European Politics and Society

ISSN: 2374-5118 (Print) 2374-5126 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpep21

The Eurasian Economic Union and Chinas silk

road: implications for the RussianChinese
relationship

Jeanne L. Wilson

To cite this article: Jeanne L. Wilson (2016): The Eurasian Economic Union and Chinas silk
road: implications for the RussianChinese relationship, European Politics and Society

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1171288

Published online: 03 May 2016.

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 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2016.1171288

The Eurasian Economic Union and Chinas silk road:

implications for the RussianChinese relationship
Jeanne L. Wilson
Department of Political Science, Wheaton College, Norton, MA, USA

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
In the last several years, both Russia and China have launched Russia; China; Eurasian
ambitious regional projects that are promoted as a means to Economic Union; one belt
strengthen linkages with neighbouring states. The Eurasian one road; Silk Road
initiatives; Central Asia
Economic Union (EEU) joins member states in an integrated single
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market providing the free movement of goods, capital, services,

and labour. Chinas one belt, one road (OBOR) is composed of
two parallel projects, one maritime and one over land. These two
ventures focus on the construction of large-scale infrastructure
endeavours, nanced by the newly established Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank. My purpose in this article is twofold. On the one
hand, I seek to assess and compare Russian and Chinese
narratives on the EEU and OBOR as well as to examine the status
of their decision, initiated in May 2015, to link the two projects.
On the other hand, I am also concerned to locate this
development in the context of Russia and Chinas extended
foreign policy goals, and its implications for the RussianChinese
relationship. I argue that these initiatives exemplify the tensions
many of them latent that exist between Russia and China, which
are largely a consequence of the growing power disparities
between the two states.

In the last several years, both Russia and China have launched ambitious regional projects
that are promoted as a means to strengthen linkages with neighbouring states. The Eur-
asian Economic Union (EEU) builds upon earlier structures in the post-Soviet space, cast as
an alternative to the European Union (EU), which joins member states in an integrated
single market providing the free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour.
Chinas one belt, one road (yidai yilu) is composed of two parallel projects, one Maritime
and one over land. These two ventures, also referred to as one belt, one road (OBOR) or the
Silk Road initiatives, focus on the construction of large-scale infrastructure endeavours,
nanced by the newly established Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
At present, RussianChinese ties are more cordial than at any time in the post-Soviet era
(or during most of the Soviet era for that matter), reaching a level that Russian president
Vladimir Putin has labelled unprecedented in history (Sonne & Marson, 2015). In the last
several years, as relations with the West have worsened, the Kremlin has increasingly pro-
moted a pivot to the East, with China a major focus of its foreign policy orientation. The

CONTACT Jeanne L. Wilson Wilson_Jeanne@WheatonCollege.Edu

2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 2 J. L. WILSON

Russian and Chinese leaderships share, as Rozman (2014) has argued, considerable overlap
in their national identities, a legacy of the MarxistLeninist experience that perceives of the
West especially the United States as a hegemonic and intrusive global actor that poses
an existential threat. Geopolitical considerations loom large in underpinning the Russian
Chinese relationship. Although Russian hopes that China would prove to be an alternative
source of economic support in the wake of the imposition of Western sanctions have not
materialized, China remains, nonetheless, Russias largest trading partner.
RussianChinese relations have moved beyond a pattern of interactions that Lo (2008)
described as an axis of convenience to a consensual appreciation of shared ideological
values in the foreign policy sphere, a movement that has been accelerated as well by
the Kremlins increased tendencies towards authoritarianism and condemnation of
Western norms and values. Nonetheless, this situation coexists with the presence of ten-
sions many of them latent in the relationship. Bluntly stated, China is a rising power
whose economic capabilities far exceed those of a weaker Russia, with the imbalance pro-
jected only to increase in the future. The challenge to the maintenance of some sort of
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equilibrium in RussianChinese interactions is the growing power disparity between the

two states. Although the Kremlin lies claim to great power status as a fundamental hall-
mark of its identity, Russia at present is engaged in essentially defensive behaviour that
seeks to preserve its perceived geopolitical interests, especially in the post-Soviet
space.1 Simultaneously, the Chinese presidency of Xi Jinping has selected to pursue an
increasingly assertive foreign policy that appears to repudiate the injunction allegedly
set forth by Deng Xiaoping over two decades ago that Chinese should bide its time
and hide its capabilities (taoguang yanghui).
The efforts of the Kremlin to establish the EEU in the post-Soviet region and the tem-
porally parallel decision of Beijing to launch the Silk Road initiatives reect the indepen-
dent foreign policy goals of each leadership, absent any prior consultation with the
other. In the Spring of 2015, however, the two sides agreed to link the two projects.
The Sino-Russian Joint Statement (Zhong E, 2015), and more specically the Sino-
Russian Joint Declaration on Cooperation between the EEU and the Silk Road Economic
Belt (Zhong E Lianbang, 2015), signed after Xi Jinpings visit to Moscow in May pledges
to make efforts to coordinate the two initiatives, setting up a joint working group to
propose concrete measures. Both the EEU and OBOR are in an embryonic stage of devel-
opment. Nonetheless, this article argues that these two projects encapsulate a number of
themes that are central in dening the means by which these two strategic partners inter-
act with each other. In this sense, an assessment of this topic provides a sort of microscopic
lens through which to identify the motivations and goals of each actor and the dynamic of
their evolving relationship.
This paper proceeds in ve sections. On the one hand, I am concerned to discuss and
compare Russian and Chinese narratives on the EEU and OBOR as well as their justication
of the decision to link the two projects. On the other hand, I also seek to locate this dis-
course in the context of Russia and Chinas extended foreign policy goals. This endeavour
relies on an assessment of Russian and Chinese source materials, supplemented by sec-
ondary sources (which are not extensive, especially in the Chinese case). First, I briey
examine the status of the EEU and the Kremlins motivations in initiating this undertaking.
Second, I turn to these same questions in an assessment of Chinas Silk Road initiative. This
is followed by a discussion of the, at present, highly rudimentary evolution of events to
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 3

coordinate the two ventures, as well as the challenges faced by this endeavour. In section
The economic implications of Chinese entrance into the EEU region, I seek to locate these
two policy initiatives and their accompanying narratives in a broader political context,
examining not only their implications for the RussianChinese relationship, but the signi-
cance of these policy goals to both states as global actors. The conclusion summarizes
these major themes.

