11/11/2017 G.R. No.

79690-707

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.79690707February1,1989

ENRIQUEA.ZALDIVAR,petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLESANDIGANBAYANandHONORABLERAULM.GONZALEZ,claimingtobeand
actingasTanodbayanOmbudsmanunderthe1987Constitution,respondents.

G.R.No.80578February1,1989

ENRIQUEA.ZALDIVAR,petitioner,
vs.
HON.RAULM.GONZALES,claimingtobeandactingasTanodbayanOmbudsmanunderthe1987
Constitution,respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERCURIAM:

WehaveexaminedcarefullythelengthyandvigorouslywrittenMotionforReconsiderationdatedOctober18,
1988filedbycounselforrespondentRaulM.Gonzalez,relatingtothepercuriamResolutionoftheCourt
datedOctober7,1988.WehavereviewedoncemoretheCourt'sextendedpercuriamResolution,inthelight
oftheargumentadducedintheMotionforReconsideration,butmustconcludethatwefindnosufficientbasis
formodifyingtheconclusionsandrulingsembodiedinthatResolution.TheMotionforReconsiderationsets
forthcopiousquotationsandreferencestoforeigntextswhich,however,whateverelsetheymaydepict,do
notreflectthelawinthisjurisdiction.

Nonetheless,itmightbeusefultodevelopfurther,insomemeasure,someoftheconclusionsreachedin
thepercuriamResolution,addressingintheprocesssomeofthe"Ten(10)LegalPointsforReconsideration,"
madeintheMotionforReconsideration.

1.Inrespondent'spointA,itisclaimedthatitwaserrorforthisCourt"tochargerespondent
[with]indirectcontemptandconvicthimofdirectcontempt."

InthepercuriamResolution(page50),theCourtconcludedthat"respondentGonzalezisguiltybothof
contemptofcourtinfaciecuriaeandofgrossmisconductasanofficerofthecourtandmemberofthebar."
TheCourtdidnotusethephrase"infaciecuriae"asatechnicalequivalentof"directcontempt,"thoughwe
areawarethatcourtsintheUnitedStateshavesometimesusedthatphraseinspeakingof"directcontempts'
as"contemptsinthefaceofthecourts."Rather,thecourtsoughttoconveythatitregardedthecontumacious
actsorstatements(whichweremadebothinapleadingfiledbeforetheCourtandinstatementsgiventothe
media)andthemisconductofrespondentGonzalezasseriousactsflauntedinthefaceoftheCourtand
constitutingafrontalassaultupontheintegrityoftheCourtand,throughtheCourt,theentirejudicialsystem.
WhattheCourtwouldstressisthatitrequiredrespondent,initsResolutiondated2May1988,toexplain
"whyheshouldnotbepunishedforcontemptofcourtand/orsubjectedtoadministrativesanctions"andin
respectofwhich,respondentwasheardandgiventhemostampleopportunitytopresentalldefenses,
argumentsandevidencethathewantedtopresentfortheconsiderationofthisCourt.TheCourtdidnot
summarilyimposepunishmentupontherespondentwhichitcouldhavedoneunderSection1ofRule71of
theRevisedRulesofCourthaditchosentoconsiderrespondent'sactsasconstituting"directcontempt."

2.InhispointC,respondent'scounselarguesthatitwas"errorforthisCourttocharge
respondentunderRule139(b)andnot139oftheRevisedRulesofCourt."

InitspercuriamResolution,theCourtreferredtoRule139(b)oftheRevisedRulesofCourtpointingoutthat:

[R]eferenceofcomplaintsagainstattorneyseithertotheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesorto
theSolicitorGeneralisnotmandatoryupontheSupremeCourtsuchreferencetotheIntegrated
BarofthePhilippinesortotheSolicitorGeneraliscertainlynotanexclusiveprocedureunderthe
termsofRule139(b)oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,especiallywherethechargeconsistsofacts
donebeforetheSupremeCourt.

