6. PEOPLE VS.

BENIPAYO

FACTS:

On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech
in the Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines held at the UP Diliman.[5] The speech was subsequently
published.

Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that filed, through its
authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint[8] for libel.

Respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can
be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.[12]

The RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it
ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in
relation to his officehe delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had
jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following
grounds:

Issue: Whether the RTC ered in ruling that it had no jurisdiction in this case,

Held: Yes.

Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. [30] Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC),[31] as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,[32] is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written
defamations, thus:

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense xxx.[33] [Underscoring and italics ours.]

This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,[36] where the Court
further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed by similar means, [37] and despite the
fact that the phrase by similar means is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.[38] In these cases, and in those that followed,
the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised
over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,[39] we explained at length that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases
[is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of
the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction..

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65[1] filed by Fernando Q. Miguel (petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and
March 27, 2006 resolutions[2] of the Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioners suspension from public office and (ii)
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.
MIGUEL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

The then Vice Mayor Lucido of Koronadal City filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the
petitioner with violation of R.A. No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering
design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City public market. The Ombudsman found
probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for
Falsification of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[8]

The Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan. On motions separately filed by two of the petitioners
co-accused,[11] the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan
gave the petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit.
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked[13] the Sandiganbayan for a thirty-day extension to submit his counter-
affidavit. Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosecutor
Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence .

Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private
individuals.[17] The petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The Sandiganbayan
denied the petitioners motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier termination of the
reinvestigation for the petitioners continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit.[18]The petitioner did not question the denial of his
motion.

The OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed his Vigorous Opposition based on the obvious
and fatal defect of the information in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. He alleges that the phrases evident bad faith and manifest
partiality actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused,[25] rendering the information fatally defective.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution [21] suspending the petitioner pendente lite.

The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order. Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et
al.,[26] he claims that [n]owhere in the records of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to show
cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended. [27] For the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-
suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the defect in the information.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the suspension order against the petitioner.

HELD:

1. The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid

The test of the informations sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity with
reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges
an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. The raison detre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.[34]

In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the standard of a person of common
understanding in appreciating the import of the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality. A reading of the
information clearly reveals that the phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality was merely a continuation of the prior
allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving
unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the
information would yield.

Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase was actually omitted in the
information[35] when, in his reaction to the OSPs comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrases
position, in relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the
phrase acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of
particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged. [36]

2. The pre-suspension order is valid

Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office.

While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine the
validity of the information[38] filed against him, taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an
[39]
elective public official even before his conviction. The accused public officials right to challenge the validity of the information
before a suspension order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing
of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of
R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code. [40]
In Luciano ruling, the Court held that upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with proper
notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended
from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion
for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof,
such show-cause order of the trial court would no longer be necessary.

(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should be given
a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of
the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information on any
of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office was
ordered. As clear as the day, however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order when the
motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted by the prosecution, as in the present case.
CASUPANAN VS. LAROYA

Facts:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Casupanan figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the MTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against
Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil
case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The
MCTC granted the motion dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 before the RTC assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The RTC rendered judgment on dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a
pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

HELD:\

Nature of the Order of Dismissal

The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative
Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with
prejudice.[6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs
dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65.Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while
Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose
from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under
the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
 Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires
the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no
forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Filing of a separate civil action

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the
Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action
to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of
the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second
civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the
MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.