaneous remedies in two different forums, for it degrades
and wreaks havoc to the rule on orderly procedure. A party must
follow the sequence and hierarchical order in availing of such
remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing fast
and loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of
malpractice, is considered as trifling with the courts and abusing
their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the
administration of justice.
On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly
disregarded the Courts directives as regards this case. The
records show that the Courts Resolution dated 4 February 2014,
wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the
Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the
impropriety of the amparo petition, was received by the RTC on 5
February 2014.60 This should have alerted Judge Gallegos to
proceed with caution and restraint in granting the privilege of the
writ of amparo. And yet, despite having knowledge of the Courts
pronouncements, Judge Gallegos proceeded to grant the said
privilege.
Also, the records show that the Courts Resolution dated 18
March 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement
of the Order dated 18 February 2014 and enjoining the RTC from
further proceeding with the case, was received by the RTC on 20
March 2014 at 9:00 a.m.61
Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the Resolution
dated 14 March 2014 which granted the privilege of the writ of
amparo, his receipt of the Courts Resolution dated 18 Marc h
2014 should have forewarned him against releasing Kus
passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and
unwillingness to follow the Courts edicts.
It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should
not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with
promptly and completely.1wphi1 Such failure to comply
accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character,
but al so disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive.62
Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders
and decisions of higher tribunals, especially the Supreme Court
from which all other courts take their bearings. A resolution of
the Supreme Court is not to be construed as a mere request nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.63
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it
is a necessity. The exacting standards of conduct demanded from
judges are designed to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself becomes
the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places
his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and
impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.64
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:
59
a) GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Resolution dated 14 March 2014 of the Regional Trial Court
which granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;
b) DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo and the
Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP.
PROC.No. 14131282 before the Regional Trial of Manila, Branch
47; and
c) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the
appropriate administrative charge/s against Judge Paulino Q.
Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to
forthwith submit to the Court its report and recommendation
thereon.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186050, June 21, 2016
ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON BALAO, NONETTE BALAO,
JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, AND BEVERLY
LONGID, Petitioners, v. EDUARDO ERMITA, GILBERTO
TEODORO, RONALDO PUNO, NORBERTO GONZALES, GEN.
ALEXANDER YANO, GEN. JESUS VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN.
REYNALDO MAPAGU, LT. P/DIR. EDGARDO DOROMAL, MAJ.
GEN. ISAGANI CACHUELA, COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE
AFP-ISU BASED IN BAGUIO CITY, PSS EUGENE MARTIN, AND
SEVERAL JOHN DOES, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 186059
EDUARDO SECRETARY TEODORO, RONALDO SECRETARY
GONZALES, SECRETARY ERMITA, GILBERTO SECRETARY
PUNO, NORBERTO GEN. ALEXANDER YANO, P/DGEN. JESUS
VERZOSA, BRIG. GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, MAJ. GEN.
ISAGANI CACHUELA, AND POL. SR. SUPT. EUGENE
MARTIN, Petitioners, v. ARTHUR BALAO, WINSTON
JARDELEZA, AND BALAO, NONETTE BALAO, CAGUIOA, JJ.
JONILYN BALAO-STRUGAR, AND BEVERLY
LONGID, Respondents.**
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution are the recommendations in the Final
Report1 dated January 15, 2016 submitted by the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 (RTC) in compliance
with the directives in the Court's Decision2 dated December 13,
2011 (December 13, 2011 Decision) in the above-captioned
consolidated cases.
The Facts
The instant case arose when James M. Balao (James), founding
member of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), a coalition of
nongovernment organizations working for the cause of
indigenous peoples in the Cordillera Region,3 was abducted by
five (5) unidentified armed men on September 17, 2008, in front
of Saymor's Store at Tomay, La Trinidad, Benguet.4 After efforts
to find him proved futile, James's siblings, namely: Arthur Balao,
Winston Balao, Nonette Balao, and Jonilyn Balao-Strugar,
together with CPA Chairperson Beverly Longid (CPA Chairperson
Longid; collectively, Balao, et al.) filed a petition for the issuance
of a writ of amparo in James's favor before the RTC, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 08-AMP-0001.5
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment6 dated January 19, 2009, the RTC granted the
privilege of the writ of amparo, thereby directing herein public
officers, namely: then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, Defense Secretary
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., Interior and Local Government Secretary
Ronaldo V. Puno, National Security Adviser Norberto B. Gonzales,
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff General
Alexander B. Yano, Philippine National Police (PNP) Police
Director General Jesus A. Verzosa, Philippine Army (PA) Chief
Brigadier General Reynaldo B. Mapagu, PNP Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Chief Lt. P/Dir.
Edgardo Doromal, Northern Luzon Command (NOLCOM)
Commander Major General Isagani C. Cachuela, PNP-Cordillera
Administrative Region Regional Director Police Senior
Superintendent Eugene Gabriel Martin, and several John Does
(the public officers)7 to: (a) disclose where James is being
detained or confined; (b) release him from his unlawful
detention; and (c) cease and desist from inflicting harm on his
person.8 The RTC held that James's unlawful disappearance was
due to his activist/political leanings and because the CPA was
seen as a front of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People's Army (CPP-NPA).9 The RTC further ruled that the
investigation conducted by the public officers was "very limited,
superficial[,] and one-sided" which, thus, unmistakably violated
James's right to security of his person.10 Meanwhile, the RTC
denied the interim reliefs that Balao, et al. prayed for i.e., the
issuance of inspection order, production order, and witness
protection order - considering that they failed to comply with the
stringent provisions of The Rule on the Writ
of Amparo11(Amparo rule) in order to grant the same.12
Separately, both parties appealed to the Court. In G.R. No.
186050, Balao, et al. challenged the RTC's denial of the interim
reliefs, while, in G.R. No. 186059, the public officers assailed the
RTC's judgment extending the privilege of the writ of amparo.13
The Court's Ruling
in the December 13, 2011 Decision
In the December 13, 2011 Decision,14 the Court reversed the
grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo, holding that the
totality of evidence presented in these cases did not fulfill the
evidentiary standard provided for by Amparo rule so as to
establish that James was a victim of an enforced disappearance.
Citing Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo,15 the Court ruled that
government involvement in the abduction of James could not be
simply inferred based on past incidents in which the victims also
worked or were affiliated with left-leaning groups.16 To add, the
Court clarified that the doctrine of command responsibility could
not be applied in amparo proceedings, considering that
pinpointing criminal culpability is not the issue thereat, but
rather, the same was conceived to determine responsibility or at
least accountability for enforced disappearances (and extralegal
killings), and to impose the appropriate remedies to address
them.17 More importantly, the Court held that, after a judicious
review of the records, the participation of members of the AFP or
PNP in the abduction of James was not sufficiently proven. It
highlighted that no concrete evidence was presented by Balao, et
al. which would have satisfactorily showed that James's
abductors were connected with them. Relatedly, Balao, et al.
likewise failed to present adequate proof that James was being
held or detained upon the orders or with acquiescence of
government agents.18
Notwithstanding these findings, the Court, however, concurred
60
with the RTC's observations describing the investigations made
by the public officers as "very limited, superficial[,] and one-
sided" and, hence, ineffective.19 As aptly pointed out by the RTC
to which the Court agreed, there was a seeming prejudice on the
part of the public officers to pin suspects who were not connected
with the government,20 further noting that they did not discharge
the burden of exercising extraordinary diligence in investigating
James's abduction, considering their abject failure to pursue
critical leads in: (a) ascertaining the identities of James's
abductors using the cartographic sketches described by the
witnesses; and (b) tracing the plate numbers of vehicles that
were allegedly used in conducting surveillance which were
previously reported by James to his family and to the CPA.21
In order to safeguard the constitutional right to liberty and
security of James who remained missing to date, the Court found
it apt to remand the case to the RTC so as to monitor and ensure
that the investigative efforts by the public officers would be
discharged with extraordinary diligence, as required under
Section 1722 of the Amparo rule. For this purpose, the RTC may
conduct hearings, as it may deem necessary, to validate the
results of the investigation.23 Lastly, anent the petition in G.R. No.
186050, the Court upheld the RTC ruling denying the interim
reliefs prayed for by Balao, et aL, holding that the issuance of
inspection and production orders could not be based on
insufficient claims, lest it would have sanctioned a "fishing
expedition."24
In light of the foregoing, the Court partly modified the RTC ruling,
as follows: (a) reversing the grant of the privilege of the writ
of amparo; (b) affirming the denial of the prayer for inspection
and production order, without prejudice to the subsequent grant
thereof, as it may be deemed necessary; and (c) ordering the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP and Director General of the
PNP to continue and pursue with extraordinary diligence - as
required under Section 17 of the Amparo rule - the investigation
of James's abduction, and specifically to take the necessary steps
to: [i] identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches;
[ii] locate the vehicles bearing the plate numbers provided by
Balao, et al. and which James had reported as conducting
surveillance on his person and to investigate their owners; and
[iii] pursue other leads relevant to his abduction.25
Within six (6) months from notice of the said Decision, the PNP
and PNP-CIDG were ordered to undertake their respective
investigations, and within fifteen (15) days from completion, the
AFP and PNP shall submit a full report of their investigations to
the RTC which, in turn, shall have thirty (30) days to submit
its Full Report to this Court for Final Action.26
Proceedings after the December 13, 2011 Decision
In a Notice27 dated November 28, 2013, the Court directed the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to conduct independent and parallel
investigations on the disappearance of James.
In a Further Partial Compliance28 dated October 30, 2014, the
RTC informed the Court that it scheduled a hearing on March 7,
2014 to determine, among others, the results of the investigation
being conducted by the Special Investigation Task Group (SITG)-
Balao,29 as monitored by the AFP and PNP, and that of the
CHR.30 Thereafter, the PNP, through SITG- Balao Commander PSS
Rodolfo S. Azurin, Jr., moved to require the Military Intelligence
Group 1 (MIG 1) based at Camp Henry T. Allen, Baguio City to
produce a copy of their Roster of Troops for calendar year 2008
in order to counter-check a name who was traced as the last
owner of the vehicle that was allegedly used in conducting
surveillance against James.31Meanwhile, the AFP, through Chief of
Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista, filed a manifestation and
compliance, confirming the reports of SITG-Balao that the owner
of the Mitsubishi Versa L-300 Van with plate number USC-
92232 was an active service officer of the Philippine Army
identified as Major Ferdinand Bruce M. Tokong (Maj.
Tokong).33 After granting PNP's motion, and upon submission of
the Roster of Troops, it was, however, revealed that Maj.
