IX.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. The President

Qualifications:
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
a registered voter;
able to read and write;
at least forty years of age on the day of the election;
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election

Election

Regular Election:
By direct vote of the people
Second Monday of May

Congress as canvassing board.

Returns of every election for President and Vice President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city shall be:
transmitted to Congress
directed to the Senate President who, upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, shall, not later than 30 days after the day of the election, open all
the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session
the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
In case two or more candidates shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall be chosen by a majority vote of all the members
of Congress.

Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003), insofar as it
grants sweeping authority to the Comelec to proclaim all winning candidates, is
unconstitutional

Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and
due execution of the certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee,
composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.

Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform
this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential and vice- presidential
election results without need of any call for a special session by the President.
 The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express
directive of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to
proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot,
adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks.
For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
functus officio

There is no constitutional or statutory basis for Comelec to undertake a separate

and an unofficial tabulation of, results, whether manually or electronically.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and
may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

Term of Office
six [6] years.

a) No re-election
b) The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, extended to
noon of June 30, 1992 [Sec. 5, Art. XVIII], See Osmena v. Comelec, 199 SCRA 750.

Oath of Office [Sec. 5, Art. VII]

oaths purpose: to deepen the sense of responsibility of the president and ensure a
more conscientious discharge of his office

Privileges [Sec. 6, Art. VII],

a) Official residence.

b) Salary.
Determined by law;
shall not be decreased during tenure
No increase shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent
during which such increase was approved.

c) Immunity from suit

while the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from
instituting suit.
After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil
damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not
performed in the exercise of official duties
Even if the DECS Secretary is an ater eg f the President, he cannot invoke the
Presidents immunity from suit in a case filed against him
Executive Privilege
right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold
information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public
presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door
Cabinet meetings, like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are
recognized as confidential.
the privilege is an exemption from the obligation to disclose information (in this
case to Congress)

Prohibitions/lnhibitions:

Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other source.
Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall not hold any other office or
employment.
Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil
degree as Members of Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or
as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

Rules on Succession.
a) Vacancy at the beginning of the term.
Death or permanent disability of the President-elect: Vice President-elect shall become
President.
President-elect fails to qualify: Vice President-elect shall act as President until the
President-elect shall have qualified.
President shall not have been chosen: Vice President-elect shall act as President until a
President shall have been chosen and qualified.
No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall have died
or become permanently disabled: The President of the Senate or, in case of his inability,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as President until a President or a
Vice President shall have been chosen and qualified. In the event of inability of the
officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is
to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice President shall have
qualified.

Vacancy during the term:

Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President: Vice
President shall become the President.
Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of President and Vice
President: Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
 Representatives, shall act as President until a President or Vice President shall be elected
and qualified. Congress, by law, shall provide for the manner in which one is to act as
President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.

Temporary Disability.

Sec 11

d) Constitutional duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the offices of President and Vice
President:
At 10 oclock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy occurs, Congress shall
convene without need of a call;
and within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice
President to be held not earlier than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of such call.
The bill shall be deemed certified and shall become law upon its approval on third
reading by Congress
convening of Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date
of the next presidential election.

Removal of the President

By impeachment

B. The Vice President.

1. Qualifications, election, term of office and removal.

The same as the President
no Vice President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms.
The Vice President may be appointed as Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

Vacancy in the office of the Vice President:

The President shall nominate a Vice president from among the members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately.

Powers of the President

1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.

The president shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
Executive power is the power of carrying out the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.
the Presidents power of general supervision over local governments could be
exercised by him only as may be provided by law.
The president is not above the law but is obliged to obey and execute them
 Until and unless a law is declared by the judiciary as unconstitutional, the
president has a duty to execute it

The Power of Appointment

Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office.

Classification

i) Permanent or temporary.
Permanent- are those extended to persons possessing the qualifications and the requisite
eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will
and without the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation; made on the
understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee
and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent choice is
made.
A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
where a person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall
hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the
appointing authority.

ii) Regular or ad interim.

