Fluid quantity

L to brake
pressure line

Rotors Stators Lining pads

/\ / \ (mounted on rotors)
Automatic

Wear-indicator pin
(two locations)

Pressure plate Backing plate

of torque tube

EXHIBtl7*9 The brake assembly on each wheel of the main

landing gear of the Douglas DC-IO. (Based on Goodyear
maintenance materials)
EXHIBIT 7-10 An information worksheet for the main-landing-gear
brake assembly of the Douglas DC-l&

SYSTEMINFORMATION WORKSHEET type of aircraft Douglas DC-1040

item number
item name Brake assembly, main landing gear
vendor part/model no. Goodyear 500709

item description
Multiple-plate disk brake (seven rotors and six stators)
powered by eight hydraulic-driven pistons. Pressure
line to this assembly is included for purposesof
analysis.

reliability data

prexnatun-removal rate (per I,OW unit hour& 1 pa too0 lvrdings

failure rate (pet l,OOtl unit hours)

source of data Simiiar equipment

1 To provide stopping A Nobralsingrction

capability on command during
ground operation
B Reduced braking action

2 Toreleasebrakes A Draggingbraice

3 To contain hydraulic fluid A External hydraulic leaks

180 APPLICATIONS
 page of

no.perairaaft 8 prepared by F. S. Nowlan date 3/6/78

m Landing gear m&wed by T. M. Edwards date 316178

zone(s) 733,743 approved by date

redundancies and protective features (in&de instrumentation)

One brake assembly in each wheel (four) of each main-landing-gear
truck. Separate hydraulic systemspower half the pistons in each brake;
loss of brake fluid due to failed pressure line to wheel prevented by
fluid quantity limiters in each hydraulic system. Engine thrust reverser
provides another source of stopping capability. Wheelwell is designed
to prevent critical secondary damage by debris from tire failure.

built-in testequipment(describe) Visual wear indicators

Can aircraft be dispatched with item dassification of item (check)

, inoperative? If so, list any limitations X &nificant
which must be observed.
Yes. If one brake assembly inoperative, X hidden function
gross takeoff and landllg weights must be
reduced. nonsignificant

failure modes failure effects

1 Brake wear to point of seizure
1 Broken pressure line
Wheel skid, causing tire blowout; audible noise and
vibration, possible extensive secondary damage to systems
within wheelwell; requires correction before dispatch
No braking action from half the actuating pistons in one
assembly, causing reduced braking capability and slightly
increasedminimum stopping distance

1 Malfunction of aduster assembly Increased wear of pad and disk; overheating of brake and
tire may causetire fuse plugs to blow, with landing on flat
tire and secondary damage from the failure; requires cor-
rection before dispatch .

1 Damaged or distorted piston seals Slow loss of hydraulic fluid from one system
 A review of the design characteristics of the DC-10 shows that each
truck on the main landing gear has four wheels, and each wheel has a
multiple-disk brake assembly consisting of seven rotors and six stators
(see Exhibit 7.9). The brakes are powered by eight pistons, four of
which are driven by one hydraulic system and four by another. With-
out this extensive replication, especially of the wheels on each truck,
reduced stopping capability in one brake assembly. might be a critical
failure. In this case the failure results only in slightly increased stopping
distances. One of the failure effects, however, is a possible tire blowout,
with secondary damage caused by rubber thrown from the damaged
tire. Brake assemblies can be replaced in the field, but the time required
will cause delays. The aircraft can also be dispatched with one assembly
inoperative, but only at a great penalty in operating weight. Thus any
observed failure of a brake assembly has operational consequences.
Note that in this case the primary function of the brake assembly
is subject to two failure possibilities, no braking action and reduced
braking action. Each of these functional failures must be considered
separately. The first type of failure is no braking action, caused by
brake wear:

1 Is the occurrence of a failure evident to the operating crew during

performance of normal duties?