Tokong's name was not in the list.34 Separately, the CHR filed an
Investigation Report35 praying for the issuance of an order
directing a certain Brian Gonzales (Gonzales) - who Balao, et
al. claimed to be an asset of MIG 1 and, incidentally, was also their
cousin - to appear before the RTC, considering that he was
repeatedly mentioned in James's journal entries.36 Consequently,
the next hearing date was scheduled on February 20, 2015.37
In a Compliance by Way of Additional Partial Updates38 dated
March 20, 2015, the RTC notified the Court that the PNP had
submitted its Formal Report,39 recommending the termination of
investigation of the SITG-Balao without prejudice to the
continuation of the investigation by the local police unit
concerned.40The PNP reported that they traced the vehicles (that
were purportedly used for surveillance) to their respective
owners; however, their investigations did not yield any
significant breakthrough.41 The RTC, then, summarized the
updates of each party during the February 20, 2015 hearing: (a)
the PNP manifested that it did not receive any information about
the case after the submission of its report; (b) the AFP mentioned
that, aside from comparing the cartographic sketches of the
suspects with all their personnel,42 it was also investigating the
possible involvement of Maj. Tokong, and undertook to submit
the results thereof to the RTC after its declassification, and for
this, it asked for a period of fifteen (15) days to submit the same;
(c) the CHR revealed that it sent summons to Gonzales which
were, however, repeatedly ignored, and thus, prayed for the
issuance of a subpoena on his person; and (d) Balao, et al.
confirmed that Gonzales was James's first cousin and were
confounded why he was not investigated beforehand, considering
that he was a member of the PNP intelligence group and they
already provided his name as early as 2008.43
Moreover, the PNP manifested that they encountered problems in
gathering evidence and in pursuing a possible lead because of the
continuous refusal of Balao, et al. to present certain personalities
identified as "Uncle John" and "Rene," alleged housemates and
last companions of James.44 To know their identities, the PNP
stated that CPA Chairperson Longid should be compelled to
appear before the RTC.45Before the conclusion of the hearing, the
AFP made a commitment to submit its investigation about Maj.
Tokong's involvement. Accordingly, the RTC set the next hearing
on September 4, 2015 to allow the declassification of some
documents, as well as to give all parties additional time to
complete their respective investigations.46
In a Final Report47 dated January 15, 2016, the RTC discussed the
contents of the confidential AFP Report48 concluding that Maj.
Tokong had no involvement in the abduction of James.49 The AFP
Report mentioned that while it was true that Maj. Tokong went to
Baguio for his rest and recreation sometime in September 2008 -
which was approved by Colonel Lyndon V. Paniza - it would be
contrary to the experience of man if he would use his own
personal vehicle to conduct surveillance on James as this would,
in effect, expose him. Had Maj. Tokong indeed conducted
surveillance operations, he would have, at the very least, used
another vehicle to avoid liability. By using his personal vehicle,
this only strengthened Maj. Tokong's good faith and intention
that he went to Baguio for his personal vacation.50
The RTC, thereafter, highlighted the contents of Gonzales's
61
testimony, stating that: (a) he was not an asset of the AFP or NBI-
(b) James feared that he was being followed by unknown persons,
and he never mentioned of any vehicle tailing him, as those plate
numbers were only given by CPA Chairperson Longid; (c) acting
on the request of James to check if the latter was included in
the order of battle or watch list, Gonzales called his bilas (sister-
in-law's husband) in the AFP Intelligence Service Unit and friends
in the PNP who both said that James was not in the list; (d) he
denied sending text messages to James except their exchanges on
July 13, 2008; (e) James appeared to have wanted to leave the
CPA, considering that he was inquiring on how to obtain a visa to
go to Japan; and (f) he suspected the colleagues of James in the
CPA as his abductors, considering that they were the only
persons - i.e., such as his housemates - who knew or had
information of his schedule, activities, or whereabouts, and more
importantly, the CPA had been dictating what his cousins should
say or do, and had prevented them from communicating with
him.51
The RTC opined that the investigation of James's abduction had
reached an impasse,52 thereby recommending that these cases be
archived, considering that the investigation of the AFP had
reached a standstill with its conclusion that Maj. Tokong did not
conduct surveillance operations on James, and that the testimony
of Gonzales presented a new angle in the abduction that must be
further verified.53 In light of the foregoing, the RTC respectfully
recommended for the Court to: (a) archive the instant case;
(b) relieve the AFP and CHR of their respective obligations to
investigate the abduction of James; and (c) direct the PNP to
continue the investigation by further pursuing the angle raised by
Gonzales who had also expressed his willingness to cooperate in
identifying the housemates of James (who are also possible leads
and persons-of-interest). In this relation, the RTC noted that
while archived, these cases may still be re-opened by any
interested party should new evidence arise.54
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for resolution is whether or not the Court should
adopt the recommendations of the RTC in the Final Report dated
January 15, 2016.
The Court's Ruling
The recommendations in the Final Report dated January 15, 2016
are partly adopted.
At the outset, the Court observes that exhaustive efforts and
extraordinary diligence were exercised by the PNP, AFP, and CHR
in investigating the abduction of James, pursuant to the
parameters laid down in the December 13, 2011 Decision. On the
part of the AFP, the Court notes its active participation in the RTC
proceedings, and as gleaned from the AFP Report, it investigated
the possible involvement of Maj. Tokong, but who was
subsequently cleared from any participation in James's abduction
for lack of evidence.55 The AFP likewise stated that it compared
the results of the cartographic sketches with their
personnel,56 but still, did not yield any significant developments.
On the part of the PNP, records show that it keenly investigated
the ownership of the vehicles that were reportedly used for
surveillance on James. According to its Formal Report, the SITG-
Balao traced the vehicles ownership history, as well as the
activities and trips of the vehicle on the day of James's abduction,
but found no considerable leads.57 It must, however, be stressed
that the angle raised by Gonzales in his testimony - i.e., that James
could have been possibly abducted by CPA members - presented
a significant development that is worth investigating. It was
reported that James had housemates living with him who were
only identified as "Uncle John" and "Rene," allegedly members of
the CPA.58 Notably, the PNP previously tried to investigate these
persons-of-interest, but lamented the continuous refusal of
Balao, et al., particularly CPA Chairperson Longid, to disclose
their identities. This notwithstanding, Gonzales, however,
manifested that he could identify these individuals.59
Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to
archive, and not dismiss, the case should it determine that it
could not proceed for a valid cause, viz.:
Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. The court shall not
dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its
determination it cannot proceed for a valid causesuch as the
failure of petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their
lives.
A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by
the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any
party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings.
The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to
prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to
the petitioner of the order archiving the case.
The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court
Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this
Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural
measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in
which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds
exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive
case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation obtains
in which action thereon can be taken.60 To be sure,
the Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it
is impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to
appear due to threats on their lives or to similar analogous causes
that would prevent the court from effectivelyhearing and
conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not
obtain in these cases.
Here, while it may appear that the investigation conducted by the
AFP reached an impasse, it must be pointed out that there was
still an active lead worth pursuing by the PNP. Thus, the
investigation had not reached a deadend - which would have
warranted the case's archiving - because the testimony of
Gonzales set forth an immediate action on the part of the PNP
which could possibly solve, or uncover new leads, in the ongoing
investigation of James's abduction. Therefore, the RTC's
recommendation that these cases should be archived is clearly
premature, and hence, must be rejected.
WHEREFORE, the recommendations of the Regional Trial Court
of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 (RTC) in the Final Report
dated January 15, 2016 are PARTLY ADOPTED. Accordingly, the
Court hereby resolved to:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) REJECT the recommendation of the RTC to archive these
cases;
(b) RELIEVE the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
62

Commission on Human Rights from their respective
obligations to investigate the abduction of James Balao; and
(c) DIRECT the Philippine National Police (PNP) to further
investigate the angle presented by Bryan Gonzales and to
ascertain the identities of "Uncle John" and "Rene" who are
persons-of-interest in these cases.
The PNP is given six (6) months from notice hereof to complete
its investigation. Within fifteen (15) days from completion, the
PNP shall submit the results thereof to the RTC. Within thirty
(30) days thereafter, the RTC shall submit its full report and
recommendation to the Court for final action.
SO ORDERED.
September 19, 2017
G.R. No. 230324
LORIE MARIE TOMAS CALLO, Petitioner
vs.
COMMISSIONER JAIME H. MORENTE, BUREAUS OF
IMMIGRATION, OIC ASSOCIATES COMMISSIONERS BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION and BRIAN ALAS, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION , Respondents
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
This is a petition for a writ of amparo (with Prayer to Issue
Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of Danielle Tan Parker from
Detention) under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC (The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo). Petitioner Lorie Marie Tomas Callo (Callo) seeks the
immediate release of Danielle Tan Parker from the Immigration
Detention Facility, Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan, Taguig City.
The Facts
Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) is a holder of Philippine Passport
No. XX5678508 issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) on 5 March 2010 and valid until 4 March 2015.
On 15 January 2013, Parker was charged for deportation for
being an undesirable, undocumented, and overstaying alien, in
violation of Section 3 7 (a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, as amended, in relation to Rule XVI, Office Memorandum
No. ADD-01-004. It was alleged that Danielle Nopuente was a
fugitive from justice in the United States of America with an
outstanding arrest warrant issued against her. Subsequently, on
24 January 2013, a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) was
issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelita
Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker, upon verification that she
arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2011 under the
Balikbayan Program, with an authorized stay of a period of one
year. Parker was not in the list of approved applications of the
DFA for dual citizenship and her American Passport had been
revoked by the United States Department of State. Thus, she was
considered an undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying alien,
in violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
On 5 June 2014, pursuant to the SDO issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, Parker was arrested in Tagaytay City on the
premise that Danielle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker are one
and the same person. She was then taken to the Immigration
Detention Facility in Bicutan, Taguig City. She is still currently
detained in the Immigration Detention Facility as the deportation
was not carried out due to the fact that Parker is charged with
falsification and use of falsified documents before Branch 4,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City.
On 12 September 2014, Parker, as petitioner, filed a Petition
for Habeas Corpus before Branch 266, Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City. The Bureau of Immigration was able to produce the
body of Parker before the RTC. The Bureau of Immigration then
alleged that as the SDO had become final and executory, it served
as the legal authority to detain Parker. The Bureau of
Immigration also argued that Parker cannot be released or
deported without the final disposition of her pending criminal
case in Davao City.