TheabovestatementwasmadebytheCourtinresponsetorespondent'smotionforreferralofthiscase
eithertotheSolicitorGeneralortotheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesunderRule139(b).Otherwise,there
wouldhavebeennoneedtorefertoRule139(b).Itisthusonlynecessarytopointoutthatundertheoldrule,
Rule139,referraltotheSolicitorGeneralwassimilarlynotanexclusiveprocedureandwasnottheonly
courseofactionopentotheSupremeCourt.ItiswelltorecallthatunderSection1(entitled"Motionor
complaint")ofRule139,"Proceedingsfortheremovalorsuspensionofattorneysmaybetakenbythe
SupremeCourt,(1)onitsownmotion,or(2)uponthecomplaintunderoathofanotherinwriting"
(Parenthesessupplied).TheproceduredescribedinSections2etseq.ofRule139istheprocedureprovided
forsuspensionordisbarmentproceedingsinitiateduponsworncomplaintofanotherperson,ratherthana
procedurerequiredforproceedingsinitiatedbytheSupremeCourtonitsownmotion.Itisinconceivablethat

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theSupremeCourtwouldinitiatemotuproprioproceedingsforwhichitdidnotfindprobablecausetoproceed
againstanattorney.Thus,thereisnoneedtoreferacasetotheSolicitorGeneral,whichreferralismade"for
investigationtodetermineifthereissufficientgroundtoproceedwiththeprosecutionoftherespondent"
(Section3,Rule139),wheretheCourtitselfhasinitiatedagainsttherespondent.TheCourtmay,ofcourse,
referacasetotheSolicitorGeneralifitfeelsthat,inaparticularcase,furtherfactualinvestigationisneeded.
Inthepresentcase,aspointedoutinthepercuriamResolutionoftheCourt(page18),therewas"noneed
forfurtherinvestigationoffactsinthepresentcaseforit[was]notsubstantiallydisputedbyrespondent
Gonzalezthatheutteredorwrotecertainstatementsattributedtohim"andthat"inanycase,respondenthas
hadtheamplestopportunitytopresenthisdefense:hisdefenseisnotthathedidnotmakethestatements
ascribedtohimbutthatthosestatementsgiverisetonoliabilityonhispart,havingbeenmadeintheexercise
ofhisfreedomofspeech.Theissueswhichthusneedtoberesolvedhereareissuesoflawandofbasic
policyandtheCourt,notanyotheragency,iscompelledtoresolvesuchissues."

Inthisconnection,wenotethatthequotationinpage7oftheMotionforReconsiderationisfrom
adissentingopinionofMr.JusticeBlackinGreenv.UnitedState.1Itmaybepointedoutthatthemajority
inGreenv.UnitedStates,throughMr.JusticeHarlan,held,amongotherthings,that:Federalcourtsdonot
lackpowertoimposesentencesinexcessofoneyearforcriminalcontemptthatcriminalcontemptsarenot
subjecttojurytrialasamatterofconstitutionalrightnordoesthe(US)Constitutionrequirethatcontempt
subjecttoprisontermsofmorethanoneyearbebasedongrandjuryindictments.

Inhisconcurringopinioninthesamecase,Mr.JusticeFrankfurtersaid:

Whatevertheconflictingviewsofscholarsinconstruingmoreorlessdubiousmanuscriptsofthe
FourteenthCentury,whatisindisputableisthatfromthefoundationoftheUnitedStatesthe
constitutionalityofthepowertopunishforcontemptwithouttheinterventionofajuryhasnot
beendoubted.TheFirstJudiciaryActconferredsuchapoweronthefederalcourtsinthevery
actoftheirestablishment,1State73,83,andoftheJudiciaryCommitteeofeightthatreported
thebilltotheSenate,fivememberincludingthechairman,Senator,latertobeChiefJustice,
Ellsworth,hadbeendelegatestotheConstitutionalConvention(OliverEllsworth,Chairman,
WilliamPaterson,CalebStrong,RicardBasett,WilliamFew.1AnnalsofCong17).IntheFirst
CongressitselfnolessthannineteenmemberincludingMadisonwhocontemporaneously
introducedtheBillofRights,hadbeendelegatestotheConvention.Andwhenanabuseunder
thispowermanifesteditself,andledCongresstodefinemoreexplicitlythesummarypower
vestedinthecourts,itdidnotremotelydenytheexistenceofthepowerbutmerelydefinedthe
conditionsforitsexercisemoreclearly,inanAct"declaratoryofthelawconcerningcontemptsof
court."ActofMar.2,1831,4Stat487.