The EEU: motivating goals

The EEU, formally established on 1 January 2015, is an institution with a long pedigree, the
latest stage in a two-decade long integration process in the post-Soviet space. In addition
to founding members Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan have
joined the union in Spring 2015 (with Tajikistan contemplating admission). Strictly speak-
ing, the EEU is not a Russian innovation. Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbaev rst
suggested the idea in 1994. Vladimir Putin, however, outlined the construct, structurally
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modelled on the EU, in a 3 October 2011 article in Izvestia (Putin, 2011). Although Putin
spoke of the common strategic national interests between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Russia, as well as the role of an economic union serving as a pole and a bridge
between Europe and Asia, the dominant orientation of his article was economic. He
specically denied that the project entailed a revival of the Soviet Union (a criticism
voiced, for example, by Hillary Clinton, then US Secretary of State) (Clover, 2012). In
Putins original vision, the EEU was linked closely with the idea of Russia as a prominent
member of a greater European space. The notion is highly evocative of Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachevs earlier invocation of a common European home, a theme that was
also promoted by then president Dmitry Medvedev in suggesting the creation of a
Euro-Atlantic security community extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok (Gorbachev,
1987; Medvedev, 2009). Putin drew upon this theme as well in a 2010 editorial in a German
newspaper, calling for the creation of a harmonious economic community stretching from
Lisbon to Vladivostok.2
Subsequently, however, the Kremlin has moved to view the EEU as a community repre-
senting the Eurasianist tradition, a process that has evolved in tandem with the deterio-
ration of relations with the West. The Eurasian notion was given impetus by the EUs
targeting of post-Soviet states as members of its European Neighbourhood Policy, a
process that was further accelerated with the Euromaidan events of 2013. Over time,
the motivational rationale for the EEU has become more associated with a civilizational
perspective that celebrates the primacy of Russian culture and values (dened in distinc-
tion to the West), in which the Russian World (Russkiy Mir) extends beyond Russias borders
into the Eurasian space (see Laurelle, 2015a). In a speech given to the 2014 Seliger Youth
Forum, for example, Putin associated the EEU with the Eurasian idea and the greater
Russian world (Akapov, 2014). This concept is popular, moreover, amongst many
members of the Russian political elite. Alexander Lukin, for example, argues that the
culture and values of many former Soviet republics really do differ from what prevails in
the West (Lukin, 2014). As Tsygankov has noted: the more the EU presented Ukrainian
membership in the organization as a civilizational choice, the more Putin and his associ-
ates viewed the Eurasian Union as a values based community (2015, p. 289; also see
Charap & Troitskiy, 2013; Popescu, 2014).
 4 J. L. WILSON

The idea of the EEU as an extension of the Russian World, however, encounters a dis-
tinct lack of enthusiasm amongst member states outside of Russia. Although in some ways
its most dedicated backer, Nazarbaev has been adamant that the EEU is to function solely
as an economic, not a political structure. The Kazakh political elite reacted negatively to
Putins 2014 remarks at the Seliger Youth Forum, which decried the rise of Kazakh nation-
alism and asserted that Kazakhs lacked the historical experience of statehood. Citing the
predominance of state sovereignty, Nazarbaev has continuously reiterated that Kazakh-
stan will not hesitate to withdraw from the EEU if it feels that its interests are threatened.3
The view is shared, if less emphatically by the Belarussian presidency of Alexander Luka-
shenko. Belarusian economic dependence on Russia was a key factor in opting to join the
EEU, especially as Russia promised the provision of loans and reduced oil and gas prices.
Similarly, the leaderships of Armenia and Krygyzstan found themselves lured into EEU
membership through a combination of the offer of subsidies, guarantees of political secur-
ity (although technically provided through the Collective Security Treaty Organization),
and the promise of the free movement of labour. Armenias movement to join the EEU
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indicated the ability of the Kremlin to persuade Yerevan to sacrice its previously con-
cluded Free Trade Association Agreement with the EU in favour of EEU accession.4 Both
Krygyzstan and Armenia, moreover, rely on labour remittances returned from Russia.
This consideration is even more important for prospective EEU member Tajikistan, in
which labour remittances were considered in 2014 to constitute over half of the Tajik
GDP (Trilling, 2014).
The EEU was inaugurated in less than optimal circumstances, the victim of the con-
tinuing impact of the 2008 global economic crisis, declining energy prices, and most
recently, Western economic sanctions. As with Armenia, Russia managed to thwart the
Ukrainian governments intention to sign a Free Trade Association Agreement with
the EU, but the Maidan events and the subsequent political upheaval have precluded
Ukrainian membership in the EEU, a signicant defeat for the Kremlin. In 2015, the
EEUs trade turnover with third countries declined by 34 per cent, while the volume
of internal trade dropped by 25 per cent (Daly, 2016). The extent to which the EEU
can succeed as a viable economic institution absent the provision of substantial
subsidy payments from Russia remains an open question. Boris Yeltsin based his argu-
ment for Russian independence on the premise that the Soviet republics constituted
an economic burden. Trenin (2011) reiterated this assessment two decades later in his
assessment of the post-Soviet space, arguing that Russia had no choice but to seek inte-
gration into the global community of states. In its rst year of existence, moreover, the
EEU was beset by considerable internal tensions, manifest in conicts both over its scope
and a disregard for adherence to administrative procedures. As previously noted, Belarus
and Kazakhstan have displayed little enthusiasm for the Kremlins increasing propensity
to view the EEU as a means to project its geopolitical inuence. Nazarbaev has been a
steadfast adherent to Eurasianism, but the Kazakh interpretation does not coincide with
the Kremlins conation of Euriasianism with the Russkiy Mir (see Laurelle, 2015b;
Mostafa, 2013). Perceptions of national interest, moreover, have often trumped consen-
sual behaviour. Contrary to the EEU decision-making rules, the Kremlin declined to
consult other members in its imposition of counter sanctions against the West, while
both Minsk and Astana have refused to follow suit, rejecting a trade war with the
West. Russia, moreover, unilaterally signed the EEU-Silk Road cooperation agreement
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 5

with China in May 2015, despite the fact that the presidents of Kazakhstan and Belarus
were also in Moscow at that time.