The RTC dismissed the petition, finding that the detention of
Parker was legal.1 Parker then appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC and found that Parker
failed to prove that she was a Filipino citizen to warrant judicial
intervention through habeas corpus.2 The CA gave weight to the
Certification dated 20 June 2015 issued by the Office of the
Consular Affairs of the DFA that there is "no available data"
regarding any record/information from the year 1990 onwards
of Philippine Passport No. :XX5678508. Parker no longer
appealed the denial of the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
and the decision of the CA became final and executory on 5
January 2016.3
On 23 March 2017, Callo filed this petition for a writ of amparo
with prayer to issue Interim Reliefs of Immediate Release of
Danielle Tan Parker from Detention. Callo argues that Parker is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and thus, there is no reason for her
to be detained by the Bureau of Immigration.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether or not the right to life,
liberty, and security of Parker is threatened by the respondents
to warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo and subsequently
the award of the interim reliefs.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Callo seeks the issuance of the writ of amparo and the interim
reliefs available under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC for the immediate
release of Parker. Callo alleges that Parker is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and thus should not have been detained by the
Bureau of Immigration. Moreover, Callo alleges that the kife of
Parker is endangered in the detention center; and thus a writ
of amparo with the interim reliefs prayed for should be issued by
this Court.
We disagree.
We disagree.
The protective writ of amparo is a judicial remedy to
expeditiously provide relief to violations of a person's
constitutional right to life, liberty, and security, and more
specifically, to address the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof. Section 1 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC provides:
63
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the writ of
amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof4 Enforced disappearance is defmed under
Republic Act (RA) No. 9851,5 Section 3(g) of which provides:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means
the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political
organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
This Court also had the opportunity to define extralegal killings
and enforced disappearance:
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the
other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the
Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law.6
In Navia v. Pardico,7 this Court clarified that with the enactment
of RANo. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo is now a
procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional right to
life, liberty, and security, but also on a concrete statutory
definition of "enforced or involuntary disappearance." Further,
elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under
RA No. 9851 were clearly laid down by this Court, viz:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period oftime.8
It is clear that the elements of enforced disappearance are not
attendant in this case. There is also no threat of such enforced
disappearance.1wphi1 While there is indeed a detention carried
out by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, the third and
fourth elements are not present. There is no refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of freedom or refusal to give
information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo
admits, Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility
of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration also
does not deny this. In fact, the Bureau of Immigration had
produced the body of Parker before the RTC in the proceedings
for the writ of habeas corpus previously initiated by Parker
herself.9 Similarly, there is no intention to remove Parker from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. As the
Bureau of Immigration explained, Parker has a pending criminal
case against her in Davao City, which prevents the Bureau of
Immigration from deporting her from the country.
Simply put, we see no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or
any threats thereof, that would warrant the issuance of the writ
of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is not sufficient that a
person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and
prove that a person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the
required quantum of proof that the disappearance was carried
out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal
to acknowledge the same or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the missing persons.10 In this case, Parker has not
disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently justified by the
Bureau of Immigration, given that there is an SDO and a pending
criminal case against her.
Callo contends that there is no cause to detain Parker because
Parker, a natural-born Filipino citizen, is a different person from
Danielle Nopuente, the person against whom the SDO was issued.
We disagree.
Callo has failed to prove that Danielle Tan Parker and Danielle
Nopuente are two different persons. In particular, we give weight
to the fact that the DFA issued a certificate verifying that there is
no available data on Passport No. XX5678508, which was the
Philippine passport used by Parker.11 Moreover, the Certificate of
Live Birth,12 which purportedly shows that Parker was born in
the Philippines on 21 March 1975 of Filipino parents, was only
registered on 4 January 2010. There was no explanation given as
to why Parker's birth was registered only after almost 35 years.
Moreover, Callo only alleges facts from the year 2005, allegedly
for purposes of brevity.13 We do not see any reason why facts
surrounding the existence of Parker should only be presented
from 2005. In fact, the only period that is thoroughly discussed
about her is from 2010 to 2011. To prove that Parker and
Nopuente are two different persons, the life and existence of
Parker should have been alleged and proven since birth. In this
case, there is no allegation nor any proof as to who Parker was, or
what she had been doing, before 2011. Taking all these
circumstances into perspective, Parker had failed to sufficiently
prove that she is a different person from Danielle Nopuente.
Callo contends that Parker's life is endangered in the Immigration
I Detention Facility because of the threats against her by her co-
detainees and the living conditions of the facility which pose
health problems for Parker. Unfortunately, these allegations -
even if proven - will not support the issuance of a writ of amparo.
To repeat, the remedy of a writ of amparo is an extraordinary
remedy that is meant to balance the government's awesome
power and to curtail human rights abuses.14 The writ .covers
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereo1 f as specifically defined under RA No. 9851. The
circumstances of Parker, as alleged by Callo, do not meet the
requirements for the issuance of the kit of amparo.
Finally, we note that the petition for the writ of amparo was filed
by Callo. However, there was no allegation of her relationship to
Parker.15 In Boac v. Cadapan,16 we emphasized the importance of
the exclusive and successive order of who can file a petition for a
writ of amparo. We held:
64
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen
do not have the requisite standing to file the amparo petition on
behalf of Merino. They call attention to the fact that in the amparo
petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen merely indicated that
they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for filing the
petition on his behalf.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any
qualified person or entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse,
children and parents of the aggrieved party; (b) Any ascendant,
descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution,
if there is no known member of the immediate family or relative
of the aggrieved party.1wphi1
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that
there were no known members of the immediate family or
relatives of Merino. The exclusive and successive order mandated
by the above-quoted provision must be followed. The order of
priority is not without reason - "to prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo
which may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security
of the aggrieved party."
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed
the petition for habeas corpus on Merino's behalf. No objection
was raised therein for, in a habeas corpusproceeding, any person
may apply for the writ on behalf of the aggrieved party.
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the
parents of Sherlyn and Karen are precluded from filing the
application on Merino's behalf as they are not authorized parties
under the Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while "any person" may file a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus, in a petition for the writ of amparo, the order of priority
on who can file the petition should be strictly followed. In this
case, there was no allegation nor proof that Parker had no
immediate family members or any ascendant, descendant, or
collateral relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity. In fact, no allegation was made on any of the familial
relationship of Parker as only her whereabouts from 2011 were
alleged and discussed. Therefore, based on the order of priority,
Callo had no legal standing to file this petition.
Given that there is no basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo,
the interim reliefs sought for are also denied. Moreover, we see
no need to address the other issues raised by Callo in this
petition, specifically, the condition of the Immigration Detention
Facility and the treatment of Parker in said detention center. A
petition for the writ of amparo is not the proper action to resolve
such issues.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
February 7, 2017
G.R. No. 191416
MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA,
JR., ARIEL MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON,
JUN CINABRE, FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO,
JOSEPH TUMALIUAN, and RANDY DAYAG, Petitioners
vs.
LEOMAR BUENO, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,2 seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision3 dated January 18, 2010 and Resolution4 dated
March 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No.
00038, which granted the petition for the issuance of a writ
of amparo filed by Leomar Bueno (respondent) against Mayor
William N. Mamba (Mayor Mamba), Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr.
(Atty. Mamba), Ariel Malana (Malana), Narding Aggangan
(Aggangan), Jomari Sagalon (Sagalon), Jun Cinabre (Cinabre),
Frederick Baligod (Baligod), Rommel Encollado (Encollado ),
Joseph Tumaliuan (Tumaliuan), and Randy Dayag (Dayag)
(collectively, the petitioners).
The Facts
On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba
(Emelita) in Tuao, Cagayan was robbed. Emelita is the mother of
Mayor Mamba, then Mayor of the Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan
and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacafiang official.5 The Task Force
Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency created by
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police force in
maintaining peace and order in the municipality, undertook an
investigation on the robbery.6
On June 14, 2009, several members of the Task Force, Malana,
Aggangan and Sagalon, together with barangay officials Cinabre
and Encollado, went to the. house of the respondent, then still a
minor, to invite him for questioning on his supposed involvement
in the robbery. The respondent and his mother, Maritess Bueno
(Maritess ), acceded to the invitation. Thereupon, the respondent
was brought to the Tuao police station.7
The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the
respondent was brought to the Tuao police station.
The petitioners claim that:
When they reached the Tuao police station, there were no police
investigators or any representative from the local Social Welfare
and Development (SWD) office and, hence, the investigation
could not proceed. At that time, Raymund Rodriguez (Raymund),
allegedly an eyewitness to the robbery, was at the police station.
Raymund pointed to the respondent as among those who robbed
the store; the respondent then told Raymund that he would kill
him for ratting him out.8 The petitioners allege that prior to the
robbery of the canteen, the respondent approached Raymund
and his brother Robin and proposed to them that they rob the
canteen. The latter, however, declined the offer. Later that night,
Raymund saw the respondent and Lorenzo Haber (Haber)
robbing the canteen. Thereafter, Robin reported the incident to
the Task Force.9
The petitioners further claim that at the time of the robbery,
Mayor Mamba and Atty. Mamba were not around since they
previously left Tuao, Cagayan for Manila on June 10, 2009. Mayor
Mamba was on official leave for 10 days, from June 10, 2009 until
June 20, 2009, while Atty. Mamba had to report for work in
Malacaang.10
65
The respondent's custody was then referred to the Task Force.
Haber was later invited to the police station for questioning
regarding his involvement in the robbery. However, his custody
was likewise referred to the Task Force since there were still no
police investigators.11
On June 17, 2009, Atty. Mamba arrived in Tuao, Cagayan. While
going out of his residence, Maritess approached Atty. Mamba and
asked him about her son. Atty. Mamba told her that he does not
know her son and that if the respondent indeed committed a
crime, she should not tolerate what her son was doing.12
On June 18, 2009, while the members of the Task Force were on
their way to bring the respondent and Haber to the police station,
they were met by Police Superintendent Joselito Buenaobra
(P/Supt. Buenaobra) of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Cagayan Regional Office. Thereafter, the respondent's custody
was transferred to the PNP Cagayan Regional Office.13
Maritess then went to the office of Mayor Mamba, but she was
told to come back at later date since Mayor Mamba was still on
official leave. When Mayor Mamba arrived in Tuao on June 20,
2009, a conference was immediately held. Maritess requested
that the members of the Task Force be brought to Mayor
Mamba's office. Almost all of the members of the Task Force
arrived. However, Maritess was unable to pinpoint who among
them took custody of his son. Mayor Mamba then advised her to
file a complaint in court should she be able to identify the
responsible persons.14
On the other hand, the respondent alleges that:
At around 3:00 p.m. of June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and Dayag, both
members of the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then
Municipal Administrator of Tuao, fetched the respondent from
the police station and brought .him to Mayor Mamba's
house.15 Sometime in the evening of even date, the respondent
was made to board a white van driven by Aggangan. Inside the
van, he was beaten with a gun by Malana, who later threatened
him that he would be killed. Thereafter, he was brought back to
Mayor Mamba's house.16
That same evening, Haber, likewise a minor, was invited by the
barangay captain in his place, accompanied by about 10
barangay tanods and two police officers, for questioning as
regards the robbery of the canteen. Haber was brought to the
police station where he spent the night.17
On June 15, 2009, Haber was brought to Mayor Mamba's house.