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NorhastheconstitutionalityofthepowerbeendoubtedbythisCourtthroughoutitsexistence.
InatleasttwoscorecasesinthisCourt,nottomentionthevastmassofdecisionsinthelower
federalcourts,thepowertopunishsummarilyhasbeenacceptedwithoutquestion....2

Tosaythatajudgewhopunishesacontemnorjudgeshisowncause,issimplisticatbest.Thejudgewho
findshimselfcompelledtoexercisethepowertopunishforcontemptdoessonotreallytoavengeawrong
inflicteduponhisownpersonratherheupholdsandvindicatestheauthority,dignityandintegrityofthe
judicialinstitutionanditsclaimtorespectfulbehaviouronthepartofallpersonswhoappearsbeforeit,and
mostespeciallyfromthosewhoareofficersofthecourt.

3.InhispointD,respondentcounselurgesthatitiserror"forthisCourttoapplythe"visible
tendency"ruleratherthanthe"clearandpresentdanger"ruleindisciplinaryandcontempt
charges."

TheCourtdidnotpurporttoannounceanewdoctrineof"visibletendency,"itwas,moremodestly,simply
paraphrasingSection3(d)ofRule71oftheRevisedRulesofCourtwhichpenalizesavarietyof
contumaciousconductincluding:"anyimproperconducttending,directlyorindirectly,toimpede,obstructor
degradetheadministrationofjustice."

The"clearandpresentdanger"doctrineinvokedbyrespondent'scounselisnotamagicincantationwhich
dissolvesallproblemsanddispenseswithanalysisandjudgmentinthetestingofthelegitimacyofclaimsto
freespeech,andwhichcompelsacourttoexonerateadefendantthemomentthedoctrineisinvoked,absent
proofofimpendingapocalypse.Theclearandpresentdanger"doctrinehasbeenanacceptedmethodfor
markingouttheappropriatelimitsoffreedomofspeechandofassemblyincertaincontexts.Itisnot,
however,theonlytestwhichhasbeenrecognizedandappliedbycourts.InLogunzadv.Vda.de
Gonzales,3thisCourt,speakingthroughMme.JusticeMelencioHerrerasaid:

...Therightoffreedomofexpressionindeed,occupiesapreferredpositioninthe"hierarchyof
civilliberties"(PhilippineBloomingMillsEmployeesOrganizationv.PhilippineBloomingMills
Co.,Inc.,51SCRA191[1963].Itisnot,however,withoutlimitations.AsheldinGonzalesv.
CommissiononElections,27SCRA835,858[1960]:

"Fromthelanguageofthespecificconstitutionalprovision,itwouldappearthattherightisnot
susceptibleofanylimitation.Nolawmaybepassedabridgingthefreedomofspeechandofthe
press.Therealitiesoflifeinacomplexsocietyprecludehowever,aliteralinterpretation.Freedom
ofexpressionisnotanabsolute.Itwouldbetoomuchtoinsistthatalltimesandunderall

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circumstancesitshouldremainunfetteredandunrestrained.Thereareothersocietalvaluesthat
pressforrecognition."

Theprevailingdoctrineisthattheclearandpresentdangerruleissuchalimitation.Another
criterionforpermissiblelimitationonfreedomofspeechandofthepress,whichincludessuch
vehiclesofthemassmediaasradio,televisionandthemovies,isthe"balancingofinterests
test"(ChiefJusticeEnriqueM.FernandoontheBillofRights,1970ed.,p.79).Theprinciple
"requiresacourttotakeconsciousanddetailedconsiderationoftheinterplayofinterests
observableinagivensituationortypeofsituation(SeparateOpinionofthelateChiefJustice
CastroinGonzalesv.CommissiononElections,supra,p.899).(EmphasisSupplied)4

Undereitherthe"clearandpresentdanger"testorthe"balancingofinteresttest,"webelievethatthe
statementsheremadebyrespondentGonzalezareofsuchanatureandweremadeinsuchamannerand
undersuchcircumstances,astotranscendthepermissiblelimitsoffreespeech.Thisconclusionwasimplicit
inthepercuriamResolutionofOctober7,1988.Itisimportanttopointoutthatthe"substantiveevil"whichthe
SupremeCourthasarightandadutytopreventdoesnot,intheinstantcase,relatetothreatsofphysical
disorderorovertviolenceorsimilardisruptionsofpublicorder.5Whatishereatstakeistheauthorityofthe
SupremeCourttoconfrontandpreventa"substantiveevil"consistingnotonlyoftheobstructionofafreeand
fairhearingofaparticularcasebutalsotheavoidanceofthebroaderevilofthedegradationofthejudicial
systemofacountryandthedestructionofthestandardsofprofessionalconductrequiredfrommembersof
thebarandofficersofthecourts.The"substantiveevil"hereinvolved,inotherwords,isnotaspalpableasa
threatofpublicdisorderorriotingbutiscertainlynolessdeleteriousandmorefarreachinginitsimplications
forsociety.