A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in session, takes
effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved,
continues until the end of the term of the appointee.
An ad interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is not in session,
takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress.
In the latter case, the ad interim appointment is deemed by-passed through inaction.
The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government
services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices.
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution: disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments, or
adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the
appointment.

***KHAIYE***
The Military Powers
[Sec. 18, Art. VII: The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
 to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In cases of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. x x x]

The power of the sword makes the President the most important figure in the country in
times of war or other similar emergency. It is because the sword must be wielded with courage
and resolution that the President is given vast powers in the making and carrying out of military
decisions.

The military power enables the President to:

1. Command all the armed forces of the Philippines;
2. Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
3. Declare martial law

1. Command all the armed forces of the Philippines

The Commander-in-Chief clause:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

Power over the Military.

The President has absolute authority over all members of the armed forces. (Gudani v.
Senga, 2006)
He has control and direction over them. As Commander-in-chief, he is authorized to
direct the movements of the naval and the military forces placed by law at his command,
and to employ them in manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer and
subdue the enemy.

Calling Out Power under Section 18

xxx to call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.
Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid her in
suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action. But
every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires.
For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. She cannot invoke a
greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power.

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the only criterion for the exercise is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion These conditions are present in this case. Considering the
circumstances then prevailing PGMA found it necessary to issue PP1017. Owing to her Offices
vast intelligence network, she is in the best position to determine the actual condition in her
country. PP1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by PGMA on the AFP to prevent
or suppress lawless violence.
Presidents action in calling out the armed forces, and judicial review.
It may be gathered from the broad grant of power that the actual use to which the
President puts the armed forces, is unlike the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus, not subject to judicial review.350

However, in IBP v. Zamora cited in David v. Arroyo, while the Court considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom and that it
cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom or substitute its own, it stressed that
this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion. (IBP v. Zamora)

Judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents
decision is correct, but that the President did not act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard is not
correctness, but arbitrariness. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents
decision is totally bereft of factual basis and that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his
assertion, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.

Declaration of State of Rebellion.

Declaration of the state of rebellion is within the calling-out power of the President.
When the President declares a state of emergency or a state of rebellion her action is merely a
description of the situation as she sees it but it does not give her new powers. The declaration
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004.)

Declaration of a state of national emergency

The President can validly declare a state of national emergency even in the absence of
congressional enactment. (David v. Ermita)

2. Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Grounds for Suspending the Privilege:

1. In case of invasion or rebellion;
2. When the public safety requires it

Duration:
Not to exceed sixty days, following which it shall be lifted, unless extended by Congress.

Duty of President to report action to Congress:

Within forty-eight (48) hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in
writing to the Congress.

Role of Congress
 1. Congress convenes
2. Congress may either revoke or (with Presidents initiative) extend

Congress convenes
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

Congress may revoke

The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

Congress may extend

Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

Role of Supreme Court

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.

3. Declare Martial Law

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ [Sec. 18,
Art. VII].

The constitutional limitations for the suspension of the privilege of the writ are likewise
imposed on the proclamation of martial law.

The Pardoning Power

[Sec. 19, Art. VII: Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in the
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.]

Forms of Executive Clemency

1. Reprieves- a postponement of a sentence to a date certain, or a stay in the execution.

2. Commutations- reduction or mitigation of the penalty.
3. Pardons- act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed form the
punishment which the law inflicts for the crime he has committed.
 4. Parole- Release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty, as parolee is
still in the custody of the law although not in confinement.
5. Remission of fines
6. Forfeitures
7. Amnesty- commonly denotes the general pardon to rebels for their treason and other
high political offenses.

Exercise bv the President.

Discretionary; may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts, unless
there is a constitutional violation.

Limitations on exercise:
1. It cannot be exercised in cases of impeachment
2. Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remission of fines and forfeitures can be
given only after conviction by final judgment;
3. A grant of amnesty must be with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
Congress
4. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,
rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of COMELEC.