The respondent and Haber were then tortured to force them to
admit to their involvement in the robbery. They were made to
roll on the grass while being kicked and beaten with a cue stick
by Malana; hot wax was poured over their bodies to force them to
admit to the robbery, but they denied any involvement therein.
Thereafter, they were blindfolded and were questioned by Atty.
Mamba regarding the robbery of the canteen. When his blindfold
was taken off, the respondent saw Atty. Mamba sitting
nearby.18 On June 16, 2009, Malana brought the respondent and
Haber, together with Robin and Raymund, to the office of the
Task Force, where they all spent the night.19
Meanwhile, Maritess went to the Tuao police station to look for
her son; she was told that the respondent was brought to Mayor
Mamba's house. However, when Maritess went to Mayor
Mamba's house, she was not permitted to see her son. Maritess
was able to talk to Mayor Mamba who told her that she should
not condone the acts of her son. Maritess then sought the
assistance of P/Supt. Buenaobra regarding the respondent's
disappearance from the police station. The PNP Cagayan Regional
Office was then preparing a case for habeas corpus when the
respondent was released on June 18, 2009 to the local SWD
office.20
Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the
case of the respondent.21 On August 25, 2009, the respondent,
assisted by the CHR, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Amparo with the CA.22
On September 14, 2009, the CA, gave due course to the petition
and directed the issuance of the writ of amparo. On September
23, 2009, the petitioners filed their verified return.23
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted by the CA. The
respondent presented in evidence his own testimony and the
testimonies of Dr. Odessa B. Tiangco (Dr. Tiangco) of the Cagayan
Valley Medical Center, provindal social welfare officer Elvira
Layus (Layus), and Maritess.24 The petitioners, on the other hand,
presented the testimony of Cinabre, Encollado, Baligod, and
Robin.25
The CA further issued subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to
and heard the testimony of P/Supt. Buenaobra.26
On January 18, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed
Decision,27 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by [the
respondent] is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. [The petitioners] are hereby enjoined from doing any act of
physical or psychological violence that would harm or threaten
[the respondent] and his family, including those who assisted him
in the preparation of this present petition, especially the [CHR],
Regional Office No. 02, Cagayan and his witnesses;
2. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan, whoever is the
incumbent, is hereby ordered to continue the investigation on the
violation done against [the respondent], and using extraordinary
diligence, to furnish this Court with a report regarding the said
investigation. The investigation must be commenced as soon as
possible but not more than 30 days from the receipt of this
Decision.
3. [Mayor Mamba] is hereby ordered to provide assistance to the
above PNP investigation including but not limited to the act of
furnishing and/or providing the latter a list of the members of the
Task Force who had direct involvement in the violation of [the
respondent's] rights to life, liberty and security, including their
identities and whereabouts, and to allow the investigation to run
its course unhindered or influenced. He is further ordered to
update and furnish this Court of the actions he has done or will be
doing regarding this directive.
4. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan and [Mayor
Mamba] are ordered to update this Court regarding their
reportorial duty under this Decision within ten (10) days from
the commencement of the investigation, and thereafter, to make a
quarterly report regarding the said investigation. The
investigation should be completed within one year from the
receipt of this Decision;
5. All findings resulting from the said investigation should be
made available to [the respondent] and his counsel should they
consider the same necessary to aid them in the filing of
appropriate actions, criminal or otherwise, against those who are
responsible for the violation of the former's rights.
66
Failure to comply with the above will render the Head of the PNP
Regional Office of Cagayan and [Mayor Mamba] liable for
contempt of this Court.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to also furnish the Head of
the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA opined that the respondent's rights to liberty and security
were undeniably undermined when he was invited by the
members of the Task Force for investigation and was brought to
Mayor Mamba's house from the Tuao police station.29 It further
pointed out that notwithstanding that Mayor Mamba was not in
Tuao when the incident happened, he is still accountable since
he failed to show sufficient action to protect the respondent's
rights; that Mayor Mamba failed to acknowledge the irregularity
of the acts of the members of the Task Force or to identify those
who were responsible for the violation of the respondent's rights.
The CA further ruled that it was incumbent upon Atty. Mamba,
being a public servant, to ensure that the respondent's
constitutional rights are not violated.30
The CA pointed out that the "invitation" extended to the
respondent by the members of the Task Force was in the nature
of an arrest as the real purpose of the same was to make him
answer to the heist committed the night before. The CA ruled that
the same amounted to an invalid warrantless arrest since the
circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.31
Further, the CA ruled that although the respondent was
subsequently released and that he failed to establish that there is
an impending danger of physical harm to him or his family, the
refusal of the respondent officials of the local government of
Tuao, especially Mayor Mamba, to admit and address the
irregularities committed by the members of the Task Force is
tantamount to a continuing violation of the respondent's right to
security.32
The petitioners sought a reconsideration33 of the Decision dated
January 18, 2010, but it was denied by the CA in its
Resolution34 dated March 2, 2010.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners claim that the CA erred in issuing the writ
of amparo in favor of the respondent. They insist that the
respondent, who was then the suspect in the robbery of the
canteen, was not illegally detained or tortured; that the members
of the Task Force merely invited him for questioning as to his
involvement in the robbery.35 They allege that the petition for the
issuance of a writ of amparo is not the proper remedy available to
the respondent since the present laws provide ample recourse to
him for the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security. They
also maintain that the respondent's rights to life, liberty and
security are not under threat since he and his mother stated that
they are not afraid of the petitioners.36
The petitioners further aver that it was improper for the CA to
direct the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further
investigation on the incident since P/Supt. Buenaobra had
already testified for the respondent during the summary hearing
conducted by the CA.37 They also maintain that Mayor Mamba
and Atty. Mamba had nothing to do with the alleged violation of
the rights of the respondent since they were not in Tuao at the
time of the incident. That when Mayor Mamba returned to Tuao,
he immediately met Maritess to discuss the incident, but the
latter failed to identify the persons involved in the incident.38
On the other hand, the respondent claims that this petition was
filed beyond the reglementary period. He claims that under
Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, an appeal from the final
judgment or order must be filed with this Court within five
working days from notice of the adverse judgment. The
respondent avers that the petitioners, instead of immediately
filing a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, opted to
file a motion for reconsideration with the CA, which is a
prohibited pleading since it is dilatory.39
The respondent further maintains that the CA did not err when it
directed the issuance of a writ of amparo in his favor. He claims
that the writ of amparo is an appropriate remedy in his case since
it covers enforced disappearances; that his illegal warrantless
arrest is covered by the term "enforced disappearances."40
Issues
Essentially, the issues for the Court's consideration are the
following: first, whether the petition for review
on certiorari before the Court was filed within the reglementary
period; and second, whether the CA erred in granting the petition
for the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Timeliness of the petition
The petition for review on certiorari before the Court, which
assails the CA's grant of the writ of amparo, contrary to the
respondent's assertion, was filed on time. Section 19 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC provides that:
Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment
or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may
raise question of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date
of notice of the adverse judgment.1wphi1
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas
corpus cases.
There is nothing in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which proscribes the
filing of a motion for reconsideration of the final judgment or
order that grants or denies a writ of amparo. Section 11 of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC only prohibits the following pleadings and
motions:
Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following
pleadings and motions are prohibited:
a. Motion to dismiss;
b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit,
position paper and other pleadings;
c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
f. Third-party complaint;
g. Reply;
67
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
i. Intervention;
j. Memorandum;
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim
relief orders; and
l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order.
What is prohibited under Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are
motions for reconsideration directed against interlocutory orders
or interim relief orders, not those assailing the final judgment or
order. The pleadings and motions enumerated in Section 11 of
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC would unnecessarily cause delays in the
proceedings; they are, thus, proscribed since they would run
counter to the summary nature of the rule on the writ
of amparo. A motion seeking a reconsideration of a final
judgment or order in such case, obviously, no longer affects the
proceedings.
Moreover, the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to A.M. No. 07-
9-12- SC insofar as it is not inconsistent with the
latter.41 Accordingly, there being no express prohibition to the
contrary, the rules on motions for reconsideration under the
Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo.
Nevertheless, considering that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC a party is only given five working days from the date of
notice of the adverse judgment within which to appeal to this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari, a motion for
reconsideration of a final judgment or order must likewise be
filed within the same period. Thereafter, from the order denying
or granting the motion for reconsideration, the party concerned
may file an appeal to the Court via a Rule 45 petition within five
working days from notice of the order pursuant to the fresh
period rule.42
The petitioners received a copy of the CA's Decision dated
January 18, 2010 on January 20, 2010.43 They, thus, have until
January 27, 2010 to either file a motion for reconsideration with
the CA or an appeal to this Court through a Rule 45 petition.44 On
January 25, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CA.45 The CA denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated March 2, 2010,
a copy of which was received by the petitioners' counsel on
March 8, 2010.46 Thus, the petitioners had until March 15, 2010
within which to appeal to this Court.47 The petitioners filed this
petition for review on certiorari on March 12, 2010.48 Thus,
contrary to the respondent's claim, this petition was filed within
the reglementary period.
Second Issue: Propriety of the grant
of the writ of amparo
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing
judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures
and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.49 Section 1 of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ
of amparo to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, viz.:
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose rights to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.50 On the
other hand, enforced disappearance has been defined by the
Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or
groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law.51
In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective
claims by substantial evidence.52 Substantial evidence is that
amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere
imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a
finding of liability against the person charged.53
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court
affirms the factual findings of the CA, which is largely based on
the respondent's evidence. Verily, the totality of the evidence
presented by the respondent meets the requisite evidentiary
threshold. To corroborate his allegations, the respondent
presented the testimony of Haber who, during the hearing
conducted by the CA on October 6, 2009, averred that on June 15,
2009, he was brought to Mayor Mamba's house where he and the
respondent were tortured. Haber testified that hot wax was
dripped onto their bodies while they were handcuffed; that they
were kicked and beaten with a cue stick and an alcohol container.