If the brake pads are allowed to wear beyond a certain point, they come
loose from the rotor and jam between the rotors and stators, causing the
brake to seize. The wheel will therefore not rotate on landing, and the
tire will skid and blow out, throwing pieces around the wheelwell. The
resulting noise and vibration would be evident to the flight crew; thus
the answer to this question is yes.
With a yes answer to question 1 we must now consider the possible
consequences of this failure:

2 Does the failure cause a loss of function or secondary damage that

could have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?

The loss of braking function for one of the eight wheels is not in itself
critical, so the answer to the first part of this question is no. The answer
to the second part is also no, because this failure has been taken into
account in the design of the wheelwell, so that secondary damage from
occasional tire failures will not be critical.
Although a scheduled task is not required for safety reasons, the
182 APPLICATIONS secondary damage does have serious operational consequences:
 3 Does the failure have a direct adverse effect on operational
capability?

In addition to the time required to exchange the brake assembly, this

particular type of failure can result in extensive damage to hydraulic
lines, flight-controi surfaces, and other fail-safe systems. Thus the sec-
ondary damage alone may prevent the airplane from being dispatched.
Such a failure therefore has serious economic consequences, and we
must consider the possible preventive tasks.
The first choice is an on-condition task directed at detecting brake
wear:

8 Is an on-condition task to detect potential failuresboth applicable

and effective?

This brake assembly is equipped with wear indicators that show when
the pad and disk stack have reached a wear IeveI that calls for replace-
ment. Since the wear indicators make it possible to define a potential-
failure condition, an on-condition task is applicable; it will also be
effective as Iong as the inspection interva1 is short enough to ensure
sufficient remaining pad to keep the brake from locking.
In an initial program inspection of the wear indicators might be
assigned for every overnight layover at a maintenance station, since this
would be a convenient time to change brake assemblies if a potential
failure is found. The brake assembly will ordinarily be removed if the
wear indicator shows that fewer than 20 more landings are possible.
The wear indicators will also be checked at every preflight walkaround,
but the wear criterion will be less stringent. The objective is for the
overnight mechanics to be the first to identify the need for a brake
change, to reduce the number of delays incurred by the discovery of
potential failures in the field.
The second type of functional failure, reduced braking action, is
caused by a broken pressure line- the line from the fluid quantity lim-
iter to the brake assembly itself. (These lines are treated as part of the
brake assembly because the limiters and lines are independent for each
system to each wheel.) Analysis of this failure possibility takes us
again to the first question in the decision diagram:

1 Is the occurrence of a failure evident to the operating crew during

performance of normal duties?
SECTION 7.3 183
 A broken pressure line will result in a loss of function for only half the
actuating pistons in the affected assembly, as the limiter stops the flow
of hydraulic fluid when the line breaks. Thus the other four pistons in
the assembly will still provide normal braking action. There is sufficient
braking margin that the slight reduction in braking capability would not
come to the attention of the operating crew- that is, the failure would
not be evident.
A no answer to the first question means that a scheduled task is
required to ensure that the failure will be found and corrected, and
further analysis falls in the hidden-function branch of the decision dia-
gram. In this case either one of the directly preventive tasks or a failure-
finding task must be assigned to avoid the risk of a multiple failure. The
choice depends on technical feasibility and relative cost.

14 Is an on-condition task to detect potential failures both applicable

and effective?

EXHlBlT 7.11 A worksheet showing the results of RCM analysis of

the Douglas DC-10 brake assembly. References in the first column are
to the functions, functional failures, and failure modes listed in
Exhibit 7.10.

SYSlEM DECISION WORK!SHEET type of aircraft Douglas DC-1040

item name Brake assembly, main landing gear

responses to decision-diagram questions

ref. consequences task selection

.FFFFM123 4 s 6 7 8 9lollIzl3141516

1 A 1 Y NY ----Y

1 B 1 N - - ----------NNN

2Al N------------y

3 A 1 N - - ----------NNN

184 APPLICATIONS