Other Limitations:
1. A pardon cannot be extended to a person convicted of legislative contempt or civil
contempt.
2. Pardon cannot also be extended for the purpose of absolving the pardonee of civil
liability, including judicial costs.
3. Pardon will not restore offices forfeited.362

Pardon Classified:
1. Plenary or partial
a. Plenary- Extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including
accessory disabilities.
b. Partial-Does not extinguish all the penalties.

2. Absolute or conditional
a. Absolute- One extended without any strings attached.
b. Conditional- One under which the convict is required to comply with
requirements.

Amnesty- grant of general pardon to a class of political offenders either after conviction or even
before the charges are filed. It is the form of executive clemency which under the Constitution
may be granted by the executive only with the concurrence of the legislature.

Requisites:
1. Concurrence of a majority of all the members of Congress (Section 19); and
2. There must be a previous admission of guilt. (Vera v. People)
Time of Application
Amnesty may be granted before or after the institution of criminal prosecution and
sometimes even after conviction. (People v. Casido, 268 SCRA 360)

Effects of the Grant of Amnesty

Criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its effects are
thus extinguished. (See Article 89 of RPC)

Pardon v. Amnesty

Pardon Amnesty

Addressed to ORDINARY Addressed to POLITICAL

offenses offenses

Granted to INDIVIDUALS Granted to a CLASS of person

Conditional pardon must be Need not be Accepted

accepted

No need for congressional Requires congressional

concurrence concurrence

Private act of the President A public act, subject to judicial

notice

Pardon looks forward. Amnesty looks backward

Only penalties are extinguished. Extinguishes the offense itself

Civil indemnity is not
extinguished.

Only granted after conviction of Maybe granted before or after

final judgment conviction

The Borrowing Power

Sec. 20, Art. VII: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of
the Republic with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every
quarter, submit to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be
contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations
which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may
be provided by law.
The Diplomatic Power.
Sec. 21, Art. VII: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.

Treaties v. Executive Agreements

1. International agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and
those involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form or a
treaty; while international agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well
established national policies and traditions and involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature take the form of executive agreements
2. In treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive agreements become
binding through executive action. (Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading 3
SCRA 351)

Budgetary Power
Sec. 22, Art. VII: The President shall submit to Congress within 30 days from the
opening of every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations act, a budget of
expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing and proposed revenue
measures.

The Informing Power

Sec. 23, Art. VII: The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular
session. He may also appear before it at any other time.

Other powers:

1. Call Congress to a special session [Sec. 15, Art. VI: x x x The President may call a
special session at any time ],
2. Power to approve or veto bills [Sec. 27, Art. VI].
3. To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections [Sec.
2(4), Art. IX-C].
4. To discipline such deputies [Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C].
5. By delegation from Congress, emergency powers [Sec. 23(2), Art. VI], and tariff powers
[Sec. 28(2), Art. VI].
6. General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional governments [Art.
X]
7. ***MARA***

c) Officials who are to be appointed bv the President.

i) The first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, says that the President shall nominate, and with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the following: {a] Heads of executive
departments; [b] Ambassadors,
OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

292 Constitutional Law

other public ministers and consuls; [c] Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain; and [dj Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the
Constitution.

ia) In Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, the Supreme Court declared that the foregoing are the
only categories of appointments which require confirmation by the Commission on Elections. In
this case, it was held that the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs
no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, because the Commissioner of the
Customs is not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence, Sec. 16, Art. VII. On the other
hand, in Quintos-Deles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on
Appointments, 177 SCRA 259, the appointment of a sectoral representative by the President of
the Philippines is specifically provided for in Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. Thus, the
appointment of a sectoral representative falls under category [d] above.

ib) In Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003, the Supreme Court said that because
the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, but is now under the Department of Transporation and Communications
(DOTC), a civilian agency, the promotion and appointment of respondent officers of the PCG
will not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Obviously, the clause
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain refers to military officers
alone.

ii) The second sentence of Sec. 16, VII, states that he shall also appoint [a] All other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; and [b] Those whom he
may be authorized by law to appoint.

iia) In Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16, the Supreme Court held that the
appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not otherwise provided for
in the Constitution or in the law. Thus, there is no necessity for such appointment to be passed
upon by the Commission on Appointments. In Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, Article 215
of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, insofar as it requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the appointment of the NLRC Chairman and commissioners, is
unconstitutional, because it violates Sec. 16,Art. VII. Infact, inManalov. Sistoza, G.R. No.
107369,August 11,1999, the Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law, require the
confirmation of appointments of government officials other than those enumerated in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.