Thereafter, Haber testified that he and the respondent were
brought to the guardhouse where they were suffocated by
placing plastic bags on their heads. He also testified that a wire
was inserted inside their penises.54
The respondent's claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco
who testified that on June 18, 2009, she examined the respondent
and found that he suffered several injuries and multiple second
degree bums. Layus also attested that she saw the scars incurred
by the respondent on his head, arms, and back when she
interviewed him on July 26, 2009.55
In contrast, the respective testimonies of the witnesses for the
petitioners merely consisted in denial and the allegation that the
respondent was indeed the one who robbed the
canteen.56 Clearly, against the positive testimony of the
respondent, which was corroborated by his witnesses, the
petitioners' allegations must fail.
It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be
believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-
culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and
without evidentiary value.57 Further, even if the respondent was
indeed guilty of a crime, assuming it to be true, it does not justify
his immediate apprehension, in the guise of an invitation, and the
subsequent acts of torture inflicted on him.
What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by
substantial evidence that he was apprehended by the members of
the Task Force, illegally detained, and tortured. It was further
established that Maritess would not have seen his son if not for
the timely intercession of P/Supt. Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan
Regional Office. The members of the Task Force apprehended and
68
detained the respondent to make him admit to his complicity in
the heist the night before sans the benefit of legal and judicial
processes.
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the respondent, after four days
of detention, had been released by the members of the Task Force
on June 18, 2009. This fact alone, however, does not negate the
propriety of the grant of a writ of amparo.
In the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v.
Manalo, et al.,58 the Court emphasized that the writ
of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in
that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it
will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action.59
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's
favor notwithstanding that he has already been released from
detention. In such case, the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate
the punishment of those behind the illegal detention through
subsequent investigation and action.
More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations
of the right to security.1wphi1 At the core of the guarantee of the
right to security, as embodied in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution,60 is the immunity of one's person, including the
extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers and effects,
against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution not only limits the State's power over a
person's home and possession, but more importantly, protects
the privacy and sanctity of the person himself.61
The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life.
The right to life guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned. On the
other hand, the right to security is a guarantee of the secure
quality of life, i.e., the life, to which each person has a right, is not
a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.62
In Manalo, the Court further opined that the right to security of
person yields various permutations of the exercise of the right,
such as freedom from fear or, in the arnparo context, freedom
from threat; a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security; and a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government.63 As regards the right to security, in the sense of the
guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government, the
Court explained:
In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the rights to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to
security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy
that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional
guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to
these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar
of justice. x x x.64 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
In this case, it is incumbent upon the petitioners, who all hold
positions in the local government of Tuao, to conduct, at the very
least, an investigation on the alleged illegal arrest, illegal
detention and torture of the respondent. The petitioners,
nevertheless, claim that the Office of the Mayor and the police
station of Tuao, unknown to the respondent, are conducting an
investigation on the incident. However, other than their bare
assertion, they failed to present any evidence that would prove
the supposed investigation. Mere allegation is not a fact. Absent
any evidence that would corroborate the said claim, it is a mere
allegation that does not have any probative value.
Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures
undertaken by them to effectively investigate the irregularities
alleged by the respondent and to prosecute those who are
responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal detention and torture
suffered by the respondent were perpetrated by the members of
the Task Force themselves.
Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed
against the respondent, the petitioners seemingly justify the
illegal arrest and detention and infliction of bodily harm upon the
respondent by stating that the latter is a habitual delinquent and
was the one responsible for the robbery of the canteen. As stated
earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the petitioners,
as local government officials, are not at liberty to disregard the
respondent's constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty
and security. It is quite unfortunate that the petitioners, all local
government officials, are the very ones who are infringing on the
respondent's fundamental rights to life, liberty and security.
Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would
warrant the conclusion that the respondent's right to security, as
a guarantee of protection by the government, was violated.
Accordingly, the CA correctly issued the writ of amparo in favor
of the respondent.
The petitioners' claim that it was improper for the CA to direct
the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further investigation
on the respondent's allegations deserves scant consideration.
There is simply no basis to the petitioners' claim that the PNP
Cagayan Regional Office would not be expected to be objective in
their investigation since representatives therefrom testified
during the summary hearing. It bears stressing that P/Supt.
Buenaobra was not a witness for the respondent; he testified
pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum issued by
the CA. Further, as aptly pointed out by the CA, it would be more
reasonable for the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct the
said investigation since it has already commenced an initial
investigation on the incident.
Nevertheless, there is a need to modify the reliefs granted by the
CA in favor of the respondent. The CA's Decision was
promulgated in 2010.1wphi1 Since then, Mayor Mamba's term
of office as Mayor of Tuao had ended and, presumably, a new
individual is now occupying the position of Mayor of Tuao.
Accordingly, the incumbent Mayor of Tuao should be directed to
likewise provide assistance to the investigation to be conducted
by the PNP Cagayan Regional Office. Further, it has not been
manifested in this case that the PNP Cagayan Regional Office had
commenced the investigation on the incident that was ordered by
the CA.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 18, 2010 and
Resolution dated March 2, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 00038 are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
following terms:
69
1. Petitioners Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N.
Mamba, Jr., Ariel Malana, Narding Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun
Cinabre, Frederick Baligod, Rommel Encollado, Joseph
Tumaliuan, and Randy Dayag and the incumbent local
government officials of Tuao, Cagayan are hereby enjoined from
doing any act of physical or psychological violence on respondent
Leomar Bueno and his family including those who assisted him in
the filing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo with
the Court of Appeals;
2. The Regional Director of the Philippine National Police
Cagayan Regional Office, whoever is the incumbent, is hereby
directed to conduct an investigation, using extraordinary
diligence, on the violation of the rights to life, liberty and security
of the respondent when he was supposedly arrested on June 14,
2009 by the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan until he
was released on June 18, 2009;
3. The petitioners and the incumbent officials of the local
government of Tuao are hereby ordered to provide genuine and
effective assistance to the investigation to be conducted by the
Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office, including
but not limited to furnishing and/or providing the latter a list of
the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan and all those who
had a direct involvement in the violation of the respondent's
rights to life, liberty and security, including their whereabouts,
and to allow the investigation to run its course unhindered;
4. The investigation shall be completed not later than six (6)
months from receipt of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days
after completion of the investigation, the Regional Director of the
Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office shall submit
a full report on the results of the investigation to the Court of
Appeals;
5. The Court of Appeals, within thirty (30) days from the
submission by the Regional Director of the Philippine National
Police - Cagayan Regional Office of his full report, is directed to
submit to this Court its own report and recommendations on the
investigation and furnish a copy thereof to the incumbent
Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan
Regional Office, the petitioners, and the respondent; and
6. This case is referred back to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of (a) the
investigation to be conducted by the Philippine National Police -
Cagayan Regional Office, (b) the actions to be undertaken in
pursuance of the said investigation, and (c) the validation of the
results.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-
Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0.
FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP
Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court) filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ
of Habeas Data,2 seeking a review of the 9 September 2010
Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the Regional Trial Court,
First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3 The
questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R.
Gamboa (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos
Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent Police Senior Superintendent
(P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-Charge, and
respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was
the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective
Management Branch, both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial
Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an
Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of
Private Armies in the Country."7 The body, which was later on
referred to as the Zearosa Commission,8 was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the
country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon
the conclusion of its investigation, the Zearosa Commission
released and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The
Independent Commission Against Private Armies Report to the
President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte
(PNPIlocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations
against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who
keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly without the benefit of data
verification, PNPIlocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zearosa Commission,13 thereby causing
her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals
maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically, she pointed out the
following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion
regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated
Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to
monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation
generated by the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs
Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in
the country according to region, indicates their identity, and lists
the prominent personalities with whom these groups are
associated.17 The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as
the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the
PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference
held in Malacaang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the
Commission was also asked to comment on the PNP report that
out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups
validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven
(67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86)
firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbao qualified that said statistics were
based on PNP data but that the more significant fact from his
report is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the
activities of these armed groups and this vigilance is largely due
to the existence of the Commission which has continued
communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
70
and PNP personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the
activities of the PAGs. Commissioner Basbao stressed that the
Commissions efforts have preempted the formation of the PAGs
because now everyone is aware that there is a body monitoring
the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant
General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are
being destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear
during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the
PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data
which is truly reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP
complied with the Commissions recommendation that they
revise their validation system to include those PAGs previously
listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the
PNP on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107)
existing PAGs. Of these groups, the PNP reported that seven (7)
PAGs have been reorganized.20
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news
program the portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the
politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred
that her association with a PAG also appeared on print
media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that
the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zearosa
Commission.23 As a result, she claimed that her malicious or
reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities
maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as
well as her supporters and other people identified with her,
susceptible to harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her
reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos
Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte
database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher
PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage done to her honor;
(d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified
reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making
baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled
to RTC Br. 13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July
2010 after finding the Petition meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the
trial court (a) instructed respondents to submit all information
and reports forwarded to and used by the Zearosa Commission
as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b)
directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to
cease and desist from forwarding to the Zearosa Commission, or
to any other government entity, information that they may have
gathered against her without the approval of the court; (c)
ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ
together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the
summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had
acted within the bounds of their mandate in conducting the
investigation and surveillance of Gamboa.29 The information
stored in their database supposedly pertained to two criminal
cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-
INQ-091-00077, and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated
murder and direct assault upon a person in authority, as well as
indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, docketed as NPS
DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete
for failing to comply with the following requisites under the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data: (a) the manner in which the right to
privacy was violated or threatened with violation and how it
affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b) the
actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information;
and (c) the location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
control of the data or information.31 They also contended that the
Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the
proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the
reputation of Gamboa.32
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010,
dismissed the Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that
the inclusion of Gamboa in the list of persons maintaining PAGs,
as published in the Report, constituted a violation of her right to
privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the
list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboas right to privacy
indubitably has been violated. The violation understandably
affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The untold
misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she
fears for her security that at any time of the day the unlimited
powers of respondents may likely be exercised to further malign
and destroy her reputation and to transgress her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is
likewise undisputed that there was certainly intrusion into
Gamboas activities. It cannot be denied that information was
gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative Order
No. 275, the Zearosa Commission was tasked to investigate the
existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of
an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa
alleged as she accused respondents, who are public officials, of
having gathered and provided information that made the
Zearosa Commission to include her in the list. Obviously, it was
this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed
the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through
substantial evidence that the subject information originated from
respondents, and that they forwarded this database to the
Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before
respondents assumed their official positions, information on her
may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held that the
Zearosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information
on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should
have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to
the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24
September 2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zearosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
71
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present
sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the
Zearosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the
Zearosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an
assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are
distinct to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following
arguments: (a) Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to
show that her right to privacy in life, liberty or security was
violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the Petition
on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof
showing that respondents were the source of the report naming
her as one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful
order, fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country
should be done in accordance with due process, such that the
gathering and forwarding of unverified information on her must
be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she was able to
present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information
originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege
of the writ of habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first,
unpack the concept of the right to privacy; second, explain the
writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy that seeks to
protect the right to informational privacy; and finally,
contextualize the right to privacy vis--vis the state interest
involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long
been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v.
Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of
liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the
objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical
submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is
violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to
be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from
unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well,
if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is
indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right
to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not
likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice
Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various
guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association
contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we
have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers in any house in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of
privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." After referring to
various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy
which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of
limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic
distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate
and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which
the state can control. Protection of this private sector
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a technological age
industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave
of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and
statutory bases of the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction,
to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of
privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill
of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
72
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our
laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts
by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It
also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual
liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other
private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime
the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and
industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is
an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code.
The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the
right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that
A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right
that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this
Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim
respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an
absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected
by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right
to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional
inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the
people to access information on matters of public concern
generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial
transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is
not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid
down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the
individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions
adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.
Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason
compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative
investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a
competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both
notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right,
the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or
overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy
designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum
to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational
privacy.49 It seeks to protect a persons right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in
order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist
a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in
Philippine law and jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin
American habeas data, on which our own Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the European
tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases
on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v.
Sweden,52 in which the ECHR balanced the right of citizens to be
free from interference in their private affairs with the right of the
state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander
(Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement
museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to
a restricted military security zone.53 He was refused employment
when the requisite personnel control resulted in an unfavorable
outcome on the basis of information in the secret police register,
which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control
Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed,
among others, that this procedure of security control violated
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55 on the
right to privacy, as nothing in his personal or political
background would warrant his classification in the register as a
security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of
information relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with
the refusal to allow him the opportunity to refute the same,
amounted to an interference in his right to respect for private
life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was justified
on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national
security,58 and (b) the Personnel Control Ordinance gave the
citizens adequate indication as to the scope and the manner of
exercising discretion in the collection, recording and release of
information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the
ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference
corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the
Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22,
55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities
enjoy a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend
not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on
the particular nature of the interference involved. In the instant
73
case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting its
national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the
interference with the applicants right to respect for his private
life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of
protecting national security, for the Contracting States to have
laws granting the competent domestic authorities power, firstly,
to collect and store in registers not accessible to the public
information on persons and, secondly, to use this information
when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in
posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr.
Leanders legitimate interests through the consequences it had
on his possibilities of access to certain sensitive posts within the
public service. On the other hand, the right of access to public
service is not as such enshrined in the Convention (see, inter alia,
the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20,
34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did
not constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own
choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of
appreciation available to the respondent State in assessing the
pressing social need in the present case, and in particular in
choosing the means for achieving the legitimate aim of protecting
national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military
authorities was not communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself
warrant the conclusion that the interference was not "necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security", as it
is the very absence of such communication which, at least partly,
ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others
judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 27, 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted
before the issue of the Ordinance of 1969, including the
Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman,
considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the
person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance,
should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the
purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion
that the safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control
system meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-
2). Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation available to
it, the respondent State was entitled to consider that in the
present case the interests of national security prevailed over the
individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above).
The interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot
therefore be said to have been disproportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a
specific component of the right to privacy, may yield to an
overriding legitimate state interest. In similar fashion, the
determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data,
being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case
entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the
private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis--vis
the interest of the state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private
armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly
constituted authority.60 It also provides for the establishment of
one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character,
and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the
issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to
investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zearosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275
clothed it with the powers of an investigative body, including the
power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or
evidence relevant to the investigation and use compulsory
processes to produce documents, books, and records.62 A.O. 275
likewise authorized the Zearosa Commission to deputize the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other
law enforcement agency to assist the commission in the
performance of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered
by law to (a) enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
protection of lives and properties; (b) maintain peace and order
and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; and (c)
investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the
foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zearosa
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on
individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and
counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish
that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler
came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court,
however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the
Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share
intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for
the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious
groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance
from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact
that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission
without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording
her the opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a
violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation.1wphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that
the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update
information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure
that the data mirrored the situation on the field.66 Thus,
safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this
Court declines to make any further determination as to the
propriety of sharing information during specific stages of
intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the
discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their
74
functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their
competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of
protection established in existing law and jurisprudence, this
Court nonetheless deems it necessary to caution these
investigating entities that information-sharing must observe
strict confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released
exclusively to the authorities empowered to receive the relevant
information. After all, inherent to the right to privacy is the
freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from
intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report,
but emphasized its confidential nature.1wphi1 That it was
leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even
warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed
to establish that respondents were responsible for this
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs
available to her to address the purported damage to her
reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove
through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In
this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials,
they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of
dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the
private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant
to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas
data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September
2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it
denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID
SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and
JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since
participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment
process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in
light of the environmental conditions and social norms set by the
society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-
SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc.
No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne),
both minors, were, during the period material, graduating high
school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits
for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne,
along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad
only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded
by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a
computer teacher at STCs high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online,
depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who
the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia,
Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STCs computers, Escuderos students logged in to their
respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of
the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne
drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b)
Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of
clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
What is more, Escuderos students claimed that there were times
when access to or the availability of the identified students
photos was not confined to the girls Facebook friends,4but were,
in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one
of her students Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine
Rose Tigol (Tigol), STCs Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the
identified students to have deported themselves in a manner
proscribed by the schools Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts
obscenity; contains sexually suggestive messages, language or
symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet
that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students
in the pictures in question, reported, as required, to the office of
Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STCs high school
principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the
meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal
Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is
more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that,
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as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the
commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angelas
mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction
and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al.,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that
defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction
that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the
mother of Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28,
2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their
memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in
issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the
graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the
sanctioned students from participating in the graduation rites,
arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its
adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO
remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No.
19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra)
were taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits
on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was
set at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or
ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the
girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case,
and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the
minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be
used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however,
violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook
accounts of petitioners children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the
copying of information, data, and digital images happened at
STCs Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum
submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-
38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes
an invasion of their childrens privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a
writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to
surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies
of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary hearing; and (c)
after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data,
and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread
and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the
childrens right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC,
through an Order dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas
data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed
to file their verified written return, together with the supporting
affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTCs directive and filed
their verified written return, laying down the following grounds
for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the
proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in
forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of
habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their
right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
petition for habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision
pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated
confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an
actual or threatened violation of the minors right to privacy, one
of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been
uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view
them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the schools policies and
rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this
Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a
writ of habeas datashould be issued given the factual milieu.
Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point
of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of
Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is
an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the
truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons
right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
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instances in which such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect
an individuals right to informational privacy, among others. A
comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a
procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse
in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the
basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information
about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a
nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a
persons right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by
substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to
informational privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper.
Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs
this question: given the nature of an online social network
(OSN)(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction
among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial
barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2)
that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in
the providers databases, which are outside the control of the
end-usersis there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first
resolve the procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas
not enacted solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of
Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. Any aggrieved party may file a petition for
the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the
aggrieved party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of
the writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have
been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule
preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the
Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce ones right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information
Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue
against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while
valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas
data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person
or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and
collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas datais a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole,
irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or
storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or
entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in
something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must
be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person
or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as
when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal
endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
To agree with respondents above argument, would mean unduly
limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private
persons and entities whose business is data gathering and
storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the
writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily
violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
communications technologya right which a great majority of
the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now
proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with
technological advancements having an influential part therein.
This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice
Reynato S. Punos speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where
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he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1)
locational or situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and
(3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case
at bar is the right to informational privacyusually defined as
the right of individuals to control information about
themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information
gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to mention each
systems inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is
more reason that every individuals right to control said flow of
information should be protected and that each individual should
have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n
this [Social Networking] environment, privacy is no longer
grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to
provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary
hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy
possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the
South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H
v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he
law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in
the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts
respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and
with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing
what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas
data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an
expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily
incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including
those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to
privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational
privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very
purpose of OSNs is socializingsharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained
personal.
b. Facebooks Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy
in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability
to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same
or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services
provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled with
millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of
which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her
bulletin board, a user/owner can post anythingfrom text, to
pictures, to music and videosaccess to which would depend on
whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to
see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social
networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its
developers, people use "to stay connected with friends and
family, to discover whats going on in the world, and to share and
express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of
"friending" another user. By sending a "friend request," the user
invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view
any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once
the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other users "Public" or "Friends Only"
posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his
or her profile and shares certain information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its
purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a users profile 31 as well
as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat:
"Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every
effort to protect a users information, these privacy settings are
not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and
accessibility of digital images(photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or "wall," except for the usersprofile picture
and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the users Facebook friends and their
friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the users Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users,
designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his
or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among
others, from another users point of view. In other words,
Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to
what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] and to put
others in the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally,
the selected setting will be based on ones desire to interact with
others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her
personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting
becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that
users particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners daughters right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents contention that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would,
in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through
the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said
to have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey
grant access to their profile will view the information they post or
upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user
automatically has a protected expectation of privacy inall of his
or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSNs
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privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation,in cyber world, of the users invocation of his or
her right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy
tool to grant or deny access to his or her post orprofile detail
should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice.38Otherwise, using these
privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for
instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to
his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or
a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it,
said photo would still be deemed public by the courts as if the
user never chose to limit the photos visibility and accessibility.
Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of
their function but it would also disregard the very intention of
the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of
his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question
were visible to other Facebook users and whether the disclosure
was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit
the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept
within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in
resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of
privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the
images will be protected against unauthorized access and
disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their childrens
privacy right being violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon
their childrens Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe
pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a
breach of the minors privacy since their Facebook accounts,
allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting
safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their
childrens disclosure was only limited since their profiles were
not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people
who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are
barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and
consent. Aspetitioners children testified, it was Angelawho
uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five
of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the
records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my
students showed me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This
student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high
school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x
x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted
on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab,
these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even
told me that there had been times when these photos were
public i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors
testimonies for one key reason: failure to question the students
act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that
the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any
evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging
Escuderos claim that the other students were able to view the
photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving
scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escuderos
sworn account that her students, who are the minors Facebook
"friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook
accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able
to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escuderos students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public,"
it can be surmised that the photographs in question were
viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where
the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the
method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-
mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent
loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners contention. In this regard, the
cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of
privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected
by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any
conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who
are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
hundreds; and
(4) A users Facebook friend can "share"49 the formers post, or
"tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the former,
despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a posts or profile
details privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer
be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the
source of the content. The users own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto,
regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or
when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the
person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post,
the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200.
A and B are not Facebook friends. If C, As Facebook friend, tags B
in As post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100
(As own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (As
100 friends plus Bs 200 friends or the public, depending upon Bs
privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post
is effectively expandedand to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of
Facebooks proclivity towards user interaction and socialization
79
rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of
individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have
facilitated their users self-tribute, thereby resulting into the
"democratization of fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or
even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily,
more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to
petitioners argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible
only to the sanctioned students Facebook friends, respondent
STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy
invasion since it was the minors Facebook friends who showed
the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of
gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by
persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough,
however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images
to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that
respondents reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In
fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that
respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum
submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-
38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minors
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or
to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are
personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated,
the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence,
other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebooks privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few.
Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this
case within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they
cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy
setting, or that the users contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the users friends en masse, becomes
more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your
childrens ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part of
OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace
communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or
her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users,
especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or
observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has
been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion that
teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly
in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating
lessons on good cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its
students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is
not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have
already deemed it important to include digital literacy and good
cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in
view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they
participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the
complexity of the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the
dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly exposed
to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their
children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these
institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit
such risks, theres no substitute for parental involvement and
supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of
teaching its students to beresponsible in their dealings and
activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the
disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta
showing that, in the process, it violated the students rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose
themselves to whenever they engage incyberspace
activities.1wphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding
how much information about themselves they are willing to give
up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or
uploading any kind of data or information online, they are
automatically and inevitably making it permanently available
online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of their
control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information,
otherwise private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be
opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may not be
allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due
diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants
themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they
allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot
afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to
place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN
users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to
use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to
keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for
changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the
minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other
assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
80
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He
created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she
heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind!
North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed
once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open.
Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a
female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In
particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a
persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of
name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the
result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes
Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded
the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of
Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino
Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is,
"anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that
he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His
attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on
January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by
Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate
attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the
procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact
engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his
birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and
his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the
Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order
were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil
registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements
were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr.
Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as
witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of
petitioner. Its relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but
solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible
with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the
relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition
would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the
physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a
mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice
will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the
petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her
[fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground
to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication
thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to
interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the
petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the
entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner,
specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a
decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of
either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex
reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial
court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex
in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the
Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA
9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of
Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his
petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or
judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive
but solely for the purpose of making his birth records
compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
81
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical
features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry
changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and
entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a
privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical
Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error
and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order,
except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first
name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in
accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing
rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the
power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first
name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged
with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and
effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court,
until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the
remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The
petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in
any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be
ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly
known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was
his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones
legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a
change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason
justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case,
he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the
change of petitioners first name was not within that courts
primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with
the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally
done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was
administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also
filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and
official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons,
the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in
so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate
As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors
are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the
need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical
error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is
harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled
place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a
substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
82
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407
of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision
can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the
faults or error from" while to change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of
petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil
registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments
of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births,
marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such
as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of
nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation
and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or
impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation
(that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person
in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status include such matters as the
beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and
sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family
relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status.
In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil
status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law)
provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of
the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child,
shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later
than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in
attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to
the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and
nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of
parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone;
(d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born;
and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to
be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical
record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the
sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth
attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of
the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their
common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in
the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to
the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male
from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and
female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears
young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and
"female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are
employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the
context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language
of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and
remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as
used then is something alterable through surgery or something
that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be
included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in
altering his body and appearance through the intervention of
modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex
in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis
for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name
or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed
that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-
ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial
court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However,
marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
83
parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes
sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).
Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to
women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment
of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and
the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore
the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts
is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the
recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change
of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil
registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be
observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has
undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name
and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the
conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a
protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The
Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or
interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government,
Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a
life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their
dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that
there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit
neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social
convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal.
However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 166676
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
- versus - CARPIO MOR
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.
BRION, JJ.
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, Promulgated
Respondent.
September 12
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition
for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan
changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the
RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13,
1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She
further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an
ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At
age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had
minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or
menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become
a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male
and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation
for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous
places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered
his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General
J., Chairperson,
respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that
84
genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes
male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and
she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this
condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully
developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has
no monthly period. He further testified that respondents
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender
because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision
dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown
that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing
proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven
that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body
as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has chosen
to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged
and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil,
Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in
the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of
the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to
JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE,
WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in
ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on
the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name
from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in
a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section
3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the
court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG
further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it
failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b),
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule 108
does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not
make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local
Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in
the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the
Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the
Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders
or processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or
gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in
which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or
some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form
and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in
some newspaper of general circulation published in the province,
as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not
be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4)
months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing
and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper
provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government
of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the
date fixed in the order that such order has been published as
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing the
85
name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in
accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of
the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for
non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and
all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be
made a party in a proceeding for the correction of name in the
civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the
same shall be considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should
also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes
Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts
shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of
securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent
furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was
amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of
such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in
the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407
of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the
early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A
person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
86
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often
appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures
of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and
fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to
appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000
children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy.
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the
term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be
classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the
state of a living thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An
organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of
both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different
cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender
role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either
male or female genitals.[24] More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder
which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by
surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the
individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested
that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans
land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly
female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances
when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female,
then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and
scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in
the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features
of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support
for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases
of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not
taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was
born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that
of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken
steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the
categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do
so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on
respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones
sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not
to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due
to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in
not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain
as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the
path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an incompetent[27] and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified
the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity
of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make
his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court
has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow.[28] The trial
courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondents change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with
the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
87
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio
Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband
and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to
someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born:
Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on
October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized
by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children
in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however,
eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with
her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent
Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with
Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody,
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed
of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
herein respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is
overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be
promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and
physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo
decreed the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby
grants [Antonios] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby
judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith
issues the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the
Petition, to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to
cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the
aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live
Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the
surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from
Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental
Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their minor children,
Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over
the parties minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard
Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios] residence in the
Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grandes]
custody from Saturday to Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande
unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the
aforenamed minors outside of the country, without the written
consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor
children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the
amount of 30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio]
and 30% for [Grande].7(Emphasis supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration.
However, her motion was denied by the trial court in its
Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and
for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing
grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to
the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to
the mother over her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the
appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the
RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri
Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and
shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname
Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in
their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in
the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and
may only take the children out upon the written consent of
[Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the
minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of
30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30%
for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that
notwithstanding the fathers recognition of his children, the
mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over
them absent the most compelling of reasons.10 Since respondent
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act
that adversely affected the welfare of the children or rendered
her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her
sole parental custody over their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal
consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that
he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the
universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in
order considering that not only did Antonio express his
willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his
acknowledging the paternity of the minor children.12Lastly, the
CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of
his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally
inherent and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed
a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the
order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors
surname to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner
came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that
Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No.
(RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive languagemay not be
invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children
of his surname without the consent of their mother.
88
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of
his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art.
176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a
legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in
force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA
925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is
that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her
filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval
of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer
for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from
Grande to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before
a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court15 is
enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted
more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental
custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as
Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on
the mother; hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring.
Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over
the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown
to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the
illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to
order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will
contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of
the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want
to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father
(herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is
granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free
from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must
be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.16 Respondents position that the court can order
the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And
where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The
use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use
the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the
illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which
policies affecting children are to be measured is their best
interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has,
time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the fathers
surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v.
Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child
to continue using the surname of her mother rather than that of
her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no
legal obstacle to prevent her from using the surname of her
mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child
concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule
regarding the use of a childs surname is second only to the rule
requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation
considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference
to the choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his
mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of
a persons name to his identity, his status in relation to his
parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate
child. For sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to
deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to
present evidence in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition.
Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all
the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established
that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of
name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by
his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
mothers intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of
mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the
mandatory use of the fathers surname upon his recognition of
his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the
Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
89
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a
public document is executed by the father, either at the back of
the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private
instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father,
provided the registration is supported by the following
documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the
Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the
child shall use the surname of the father upon the submission of
the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the
Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father,
the child shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a
public document or a private handwritten instrument supported
by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is
required if he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent
may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name
of the child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live
Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the
Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a
private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF
shall be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of
Births as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original
surname) to (new surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of
Live Birth and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of
registration, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in
the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be
made in the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as
follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the
child is hereby changed from (original surname) on (date)
pursuant to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance
cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v.
Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules
in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is
found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules
and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in
the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic
law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere
administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly
cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where
there is no ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly
erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional
prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the
rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial
bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the
Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted
provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the
mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname
upon the latters recognition of his paternity.
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is
of no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of
"may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are
given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the
children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this
Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before
and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any
evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence
of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
July 24, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri
Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and
shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein
appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded
the full or sole custody of these minor children;
90
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week,
and may only take the children out upon the written consent of
[Grande]:
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the
minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of
30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30%
for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of
Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname
to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED
and hereby declared NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial Court1(RTC)
Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted
respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of
entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years.
Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24,
2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and
claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature
appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent
impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her
alleged husband, as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that
she could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the
supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied
having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met
them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.6 Respondent
also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of
Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed
that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is
granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in
the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the
petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage
contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in
granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify
the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the
marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108
of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the
entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in
effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish
copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the
petitioners counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of entries
even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
being the appropriate adversary proceeding required.
Considering that respondents identity was used by an unknown
person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not
be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the
following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY
WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE
CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE
WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN
EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to
be cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the
certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who
91
appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are,
in fact, the latters personal circumstances.15 In directing the
cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void
ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this
Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be
taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is
a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of
the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the
issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of
entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily,
petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing
of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure
to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v.
Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a
petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and
the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the
appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary
suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity
to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence
has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a
hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon
mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not
always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who
may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although
the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after
hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and
changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate
of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of
respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was
forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one
who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared
that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought
the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage
certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108,
respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as
her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is
likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in
Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General
was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the
Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings.