The Silk Road initiative: the Chinese presentation

In the Fall of 2013, Xi Jinping announced the pair of initiatives that collectively form OBOR.
Speaking at Nazarbaev University in Kazakhstan, Xi proposed that China and the states of
Central Asia cooperate to establish trade and economic linkages through a modern
version of the Silk Road to promote regional cooperation. Several months later, Xi set
forth his plan to establish the Maritime Silk Road on a trip to Indonesia. In essence, Xi
has proposed not only the expansion of trade links but, with respect to the land com-
ponent of this venture, the construction of large scale infrastructure projects to be
nanced through the AIIB. In November 2014, the Chinese government announced that
China would contribute 40 billion dollars to fund this endeavour. Although still in a
state of construction, OBOR is envisioned as the development of a series of transportation
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corridors on land and on sea. The main land component of the plan constitutes a route
across Central Asia that stretches from China to Europe. As of September 2015, over 60
states had signed Silk Road cooperation endorsements with China while 57 states, includ-
ing a number of European countries, had signed on to participation in the AIIB (Guo, 2015).
The Chinese leadership has offered several rationales for OBOR. These initiatives, and
especially the land-based component of the project, are explained as a means of contri-
buting to Chinese domestic economic development, a leitmotif that has been a promi-
nent, indeed overriding, theme of Chinese foreign policy behaviour in the reform era.
The Westward orientation of the Silk Road is considered to aid in the regional develop-
ment of Chinas less prosperous Western regions.5 More implicitly, OBOR provides an
outlet for Chinas huge foreign exchange reserves and a stimulus to economic growth
within the Chinese domestic economy. These domestic goals are nonetheless conveyed
as serving positive international ends a winwin solution to draw upon Chinas
mantra of stock phrases especially for Chinas less prosperous regional neighbours in
Central Asia.
The Chinese leadership has actively sought to downplay the obvious geopolitical impli-
cations of OBOR, although it is indisputable that this endeavour reects the far more asser-
tive foreign policy approach of Xi Jinping compared to his predecessors. Yan (2014) has
stressed the increased attention given to foreign policy at the top echelons of the
Chinese leadership: a working conference on diplomacy with neighbouring states held
in October 2013 was the highest level meeting on foreign affairs since 1949 and the
rst to be attended by all of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
For Yan, a self-identied political realist, OBOR indicates the strategic goal of the
Chinese leadership to contest US power in a drive to assume regional hegemony (also
see Yan, 2015). Although other Chinese scholars tend to be less outspoken in their
views, they share a widespread belief that these initiatives indicate a sense amongst the
Chinese leadership and its foreign policy community that China needs to be more
direct in engaging the United States in the region as well as to distance itself from its pre-
vious low prole international image (Li, 2015a).
Although Chinas economic downturn in 2015, evident in a decline in growth in GDP
and stock market volatility, casts doubt on the CCPs ability to carry through its plans
 6 J. L. WILSON

for OBOR, the project, if successfully institutionalized, will enhance Chinas inuence in the
Southeast Asian and Eurasian region, as well as more closely integrate neighbouring econ-
omies to its increasingly powerful neighbour. Despite its reluctance to employ geopolitical
rhetoric, Beijing has made use of civilizational themes to describe its goals for these initiat-
ives. This development bears some resemblance to the Kremlins development of Eura-
sianism as a civilizational construct. In the Chinese case, such discourse is evocative of
Chinas historical status as the core and predominant power in the region, to which its
neighbours paid tribute in a hierarchical relationship of superior and subordinate.
Chinese ofcials have presented OBOR as a means, in the words of Minister of Commerce
Guo (2015), to learn about Chinese civilization that has a long history and profound
culture. In his speech in Indonesia introducing the Maritime Silk Road, Xi made reference
(as he has subsequently) to the creation of a community of common destiny (minyun
gongtongti) (Arase, 2015; Xi, 2013). Speaking at the 2014 APEC summit, Xi (2014) evoked
the concept of the Asia-Pacic dream, a construct that he has specically linked to his
domestic vision of the China Dream. Although the China Dream is sufciently vague to
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be open to a variety of interpretations, Xi has promoted it as a symbol of nationalist aspira-

tions that heralds the emergence of a prosperous and self-condent China (see Callahan,
2015; Wang, 2013a, 2013b). The pairing of the China Dream with the Asia-Pacic Dream
evokes a Sinocentric image that posits China as the core cultural reference point in the
region (see Yong, 2015). Chinas neighbours, in other words, are compelled to link their
economic and presumably also their civilizational destinies to China as a dominant partner.

RussianChinese cooperation and integration of the EEU and the Silk Road
initiative
The EEU has a considerably longer trajectory in its evolution relative to OBOR. Xi Jinpings
decision to unveil the Silk Road initiative in a 2013 visit to Kazakhstan was not a matter of
happenstance. To some extent, it appears that the CCP developed the construct in
response to its mounting frustration over Russias lack of support for plans proposing
joint economic cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), including
Beijings efforts to establish a SCO development bank (Gabuev, 2015a; Lukin, 2015a, p. 4).
The two projects reect contrasting models of establishing economic linkages. The EEU
seeks to develop an economic community within a prescribed geographic space while
placing tariff obstacles to the movement of goods and services to non-participants.
Chinese discourse is neo-liberal in its embrace of free trade, but this rhetoric does not cor-
respond with the underlying reality that the Chinese leadership, far from leaving economic
transactions to the invisible hand, assumes a dominant role in orchestrating OBOR as a
state led project. The Chinese model is better considered as Arase (2015, p. 33) notes as
policy led trade facilitation. Nonetheless, non-ofcial Chinese assessments tend to view
the EEU as a somewhat obsolescent and dated undertaking that sties innovation and
is an obstacle to economic efciency (see Huang, 2012; Huang, Lu, and Yu, 2015).
Chinese analysts tend to express further doubts, moreover, that the EEU is economically
viable absent signicant Russian subsidies, considered an economic blood transfusion
that the Kremlin is ill equipped to bear (Cheng, 2015). Even the article in Peoples Daily
on the launching of the EEU considered that the Eurasian economic integration process
is far from smooth sailing (Huang & Xie, 2015).
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 7

Given Russias longstanding view of Central Asia as falling within its geographic sphere
of inuence, Chinese targeting of the region as a focus of its Silk Road initiative received a
largely negative reaction in the Kremlin. Ofcially, the Kremlin simply made no formal
acknowledgement of OBOR, although it did initially decline (as with the United States)
to join the AIIB.6 It did not take Putin long, however, to realize that Russia had no better
options than to seek some accommodation with China. For its part, the Chinese leadership
acknowledged Russian concerns and proved willing to make concessions. The original
Chinese conception of the land-based portion of OBOR bypassed Russia, which left
Russian railways fearing the loss of freight trafc. When Xi Jinping met Putin in February
2014 in Sochi, he indicated that China welcomed Russian participation in OBOR, proposing
the creation of an economic corridor with Russia and Mongolia which would connect to
the Trans-Siberian railway (Li, 2015b). Subsequently, at the March 2015 Boao Forum in
Beijing, the Russian delegation, led by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov,
announced that the EEU was ready to cooperate with OBOR. Interviews with Russian
China specialists in Moscow in the summer of 2015 were unanimous in their account of
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the process by which Russia came to endorse the Silk Road project, indicating that a
very small circle of advisers close to Putin had convinced him to support the Silk Road
initiative. In this case, First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov was apparently the deci-
sive gure in orchestrating the Kremlins change of position. Shuvalov, who coordinates
cooperation with Asia and China in the government, also managed to convince Putin to
reverse the Kremlins earlier decision not to join the AIIB.
Subsequently, at the May 2015 meeting of the Russian and Chinese presidents in
Moscow, the two sides released their annual joint statement (Zhong E, 2015) as well as
a specic joint declaration (Zhong E Lianbang, 2015) that noted their commitment to coor-
dinating the planning processes of the two initiatives, as well as implementing joint ven-
tures (in reality Chinese projects within the EEU geographic space). A joint RussiaChina
working group was formed, with its rst meeting held in August 2015. Free trade has
been posited as a long-term goal but this sensitive issue has been postponed to the
distant future. The EEUOBOR agreement has been heralded as a triumph for Russian
diplomacy. Here too discussions with Russian China specialists in Moscow in June 2015
were unanimous in their insistence that the agreement was a wholly Russian construction,
absent any Chinese input.7 There existed, moreover, a certain sense of surprise that China
agreed to sign the document. The Russians gained some concessions from the Chinese,
specically the inclusion of a Northern route, transiting through Russia, as a component
of the Silk Road. Russia is also lobbying for Beijing to include the Trans-Siberian Railway
and the northern BaikalAmur Railway as transit routes in the Silk Road initiative
(Gabuev, 2015b). Specically, the Kremlin is anticipating that China will direct some of
its 40 billion dollars allocated to the AIIB Moscows way, particularly in the funding of
the construction of a high-speed trans-European railway. Beijings motives in signing
this agreement are more opaque. Alexander Lukin has suggested that the Chinese leader-
ship wanted to support Russia as a sign of solidarity, given the two states joint opposition
to Western hegemony.8 In fact, the agreement provides a semblance of joint Russian
Chinese cooperation, but it does not fundamentally challenge Chinese plans for economic
expansion into Central Asia or the broader post-Soviet space.
 8 J. L. WILSON

The economic implications of Chinese entrance into the EEU region

In the past several decades, China has signicantly increased its economic inuence in
the post-Soviet region especially in Central Asia, but notably throughout the rest of
the former Soviet republics as well (including Russia itself). Table 1 compares Chinese
exports to the former Soviet republics (except the Baltic states) in 1997 and 2014.
Perhaps the most notable gure is the rise in Chinese exports to Russia itself, increasing
by a magnitude of over 26 times to reach over 53 billion dollars in 2014.9 This number,
however, is eclipsed by the enormity of the percentage rate of the growth in Chinese
exports in Central Asia: rising by a magnitude of 223 times in Tajikistan as the
country regained some stability after a devastating civil war, 82 times in Turkmenistan
and 74 times in Kyrgyzstan. Table 1 indicates, moreover, that China has vastly expanded
its exports to Ukraine (by a magnitude of over 50 times). Table 2 provides comparative
data on the extent of Russian and Chinese trade with the former Soviet republics (with
the exception of the Baltic states). Chinese imports from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkme-
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nistan, and Uzbekistan exceeded Russian imports in 2013, while Chinese exports
surpassed those of Russia in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Chinese total trade
volumes were greater than Russia in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan,
and Uzbekistan, and close to total trade turnover to Russia in Georgia. These gures
which do not reect the impact of low energy prices, interdependence with the
weakened Russian economy, or the implications of Chinas current economic travails
nonetheless still forecast the increasing economic penetration of China into the Eurasian
region over the longer term.
In this situation, Russia nds itself at a disadvantage in dealing with China as an
economic juggernaut. On the one hand, the Kremlin has taken a page from the
Chinese playbook, recasting its narrative to stress the positive benets of Russian
and Chinese cooperation as a winwin solution. Thus, the Valdai Discussion Club
report on Russias presence in Asia (Toward the Great Ocean-3, 2015, p. 14) insists
that from an economic point of view there is no contradiction between [the EEU pro-
jects and the Silk Road Economic Belt] on the contrary, they complement each other.
Nonetheless, this optimistic assessment obfuscates a more, at best, nuanced reality. The
EEU is a shaky edice, made all the more so by the competing motivations of the

Table 1. Chinese exports to the post-Soviet republics 1997 and 2014 (US $ thousands).
1997 2014 Magnitude increase
Armenia 36,788 122,809 3.3
Azerbaijan 146,936 645,252 4.3
Belarus 168,839 1,110,594 6.5
Georgia 79,359 908,530 11.4
Kazakhstan 946,227 12,712,076 13.4
Kyrgyzstan 70,598 5,242,697 74.2
Moldova 34,284 115,288 3.3
Russia 2,038,035 53,675,376 26.3
Tajikistan 11,044 2,468,232 223.0
Turkmenistan 11,625 954,262 82.1
Ukraine 101,032 5,106,239 50.5
Uzbekistan 61,524 2,678,262 41.5
Source: World Bank, at http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProle/en/Country/CHN (Retrieved January 6,
2016).
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 9

Table 2. Chinese and Russian imports, exports and total trade from the post-Soviet states 2013 (US
thousands).
Imports Exports Total
Russia China Russia China Russia China
Armenia 352,394 73,138 468,421 119,849 820,815 192,987
Azerbaijan 635,868 233,583 2,942,532 868,568 3,578,400 1,102,151
Belarus 13,959,261 580,512 16,870,227 872,159 30,829,488 1,452,671
China 53,173,086 35,625,419 88,798,505a
Georgia 221,147 54,455 831,083 862,092 1,052,230 916,547
Kazakhstan 5,664,930 16,060,838 17,218,175 12,545,123 22,883,105 28,605,961
Kyrgyzstan 110,128 62,350 2,029,443 5,075,346 2,139,571 5,137,696
Moldova 417,405 18,585 417,887 112,628 835,292 131,213
Russia 39,667,826 49,591,171 89,258,997*
Tajikistan 37,883 88,751 724,360 1,869,363 762,243 1,958,114
Turkmenistan 139,416 8,893,256 1,429,899 1,137,363 1,569,315 10,030,899
Ukraine 15,790,890 3,272,866 15,215,254 7,849,224 31,006,144 11,122,090
Uzbekistan 1,256,885 1,938,092 2,803,910 2,613,355 4,060,795 4,551,447
Source: World Bank, at http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProle/en/Country/CHN; http://wits.worldbank.org/
CountryProle/en/Country/RUS (Retrieved January 6, 2016).
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a
World Bank data for Russian and Chinese imports and exports are not equivalent.

central actors. The Kremlin has played the energy card as a key incentive for soliciting
members, but it lacks a diversied array of instruments at its disposal. Both Kyrgyzstan
and Armenia (and potentially Tajikistan as an incoming EEU member) not only rely on
Russia as a source of energy, remittances, and subsidies, but look to Russia as a guar-
antor of security. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, these considerations trumped the potential
adverse effects of the erection of tariff barriers in the border trade with China (see Peyr-
ouse, 2015). Nonetheless, the entrance of China as a prominent actor in the post-Soviet
region adds an additional layer of complexity to the Kremlins efforts to manage
interactions with EEU members, and most notably with Belarus and Kazakhstan,
whose long-entrenched leaders maintain a erce commitment to state sovereignty
and independent action.
Both Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko and Kazakh president Nazarbaev have
emerged as enthusiastic supports of OBOR. Kazakhstan, as with Kyrgyzstan, has been com-
pelled to impose higher tariff levels for Chinese goods as a condition of EEU membership
and undercurrents of anti-Chinese sentiment exist in Kazakhstan (as throughout Central
Asia and in Russia itself), reecting concern over potential Chinese economic domination.
Nonetheless, Nazarbaev has extended a warm welcome to economic investment and the
development of forms of economic cooperation with China. Unlike Russia, China possesses
the capital, the will, and the technological capability to engage in modernizing joint ven-
tures and infrastructure projects. Kazakhstan is the biggest recipient of Chinese FDI in the
former Soviet Union, receiving some US 22 billion dollars in investment from 1991 to 2013.
During a December 2014 visit, Chinese premier Li Keqiang announced a new set of econ-
omic deals totalling US 14 billion, followed by a second package of agreements signed in
March 2015 worth 23.6 billion dollars (Almaganbetov & Kurmanov, 2015; Lim, 2015). These
projects include a series of joint ventures in the manufacturing sector that would produce
products to be marketed in the EEU free trade zone. Kazakhstan, moreover, is a founding
member of the AIIB. In this capacity, Nazarbaev hopes to connect his Bright Road Econ-
omic Policy, which focuses on infrastructure development, to OBOR making use of
funding provided by the AIIB.
 10 J. L. WILSON

For his part, Lukashenko has viewed Sino-Belarusian economic cooperation as a com-
ponent of a multifaceted strategy of decreasing dependence on Russia. In 2015, Luka-
shenko noted that Russia accounted for 42 per cent of Belrussian total trade turnover,
compared with a previous high of 85 per cent (Tass, 2015). China is, moreover, Belarus
largest Asian trade partner. After upgrading their relationship to that of a strategic partner-
ship in 2013, Belarus and China have considerably expanded their economic linkages.
During Xis 2013 visit, China and Belarus signed an estimated 15.7 billion dollar
cooperation package in addition to Belarus receiving some 5.5 billion dollars in loans. A
key project involving Sino-Belarusian cooperation is the Great Stone Industrial Park near
Minsk which will locate Chinese manufacturers in a close proximity to EU markets as
well as providing for customs free entry in trade with EEU members (Lim, 2015). As with
his Kazakh counterpart, Lukashenko has been blunt in describing Belarusian participation
in the EEU project as a matter of costbenet calculations: Belarus position on the future
EEU will depend on what it can derive; if it is nothing, then what is the point to this alli-
ance? (Cheng, 2015).
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A series of coincident factors combined to hobble the performance of the EEU in its
inaugural year, including economic downturns throughout the post-Soviet space as well
as the divergent perception of its mission amongst the political elites of the member
states. It should also be noted, moreover, that although the current performance of the
Chinese economy far surpasses that of the EEU members, the governments projection
of a 7 per cent increase in GDP for 2015 represents the lowest rate of increase in a
quarter century.10 A general lack of coordination and absence of structural institutionali-
zation is apparent in the still nascent efforts to forge linkages between the EEU and
OBOR. To begin with, a situation of sovereign anarchy exists in the bilateral nature of inter-
actions between China and individual member states, a situation that the Chinese prefer.
The Kremlin negotiated an agreement with China on EEU-Silk Road engagement without
the input of the other members, and proceeded to establish a joint RussianChinese
working group, absent even the faade of collective participation. To date, the working
group has only met once, but the (very limited) information on this endeavour suggests
that the initiative lacks any sort of dened road map.11 The SCO has been designated
the structure to coordinate EEUOBOR initiatives in the Central Asian region, although
two of its six members (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) are not members of the EEU. Russia,
moreover, has long been wary of Chinese efforts to develop the SCO as an economic struc-
ture. At the December 2015 SCO meeting of heads of state in Beijing, the Chinese leader-
ship once again put forward its perennial suggestion that the SCO function as a free trade
zone, a proposal that has been resolutely opposed by the Kremlin. In this case, Russia
reluctantly agreed to consultations, but all indications exist that it will seek to impede
the process (see Alexandrova, 2015; Gabuev, 2015c). At this same meeting, China also indi-
cated a willingness to consider the establishment of a SCO development bank with
related parties, when the time is ripe, another one of its longstanding initiatives
opposed by Russia (Xinhuanet, 2015). However, it seems that China has increasingly lost
interest in the SCO, as its energies have turned towards developing OBOR. Russias
attempts to enlarge the membership of the organization have been informally opposed
by China (especially with respect to Indias accession to membership), but Beijing has
not been invested enough in this outcome to exercise its veto power (Gabuev, 2015d;
also see Lukin, 2015b).
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 11