OUTLINE REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

Constitutional Law 293

iib) In Tarrosa v. Singson, supra., the Court denied the petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioner as a taxpayer questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson as Governor of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
as provided in RA 7653, calling attention to its ruling in Calderon v. Carale. The petition was
dismissed, however, primarily on the ground that it was in the nature of a quo warranto
proceeding, which can be commenced only by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to
be entitled to a public office or position unlawfully held or exercised by another.

iic) In Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 113956, July 21, 2006, the Supreme Court declared that a
statute cannot circumvent the constitutional provisions on the power of appointment by filling
vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. This manner of
filling vacancies in public office has no constitutional basis. Thus, because the challenged
section of the law is unconstitutional, it is the President who shall appoint the trustees, by virtue
of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution which provides that the President has the power to
appoint officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law.

d) Steps in the appointing process:

 i) Nomination by the President;

ii) Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments;

iii) Issuance of the commission;

iv) Acceptance by the appointee. In Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740,,

the Supreme Court declared that an appointment is deemed complete only upon its acceptance.
Pending such acceptance, which is optional to the appointee, the appointment may still be validly
withdrawn. Appointment to a public office cannot be forced upon any citizen except for purposes
of defense of the State under Sec. 4, Art. II, as an exception to the rule against involuntary
servitude.

e) Discretion of Appointing Authority. Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and

must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the
minimum qualification requirements, including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for
the position. This discretion also includes the determination of the nature or character of the
appointment, i.e., whether the appointment is temporary or permanent. See Luego v. Civil
Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327; Lapinid v. Civil Service Commission, 197 SCRA 106;
Pobre v. Mendieta, 224 SCRA 738.
i) In Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, several Senators, including
members of the Commission on Appointments, questioned the constitutionality of the
appointments issued by the President to respondents as Acting Secretaries of their respective
departments, and to prohibit them from performing the duties of Department Secretaries. In
denying the petition, the Supreme Court said that the essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. In case of a vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the
President, such as the office of Department Secretary, the President must necessarily appoint the
alter ego of her choice as Acting Secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or
permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the
need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. However, we find no abuse in the
present case. The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyos issuance of ad
interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way before the
lapse of one year.

f) Special Constitutional Limitations on the Presidents appointing power:

.
by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, as Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus
or offices, including government- owned or -controlled corporations [Sec. 13, Art. VII].

ii) Appointments extended by an acting President shall remain effective unless revoked by the
elected President within ninety days from his assumption of office [Sec. 14, Art. VII].

iii) Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or acting President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety [Sec. 15, Art. VII].

iiia) In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, the Supreme Court
ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits
local executive officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure.

i) The President may not appoint his spouse and relatives

iiib) During this period, the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor
allowed to do so. Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is required by
law to fill up vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein, unless prohibited
by Sec. 15 of Article VII. While the filling up of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the
public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of
the appointments during the period of the ban [In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC,
November 9, 1998].
[Note: The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power
to prescribe qualifications for public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by
the President if the appointee is not qualified or has not been validly confirmed.]

g) The Power of Removal. As a general rule, the power of removal may be implied from the
power of appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him where
the Constitution prescribes certain methods for separation of such officers from public service,
e.g., Chairmen and Commissioners of Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by
impeachment, or judges who are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. In
the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the Presfdent, the same may be exercised only
for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the prescribed administrative
procedure.

i) Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the President may be
directly disciplined by him [Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710], provided that the same is for
cause and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.

ii) Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the
pleasure of the President may be replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their separation is
effected not by removal but by expiration of their term. See Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683; Aparri
v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231.