4.InhispointH,respondent'scounselarguesthatitiserror"forthisCourttoholdthatintentis
irrelevantinchargesofmisconduct."WhattheCourtactuallysaidonthispointwas:

RespondentGonzalezdisclaimsanintenttoattackanddenigratetheCourt.Thesubjectivitiesof
therespondentareirrelevantsofarascharacterizationofhisconductormisconductis
concerned.Hewillnot,however,beallowedtodisclaimthenaturalandplainimportofhiswords
andacts.Itis,upontheotherhand,notirrelevanttopointoutthattherespondentofferedno
apologyinhistwo(2)explanationsandexhibitednorepentance(Resolution,p.7footnotes
omitted).

Theactualsubjectivitiesoftherespondentareirrelevantbecausesuchsubjectivities(understoodas
pyschologicalphenomena)cannotbeascertainedandreachedbytheprocessesofthisCourt.Humanintent
canonlybeshownderivativelyandimpliedfromanexaminationofactsandstatements.Thus,whattheCourt
wassayingwasthatrespondent'sdisclaimerofanintenttoattackanddenigratetheCourt,cannotprevail
overtheplainimportofwhathedidsayanddo.Respondentcannotnegatetheclearimportofhisactsand
statementsbysimplypleadingasecretintentorstateofmindincompatiblewiththoseactsorstatements.Itis
scarcelyopentodisputethat,e.g.,oneaccusedofhomicidecannotsuccessfullydenyhiscriminalintentby
simplyassertingthatwhilehemayhaveinsertedaknifebetweenthevictim'sribs,heactuallyactedfromhigh
motivesandkindfeelingsforthelatter.

5Inhispoint1,respondent'scounselarguesthatitiserror"forthisCourttopunishrespondent
forcontemptofcourtforoutofcourtpublications."

Respondent'scounselasksthisCourttofollowwhathepresentsasallegedmoderntrendsintheUnited
KingdomandintheUnitedStatesconcerningthelawofcontempt.Weare,however,unabletoregardthe
textsthathecitesasbindingorpersuasiveinourjurisdiction.TheCourtwenttosomelengthtodocumentthe
stateofourcaselawonthismatterinitspercuriamResolution.Thereisnothinginthecircumstancesofthis
casethatwouldsuggesttothisCourtthatthatcaselaw,whichhasbeenfollowedforatleasthalfacenturyor
so,oughttobereversed.

6.InhispointJ,respondent'scounselpleadsthattheimpositionofindefinitesuspensionfrom
thepracticeoflawconstitutes"cruel,degradingorinhumanpunishment".TheCourtfindsit
difficulttoconsiderthisasubstantialconstitutionalargument.Theindefinitenessofthe
respondent'ssuspension,farfrombeing"cruel"or"degrading"or"inhuman,"hastheeffectof
placing,asitwere,thekeytotherestorationofhisrightsandprivilegesasalawyerinhisown
hands.Thatsanctionhastheeffectofgivingrespondentthechancetopurgehimselfinhisown
goodtimeofhiscontemptandmisconductbyacknowledgingsuchmisconduct,exhibiting
appropriaterepentanceanddemonstratinghiswillingnessandcapacitytoliveuptotheexacting
standardsofconductrightlydemandedfromeverymemberofthebarandofficerofthecourts.

ACCORDINGLY,theCourtResolvedtoDENYtheMotionforReconsiderationforlackofmerit.Thedenialis
FINAL.

TheCourtalsoNOTEDtheExParteManifestationandMotion,datedOctober25,1988andthe
SupplementalManifestation,datedOctober27,1988,filedbyrespondent

Fernan,C.J.,Narvasa,MelencioHerrera,Gutierrez,Jr.,Cruz,Paras,Feliciano,Gancayco,Padilla,Bidin,
Sarmiento,Cortes,GrioAquino,MedialdeaandRegalado,JJ.,concur.

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