The EEU and OBOR as foreign policy initiatives: geopolitical implications

Russian political elites, including Putin himself, have been adamant that the EEU does
not seek to resurrect the Soviet Union. That undertaking, in fact, lies far outside of
the capabilities of the Russian Federation. The motivation of the Kremlin, nonetheless,
is to preserve Russias inuence in the post-Soviet space. This is a defensive goal
insofar as the Kremlin seeks to prevent further losses rather than expand Russias geo-
graphical inuence beyond Tsarist and Soviet boundaries. Russias cultural and economic
stature in the region has declined notably since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this
regard, the Kremlin has been engaged in a struggle to counteract the efforts of the West
as seen in the expanding membership of NATO and the EU to draw post-Soviet
states into its political and economic orbit. The Kremlin has more or less accepted the
defection of the Baltic states but perceives of Ukraine as a constituent element of the
Eurasian space, and more specically, the Russian World. Chinas Silk Road initiative
signals yet another emergent potential danger, this time emanating from the East
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rather than the West. The challenge for the Kremlin has been to devise a policy that sus-
tains Russian primacy in the Eurasian area. Russia to some degree has been aided by the
vagaries of Western policy in this quest. The 2008 GeorgianRussian war deterred
Western states from granting Georgia and Ukraine NATO membership. The unfolding
of the events in Ukraine beginning in the Autumn of 2013 did not in the end thwart
a reconstituted Ukrainian government from signing a Free Trade Association agreement
with the EU, but Russian willingness to occupy Crimea and support separatists in the
East served as a cautionary lesson to Western actors as to the potential risks of
further engagement and military support of Kiev. All the same, the present situation
in Ukraine, which represents a torn state split between competing ideological alle-
giances, has to be interpreted as a diplomatic failure for both the West and Russia, as
well of course for the Ukrainians themselves. So far, the Kremlin has pursued a policy
of accommodation rather than confrontation with China, a state of affairs that is
aided by the ideological ties that unite the two states, rooted in a joint mistrust of
the West. The Kremlins eminently sensible approach has been to stress the division
of labour between the two partners in Central Asia in which Russia provides security
for the states in the region while China devotes its attention to economic development
proposals. It is notable, nonetheless, that this is not a theme that the Chinese themselves
have embraced in their own narrative. At the same time, the Kremlins reaction is a tacit
acknowledgement that Russia is unable economically to compete with China in Central
Asia, while Chinas inuence in the region is in all likelihood destined only to increase
over time.
The Putin regimes interest in the development of civilizational themes dates back to
the early days of his presidency but has received heightened attention with the deterio-
ration of relations with the West. The Kremlins increasing identication of the EEU as a
Eurasian project simultaneously is imbued with geopolitical implications. Russia seeks
as Putin (2011) noted in his article in Izvestia to locate the EEU as a viable pole in a multi-
polar world. This is a mission that is closely linked to the Kremlins concern perhaps more
accurately obsession that Russia continues to be perceived as a great power. In this
respect, Russias claim to great power status has served as a fundamental bulwark of
regime legitimacy, that is all the more important in a time of economic duress.
 12 J. L. WILSON

Nonetheless, the other member states are highly sensitive to overtures emanating from
the Kremlin that are reminiscent of Soviet and Tsarist dominance.
The 2015 Joint Declaration on Cooperation Between the EEU and the Silk Road Econ-
omic Belt (Zhong E Lianbang, 2015) can be analysed on several interrelated levels.
Although the EEU is a specied referent, this document in essence represents a bilateral
decision taken between the Kremlin and Beijing. At the same time, the agreement also
constitutes a component element of Russias geopolitical strategy, an evolutionary step
in Russias turn (or pivot) to the East (povorot na Vostok). It must be stressed, however,
that China plays an instrumental role in this strategy; the key referent is the West. The
Kremlins actions can be seen to update a long-standing pattern of behaviour between
Russia and China in which their interactions with each other have been subordinated to
the goal of sending a message to the third party in this strategic geopolitical triangle. In
the Soviet era, the targeted referent was the United States (which also was a player in
this game). Currently, Europe has assumed a more decisive role than previously although
the United States is by no means absent in the Kremlins calculations.
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Gabuev (2015d) stresses several interrelated facets of the decision-making process that
are relevant to the Kremlins foreign policy behaviour towards China. He notes Putins
extreme Eurocentrism as well as the near complete illiteracy of Russian elites with
respect to China (or to Asia related topics in general). This situation again is not new
but reects the historical preoccupation of Russian political elites with Europe as a dening
other (see Neumann, 1996; Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2010). Despite Putins current move-
ment to construct an Eurasian identity, it nonetheless remains that this effort continues to
dene Russia relative to Europe and to provide a means for negotiating with Europe. The
pivot to the East indicates the Kremlins hope that economic interactions with China could
counter the negative impact of Western sanctions. Russia also seeks to enlist Beijings
support in opposition to Western specically United States hegemonic behaviour.
But the overall strategy of engaging with China is reactive in nature: a response to the
deterioration in relations with the West. Trenin (2015, p. 11) has written of a new geo-
graphic community consisting of a Greater Asia stretching from Shanghai to
St. Petersburg in the making. But this development upends the Kremlins original goals
in establishing the EEU as a vector through which Russia, as the dominant member,
could demonstrate its great power status and locate Russia as a fundamental member
of Greater European community (see Lane, 2015; Sakwa, 2015).
The Kremlins rebalance to the East has been promoted with considerable fanfare. It has
been the subject of various Valdai Discussion Club reports, and papers as well as inter-
national conferences and seminars.12 A host of scholars with ties to the Kremlin have
been mobilized to extol the positive benets of RussianChinese cooperation. However,
China has become more important to Russia, but it is not the case that Russia has
become more important to China. China values its warm ties with Russia, and Putin and
Xi apparently have a personal relationship that transcends diplomatic formalities. But
the Kremlins reorientation indicates its own individual initiative undertaken absent
coordination with China, or a commensurate reaction of the part of the Chinese leader-
ship, which has nonetheless continued to emphasize its interest in a productive and
supportive relationship with Russia (see Fu, 2015). For China, however, its interactions
with the United States for better or for worse have long been its key foreign policy
relationship.
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 13