3. The Power of Control [Sec. 17, Art. VII: "The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices, x x x].

a) Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter [Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.]. It is distinguished from supervision in that the
latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate

officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the former may
take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.

i) The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under
the Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Art. VII,
Sections 1 and 17, of the Constitution. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged
in the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may
incidentally include such abolition, is permissible under present laws [Malaria Employees and
Workers Association of the Philippines (MEWAP) v. Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007].

ii) The Presidents power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual
powers under Section 20, Title I, Book II, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of the
Philippines), which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization
measures. Further, Presidential Decree No. 1772, which amended P.D. 1416, grants the President
the continuing authority to reorganize the national government which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classify functions, services and activities, and to standardize salaries and materials [MEWAP v.
Romulo, supra.].

iii) Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of
any branch or agency of the executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. R.A, 6656 enumerates the circumstances which may be considered
as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees as a result of reorganization:
(a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing
substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less
qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a
classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and (e) where the removal
violates the order of separation [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].

b) The alter ego principle. Also known as the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this
doctrine which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and
administrative organizations are adjuncts

of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive
[DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees. G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003].

i) The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other
subordinate executive officers [City of lligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158; Araneta v.
Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328], Even where the law provides that the decision of the Director of Lands
on questions of fact shall be conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the same may, on appeal to the President, be reviewed and reversed by the
Executive Secretary [Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA 895]. Thus, in Gascon v. Arroyo,
178 SCRA 582, it was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to enter into the
Agreement to Arbitrate with ABS-CBN, since he was acting on behalf of the President who
had the power to negotiate such agreement.

ii) Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government
may validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive
department. Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President,
is presumed to be the act of the President because the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, supra.].

iii) But even if he is an alter-ego of the President, the DECS Secretary cannot invoke the
Presidents immunity from suit in a case filed against him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are
not those of the President [Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000].

c) Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including Cabinet
members, completes exhaustion of administrative remedies [Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125
SCRA 302], except in the instances when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies, in
which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the presumptive approval of the

President, and there is no need to appeal the decision to the President in order to complete
exhaustion of administrative remedies [Kilusang Bayan, etc., v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92],

d) But the power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts, not over the
actor [Angangco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619].

e) The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is under the control of the Office of the
President. All projects undertaken by SBMA involving P2- million or above require the approval
of the President of the Philippines under LOI 620 [Hutchinson Ports Phils, Ltd. V. SBMA, G.R.
No. 131367, August 31,
2000] .

f) Power of control of Justice Secretary over prosecutors. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,

supra., it was reiterated that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who exercises the power of direct control and supervision over prosecutors.
Review, as an act of supervision and control by the Justice Secretary, finds basis in the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This power may still be availed of despite the filing of
a criminal information in Court, and in his discretion, the Secretary may affirm, modify or
reverse the resolutions of his subordinates. The Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice
Secretarys power of review. Thus, where the Secretary of Justice exercises his power of review
only after an information is filed, trial courts should defer or suspend arraignment and other
proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment, however, does not mean that the trial
court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, because jurisdiction, once
acquired by the trial court, is not lost despite the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to
withdraw the information or to dismiss the case. See also Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge
How, G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000; Noblejas v. Salas, 67 SCRA 47; Villegas v. Enrile, 50
SCRA 11; David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 842.

g) The President exercises only the power of general supervision over local governments [Sec. 4,
Art. X], i)

i) On the Presidents power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in
the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted
contrary to law. The President or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as
the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.
Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a
law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity, because
it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation of powers of the
executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal corporations [Judge Dadole v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002].

ii) Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review the constitutionality
or legality of a tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds is
valid, and does not confer the power of control over local government units in the Secretary of
Justice, as even if the latter can set aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute his own judgment
for that of the local government unit [Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135],

iii) In Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, the Supreme Court held that Sec. 4,
Administrative Order No. 327, which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of
local government units, is unconstitutional, because the Presidents power over local
governments is only one of general supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature of local
fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of LGU shares in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution.