REYES V CA

7 NOV
G.R. No. 96492 | November 26, 1992 | J. Nocon

Facts:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent Courts
decision, which affirmed with modification the agrarian courts decision, which ordered them and
the other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to
private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now
deceased Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husbands death, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject
lots; that Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her
workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the subject
premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender
the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the recovery of
possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between
plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latters farm lots and asked for
the dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorneys fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and
approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his
defenses.

Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable

Held:
No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their findings
of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled is the rule
that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil
case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on
record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria
for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is
entitled to belief.
PEOPLE V TURCO

7 NOV
G.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J. Melo

Facts:
Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka Totong) was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-
year-old Escelea Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from
outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years
and he is her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the
door. Turco, with the use of towel, covered Esceleas face, placed his right hand on the latters neck
and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12 meters
away from the victims house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top of
the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by
forcibly inserting his penis inside Esceleas private part despite Esceleas resistance. Appellant then
threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster enough courage
to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victims father,
about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately asked Escelea to see a
doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of the medical
certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of the
complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain the same.

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape

W/N the appellants contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is with merit

Held:
1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts finding of credibility in the testimony and
evidence presented by the victim, and finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
2. Yes. With regards to appellants argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the certificate
could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records constitute
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be
established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it
is presented in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction between
admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since admissibility of
evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic
and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the
Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all.
Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as
evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In fact,
reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without medical
examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable
in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not
disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony alone is credible and sufficient to
convict.

SASAN
vs.
NLRC

G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank andHI
for illegal dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become
regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed,
havingcontinuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year;
that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to
performtheir jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to
do sosince they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it
entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent jobcontractor which hired and assigned
petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerialservices thereat. HI, on the other hand,
asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial
and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was oneof its clients.O
n the basis of the parties position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered
a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess
therequired substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its
ownaccount and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor
andthe real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.Aggrieved by the
decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed thesame to the NLRC, 4
th
Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRCtook into consideration the
documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, onthe basis thereof, declared HI
as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in
"labor-only contracting."Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the CA
by filing a Petitionfor
Certiorari
under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was alegitimate job
contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases.
RULING:The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules
of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling inlabor
cases.
The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means toascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in
the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that
the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first
time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party
for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, becausetechnical
rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.

Hearsay Rule
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is
relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence,
the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary
but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the
existence of such a fact. The witness who testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this
is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to prove either that the statement
was made or the tenor thereof. (People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. 178301, April 24, 2009)

Bautista vs. Aparece51 O.G. 805 (1995)Relevance

FACTS:As owner of the lot subject of the case, Nicolas Anasco sold the same to ValentinJustiniani. In the
same year, Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani, In October 12,1935, Claudio Justiniani
executed a public instrument whereby he sold the same property for P100 to Apolonio Aparece in
whose name it was assessed since 1935. While Aparece was
in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of the land and took possessionthereof. Thus
, Aparece file a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating in the provinceof Bohol. When the case
was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a
guerillaofficer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the
land toAparece in good will, and recognized Apareces lawful ownership over the land. Thus, possession
of the land was restored to Aparece.However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging
that with the aid of armed men and pretending to be owner, usurped the land, Bautista filed a
complaint in theCourt of First Instance (CFI) of Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece
asowner of the land.On appeal, Bautista raised as defense the error of the trial court in admitting the
publicinstrument which he executed as evidence. He argued that the document was executed
under duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed,had
no jurisdiction over the matter.ISSUE(S):Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a
public documentexecuted before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.RULING:This
argument is beside the point.
The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of acertain document is whether or not it is relevant,
material or competent.
The public documentis not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership
between the parties litigants.
Relevant evidence
is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove anymatter probable in ac action. And evidence
is said to be
material
when it is directed to prove afact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings,
while
competent
evidence is one that s not excluded by law in a particular case.With these criteria in mind, we hold that
the mere fact that the public document
wasexecuted before a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent
to the main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, consideredtogether with the
other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really
belong to defendant Aparece.