It is important to recognize, moreover, that while Russia and China share a largely con-
sensual view of the international order, Beijing has stopped short of endorsing some of the
Kremlins more provocative foreign policy behaviour in recent years. For China, preoccu-
pied with its own internal territorial disputes, a commitment to the precept of state sover-
eignty (as expressed in the traditional rather than Putins revisionist interpretation) is pre-
eminent. Although Putin (2014) thanked China for its understanding of Russian actions in
Crimea in his March 2014 address on the topic, the Chinese position on Ukraine is more
complicated, as China has sought to maintain a position of relative neutrality. China
abstained from both the 2014 Security Council draft resolution that urged states to
reject the Russian sponsored referendum in Crimea, and the resolution that would have
established an international tribunal in connection with the July 2014 downing of Malaysia
Airlines ight 17 in Donetsk Oblast in Ukraine.
The Kremlin elite assumed that strengthening its ties with China would provide a basis
for the expansion of economic linkages that could offset the economic impact of the break
with the West. This expectation or perhaps hope has not been realized. At their May
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2015 summit, Russia and China signed 32 agreements on collaborative activities, the
majority of which related to economic endeavours (Dokumenty, 2015). Six of these agree-
ments related in some fashion to the provision of credits to Russian companies and banks,
allowing them access to nancing they had lost because of Western sanctions. The most
publicized project the centrepiece to date of the EEU-Silk Road collaboration has been
the joint venture infrastructure project to construct a high-speed railway between Moscow
and Kazan. Chinas Silk Road fund has also obtained a 9.9 per cent stake in the Yamal
Liqueed Natural Gas project, with Chinese investors indicating further interest (if no
specic details) in the project.13 Nonetheless, the Chinese approach to investment is
rooted in pragmatic calculations of prot and economic advantage. Beijings primary inter-
est is in securing raw materials in Russia. Unofcially, the Chinese are often disparaging of
Russian economic behaviour (a criticism, however, that extends across the post-Soviet
space). The Russian economy is considered inefcient, technologically backward, and
highly corrupt (see Cheng, 2015; Huang et al., 2015). Friendship alone is not a sufcient
condition for the infusion of Chinese FDI. It is not clear at this point either whether the
Chinese acceptance of a Northern Route that passes through Russia will be realized as a
major transit point, rather than a supplementary offshoot. Sino-Russian negotiations
about joint venture infrastructure projects, in particular the high-speed railway between
Moscow and Kazan have become enmeshed in bureaucratic haggling. Gabuev (2015f)
notes that although China is the only possible source of founding, the Russian side
insists that that 60 per cent of the technology employed be of Russian origin (although
Russian rms lack any experience with the technological demands of this sort of
project). The danger exists that the ambitious visions signed on paper will fail to materi-
alize, a common experience in the past 20 years of the Sino-Russian relationship.
The Silk Road initiatives reect the more assertive foreign policy approach of Xi Jinping
who seems increasingly willing to jettison Deng Xiaopings legacy that maintained the
necessity for China to assume a passive if not occasionally nearly invisible international
prole. Anxiety over Chinas growing global presence is not a symptom conned to Russia.
Concern over the perceived China threat is a constantly invoked topic in American political
discourse. Despite the interconnectedness of Sino-US markets, certain US academic and
policy circles exhibit a distinct satisfaction over the current Chinese economic downturn,
 14 J. L. WILSON

which has been interpreted to indicate the end of the rise of China. (see Lynch, 2016). In
this context, it is instructive to examine the albeit interrelated regional and the global
implications of OBOR as a component of an emergent Chinese foreign policy strategy.
OBOR signals Chinas goal to establish a dominant presence in the East Asian region. Xi
Jinpings rhetoric is unambiguous in proposing to build a community of common destiny
that not only connects with his China Dream as a domestic endeavour but also reafrms
Chinas traditional status as the dominant regional power. This imagery is far more com-
pelling in describing the states located along the Maritime Silk Road than its land-based
version in Central Asia. The tributary system did not extent to Central Asia and Chinas civi-
lizational impact has historically been limited. However, this is not to say, borrowing from a
more realist vocabulary, that China is not likely to assume a dominant presence there as
the regional hegemon. OBOR presents an implicit challenge to the United States. The
Obama administrations pivot to Asia (later relabelled rebalance to Asia) can be
viewed as a conscious effort to constrain the growth of Chinas inuence in the Southeast
Asian region. It further seems likely that the level of competition between China and the
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United States will increase in the future, as China seeks to integrate its periphery neigh-
bours into economic networks with China (see Yan, 2014, 2015). This situation is far less
acute in Central Asia. To be sure, the United States launched its own New Silk Road
project in 2011, which sought to integrate Afghanistan into the region and promote stab-
ility after the departure of United States and NATO troops from Afghanistan (Kim & Indeo,
2013; Peyrouse & Raballand, 2015). This project, of at best highly limited effectiveness,
speaks to the disinclination of the United States and its NATO allies to commit to
further direct military involvement in the area. In this sense, the potential ability of the
Chinese initiative to serve as a means of economic development and political stability is
arguably benecial to NATO interests. Nonetheless, the Chinese expansion comes at the
expense of Russia, edging out its already fading regional presence.
Although the geographical orientation of OBOR looks rst to interactions with neigh-
bouring states, its broader focus is transcontinental if not global. Prospective maps lay
out maritime and land routes extending to Europe and Africa. In this sense, OBOR com-
prises one facet of the Chinese leaderships revised foreign policy strategy that seeks to
project a larger geopolitical role. This is a movement that is justied by Chinas economic
performance, and its standing as the worlds second largest economy. The Xi leadership,
however, has sought to lay claim to Chinas emergent status as a great power in the more
traditional sense of the term with commensurate political and military capabilities. In his
2013 meeting with President Obama, Xi Jinping indicated that he considered it appropri-
ate for China and the United States to interact within the framework of a new kind of great
power relationship (xinxiang daguo guanxi), a position that implies a Chinese willingness
openly to claim the mantle of great power status in the international arena. Beijings
enhanced view of its international role is underscored by its recently released White
Paper on China Military Strategy, which presages the commitment of the Chinese leader-
ship to project military power in the international arena. The White Paper not only upholds
the primacy of Chinese sovereignty over contested island chains in the South China Sea,
but implicitly criticizes the United States for its interference in the region.14 Chinas interest
in expanding its global reach has also been seen in its December 2015 announcement that
it would establish a military outpost (explicitly not described as a military base) in Djibouti
(Perlez & Buckley, 2015). Although presented as a means to resupply navy ships
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 15

participating in United Nations antipiracy missions, the location also would appear to serve
as a means of protecting Chinese maritime trade routes, including Chinas extensive trade
in natural resources with Africa, as well as new projects developed through OBOR (see
Economy & Levi, 2014). Notably, the Djibouti undertaking represents Chinas rst overseas
military outpost, a decision that contrasts with Chinas previous criticisms of the United
States for its militarized approach to Africa (Gawthhorpe, 2016).15
For many years, the United States has pressured China to assume an active role in struc-
tures of global governance, becoming in the words of then Deputy Secretary of State Zoel-
licks 2005 speech, a responsible stakeholder in the international system (Zoellick, 2005).
This is an explicit effort to socialize China into the norms and values of the Western domi-
nated international order. To a considerable extent, China has been integrated into the
structures of the international system, if not adequately socialized to the satisfaction of
the United States. The December 2015 announcement that the IMF would label the
renminbi a reserve currency, acknowledges Chinas global economic ascendance,
although it compels the government to relinquish some of its control over the currency
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system. The global dominance of the Chinese economy indicates the increasing weight
of China in the global economic institutions, as well as its ability, as seen in the establish-
ment of the AIIB, to erect alternative economic structures that pose an implicit challenge
to the Bretton Woods system that has been dominant since the Second World War. The
United States, for its part, has resolutely opposed the AIIB, although a number of its
allies, including the United Kingdom and Germany, have broken ranks and served as
founding members of the institution.16

