Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6120 June 30, 1953

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Judge-at-large presiding over Branch C of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and EUGENIO ANGELES, as City Fiscal of Manila, representing the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Claro M. Recto for petitioner.

City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles for respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition which seeks to prohibit respondent Judge from proceeding with the trial of two
criminal cases which were then pending against petitioner without the assistance of assessors
in accordance with the provisions of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 in relation to section
154 of Act No. 190, and as an auxiliary remedy, to have a writ of preliminary injunction issued
so that the trial may be held pending until further orders of this court.

This petition was originally filed with the Court of Appeals, but was later certified to this court on
the ground that the main basis of the petition is section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise
known as Revised Charter of the City of Manila, approved on June 18, 1949, and respondents
assail the constitutionality of said section in that it contravenes the constitutional provision that
the rules of court "shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade . . . .(Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution.).

Petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila with two statutory offenses,
namely, (1) with a violation of Commonwealth Act No. 606, which was docketed as criminal
case No. 18374, in that he knowingly chartered a vessel of Philippine registry to an alien without
the approval of the President of the Philippines and (2) with a violation of section 129 in relation
to section 2713 of the Revised Administrative Code, which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
18375, in that he failed to submit to the Collector of Customs the manifests and certain
authenticated documents for the vessel "Antarctic" and failed to obtain the necessary clearance
from the Bureau of Customs prior to the departure of said vessel for a foreign port.

On April 23, 1952, before the trial of said criminal cases, petitioner filed a motion praying that
assessors be appointed to assist the court in considering the questions of fact involved in said
cases as authorized by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as Revised
Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that "the aid of assessors in the trial of any civil or
criminal action in the Municipal Court, or the Court of First Instance, within the City, may be
invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure." This motion was opposed by
the City Fiscal who appeared for the People of the Philippines.
On April 28, 1952, the court issued an order denying the motion holding in effect that with the
promulgation of the Rules of Court by the Supreme Court, which became effective on July 1,
1940, all rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines
previously existing were not only superseded but expressly repealed, that the Supreme Court,
having been vested with the rule-making power, expressly omitted the portions of the Code of
Civil Procedure regarding assessors in said Rules of Court, and that the reference to said
statute by section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 on the provisions regarding assessors should be
deemed as a mere surplusage. Believing that this order is erroneous, petitioner now comes to
this court imputing abuse of discretion to the respondent Judge.

The issues now posed by petitioner are:.

I. The right of the petitioner to a trial with the aid of assessors is an absolute substantive right,
and the duty of the court to provide assessors is mandatory.

II. The right to trial with the aid of assessors, being a substantive right, cannot be impaired by
this court in the exercise of its rule-making power.

III. Section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 2477 of the Old Charter of Manila,
creating the right to trial with the aid of assessors, are substantive law and were not repealed by
Rules of Court.

IV. Granting without admitting that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the old Charter of Manila were impliedly repealed, nevertheless, the same provisions were
later reenacted by reference in section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila, which is now the
source of the right to trial with the aid of assessors and which refers to the Code of Civil
Procedure merely to indicate the procedure for appointing assessors.

V. Section 49 of the Revised Charter of Manila is not invalid class legislation and does not
violate the constitutional provision that the rules of pleading, practice and procedure 'shall be
uniform for all the courts of the same grade.

A brief summary of the historical background of the legislation regarding trial with the aid of
assessors in the Philippines may be of help in the determination of the issues posed by
petitioner. The first provision which allowed trial with the aid of assessors in civil cases in inferior
courts and Courts of First Instance is contained in Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission,
otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure, which took effect on October 1, 1901
(Sections 58-62; 154-161). Almost simultaneously, or on October 17, 1901, the trial with the aid
of assessors both in civil and criminal cases was allowed in the Manila courts upon the
enactment of Act No. 267, amending Act No. 183, the original Charter of Manila. In 1914, the
trial by assessors was allowed in criminal cases in the courts of first instance in the provinces
with the enactment of Act No. 2369. And in 1915, Act No. 2520 was passed extending the same
trial by assessors to the courts of first instance and justice of the peace courts in the
Department of Mindanao and Sulu.

In connection with the use of assessors in Manila, section 44 of Act No. 183, the original Charter
of Manila, as amended by section 13 of Act No. 267, was reenacted as section 2449 of the
Administrative Code 1916, Act No. 2657. Section 2449 of the Administrative Code of 1916
became section 2477 of Act No. 2711, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. And section 2477 in turn became section 49 of the Republic Act No. 409, which is the
present Charter of the City of Manila. This section 49 is the law now invoked by petitioner in
support of his claim to a trial with the aid of assessors in the two criminal cases now pending
against him. Its pertinent provisions are quoted hereunder for ready reference:.

SEC. 49. Assessors in the courts in the city. The aid of assessors in the trial of any
civil or criminal action in the municipal court, or the Court of First Instance, within the
city, may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. It shall be
the duty of the Municipal Board to prepare one list of the names of twenty-five residents
of the City best fitted by education, natural ability and reputation for probity to sit as
assessors in the trial of actions in the municipal court and a like list of persons to sit as
assessors in the trial of the action in the Court of First Instance. The Board may at any
time strike any name from the list so prepared, by reason of the death, permanent
disability, or unfitness of the person named; and in case names are so stricken out, other
names shall be added in their place, to be selected as in this section provided. Parties
desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors in the municipal or Court of First
Instance shall proceed as provided for by law or rules of court; and the method of
summoning assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing them from attendance, their
compensation, oath duties and effect of dissent from the opinion of the judges shall be
as provided in those laws or rules.

A careful analysis of the above provisions is interesting. Their most salient features are: The aid
of assessors in the trial of any civil or criminal action in the Municipal Court or the Court of First
Instance may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. The parties
desiring to avail themselves of the use of assessors "shall proceed as provided for by law or
rules of court", and "the method of summoning assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing
them from attendance, their compensation, oath, duties, and effect of the dissent from the
opinion of the judge shall be as provided in those laws or rules." If we are to be guided merely
by these provisions, the right to trial with the aid of assessor would seem to be beyond dispute.
These provisions are simple and clear and appear to be mandatory. But where the difficulty
arises is in their relation or bearing on the directive of the Constitution which provides that "the
existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared rules of courts subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same." Pursuant to this rule-making power, the Supreme Court promulgated the present Rules
of Court, which became effective on July 1, 1940, but because it failed to incorporate therein the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure on assessors, respondents now contend that the right
to trial with the aid of assessors, with all its concomitant provisions, cannot now be invoked
because, being procedural in nature, the same must be deemed to have been impliedly
eliminated.

This claim would be correct if we were to hold that the right to trial with the aid of assessors is
not substantive but procedural or adjective in nature. If it were merely procedural, not having
been incorporated in the Rules of Court, the logical conclusion is that the rule- making power
has deemed wise to eliminate it. But no such presumption, nor conclusion, can be drawn for the
reason that the right to a trial by assessors is substantive in the sense that it must created and
defined by express enactment as opposed to a mere remedy devised to enforce such right or
obtain redress therefor. "Rules of procedure should be distinguished from substantive law. A
substantive law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the
powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs, whereas rules of
procedure are provisions prescribing the method by which substantive rights may be enforced in
courts of justice." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, 1952 ed., p.4.)
In Bustos vs. Lucero,* (46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448), this Court cited with approval
the following definitions of substantive law:

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said
to be synonymous. Substantive rights in a term which includes those rights which one
enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J. 980.)

Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the
law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions (36
C.J. 27; 52 C.J.S. 1026).

The trial with the aid of assessors as granted by section 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
section 2477 of the old Charter of Manila are parts of substantive law and as such are not
embraced by the rule-making power of the Supreme Court. This is so because in said section
154 this matter is referred to as a right given by law to a party litigant. Section 2477 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is couched is such a manner that a similar right is implied when
invoked by a party litigant. It says that the aid may be invoked in the manner provided in the
Code of Civil Procedure. And this right has been declared absolute and substantial by this Court
in several cases where the aid of assessors had been invoked (Berbari vs. Concepcion, et al.,
40 Phil., 320; Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 54 Phil., 344.) Thus, it was there said that these
provisions "necessarily lead to the conclusion that the intervention of the assessors is not an
empty formality which may be disregarded without violating either the letter or the spirit of the
law. It is another security given by the law to the litigants, and as such, it is a substantial right of
which they cannot be deprived without vitiating all the proceedings. Were we to agree that for
one reason or another the trial by assessors may be done away with, the same line of reasoning
would force us to admit that the parties litigant may be deprived of their right to be represented
by counsel, to appear and be present at the hearings, and so on, to the extent of omitting the
trial in a civil case, and thus set at naught the essential rights granted by the law to the parties,
with consequent nullity of the proceedings." (Colegio de San Jose vs. Sison, 54 Phil., 344, 349.)

Being substantive in nature, it is not difficult to see why the provisions concerning trial by
assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure have not been incorporated by the Supreme
Court in the present Rules of Court. To have done so, it would have been a travesty of its rule-
making power which, by direct mandate of the Constitution, is limited to matters referring to
pleading, practice and procedure. The application that the respondents draw from the failure to
incorporate these provisions in the present Rules of Court to the effect that the intention was to
eliminate them or repeal them all together cannot, therefore, stand in the light of the
observations and authorities we have above adverted to.

There is a point in the claim that the provisions concerning trial by assessors embodied in the
Code of Civil Procedure are not wholly substantive but portions thereof are remedial such as
those which refer to the method of summoning assessors, enforcing their attendance, excusing
them from attendance, their compensation, oath, duties and effect of dissent from the opinion of
the judge, as to which no cogent reason is seen for their non-incorporation if the intent is not to
eliminate them from the Rules of Court. This is true; but it is likewise true that because said
remedial provisions are inextricably interwoven with the substantive part, it must have been
deemed wise and proper to leave them as they were for reasons of coordination and
expediency, it being a truism that the one cannot be detached from the other. Ubi jus ibi
remedium. Remedial measures are but implementary in character and they must be appended
to the portion of the law to which they belong. Mention should be made here that not all of the
provisions appearing in the Code of Civil Procedure are remedial in nature, such as those
pertaining to prescription, the requisites for making a will, and the succession of the estate of an
adopted child, which are admittedly substantive in character and for that reason were not
incorporated in the Rules of Court. To this group belong the provisions under consideration.

Granting arguendo that the provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure and even in
the old Charter of Manila are purely remedial in nature and because of the failure to incorporate
them in the Rules of Court they are deemed to have been impliedly repealed as claimed by
respondents, we are of the opinion that they can still be invoked by a litigant upon the theory
that they had been reaffirmed and reenacted by Republic Act No. 409, which was approved in
1949, or nine years after the Rules of Court became effective. As already stated, section 49 of
said Act states that the aid of assessors may be invoked in the manner provided in the Code of
Civil Procedure. It likewise states that the parties desiring to avail themselves for the use of
assessors shall proceed as provided for by law. The mention made of the Code of Civil
Procedure in said section indicates in itself a re-enactment or incorporation by reference of the
provisions concerning assessors contained in said law. Congress, whose members were mostly
lawyers, must be presumed to know that at the time said Act was approved the Rules of Court
had already been promulgated without incorporating therein the provisions concerning the aid to
assessors, and fully cognizant of this situation, and not desiring to omit this right granted to a
litigant, they must have deemed it wise and proper to re-enact them by reference in said section
49. This Congress can do, for, while our Constitution has given the power to adopt rules of
procedure to the Supreme Court, such grant did not preclude Congress from enacting any
procedural law or altering, amending, or supplementing any of the rules that may be
promulgated by the Supreme Court (Section 13, Article VIII, Philippine Constitution).

The practice of making such reference has long been sanctioned. Our Congress did this not
only in connection with courts in the City of Manila. It also did it in connection with courts in
Quezon City (Republic Act No. 537). Statutes which refer to other statutes and make them
applicable to the subject for legislation are called "reference statutes". These statutes are
frequently used "to avoid encumbering the statute books by unnecessary repetition, and they
have frequently been recognized as an approval method of legislation, in the absence of
constitutional restrictions." [50 Am. Jur. 57; Gruen vs. Tax Commission, 211 P. (2d) (1949) 651,
666.].

Again, it has been held that "The adoption of an earlier statute by reference makes it as much
as a part of the latter act as though it had been incorporated at full length. This is true of a
legislative act which refers to another act for the procedure to be taken." (50 Am. Jur. 58.) The
reference in Republic Act No. 409 to the provisions on assessors must be deemed, therefore, to
have incorporated therein the pertinent provisions on the matter contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure in much the same manner as if the whole provisions had been reproduced.
Consistent with this theory, we cannot but hold that the observations made by respondents to
the effect that the reference made to said provisions is section 49 is a mere surplusage, or was
due to a mere oversight, has no legal basis, as such innuendo would be tantamount to imputing
lack of foresight, if not brazen negligence, to our legislative body.

It is finally contended that section 49 of Republic Act No. 409 is unconstitutional because it
violates the constitutional provisions that procedural rules "shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade" and, therefore, it is a class legislation. This contention cannot be entertained:
firstly, because it is raised for the first time in this instance, a procedural defect which would bar
any further discussion on the matter following well-known precedents1 and, secondly, because it
is not correct that at present only in Manila trial with the aid of assessors may be invoked if we
will sustain the theory that the promulgation of the Rules of Court did not have the effect of
repealing the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure.

The contention of respondents we reckon is predicated on the assumption that the

provisions on assessors of the Code of Civil Procedure had been impliedly repealed. Such is
not the case. We have already pointed out that the basic provisions on the matter partake of the
nature of substantive law and as such they were left intact by the Supreme Court. The corollary
to this conclusion is that this remedy may be invoked out only in Manila but in all other places
where it existed prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Court. This is true in civil cases. With
regard to criminal cases, we have already said that the same remedy may be invoked in the
cities of Cebu, Iloilo and Quezon, with the particularity that their charters make express
reference, either directly or indirectly, to the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure. With this
historical background, the claim that under the theory we have entertained the trial with the aid
of assessors can only be invoked in the City of Manila is certainly without merit.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the provisions on assessors embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure are still in force and that the same may still be invoked in the light of the provisions of
section 49 of the Republic Act No. 409. It is therefore our opinion that the respondent Judge
acted with abuse of discretion in denying petitioner his right to the aid of assessors in the trial of
the two criminal cases now pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Wherefore, petition is hereby granted, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

REYES, J., concurring:

In view of section 49 of Republic Act No. 409, approved June 18, 1949, authorizing the use of
assessors in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the city of Manila, I concur in the result.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014 ]

 DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, PETITIONER, VS. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated August 30,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent
Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).

The Facts

In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data[3] dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged
that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime
in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's condominium, rested for a while and
thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was
missing.[4] On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a purported
sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another
woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no
avail.[5] During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee's head against a wall inside his
office and walked away.[6] Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various
complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No.
9262,[7] otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004," before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint
for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).[8] Ilagan claimed
that Lee's acts of reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the
upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to
life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a
writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.[9]

Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data[10] dated
June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan's digital
camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file
a verified written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.

In her Verified Return[11] dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card
of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did so to
utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her
relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in
August 2011, and that she only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his
camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan's petition for the issuance
of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.[12]

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[13] dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in Ilagan's favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies of
the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.[14]

The RTC did not give credence to Lee's defense that she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of reproducing
the subject video and showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the
latter's right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this
relation, the RTC opined that Lee's use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she
filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC
clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility
before other tribunals.[15]

Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances.[16] It was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals,[17] which is defined as "the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself."[18]

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as "a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
party." Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of
the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." In other words, the
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.[19] Corollarily, the
allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.[20] In this
relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague and doubtful.[21]

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy
in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in
the suppression of this video which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be
uploaded in the internet for public consumption he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot
speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one's privacy right to
the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a
failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that Ilagan
submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the
substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because
nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the
end of violating Ilagan's right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record
even lead a reasonable mind to conclude[22] that Lee was going to use the subject video in order
to achieve unlawful ends say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan's
reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she
reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.[23] Hence, due to the insufficiency of the
allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to
reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2756 March 15, 1988

PRUDENTIAL BANK complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition" filed by
respondent Benjamin M. Grecia himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying that the decision of
November 12,1987, and the resolution of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision be set aside and a new one entered by this Court dismissing the administrative
complaint and exonerating the respondent, the Court RESOLVED (1) the EXPUNGE said
Petition, it being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration filed without leave of
Court, besides the fact that the first motion for reconsideration filed by the same respondent had
already been denied with finality on January 12, 1988; (2) to STRIKE OUT Annex "1" of the
Petition and its exclosures, Annex "1" being a xerox copy of a letter dated 04 August 1986
written by Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano to an unknown addressee, for being immaterial and
impertinent to this case for disbarment (Sec. 5, Rule 9, Rules of Court). The Court will not allow
the filing of such kinds of Petitions/Annexes that are not only irrelevant to the issue and
presented out of time as hereinafter explained, but are also scurrilous and defamatory.

Certain points raised in the Petition, however, call for separate treatment and determination.

1) The "Petition for Voluntary Inhibition" of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and Justice
Teodoro R. Padilla is DENIED there being no legal nor factual basis therefor. It is settled
jurisprudence that after a member has given an opinion on the merits of the case, a motion to
disqualify a member of the Supreme Court cannot be considered because litigant cannot be
permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and raise an objection of this sort after
decision has been rendered (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, citing Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abelia, 49 Phil. 374).

The decision to disbar respondent lawyer was the collective judgment of the Court, with the
exception of Justice Sarmiento who had inhibited himself, with no member in the least bit
attempting to influence one or the other. In fairness to the Chief Justice, and to disabuse the
fears and suspicions of respondent Grecia, it should be made of record that at no time during
the deliberations on the case did the Chief Justice show any ill will nor any signs of
"vindictiveness" much less any attempt to "exact vengeance for past affront" against respondent
lawyer. All discussions were characterized by judicial objectivity dictated only by the highest
interests of the profession and public welfare.

Similarly, the plea for the inhibition of Justice Padilla has to be DENIED for being devoid of any
valid reason. Justice Padilla was counsel for Cityland Development Corporation in the case of
Manchester Development Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, Cityland Development
Corporation, et al. (G.R. No. 75919, May 7,1987,149 SCRA 562), for which reason he took no
part in the said suit. Cityland, however, is not a party in this administrative case.

2) The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987 Constitution due to
lack of certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the
Court, is bereft of basis. The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not
administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in
administrative cases have not been accompanied by. any formal certification. In fact, such a
certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to
be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM
No. R-510-P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is
but an oversight.
But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions of the
Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides, being
a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any
member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certification is
obviously not required.

3) No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court's Minute Resolution,
dated January 12,1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues
raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears repeating that
this is an administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no ... motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be ... denied without stating the legal basis
therefor" is inapplicable. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial
and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was
one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45).

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

As the Court's unanimous Resolution states, respondents' so-called petition for redress dated
February 8, 1988 (in effect a second motion, filed without leave of Court, for reconsideration of
the disbarment decision of November 12,1987 and the Resolution of January 12, 1988 denying
reconsideration) has been filed out of time and has been expunged. Aside from the fact that the
petition for my voluntary inhibition is devoid of factual and legal basis, there is nothing left before
the Court for determination on the merits. Be that as it may, I had refrained from taking part in
the deliberation on this incident and had wanted to abstain even as a beau geste but submitted
the question to the judgment of my peers. Bowing to their collective judgment against my
inhibition, I herewith express my fun concurrence with the Court's action.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur. In addition, I wish to make this brief statement. I do not personally know respondent
Benjamin M. Grecia. As far as my memory can recall, I have not dealt with said respondent,
personally or professionally at any time. There is therefore absolutely no basis for respondent's
claim that I have acted with bias or prejudice against his cause.
In Manchester Development Corporation, et al., petitioners, vs.Court of Appeals, City Land
Development Corporation, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 75919, I took no part simply because I
was a retained counsel of the respondent City Land Development Corporation before my
appointment to the Court. In this administrative case, I have not been related, personally or
professionally, with any party or counsel. There is thus absolutely no reason for me not to take
part in this case. In fact, I consider it a part of my sworn duty to take part therein since there is
absolutely no legal, moral or ethical ground which would justify my inhibition.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

As the Court's unanimous Resolution states, respondents' so-called petition for redress dated
February 8, 1988 (in effect a second motion, filed without leave of Court, for reconsideration of
the disbarment decision of November 12,1987 and the Resolution of January 12, 1988 denying
reconsideration) has been filed out of time and has been expunged. Aside from the fact that the
petition for my voluntary inhibition is devoid of factual and legal basis, there is nothing left before
the Court for determination on the merits. Be that as it may, I had refrained from taking part in
the deliberation on this incident and had wanted to abstain even as a beau geste but submitted
the question to the judgment of my peers. Bowing to their collective judgment against my
inhibition, I herewith express my fun concurrence with the Court's action.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur. In addition, I wish to make this brief statement. I do not personally know respondent
Benjamin M. Grecia. As far as my memory can recall, I have not dealt with said respondent,
personally or professionally at any time. There is therefore absolutely no basis for respondent's
claim that I have acted with bias or prejudice against his cause.

In Manchester Development Corporation, et al., petitioners, vs.Court of Appeals, City Land

Development Corporation, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 75919, I took no part simply because I
was a retained counsel of the respondent City Land Development Corporation before my
appointment to the Court. In this administrative case, I have not been related, personally or
professionally, with any party or counsel. There is thus absolutely no reason for me not to take
part in this case. In fact, I consider it a part of my sworn duty to take part therein since there is
absolutely no legal, moral or ethical ground which would justify my inhibition.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his own lawyer has a
fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in these aphorisms; and they
appear to find validation in the proceeding at bench, at least.

The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has apparently read
some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few
substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with nothing more than this
smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen (16) years now, from 1978 to the
present, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in various courts, dogmatically
pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In the
picturesque language of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has "with all the valor of
ignorance," 1 been verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the
words of a well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion
that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake litigation, he
has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review proceedings. Expectedly, the
results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly in aid of his interminable and quite
unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has seen fit to compose and circulate many
scurrilous statements against courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for
which he is now being called to account.

Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by fairly prosaic
transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly
because of his failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence
on imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment. These banks were: Traders Royal
Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC).
Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted
mortgages over immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He
failed to pay these obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his
own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon with his
obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused to let him have his
way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not contemporaneously, against said banks,
its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or
against him. He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a
judgment, resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court
employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in different
fora the astounding number of no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil,
criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously
cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and
contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS
ROYAL BANK (TRB)

The first bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the Traders Royal Bank
(TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of P45,000.00. This he secured by a
real estate mortgage created over two parcels of land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No.
59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred
Lavarino. On June 16, 1978, Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of
P10,000.00, this time giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of
Vicente V. Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.

Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in the sum of
P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No. 595/80) falling due on
July 22, 1980.2

Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor. Consequently, TRB
caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to secure them. At the public sale
conducted by the sheriff on September 7, 1981, the three mortgaged parcels of land were sold
to TRB as the highest bidder, for P73,529.09.

Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to redeem the
properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made clear that Borromeo
would also have to settle his outstanding account under Trust Receipt No. 595/80
(P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement gave rise to a series of
lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank, its officers and counsel, as aforestated.

A. CIVIL CASES

1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R.

CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306

On October 29, 1982 Borromeo filed a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial Court for
specific performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas Abril, docketed as
Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants to allow redemption of the
foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with stipulated interests and charges, without
need of paying the obligation secured by the trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was
rendered in his favor on December 20, 1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on
defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 the
judgment was reversed, by decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the
"plaintiff (Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel defendant to
allow redemption of the properties in question."

Borromeo elevated the case to this court where his appeal was docketed as G.R. No. 83306. By
Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his petition for review "for
failure . . . to sufficiently show that the respondent Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on the contrary that the said decision is
supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts and applicable law."
Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for
reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion,
by Resolution dated April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the
remand of the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment
was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied another
motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment; and by Resolution dated December 20, 1989, the
Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying that the decision of the
Court of Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further motion or pleading . . . shall be
entertained . . . ."

2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750;

CA-G.R. SP No. 22356

The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo initiated another civil
action in the same Cebu City Regional Court by which he attempted to litigate the same issues.
The action, against the new TRB Branch Manager, Jacinto Jamero, was docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-8750. As might have been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense,
dismissed by Order dated May 18, 1990,3 on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in
the second action i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB having been
ventilated in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal
Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with finality by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court in favor of defendants therein.

The Trial Court's judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 22356.

3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28221

In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB consolidated its
ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that act of consolidation amounted to a
criminal offense, Borromeo filed complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against
the bank officers and lawyers. These complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short
shrift by that Office. Borromeo then filed suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the
TRB, TRB officers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor
Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB lawyers,
Mario Ortiz and the law, firm, HERSINLAW. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot with manifest partiality
and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and faulted TRB and its manager,
Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles to the foreclosed properties in favor of
the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-22506. This action also failed. On defendants'
motion, it was dismissed on February 19, 1992 by the RTC. (Branch 22) on the ground of res
judicata (being identical with Civil Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with
finality in favor of TRB), and lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and
Igot).

Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221) was dismissed by
that Court's 16th Division4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that the proper remedy was
appeal.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368;

CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was finally decided, Borromeo filed, on May 30, 1991, still another
civil action for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero, and its lawyers,
Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law office. This action was docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles
with Damages." The case met the same fate as the others. It was, on defendants' motion,
dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC (Branch 145) on the ground of litis pendentia.

The RTC ruled that

Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein, namely
the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders Royal
Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are the
same persons or nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants in the
present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto
Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more
defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City
Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot.
The inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No.
CEB-9485 was however merely incidental as apparently they had nothing to do
with the questioned transaction in said case. . . .

The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those sought in Civil Case
No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were essentially the same the alleged
fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation of the three properties mortgaged years earlier by
Borromeo to TRB.

For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order rendered by
another Judge on November 11, 1991 6 the Judge who previously heard the case having
inhibited himself; but this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn, nullified by the Court of
Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on March 31, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
(Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and Joaquin T. Borromeo), 7 which
decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's complaint.

5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452

When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City, Borromeo
forthwith made that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB, Ronald Sy, and the
bank's attorneys Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo Navarro and HERSINLAW
firm. This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452, and described as one for
"Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated October 20, 1987, again involved the
foreclosure of the three (3) immovables above mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged
malicious, deceitful, and premature consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of
Civil Case No. 22506. On defendant's motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the ground
of prematurity, holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek annulment of defendant
Traders Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately and finally win Civil
Case No. R-22506."

6. RTC Case No. CEB-8236

Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit" of his cause
against TRB and its officers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different tack by also suing (and
thus also venting his ire on) the members of the appellate courts who had ruled adversely to
him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-8236, impleading as defendants not
only the same parties he had theretofore been suing TRB and its officers and lawyers
(HERSINLAW, Mario Ortiz) but also the Chairman and Members of the First Division of the
Supreme Court who had repeatedly rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1,
supra), as well as the Members of the 5th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who
had likewise made dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989,
aimed to recover damages from the defendants Justices for

. . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and disregarding

evidence and pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased resolutions
and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support thereof, depriving
plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against deprivation of property
without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently illegal,
fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendants TRB, (which) constitute a)
GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the
people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL
PRIMARY RIGHTS DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV.
PENAL CODE, and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held liable under
said laws.

The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained fraudulently by
TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "100,000.00 moral damages; 30,000.00 exemplary
damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too, met a quick and unceremonious
demise. On motion of defendants TRB and HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated
November 7, 1989,9 dismissed the case.

7. RTC Case No. CEB-13069

It appears that Borromeo filed still another case to litigate the same cause subject of two (2)
prior actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069, against TRB and the latter's
lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz. The action was dismissed in an Order dated October
4, 1993, 10 on the ground of res judicata the subject matter being the same as that in Civil
Case No. R-22506, decision in which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
07015 as well as by this Court in G.R. No. 83306 11 and litis pendentia the subject matter
being also the same as that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 22356.12

8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344;

CA-G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928

On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed an information with the RTC of Cebu
(Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust Receipts Law.13 The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a while, Borromeo moved to
dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a speedy trial. His motion was denied by
Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April 10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an
early date for Borromeo's arraignment and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on
the dates as may be agreed by the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for
reconsideration. When his motion was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992,
he betook himself to the Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to nullify these
adverse orders, his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.

Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not show that
there had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and denied his petition for
being without merit. 14

Borromeo then filed a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but by resolution
dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo to comply with the
requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by Resolution dated March 23, 1994.

a. Clarificatory Communications to
Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next filed a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March 23, 1994 "Un-
Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'" because it was "signed
only by a mere clerk and . . . (failed) to state clear facts and law," and "the petition was not
resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 15

The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994, and with some
patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous case (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao, G.R. No. 82273, 1 June 1990; 186 SCRA
1) 16 and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of June 22, 1994, after reiterating
that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court En Banc or any of the Divisions simply
advise of and quote the resolution actually adopted by the Court after deliberation on a
particular matter, additionally stated that Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications
(notices) signed by the Clerk of Court start with the opening clause

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division of this
Court dated. _________,

thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed the
resolutions."

This was not, by the way, the first time that the matter had been explained to Borromeo. The
record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon
(of this Court's Third Division) dealing with the subject, in relation to G.R. No. 77243. 17 The
same matter was also dealt with in the letter received by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D.
Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J.
Garma, dated May 19, 1989.18 And the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of
this Court, notice of which was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in
G.R. No. 87897.19

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt with "all the valor of ignorance" to
fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its officers and lawyers. 20 Several other
attempts on his part to cause criminal prosecution of those he considered his adversaries, will
now be dealt with here.

1. I. S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188

On March 7, 1990, Borromeo filed criminal complaints with the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch Manager), "John Doe and officers of
Traders Royal Bank." The complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-1187-88) accused the
respondents of "Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents." He claimed, among others that
the bank and its officers, thru its manager, Jacinto Jamero, sold properties not owned by them:
that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses, respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of
the (foreclosed) properties from his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal
knowledge," agreed to the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing
market prices, she should have received P588,030.00 more.

In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 21 the Cebu City Fiscal's office dismissed the
complaints observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the bank and Borromeo's
mother, but between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one of the original owners of the
foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim
injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed
properties was beyond question as the matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial
litigation; and moreover, there was no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the
manner of its falsification.

a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234

Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless filing of unfounded complaints, the
Fiscal also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by Borromeo involving
the same foreclosed properties and directed against respondent bank officers' predecessors
(including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers both of which were dismissed for
lack of merit. These were:

a. I. S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and

RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, Deceit and
False Pretenses." This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19,
1988 of the City Prosecutor's Office because based on nothing more than a letter
dated June 4, 1985, sent by Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a portion
of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the bank
as new owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was no
showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the deed
of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of redemption, or that Ortiz
had benefited pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice of complainant;
and

b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL.) for
"Estafa Through False Pretenses and Falsification of Public Documents." This
case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.

2. I.S.Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the Supreme
Court, 22 an affidavit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in connection with
the former's fire insurance claim over property registered in its name one of two immovables
formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin Borromeo's sister) and foreclosed by said
bank. 23 In that affidavit, dated September 10, 1987, Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983,
TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property together with the improvements thereon which
property is located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name or TRB."
The affidavit was notarized by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso.

Claiming that the affidavit was "falsified and perjurious" because the claim of title by TRB over
the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant fasehood in that, among others: . . . the
consolidation was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo filed a criminal complaint with the
Cebu City Fiscal's Office against the affiant (Bustamante) and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso)
for "falsification of public document, false pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the
Fiscal's Office dismissed the complaint. 24 It found no untruthful statements in the affidavit or any
malice in its execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer
Certificate of Title in TRB's file, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was legally in
order.

3. OMB-VIS-89-00136

This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15, 1988
sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27, 1988 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of a criminal complaint by Borromeo in the Office of
the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136. His complaint against "Supreme
Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals Justice (10th Div)" was dismissed for lack of
merit in a Resolution issued on February 14, 1990 25 which, among other things, ruled as
follows:

It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies available

under the Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing laws. It is
not the prerogative of this Office to make a review of Decisions and Resolutions
of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The records do not warrant
this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.

In addition, Sec. 20. of R.A. 6770, "the Ombudsman Act states that the Office of
the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that (1) the complainant
had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;" and Sec. 21 the
same law provides that the Office of the Ombudsman does not have disciplinary
authority over members of the Judiciary.

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT

PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, 26 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed money from the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate mortgage to secure
repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-square-meter commercial lot
covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This same lot was afterwards sold on August
7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its
repurchase (pacto de retro) by him (Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the
knowledge and consent of UCPB.

A. CIVIL CASES

Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit accommodations he had
obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the fulfillment of his obligations to the
UCPB.

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize the ill effects
of the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a loan, offering the
property he had purchased from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was not averse to dealing with
Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of which was for Lao to consolidate his title
over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit for consolidation of title, docketed as Civil
Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation
prayed for. As a result, UCPB cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced
proceedings foreclose the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.

This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against Lao, but also
against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought contemporaneously
with his court war with Traders Royal Bank.

1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R.

No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273

The first of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action initiated by Samson
Lao in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as Case No. R-21009, for
consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-square-meter lot subject of the UCPB mortgage, in
accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo
Perez, who was later substituted by Atty. Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application.

Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis Militante,
presiding) denying consolidation because the transaction between the parties could not be
construed as a sale with pacto de retro being in law an equitable mortgage; however, Borromeo
was ordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00, representing the price stipulated in the sale a
retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for capital gains and other taxes in connection with the
transaction (P10,497.50).

Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was dismissed for
failure of his lawyer to file brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal AC-G.R. No. CV-07396
resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals dated December 14, 1987, affirming the RTC's
judgment in toto.

The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, affirmed by this Court (Third Division) in a four-page
Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 an appeal also taken
by Borromeo. Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration on several grounds, one of which was
that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3),
Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not signed by any Justice of the Division, and there was "no
way of knowing which justices had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at
least three of the members." Since the motion was not filed until after there had been an entry of
judgment, Borromeo having failed to move for reconsideration within the reglementary period,
the same was simply noted without action, in a Resolution dated November 27, 1989.

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule and practice,
sent to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court (namely:
Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo MARASIGAN, respectively).

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679

Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders Royal Bank,
Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the Supreme Court officers who, as
just stated, had given him notices of the adverse dispositions of this Court's Third Division. He
filed Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI) for recovery of damages against
"Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division
Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I. Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records Office." He
charged them with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously
issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R.
No. 82273."

Summonses were issued to defendants by RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R. Ybaez,

presiding). These processes were brought to the attention of this Court's Third Division. The
latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in G.R. No. 82273, and referred it to the
Court En Banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No. 82273, supra) dated
June 1, 1990, the Court En Banc ordered Judge Ybaez to quash the summonses, to dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or otherwise to entertain cases of similar
nature which may in the future be filed in his court." Accordingly, Judge Ibaez issued an Order
on June 6, 1990 quashing the summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No.
CEB-8679.

The Resolution of June 1, 1990 27 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the nature and
purpose of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of the Court En
Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against
officials of the Court. In several letter complaints filed with the courts and the
Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices,"
because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this
Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of
Sections 4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable
complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the
signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions
and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the
resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state
the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the
Clerks of Court and therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."

xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the
bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory,
as were a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with the facts of the case
and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with
the rules. The resolution denying due course always gives the legal basis. As
emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987], "[T]he
Court is not 'duty bound' to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample
discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal
basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . This is the only way
whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly, discharge its
constitutional functions. . . .

. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent

pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to
the petition and states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error
in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basis stated
in the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement
. . . (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition for review or
motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis thereof").

For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are

promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of
sending copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the
resolution issued on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the
parties of the action taken on their cases quoting the resolution adopted by the
Court. The Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All
decisions and resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely
transmits the Court's action. This was explained in the case G.R. No. 56280,
"Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al.," where, in a resolution dated
July 6, 1981, the Court
said "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious
petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its
subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions.

Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took
part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief
Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued would
not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their
time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of Court
and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the
formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with
the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases
coming to it. . . .
 b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501)
6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no relation to the
UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for other suits filed by
Joaquin Borromeo against administrative officers of the Supreme Court and the Judge who
decided one of the cases adversely to him.

The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo filed a civil action for
damages against a certain Thomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court dismissed the case, without prejudice, for failure
to state a cause of action and prematurity (for non-compliance with P.D. 1508).

What Borromeo did was simply to re-file the same complaint with the same Court, on March 18,
1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and assigned to Branch 17 of the
RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario Dizon. Again, however, on defendants' motion, the trial
court dismissed the case, in an order dated May 28, 1988. His first and second motions for
reconsideration having been denied, Borromeo filed a petition for review before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Non. Mario Dizon).

In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply with the rules by
submitting a verified statement of material dates and paying the docket and legal research fund
fees; it also referred him to the Citizens Legal Assistance Office for help in the case. His petition
was eventually dismissed by Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for
failure on his part to show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment. His motion for
reconsideration was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.

Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division) on April 27,
1989 once more remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had not been signed by any
Justice, set forth no findings of fact or law, and had no certification of the Chief Justice. Atty.
Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the minute resolutions of this Court
denying dismissing petitions, like the petition in the case at bar, which was denied for failure of
the counsel and/or petitioner to sufficiently show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch
17, had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November
21, 1988], are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial function to its Clerk of Court or any of
its subalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains the challenged
decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."

Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1, 1990 in G.R.
No. 82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the same subject) which had so
clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of the Court are as much the product of the Members'
deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions, and that the intervention of the Clerk
consists merely in the ministerial and routinary function of communicating the Court's action to
the parties concerned.

c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet another in an
already long series, was to commence a suit against Supreme Court (Second Division) Clerk of
Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita Dris. They were the officers who
had sent him notices of the unfavorable resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, filed on
June 1, 1990, was docketed as Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas presiding).
Therein he complained essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in
relation to G.R. No. 91030 in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical
reasons" and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment the
notice sent to him of the "unsigned and unspecific" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying
his motion for reconsideration had been signed only by the defendant clerks of court and not
by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to defendants demanding an
explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional resolutions," which they ignored;
defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing resolutions signed only by them and not by
any Justice, and without stating the factual and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton,
malicious and patently abusive acts" had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral
shock, embarrassment, sleepless nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral
damages of no less than P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation
expenses of P5,000.00.

On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case transmitted to the
Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82273, entitled
"Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Samson-Lao," supra directing that all
complaints against officers of that Court be forwarded to it for appropriate action. 28

Borromeo filed a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court to "rectify the
injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897, 77248 and 84054. This
the Court ordered expunged from the record (Resolution, July 19, 1990).

2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R.

CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897

Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his property. In the Cebu
City RTC, he filed a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which was docketed as Civil Case
No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. United Coconut Planters Bank, et al.). Named
defendants in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager) and
Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by
Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both being then resident partners of ACCRA Law Office). Lao was
represented by Atty. Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br.
11, Judge Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr. presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to
foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00; attorney's
fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.

Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with de la Fuente and
Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment.

Borromeo filed a petition far review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No. 87897 dismissed
it for insufficiency in form and substance and for being "largely unintelligible." Borromeo's motion
for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated June 25, 1989. A second motion for
reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of
judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In this Resolution, the Court (First Division) said:
 The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989 filed by
petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit, the motion
having been filed without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52, Rules of
Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the Petition for
Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25,
1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been twice rejected
as without merit, first by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the Court
of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the
merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of
a decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and important reason
therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed
summarily on the ground that "the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted
manifestly for delay or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require
consideration" (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised in the
petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites
prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is
further advised that the first sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to a resolution as to
which said section pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of
June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's first Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25,
1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signification of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989
is that the petitioner's arguments aimed at the setting aside of the resolution
denying the petition for review and consequently bringing about a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals had failed to persuade the Court that the
errors imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and
therefore, there was no cause to modify the conclusions set forth in that
judgment; and in such a case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and
restating the conclusions and reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT.

On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk of Court of the
Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a LITANY OF LIES,
EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court deluded and drunk
with power which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside from being "patently
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law: . . . and characterizing the
conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-
LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE
POWER totally at variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . ." To the
letter Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August 10,
1989 protesting the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS 'MINUTE
RESOLUTIONS;'" (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and (3) a
communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer, dated August
10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the record because containing "false,
impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court)." Another letter of
the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED without action" by Resolution
promulgated on December 13, 1989.
 3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R.
SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999

In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo filed another action to invalidate
the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had unsuccessfully tried to prevent
in Case No. CEB-21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB-4852 of the Cebu City RTC (Joaquin T.
Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al.) for "Annulment of Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was
represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in consultation with Atty. Deen.

On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban, presiding)
dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered Borromeo to pay
attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses (P1,000.00).

Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this judgment (CA G.R.
SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court on June 7, 1988 on
account of his failure to comply with that Court's Resolution of May 13, 1988 for submission of
certified true copies of the Trial Court's decision of December 26, 1987 and its Order of
February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates he received . . . (said) decision and . . .
order."

Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 84999. In a
Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment on Borromeo's
petition for review by the respondents therein named, and required Borromeo to secure the
services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles entered his appearance for
Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated
March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration
dated April 4, 1989, again complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and law,
was denied.

a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178

Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by Borromeo in the
RTC of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had lately rendered judgment adverse
to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded as defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres
Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division), Estrella G.Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then,
respectively, Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge
German G. Lee of Branch 15 of said Court to which the case was raffled caused issuance
of summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others, on said
defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated October 2, 1989 in
G.R. No. 84999 this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of Court and Assistant Clerk of
Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against them
for issuing said summonses.

Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles who, as already stated, had for a time represented
Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 filed with this Court his withdrawal of appearance, alleging that
there was "no compatibility" between him and his client, Borromeo because "Borromeo had
been filing pleadings, papers; etc. without . . . (his) knowledge and advice" and declaring that
he had "not advised and . . . (had) no hand in the filing of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu. On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October
23, 1989, apologized to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order
dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely,
Judge Generoso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal
of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution dated
November 29, 1989.

4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R.

CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248

It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson K. Lao which
gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in this Court. 29 The transaction involved a
parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property" (TCT No. 34785). Borromeo
sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory
that his contract with the latter was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action
was docketed as Case No. CEB-374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court
(Branch 12) declaring valid and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the
subsequent sale thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that
Court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, affirmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated
on October 10, 1986.

Borromeo came up to this Court. on appeal, his review petition being docketed as G.R. No.
77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his petition was
denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well as the docket and legal research fund fees
were filed and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the findings thereon of the
Court of Appeals are final." He moved for reconsideration; this was denied by Resolution dated
June 3, 1987.

He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said adverse resolutions
through various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One of his letters inter
alia complaining that the notice sent to him by the Clerk of Court did not bear the signature of
any Justice elicited the following reply from Atty. Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the
Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as follows:

Dear Mr. Borromeo:

This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the actual
resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division in Case
G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
petition was denied for lack of merit.

In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution dated July
6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr., et al.,
wherein the Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court
denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar,
are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a
petition is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged
decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions." It is the
 Clerk of Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their case by
quoting the resolution adopted by the Court.

Very truly yours,

JULIETA Y.
CARREON

B. CRIMINAL CASES

Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank, and similarly
without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the cases concerning the
UCPB criminally liable.

1. Case No; OMB-VIS-89-00181

In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts to overturn the
judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 30 Borromeo filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a complaint against the Chairman and Members of
the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals,
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez, Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu
City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja, charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 31 the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed Borromeo's
complaint, opining that the matters therein dealt with had already been tried and their merits
determined by different courts including the Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R.
No. 87987). The resolution inter alia stated that, "Finally, we find it unreasonable for
complainant to dispute and defiantly refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered
by the highest tribunal of the land in this case. . . ."

2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418

A second complaint was filed by Borromeo with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), dated
January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, Supreme
Court, and others, charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019 (and the Constitution, the Rules
of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial functions in that they issued Supreme Court
resolutions (actually, notices of resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not
bear the justices' signatures. 32 In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the
questioned actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be
reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering them," and "it is
not the prerogative of this office to review the correctness of judicial resolutions." 33

III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY

BANK & TRUST CO. (SBTC)

A. CIVIL CASES
 1. RTC Case No. 21615; CA-
G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769

The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running court battles, was
the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had obtained five (5) loans in
the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single Promissory Note on May 31, 1979.
To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp. (Summa) issued a performance bond
which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability thereunder. Again, as in the case of his
obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB, Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual
obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and
Summa for collection.

The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch 10, Judge
Leonardo Caares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar Gica, who later
withdrew and was substituted by the law firm, HERSINLAW. The latter appeared in the suit
through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.

Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both defendents were
sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25% thereof as attorney's
fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the costs.
A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to which an immovable of Borromeo was
levied on, and eventually sold at public auction on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest
bidder, SBTC.

On February 5, 1990, Borromeo filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default, but the
same was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration having likewise been
denied, Borromeo went to the Court of Appeals for relief (CA-G.R. No. 20617), but the latter
dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court
on certiorari his appeal being docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this
Court dismissed his petition, and subsequently denied with finality his motion for
reconsideration. Entry of Judgment was made on December 26, 1990.

However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light of his history
of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end of litigation concerning
Borromeo's aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but only marked the start of another
congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and criminal concerning the same matter, instituted
by Borromeo.

2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo commenced a suit of
his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who represented it in Civil Case No. R-
21625 HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty. Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried
and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo Caares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-9267, as one for "Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract,
Fraud, Unjust Judgment, with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused
defendants of "wanton, malicious and deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process
and defraud him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and
moral shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he
sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo Jacinto,
presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed the complaint,
holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to support . . . (his) causes of action
asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require defendants to present their own evidence as
there is nothing for them to controvert."

2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458;

CA-G.R. CV No. 39047

Nothing daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo filed on July 2, 1991 still another
suit against the same parties SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Caares but now including
Judge Godardo Jacinto, 34 who had rendered the latest judgment against him. This suit,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one "for Damages (For
Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws Violation of the
Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges Caares and Jacinto
"for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB NO. 9267)," and contended that
defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts" by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and
deny him equal protection of the laws and due process," on account of which he had been
"caused untold mental anguish, moral shock, worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for
which the former are liable under Arts. 20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."

The defendants filed motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the RTC of Cebu
City, Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint on grounds
of res judicata, immunity of judges from liability in the performance of their official functions, and
lack of jurisdiction.

Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R. CV No. 39047.

In the course thereof, he filed motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of SBTC, for
contempt of court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of Appeals (Special 7th
Division) dated April 13, 1993. 35 Said the Court:

Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject motions, in

fact, proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can, or cannot, be
considered res judicata under the circumstances.

xxx xxx xxx

By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent
penchant for argumentum ad hominen, it is, on the contrary the appellant who
precariously treads the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal
advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible leaflets
he admits to have authored and finds them highly reprehensible and needlessly
derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts. That he is not a
licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason that his otherwise
contumacious behavior is presently accorded the patience and leniency it
probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he has, by far,
exhibited, the appellant is, however, sufficiently warned that similar displays in
the future shall accordingly be dealt with with commensurate severity.
IV. OTHER CASES

A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R,

CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929

One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K. Lao is pertinent.
This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It appears that sometime in
1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of P165,000.00 by the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by
TCT No. 34785.36 Later, Borromeo obtained a letter of credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from
Republic Planters Bank, with Samson Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations;
Lao agreed to, and did pay Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in
consideration of which a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2)
parcels of land, one of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then
mortgaged the land to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00.

Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in the Cebu
Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him of his property.
Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court. Borromeo elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 14770. On March 21,
1990, said Court rendered judgment affirming the Trial Court's decision, and on February 7,
1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First
Division) promulgated a Resolution denying his petition for review "for being factual and for
failure . . . to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment."

Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the resolutions sent to
him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures of the Justices who had
taken part in approving the resolution therein mentioned.

B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528

What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against Borromeo, at least as of
date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No. CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial
Court at Cebu City (Branch 18), which was yet another case filed by Borromeo outlandishly
founded on the theory that a judgment promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third
Division) was wrong and "unjust." Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August
31, 1994 the presiding judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter
alia dismissing Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His
Honor made the following pertinent observations:

. . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court has
indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of the
Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the plaintiff
against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court of the
land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly beyond
the sphere of this humble court to consider and pass upon to determine their
propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order
 of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but also
contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal of
the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all material allegations thereof
are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was allegedly
issued by the Third Division composed of five (5) justices. No allegation is made
directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity. That being
the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the final order or judgment
of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff himself had
issued a resolution denying plaintiffs petition and affirming the Lower Court's
decision as reflected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there was such
violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the
Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have
been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or
review the acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a
show of an uncommon common sense. Lower courts are without supervising
jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher courts.

Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied "for lack of
sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.

V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433

A. Complaint Against Lawyers

of his Court Adversaries

Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers who had
appeared for his adversaries UCPB and Samson K. Lao in the actions above mentioned,
and others. As already mentioned, these lawyers were: Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo
Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them,
docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433, prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that
the respondent lawyers connived with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of
sale with pacto de retro as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2)
fraudulently depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3)
defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that respondents Perez and Regis
falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.

B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers

The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely baseless and
nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled "Comments and
Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court;" July 10, 1990, filed by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by Domero C. Estenzo (President),
Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap (Treasurer); Felipe B. Velasquez
(Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U. Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina
(Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybaez (Director), Sylvia G. Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista
P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the following observations:

It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the Judiciary
with deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering before the
 might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon and
unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the
authority and name of the courts.

And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that here is a non-lawyer
who uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who crosses his
path more especially if their actuations do not conform with his whims and
caprices.

Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief Justice
Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed infidelity and violation of the constitution, etc., the lawyers
went on to say the following:

The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court, and other
members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent and
contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the
public confidence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will
undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the loss of confidence in the
country's judicial system and administration of justice.

. . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and the legal
profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by Borromeo
against this Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-free would
certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded the court
with all the respect and esteem due them.

Subsequently, in the same proceeding; Borromeo filed another pleading protesting the alleged
"refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to act on his
disbarment cases "filed against its members."

C. Decision of the IBP

On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila Grapilon)
transmitted to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the case, reached after due
investigation, as well as the corresponding records in seven (7) volumes. Said decision
approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated December 15, 1993 of Atty.
Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP, Cebu City Chapter, representing the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, recommending dismissal of the complaint as against all the respondents and the
issuance of a "warning to Borromeo to be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate
in the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers." 37

VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS

Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters ("open" or
otherwise), "circulars," flyers or leaflets harshly and quite unwarrantedly derogatory of the many
court judgments or directives against him and defamatory of his adversaries and their lawyers
and employees, as well as the judges and court employees involved in the said adverse
dispositions some of which scurrilous writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in
Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were
apparently undertaken by Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court
of Appeals had occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominen" and of
the "irresponsible leaflets he admits to have authored . . . (which were found to be) highly
reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Courts."

In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors,
violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.

Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as regards the
reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award from the University
of Texas for his contributions in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice, etc.," stressing that Fernan
"and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings patently violative of the Constitution, Due
Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of
FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES . . ." He sent a copy of his letter in the Supreme Court.

He circulated an "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had "suffered

INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE but done the
opposite, AND INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labeled my cases as 'frivolous, nuisance,
and harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable evidences therein . . .;" in the same
letter, he specified what he considered to be some of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by
this Court."

In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA, your pledges
have not been fulfilled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are agents of oppression,
instead of being saviours and defenders of the people. The saddest part is that (referring again
to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, many times, sanctions
injustice and the trampling of the rule of law and due process, and does not comply with the
Constitution when it should be the first to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of
his, dated June 21, 1989 and captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo
Fernan and Andres Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute
Resolutions' . . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing and arson of my properties
by TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B.
TAN all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases,
despite your firm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or laws (during
our talk in your house last March 12 1989);" and that "you in fact have no such facts or laws but
simply want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a wrongful party. . . ."

In another flyer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to fool people!" he
mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the Supreme Court, CA to
support the landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos' Lands." Another flyer has at the
center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded
by such statements as, "Sa TRB para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB
WILL STEAL!" etc Still another "circular" proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court
minute resolutions w/o facts, law, or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the
admonition: "Supreme Court, Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 38

One other "circular" reads:

SC, NARVASA TYRANTS!!!

CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
VIOLATOR OF LAWS
 by: JOAQUIN BORROMEO

NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in the
judiciary. Adding "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing vigilance
Of the supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving denials and
another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for themselves (Res
Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) the SCRA itself.

It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued

UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR
FACTS and LAWS in patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution.
It is precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham
rulings that Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB,
UCPB, and SBTC, and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or
shown IGNORANCE of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY
IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions,
NARVASA & CO. have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's defiance of court orders and
naked land grabbing What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).

Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without first resolving
the motion for reconsideration (G.R No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and abuse of
power for the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-8679) and
declare justices and said clerks "immune from suit" despite their failure to file
any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule of law and
rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273).

TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for
themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS
CHARGES OR RESIGN!!

IMPEACH NARVASA

ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR,

UNCONSTITUTIONAL "MINUTE RESOLUTIONS" VIOLATIVE
OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution

VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN

ORDERING CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679)
DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO FILE
PLEADINGS; HENCE IN DEFAULT

CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN

RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION, CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN
RULINGS TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO STEALS LOTS
WORTH P3 MILLION

CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF TWO

LAWFUL COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF TITLE OF
PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION
 BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME AND
PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND FELLOW
CORRUPT JUSTICES

DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES, and even MERE CLERKS

TO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-ACCOUNTABLE TO THE
PEOPLE and REFUSING TO ANSWER AND REFUTE
CHARGES AGAINST HIMSELF

JOAQUIN T.
BORROMEO

VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS

OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR

A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter

IBP, dated June 21, 1992

Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others, of some
members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its President
thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated June 21, 1992, which (1) drew attention to one
of them that last quoted, above " . . . .sent to the IBP Cebu City Chapter and probably
other officers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly libelous and defamatory remarks
against the Supreme Court and the whole justice system" and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's
"officers and members," strongly urged the Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for
his condemnable act."

B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En Banc issued a Resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring comment by
Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to him by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The
resolution pertinently reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The records of the Court disclose inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989, the
Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four page letter to Mr.
Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Traders Royal
Bank [referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the relator herein,
the IBP Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also filed with the Court by
Borromeo: G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano
Logarta) and G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and
Tomas Tan), all resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In
that letter Atty. Puno explained to Borromeo very briefly the legal principles
applicable to his cases and dealt with the matters mentioned in his circular.

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in other
cases instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al.) and No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v.
Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of other
communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already
passed upon by the court in his cases and condemning the court's rejection of
those arguments.

Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its above named, President, and taking
account of the related facts on record, the Court Resolved:

1) to REQUIRE:

(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for
contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City
Chapter, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the City Sheriff,
Cebu City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter dated June
21, 1993 together with its annexes; and

(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said notice
of resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993, together
with its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu City;
and
 2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt of such
notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to file a
comment on the letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set forth in
this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu City.

SO ORDERED.

1. Atty. Puno's Letter of April 4, 1989

Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the first paragraph of the
resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the second time, precisely the
principles and established practice relative to "minute resolutions" and notices thereof, treated
of in several other communications and resolutions sent to him by the Supreme Court, to wit:
the letter received by him on July 10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this
Court's Third Division) (in relation to G.R No. 77243 39) the letter to him of Clerk of Court
(Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19,
1989, 40 and three resolutions of this Court, notices of which were in due course served on him,
to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897; 41 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274
(186 SCRA 1), 42 and that dated June 11, 1994 in G. R. No. 112928. 43

C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993

In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo filed a Comment dated August 27,
1993 in which he alleged the following:

1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 (requiring comment) violates the Constitution
which requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of members of the High
Court;" hence, "a certified copy duly signed by Justices is respectfully requested;"

2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit themselves
"since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . . (and) this
case should be heard by an impartial and independent body;"

3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP
Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to
point out "what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and
condemnable;" and does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or
file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the "libelous circular;"

4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of freedom of

speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances
as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the
accountability of public officials;" the circular merely states the truth and asks for
justice based on the facts and the
law; . . . it is not libelous nor disrespectful but rather to be commended and
encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . . should specify under oath which statements
are false and lies;
 5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them with
pertinent facts, evidence and law;" and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief Justice
and members of the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense the
justice that they are duty bound to dispense.

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest opportunity to explain
his side, and be reprsented by an attorney, the Court promulgated the following Resolution on
September 30, 1993, notice of which was again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of
Court.

. . . The return of service filed by Sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, Office of the Clerk
of Court Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the
Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President
Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After
deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT
Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fifteen (15) days from notice hereof
within which to engage the services or otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer
and submit such further arguments in addition to or in amplification of those set
out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded.

SO ORDERED.

E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment

of October 15, 1992

Borromeo filed a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating the arguments
and allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth "additional arguments and
amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:

1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath the
alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be ordered
to file a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . .(failing in which, they should) be cited in
contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the precious time of this
Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;

2) the allegations in their circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are based
on the TRUTH and the LAW", namely:

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and

laws are patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the
Constitution;

b) there is no basis nor thruth to this Hon. Court's affirmation to

the Appelate Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of
redemption price, since no less than this Hon. Court has ruled in
many rulings that CONSIGNATION IS UNNECESSARY in right of
redemption;
 c) this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and UCPB's frauds
and defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997 and 84999.

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of
November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards filed a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993, adverting to "the
failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under oath and the failure of the
concerned Justices to refute the charges in the alledged "libelous circular" and, construing these
as "and admission of the thruth in said circular," theorized that it is "incumbent on the said
Justices to rectify their grave as well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless and false charges."

VII. THE COURT CONCLUSIONS

A. Respondent's Liability
for Contempt of Court

Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to
courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice.44 He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without
merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits
and proceedings, rulings which had become final and executory, obdurately and unreasonably
insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on nothing more
than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted
the judges and court officers, including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly
overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees
who have had to act on his repetitious and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and
motions. He has wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court
employees who have had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his
unmeritorious cases. More particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to
the egregious error of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should
contain findings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certified by the Justices
promulgating the same, 45 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-same theory in
various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the
court employees and parties involved.

1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses

The first defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should
inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time . . . (and) this
case should be heard by an impartial and independent body, is still another illustration of an
entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the field of the
law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument long since
declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to
institute a charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting
officer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants,
lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting officer required and judges
obliged to file complaints for contempts against them before the prosecuting officer, in order to
bring the guilty to justice, courts would be inferior to prosecuting officers and impotent to
perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The institution of charges by
the prosecuting officer is not necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt
amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge
in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or
counsel. The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . .
." 46

His claim that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not verified nor signed by members of said (IBP
Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspecific, and sweeping" because failing to point out what
particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and condemnable;" and it does not
appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or file a complaint "in behalf of those accused
in the 'libelous' circular" is in the premises, plainly nothing but superficial philosophizing,
deserving no serious treatment.

Equally as superficial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the allegations
claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of speech, of expression,
and to petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution
(Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the accountablity of public officials." The constitutional
rights invoked by him afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and
issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees; and other persons, for abusing the
processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and
disrespect.

B. Basic Principles Governing

the Judicial Function

The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a restatement of the
principles governing finality of judgments and of the paramount need to put an end to litigation
at some point, and to lay down definite postulates concerning what is perceived to be a growing
predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants like Borromeo to resort to administrative
prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the
specific modes of appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.

1. Reason for courts; Judicial

Hierarchy

Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there
is a more or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less
comprehensive system of review of judgments and final orders of lower courts.

The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation
of evidence by the parties a trial or hearing in the first instance as well as a review of the
judgments of lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of
the factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is fixed by
law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.

2. Paramount Need to end

Litigation at Some Point
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence,
after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of review
set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same subject matter
is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties, continuing disagreement
with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, is to be
expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy
demands that at some definite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's dispositions
thereon accorded absolute finality. 47 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines
v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 48 a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism
that courts are the temples of right."

3. Judgments of Supreme Court

Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that
judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency, branch,
department, or official of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there the matter
must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by any other entity,
much less reversed or modified on the ground that it is tainted by error in its findings of fact or
conclusions of law, flawed in its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other
respect. 49 This, on the indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and
constitutional and traditional principle.

In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta

involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanod bayan "members of the First
Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust
extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised
penal Code ". . . and for deliberatly causing "undue injury" to respondent . . . and her co-heirs
because of the "unjust Resolution" promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act . . . the following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established
doctrine: 50

. . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986,

which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court
is supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively
with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and
private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare
them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been stressed since the early
case of Arnedo vs.Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911]) "controlling and irresistible
reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the courts demand that at the
risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining controversies submitted
to them should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of
practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of the
court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law,
into which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for
which the courts are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the
questions submitted to the litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the
 parties. (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305,
316-317)

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether an en

banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence
and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729;
Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
1) The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that "(I)t is well settled
that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who
unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democractic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree" is fully and reciprocally applicable to
Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil.
Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes,
61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3
SCRA 1).

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of

powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see fit" (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA
677). It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to
expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the
mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to
alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch
into acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes
mutual respect by and between the three departments of the government.
(Tecson vs. Salas, 34 SCRA 275, 286-287).

4. Final and Executory Judgments of

Lower Courts Not Reviewable
Even by Supreme Court

In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a
party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or
reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in
accordance with fixed and familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of
courts. 51Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the
special civil action of certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

However, should judgments of lower courts which may normally be subject to review by
higher tribunals become final and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of
appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be
reviewed, or in anyway modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government. 52

C. Administrative Civil or Criminal Action

against Judge. Not Substitute for Appeal;
Proscribed by Law and Logic

Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase
in the resort to administrative prosecution or the institution of a civil or criminal action as a
substitute for or supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these
remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of
their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative
complaints are being presented to the Office of the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are
being filed with the Office of the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's office; civil actions for
recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and justices
of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.

1. Common Basis of Complaints

Against Judges

Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or
Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders 53 i.e., judgments or
orders which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or are
tainted by grave abuse of discretion thereby causing injustice, and actionable and
compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of complaints of
this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the fiscal, the Ombudsman or the
Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of the respondent Judge or Justice to determine its
correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a pronouncement of liability.

2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for

Correction of Judgments and Orders

The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not in lieu of the
prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and orders of courts, a party may file an
administrative or criminal complaint against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or,
having opted for appeal, may nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or
criminal remedies.

Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the
administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review
where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.

Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary
postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by
a judicial order or decision not yet final and executory to mount an administrative, civil or
criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as
an indispensable first step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous function
pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the questioned disposition
is erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that
impediment, whatever determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative
or criminal litigation, a possibility here after more fully explored.

Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed out, within the
power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly or vicariously, to review
judgments or final orders or resolutions of the Courts of the land. The power of review by
appeal or special civil action is not only lodged exclusively in the Courts themselves but must
be exercised in accordance with a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long-
standing processes and procedures. No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be
interminable, and vexatiously repetitive.

These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 54

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual judge
who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not
the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision
rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the
same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents
should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of
a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions
in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is
"unjust" cannot prosper.

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a judge,

more so a member of the Supreme Court for official acts done by him in good
faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert
and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the
judiciary to the executive. "For it is a general principle of the highest importance
to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to
everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful."
(Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U. S. 335).

xxx xxx xxx

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the members
acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in disregard
or violation of the duty of their high office to act upon their own independent
consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to destroy the
authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions
and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official duty.
 To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of powers and
undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all justiciable
disputes.

Dissatisfied litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the separation
of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the final
judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their adversaries
for final determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall within
the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law.

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have become final and
executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher tribunals, are certainly not
reviewable by any other body or authority.

3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed

Rules to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust

To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgement or order is unjust or
was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had
exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case is an
essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of
courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch; nor any
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision whether final and
executory or not and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to
the courts alone.

4. Contrary Rule Results in Circuitousness

and Leads to Absurd Consequences

Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of unjust judgments
or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the
accusation that the decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of
fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion as distinguished from accusations
of corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would
not only be legally improper, it would also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to
absurd consequences.

Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial hierarchy; i.e., a
judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and affirmed by the proper
Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is appealed to and in due course affirmed by the
Court of Appeals; and finally, the appellate court's decision is brought up to and affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial court judge who rendered the original
decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the
question; it would mean that the Office of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would
have to find, at the preliminary investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and
unjust, but by necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court
Judge, as well as the Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who affirmed the
original judgment were also all wrong and unjust most certainly an act of supreme arrogance
and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the public
prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the decision in
question despite its having been affirmed at all three (3) appellate levels and thereafter,
disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, file an information in the Regional Trial Court
against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment at the hands of the
Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.

Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan or a
Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals would have
an inevitable result: given the antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be set aside and the
correctness of the judgment in question, already passed upon and finally resolved by the same
appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained.

Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from
filing a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge
who should convict him of the offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against
the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.

The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be modified, and
regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding that is availed of as the
vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly rendering an unjust decision or order.

5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative

Criminal Prosecution

This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this impropriety, of
rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of all the foregoing
considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final declaration by a competent
court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged
judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said judgement or order. That final declaration
is ordinarily contained in the judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the
decision of the trial court in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged.

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or dismissal in a

criminal action, as to which the same being unappealable it would be unreasonable to
deny the State or the victim of the crime (or even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put
to the test of proof such charges as they might see fit to press that it was unjustly rendered, with
malice or by deliberate design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this
case, the essential requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the
manifestly unjust character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may
result from either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity
of the; judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or (b) if this
be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely
for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a final,
authoritative judicialdeclaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no civil or
criminal action against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be entertained, for want
of an indispensable requisite.