More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself,
the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several
documents were also considered as evidence. With the
testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found
that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate
was different from respondents signature appearing in some of
her government issued identification cards.23 The court thus
made a categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the
marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged.
Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no
such marriage was celebrated.
92
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara,
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention
of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A
direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of
the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage.1wphi1 Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage
was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule
108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations
of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the
subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion
thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5,
2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-
CEB, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure
question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January
2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution
dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality
of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab
initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National
Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately
issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following
provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of
the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or
in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found
in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was
in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based
its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding
requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
93
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the
husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can
file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign
judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is
"for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki
and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition
of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy.
The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course,
difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior,
pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108
is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act
No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for
divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final
decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality
where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the
civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments
of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the
judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that
the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the
petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may
be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of
jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court
to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate
Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt
the defendants prerogative to object to the improper laying of
the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the
provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion
for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated
its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and
improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks
to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC
did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said
that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground
for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the
other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the
petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a
special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry),
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as
legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral
attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required
under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also
warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the
same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their
comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents,
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the
Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x
x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The
Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first
marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The
Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of
bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he
or she had only discovered during the connubial period that the
marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage.
The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage
will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
94
proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that
"[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected
the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino
citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as
required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that
produce legal consequences upon a persons legal capacity and
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore
be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule
108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which
declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to
comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the
fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also
denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. 44 On the
other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the
petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and
Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries
in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this
Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may
prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer
who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody
is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be
made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal
of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the
investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is
absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the
plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the
civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However,
the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of
the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international
law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the
case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction
of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section
48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The
95
rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the
jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce
decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as
a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While
the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance
with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of
fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which
are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording.
As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule
108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the
Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is
also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry
of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises
the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in
marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends further
to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and
Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse
of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section
2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under
the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage
is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy
is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for
bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and
prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which
leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there
is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the
wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only
share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes,
he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated,
the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested
in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage
not only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage
and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in
the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the
civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
96
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus,
the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a
collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention
of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary
to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts
under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a
foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A.
No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction
of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v.
Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure
to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen,
whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino
spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is based on this Courts decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are
to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying
the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or
her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the
Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminatedthe
foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of
the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is
fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full
trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage,
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of
the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of
a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to
extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction
or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the
97
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent
event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles
89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91
of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from
the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer
sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents
and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-
11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
August 24. 2016
G.R. No. 211724
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF
ENTRY (CHANGE OF FAMILY NAME IN THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA AS APPEARING IN
THE RECORDS OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE),
FELIPE C. ALMOJUELA, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the
Decision2 dated February 27, 2014 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 98082, which reversed and set
aside the Decision3 dated October 6, 2011 and the Order4 dated
November 14, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 43 (RTC) in Spec. Proc. No. 1345 granting
the Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth
filed by petitioner Felipe C. Almojuela (petitioner).
The Facts
For almost sixty (60) years, petitioner has been using the
surname "Almojuela." However, when he requested for a copy of
his birth certificate from the National Statistics Office (NSO), he
was surprised to discover that he was registered as "Felipe
Condeno," instead of "Felipe Almojuela." Thus, he filed a Petition
for Correction of Entry5 in his NSO birth certificate before the
RTC, 6 docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 1345.7
Petitioner alleged that he was born on February 25, 1950 in
Pandan, Catanduanes and is the acknowledged natural child of
Jorge V. Almojuela (Jorge), fonner governor of the said province,
and Francisca B. Condeno (Francisca), both deceased. He averred
that while his parents did not marry each other, he has been
known to his family and friends as "Felipe Almojuela" and has
been using the said surname in all of his official and legal
documents, including his school records from elementary to
college, certificate of Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) membership, government service records, appointment as
Provincial General Services Officer, report of rating in the First
Grade Entrance Examination of the Civil Service Commission,
Philippine Passport, Marriage Contract, and Certificate of
Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld. In support of his petition,
he also presented a copy of his birth certificate issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pandan, Catanduanes
showing that "Felipe Almojuela" appears as his registered full
name.8
In an Order9 dated January 10, 2011, the RTC initially dismissed
the petition on the ground that petitioner's recourse to Rule 108
of the Rules of Court was improper, as the petition did not involve
mere correction of clerical errors but a matter of filiation which
should, thus, be filed in accordance with Rule 103 of the same
Rules. Moreover, it found that a similar petition docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 1229 had already been ruled upon and dismissed by the
court. 10
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, maintaining that the issue
of filiation is immaterial since he was only seeking a correction of
entry by including the surname "Almojuela" to "Felipe Condeno,"
his first and middle names appearing on his birth certificate with
the NSO. He likewise insisted that the name "Jorge V. Almojuela"
was clearly indicated thereon as the name of his father. Finding
merit in petitioner's arguments, the RTC, in an Order11 dated
February 9, 2011, reconsidered its earlier disposition and
allowed petitioner to present his evidence.12
During the proceedings, it was discovered that petitioner's name
as registered in the Book of Births in the custody of the Municipal
Civil Registar of Pandan, Catanduanes is "Felipe Condeno" and
not "Felipe C. Almojuela," contrary to petitioner's allegation.13
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision14 dated October 6, 2011, the R TC granted the
petition and accordingly, directed the Municipal Civil Registrar .of
Pandan, Catanduanes to cause the correction of entry of the facts
of petitioner's birth by changing his surname from "Condeno" to
"Almojuela" and to furnish the Civil Registrar General with a copy
of the corrected birth certificate.15
In so ruling, the R TC found that the change in petitioner's
surname would cause no prejudice to the Almojuela family nor
would they be the object of future mischief. Instead, petitioner
has shown that he was accepted and acknowledged by his half-
siblings. Moreover, allowing petitioner to retain the surname that
he has been using for over sixty (60) years, i.e., "Almojuela,"
would avoid confusion in his personal undertakings, as well as in
the community.16
However, considering that the Book of Births of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Pandan, Catanduanes reflects the name "Felipe
Condeno" as petitioner's registered name, the R TC ordered that
the same be first corrected before the correction of entry in the
records of the NSO could be had.17
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), moved for reconsideration,18citing lack of
jurisdiction due to defective publication and contending that the
caption or title of a petition for change of name should state: (a)
the alias or other name of petitioner; (b) the name he seeks to
98
adopt; and (c) the cause for the change of name, all of which were
lacking in the petition filed before the RTC.19 In an Order20 dated
November 14, 2011, the RTC denied the OSG's motion and
reiterated its stance that based on the allegations thereon, the
petition was only for the correction of entry in the records of the
NSO. As petitioner had established compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements therefor, the RTC had thus acquired
jurisdiction.21 Dissatisfied, the OSG appealed22to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision23 dated February 27, 2014, the CA reversed and set
aside the assailed RTC Decision and Order, and nullified the RTC's
order for the correction of entry in petitioner's birth
certificate.24 It held that although petitioner correctly invoked
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court in filing his petition,25 he, however,
failed to strictly comply with the requirements thereunder when
he omitted to implead the Local Civil Registrar and his half-
siblings, who stand to be affected by the corrections prayed for,
as parties.26 Sections 427 and 5 28 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
require that notice be sent to persons named in the petition, as
well as to those not named thereon but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. In petitioner's case, his
failure to imp lead and notify the Local Civil Registrar and his
half-siblings as mandated by the rules precluded the RTC from
acquiring jurisdiction over the case. 29
Moreover, the CA also found that the correction of entry sought
by petitioner was not merely clerical in nature, but necessarily
involved a determination of his filiation. As petitioner failed to
show that his putative father, Jorge, recognized him as his child
through any of the means allowed under Article 176 of the Family
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,30 petitioner,
therefore, cannot use "Almojuela" as his sumame.31
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter before the Court
through the instant petition.1wphi1
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the
CA erred in nullifying the correction of entry on petitioner's birth
certificate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry through an
appropriate adversary proceeding. 32 An adversary proceeding is
defined as one "having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party,
and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it."33
Sections 3, 4, and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court state:
SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in
the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause
the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having
or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto. (Emphases supplied)
A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two
(2) sets of notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons
named in the petition, and another given to other persons who
are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties. 34 Consequently, the petition for a
substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry should
implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other
persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby. 35
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 36 the Court emphasized that in
a petition for a substantial correction or change of entry in the
civil registry under Rule 108, it is mandatory that the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby be made respondents
for the reason that they are indispensable parties.37 Thus, the
Court nullified the order to effect the necessary changes for
respondent's failure to strictly comply with the foregoing
procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Citing
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, 38 the Court held therein:
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They
include not only the declared father of the child but the child as
well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary
system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would
be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the
notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108,
like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making
authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution,
which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended
beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors
which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so
as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper
proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby
become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not
contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code. 39 (Emphases,
italics and underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in Republic v. Uy,40 the Court nullified the trial court's
order to correct respondent's entry for the latter's failure to
implead and notify not only the Local Civil Registrar, but also her
parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are
affected by the changes or corrections sought.41
In this case, the CA correctly found that petitioner failed to
implead both the Local Civil Registrar and his half-
siblings. 42 Although he claims that his half-siblings have
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acknowledged and accepted him, the procedural rules
nonetheless mandate compliance with the requirements in the
interest of fair play and due process and to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so
chooses. 43

Moreover, although it is true that in certain instances, the Court

has allowed the subsequent publication of a notice of hearing to
cure the petition's lack/failure to implead and notify the affected
or interested parties, such as when: (a) earnest efforts were made
by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties;
(b) the parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings;
(c) there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence
of the interested parties; or, (d) when a party is inadvertently left
out,44 these exceptions are, unfortunately, unavailing in this case.

In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above-discussed

requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of
an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and
controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein
null and void. In Republic v. CA,45 the Court held that the
proceedings of the trial court were null and void for lack of
jurisdiction as the petitioners therein failed to implead the civil
registrar, an indispensable party, in the petition for correction of
entry, viz.: >>

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the

proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. As he was not imp leaded in
this case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of
the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction
of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a
case renders ineffectual all proceedings subsequent to the
filing of the complaint including the judgment.

xxxx

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil

registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
publication of the petition for correction of entry was to
render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
corrction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of
jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject
matter.46 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Cobnsequently, the petition for correction of entry by petitioner

must perforce be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

February 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No.
98082 is hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, the Decision dated
October 6, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes,
Branch 43 in Spec. Proc. No. 1345 granting the Petition for
Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth in NULLIFIED.

SO ORDERED.

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