Case Title:Lopez v. HessenCitation:G.R.70642Nature:On relevance of evidencesFACTS:

Hessen was an air force officer who purchased a JC Higgins model rifle from Sears. He was givenan
instruction pamphletwhich explains the composition of rifle and gave operating instructionsto shift the
rifle from "fire" to "safe".He left for a deer hunting trip in which he accidentally shoot Lopezwhohappens
to be nearbyafter his rifle itself moved its gear from safe to fire.As a result, Lopez filed for damages. In
defense, the owner of Sears presented the followingevidences: (1) expert testimony on the general
reputation of other firearms, (2) expert testimonyon the poundage pressure required to move safety
levers from safe to fire position and (3)opinion evidence on the design of safety mechanism.Lopez
claimed thatexpert testimonies and opinion evidences are irrelevant since it does notdirectly point
to the issue.Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Are the expert testimonies and opinion evidences admissible?
COURT RULING:
Yes. The law provides that for evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant which means itshould point
to the facts surrounding the case. In the case at bar, expert testimonies and opinionevidenceson the
design and safety mechanism of the rifle is relevant, as it points out to the rifleused in the case.
Though itmay have little or weightyprobative value, still, the court considerssuch to be admissible. For
an evidence to be admissible, it only requires for such to be relevant tothe facts surrounding the case
and that it must be competent in such that it must beallowed bythe law and the rules.

Case Title:State v. BallCitation:American JurisprudenceNature:On relevance of evidencesFACTS:

Two colored men entered Krekeler Jewelry Store and robbed John Krekeler, the shorter manbetween
the two, hitting Krekeler on the face using a pistol. Three weeks later, Ball was arrestedby Officers
Powell and Ballard while walking in the street.
ISSUE:
During the trial,Ball claims the following issues: (1) the evidence of his flight was immaterialand
irrelevant because it wasremoteto the date of robbery. (2) the articles found in his personduring the
arrest are immaterial, such as the following: brown felt hat, brown windbreaker type jacket, grayshirts
and shoes and $258.02 dollars.
COURT RULING:
The Court ruled that unexplained flight is a relevant circumstance, but it is more on probativevalue.
Second, the articles found in his person is relevant since it allows the victim to identify thesuspect--
except the money, which failed to point whether or not it was from the jewelry store.Hence, all the
seized articles except the $258.02 dollar cash is admissible.

[G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOERAL GALLENO,
Facts:
The victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera a 5-year old together with her younger brother, 3-year
old Eleazar, live under the care and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola
Obligar.The accused-appellant, is 19-year old Joeral Galleno. On August 16, 1994, Emetario
and Penicola left their residence to work at sugarcane plantation and the only persons left in
the house were Evelyn and Eleazar.
At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Galleno passed by the Obligars' residence and found
the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting
versions on what occurred at said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn
sustained a laceration in her vagina which result in profuse, life-threatening bleeding due to her
tender age.
For the prosecution, the victim herself testified that Galleno took advantage of the situation by
sexually molesting her. After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. The
penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. Emeterio and Penicola
also testified that when they came home from work, they arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emetario
noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she was pressing a rug against her genital
organ. Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician reported, upon examining Evelyn, that
he found (1) clotted blood, and (2) a vaginal laceration.
On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital were
she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Laada. Dr. Laada, testified that
she found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the vagina"
and "the pressence of about 10-15cc of blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Laada recommended
that evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital because the wound in her vagina, which
was bleeding, had to be repaired. The following day, Evelyn was examined at Roxas Memorial
General Hospital again where she was attended to by Dr. Machael Toledo, the resident
physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo "
pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) admitted the patient for possible
repair of the laceration and blood transfusion because she has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding."
The trial deemed the following circumstances significant in finding accused-appellant culpable
for the crime of Statutory Rape.
Hence, the instant appeal and review.

Issue:
The Trial Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical
doctors.