D. Judges Must be Free from

Influence or Pressure

Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors.
They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions
for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and
functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that
judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good
faith.

This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. 55 To hold otherwise would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment. 56 The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with
evident bad faith; 57 it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an
imperative duty of the Supreme Court.

As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and
general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may do in
the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction."58 Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, 59 the doctrine is still good law, not inconsistent
with any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of the peace or
assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial
action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and
jurisdiction."

Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public
officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of
another person which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III
of the Constitution); shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute. But again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust
judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that
prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already mentioned: that such
prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final judicial
pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.

E. Afterword

Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well be asked why it
took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fifty (50) grossly unfounded cases lodged by
respondent Borromeo in the different rungs of the Judiciary before this Court decided to take the
present administrative measure. The imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary
work occasioned by respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further
elaboration. If the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that
the repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would
somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays along his misguided
path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the power of contempt is exercised on the
preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately the Court's forbearance had no effect
on him.

Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs of weakness
and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to have influenced and
emboldened others to just as flamboyantly embark on their own groundless and insulting
proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado or sheer egocentrism, to the extent of
even involving the legislative and executive departments, the Ombudsman included, in their
assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must
come to an end, and it is time for the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude,
between reasoned dissent and self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to
those with the same conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with them, decisively and
fairly, with a firm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive sanctions as may be
appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the country.

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive contempt

repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to him, and to the end
that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and learn due respect for the
Courts and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of TEN (10)
DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00).
He is warned that a repetition of any of the offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any
similar or other offense against courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more
serious sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166051 April 8, 2008

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
EVELINA LASERNA and GLORIA CAJIPE, represented by PROCESO F.
CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the Decision1 dated 21 July 2004 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82153, which denied and dismissed the Petition filed
before it by the petitioner for lack of merit; and (2) the Resolution2 dated 10 November 2004 of
the same court, which denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:

On 1 April 1977, respondents Evelina Laserna and Gloria Cajipe, represented by their attorney-
in-fact, Proceso F. Cruz, as buyers, entered into a Contract to Sell3 with petitioner Solid Homes,
Inc. (SHI), a corporation engaged in the development and sale of subdivision lots, as seller. The
subject of the said Contract to Sell was a parcel of land located at Lot 3, Block I, Phase II,
Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City, with a total area of 600 square meters, more or less. The
total contract price agreed upon by the parties for the said parcel of land was P172,260.00, to
be paid in the following manner: (1) the P33,060.00 down payment should be paid upon the
signing of the contract; and (2) the remaining balance of P166,421.884 was payable for a period
of three years at a monthly installment of P4,622.83 beginning 1 April 1977. The respondents
made the down payment and several monthly installments. When the respondents had allegedly
paid 90% of the purchase price, they demanded the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale
and the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the subject property upon the final payment of the
balance. But the petitioner did not comply with the demands of the respondents.

The respondents whereupon filed against the petitioner a Complaint for Delivery of Title and
Execution of Deed of Sale with Damages, dated 28 June 1990, before the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The same was docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-073090-
4511. In their Complaint, respondents alleged that as their outstanding balance was
only P5,928.18, they were already demanding the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale
and the TCT of the subject property upon final payment of the said amount. The petitioner filed
a Motion to Admit Answer,5 together with its Answer6 dated 17 September 1990, asserting that
the respondents have no cause of action against it because the respondents failed to show that
they had complied with their obligations under the Contract to Sell, since the respondents had
not yet paid in full the total purchase price of the subject property. In view of the said non-
payment, the petitioner considered the Contract to Sell abandoned by the respondents and
rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the same contract.

On 7 October 1992, HLURB Arbiter Gerardo L. Dean rendered a Decision7 denying

respondents prayer for the issuance of the Deed of Sale and the delivery of the TCT. He,
however, directed the petitioner to execute and deliver the aforesaid Deed of Sale and TCT the
moment that the purchase price is fully settled by the respondents. Further, he ordered the
petitioner to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees from the respondents other
than those authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 9578 and similar statutes.9

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner appealed10 the aforesaid Decision to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners. The case was then docketed as HLURB Case No. REM-A-1298.

On 10 August 1994, the HLURB Board of Commissioners rendered a Decision,11 modifying the
7 October 1992 Decision of HLURB Arbiter Dean. The decretal portion of the Boards Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [D]ecision of [HLURB] Arbiter Gerardo Dean dated
07 October 1992 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. [Herein respondent]12 is hereby directed to pay the balance of P11,585.41 within the
(sic) thirty (30) days from finality of this [D]ecision.

2. [Herein petitioner] is hereby directed to execute the necessary deed of sale and
deliver the TCT over the subject property immediately upon full payment.

3. [Petitioner] is hereby directed to cease and desist from charging and/or collecting fees
other than those authorized by P.D. 957 and other related laws. 13 (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner remained unsatisfied with the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, thus,
it appealed the same before the Office of the President, wherein it was docketed as O.P. Case
No. 5919.

After evaluating the established facts and pieces of evidence on record, the Office of the
President rendered a Decision14 dated 10 June 2003, affirming in toto the 10 August 1994
Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. In rendering its Decision, the Office of the
President merely adopted by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in
the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

Resultantly, petitioner moved for the reconsideration15 of the 10 June 2003 Decision of the
Office of the President. However, in an Order16 dated 9 December 2003, the Office of the
President denied the same.

The petitioner thereafter elevated its case to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review
under Rule 4317 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
82153, raising the following issues, to wit: (1) the Honorable Office of the President seriously
erred in merely adopting by reference the findings and conclusions of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners in arriving at the questioned [D]ecision; and (2) the Honorable Office of the
President seriously erred in not dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action. 18

On 21 July 2004, the appellate court rendered a Decision denying due course and dismissing
the petitioners Petition for Review for lack of merit, thus affirming the Decision of the Office of
the President dated 10 June 2003, viz:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant [P]etition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit.19 (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but, it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated 10 November 2004.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner raises the following issues for this Courts resolution:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
 WHICH MERELY ADOPTS BY REFERENCE THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE [HLURB], IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT THE DECISION SHOULD BE BASED
ON THE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND LAW TO ARRIVE AT A DECISION; AND

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN NOT REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
CONSIDERING THAT THE COMPLAINT OF THE RESPONDENTS LACKS CAUSE OF
ACTION.20

In its Memorandum,21 the petitioner alleges that the Decision of the Office of the President, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which merely adopted by reference the Decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners, without a recitation of the facts and law on which it was
based, runs afoul of the mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which provides that: "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based." The Office of the President, being a
government agency, should have adhered to this principle.

Petitioner further avers that a full exposition of the facts and the law upon which a decision was
based goes to the very essence of due process as it is intended to inform the parties of the
factual and legal considerations employed to support a decision. The same was not complied
with by the Office of the President when it rendered its one-page Decision dated 10 June 2003.
Without a complete statement in the judgment of the facts proven, it is not possible to pass upon
and determine the issues in the case, inasmuch as when the facts are not supported by
evidence, it is impossible to administer justice to apply the law to the points argued, or to uphold
the rights of the litigant who has the law on his side.

Lastly, petitioner argues that the Complaint filed against it by the respondents stated no cause
of action because the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject
property. The right of action of the respondents to file a case with the HLURB would only accrue
once they have fulfilled their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price for the subject
property. Hence, the respondents Complaint against the petitioner should have been dismissed
outright by the HLURB for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.

The Petition is unmeritorious.

The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,"22 does not preclude the
validity of "memorandum decisions," which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.23In fact, in Yao v. Court of
Appeals,24 this Court has sanctioned the use of "memorandum decisions," a specie of succinctly
written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40,25 B.P. Blg.
129, as amended,26 on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenience and docket status
of our courts. This Court likewise declared that "memorandum decisions" comply with the
constitutional mandate.27

This Court found in Romero v. Court of Appeals28 that the Court of Appeals substantially
complied with its constitutional duty when it adopted in its Decision the findings and disposition
of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:
 "We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-assessment of the
same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to affirm the correctness of the trial
courts factual findings and the soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and
expediency, therefore, We hereby adopt, by way of reference, the findings of facts and
conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral part of this Our
decision." (Underscoring supplied)

In Francisco v. Permskul,29 this Court similarly held that the following memorandum decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City did not transgress the requirements of Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1997 Philippine Constitution:

"MEMORANDUM DECISION

After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this Court
hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that
there is no cogent reason to disturb the same.

"WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto." (Underscoring

supplied.)

Hence, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of

the decision of the lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher court. 30

However, also in Permskul,31 this Court laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum
decisions, to wit:

The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say
that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person
reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be
allowed, it must provide for direct access to the facts and the law being adopted,
which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other
words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Blg. 129 should
actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in
an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the
decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a proper
examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the
annexed statement should suggest that such an examination has been
undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should,
to begin with, comply with Article VIII, Section 14 as no amount of incorporation or
adoption will rectify its violation.

The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be
sparingly used lest it become an addictive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional
condition for the validity that this kind of decision may be resorted to only in
cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily
determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that
 will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum
decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases,
where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed
to dismiss it.

xxxx

Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein
set forth both as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be
rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section
14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless
disobedience.32

In the case at bar, we quote verbatim the Decision dated 10 June 2003 of the Office of the
President which adopted by reference the Decision dated 10 August 1994 of the HLURB Board
of Commissioners:

This resolves the appeal filed by [herein petitioner] Solid Homes, Inc. from the [D]ecision
of the [HLURB] dated [10 August 1994].

After a careful study and thorough evaluation of the records of the case, this Office is
convinced by the findings of the HLURB, thus we find no cogent reason to depart from
the assailed [D]ecision. Therefore, we hereby adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the aforesaid [D]ecision, copy of which is hereto
attached as "Annex A."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in

toto.33 (Emphasis supplied).

It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to
decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies
only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all
of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government.
Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or
administrative agencies are oblige to meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied.34 In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we
laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit
evidence in support thereof.

2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

3) The decision must have something to support itself.

4) The evidence must be substantial.

 5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.35

As can be seen above, among these rights are "the decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;" and that the decision be rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the
proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered."
Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative decision is
grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the
factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.

At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and
sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the
product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision
noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely affected need
only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed appeal or action
for certiorari under Rule 65.

However, it bears observation that while decisions of the Office of the President need not
comply with the constitutional requirement imposed on courts under Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution, the Rules of Court may still find application, although suppletory only in
character and apply only whenever practicable and convenient. There is no mandate that
requires the application of the Rules of Court in administrative proceedings.

Even assuming arguendo that the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner applies in the
instant case, the decision of the OP satisfied the standards set forth in the case of Permskul.

Firstly, the Decision of the Office of the President readily made available to the parties a copy of
the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted and affirmed in toto,
because it was attached as an annex to its Decision.

Secondly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the HLURB Board of Commissioners
have been embodied in the Decision of the Office of the President and made an indispensable
part thereof. With the attachment of a copy of the Decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the Decision of the Office of the President, the parties reading the latter can
also directly access the factual and legal findings adopted from the former. As the Court of
Appeals ratiocinated in its Decision dated 21 July 2004, "the facts narrated and the laws
concluded in the Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners should be considered as
written in the Decision of the Office of the President. It was still easy for the parties to determine
the facts and the laws on which the decision were based. Moreover, through the attached
decision, the parties could still identify the issues that could be appealed to the proper
tribunal."36

Thirdly, it was categorically stated in the Decision of the Office of the President that it conducted
a careful study and thorough evaluation of the records of the present case and it was fully
convinced as regards the findings of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.

And lastly, the facts of the present case were not contested by the parties and it can be easily
determined by the hearing officer or tribunal. Even the respondents admitted that, indeed, the
total purchase price for the subject property has not yet been fully settled and the outstanding
balance is yet to be paid by them. In addition, this case is a simple action for specific
performance with damages, thus, there are neither doctrinal complications involved in this case
that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved.

Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court
rules that the said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative
due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The Office of the President did not violate petitioners right to due process when it rendered its
one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including
petitioner, were well-informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived
at, as well as the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office of the
President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the petitioner
would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a
presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the issues
involved in its case.

This Court also quotes with approval the following declaration of the Court of Appeals in its
Decision on the alleged violation of petitioners right to due process:

The contention of the [herein] petitioner that the said [D]ecision runs afoul to the
Constitutional provision on due process cannot be given credence. The case already
had gone through the Offices of the HLURB Arbiter and the Board of
Commissioners where petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard and
present its evidence, before the case reached the Office of the President which
rendered the assailed [D]ecision after a thorough evaluation of the evidence
presented. What is important is that the parties were given the opportunity to be
heard before the [D]ecision was rendered. To nullify the assailed [D]ecision would
in effect be a violation of the Constitution because it would deny the parties of the
right to speedy disposition of cases.37

Petitioners assertion that respondents complaint filed with the HLURB lacked a cause of action
deserves scant consideration.

Section 7 of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure states that:

Section 7. Dismissal of the Complaint or Opposition. The Housing and Land Use
Arbiter (HLA) to whom a complaint or opposition is assigned may immediately dismiss
the same for lack of jurisdiction or cause of action. (Emphasis supplied).
It is noticeable that the afore-quoted provision of the 1987 HLURB Rules of Procedure used the
word "may" instead of "shall," meaning, that the dismissal of a complaint or opposition filed
before the HLURB Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action is simply
permissive and not directive. The HLURB Arbiter has the discretion of whether to dismiss
immediately the complaint or opposition filed before him for lack of jurisdiction or cause of
action, or to still proceed with the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence. HLURB
Arbiter Dean in his Decision explained thus:

This Office is well aware of instances when complainants/petitioners fail, through

excusable negligence, to incorporate every pertinent allegations (sic) necessary to
constitute a cause of action. We will not hesitate to go outside of the complaint/petition
and consider other available evidences if the same is necessary to a judicious,
speedy, and inexpensive settlement of the issues laid before us or when there are
reasons to believe that the [com]plaints are meritorious. "Administrative rules should be
construed liberally in order to PROMOTE THEIR OBJECT AND ASSIST THE PARTIES
IN OBTAINING A JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE DETERMINATION OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE CLAIMS AND DEFENSES" (Mangubat vs. de Castro, 163 SCRA
608).38 (Emphasis supplied).

Given the fact that the respondents have not yet paid in full the purchase price of the subject
property so they have yet no right to demand the execution and delivery of the Deed of Sale and
the TCT, nevertheless, it was still within the HLURB Arbiters discretion to proceed hearing the
respondents complaint in pursuit of a judicious, speedy and inexpensive determination of the
parties claims and defenses.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals already sufficiently addressed the issue of lack of cause of
action in its Decision, viz:

The Offices below, instead of dismissing the complaint because of the clear showing that
there was no full payment of the purchase price, decided to try the case and render
judgment on the basis of the evidence presented. The complaint of the respondents
does not totally lack cause of action because of their right against the cancellation
of the contract to sell and the forfeiture of their payments due to non-payment of
their monthly amortization.

xxxx

The HLURB Arbiter in his [D]ecision, stated that it is undisputed that the contract price is
not yet fully paid. This was affirmed by the HLURB Board of Commissioners and the
Office of the President. No less than the respondents admitted such fact when they
contended that they are willing to pay their unpaid balance. Without full payment, the
respondents have no right to compel the petitioner to execute the Deed of Sale and
deliver the title to the property. xxx.

xxxx

Lastly, notwithstanding such failure to pay the monthly amortization, the petitioner
cannot consider the contract as cancelled and the payments made as forfeited.

Section 24, PD 957 provides:

 "Section 24. Failure to pay installments. - The rights of the buyer in the event
of his failure to pay the installments due for reasons other than the failure of the
owner or developer to develop the project shall be governed by Republic Act No.
6552. x x x."

Section 4, RA 6552 or the Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act provides:

"Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the
seller shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date
the installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the
expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days
from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for
rescission of the contract by a notarial act."

It is therefore clear from the above provisions that the petitioner cannot consider the
[C]ontract to [S]ell as cancelled. The requirements above should still be complied
with.39 (Emphasis supplied).

Hence, during the hearing conducted by HLURB Arbiter Dean, it became apparent that
respondents cause of action against petitioner is not limited to the non-execution and non-
delivery by petitioner of the Deed of Sale and TCT of the subject property, which is dependent
on their full payment of the purchase price thereof; but also the wrongful rescission by the
petitioner of the Contract to Sell. By virtue thereof, there is ample basis for HLURB Arbiter Dean
not to dismiss respondents complaint against petitioner and continue hearing and resolving the
case.

As a final point. Based on the records of this case, respondents have tendered payment in the
amount of P11,584.41,40 representing the balance of the purchase price of the subject property,
as determined in the 10 August 1994 Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and
affirmed by both the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals. However, the petitioner,
without any justifiable reason, refused to accept the same. In Ramos v. Sarao,41 this Court held
that tender of payment is the manifestation by debtors of their desire to comply with or to pay
their obligation. If the creditor refuses the tender of payment without just cause, the
debtors are discharged from the obligation by the consignation of the sum due.
Consignation is made by depositing the proper amount with the judicial authority, before whom
the tender of payment and the announcement of the consignation shall be proved. All interested
parties are to be notified of the consignation. Compliance with these requisites is
mandatory.42 In the case at bar, after the petitioner refused to accept the tender of payment
made by the respondents, the latter failed to make any consignation of the sum due.
Consequently, there was no valid tender of payment and the respondents are not yet
discharged from the obligation to pay the outstanding balance of the purchase price of the
subject property.

Since petitioner did not rescind the Contract to Sell it executed with the respondents by a
notarial act, the said Contract still stands. Both parties must comply with their obligations under
the said Contract. As ruled by the HLURB Board of Commissioners, and affirmed by the Office
of the President and the Court of Appeals, the respondents must first pay the balance of the
purchase price of the subject property, after which, the petitioner must execute and deliver the
necessary Deed of Sale and TCT of said property.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338. September 5, 1997]

ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant, vs. JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, respondent.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109,
Pasay City, with violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and falsification in
connection with her decision in Criminal Case No. 91-0716 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Engineer Fernando S. Dizon.
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of
falsification of private document. The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the
dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the
decision on him. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few days for their copy of
the decision, but although petitioner and his father by turns went to the court to obtain a copy of
the decision they were not able to do so. To protect his right, complainant filed a partial motion
for reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his right to submit a more elaborate one
upon receipt of the decision. The hearing of the motion for reconsideration was scheduled on May
12, 1993, but the case was not called as complainants counsel was told that the decision had not
yet been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed an Omnibus Motion to Annul
Promulgation of Sentence and to Dismiss the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for
hearing the motion, complainant was served a copy of the decision, dated April 22, 1993, the
dispositive portion of which states:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in
relation to Art. 171 par. 2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Two (2) Years,
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00.

Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision
until almost one year and eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April
22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, 14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from
rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which
they are based and 15 of the same Art. VIII, which provides that in all cases lower courts must
render their decisions within three months from the date of their submission. He alleges further
that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in violation of Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution and
that Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and including therein, as additional
penalty, a fine of P5,000.00.
On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion for reconsideration after receiving
a copy of the full decision of the court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify respondent
from hearing the motions for reconsideration which he had filed. Respondent judge responded
by voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of the case and ordered it forwarded to
the Office of the Clerk of Court for re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Manuel
F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City RTC.
Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment was promulgated with the
reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared, although to prevent leakage
in the process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its
promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had been read to
complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of Branch
109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The court found complainant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the
decision was unintentional.
Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in preparing her decision and to a series of
personal problems which contributed to this delay in the release of her decision, to wit: she has
only two (2) stenographers to attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for her to
make use of the Social Worker assigned to her to type her decisions. During the period January
to December 1993 she had to dispose of 285 cases, apart from the fact that there was an
unusually big number of criminal, civil, and land registration cases as well as special proceedings
filed in her court which required the holding of hearings in the mornings and in the
afternoons. During the same period, she went through some personal tragedies. She lost her
niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from childhood, due to a hospital accident. This
was followed by the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez, who had been under
respondents care for the past eight years after suffering a stroke. On September 17, 1993,
respondents father died of diabetes, renal failure, pneumonia, and cardiac arrest.Respondent was
the one who single-handedly brought them in and out of the hospital because all her able-bodied
relatives are abroad. Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes and
hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of absence from September 27, 1994 to
December 12, 1994, in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from these, respondents
family suffered financial reverses because of estafa committed against them.
On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo P. Abesamis submitted a
memorandum, finding the charge of violation of the Constitution to be without merit. He called
attention to the written decision of respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant late,
nonetheless states the facts and law on which it is based. He likewise finds the charge of serious
misconduct and falsification to be without basis in view of the absence of malice. However, he
finds the charge of inefficiency to be well founded on the basis of respondents failure to furnish
complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision within a reasonable time after its
promulgation. Hence, the Deputy Court Administrator believes that Judge Lopez should be given
admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her for violation of
the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme
Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower courts.

Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within three months of the submission
of the case for decision, the fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such
promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of her decision, containing her findings
and discussion of complainants liability, had already been prepared although it had to be put in
final form by incorporating the dispositive portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight
months more before this was done and a copy of the complete decision furnished the complainant
on December 16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

1. Judgment defined. - The term judgment as used in this Rule means the adjudication by the court that
the accused is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the imposition of the proper penalty and
civil liability provided for by law on the accused.

2. Form and contents of judgment. - The judgment must be written in the official language, personally
and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement
of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.

6. Promulgation of judgment. - The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the
accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light
offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the
judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.