Conclusion
In the past several years, the Kremlin has increasingly distanced itself from the predomi-
nant global norms and values that identify globalization as a positive collective good.
Although Russia joined the WTO in 2012, it resists in certain key respects expectations
of integration into the global economic order. The EEU is modelled after the EU as an econ-
omic community within a proscribed geographical space but it also represents an effort to
maintain a regional identity (Kirckovic, 2014). In fact, over time, and especially since the
Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin has increasingly come to identify the EEU as a civilizational
rather than an economic project. Although Beijings articulation of OBOR has incorporated
components of a civilizational narrative, this coexists with a neo-liberal emphasis on the
virtues of free trade. Beijing, unlike the Kremlin, is a fervent proponent of global economic
integration, and consequently skeptical of the EEU as an economic, much less a civiliza-
tional, endeavour. This difference in perspective further indicates the extent to which
Russia and China nd themselves in a different place on a global continuum, with diver-
gent views as to the optimum means of relating to the world economy.
The interactions between Russia and China regarding the EEU and the Silk Road illus-
trate the complexities of a relationship that is rooted in a largely consensual view of the
political dynamics of the international system but separated by economic distance. It is
not certain how far China is willing to go to accommodate Russia: the Chinese leadership
realized the need to readjust their plans for the land-based portion of OBOR to assuage
Russian concerns. But Beijing is not known for prioritizing friendship as a factor in its econ-
omic decision-making. The Kremlin, for its part, has conceived of its pivot to Asia as a
 16 J. L. WILSON

means of playing the China card when its primary target audience is the West. Russian pol-
itical elites, moreover, continue to bear the legacy of the Soviet era, in their attitudes
towards China, where they have been reluctant to abandon the notion that Russia
implicitly remains the big brother in the RussianChinese relationship. This depiction is
rooted in the assumption that Russias great power status trumps China growing economic
capabilities. Sergei Karaganov, Head of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, noted
in a 2015 interview that it was a mistake to underestimate the capabilities of Russia (Shes-
takov, 2015). Similarly, a recent interview with Kortunov (2015), the Director of the Russian
Council of International Affairs, moved the pendulum a bit in identifying Russia as a big
sister to China.
The Chinese, to be sure, have been meticulously polite in treating Russia as an equal
partner, a pattern that was initiated amidst the economic dislocation of the early days
of the Russian Federation. The two states, moreover, are united not only by their shared
ideological convictions, but by their shared status as outliers in the international system,
resistant to its norms and values. Nonetheless, RussianChinese interactions regarding
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the EEU and the Silk Road projects illustrate the latent tensions in their relationship,
which are rooted in growing power disparities between the two states. The most
evident tension regards Chinas likely future economic dominance of Central Asia,
although it seems likely that China will also continue its economic penetration further
into the post-Soviet space including Belarus and Ukraine. The Xi leaderships emergent
claim to Chinese great power status not only adds another member to this exclusive (if
nebulously dened) club but also implicitly challenges the narrative of the Russian
Chinese relationship.

Notes
1. I am grateful to David Lane for emphasizing this point in an earlier version of this article.
2. Putin Envisions a Russia-EU Free Trade Zone (2011, November 25). Spiegel Online. Retrieved
December 30, 2015, from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/from-lisbon-to-
vladivostok-putin-envisions-a-russia-eu-free-trade-zone-a-731109.html.
3. See Nursultan Nazarbaev, president Kazakhstana: Evraziiskii soyuz ot idei k istorii udush-
chego (Nursultan Nazarbaev, President of Kazakhstan: the Eurasian Union from an Idea to
the History of the Future), Samruk Kazyna, n.d. Retrieved October 6, 2015, from http://sk.kz/
topblog/view/44; and N. Nazarbaev: Dlia Kazakhstana evraziiskii ekonomicheskii soyuz
eto neobkhodimost (N. Nazarbaev: the EEU is a Necessity for Kazakhstan) Kazaakhstan
2050, n.d. Retrieved October 6, 2015, from http://strategy2050.kz/ru/news/5935.
4. However, in December 2015, the Armenian government announced that it was resuming talks
with the European Commission on the signing of a free trade agreement with the EU. See Lav-
nikivich (2015).
5. Meeting with Wang Yiwei, Senior Fellow, Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin
University, Beijing, 13 May 2015.
6. According to Gabuev (2015e), the Kremlins unwillingness to endorse the AIIB was largely a
consequence of bureaucratic politics and the lack of coordinating mechanisms in government
ministries.
7. In late 2014, Alexander Gubuev, then an editor at Kommersant and currently a Senior Associate
and Chair of Russia in the Asia Pacic Program at the Moscow Carnegie Center, was instructed
to put together a group of experts at the Ministry of Economic Development to discuss ways
to cooperate with China. The product of this research was eventually transmitted to Shuvalov.
See Lukin (2015b, p. 36).
 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 17

8. Interview with Alexander Lukin, Head of the International Relations Department of the Higher
School of Economics, Director of the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies, Moscow State
Institute of International Relations, Moscow, 30 June 2015.
9. Russian-Chinese trade, however, decreased substantially in 2015. Chinese exports to Russia fell
by 34.4 percent to 64.2 billion dollars, Russian exports to China decreased by 19.2 per cent to
31.4 billion dollars, and the overall trade turnover dropped by 27.8 per cent to 62.2 billion
dollars (Moscow Times, 2016).
10. Chinese State Planner Sees 2015 GDP Growth Around 7 Percent, Okays More Big Projects,
Reuters, 12 January 2016. Retrieved January 14, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-china-economy-planning-idUSKCN0UQ0BH20160112.
11. Remarks made by Maria Snegovaya, columnist for Vedomosti at the event Cooperation or
Competition?: Chinese and Russian Eurasian Projects, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington,
DC, 14 October 2015. Retrieved October 17, 2015, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
event/cooperation-or-competition-chinese-and-russian-eurasian-projects/.
12. These include Toward the Great Ocean or the New Globalization of Russia (2012), Toward the
Great Ocean-2, or Russias Breakthrough to Asia (2014), and Toward the Great Ocean-3: Creating
Central Asia (2015).
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13. Chinese Fund Invests in Russias Yamal LNG, 1 January 2016. Retrieved January 13, 2015, from
http://maritime-executive.com/article/chinese-fund-invests-in-russias-yamal-lng.
14. The document (Chinas Military Strategy, 2015) notes that some external countries are also
busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-in air and sea
surveillance and reconnaissance against China.
15. In fact, the United States only has one military base in Africa, also based in Djibouti.
16. It is notable, however, that the EU member states have joined individually rather than through
the structure of the EU.

Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author.

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