Ruling:
As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is
 the court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts
proved. However, conclusions and opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are
not confined to expert testimony, based on the principle that either because of the special skill
or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of the subject matter under
observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a judgment.
In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration,
but also the testimony the victim herself. In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the
testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the experts enumerated various
possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's interference is wrong.
As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration, particularly as to what really caused
the laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused.
As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted story
of what really happened, we apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose
chastity was abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto, 253 SCRA 455 [1996]). We
likewise consider the fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves
support her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice,
especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma (People vs.
Dones,supra.)

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record,

the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121087. August 26, 1999]
FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City went to
the police station to report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment
shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan
and accused policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters,
lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun below the left
eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment.
The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations
made by Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight.
During the trial, Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to
confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at
the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200,
which prohibits wire tapping.
 2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the
part of the offended party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be
appreciated in favor of the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which
prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private

communications (Ramirez v Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused,
constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The
provocation must be sufficient and must immediately precede the act; and in order to be
sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must be
accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro
after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill
the latter.

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]

FACTS:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico after
demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension
as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor
was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and
Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such
that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of
communication between two parties using a telephone line.

HELD:
No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or
other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot
be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the
phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension
telephone.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups
from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some
unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to
be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

7 NOV
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from
the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness
and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously
inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on
admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling
should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error
of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.

RAMIREZ V CA

7 NOV
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that
the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted
and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity
and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation
of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant
petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by
the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same
need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to
share or to impart. In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of meanings or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the phrase private
communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and
communication were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

Inadmissibility of evidence due to infirmity of an arrest PEOPLE VS. LAGUIO, G.R. No. 128587
March 16, 2007 Facts: Private respondent was walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was
about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him. When frisked, there
was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed guns and
shabu in the car. Issue: Is the evidence competent? Ruling: No. There can be no valid warrantless
arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section5 Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Hence the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest was likewise unlawful.
Therefore the evidence obtained was illegal.

City of Manila vs. Gerardo Garcia et.al

Jun 28
FACTS:
1.Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants
occupied the property and built their houses.2.Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant
written permits, each labeled as lease contract to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were
charged nominal rentals.3.After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and
vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary Schools expansion.4.Despite the demand, defendants
refused to vacate the said property. Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession.5.The trial court ruled in
favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 appropriating P100k for the construction of additional
building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School.6.Defendants appealed.

ISSUE: WoN the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes

HELD: YES The trial court ruled out the admissibility of the documentary evidence presented by plaintiff

Certification of the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board which recites the amount of
P100k had been set aside in Ordinance 4566 for the construction of additional building of the said school.

But then the decision under review, the trial court revised his views. He then declared that there was a need for
defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document. Because of the courts
contradictory stance, defendants brought this case on appeal. However, the elimination of the certification as
evidence would not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken because he
was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 . The reason being that the city charter of Manila
requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.

And, Ordinance4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for
the construction of additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Further defendants entry to the said property is illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits. The city
mayor doesnt have the authority to issue permits. The permits issued are null and void.

City of Manila v. Garcia

Doctrine: The Charter of the City of Manila states that all courts sitting therein are required to take
judicial notice of ordinances passed therein.

Facts:
The City of Manila is the owner of parcels of land in Malate, Manila. Sometime between 1945
and 1947, the defendants entered upon these premises without the Citys knowledge and
consent.
They built houses of second-class materials, again without the Citys knowledge and consent,
and without building permits.
In November, 1947, upon discovery of the presence of defendants, they were given by Mayor
Valeriano Fugoso written permits labeled lease contract to occupy specific areas in the
property upon conditions set forth therein. They were charged nominal rental.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School, which was close, though not contiguous, to the
property had a pressing need to expand.
The City Engineer gave the defendands 30 days each to vacate the premises and to remove the
constructions therein.
This was followed by the City Treasurers demand on each defendant for the payment of the
amount due by reason of the occupancy.
The defendants refused, alleging that they have acquired the legal status of tenants by reason of
the written permits issued them.