It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not
sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such
judgment is based. Since this was done only on December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete
decision was served on complainant, it is obvious that the respondent failed to render her decision
within three months as required by Art. VIII, 15 of the Constitution.
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive portion had been read in open court on
April 22, 1993 was to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then already prepared, it
is difficult to see why it took respondent judge one year and eight more months before she was
able to do so. Respondent claims that she was prevented from putting out her decision by a series
of personal and other problems which leads the Court to believe that when she promulgated her
sentence she had not finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all events, she could have
applied for extension of time to decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment until she
had finished it.
What respondent did in this case was to render what is known as a sin perjuicio judgment,
which is a judgment without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion to be later
supplemented by the final judgment.[1] That is why, in answer to complainants charge that the
dispositive portion of the judgment read to him did not impose a fine, respondent contends that
the addition of the fine of P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no such fine had been
included in the oral sentence given on April 22, 1993. As respondent judge states, because the
decision was not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her contention the case of
Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.[2] Respondent only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated on
April 22, 1993 was a sin perjuicio judgment which was incomplete and needed a statement of the
facts and law upon which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this Court already expressed
its disapproval of the practice of rendering sin perjuicio judgments, what with all the uncertainties
entailed because of the implied reservation that it is subject to modification when the decision is
finally rendered.[3] This Court has expressed approval of the practice of some judges of
withholding the dispositive portion from their opinions until the very last moment of promulgation
of their judgment in order to prevent leakage,[4] but that refers to the preparation of their decision,
not its promulgation. What must be promulgated must be the complete decision. There would be
no more reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage of promulgation of judgment.
However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to be without merit.
First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by reason of
respondents failure to furnish him with a copy of the decision until after one year and eight months
is without basis. It appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in the Pasay City Hall on
January 18, 1992 the parties were required to submit simultaneously their memoranda on August
18, 1992. The delay, if any, was not such vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay[5] as to
justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial. The fact is that the reading of the sentence on
April 22, 1993, albeit not in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of judgments,
nonetheless put an end to trial.
Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did not prejudice
his right to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a
copy of the decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so that he can intelligently
prepare his appeal or motion for reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in
Director of Lands v. Sanz,[6] complainants period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration did
not begin to run until after he actually received a copy of the judgment on December 16, 1994. He
therefore suffered no prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to refute a
conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of the basis of the conviction.
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judges culpability. Except for this incident,
respondents record of public service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice
for 17 years and as Regional Trial Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance,
misfeasance or wrongdoing. This is the first time she is required to answer an administrative
complaint against her. Her failure to decide the case of complainant was brought about by factors
not within her control, to wit, lack of stenographers and unusually big number of cases; and her
personal loss as a result of the death of her niece and both her parents, financial reverses of the
family, and poor health as a result of diabetes and hypertension.
In Mangulabnan v. Tecson,[7] a joint decision in two criminal cases was rendered by
respondent judge on February 24, 1978, six months and eight days from submission of the case,
and a copy was delivered to complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months after rendition
of the decision. Two complaints were filed for violation of the constitutional provision requiring
submitted cases to be decided by lower courts within three months and for violation of
complainants right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the delay in deciding the cases on
the fact that his clerks had misfiled the records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant with a
copy of the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of his clerk who did not think
complainant was entitled to receive the same. The judge was reprimanded. The reason for the
delay in that case was even less excusable than the difficulties experienced by respondent Judge
Lopez, i.e., deaths in respondents family, her own poor state of health, financial reverses suffered
by her family, and the volume of work done within the period in question, which somewhat mitigate
her liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would be appropriate.
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that
repetition of the same acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.
 SO ORDERED.
Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr. JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., (Chairman), on leave.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 137933. January 28, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VALENTIN BARING, JR., accused-

appellant.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

Valentin Baring, Jr., herein accused-appellant, was indicted for statutory rape committed
against a seven-year-old girl in an information that reads-

That prior to August 2, 1997 and on several occasions thereto, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province
of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation taking advantage of his superior strength over the
person of the victim who is only seven (7) years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Jennifer Donayre, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

On his arraignment accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision dated January 20,
1999, convicting accused-appellant of rape, to wit

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape, the accused-
Valentin Baring Jr. is sentenced to die by lethal injection and to pay the victim an indemnity
of P50,000.00 plus moral damages of another P50,000.00 plus the cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED.[2]

In a sworn complaint,[3] Jennifer Donayre accused Valentin Baring, Jr., her grandmothers
commonlaw husband, of raping her on several occasions. It appears that Jennifer was living with
her grandmother in Dasmarias, Cavite. She does not know her real father since her mother and
father were separated.[4] Since 1990, when she was about 8 months old[5] until 1997, she was left
under her grandmothers care and custody. She calls Valentin Baring, Jr. as Papa.[6]
 According to Jennifer, the repeated sexual abuse happened when she was about 6 years old
whenever she was left alone in the house. Accused-appellant would touch her private parts, and
on such occasions, accused-appellant would remove her panty, mount on her and violate her.
She informed her grandmother that accused-appellant sexually abused her.[7]
On July 29, 1997, Jenelyn Donayre-Mendoza visited her daughter Jennifer, herein victim, in
Dasmarias, Cavite. She learned from her daughter that the latter was sexually abused by
accused-appellant. Acting on her daughters accounts of sexual abuse, she took Jennifer to the
National Bureau of Investigation and filed a complaint. Thereafter, Jennifer underwent a medical
examination at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service
in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Dennis G. Bellen, the medico-legal officer
at Camp Crame found that Jennifer was in non-virgin state physically. The examination disclosed
a congested, fleshy-type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 9 oclock position and the
external vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiners smallest finger.[8]
For his defense, accused-appellant denied the allegations against him.[9] According to
accused-appellant, he has been living with Jennifers grandmother for ten (10)[10] or eighteen (18)
years.[11] Accused-appellant claimed that Jennifer was not living with them during the time the
alleged rape occurred.[12] Later on, he testified that prior to July, 1997, Jennifer was living with
them since 1990.[13] However, Jennifer was taken from them sometime in July 1997, but he does
not know why.[14]
The trial court meted out its judgment of conviction on the basis of the victims clear,
trustworthy and positive testimony that she was raped several times by accused-appellant.
Because of the penalty imposed, this case is now before us on automatic review.
On April 20, 1999, accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a petition before this Court
to dismiss the case that is subject of our automatic review because (i) the three-page double-
spaced decision of the trial court is bereft of material facts supporting the conviction; (ii) the
medico-legal certificate is merely a scrap of paper since the physician who conducted the
examination was not presented as a witness that deprived accused-appellant of his right to cross-
examination; (iii) the case of attempted homicide filed by the victims grandmother against
accused-appellant was provisionally dismissed; and (iv) accused-appellant was merely a fall guy
and that another person is responsible for the commission of the crime charged against him. [15]
In the appellants brief filed on November 4, 1999, accused-appellant assigns the following
errors-

The lower court erred:

I. In promulgating a brief and short decision with material facts that have been omitted
with no allusions to the transcripts of records erroneous of tenses and grammar
jotted by the Court Stenographer.
II. In denying the accused his right to plead for a DNA Test to determine that the blood
found in the panty of the victim is not his but of another man, Venancio Mendoza,
live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer Donayre, the victim.
III. In not finding the accused as a fall guy framed up to take the place of Venancio
Mendoza, live-in husband of Jennelyn, mother of Jennifer, whose behavior in the
courtroom as a witness has been beyond normal.[16]
The Philippine Constitution no less, mandates that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.[17] This
vital requirement is not only demanded from the courts. Quasi-judicial bodies are similarly
required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative
Code[18] whose roots may also be traced to the Constitutional mandate.
A decision need not be a complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual
and legal basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn therefrom,
the decision arrived at is valid. Nonetheless, in order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived
at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must
state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a
statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunals assessments and
conclusions on the case. This practice would better enable a court to make an appropriate
consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is
consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law made by the tribunal that rendered the
decision.[19] Compliance with this requirement will sufficiently apprise the parties of the various
issues involved but more importantly will guide the court in assessing whether the conclusion
arrived at is consistent with the facts and the law.
In the case at bar, the trial courts decision may cast doubt as to the guilt of accused-appellant.
Such doubt may be engendered not by the lack of direct evidence against accused-appellant but
by the trial courts failure to fully explain the correlation of the facts, the weight or admissibility of
the evidence presented for or against the accused, the assessments made from the evidence
presented, and the conclusions drawn therefrom after applying the pertinent law as basis of the
decision.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of rape
despite prosecutions failure to present the examining physician to appear in court depriving him
of his constitutional right to confront a witness against him.[20] However, a review of the transcript
of stenographic notes reveal that accused-appellants counsel waived presentation of the medico-
legal officer and thus, was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront said witness, to wit-

PROS. ORQUIEZA:
Your Honor, I was informed by the mother of the private complainant that the doctor is no
longer connected with the Crime Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City but was
reassigned to the Eastern Police District at Mandaluyong City.

PROS. ORQUIEZA:
I just prefer that a subpoena be sent. We have to ask for the postponement.

ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We can dispense with the testimony.

COURT:
Provided this is admitted.

COURT:
Do you admit the due execution and authenticity of the report of the doctor?

ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
We admit everything written here because (sic) doctor says.

COURT:
 Yes, whatever is written there, do you admit that?

ATTY. ABUBAKAR
Yes, your Honor.

COURT:
No need to present the doctor

PROS. ORQUIEZA:
We will no longer present Dr. Dennis G. Bellen of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory Service at Camp Crame, Quezon City. We have here the xerox copy of the medico
legal report no. M-2831-97.

COURT:
Will you show that to Atty. Abubakar.

ATTY. ABUBAKAR:
Yes, your Honor.

COURT:
Admitted.
You dispense the testimony of the doctor.[21]

A medical certificate after all is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape.[22] It is well
entrenched in our jurisprudence that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a
prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict
the accused of the crime.[23] Besides, testimonies of rape victims who are of tender age are
credible,[24] and the testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit.[25]
Accused-appellant likewise impugns the credibility of the victim by pointing out that the rape
was filed one year after its commission, which allegedly leaves doubt as to the real identity of the
culprit.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape does not create any doubt over the credibility of the
complainant nor can it be taken against her.[26] The following realities justified the delay in the
filing of the case against accused-appellant: (1) the victim was merely six years old when she was
sexually abused; (2) the victim lived separately from her mother and was left under her
grandmothers care; and, (3) the victims sexual abuser happens to be her step-grandfather.
According to accused-appellant, he was simply framed-up and that another person also
raped the victim.[27] He avers that his allegation is supported by the testimony of the victims mother
Jenelyn that the victim was likewise abused by the latters husband.
The categorical testimony of the victim that she was raped by accused-appellant cannot be
overturned by the bare denial and defense of being framed-up interposed by accused-
appellant. The victim made a positive, clear and categorical declaration pointing to accused-
appellant as the person who sexually ravaged her-
Q: Are you the same Jennifer Donayre the private complainant against the accused
Valentin Baring, Jr.?
A: Yes, sir.
 xxxxxxxxx
Q: Who is your father?
A: I do not know the name of my father because my father and mother are separated.
Q: If your father is in the courtroom can you point to him?
A: Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a man inside this courtroom when asked given [sic] his
name as Valentin Baring.)
Q: Is he your true father?
A: No sir. He is my stepfather.
Q: You were pointing to your stepfather, do you know what things or particular things, if
any, he did to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were those particular things your stepfather had done to you?
A: He raped me.
Q: When your stepfather raped you, what actually did your stepfather do to you?
A: He removed my panty.
Q: What did your stepfather do after removing your panty?
A: He placed himself on top of me.
Q: Was he naked when he placed himself on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When he was on top of you, did he place his penis inside your private parts?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you feel when his penis was inside your private parts, if any?
A: I felt pain.
Q: Was your private part bleeding as a result of the insertion of the penis of your
stepfather into your private parts?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he kiss you while he was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What parts of your body or face was kissed?
A: My cheek.
Q: Where did this happen?
A: Dasmarias, Cavite.
Q: In whose house or place?
A: In the house of my grandmother.
 Q: Who are the residents of that house at that time?
A: At that time nobody was in the house because they were working.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you recall if the rape you mentioned to us happened while you were 7 years old,
6 years old? What was your age then if you can recall?
A: 6 years old.
Q: How many times did your stepfather do to you these things you mentioned to us that
is by placing (sic) on top of you and inserting his penis into your private parts and
kissing you?
A: 10 times.
Q: Do you know how to count?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many is this? (prosecutor is depicting two fingers)
A: Two, sir.
Q: How about this, how many? (Prosecutor is depicting five fingers).
A: Five, sir.
Q: How about this?(Prosecutor is depicting 10 fingers)
A: Ten, sir.[28]
Accused-appellant even contends that the failure of the prosecution to establish the dates
when the other alleged rapes were committed justifies the outright dismissal of the case.[29]
Failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make
the information defective on its face.[30] When all the essential elements of the crime of rape are
stated in the information, an accused is sufficiently apprised of the charged against him.
Moreover, the precise time of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of
rape.[31] Neither is the exact date of commission of rape an element of the crime [32] for the
gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse without consent.[33]
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court denied him his right to subject the blood found
on the victims panty for DNA testing.
The records reveal that accused-appellants counsel initially asked the court to subject the
alleged blood found in the victims panty to a DNA test for comparison with accused-appellants
blood.[34] However, he voluntarily withdrew his proposition.[35] Obviously, accused-appellants
counsel is misleading the Court. It was even accused-appellants counsel who recalled the
submission for DNA testing. The alleged denial of accuseds right to avail of the DNA tests is a
futile attempt to confuse the issues. He lost sight of the categorical testimony of the victim pinning
him down as the perpetrator. It would have been more prudent for him to attack this damaging
evidence directly. It must be noted that in the prosecution of rape cases, the presentation of the
bloodstained panty is not even essential.[36] The victims credible testimony, standing alone, is
sufficient basis for the conviction of accused-appellant.
Cases subject of our review, especially those in the nature of child sexual abuse, often involve
victims of tender years. On account of the increased number of children coming into the realm of
the judicial system, we adopted the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness to govern the
examination of child witnesses who may either be victims, accused or witnesses to a
crime.[37] This rule ensures an environment that allows children to give reliable and complete
evidence, minimize trauma, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the
ascertainment of truth.[38]
In line with our foregoing thrust to protect children, we observed the peculiar physical
examination performed by the doctor on the seven-year-old victim in this wise-

GENITAL
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and slightly gaping with the pinkish brown labia
minora presenting in between. On separating, the same disclosed a congested, fleshy-type hymen with
shallow healing laceration at 9 o'clock position. External vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiners
smallest finger.[39] (emphasis ours)

This Court is disturbed by the method of physical examination done on the seven-year-old
victim. We noticed that in the examiners effort to show the existence of abuse, the examining
physician inserted his smallest finger, as shown in the medico-legal report that the external
vaginal orifice admits tip of the examiner's finger.
It bears to stress that this particular manner of establishing evidence by determining the
diameter/hymenal opening in rape cases was a common practice in the past. With the passage
of R.A. 7610, this Court has nonetheless allowed the utilization of the same kind of evidence in
the prosecution of Child Abuse cases. In light however of radical medical developments and
findings, specifically as to the determination of the existence of child sexual abuse, this Court
deems it necessary to firmly adopt a more child sensitive approach in dealing with this specie or
genre of crime.
In the international scientific community, recent medical studies have shown that
measurement of hymenal opening is unreliable in determining and/or proving child sexual abuse

The diameter of the hymenal opening previously has been used as a diagnostic criterion for abuse. More
recent studies have shown this to be undependable (Paradise, 1989).Factors affecting hymenal and anal
diameter include the examination position (McCann, Voris, Simon, & Wells, 1990) and the degree of
relaxation of the child. The anal diameter is also affected by the presence of stool in the ampulla.Hymenal
diameter may increase with age and with the onset of pubertal development.[40]

In fact, there is no evidence, nor published research studies which show that enlarged
hymenal opening diameter is any more common in abused than in non-abused children.[41] Thus
-

In the latest revision of the classification system, enlarged hymenal opening is also removed as a criterion
that should be considered suspicious for abuse. With labial traction, the hymenal opening may appear
quite large, especially to the less experienced clinician, and internal structures such as vaginal ridges,
rugae, and vaginal columns may be visualized. This is purely a matter of how much traction is applied,
and the degree of patient relaxation, and has no proven correlation with past sexual abuse. Likewise, it is
not possible to obtain accurate measurements of the dilated hymenal opening, unless photographs are
taken at the point of maximal dilation and measurements are taken from the photographs using a
calibrated measuring device. Rings of different sizes that are etched into eyepieces of certain types of
colposcopes can be used to estimate diameter size but not to obtain exact measurements. [42]
 Hence, insertion of a finger or any foreign matter inside the hymenal opening under the
pretext of determining abuse is unnecessary and inappropriate. The Philippine Judicial Academy
[PHILJA] training program for family court judges,[43] through the auspices of the U.P.-P.G.H.
Child Protection Unit, sanctioned that in prepubertal girls[44] without active bleeding, all that is
needed is an external examination with a good light source and magnification. Be that as it may,
the physical findings alone will not be conclusive of child sexual abuse, for a child who gives a
clear, consistent, detailed, spontaneous description of being sexually molested may still have
normal genital examination. Despite the physical or laboratory findings, however, a childs clear
and convincing description of the abuse has a high rate of probability.
We are not at all uninformed in this regard for we, in a plethora of cases, have consistently
upheld the full weight of a young victims unwavering testimony.[45] Also, there is Section 22 of the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which categorically states:

Section 22. Corroboration.- Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His
testimony, if credible by itself, shall be sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or
judgment subject to the standard proof required in criminal and non-criminal cases.

What is important at this point, and we do not hesitate to reiterate, is that forensic examination
inclusive of physical examination and forensic interview of sexually assaulted children
[adolescents included] must be conducted with maximum sensitivity to the young victims feelings
of vulnerability and embarrassment. Great care must be observed in order to make the
examination less stressful lest they be more traumatic to the victim than the very assault itself.
The value of collecting evidence should always be weighed against the emotional cost of the
procedure and examination of the child.
We now come to the matter of the death penalty imposed by the trial court. The single
information filed against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6334-98, charged
him with the crime of Multiple Statutory Rape.[46] Even then, accused-appellant cannot be held
answerable for the other incidents of rape committed. Each and every charge of rape is a separate
and distinct crime so that each of the other rapes charged should be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[47]
Article 266-B, paragraph No.5 of the Revised Penal Code, imposes death penalty when the
victim is a child below seven (7) years old. The allegation in the information specifically stated
that xxx the victim xxx is only seven years old which clearly rules out the application of this specific
provision that can justify the imposition of the capital punishment. Paragraph No. 1 of the same
article which warrants the imposition of the death penalty if the crime of rape is committed where
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw
spouse of the parent of the victim,[48] will not apply for while the victim is under eighteen (18) years
old, the accused-appellant is not the common-law husband of the victims mother. The trial court
therefore erred in meting out the death penalty upon accused-appellant for qualified rape. Thus,
accused-appellant may only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In line with our prevailing jurisprudence,[49] we sustain the trial courts award of P50,000.00
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, in Criminal
Case No. 6334-98, finding accused-appellant Valentin Baring, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
 SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127682. April 24, 1998]

KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE

NATIONAL BANK, SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MAXIMO
CONTRERAS, respondents.

RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J.:

Before the Court is pleading filed on March 4, 1998 in behalf of petitioner and denominated
as a Motion for Leave to file Incorporated Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of September 10, 1997. This resolution does not in the least depart from or enervate the specific
prohibition against second motions for reconsideration[1] Which are applicable
thereto. Considering however, the increasing practice by defeated parties of conjuring scenarios
which they blame for their debacle instead of admitting the lack of merit in their cases, the Court
is constrained to once again express its displeasure against such unethical disregard of the
canons for responsible advocacy, with the warning that this insidious pattern of professional
misconduct shall not hereafter be allowed to pass with impunity.
Indeed, petitioner has gone to the extent of attributing supposed errors and irregularities in
the disposition of this case to both the Court of Appeals and this Court, with particular allusions
amounting to misconduct on the part of counsel for respondent private corporation and with
specific imputations against retired Justice Teodoro Padilla in connection therewith.These will
hereafter be discussed in light of the records of this Court and the vigorous disclaimer of counsel
for said private respondent.
Petitioner's unbridled remonstrations are directed at the fact that its petition for review
on certiorari of the adverse decision of respondent Court of Appeals[2] was denied by this Court
for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its
questioned judgment.[3] This was arrived at after due consideration by the Second Division of this
Court of the merits of the challenged decision and the extended resolution of respondent court
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof, the arguments of petitioner in his present
petition for review on certiorari, the joint comment of respondents, the reply of petitioner, and the
joint rejoinder of respondents, as well as the respective annexes of said pleadings.Indeed, the
parties had all the opportunity to expound on and dissect the issues in this case, and in some
instances even the non-issues, through the liberal admission by this Court of such pleadings.
 Petitioner then filed a 24-page motion for reconsideration, and this Court required
respondents to comment thereon, after which petitioners reply filed without leave was nonetheless
admitted, and to which, on leave sought and granted, respondents filed a joint rejoinder. All these
pleadings, just like those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were so extensive, to the point
of even incorporating new and modified issues, as to cover all possible aspects of the case to
subserve the partisan views of the parties. Since no additional and substantial arguments were
adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought, the Court resolved to deny the motion on January
26, 1998.[4]
It defies explanation, therefore, why petitioner would still insist that the parties should further
have been allowed to file memoranda, an obvious ploy to justify a resolution giving due course to
its petition, while simultaneously insinuating that its pleadings were not read. Indeed, petitioner
would even dictate how this Court should have acted on its petition, with the improbable theory
that because the case had progressed to the rejoinder stage, the petition must be given due
course and a decision be rendered thereafter in its favor. This it tries to buttress by the palpably
erroneous submission that since respondent court reversed the decision of the court a quo, this
Court is duty bound to determine the facts involved. Firstly, this is a deliberate misstatement of
our jurisprudence which merely holds that, in such a case, this Court may at its option review the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals instead of being bound thereby. Secondly, and worse for
petitioner, there is no conflict in the factual findings of the two lower courts as the Court of Appeals
actually adopted the findings of fact of the trial court.
In its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner now tries a different tack by lecturing this
Court on its theory that the minute resolutions it assails are supposedly in violation of Section 14,
Article VIII of the present Constitution. In characteristic fashion, it insinuates that such procedure
adopted by this Court is a culpable constitutional violation and can be subject of impeachment
proceedings. Petitioner is, of course, free to believe and act as it pleases just as this Court may
likewise be minded to take the appropriate sanctions, for which purpose it would do well for all
and sundry to now imbibe the consistent doctrines laid down by this Court.
As early as Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al,[5] it has been stressed that these
resolutions are not decisions within the above constitutional requirements; they merely hold that
the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so
understood it; and the petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Courts denial
since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals decision.
This was reiterated in Que vs. People, et al.,[6] and further clarified in Munal vs. Commission
on Audit, et al.[7] that the constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases submitted for decision,
i.e., given due course and after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution therefore stating the legal basis
thereof. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent pleadings, decides
to deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or there is no
reversible error in the respondent courts decision, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.[8]
For, as expounded more in detail in Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, et al.:[9]

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by
minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit,
where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial
evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the
records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the
legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta (148 SCRA 382, 417 [1987]), [T]he Court is not
duty bound to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or
Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case (Italics
supplied). This is the only way whereby it can act on all cases filed before it and, accordingly discharge
its constitutional functions. x x x.

xxx

In G.R. No. 76355, Macario Tayamura, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (May 21, 1987), the
Court clarified the constitutional requirement that a decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts
and law on which it is based as referring only to decisions. Resolutions disposing of petitions fall under
the constitutional provision which states that, No petition for review x x x shall be refused due course x x
x without stating the legal basis therefor (Section 14, Article VIII, Constitution). When the Court, after
deliberating on a petition and any subsequent pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to
deny due course to the petition and states that the questions raised are factual or no reversible error in the
respondent court's decision is shown or for some other legal basis stated in the resolution, there is a
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.

The course of action adopted by the Court in disposing of this case through its two
resolutions, after a thorough review of the issues and arguments of the parties in the plethora of
pleadings they have filed, is not only in accord with but is justified by this firm and realistic doctrinal
rule:

x x x The Supreme Court is not compelled to adopt a definite and stringent rule on how its judgment shall
be framed. It has long been settled that this Court has discretion to decide whether a minute resolution
should be used in lieu of a full-blown decision in any particular case and that a minute Resolution of
dismissal of a Petition for Review on Certiorari constitutes an adjudication on the merits of the
controversy or subject matter of the Petition. It has been stressed by the Court that the grant of due course
to a Petition for Review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to
fully explain the Courts denial. For one thing, the facts and law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals opinion. A minute Resolution denying a Petition for Review of a Decision of the Court of
Appeals can only mean that the Supreme Court agrees with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals, in other words that the decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct.[10]

That this Court was fully justified in handing down its minute resolution because it agrees with
or adopts the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals since the decision sought to be
reviewed and set aside is correct, is best demonstrated and appreciated by reproducing the
salient pronouncements of respondent court on the real issues actually involved in this case. The
material holdings in its decision[11] of June 28, 1996 are as follows:

The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:

Sometime in 1975, NIDC granted KIPI a direct loan of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00) and
a Two Million ((P2,000,000.00) guarantee to secure PNB. (Exh. M of petitioner and Exh. 22 of
respondent PNB and intervenor SLDC, T.S.N. October 14, 1992 pp. 19-28). As security thereof, a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated April 24, 1975 was executed by Petitioner KIPI in favor of
NIDC, covering, among others, a parcel of land with all its improvements embraced in and
covered by TCT NO. 469737 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal (now Makati,
Metro Manila).At the instance of Respondent PNB and with the conformity of its subsidiary,
NIDC, in order to secure the obligation of Petitioner KIPI under Respondent PNBs deferred letter
of credit for US$1,564,826.00 in favor of Toyota Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, Petitioner KIPI
executed an Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 covering the same parcel of land
and its improvements under TCT No. 469737 on a pari passu basis in favor of Respondent PNB
and NIDC. (Exhibit H, H-1 to H-9). Upon full payment of Petitioner KIPIs account with NIDC
and the P2.0 M Credit Line with Respondent PNB, NIDC executed a Deed of Release and
Cancellation of Mortgage[12] dated January 7, 1981 releasing the mortgage on TCT No. 469737
(Exhibit 1 to 1-4 of Petitioner and Exhibits 7 to 7-D of Respondent PNB and Intervenor
SLDC). In this Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, it is provided among the
whereases that Whereas, the credit accomodations had been fully paid by the Borrower to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and NIDC. (Exh. 1-5). By virtue of this full payment and the
execution of the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage, NIDC returned the owners copy
of the TCT No. 469737 of the petitioner and accordingly the Deed of Release and Cancellation of
Mortgage was registered with the Registry of Deed on January 28, 1981. (Exhibits E to E-5) (sic)
that there were some accounts chargeable to Petitioner KIPI on deferred letters of credit opened
and established in 1974 and 1975 settled by Respondent PNB with the foreign suppliers in 1978
and 1979 but came to the knowledge of Respondent PNB only in 1981 and 1982 (Exhibits 21-1 to
21-L. T.S.N. May 20, 1992 pp. 16-30).

In a letter to Petitioner KIPI dated March 31, 1992, Respondent PNB requested for the return of
the owners copy of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. 22). On July 7, 1982 in a letter addressed to Mr.
Ricardo C. Silverio, then President of Petitioner KIPI, Respondent PNB reiterated for the return
of the aforesaid TCT NO. 469737 (Exh. 22-A) and the said title was returned to Respondent
PNB.

On May 7, 1982, Respondent PNB filed a Petition for Correction of Entry and Adverse Claim
with the office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila and was able to have the same
annotated at the back of TCT No. 469737 (Exh. 9 joint exhibit of Respondent PNB and
Intervenor SLDC).

On November 2, 1983, Respondent PNB filed with the Ex-Officio Sheriff of Makati, Metro
Manila a Petition of Sale Under ACT 1508, as amended by P.D. 385 to extra-judicially foreclose
various properties belonging to Petitioner by virtue of a Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney
dated June 21, 1978 (Exhibits J to J-4).

On November 25, 1983, Petitioner KIPI received an undated Notice of Sheriffs Sale to the effect
that the land covered by TCT No. 469737 would be foreclosed extra-judicially on December 19,
1983 at 9:00 a.m. (Exh. K to K-2).

xxx

Simplifying and summing up all the assigned errors of both appellants Philippine National Bank
and Santiago Land Development Corporation, there are actually three main issues to be resolved
in this appeal, to wit: (1) Whether the Deed of Release dated January 7, 1981 executed by the
National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of appellee Komatsu Industries
(Phil.) Inc. [Exhibit I, p. 76 Record Vol. I; Exhibit 7, p. 1494 Record Vol. IV], had the effect of
releasing the real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank, as embodied in
the Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June 21, 1978 [Exhibit H, p. 64 Record Vol I; Exhibit 6,
p. 1482 Record - Vol. IV]; (2) Whether the foreclosure of appellees property conducted on May
 17, 1984 is valid; (3) Whether there is legal and/or factual basis for the awards of damages in
favor of the appellee.

Anent the first issue, We rule that the Deed of Release dated January 7, 1981 executed solely by
the National Investment and Development Corporation in favor of the appellee Komatsu
Industries (Phil.) Inc., did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of
appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the Amendment of Mortgage Deed dated June
21, 1978. Said Deed of Release is not binding upon the appellant Philippine National Bank which
was not a signatory to it and has not ratified the same.

It is axiomatic under Our law on obligations and contracts that contracts take effect only between
the parties, their assigns and heirs (Art. 1311, New Civil Code). The characteristic of relativity of
contracts renders it binding only upon the parties and their successors. [Civil Code of the
Philippines, Annotated, Paras, Vol. IV 1994 ed., pp. 550-552]. A contract cannot be binding upon
and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to it [Civil Code of the Philippines,
Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995 ed., p. 428 citing Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil. 336, Ibaez vs. Rodriguez,
47 Phil. 554, etc.] even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof
[Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol. IV 1995, p. 428 citing Manila Port Service et
al. vs. Court of Appeals et al. 20 SCRA 1214]. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by the
act, declaration, or omission of another, and proceedings against one cannot affect another, except
as expressly provided by law or the Rules of Court [Civil Code of the Philippines, Tolentino, Vol.
IV 1995 ed., p. 428 / Rule 123 sec. 10 Rules of Court].

We accordingly find no legal basis for the courts ruling that the Deed of Release dated January 7,
1981, had the effect of releasing the mortgage in favor of appellant bank despite the fact that it
was executed solely by the National Investment and Development Corporation without any
conformity or authority whatsoever of its joint mortgagee, the appellant Philippine National
Bank. It is not disputed that PNB is a corporation with a separate and distinct personality from
that of NIDC. The court a quo erred in holding that PNB recognized the release of the mortgage
as shown by its Exhibit 22 wherein Vice President Ramirez stated in his memo to the Litigation
and Collection Division of the PNB that upon discovery of the aforecited release of the mortgage,
we immediately wrote NIDC informing them that KIPI effected the release of PNBs mortgage
using NIDCs Deed of Release. The same memo stated that PNB requested KIPI to return the title
for the reannotation of PNBs mortgage which was erroneously cancelled (p. 1712,
Record). Accordingly, the same exhibit indubitably showed that PNB promptly objected to the
erroneous cancellation of the mortgage in its favor. Moreover, as above pointed out, an agreement
cannot bind one who is not a party even if he had knowledge of the agreement and had acted on
the basis thereof.

Moreover, a reading of the Amendment of Mortgage Deeds executed by Komatsu, PNB and NIDC, will
show that it covered not only the credit accommodations obtained by Komatsu with NIDC as described in
the first whereas clause, but also another obligation arising from the establishment of a deferred letter of
credit for US$1,564,826.00, and other credit accommodations. We quote from the said Amendment:

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Deed of Mortgage in favor
of NIDC referred to in the first Whereas clause hereof shall be as it is hereby amended in the sense that
the mortgage shall be in favor of PNB and NIDC, their successors and assigns on a pari-passu basis to
secure the respective obligations of the Mortgagor to PNB and NIDC as follows:

NIDC : a) Direct loan of P8,000,000.00

: b) Guarantee in the amount of P2,000,000.00 issued in favor of PNB to secure the Credit Line of the
MORTGAGOR with PNB

PNB : US $1,564,826.00 or equivalent in Philippine Currency by way of deferred Letter of Credit issued
by PNB in favor of Toyoda Tsusho Kaisha Ltd., Japan, thru Republic National Bank of New York, N.Y.

plus interest and charges as well as all other obligations, whether direct or indirect, primary or secondary,
as appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB and other reasonable expenses and
charges arising thereunder, whether such obligations have been contracted before, during or after date
hereof. Subject to condition No. 4 hereinbelow, in case the MORTGAGOR execute subsequent
promissory note or notes either as renewal of the former note, an extension thereof, as new loan, or is
given any kind of accommodations such as overdraft, letters of credit, acceptance and bills of exchange,
release of import shipments, on trust receipts etc., this mortgage shall also stand as security for the
payment of said promissory notes or notes and/or accommodations without necessity of executing new
contract and this mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory notes or notes
and/or accommodations were existing on the date hereof. However, if the MORTGAGOR shall pay to the
MORTGAGEES, their successors or assigns the obligations secured by this mortgage, together with
interest, costs and other expenses on or before the date they are due and shall keep and perform all the
covenants and agreements herein contained for the MORTGAGOR then this mortgage shall be null and
void, otherwise, it shall remain in full force and effect. (pp. 65-66, Record).

It is clear that the reference to the credit accommodations consisting of P8,000,000.00 direct loan
and P2,000,000.00 guarantee mentioned in the third whereas clause of the Deed of Release as having
been fully paid by the borrower was to these two obligations obtained from NIDC, and not to the other
obligation described in the Amended Mortgage as pertaining to PNB directly, arising from the issuance
of the deferred letter of credit in the amount of US $1,564,826.00, the express inclusion of which
obligation in the Amended Mortgage cannot be ignored. It is equally clear that NIDC was in no position
to state that Komatsus direct obligation to PNB has been fully paid. And on the basic proposition above-
stated that the deed of release executed by NIDC cannot bind its joint mortgagee, which is an entirely
different entity, We find that the court a quo erroneously invoked the 3rd whereas clause stating that the
credit accommodations had been fully paid by the Borrower to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
NIDC.

We are thus unable to accept the trial courts reasoning that the release executed by NIDC will necessarily
include the mortgage to PNB. The hypothesis that NIDC being a wholly owned subsidiary of its joint
mortgagee could not have executed the Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage without the
knowledge and consent of respondent PNB, its mother company, has no support in law and
jurisprudence.Neither does the evidence of record show that any confirmation or ratification of the release
of mortgage was made by the PNB. Nothing short of an actual payment of the debt or an express release
will operate to discharge a mortgage (55 Am. Jur. 394).

Defendants-appellants also question the trial courts ruling that even granting that PNBs claim is correct
that insofar as it is concerned, the mortgage was not released it being separate entity and the mortgage
being on a pari passu basis, the extrajudicial foreclosure should be to the extent only of its proportionate
credit.

We do not agree that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property is
null and void. A mortgage is indivisible in nature, so that payment of a part of the secured debt does not
extinguish the entire mortgage (See Paras, Civil Code Anno., 1995 ed., Vol. V, p. 1044; Art. 2089, Civil
Code). There is also no language in the mortgage instrument to indicate otherwise, i.e. that the mortgage
of the Pasong Tamo property is divisible, so that in case of the payment of the obligation to one
mortgagee the mortgage would subsist only to the extent of the remaining lien of the other mortgagee.The
mortgage instrument contemplated not only obligations existing on the date thereof, but also future
obligations or accommodations appearing in the respective Books of Account of NIDC and PNB, thus
rendering it unlikely and impractical for the parties to have intended a division of the mortgaged property
in accordance with the proportionate credits of the two joint mortgagors.

The case of Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 46) cited by the court a quo
is not in point. It refers to a mortgage of one parcel of land in favor of one mortgagee, where there was a
failure of consideration, i.e., the entire amount of the loan was not released to the mortgagor and the
mortgage was thus held to be enforceable only to the extent of the amount of the loan that was
released. The factual situation in this case is obviously different. The mortgage here is not being enforced
for more than the actual sum due.

With respect to the courts pronouncement that the Petition for Correction of Entry or Adverse Claim
cannot be made as basis of any foreclosure proceeding, suffice it to point out that the records bear out
defendants-appellants claim that the PNB filed a verified petition for extrajudicial foreclosure under Act
No. 3135 pursuant to the provisions of the Amendment of Mortgage Deed (Records, pp. 1482 to
1493).The Petition for Sale under Act No. 3135, as amended, dated October 8, 1983, was made the basis
for the issuance of the Notice of Sheriffs sale (Exhs. 9 to 9-d, 9-e to 9-bbb, 9-ccc Komatsu; Exhs. 10, 14
to 14-b, 15, 17 PNB,/SLDC). The plaintiff-appellee has not controverted the veracity of these documents
either in the court below or in its Appellees brief. Accordingly, We rule that since the mortgage in favor
of PNB is still subsisting, the sheriffs sale on the basis of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure is valid.

Finally, consistently with Our above ruling relative to the validity of the foreclosure proceedings and the
non-binding effect of the Deed of Release executed by the National Investment and Development
Corporation in so far as the mortgage in favor of the appellant Philippine National Bank is concerned. We
rule that the appellee Komatsu Industries (Phil.) Inc. is not entitled to any award of damages pursuant to
the principle of damnum absque injuria, i.e. there might have been a loss (on the part of the appellee-
mortgagor) arising from the foreclosure but said loss does not create a ground of legal redress. A loss or
damage which does not constitute the violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is damnum
absque injuria [Huyong Hian vs. Court of Appeals, 59 SCRA 134; Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 29 Phil.
548].(Italics supplied)

Consequently, respondent court reversed and set aside the judgment of the trial court in Civil
Case NO. 5957 and declared legal and valid the First Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated November 12,
1983, the Second Notice of Sheriffs Sale dated April 6, 1984, the Extrajudicial Foreclosure
Proceedings held and conducted thereunder, the Certificate of Sale dated May 17, 1984 and the
registration thereof, the Final Deed of Sale, its registration and the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued to respondent Philippine National Bank as the highest and lone bidder, the Deed of Sale
in favor of and the Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the intervenor Santiago Land
Development Corporation.
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its
resolution[13] of January 14, 1997, from which we quote the following pertinent excerpts:

The motion for reconsideration has no merit.

We reiterate our ruling that the Deed of Release executed solely by National Investment and
Development Corporation did not operate to release the real estate mortgage executed in favor of
appellant Philippine National Bank as embodied in the Amendment of Mortgage Deed. This issue was
fully discussed in our decision and We find no substantial argument in the motion for reconsideration, the
petitioner-appellees memorandum or at the hearing, that would warrant a reversal of our previous
findings.

It is evident that the Deed of Release pertains only to the mortgage executed in favor of the National
Investment and Development Corporation whose credit has been fully paid. Insofar as the mortgage
executed in favor of PNB is concerned, the same subsists as the credit in the amount of $1,564,826.00
remained unpaid. Contrary to appellees submission, the Deed of Release executed by the National
Investment and Development Corporation is not an exercise in futility for said document actually released
the indebtedness due to the National Investment and Development Corporation consisting of an
P8,000,000.00 direct loan and P2,000,000.00 guarantee loan.

Petitioner-appellee submits that in the light of Article 2089 of the Civil Code, the Amendment of
Mortgage Deed is null and void, and there was no valid mortgage in favor of PNB. Hence when the Deed
of Release cancelled the only valid mortgage in favor of National Investment Development Corporation,
there was no more mortgage left to be foreclosed by Philippine National Bank.

We do not agree.

At the outset, We note that the legality and validity of the Amendment of Mortgage Deed was never put
in issue before the trial court nor was it raised in the appeal proper. If well recognized jurisprudence
precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be
disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
appellate court [Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 303].

At any rate, We are not inclined to uphold appellees contention that the Amendment of Mortgage Deed
(which is the basis of the mortgage in favor of the PNB) is null and void on the argument that Article
2089 of the Civil Code prohibits a situation where two or more creditors, with separate and distinct
credits secured a mortgage over a single property.

There is nothing in Article 2089 of the Civil Code that prohibits the mortgagor from mortgaging the same
property for a separate and distinct debt in favor of another creditor. In this jurisdiction, the mortgagor is
allowed to obtain subsequent loans by means of subsequent and successive mortgages on the same
property. We further agree with appellant that if an owner-mortgagor can enter into second and further
mortgages, there is no law that prohibits the mortgagor and the mortgagee from agreeing that the
mortgages would be pari-passu. What is proscribed by Article 2089 is for a debtor who has mortgaged his
property to secure a debt, to demand that the mortgage be released in proportion to the amount of the debt
he has paid. Under the said article, the mortgagor has to pay the debt in full before he can ask for the
release of the mortgage. This is compatible with the principle that a mortgage is indivisible.

Our ruling that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the whole Pasong Tamo property is valid
since the mortgage is indivisible in nature is not inconsistent with our statement that the Deed of Released
executed solely by National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to release the real
estate mortgage executed in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank. The fact that the Deed of
Release executed by the National Investment and Development Corporation did not operate to release the
real estate mortgage in favor of appellant Philippine National Bank, does not render the mortgage
divisible. Indeed, foreclosure of the property in its entirety by Philippine National Bank is necessary
because of the indivisible nature of a mortgage. The fact that there are two obligations secured by the
same mortgaged property does not render the mortgage divisible. The indivisibility of the mortgage or
pledge does not affect the divisibility of the principal obligation. When the same thing is pledged or
mortgaged to several creditors, the indivisibility of the pledge or mortgage entitled each and every
creditor to the same action against the thing which is liable in its entirety for the individual share of each
creditor. [Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino, Vol. V, pp. 538-539, 1992 Ed.].

The rest of the arguments of the appellee in its motion for reconsideration are mere rehash of what have
been raised in its brief and were already fully considered and discussed in our decision. (Emphasis ours)

In the same manner, we readily found that, despite the lengthy and repetitious submissions
of petitioner in its pleadings filed with this Court as earlier enumerated, all the arguments therein
are also mere rehashed versions of what it posited before respondent court. We have patiently
given petitioners postulates the corresponding thorough and objective review but, on the real and
proper issues so completely and competently discussed and resolved by respondent court,
petitioners obvious convolutions of the same arguments are evidently unavailing. It must be noted
that its recourse to respondent court was by appeal on writ of error, hence the preceding
quotation in extenso of said courts decision readily shows how the real issues were correctly
particularized and summarized to meet petitioners assignment of errors, and then ably
adjudicated on both evidential and legal grounds.
Petitioner has come to this Court this time on appeal by certiorari and it must be aware of the
elementary rule that, as emphasized in the decisions previously cited, a review thereunder is not
a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons therefor.[14] Here, there is no novel question of substance nor has
respondent court decided the case contrary to law or our applicable decisions. On the contrary, it
acted with commendable fealty to the same, and that is the other reason why we extensively
reproduced the pertinent discussions in its challenged decision.
All these notwithstanding, petitioner still comes up with another supposed issue, this time
faulting respondent court for allegedly not resolving the question of whether or not petitioner is
entitled to redeem its foreclosed property from respondent Philippine National Bank in the event
the foreclosure thereof is held to be valid. We agree with respondents observation that this matter
is not proper at this stage of the case since it was never raised in the complaint or admitted as an
issue at the pre-trial, but was raised only in petitioners memorandum before the trial court.[15] Also,
respondents point out that the period of redemption had long lapsed since the sheriffs certificate
of sale was registered on May 17, 1984 and, citing applicable authorities, the one-year redemption
period is not suspended by an action for nullification of the auction sale.
What is more telling against petitioners new proposition, however, is the documented fact
that as early as April 17, 1985, it executed a Deed of Assignment of Right of Redemption over
the property in question in favor of Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing.[16] In fact, the exercise of such
right of redemption by the assignee is involved in Civil Case No. 105 of the Regional Trial court
of Makati, and the side issue of the right of respondent Santiago Land Development Corporation
to intervene therein was decided by this Court in G.R. NO. 106194. On both substantive and
procedural considerations, therefore, petitioners presentation of that so-called issue in the present
appellate stage is an undue imposition on the time of this Court.
We have stated, at the outset, that petitioners second motion for reconsideration could have
been correctly rejected outright. But, as further noted, petitioner has distressingly adopted the
lamentable technique contrived by losing litigants of resorting to ascriptions of supposed
irregularities in the courts of justice as the cause for their defeat. Here, petitioner speaks of
pressure having been employed by respondents against the trial court. It then proceeds to
insinuate anomalous haste on the part of respondent court in reversing the trial court, pointing to
the supposed short period of time it took the former to come out with its decision. It never even
bothered to mention that the issues are actually very simple, that the evidence is basically
documentary, and that the questions raised are easily answered by applying settled doctrines of
this Court.
On top of that, it now veers towards this Court, spinning the yarn that retired Justice Teodoro
Padilla first approached the ponente to whom its petition had been raffled, and asked for a
disposition in favor of respondents as a birthday and parting gift; that said ponente declined and
unloaded the case such that it was again raffled to a good friend of Justice Padilla. The records,
however, show that this case was directly raffled to the Second Division on January 28, 1997 and
there was no prior ponente to whom it was assigned who then supposedly unloaded it; and under
the internal rules of this Court, when a case is unloaded, there is no need for holding a second
raffle.
Petitioner could have rendered a signal service to the judiciary if it had only verified and
proved the facts it purveyed but which are now belied even just by the internal rules of this Court,
of which petitioner appears to be ignorant hence the valor of his denunciation. The members of
the Second Division of this Court vehemently deny and denounce the animadversion on their
allegedly having been approached by Justice Padilla regarding this case. The Padilla Law Office,
counsel for respondent private corporation, has submitted its response to the imputations against
it, thus calling for petitioner to prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner
to prove its charges. The same burden is also imposed upon petitioner for the aspersions it has
cast upon respondent Court of Appeals. We, therefore, leave it to the aforesaid law firm, Justice
Teodoro Padilla and the Court of Appeals, on the one hand, and to herein petitioner, on the other,
to decide for themselves whether to further pursue this incident in the proper proceedings.
On such contingency, this Court will content itself for the nonce with a stern admonition that
petitioner refrain from conduct tending to create mistrust in our judicial system through innuendos
on which no evidence is offered or indicated to be proffered. Responsible litigants need not be
told that only pleadings formulated with intellectual honesty on facts duly ascertained can
subserve the ends of justice and dignify the cause of the pleader.
WHEREFORE, petitioners second motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and EXPUNGED as an unauthorized pleading. This resolution is immediately final and
executory, and no further pleadings or motions will be entertained.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

ROBERT G. YOUNG, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE PASTOR V. DE GUZMAN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Baguio
City, respondent.

VITUG, J.:

In a verified letter-complaint, dated 26 March 1996, Robert G. Young, President of Banawe

Realty Development Corporation, charged Judge Pastor V. De Guzman, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 60, with unreasonable delay in the disposition of Civil Case
No. 873-R, entitled "La Commercial Company, et al. vs. China Banking Corporation," for
recovery of unpaid rentals owing from store space lessees and accounting of all rentals due and
demandable, as well as the proceeds and receivables from the sales of units, over a
condominium property.

During the pendency of the case, La Commercial Company was substituted by Inter Realty
Development Corporation, while China Banking Corporation was substituted by Banawe Realty
Development Corporation. On 16 July 1990, the condominium building was destroyed by a
relatively strong earthquake, prompting the parties to file a manifestation to the above effect,
along with a joint motion to dismiss the case, with the Court. On 01 December 1994, counsel for
both parties submitted, reiterating the above motion to dismiss, an opposition to a request for
answers by written interrogatories caused to be made by the manager of Prudential Bank of
Baguio City. The motion remained unresolved until the institution months later, of the instant
administrative case. Instead, complainant averred Judge De Guzman had acted "with indecent
haste" on a collateral issue granting Atty. Helenea M. Dauz, former counsel of Banawe Realty
Development Corporation attorney's fees amounting to P250,000.00 issuing forthwith a writ of
execution to enforce the award.

In his comment, 1 dated 14 August 1996, respondent Judge countered that the case, far from
being "a simple case" for the recovery/accounting of unpaid entals, was really one for a
"Declaration/Recognition of Ownership, Possession and Annulment of Mortgage." Respondent
Judge disputed complainant's allegation that Inter Realty Development Corporation and
Banawe Realty Development Corporation substituted La Commercial Company and China
Banking Corporation, respectively, as party plaintiff and as party defendant, the of the matter
being that Inter Realty was dropped as party defendant in an order, dated 20 December 1990,
while Banawe Realty, in its case was merely an intervenor. Respondent Judge maintained that
although the property in dispute was destroyed in 1990 by an earthquake, the issues did not
become moot and academic, because, firstly, "the issue of ownership (was) corollary to the
issue of who should be entitled to the accumulated rentals," and
secondly, "the issue of ownership over a portion of the condominium project (would) necessarily
affect the issue of ownership over an undivided portion of the land upon which the same was
built." Respondent Judge blamed the parties for the delay in the disposition of the dispute by
their several motions and pleadings. The judge called attention to the fact that the case was
filed seven years prior to the creation of Branch 60. He explained that the, pending motion of
China Banking Corporation for the return of the rentals, amounting to P2,479,302.20 withdrawn
without authority by Atty. Teofisto Rondez for Banawe Realty, took precedence over the joint
motion to dismiss. It was unfortunate, he said, that the issue on the withdrawn rentals, submitted
for resolution on 04 August 1995, remained unresolved because he had to take a prolonged
leave of absence due to sickness until, in fact, he finally had to file, on 16 February 1996, an
application for retirement an total disability which the Court approved on 18 June 1996.
Respondent Judge denied that he had hastily decided the motion for payment of attorney's fees
to Atty. Helenea Dauz, which he said indeed took him three months to resolve in favor of Atty.
Dauz and only because no opposition was filed by Banawe Realty the petition to reverse the
said order he stressed was even dismissed by the Court of Appeals on 26 June 1996.

The Office of the Court Administrator, to which the case was referred for evaluation, report and
recommendation, opined that respondent Judge had failed to abide by paragraph 1.2 of
Administrative Circular No. 4, dated 22 September 1998, to the effect that
 1.2 Cases already being tried at the time of the issuance of this Circular, shall be
immediately set for conference in accordance with the procedure set forth in
Section 6, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court with end in view of eventually setting
them for completion of the trial phase within three (3) months. The older cases
shall be given priority in the trial calendar.

The OCA recommended that respondent Judge be ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00.

In the Court's resolution of 17 March 1997, the parties were required to manifest whether they
would be willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings theretofore on
file. Respondent Judge submitted his manifestation, dated 02 May 1997, expressing his
agreement thereto. Complainant failed to submit his manifestation, constraining the Court to
dispense with it and to deem the case submitted for decision.

It is truly the duty of every judge to resolve cases filed before him with good dispatch; 2 no less
than the Rules of Court commands that justice must be administered without unnecessary
delay. 3 Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct generally admonishes a judge to dispose of the
business of his court promptly. 4 Nevertheless, the judge must not sacrifice for expediency's
sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor to forget that he must conscientiously
endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the
controversy objectively and impartially, all to the end that justice is done to every party.

Respondent Judge, in this instance, evidently felt that the issues raised could only be resolved
properly if and after all the parties concerned would have been fully heard. He made it clear in
his order of 20 December 1990 that the issue presented, i.e. the entitlement to the rental
deposits demanded, would require the question of ownership to be first resolved. The matter
was judicial in nature. This administrative case would not be the right forum for it. There was
utterly no showing that respondent Judge had been motivated by, or had acted in, bad faith or
malice. With regard to the claim that respondent resolved the motion for payment of attorney's
fee to Atty. Helenea Dauz with undue haste, the order of 11 April 1995 would show that the
motion was granted only when Banawe Realty had failed to file any comment thereon, let alone
an opposition thereto, despite opportunity given by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the administrative case filed against Judge Pastor V. De Guzman is hereby
DISMISSED.

Let the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) withheld from his retirement benefits in the
Court's resolution of 19 November 1996 be released to him immediately.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-98-1419. October 13, 1998]

ATTY. RAUL A. SANCHEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes. Hence, judges are mandated to decide cases seasonably. Judges who cannot comply with such
mandate should ask for additional time, explaining in their request the reasons for the delay.

The Case

In a complaint dated July 3, 1996, Atty Raul A. Sanchez charged Presiding Judge Augustine A. Vestil
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, with (1) grave misconduct, (2) graft, (3) gross
ignorance of the law and (40 falsification of his certificate of service in relation to Special Proceedings No.
MAN 185 entitled Intestate Estate Proceedings of the Deceased Jose D. Sanchez, allegedly committed as
follows:
1. GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN PERFORMANCE
OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES AND
VIOLATION OF JUDICIAL ETHICS.

"The respondent committed grave misconduct in the performance of his duties by showing partiality in
granting Roquita A. Sanchez the authority to mortgage the property with an area of 8,742 Square Meters,
despite the fact that in the compromise agreement entered into by the parties, it was specifically agreed to
sell the said property within the earliest possible time and proceeds thereof will be equally divided by the
parties less expenses and agent[]s commission.

He violated Judicial Ethical Standard, by allowing his private car to be used by Roquita A. Sanchez a
litigant in the case, in the transaction of sale of property.

2. GRAFT CHARGES.

By receiving monetary considerations and accepting foods offered to him by Roquita A. Sanchez.

3. GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW,

RENDERING UNJUST
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
D[E]PRIVING PARTY A DAY IN
COURT.

The respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of law by authorizing Roquita A. Sanchez, in behalf of her
minor children, to mortgage property in the intestate/testate proceedings of Jose D. Sanchez when the
same should be heard in Guardianship proceedings.

The respondent is guilty of rendering unjust interlocutory order in granting Roquita A. Sanchez the
authority to mortgage the property when the same should have been sold and depriving Teogenes P.
Sanchez a day in court by failing to give notice of the notice of the motion and copy of order granting the
same.

IV. FALSIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE OF

SERVICE.

The respondent had falsified his monthly certificate of service submitted to this Honorable Court by
stating that he has no pending case submitted for decision or resolution that has gone beyond the
NINETY (90) day period allowed by law. The truth of the matter being that there are several if not
numerous not only civil but also criminal cases which the respondent ha[s] failed to resolve within the
NINETY (90) days period. In fact some of them have been submitted for resolution more than a year ago
yet until [the] present the presiding judge has not acted upon it.

An example is the case of Ariston Perez vs. Marcelino Perez, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
796. The last pleading filed was on April 27, 1995 which is an opposition to plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration. Until at present the same has not been acted upon. Photocopy of the pleading hereto
attached and made an integral part of this complaint as Annex O.

Aside from the above-mentioned case, so far as known to this representation, the following are criminal
cases submitted to the court for decision which has gone beyond the NINETY (90) day reglementary
period:

P.P. vs. Gerry Ando Crim Case No. DU-2259

P.P. vs. Maximo Mora Crim. Case No. DU-3754
P.P. vs. Rudy Atis Crim. Case No. DU-3085
P.P. vs. Arturo Macasero Crim. Case No. DU3096
P.P. vs. Allan Ariza Crim. Case No. D[U]-1907
P.P. vs. Jorgie Blanco, et al. Crim. Case No. DU-876 & 877
P.P. vs. Simeon Cagang Crim. Case No. DU-3629
P.P. vs. Jose Bontuyan Crim. Case No. 2322 & 2333
P.P. vs. Primo Salundaga Crim. Case No. DU-1056[1]
On October 28, 1996, respondent filed his Comment, praying that the Complaint be dismissed and
specifically denying the allegations therein, viz:

I. Alleged Grave Misconduct.

Complainants claim that respondent allegedly committed grave misconduct by showing partiality in
granting Roquita Sanchez authority to mortgage the property with an area of 8,742 square meters,
(located in Li-ong, Mandaue City).

This charge is a malicious lie, a distortion of facts and is without basis in fact because:

a. What was authorized to be mortgaged was ANOTHER lot, only One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty
Nine (1,439) square meters located in Paknaan (NOT Liong) Mandaue City.

xxxx
There is no evidence whatsoever that respondent allowed Roquita Sanchez to use his (Resposdents)
private car. In fact, in his Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, Complainant stated that he was allegedly
merely told or was informed.

II. Alleged Graft Charges

There is absolutely no proof whatsoever that respondent received monetary consideration nor accepted
foods offered by Roquita Sanchez.

In fact, in his Supplemental Motion to Inhibit, Complainant himself stated (under oath) that he was
merely informed (HEAR-SAY) about the alleged offering of food.

With respect to the baseless and cruel charge of monetary consideration, this has been explained and
unmasked as maliciously false (please refer to our Annex 1).

III. Alleged Gross Ignorance of Law, etc.

This is a repetition of charges herein before already discussed. (Please see page 5 of this comment and the
order of denying the motion to inhibit hereto attached as annex 2).

IV. Falsification of Certificate of Service.

This again is a distortion of facts. The truth is, and as hereinbefore already stated, almost seven hundred
(700) cases most of which had been substantially heard by other judges were unloaded to Branch 56 from
Branch[es] 55 and 28. Some of these cases were filed YEARS before respondent assumed office. As a
consequence, some transcripts of records were no longer available. Worse, some stenographers could no
longer be found. Which is precisely why in the Certificate of Service, there is always that portion which
states except voluminous inherited cases which were substantially heard by another judge and require
further study by the respondent or where stenographic notes have not been transcribed.

Clearly, therefore, the Certificate of Service does NOT contain any falsified statement. The cases
enumerated in the Complaint were filed BEFORE respondents assumption to duty. Despite this however,
one, DU-3629 entitled People versus Simeon Cagang, has already been resolved while the rest are under
study.

In this connection, respondent would like to respectfully inform this Honorable Supreme Court that he
has been exerting utmost efforts reducing his case load which at one time reaches more than one thousand
one hundred (1,100) cases including the almost seven hundred (700) unloaded to him in 1993. Almost
EVERY SATURDAY and during some holidays, respondent with two or three of this staff have been
reporting for work at no additional compensation.

But with schedules or trial reaching sometimes as many as eighteen (18) cases a day and averaging
around eight (8), it simply is beyond human capability and endurance to cope with cases substantially
heard by other judges, oftentimes WITHOUT transcripts of testimonial evidence.

Nonetheless, Branch 56 is doing its best, which probably explains why from a high of more than one
hundred thousand one hundred cases we now have barely seven hundred.[2]
 In a Resolution dated July 30, 1997, this Court referred the Complaint to Justice Consuelo Y. Santiago
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation. The Court also directed the Office
of the Court Administrator to send a team to conduct a judicial audit of cases pending before the sale of
respondent.
After the judicial audit was conducted, the Court, in its Resolution dated December 3, 1997,[3] adopted
the following recommendations of the OCA and directed respondent (1) to concentrate meanwhile in
deciding with dispatch those cases which have remained unresolved beyond the constitutionality prescribed
ninety days and (2) to explain within ten days from notice the reason for the delay in the resolution of said
cases. The Court further directed the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the OCA to withhold the
salary of respondent until he has decided the said cases and has submitted copies of the decision to the
Office of the Court Administrator.

Report and Recommendations

In her Report dated July 27, 1998,[4] Justice Santiago stated:

In the crux of the controversy is the Order of respondent Judge dated December 5, 1995 in Sp. Proc. No.
185-MAN, the full text of which reads as follows:

Order

Forming part of the records of this case is an Ex Parte Motion for Authority to Mortgage Property filed
by Roquita Sanchez

Considering the reasons set forth in the Motion and finding the same to be impressed with merit, the same
is granted.

Accordingly, herein movant is hereby granted the authority for and in behalf of her minor children to
mortgage/encumber the lot situated at Paknaan, Mandaue City under administration.

Notify counsel and parties.

SO ORDERED.

Given this 5th day of December 1995 at Mandaue City, Philippines. (id., p. 29; Exh. H).

The aforeqouted Order failed to indicate which property in Paknaan, Mandaue City, Roquita was
authorized to mortgage. A circumspect scrutiny of the provisions of the Compromise Agreement entered
into by Roquita and Teogenes on March 2, 1995 speaks of two (2) parcels of land situated in the same
locality; a lot with an area of 1,439 square meters and another with a bigger area of 8,742 square
meters. Both lots appear to have been denominated in Roquitas favor, except that the bigger parcel was to
be disposed of immediately, with the proceeds thereof divided equally between Roquita and
Teogenes. The complainant, moreover, charged that he had not been furnished with a copy of the
December 5, 1995 Order which granted Roquita authority to mortgage the property (id., p. 10; Exh.
P). Respondent Judge failed to controvert this charge.
It needs [to] be stressed in this regard that the judge hearing or taking cognizance of an ex parte motion is
duty bound to make known to all parties whatever action has been taken thereon. It is not enough that a
judge issues orders or pens his decision[;] it is also important to promulgate and make them known to all
concerned at the earliest possible time and within the mandated period (Nidua v. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 58
[1989], citing Mangulabnan v. Judge Tecson, 101 SCRA 810 [1980]; Centrum Agri-Business Realty
Corp. v. Katalbas-Moscardon, 247 SCRA 145 [1995])

Furthermore, after the motion for inhibition and the supplemental thereof were filed where it was alleged,
among others, that complainant and Teogenes were not duty notified of what action he took on
Roquitas ex parte motion, it was respondent Judge duty to ascertain whether or not a copy of the Order
dated December 5, 1995 was indeed sent to complainant or Teogenes, the latter being the duly appointed
administrator of the estate who, therefore, had every right to be notified of the said order.

Judges should verify if notices of court hearings have been sent and received by the parties (Fernandez v.
Imbing, 260 SCRA 536 [1996]). A judge is liable for culpable negligence if he did not ascertain the facts
before reaching conclusions and issuing orders. It is, in fact, routinary in every hearing that the judge
confirms in open court whether notices were duly served on all parties (Tabao v. Butalid, 262 SCRA 559
[1996).

Along the same vein, judges have been tasked with drawing up their decision and resolutions with due
care and to make certain that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions and final dispositions
(Saballa v. NLRC, 260 SCRA 697 [1996]). As a judge, who is called upon to administer the law and
apply it to the facts, respondent should be studious of the principles of law and diligent in endeavoring to
ascertain the facts (Del Callar v. Salvador, 268 SCRA 320 [1997], citing Canon 4, Canons of Judicial
Ethics and Rule 3.02, Code of Judicial Conduct) before granting motions[,] much more so ex parte ones
as in this case.

Certainly a judge sitting in a case is not a mere hearing officer and must look beyond the allegations of
the parties (Marciano v. Sebastian, 231 SCRA 558 [1994]). Indeed, a person presiding over a court of law
must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render justice at all times without
resorting to shortcuts which are unwarranted or uncalled for (Ortiz v. Palaypon, 234 SCRA
391[1994]). Thus, Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics states in no uncertain terms that:

In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by
partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.

The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that:

Canon I

Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

Canon II

Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Rule 2.01: A Judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Rule 2.03: A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationship to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. [T]he prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interest of
others nor convey or permit others to convey the impressions that they are in a special positions to
influence the judge.

xxxxxxxxx

All told, the acts of respondent judge leave much to be desired and do not measure up to the exacting
standards demanded by his office viewed in the peculiar factual context of this case much more so vis-a-
viz the strong-handed manner in which he dealt with the move for this inhibition in his Order of May 23,
1996 wherein he denied the motion with the warning to Raul Sanchez, as an officer of the Court, that the
Court will not hesitate to use its contempt powers to uphold and defend its dignity' (rollo, p. 41) instead of
exercising that becoming degree of humble self-examination expected of a member of the bench whose
impartiality and integrity ha[ve] been placed under serious inquiry, for a judge is bound never to consider
lightly a motion for his inhibition that questions or puts to doubt, however, insignificant, his supposed
predilection [in] a case (Albos v. Alaba, 231 SCRA 68 ]1994]). And while a magistrate is given a wide
latitude of discretion in the resolution of cases pending before him. He is not a depository of arbitrary
power but a judge under the sanction of law who must never for a moment act like a petty tyrant or
provide any opportunity to be perceived as such through the abuse or misuse of the compulsory processes
of the law (Caamic v. Galapon. Jr., 237 SRCA 390 [1994]; Mangalindan v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA
105 [1995])

"Anent the charge that respondent judge falsified his certificate of service attesting that he has no pending
cases submitted for decision or resolution beyond the 90-day period set down by law, it bears stressing
that a judge should always be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and should
administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.01 and 1.02, Code of Judicial Ethics; Cantela v.
Almoradie, 229 SCRA 712 [1994]). x x x

xxx xxx xxx

"xxx A judge who fails to decide cases within the reglementary period and continues to collect his salaries
upon his certification that he has no pending matters to resolve, transgresses the constitutional right of the
people to the speedy disposition of their cases (Re: Report on the judicial Audit and Physical Inventory of
the Record of Cases in the RTC, Br. 43, Roxas, Mindoro Oriental, supra) and if he falsifies his certificate
of service, he is not only administratively liable for serious misconduct under the Rules of Court but is
also criminally liable under the Revised Penal Code (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
RTC, Branches 61, 134 and 147, Makati, Metro Manila, supra).

"The 'Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56, Mandaue City' dated November 12, 1997 submitted by the Judicial Audit Team of the OCA
pursuant to the resolution of the Supreme Court dated December 3, 1997 (Rollo, pp. 220-222) discloses,
among others, that RTC, Branch 56, Mandaue City presided by respondent judge has a case load of more
than [e]ight [h]undred (800) cases (Report, p. 19 with the status of the cases thereat broken down as
follows:

'Case Status/Stage of Criminal Cases Civil

Cases Proceedings
Submitted for Decision
within & beyond ninety
 (90) days 59 70
On Pre-Trial/Trial/Pending 206 236
Without Court Order for
Compliance 8 26
With Warrants/Summons 40 18
Unacted upon for a
considerable length of time 24 130
Decided/Promulgated
during the Month of Audit 6 3
Archived/Dismissed/
Withdrawn and/or
Consolidated with another
Branch (Report p. 1)' 15 14
"The said Report made an even more thorough and detailed inventory of the said Branch's case
load including therein the case's dated of submission, to wit:
'1.) Cases Submitted For Decision Beyond 90-Day Period:
a.] Criminal Cases 54
b.] Civil Case 34
c.] Land Registration Cases 26

2.) Cases Submitted For Decision Within 90-day Period

a.] Criminal Cases 5

b.] Civil Cases 5

c.] Land Registration Cases 5

3.) Cases Unacted Upon

a.] Criminal Cases 24

b.] Civil Cases 130

(Report, pp. 2-19)'

which belie[s] any claim, much less any certification that respondent judge does not have cases
submitted for decision that has gone beyond the ninety (90) day reglementary period. Furthermore, a
circumspect scrutiny of the records of this administrative matter do[es] not show that respondent
judge made any attempt to request for a reasonable extension of time to dispose of, if not at least cut
down on his backlog of cases. Instead, he preferred to keep the actual status of his case load
shrouded in silence and belatedly made such a request in his Manifestation and Motion of February
6, 1998 (Rollo, p. 212) upon receipt of the Supreme Court Resolution dated December 3, 1997 (id.,
pp. 213-214) lamely explaining in said manifestation:
 'That because most if not all of the cases adverted to were however TURNED OVER
or INHERITED cases from Branch[es] 28 and 55 of this Court most of which were
already in the terminal stage with only one or two last witnesses testifying before the
undersigned, stenographic transcript transcripts of the testimonies of previous
witnesses were not available; xxx'

"Suffice it to state that such an excuse is hardly a defense against the act of submitting a false certificate
of service indicating that the person submitting the same had no cases pending beyond the reglementary
ninety (90) day period (Abad v. Belen, 240 SCRA 733 [1995]). Thus, it was held in the recent case
of Office of the Court Administrator v. Panganiban (A.M. No. RTJ-96-1350, 18 August 1997, 277 SCRA
499) that

'[T}he act of a judge in stating in her certificates of service that she had no case
submitted for decision within the 90 days preceding the submission of her certificate
in the honest belief that the salary which she collected 'had been justly earned
notwithstanding the fact that there are substantial cases remaining for
decision' constitutes serious misconduct.'

and neither good faith nor a long unblemished and above-average service in the judiciary can fully justify
the erring judge's lapses (Office of the Court Administrator v. Panganiban, supra).

"It also needs be pointed out in this regard that with or without the transcribed stenographic notes, the
ninety (90) day period for deciding cases should be adhered to (Re: Report on the Judicial Audit and
Inventory of the Record of Cases in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Roxas, Mindoro Oriental,
supra). The delay in the transcription of the stenographic notes by a stenographer reporter under the
judge's supervision and control cannot be considered a valid reason for the delay in rendering judgment in
a case. Precisely judges are directed to take down notes of salient portions of the hearings and proceed
with the preparation of decisions without waiting for the transcribed stenographic notes (Re: Judge
Danilo M. Tenerife, supra).

"While complainant did not adduce the questioned certificates of service which would support his charge
that respondent judge indeed falsified the said documents, there is ample proof on record which would
support the indictment. Be that as it may, even on the assumption that respondent judge did not falsify his
certificate of service as alleged, this fact alone will not absolve him from liability because the factual
landscape of this case is replete with evidence, in the very least, of gross inefficiency and neglect of
duty. It must be borne in mind [in] this regard that a case has to be decided within ninety (90) days from
its submission otherwise the judge would be guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty (Ubarra v.
Mapalad, 220 SCRA 224 [1993]. As stated earlier, the Supreme [C]ourt has consistently held that the
failure of a judge to decide a case within the required period is not exc[u]sable and constitutes gross
inefficiency and the non-observance of said rule is a ground for administrative sanction against the
defaulting judge (Lambino v. De Vera, A.M. No. MTJ-94-1017, 7 July 1997, 275 SCRA 60, citing In Re
Judge Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]; Longboan v. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 [1990]; Sabado v. Cajigal,
supra and Alfonso-Cortes v. Maglalang, supra).

"In previous cases, the Supreme [C]ourt considered the failure of a judge to decide even a single case
within ninety (90) days gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of fines ranging from P5,000.00
(Castillo v. Cortes, 234 SCRA 398 [1994]; In Re Letter of Mr. Octavio Kalalo, supra); P10,000.,(Adriano
v. Sto. Domingo, 202 SCRA 446 [1991]; fine equal [to] one (1) month salary and reprimand (In Re: Judge
Madara, supra); P20,000.00 for respondent judge's failure to decide three (3) criminal cases although the
Supreme Court found four (4) mitigating circumstances (Baguio v. Torres, 211 SCRA 1 [1992]).
"In the case at bar, the magnitude of respondent judge's backlog redefines the meaning of gross
inefficiency and neglect of duty and elevates the degree of his culpability to a much higher level than the
aforecited cases."

Capping the foregoing, the investigating justice recommended that respondent be sanctioned thus:

"IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned recommends that respondent judge be fined in
an amount equivalent to his salary for [o]ne (1) [y]ear with the stern warning that a repetition of similar
acts of impropriety in the future will be dealt with more severely."[5]

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with Justice Santiago's conclusions and recommendation that respondent judge be
sanctioned.
We reiterate that a "judge, as the person presiding over the court, is the visible representation of the
law and justice,"[6] and that "[a] judge's official conduct should be free and untainted by the appearance of
impropriety, and his or her personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in performance of judicial duties,
but also in his or her everyday life, should be beyond reproach."[7] Evidently, the acts of herein respondent
judge have not been consistent with the conduct expected of his stature and profession.

Gross Dereliction of Duty

Respondent judge is being charge with dereliction of duty for failing to resolve numerous civil and
criminal cases within the period prescribed by law. He is also being called to account for falsely stating in
his certificate of service that there were no cases submitted for decision or resolution beyond the
reglementary period pending before his sala.
The Report on Audit and Physical Inventory of the Records of Cases in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 56, Mandaue City, submitted by the judicial audit team of the OCA, disclosed a thorough and
detailed inventory of respondent's case load, as follows:

"1.) Cases Submitted For Decision Beyond 90-Day Period:

a.] Criminal Cases 54

b.] Civil Cases 34

c.] Land Registration Cases 26

[Total 114]

2.) Cases Submitted For Decision Within 90-Day Period:

a.] Criminal Cases 5

b.] Civil Cases 5

 c.] Land Registration Cases 5

3.) Cases Unacted Upon

a.] Criminal Cases 24

b.] Civil Cases 130"

Clearly, the foregoing shows that there are 114 cases before the sala of respondent judge which have
not been resolved within the reglementary period.
In his defense, respondent judge states that almost seven hundred cases, most of which had been
substantially heard by other judges, were unloaded to his branch. Consequently, some transcript, as well as
the stenographers who had transcribed them. Were no longer around. He adds that his certificate of service
contained the following disclaimer: "except voluminous inherited cases which were substantially heard by
another judge and require further study by the respondent or where stenographic notes have not been
transcribed." For the same reason, he maintains that his certificate of service does not contain any falsified
statement.
Furthermore, he informs the Court that despite the heavy workload, he has significantly reduced the
number of cases in his sala to 700, which at one time was more than one thousand one hundred, by working
almost every Saturday and on Holidays without additional compensation.
The arguments of respondents judge are not persuasive. While he claims that he did not falsify his
certificate of service, the fact remains that he failed to decide 114 cases within the reglementary period and
to report such fact faithfully. The rule is that the ninety-day period for deciding cases should be observed
by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time.[8] Failure of a judge to resolve a case within
the prescribed period constitutes gross dereliction of duty. For this, respondent judge must be sanctioned.
We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from disposing their
cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time. While the certificate of service of
respondent judge contained a statement that there were cases before his sala that were still undecided
beyond the reglementary period, he made no attempt to request an extension of time.
"This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously,
for it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines
the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so. Constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction on them."[9]
Furthermore, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Delia Panganiban,[10] we held:

"Neither good faith nor long, unblemished and above average service in the judiciary can fully justify
respondent judge's lapses. The Court cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition of cases which is
one of the causes of the loss of faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary and brings it into
disrepute."

Grave Misconduct

Complainant alleges that respondent judge committed grave misconduct when he issued the order
allowing Roquita Sanchez to mortgage "the lot situated in Paknaan." The records show that the ex parte
"motion for authority to mortgage property" filed by Roquita Sanchez referred to either one of the
properties in Paknaan that had been adjudicated to her in the project of partition. The judge, however, failed
to specify which of these properties was covered by his Order. It should be noted that, in the project of
partition, both properties had been designated to be in Paknaan.
It is true that the property subsequently mortgaged turned out to be situated in Liong-an, as evidenced
by a certification issued by the Office of the City Assessor. But this does not change the fact that, based on
the project of partition, the authority to mortgage included both properties. Thus, it is futile for respondent
to asseverate that his Order pertained to the smaller property, which is not the subject of the compromise,
since it is obvious that his Order was inaccurate and ambiguous. Having approved the compromise
agreement himself, he should have been more careful in couching his subject Order such that it would have
been ascertainable which property he was referring to, considering that a mistake could prejudice the
interest of the other parties. It is irrelevant that no prejudice actually resulted from the mortgage, the
property having been eventually redeemed; what is significant is the misconduct attributable to the judge,
which led to the filing of the instant administrative case.
In the performance of his duties, respondent judge obviously failed to observe due care, diligence,
prudence and circumspection, which the law requires in the rendition of any public service.[11] "We reiterate
the rule that although a judge may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order
or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law,
there will be not only confusion in the administration of justice but even also oppressive disregard of the
basic requirements of due process."[12] This misuse of powers, coupled with the allegations that respondent
had accepted favors from one of the parties (Roquita Sanchez), who benefited from his ambiguous order,
led to the additional charge of graft against him.
In issuing the questioning Order, respondent judge also failed to furnish the other party, Teogenes
Sanchez, a copy thereof. "It is not enough that judges write their decisions; it is also important to promulgate
and make it known to all concerned. Otherwise, what good would a favorable decision be if the interested
parties were kept in the dark about it? It would only be a tool for maneuvers on the part of the losing party
or valuable commodity for sale by unscrupulous persons."[13]

The Penalty

In the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC-Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City,[14] the Court
observed the factors considered in the determination of the proper penalty for gross dereliction of duty:

"We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within ninety (90) days as gross
inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The fines imposed
vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary period
and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances -- the damage suffered
by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc. Thus, in one case,[15] we set the
fine at ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) for failure of a judge to decide 82 cases within the reglementary
period, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance that it was the judge's first offense. In
another case,[16] the fine imposed was sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00), for the judge had not decided
about 25 or 27 cases. Still in other cases, the fines were variably set at fifteen thousand pesos
(P15,000.00), for nineteen (19) cases left undecided, taking into consideration that it was the judge's first
offense;[17] twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), for three (3) undecided criminal cases;[18] eight thousand
pesos (P8,000.00), for not deciding a criminal case for three (3) years;[19] forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00), for not deciding 278 cases within the prescribed period, taking note of the judge's failing
health and age;[20] and ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), for belatedly rendering a judgment of acquittal in
a murder case, after one and one-half years from the date the case was submitted for decision.[21] In
another case,[22] suspension without pay for a period of six (6) months was imposed since, besides the
judge's failure to timely decide an election protest for eight (8) months, the judge submitted false
certificates of service and was found guilty of habitual absenteeism."

In the present case, respondent judge is guilty not only of gross dereliction of duty for his failure to
resolve 114 cases within the reglementary period and to report such fact faithfully. He is also culpable for
grave misconduct for issuing the aforesaid Order. Worse, the present case is not his first offense; in PDCP
Development Bank v. Vestil,[23] he was fined P5,000 for interfering with proceedings of another court of
coequal jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Augustine Vestil is SUSPENDED from office for one year
without pay and FINED P50,000 for gross dereliction of duty and grave misconduct. This Decision is
immediately executory, and respondent is hereby ORDERED to vacate his office and henceforth cease and
desist from performing any function or act in connection with such office, upon receipt hereof.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to evaluate the above-mentioned 114 cases
which have remained undecided beyond the reglementary period, and to submit to this Court, within thirty
days from notice, appropriate recommendations on the expeditious disposition thereof.
SO ORDERED.

SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1189. May 12, 1999]

FE T. BERNARDO, complainant, vs. JUDGE AMELIA A. FABROS, Metropolitan Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 9, respondent.

D E C I S IO N
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The failure of a judge to decide a case within the reglementary period constitutes gross dereliction of
duty. The gravity of this offense depends on several factors, including the number of cases not decided on
time, the damage suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, and the presence of other aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.

The Case
 The Court stresses this principle in resolving the February 29, 1996 sworn Complaint[1] of Fe T.
Bernardo, in which Judge Amelia A. Fabros (Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9) was charged
with failure to decide Civil Case No. 150796, an ejectment case, within the reglementary period of thirty
days.

The Facts

In her sworn Complaint, Bernardo alleges the following:

1. I am the attorney-in-fact of the Spouses Marcial Yandoc and Emerciana Yandoc who filed an ejectment
case against Flordeliza M. Morales last March 1, 1996[;] a copy of the said ejectment complaint is hereto
attached and marked as Annex A hereof;

2. Said case which is docketed as Civil Case No. 150796-CV was raffled to the sala of Judge Amelia A.
Fabros of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9;

3. On March 28, 1996, the herein defendant Flordeliza M. Morales filed or tendered her answer to the said
ejectment case[;] a copy of the said answer is hereto attached and marked as Annex B hereof;

4. The said presiding judge set the preliminary conference of the instant case last May 22, 1996 at 8:30
a.m. where the parties to the said ejectment case were required to submit their position paper and the
affidavits of their witnesses therein;

5. As attorney-in-fact of the plaintiffs therein, I filed my affidavit and the position paper for the plaintiffs
therein last May 28, 1996[;] a copy of my compliance containing the said affidavit and position paper is
hereto attached and marked as Annex C hereof;

6. On the other hand, I and even our counsel have not received a copy of the defendants position paper or
even her affidavit in the said ejectment case;

7. Unfortunately, despite the fact that I have long submitted my said affidavit and position paper in behalf
of the plaintiffs in the said ejectment case, it took almost seven (7) months for the said judge to decide a
simple ejectment case which under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure should be resolved within a
period of thirty (30) days from the time the said case is deemed submitted for decision;

8. Definitely, the said judge had flagrantly and blatantly violated the provision of the said rules in the
instant case and I am even surprised how said judge could have possibly received her regular salary
despite the pendency of the said case for more than thirty (30) days;

9. I am hereby executing this affidavit in order to attest to the truth of all matters herein contained and for
the purpose of filing an administrative complaint against Judge Amelia A. Fabros for being clearly
inefficient and for deliberately neglecting her duty in resolving promptly the said ejectment case within
the period allowed under the said Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.[2]

In her Comment filed on June 26, 1997,[3] Judge Fabros admited that she failed to decide the said case
within the prescribed period due to oversight. She offered no excuse for the omission, but assailed the legal
standing of complainant. In her own words:
This is my comment which you required for me to submit within ten (10) days from receipt of your 1st
Indorsement dated May 20, 1997 which I received on June 18, 1997. The instant case complained of
which is Civil Case No. 150796-CV was decided by the undersigned in favor of the defendant and against
the plaintiff on December 23, 1996. The dispositive portion of [the Decision] is as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Court renders judgement for the defendant and against the plaintiffs
[d]ismissing the Complaint therefor for lack of merit. The Court likewise orders the plaintiffs to pay the
defendant the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of the suit.

The reason for the dismissal is based on the fact that the defendant in the ejectment case filed a criminal
case against the son of the plaintiff[;] and from the evidence adduced by both the parties, I arrived at the
conclusion that there was absolutely no basis for the complaint of unlawful detainer and that the filing of
the complaint of unlawful detainer was motivated solely to harass the herein defendant. This is evident
since the complaint was filed only by an attorney-in-fact, an agent of the principal who is the plaintiff
herein. This may be a collateral matter but I believe it is relevant when viewed for the purpose of showing
the character of the complainant (she is not even the complainant for again it [was] the attorney-in-fact
who filed the case[;] however, this will be taken up later) who herself [i]s a crusader, as it were, [in] the
continuing campaign to remove corrupt and inefficient judges. From this letter-complaint, there is a
dubious insinuation that even at this time I have not decided the case. For the record, I decided the case
last December 23, 1996. It was appealed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
36. The appeal of the plaintiff was decided against her. My decision was affirmed by the said Court, a
copy of which is hereto attached.

While it is true that the attorney-in-fact Fe Bernardo was the one who filed the instant complaint against
me, in this particular administrative proceeding, it is respectfully and humbly submitted that her authority
as an attorney-in-fact does not give her authority to file an administrative complaint against me. In
administrative actions where there is a complainant and a respondent, certainly it is a condition sine qua
non that the one who complains or who appears to be the offended party must personally file the
same. Otherwise, how can the respondent, if charged unjustifiably or without any valid grounds at all,
recover damages to vindicate a wrong done or committed against him. It is in this context and my
submission, most respectfully, that a complainant or offended party must file a complaint in his or her
personal capacity and not made through delegation to an attorney-in-fact who may never be held
criminally or civilly answerable in case of any wrong doing or a groundless complaint. This would be
akin to an anonymous complaint not worth the paper on which it is written. I believe that the respondents
right to confront his accuser personally is basic. The accuser must not hide behind the protective shield of
a power of attorney. To sustain an accusers right to be able to do this thru a third person would be
overextending the purpose of a special power of attorney. If only for all the foregoing, the complaint
proffered against me should not be given due course.

But there is that other matter now which has come to fore and which is the documented fact that the
decision was rendered beyond the thirty day period. While the case was submitted for decision on June
11, 1996 it was only on December 23, 1996 that it was decided. The explanation is simply that in the
course of [my] working as the Presiding Judge of Branch 9 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila
there was an oversight. There was a failure to record the due date when it should be decided. I offer no
excuses. I can not even say that because of the volume of work now facing Metropolitan Trial Court
Judges it is virtually impossible to monitor each and every case. My court receives an average monthly
input of raffled cases at the rate of 157 a month. I have 994 pending cases as of April 1997. Despite this I
am able xxx to the best of my ability xxx resolve an average of 42 cases a month.
 Recommendation of the Court Administrator

The Court Administrator, in his Report dated February 25, 1999, noted that indeed respondent failed
to decide the case within the reglementary period and, thus, recommended that she be fined in the sum of
three thousand pesos (P3,000), viz.:

The respondent Judge in her comment humbly admits the delay of her decision on the said ejectment case
and offers no excuses for such delay, claiming merely that the omission was a simple oversight on her
part. Such contrite admission, however, would not warrant a total exculpation of respondent for her
nonfeasance. She should be reminded that it is incumbent upon a judge to devise [an] efficient recording
and filing system in her court to facilitate an orderly and expeditious flow of cases and their speedy
disposition. There should be a continuous and physical inventory of cases on a monthly basis so that the
trial judge is kept aware of the status of each case. [Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the
Regional Trial Court Branches 61, 134 and 147, Makati, Metro Manila, 248 SCRA 5.] Although the rules
require courts to decide cases submitted for decision generally within three (3) months from the date of
such submission, with respect to cases falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure, first level courts are
allowed only thirty (30) days following the receipt of the affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of
the period for filing the same, within which to render judgment. In one case, a respondent judge was fined
and warned against a repetition of similar acts in the future [Raboca v. Pantanosas, Jr. 245 SCRA 293].

The respondent Judges violation of the rule and her failure to give a satisfactory explanation of her failure
to decide the case within the time required by law and to report the case to the Court warrant imposition
of a fine and stern warning that a repetition of this offense will be dealt with more severely.[4]

This Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and the conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

Timely Resolution of Cases

Respondent admits that she failed to decide the aforementioned case within the thirty-
day period prescribed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. For this reason, she should be
administratively sanctioned. As held in Sanchez v. Vestil:[5]

This Court has constantly impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously, for
it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines
the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction on them.

We reiterate that judges may ask for additional time when they are burdened with heavy caseloads,
which they cannot dispose of within the reglementary period. In the present case, however, respondent
judge never asked for an extension.
Respondent avers that, due to plain oversight, she failed to record the expiration of the period for
resolving the case. As she herself admits, this is not a valid excuse. This Court reiterates that judges must
adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient
dispatch of business.[6] In Office of the Court Administrator v. Villanueva, we ruled as follows.

A judge xxx is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly without
undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court so
that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. x x x Proper and efficient
court management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.[7]

The Court finds no merit in respondents allegation that the complainant herein, being merely an
attorney-in-fact, does not have the standing to file this administrative complaint. Respondent further states
that, [i]n administrative actions where there is a complainant and a respondent, certainly it is a
[conditio] sine qua non that the one who complains or who appears to be the offended party
must personally file the same. It is well-settled that the standing or the personal interest of a complainant is
not material in an administrative case against a judge or another court personnel. Because such case
involves the public good,[8] it has been held that this Courts interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a
paramount concern that must not know bounds.[9] Thus, this Court has a duty to investigate charges against
court personnel, regardless of complainants standing or subsequent desistance. In fact, it can do so on its
own, even when there is no complainant. In any event, as earlier noted, respondent admits that she failed to
decide the ejectment case within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, we adopt the recommendation of the OCA that respondent judge be sanctioned. In
the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in RTC-Branches 29 and 59, Toledo City,[10] the Court observed
the factors considered in the determination of the proper penalty for failure to decide a case on time.

We have always considered the failure of a judge to decide a case within [the reglementary period]
as gross inefficiency and imposed either fine or suspension from service without pay for such. The fines
imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not decided within the reglementary
period and other factors, to wit: the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances -- the damage
suffered by the parties as a result of the delay, the health and age of the judge, etc.

In the present administrative matter, only one case was not decided within the reglementary
period. Furthermore, respondent judge herself admits her fault, and complainant alleged no undue damage
caused by the delay. Under the circumstances, we agree with the OCA that respondent should be fined in
the amount of P3,000.
WHEREFORE, Judge Amelia A. Fabros is found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and is hereby
ordered to PAY a fine of three thousand pesos (P3,000). She is WARNED that a repetition of the same or a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to her personal records.
SO ORDERED.
Romero (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.