Issue:

If the certificates showing the need to expand Epifanio de los Santos Elementary school is held
inadmissible, will this fact help Garcia in this case?

Held:

No. The courts in Manila are required to take judicial notice of ordinances by the City of Manila.

We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly found that the
city needs the premises for school purposes.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of P100,000.00, had
been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the construction of an
additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the
court below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under
review, the trial judge obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants
to vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E, aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make
it formable to law and justice. Such was done here. Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of
the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this
purpose.

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit defendants. For, in
reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken-because he was duty bound to take-judicial
notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting
therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. And, Ordinance
4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for
the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction. Defendants have
absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at
best flimsy. The permits to occupy are revocable on thirty day's notice. They have been asked to leave;
they refused to heed. It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is
unimportant. The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's
dominical right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land,
such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below.

Baguio v. Vda. De Jalagat

Doctrine: A court may take judicial cognizance of the finality of judgment rendered by the same court in
a different case.

Facts:

The case started with a complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by Gabriel
Baguio.
Teofila Jalagat, et al. filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by
prior judgment, being identical to a civil case filed by Baguio against Melecio Malagat, now
deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant
complaint.
Baguio alleged that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must
be apparent on the fact of the complaint. There was nothing in the complaint from which such a
conclusion may be inferred.

Issues:

In ruling that there is res judicata in this case, the court took judicial cognizance of the fact that its
judgment in another case involving the same parties, issues, and causes of action has become final and
executory. Is the court correct in taking judicial cognizance?

Held:
Yes. A court may take judicial cognizance of the finality of judgment rendered by the same court in a
different case.

It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take
judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided
by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is
not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus:
"Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending
is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."

There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy
which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better,
not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were
subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not
have been frittered away on a useless and hopeless appeal. It has ever been the guiding principle from
Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality.

Prieto v. Arroyo

Doctrine: As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the cases pending before
them, or the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge.

Facts:

Arroyo Sr. Filed a petition for registration of several parcels of land in 1948. As a result, OCT no.
39 was issued in his name. That same year, Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining
parcel of land.
When Arroyos Sr. died, OCT 39 was cancelled and a TCT was issued in the name of his heirs.
Thereafter, the heirs filed a case to correct the technical descriptions of the land covered by the
TCT.
The court granted the said petition.
Prieto then sought to annul the aforesaid decision, however this was dismissed by the court on
the ground of res judicata.

Issue:

Prieto contends that the court should not have dismissed his first case for annulment because no
parole evidence need be taken to support it, the matters therein alleged being part of the records of
the cases, which are well within the judicial notice and cognizance of the court. He also contends that
there is no res judicata in this case. Is his contention correct?

Held:
No.

In the first place, as a general rule courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of
cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are
actually pending before the same judge (Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna, et al., vs. Colegio de
San Jose, et al., 65 Phil., 318). Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of
such records he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of
sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly
denied. Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order
dismissing his first petition, and said order had long become final when the complaint in the present
action was filed.

The contention that the causes of action in the two suits are different is untenable.

Both are based on the alleged nullity of Special Proceedings No. 900; in both appellant seeks that the
order of correction of the title of appellees be set aside. Of no material significance is the fact that in the
complaint in the instant case there is an express prayer for reconveyance of some 157 square meters of
land, taken from appellant as a result of such correction of title. For that area would necessarily have
reverted to appellant had his first petition prospered, the relief asked for by him being that "the Register
of Deeds of Camarines Sur be ordered to amend Certificate of Title No. 332 by incorporating therein
only and solely the description of Lot No. 2, Plan Psu-106730 as appearing in the Decree No. 5165 and
maintaining consequently the description limits and area of the adjoining land of the herein petitioner,
Lot No. 3, Plan Psu-117522, in accordance with Decree No. 2301 of Land Registration No. 173." The
claim for damages as well as for other additional and alternative reliefs in the present case are not
materially different from his prayer for "such other remedies, just and equitable in the premises"
contained in the former one.

There being identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the two cases, the order of
dismissal issued in the first constitutes a bar to the institution of the second.

Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

Doctrine: To establish a valid foreign law, its existence as a question of fact and the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence must be proven. In the absence of such proof, the foreign law is
presumed to be the same as Philippine Law.

Facts:

Sy Kiat died and left properties.

He was allegedly married to Yao Kee in China through a customary Chinese wedding ceremony -
they had children.
He also had illegitimate children with Ascuncion Gillego. Gillegos children filed a petition for the
grant of letters of administration of Sy Kiats properties.
 The Court of First Instance of Rizal declared all children from both Gillego and Yao Kee as natural
children of Sy Kiat. The court did not recognize Sy Kiats alleged marriage to Yao Kee.

Issue:

Whether or not the court should acknowledge the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee.

Held :

No, the court should not recognize the said marriage. It was told that Sy Kiat and Yao Kee married in
China. According to Article 12 of the Civil Code, customs must be proven in order for it to be admissible
as evidence. However, Yao Kees party failed to establish such customs binding between the relationship
of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee. Therefore, the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee cannot be recognized for there is
no proof of its existence.

In the absence of such proof, the foreign law is presumed to be the same as Philippine law. Therefore,
applying Philippine law, Yao Kees marriage is void because of non-compliance the essential and formal
requisites of marriage.

Tabuena v. Court of Appeals

Doctrine: There are exceptions to the rule that the court cannot take judicial notice of contents of other
cases pending before it.

Facts:

In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership of a parcel of residential land in Makato, Aklan, was
filed in the RTC of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. The trial court
found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Tabernilla while they were in the United
States.
Peraltas mother conveyed the land to Tabernilla upon the latters return. At the same time, she
asked to be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life.
Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she did. Upon her
death, Tabuena, the half-brother of Peralta, took possession of the property. He refused
demands made Tabernilla to surrender the property, claiming it as his won.
The trial court ruled for the estate and ordered Tabuena to vacate the property.
Tabuena protested that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of documents which had
never been formally submitted in evidence and in considering the proceedings in another case
involving the same parties but a different parcel of land in resolving the ownership of the
subject lot.

Issues:

Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuenas testimony in Civil Case No.
1327?

Held:

Yes.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial notice
of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case
before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the
adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both
cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge." Nevertheless, it applied the
exception that:

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly
treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the
court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record
of the case then pending.

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the
knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is
clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the
archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been
established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil
Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung upon him, leaving
him no opportunity to counteract.

People v. Godoy

Doctrine: The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young
ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.

Facts:

Godoy was charged with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the complainant to
the accused.

Issue:

Can Godoy be convicted of rape?

Held:

No. They were in fact lovers.

It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the
malefactor was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such
intent has not at all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that the Taha
spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they themselves instituted, several grave and
irreconcilable inconsistencies bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on the
guilt of appellant.

The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies are
strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their
reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character
humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted to save face in
the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter's
indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the
scenario of this rape drama.

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Tax Appeals

Doctrine: There are exceptions to the rule that the court cannot take judicial notice of contents of other
cases pending before it.

Facts:

BPI filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,000 with the CIR alleging that it did
not apply the 1989 refundable amoun to fP279,000 to its 1990 Annual income Tax Return or
other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year.

Issue:

Is BPI entitled to the claimed refund?

Held:

Yes.

Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by
the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax
Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990 x x x."18 [Decision in CTA Case
No. 4897, p. 7; rollo, p. 59.] Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said
case.19 [Respondents Memorandum, pp. 9-10.]

As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases,
even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact
that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.

Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the
Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court.
Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent.
Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court
cannot take judicial notice thereof.
To our mind, respondents reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had really
believed that petitioner is not entitled to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did not
suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not to assail the fact appearing
therein -- that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 - in the same way that it refused to controvert the
same fact established by petitioners other documentary exhibits.

In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case. It is merely one
more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes
for 1990.